

walliboi's blocks



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A/2 Pro

A/2 Overviews

A/2 Root Problem

1. [Americas Quarterly in 2019](#) writes that many months before the sanctions, capital markets had already decided it was too risky to lend money at any sustainable rates. They explicitly conclude that the lack of market access had nothing to do with the financial sanctions. We have the risk of solvency.

A/2 Humanitarian Aid

A/2 General

1. Delink. [Forero in 2019](#) gives two reasons why aid would never work:
 - a. Agencies like Red Cross don't give aid because it's perceived as taking sides in the political crisis itself.
 - b. The opposition has no clear plan as to how it can effectively distribute aid, even if it can get it across the border in the first place.

A/2 Link

1. Even if sanctions are lifted, there's no guarantee that he'll accept the aid from the U.S. because he has an incentive to oppose the west and show that he's not friends with the United States. If he's already receiving aid from eastern countries, he wouldn't want to risk losing this current sustainability by taking an extra bit from the US.
2. No impact. [Pritsker of Mint Press](#) in 2019 finds that Venezuela is receiving aid from other countries like Russia, Iran, China, and Cuba. Russia recently delivered 300 tons of aid to Caracas, and Maduro accepted it with open arms. He's just refusing U.S. aid.
3. Delink. Increasing revenue isn't going to do anything, as Maduro still controls where it goes. [Rendon of CSIS](#) explains in 2019 that Maduro's regime has neglected the many needy of Venezuela and has directly profited from these revenues, funding illicit projects and buying the loyalty of military officials.
4. Delink. Sanctions aren't the problem as [Pozzebon](#) of CNN in 2019 reports that although there's plenty of aid at the door, Maduro sees the aid as a trap and rejects it. NBC News gives the warrant: Maduro doesn't want to risk destabilizing his country's socialism.

A/2 Negotiations

A/2 General

1. They are too entrenched and negotiations won't make the administration budge. [Thompson of Stratfor in 2019](#) finds that Maduro and his allies are so deeply involved in every aspect of the state that there is no scenario in which a negotiated settlement could come soon.
2. Nonunique. [Emmott](#) of US News in 2019 reports that the EU has placed sanctions to expedite negotiations and transition out of talks to action
 - a. They have to prove stopping US sanctions stop these sanctions or that
 - b. These sanctions are functionally different from US sanctions
3. Turn. Pressure is key. [Rodriguez of Americas Quarterly](#) in 2019 notes that international pressure today is much more significant than in previous years, and that the only way to ensure the success of negotiations is to increase the pressure on Maduro because he won't back down voluntarily.

A/2 Scapegoat

1. Maduro always has an incentive to blame the west given that he's friends with Russia and China. If not sanctions, he'll just use another imperialist policy, like for example US intervention online or US troops in order to justify his policies.
2. Nonunique. Alternative scapegoats exist. [Parra of the New York Times](#) finds that Maduro uses Colombian immigrants in order to scapegoat the country's issues. This means he'll always find another reason to justify regardless.
3. If we win the link into Maduro improving the economy, then we also win the link into scapegoating. This is because it means that scapegoating is a positive thing because it allows Maduro to justify drastic economic reform, which means our argument functions as a prerequisite.

A/2 Resource Hoarding

1. He didn't give resources prior to sanctions either. They don't solve.
2. Liberalization proves this argument wrong. [The Economist](#) explains that because of sanctions, Maduro is transitioning away from socialism and increasing their privatization. This is literally antithetical to what they claim is supposed to be happening right now.
3. Delink. [Reuters](#) writes just last week that Venezuelan state company PDVSA is letting joint venture partners take over and produce through privatization.

A/2 With US

1. Maduro came out and said that he wanted to stop negotiations on August 8th, but [the Guardian](#) explains that two weeks after that, Maduro confirmed that there were still secret talks between top Venezuelan officials and the US.
2. Negotiations will never work. [The Financial Times](#) explains this year that all talks with Maduro have failed not because of our sanctions, but because Cuba, Russia, and China are too suspicious of the west to support Maduro in negotiations. They conclude that as long as these countries have nothing to gain from Maduro leaving power, they will continue upholding his regime.
3. Turn. [Arrijoja](#) of Bloomberg just a few weeks ago reports that Maduro has been negotiating a payback deal with American financiers who hold defaulted bonds. "Maduro's willingness to entertain such a plan underscores how painful the U.S. sanctions have been and how desperate he is to have them eased."

A/2 With Guaido

1. [Rodriguez](#) of Americas Quarterly in 2019 explains why negotiations will never exist independent of US sanctions
 1. The majority of Guaido's party has a hard line stance towards Maduro, advocating for forceful takeover rather than negotiation. It doesn't matter what the circumstances are: as long as there is an internal conflict within the Guaido administration, resolutions can't be reached
 2. Guaido does not have public support due to the fact that negotiations have been useless in the past. This leaves Maduro in a complacent stance where he can just bide his time, as there is no internal Venezuelan pressure to incentivize Venezuelan negotiation.
2. Delink. The negotiations aren't good. [The Washington Post in 2019](#) explains that the Maduro regime is using negotiations with the opposition to buy time, not to seek a peaceful solution, and that because Maduro has the leverage right now, the only way to change that is through further sanctions.

