We negate.

Resolved: On balance, the benefits of United States participation in the North American Free Trade Agreement outweigh the consequences.

Our sole contention is the Mexican Story.

Patten of Western Michigan University outlines in 2017 that during NAFTA negotiations, Mexico sought typical protections for developing nations, but America would only accept complete liberalization. He furthers that because Mexico needed the US more than the US needed them, Mexico passed supplementary policies that are fundamentally consequences of US participation.

This costly mistake devastated two groups of Mexico's most vulnerable.

Subpoint A is the farmers.

NAFTA has obliterated the Agricultural industry in three ways.

First, Resource Extraction Firms.

Trew of the Council of Canadians describes in 2014 that NAFTA rapidly expanded mining activity in Mexico, with 25,000 permits of land given to transnational mining companies, constituting 28% of all Mexican land. He furthers that this transpired as Mexico passed a host of laws due to NAFTA to privatize the country, allowing the sale of former communal farmlands to transnational companies. Ultimately, Patten impacts that these firms forcefully vacated entire towns, forcing them to migrate. Overall, Leech '12 of Cape Breton University quantifies that thousands of indigenous farmers have been displaced by extraction firms.

Second, Monopolization of Agriculture.

Patten furthers that because of NAFTA, GM crops proliferated across Mexico as agribusinesses entered. Problematically, he furthers that intellectual property provisions under NAFTA allowed transnational companies to control GM patents and restrict peasants' ability to plant certain types of seeds. He continues that transnationals control 90% of these patents, which is why they've consolidated 75% of the market at the expense of small farmers. Nisivaco of DePaul University implicates in 2017 that because of NAFTA, monopolies have taken over, hiking up prices of staple foods like tortillas by 279%.

Third, Flooding the Market.

Patten outlines that NAFTA eliminated Mexican tariffs on crops like corn while not imposing penalties for subsidies, which the WTO had. He furthers that this provided well-subsidized American agribusinesses the opportunity to export products below production costs, outcompeting small Mexican farmers. As a result, Wise of Tufts University indicates in 2010 that American agricultural exports flooded the Mexican market, rising 707% post-NAFTA. Patten concludes that because of this, the income of corn farmers fell by 66%. This isn't just a problem of the past, as Wise of the Global Development and Environment Institute concludes in 2007 that NAFTA remains a formidable barrier for the Mexican government to formulate policies to halt the endless devastation of its agricultural sector.

Consequently,

Carlsen of the New York Times writes in 2013 that because of NAFTA, 20 million Mexicans live in food poverty, 25% of the population can't access basic food, and ⅕ of Mexican children suffer from malnutrition.

Subpoint B is the workers.

NAFTA has disenfranchised Mexican labourers by destroying unions.

Patten '17 indicates that in anticipation of a trade agreement with NAFTA, Mexico disregarded a constitutional article that protected workers' rights to unionize to make Mexican labor attractive to America. Overall, Holman '17 of Al Jazeera writes that the cause of low wages in Mexico is the lack of unions to regulate salaries, which is why wages have stagnated, quantifying that real minimum wages in Mexico have fallen by 60% in the past 3 decades. As a result, Anderson '09 of Foreign Policy writes that the real wages of Mexican manufacturing jobs fell by 11% post-NAFTA. This problem extends well beyond the manufacturing sector; Public Citizen '14 concludes that across the country, Mexican workers can now afford 38% less consumer goods than before NAFTA.

Ultimately, this is the story of NAFTA: a manipulative trade agreement facilitated by misguided American participation that derailed Mexico from its track towards success, driving it towards widespread devastation. Weisbrot '17 of the Center for Economic and Policy Research finalizes that since NAFTA, 20.5 million more Mexicans fell into poverty.

To save Mexico, we negate.

C1: Mexico

Framing

A: Ag

Link 1: Dumping

Link 2: Monopolization (IP Laws IL)

Link 3: Article 27

! = switching to drug crops

! = food dependency

Terminal Impact:

! = poverty

Resource extraction firms.

Trew of the Council of Canadians describes in 2014 that NAFTA rapidly expanded mining activity in Mexico, with 25,000 permits of land given to transnational mining companies, constituting 28% of all Mexican land. He furthers that this transpired as Mexico passed a host of laws due to NAFTA to privatize the country, allowing the sale of former communal farmlands to transnational companies. Unfortunately, Bacon of Beacon Press furthers in 2012 that these laws required, regardless of circumstances above ground, for resources to be exploited. Ultimately, Patten impacts that these firms forcefully vacated entire towns, forcing them to migrate.

First, a pivot to drug production.

Dube of the Journal of the European Economic Association writes in 2016 that Mexican farmers turned towards the drug trade when maize became unsustainable as they sought higher incomes. Problematically, he furthers that this pivot led to cartels fighting to control these areas to control the supply of drugs. Ultimately, Dube quantifies that an 8% increase in maize prices would reduce the number of drug war killings by 7%.

Second, food security.

Nisivaco of DePaul University explains in 2017 that because of NAFTA, corn prices plummeted and farmers were displaced, depriving farmers of income to afford food and basic necessities. He furthers that while corn prices fell, monopolies have taken over, hiking up prices of staple foods like tortillas by 299%. Consequently, Carlsen of the New York Times writes in 2013 that because of NAFTA, 20 million Mexicans live in food poverty, 25% of the population can't access basic food, and ⅕ of Mexican children suffer from malnutrition.

Patten, Daniel J. PHD, Western Michigan University, "Dangerous Deals: A Case Study of NAFTA as a Criminogenic Policy." (2017). //JN

https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.google.com/scholar?start=20&q=+%22nafta%22+%22empirical%22&hl=en&as_sdt=0,5&as_ylo=2017&httpsredir=1&article=4173&