A/2 Economy

A/2 General

1. Not causal. [Rendon of CSIS](#) explains this year that Venezuela was experiencing dire economic trajectories way before we placed sanctions. Thus, he concludes that quote "the humanitarian damage suffered before indicates that the blame... cannot be placed on sanctions." In fact, [Purcell of Times](#) finds that despite our sanctions, their economic woes were completely home-grown and caused by the mismanagement of shares. They don't solve.

2. No clarity. [Bahar of Brookings](#) explains that the methodology of studies on our 2017 sanctions against Venezuela were extremely flawed, and that the economic trends were inevitable. The same applies to the status quo, as there are too many confounding variables for us to isolate the sanction's impacts.
3. [Rapoza of Forbes](#) finds in May of this year that the US policies against Venezuela are not making their situation any worse and have absolutely no effect on their economy--it's the corrupt failed state under Maduro that's causing the issues.

A/2 Debt Default

1. [Barnstein](#) last October reports that Venezuela already defaulted on their last bond. Removing sanctions won't take back the default.
2. [Bloomberg](#) a few weeks ago writes that creditors hold at least \$60 billion in defaulted bonds. There's absolutely no brightline to their argument as to when they or how much more they can "default."

A/2 Secondary Sanctions

1. [Wall Street Journal](#) in Jan 2020 makes it very explicit that Venezuelan allies would not comply with secondary sanctions, because historical precedence shows that our embargoes on Iran and Cuba didn't deter China and Russia from doing business with those countries.

A/2 Oil Profits

1. [Rapoza of Forbes](#) writes in October that Russia is already planning to buy most if not all of Venezuela's oil in the near future. Russia's state-owned oil giant Rosneft is planning to take control of PdVSA, the bankrupt Venezuelan company that produces the majority of the country's oil.
2. No benefit from affirming. Even if you do believe that oil profits return after lifting sanctions, affirming means that there is less pressure on Maduro, which decreases the likelihood that he'll leave office. However, [the US Embassy in Cuba](#) finds that Maduro illegally launders money from the Venezuelan oil companies, having already taken more than 2 billion. The money won't be injected back into the economy.
3. Delink. [Slav of Oil Price in 2019](#) explains that similar to Iran, Venezuela is easily able to get around oil sanctions by secretly exporting oil to countries like China, Russia, and India in exchange for cash which the US cannot track--sanctions aren't the reason the oil industry is failing, as they're already finding loopholes around it in the status quo.
 - a. In fact, according to [Reuters](#) just a few weeks ago, Venezuela's crude oil output jumped by 20% to the highest level since sanctions were put in place as major customers like India and Spain stepped up shipments.
4. Turn. The short-term decline of the oil industry spurs long-term diversification. [Wight](#) in 2019 explains that Venezuela's vast oil reserves disincentivize the drive for diversification, with the revenue always ending up in the hands of an oligarch. When

sanctions force the transition to a new government, the oil revenues can actually be used for the benefit of the lower class and diversification of industries.

- a. Indeed, the ICS in 2019 finds that because of sanctions on oil, Maduro launched the development of diversifying exports and investments and strengthening the tourism industry

A/2 Gold

1. Delink. Illegal gold cannot be sanctioned. [The Senate](#) just two weeks ago reports that Venezuela holds vast deposits of gold, and 91% is illegally mined and thus unsanctionable. They conclude Maduro can use this revenue to completely circumvent U.S sanctions.
2. Delink: Venezuela sells its gold elsewhere. Black market transactions are undocumented and thus impossible to stop with sanctions. Problematically, [El Espectador in 2019](#) finds that 80% of Venezuela's gold is exported illegally. This is why [the Senate](#) just two weeks ago reports that revenue from illicit mining continues to prop up Maduro's regime today. Additionally, some countries continue to buy from the regime as [Frost of Quartz](#) explains that in 2018, Venezuela exported over 900 million dollars of gold to Turkey alone.
 1. This defense outweighs their offense on probability, as we have seen gold sanctions for almost 3 years but no real impact because of Venezuela's illegal market.

A/2 Dollarization

1. Nonunique. People are already purchasing with dollars in the status quo. [Long in 2019](#) finds two weeks ago that because private citizens are not sanctioned, they are able to acquire dollars in various means, concluding that more than half of all Venezuelan purchases are made in the dollar, not the bolivar.
2. Nonunique [Kohlmann in 2019](#) finds that 54% of all transactions in goods and services in Venezuela were settled in foreign currencies, most of which is the US dollar. Dollarization is literally already happening right now, there's no need to lift sanctions.
3. [World News](#) writes just two months ago that Maduro has literally embraced the dollar and said, quote, "thank God it exists."
4. Turn. [Wang of Coha in 2016](#) finds that trade deficits can only be met with a depreciating currency, but currently, the value of the US dollar has risen 25% since 2014. If Venezuela were to dollarize, their exports would be much less competitive in the international market. Ecuador, a country which is also dollarizing and has a very similar economy to Venezuela, saw their export value drop by about 5.9% in the span of a year.
 1. (If they say countries can devalue their currency) Wang continues that in petrostates, the dominance of the oil sector makes it extremely hard to rely upon monetary policies to boost exports for two reasons.
 1. First, a currency depreciation does not help oil export because oil is priced and traded in a world price denominated in U.S. dollars. A country's capacity to produce oil is also limited; Ecuador cannot

- immediately increase oil production even if there is a sudden increase in demand.
2. Second, the revenue brought in by oil exports is in U.S. dollars. If Venezuela de-dollarizes, a large and constant inflow of U.S. dollars would lead the national currency to appreciate because there will be a constant demand for changing the petrodollars to the national currency
 5. Disad. Dollarization in Venezuela leads to more crime. [VIU of Insight Crime in 2019](#) finds that the adaption of US currency in Venezuela has kicked the door wide open for the creation of shell corporations acting as fronts for money laundering activities, making the market very attractive for illicit operations. It concludes that more than \$6 billion in US currency is circulating within Venezuela, largely linked to three criminal economies: gold smuggling, oil smuggling and drug trafficking. Problematically, [Redman](#) concludes that as a result of drug trafficking, 70,000 people have been killed, with larger estimates putting the number 120,000. More than 20,000 people have disappeared and a quarter of a million have been displaced.

A/2 FDI

1. Nonunique. Investors have pulled out investments long before sanctions were put into place. For example, [Friesen](#) of Forbes reports in 2018 that FDI from the US has been going down by 600 billion since 2011.
2. Delink. [Santander](#) in 2019 reports that the country experienced a sharp increase in FDI inflows in 2018. The direction of investment is up during times of sanctions, there's no reason why it's going to go down.

A/2 Debt Restructuring

1. Delink. Debt restructuring negotiations will never happen. [Ellsworth of Reuters in 2017](#) reports that investors say bondholders have no interest in renegotiating payment timelines without a plan to reform the country's dysfunctional socialist model. Maduro has repeatedly balked at carrying out such reforms. [Armas in 2019](#) furthers that creditors are making zero pushes to renegotiate debt because of Maduro's illegitimate regime. This also functions as a turn because regime changes happen in the neg meaning that for any debt restructuring to happen, you must keep sanctions in place.
2. [Levine in 2019](#) writes that there is no probability of debt restructuring happening until the interim government i.e. Guaido takes control of Venezuela. The west and the IMF would never help restructure their economy because it would make Maduro seem like he's in more control.
3. [Verrastro in 2018](#) explains that because of deteriorating production and shrinking hard currency, the default will come sooner or later. At best, they are only pushing back the maturity payments and delaying the issue. The only way you can actually pay back the debt is by putting more revenue into the economy by liberalizing.

A/2 Trade

1. Delink. [Dobson](#) of VA in 2018 reports that in order to overcome sanctions, Venezuela joined China's multi-billion dollar Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI. Maduro also announced 28 new agreements between China and Venezuela in energy, mining, gold, iron, technology, education, health, and culture. Critically, [Ruta](#) of the World Bank in 2019 explains that through increasing connectivity and investment between countries, joining the BRI is set to increase trade by almost 10%. Venezuela is likely to experience this massive increase in trade as well as [Lievano](#) of DC last June writes that trade has increased between China and Latin American countries 20-fold since joining the BRI.
2. Delink. According to [Reuters](#) just a few weeks ago, Venezuela's crude oil output jumped by 20% to the highest level since sanctions were put in place as major customers like India and Spain stepped up shipments.
3. Delink. [Slav of Oil Price in 2019](#) explains that similar to Iran, Venezuela is easily able to get around oil sanctions by secretly exporting oil to countries like China, Russia, and India in exchange for cash which the US cannot track. They're already finding loopholes around it in the status quo.

A/2 Cryptocurrency

1. Nonunique. The Petro was dying already. [Chepkova in 2019](#) finds that "The Venezuelan state-issued cryptocurrency is based on lies and distortions incompatible with the fundamental characteristics of digital money", concluding that "Instead of being decentralized and secure asset free from manipulations and abuse, it is controlled by a corrupt government that changes its price at will." Because of this, it concludes that no one actually wants the Petro.
 - a. Even if the US had not sanctioned, the corruption in the Venezuelan government and the practice in the Petro would have doomed the currency to an early grave.
2. Nonunique. Private Markets would have rejected the Petro even without sanctions. [Kissi of CNBC](#) finds that many investors have little faith that the fledgling Petro will help resolve the Bolivar's ongoing crisis, concluding that "it is unlikely that this made-up currency will be accepted by any company or bank in lieu of cash."
3. Delink. [Sharma](#) of Investopedia in 2018 writes that Venezuelan cryptocurrency is not being used in mainstream society. What's more, there's reason to believe that the blockchain underlying the Petro is still under development.
4. Delink. [Liao in 2018](#) explains that the Venezuelan cryptocurrency is supposed to be backed up by oil. However, the underground oil reserves meant to be tapped to back up this currency are still untouched, and no plans have been made to extract them.

A/2 Exchange Rate Reform

1. Nonunique. [CNBC](#) finds in 2018 that Maduro already implemented a single exchange rate program that devalues the currency by 96 percent in a move that economists said would fan hyperinflation in the chaotic country.

A/2 IMF Solvency

1. Pakistan got nuked
2. Delink. [Weisbrot of the Guardian](#) explains that the US is one of the head figures on the IMF, and that they have enough votes to veto any decisions by themselves. If you remove sanctions, they can still find other ways to punish them.
3. Delink. [Campos of Reuters](#) writes that it's the leadership uncertainty standing in the way of IMF aid, not sanctions.
4. Turn. An IMF deal would actually be disastrous for Venezuela as [Shah of Global Issues in 2013](#) explains that IMF policies require poor countries to reduce spending on health, education and development by prioritizing debt repayment policies. As a result, these policies cut essential programs that directly benefit the poor, which is why in an empirical analysis, [Buckley](#) finds that 5 million people across the globe died as a result of IMF policies.
5. Turn. [Tagg in 2018](#) explains that IMF loans often demand a nation to reduce its spending in order to ensure that the nation can actually repay the loan. Tagg continues that Zimbabwe saw its health spending fall by a third while 40 million people in Indonesia fell into poverty after receiving bailouts. Loans from the IMF reduce a nation's capacity to protect its people. Problematically, [Haile 17](#) finds that a 1 percent decrease in social spending increases poverty by 5.7%. Ultimately, the IMF causes cyclical poverty and weakens the government.

A/2 Petrocaribe

A/2 General

1. X

A/2 Impacts

A/2 Food

1. It would have happened anyway. [Rendon of the CSIS](#) in 2019 explains that in the year before sanctions were imposed, food imports fell 71 percent. Sanctions weren't the cause.

2. Delink. [The New Yorker](#) reports that Canada, Brazil and Columbia are filling in the gap left by the US placing sanctions. Even if Venezuela loses food due to the US, other entities are filling in.
3. Turn. [Al Jazeera in 2019](#) finds that because of sanctions, Venezuela right now is making local production of food a priority. This means the problem is being solved back for in the status quo specifically because of sanctions. The price of oil fluctuates so much that government revenues can change on a dime, but there is sustainable production that allows for diversification and more economic stability.
4. Turn. The [Economist](#) just a few weeks ago finds that the oil sanctions were enough of a shock to force the government to retreat from socialism, and that Maduro has stopped trying to dictate the exchange rate and control prices. Private firms can now import whatever they choose and set their own prices. "Supermarkets in Caracas, nearly empty for much of 2017 and 2018, are again stocked with food. It is not just the rich who can afford it."

A/2 Medicine

1. It would have happened anyway. [Rendon of the CSIS in 2019](#) explains that before sanctions, as a result of a declining economy, medicine imports dropped 68%.
2. The US sanctions literally have no effect on medicine. [The BBC in 2019](#) finds that sanctions have exemptions for medicine imports. That's why [Reuters](#) in 19' writes that US already sent over medicine--we already clutching.

A/2 Water Access

1. There's literally no evidence saying that this is because of sanctions and no reverse causal evidence saying that this gets fixed by lifting sanctions. Why does lifting sanctions fix broken water purification plants, broken dams, broken distribution, and inflation which are all barriers to getting water.
2. Nonunique. The [UN](#) reports in July that through collaboration with Venezuela's government, 2.8 million are set to gain access to drinking water.
1. Delink. [Monsen of ShareAmerica in 2019](#) explains that the reason why there is a water crisis is the political crisis and Maduro's mismanagement of power grids. Sanctions aren't the cause.
2. Liberalization controls the internal link. [Miller 19' of Americas Quarterly](#) explains that the lack of access reflects a lack of investment and management of the water in the country. Removing regulation on water, encouraging investment into the country is the way to create long term solvency into the problem. That's why [Trujillo 19' of IDEAS](#) in an analysis of Venezuelan water concludes that decentralizing the water companies led to a greater level of efficiency than centralized water- means we solved.

A/2 Blackouts

1. They do not prove the probability of Maduro having the incentive to divert all of his funds into his infrastructure programs. In fact, the [PRI](#) reports that Maduro is very much focused on consolidating his power among his own peers which is why his first term delivered practically nothing in terms of public policy.
2. [Hetland](#) in 2019 explains that even though hacking the grid was a possibility, all the evidence points to the grid falling apart due to aging infrastructure and a lack of maintenance.
3. [Castro](#) of Doctors for Health finds that the blackout likely aggravated existing medical conditions, but does not directly attribute any deaths to the outages. There's no impact.
4. Liberalization controls the internal link

A/2 Other

A/2 Brain Drain

1. [Hinteregger of the Borgen Project](#) explains that the brain drain started years ago in 2002 when the oil industry first started its massive layoffs. Indeed, since 1999, Venezuela was steadily losing talent as a result of low wages and high crime rates. Sanctions weren't the cause. By their logic, Venezuela should've been on rise to become high tech before sanctions were placed.
2. The people that are leaving now are logically those most affected by the crisis. In this case, it's going to be the poorest and most disadvantaged civilians without a higher degree of education to begin with--not the educated workers who are needed to rebuild a state.

A/2 Hezbollah Bolstered

1. Their evidence says this happens because they're isolated economically. Liberalization solves back for this by decreasing regulations and increasing access to more markets.
2. Nonunique. [Kajjo of VOA News](#) explains that there are other factors as to why Venezuela and Hezbollah are partnering, like for example arms deals. Lifting sanctions won't solve.
3. Nonunique. [Clark of Foreign Policy](#) in 2019 finds that Hezbollah is here to stay in Venezuela regardless of whether or not there are sanctions.

A/2 Trump Florida War

1. No reason as to why war is the next best alternative for Trump to use as a means of winning over voters in Florida. For example, [Kumar of Politico](#) highlights the Temporary Protective Status program to allow Venezuelans to live and work legally in the US to

protect against war or disasters. Indeed, Kumar concludes that this would be a good political move for Trump to win over Hispanics in Florida.

A/2 Violates International Law

1. [Posner](#) of Foreign Policy explains that empirically, international law has not impact on the actual practices of states. No one really cares about international law--there's no impact to breaching it.
2. We've already left the Paris Accords and UNHRC and intervened in wars that have killed millions--there's no way our soft power can decrease more.
3. We don't even violate. The sanctions don't explicitly block aid. That's just the unintended consequence.

A/2 Migration Hurts Neighbors

1. Nonunique. [Bustos](#) of Brookings concludes that the bulk of the collapse that followed after 2017 wasn't attributed to sanctions, but to an already rapidly deteriorating economy. Venezuela's economy was failing anyway. Make them quantify how many immigrants sanctions created.
2. Delink. [Janetsky of Al Jazeera](#) in 2019 reports that neighboring Latin American countries are severely limiting migration through harsh immigration policies. Peru now requires Venezuelan migrants to present a valid passport and other documentation, as well as Chile and Ecuador. As a result, [Burgos](#) of Foreign Policy in 2019 quantifies that Venezuelan migration to Peru has fallen 90 percent as a result.
3. Turn. [Burgos](#) continues that migration brings the potential for Latin American economies to liberalize in order to accommodate new arrivals. Burgos cites Israel and Jordan as lowering trade barriers and regulations in response to massive refugee surges, causing growth to increase from 1.6 percent to 14.4 percent in Jordan. Crucially, Latin America has extremely unfree labor markets and inadequate labor market flexibility.
 1. The associated investment was able to generate long term, sustained growth--a similar pattern in Latin America would justify long term gains over short term pressures
4. Turn. [Fernandez](#) of the IMF in 2019 quantifies that Venezuelan migrants would increase GDP growth of neighboring countries by 0.1 to 0.3 percentage points from 2017 to 2030, as they are uniquely able to integrate into neighboring economies faster, are highly educated and skilled, and would bring in more investments.
 1. Prefer long term benefits--labor force pressures exist in the short term when migrants enter the country, but in the long term, they generate more sustained growth.

A/2 Water Privatization

1. The [UN](#) in July reports that through collaboration with Venezuela's government, 2.8 million are set to gain access to drinking water. By affirming, you destroy this deal and future agreements.
2. [Thill](#) of the Real Agenda reports that these corporations don't care about infrastructure for the future, but only invest to pare down operations and skim profits. Worse yet, they lower the quality of water provided, cut the utility workforce, and raise prices to shut out the poor.
3. [Deen](#) of Global Policy in 2011 quantifies that in other Latin American like Argentina, privatization increased the price of water by 88%. [Siregar](#) of COB in 2012 concludes that water privatization allows for the unlimited exploitation and degradation of water resources and an even graver worsening of poverty and injustice at the expense of the poor.

A/2 Colombian Invasion

1. This argument stupid.

A/2 Con

A/2 War

A/2 Alternative

1. No probability. [Chiacu of Reuters](#) explains that foreign policy action must go through Congress first, and that the democrats have sworn to oppose military intervention in Venezuela, despite Trump's claims. He's just posturing.
2. Resorting to conventional war assumes that Trump becomes desperate with the lack of influence in the region. However, we have sanctions on over [100 Venezuelan entities](#) in various sectors. Taking out the economic sanctions won't suddenly change our paradigm.
3. Delink. [Toosi of Politico in 2019](#) explains that despite Trump's claims, there's always a political disincentive for using conventional war, as it would harm Trump's election bid if he led a coup in Venezuela. The reason is because it would anger his isolationist base as well as many Latin American citizens that resent western involvement in Latin America.
4. [The Military Times](#) finds that Elliott Abrams, a US embassy official, admitted that Trump was only using the possibility of military intervention as a way to pressure Maduro to act, when in reality Trump would never actually use sheer force unless Venezuela did something crazy like attack the embassy.

5. [Reuters](#) in 2019 finds that Brazilian Vice President Hamilton Mourão said a few weeks ago that under no circumstances would his country allow the United States to intervene militarily in Venezuela from Brazilian territory during a meeting of the Lima Group, a bloc of nations from Argentina to Canada dedicated to peaceful resolution of the Venezuelan crisis.
6. Turn. [Holland of Reuters](#) explains in 2019 that Trump is only using the threat of conventional war as a means of getting Maduro to step down. However, [Rodriguez of Foreign Policy](#) finds that sanctions are actually making it increasingly difficult for the anti-Maduro party because we're continuously driving the economy to the ground. Maduro won't step down at this rate; it's clearly not working in the status quo.

A/2 Impact

1. [Foreign Affairs](#) in 2019 explains the plausible direction of intervention is precision airstrike. These airstrikes destroy the Maduro regime's military, security, and economic infrastructure, but do not target citizens. Comparatively these are a quick, cheap, safe, and effective alternative to a broader military intervention that don't hurt the citizens.

A/2 Colombian Invasion

1. Delink. Columbia will never go to war. The reasoning comes from [France24](#) '18 who writes Colombia's six-decade-long conflict has left more than 260,000 people dead, mostly civilians. They further the civil strife has also displaced 6.9 million civilians. This internal war Colombia is facing is detrimental enough to their people, they wouldn't want to engage in another terrorizing war.
2. Delink. Columbia's economy is fragile. [Reuters](#) '19 writes because of the political problems Columbia faces, its economic recovery is really weak with high inflation rates and low GDP. This is crucial because, with a weak economy, Colombia wouldn't risk going into a full out war with Venezuela.
3. Delink. Even if a war would happen, it would be relatively marginal. The reason comes from [Hanson](#) '08 of the CFR who writes most militia warfare happens with Colombia's paramilitary. These paramilitaries are usually small so the war wouldn't be country vs country but just small guerilla warfare groups

A/2 Hegemony

A/2 Stop China

1. Delink. [The Washington Post](#) explains that China is approaching Venezuela in a very non-interventionist way, and that they're only in the region to protect their economic

interests. In fact, China became super suspicious of Maduro's ability to properly manage money, which is why China refuses to give any new financial deals to Maduro, and their influence is waning in the region.

2. Delink. [Genden of RCW](#) explains that fear of Chinese intervention in Venezuela is completely overblown by US fear mongering; in reality, China's reputation is deeply damaged by supporting Maduro's regime, which is why China is cutting ties with Venezuela to maintain good oil relations because economic incentives underpin China's deals with Maduro.
3. Advantage. [The Washington Post](#) continues that Chinese interests are in Venezuela's oil sector, which is why Chinese loans to Venezuela have been used for the building of new infrastructure and revival of Venezuela's oil sector. Beijing filling the gap would, if anything, be beneficial to Venezuela's economy.

A/2 Stop Russia

1. Delink. [Genden of RCW](#) explains that fear of Russian intervention in Venezuela is completely overblown by US fear mongering; in reality, Putin is having to cut interventionist spending to make up for Russia's sputtering economy which is why he concludes that Russia is done expanding influence in Venezuela because economic incentives underpin Russia's deals with Maduro.
2. Russia is still meddling in the region and cooperating with Venezuela even with sanctions. For example, [DW World](#) reports that Russia sent nuclear-capable bombers to Maduro in 2018, making a display of their diplomatic friendship. In fact, relations have increased. [Berg of Foreign Policy in 2019](#) explains that Putin is playing a leading role in keeping Maduro afloat under the US's pressure.
3. Turn. Sanctions on Venezuela would only embolden Russia to power-project in other regions. [Bandow of the CATO Institute](#) this year explains that increasing economic pressure on Putin makes him much less likely to concede failure in other places such as the Ukraine ordeal.

A/2 Drugs

A/2 Trafficking

1. They need to prove that
 - a. Drug trafficking is decreasing or suppressed in the status quo
 - b. The decrease is specifically caused by our sanctions without confounding factors
2. Delink. [Imbert of CNBC](#) notes that the sanctions on narcotic shipments won't functionally change the trafficking on the ground, because it's only targeted at higher-up officials, not the majority of movers.
3. Turn. [The Washington Post](#) this year finds that to survive the economic effects of sanctions, Maduro's administration is relying on criminal activity and illicit revenue from

drug trafficking. [Torres](#) in 2019 furthers that narco trafficking has increased over 50 percent through Venezuela, which is helping Maduro make up for lost revenue from sanctions. [Walsh](#) in 2019 gives the warrant: the reason why this is possible is because the Colombia-Venezuela border is extremely poorly covered by US assistance in the region.

A/2 Reforms

A/2 General

1. Sanctions have been on Venezuela for years now, yet their arguments haven't occurred yet. Make them tell you why it would suddenly work now.
2. Delink. [The Washington Post in 2019](#) explains that the only way that Maduro retains power is through military backing. However, flush with illicit revenue, the army lacks a discernible central command and competes over lucrative economic activities. They conclude that the army is united only by their willingness to put the Maduro regime's survival ahead of any political reforms. Even if Maduro wanted to reform, the army would not let him. That's why no progress has been made yet.
3. Delink. The [Washington Post](#) in 2019 finds that Maduro's regime is part of a regional network called the Bolivarian Joint Criminal Enterprise, a "consortium of criminalized states and nonstate actors... The network's ability to adapt and diversify their criminal portfolio means that money continues to flow into the regime's coffers."
 - a. Drugs: [Torres](#) in 2019 finds that narco trafficking has increased over 50 percent through Venezuela, which is helping Maduro make up for lost revenue from sanctions. In fact, [Walsh](#) in 2019: the profits of cocaine trafficked to Colombia alone are worth \$39 billion.
 - b. Gold: the [Washington Post](#) in 2019 writes that the Maduro regime sold 73 tons of gold last year and its reserves grew by 11 tons — the likely result of illegal gold mining, including by Colombian rebel groups allied with the regime. Those sales could have raised close to \$3 billion, more than enough to fund military and paramilitary groups loyal to Maduro.
4. Mitigate. [The Economist](#) in 2018 finds that Venezuela is an inherently corrupt country so even when Maduro pushes for reform, it won't ever actually take into account the good of its people. He'll find whatever loopholes to keep his regime intact.
5. Turn. [Smith of USA Today](#) finds the biggest reforms that Maduro passed sounded good only on the surface level. Behind the scenes, his attempts at reform only increased hyperinflation and ignored the deeper problems in Venezuela's economy like its oil sector.

A/2 Negotiations

1. Sanctions have led to Maduro halt negotiations. [Goodman of APNews](#) writes that after Trump imposed sanctions in August that froze Venezuelan assets, Maduro stepped out of negotiations with Guaidó and the US that may have led to a crisis resolution. The only risk of solvency lies on the aff.

A/2 Key for Democracy

1. Turn. [The Global Institute of Global and Area Studies](#) finds in a study of 120 global sanctions on authoritarian regimes finds that sanctions actually strengthen nondemocratic rule because regimes just incorporate their existence into its legitimation strategy.
2. Turn. [Michael Penfold](#) of the IESA finds that Maduro's administration just shifts the blame for the economic crisis and violence onto the US to reduce pressure on his own administration. He concludes that sanctions are only playing into the hands of their government officials who now have more excuses to jail and censor the news against "coup-mongering" opposition leaders.
3. Turn. [Cawthorne of Reuters](#) finds that the sanctions are leading to nationalist sentiment that rallies strained support among the traditional power-base of Venezuela's poor and unites Socialist Party factions, allowing Maduro to take advantage of the situation with the United States.

A/2 Guaido Takeover

1. [Wyss](#) of the Miami Herald just last month reports that Guaido's approval ratings have been tanking, and are now the same as Maduro's, and if the trend continues, he'll stoop lower. There's no guarantee that Guaido would be the one to take over if Maduro steps down.
2. Delink. [Moreno of the Conversation in 2019](#) writes that Sanctions will not end the Maduro regime for 4 reasons:
 - a. The Venezuelan elite has already transferred their assets into foreign markets like Europe, so sanctions can't hurt the ruling class.
 - b. The embargo still allows cash flows like private imports and exports and remittances from Venezuelans living abroad to flow freely, enabling the economy to stay afloat in the future.
 - c. Russia and China will still continue to support Venezuela on the international stage, give them bailout loans, and purchase their goods such as oil and gold.
 - d. Maduro will be able to continue using US sanctions as a scapegoat for Venezuela's problems, increasing anti-American sentiment and support for Maduro.

3. Delink. According to the [University of Pittsburgh](#) in 2018, sanctions have given Maduro no incentive to exit power. Instead, he's merely forged new economic relations with China and Russia to compensate.
4. Turn. Sanctions are hurting Guaido's structural takeover. [Hanson of the NACLA](#) finds that polarizing unilateral policies like sanctions increase tensions, justifying authoritarian regimes by signalling that there is no time for debate, discussion, and popular participation.
5. Turn. [Stuenkel](#) of Americas Quarterly in 2019 explains that sanctions caused many of the people who dislike the government to leave the country, so the opposition finds it increasingly difficult to mobilize protests without members.
6. Turn. [Rodriguez](#) from Foreign Policy in 2018 explains that sanctions decrease support for the opposition because instead of undermining Maduro, sanctions are convincing voters that the opposition prioritizes driving Maduro from power over the welfare of Venezuelans.
7. Turn. Sanctions foster anti-American sentiment which bolsters Maduro's power.
 - a. [Aponte-Moreno](#) in 2019 cites a historical example. In Cuba, the US embargo fostered greater anti-American sentiment as a result of greater economic issues, bolstering the Castro regime's popularity; Aponte-Moreno finds that the same would occur in Maduro. [Reuters](#) in 2018 furthers that Maduro's CLAP food box program helps feed at least 6 million Venezuelans, and could help his regime garner support. If Venezuelans perceive the US as threatening one of their only sources of sustenance, they may be more inclined to buy into Maduro's anti-US rhetoric.

A/2 Lost Military Support

1. The [Washington Post](#) finds in 2019 that Maduro maintains strong loyalty from the military, paramilitary, criminal gangs, and Colombian insurgents because he uses revenue from illicit trades like drugs and gold smuggling to pay them. Moreover, Maduro's DGCIM surveils the entire armed forces and uses torture or imprisonment as tactics to keep officials and soldiers loyal to the regime.
2. Delink. [Forero](#) in 2019 finds that the highest military officials have been given a cut in the spoils of gold mining, food distribution, and oil production. Yet, they still pledge their loyalty to Maduro.
3. Turn. [Reuters](#) in July confirms that the sanctions are being placed on top military officials, blocking their assets and visas. If military leaders get personally harmed through sanctions, they are even more anti-US and pro-US, decreasing the chance of a transition.

A/2 Oil for Food Program

1. [Lattig of the Conversation](#) in 2017 writes that an “oil for food” program is unlikely because it requires an agreement from the Venezuelan government, which is unlikely given Maduro’s increasingly retaliatory and authoritarian behavior.

A/2 Economy

A/2 CITGO

A/2 Liberalization

1. This argument assumes that Maduro’s policies are sustainable in the long term. But, in a world with sanctions where Venezuela has no exports, no international help, and no concrete form of growth, there’s only so much that Maduro can do with his economy. That’s why [Washington Post](#) concludes just a few weeks ago that the economic changes caused by liberalization are only a band-aid solution and are not long term. That’s exactly why [the Economist](#) writes just two weeks ago that Venezuela’s economy is expected to suffer a 20.5% decline by 2020. Liberalization clearly isn’t helping like they say they are.
2. **Maduro probably doesn’t have the incentive to suddenly turn his economy into a prosperous state. He only started liberalizing to offset the effects of the economic sanctions, but he just needs enough revenue to keep his regime alive. Other than that, there’s no reason for him to continue building on the process.**
3. Nonunique. If liberalization really were so good for Maduro’s economy, he would probably continue the process because he still has that economic incentive for his government to do so. They do not read any reverse causal pieces of evidence.
4. [Gordon of Mises Institute](#) finds that economic reform towards a free market economy in Venezuela must be extensive and fast, not creeping and piecemeal. He concludes that freeing only a few areas at a time, as Maduro is doing, imposes a misperception that actually cripples the inner workings of the market and discredits it in the eyes of an already suspicious public.
5. [Victor Alvarez for Venezuela Analysis](#) explains just two days ago that the competitive election against Guaido is the powerful and true incentive that’s prompting Maduro to liberalize and open up the oil industry in order to seem stronger and to weaken Guaido’s campaign. This has three implications:
 - a. If it’s for the purpose of winning the election, the policies are probably half-assed and not that effective
 - b. The liberalization is only opening in the short term and won’t continue after Maduro wins his election. We outweigh on timeframe.

- c. There are alternative incentives to him liberalizing, lifting sanctions won't remove liberalization.
6. Turn. The affirmative actually facilitates the process of liberalization. Without sanctions Venezuela then has access to international markets, and more countries will start trading with them, expediting their growth and economic flexibility.
7. Historical precedence proves their argument wrong. [John of Sage](#) explains that in 1990-1998 when Venezuela tried to liberalize, their per capita decreased by 2.7% and did not reverse the long-run decline of their growth. He concludes that private investment rates in the 1990s were significantly lower than in any period since 1950. Two implications:
 - a. Every time that Venezuela has tried to liberalize, they failed
 - b. Our evidence accounts for the long term trend, while all their evidence is in the context of short term
8. Turn. [Myers of LARR](#) finds that when Venezuela did try to liberalize in the 90s, privatization of state enterprises reduced the ability of AD and COPEI to sustain the network of clients, which exacerbated income inequality. Indeed, [Lander of Sage](#) explains that the privatization contributed to the concentration of wealth despite attempts at democratization. Because of this, Lander concludes that poverty increased from 36 to 46 percent between 1984 and 1988 and extreme poverty from 11 to 14 percent.
9. Disad. [Thill](#) of UC in 2010 observes that, empirically, deregulation and the opening of economies across Latin America and the developing world have led to the rapid privatization of water services. He continues that these corporations don't care about infrastructure for the future, but only invest to pare down operations and skim profits. Worse yet, they lower the quality of water provided, cut the utility workforce, and raise prices to shut out the poor for profit.

A/2 Lib. Dollarization Link

1. Turn. If you have access to US markets, you can dollarize even more because you directly get the dollar currency as opposed to what they're doing right now
2. Turn. [Rosales of the Globe and Mail in 2019](#) finds that as dollarization becomes more widespread, Venezuelan's purchasing power worsens because only those who hold the most bolivares are able to translate that into dollars. He concludes that the gap between the rich and poor will widen even further. That's why [Perez in 2019](#) writes that three quarters of the population would see their purchasing power absolutely vanish through dollarization.

A/2 FDI Bad

1. Their logic doesn't make sense because their argument is essentially saying that Venezuela's economy should never recover or grow because as soon as it does, FDI will flood in.

2. [Santos](#) from Brookings writes that FDI for Venezuela is the solution to access external resources and develop new sectors in the economy, which is why without foreign investment it will be very difficult for Venezuela to go back to the path of economic prosperity.
3. [Forbes](#) in 2019 explains that the only way for the oil industry to recover is by attracting foreign oil investment to restructure, resize, etc PDVSA in order to increase oil prices and profits.

A/2 Others

A/2 Police Brutality

1. Delink. [Watts](#) from the Guardian writes that the U.S. has been using sanctions since 2014 to fight police brutality and stop violent suppression of protests but [Business Insider](#) in 2018 explains that Venezuela security have still killed over hundreds of demonstrators in numerous human rights abuses.

A/2 Migration Good

1. Delink. [Janetsky](#) of Al Jazeera in 2019 reports that neighboring Latin American countries are severely limiting migration through harsh immigration policies. Peru now requires Venezuelan migrants to present a valid passport and other documentation, as well as Chile and Ecuador. [Burgos](#) of Foreign Policy in 2019 further quantifies that Venezuelan migration to Peru has fallen 90 percent as a result.
2. Nonunique. [Bustos](#) continues that the bulk of the collapse that followed after 2017 wasn't attributed to sanctions, but to an already rapidly deteriorating economy. Venezuela's economy was failing any way make them quantify how many immigrants sanctions created
3. Turn. [Bahar](#) of Brookings in 2019 finds the total burden of migrants in 2018 alone could be around \$5.2 billion. The bigger issue is, the international community has done little to nothing to pitch in and support regional countries, causing the host countries to struggle.
 - a. The [Economist](#) in 2019 reports less than a third of the \$738 million sought by the UN has been collected; Colombia must spend 0.5% of its GDP (equal to a fifth of its budget deficit) on services to Venezuelans and Ecuador must spend \$170 million a year.
4. Turn. [Carpio](#) of Harvard Political Review in 2019 reports that the booming economies of the Colombia-Venezuela border have struggled with more informal workers and up to 40% poverty rates. Current receiving countries don't have infrastructure or the policy to accommodate new migrants, and they also face increasing unemployment rates.
5. Turn. [Foreign Affairs](#) in 2019 explains that with an expected influx of millions of immigrants aid funds from the UNHCR and the IOM have only met 23.7% of the funds required. This has two implications

a. By forcing out Venezuelans faster with sanctions the US is not giving these countries time to prepare. None of the migrant-receiving countries in Latin America has the financial wherewithal to provide shelter, food, medical care, and employment to such large numbers. By expediting immigration, the US has forced these countries into a bad position where they don't have time to cope, but also forces immigrants to arrive in countries which are worn too thin to help because of the rapid flow of immigrants

b. These countries have to provide for these people somehow and that has included cutting money out of their budget. Make them prove that these countries still benefit in the long term if they want offense.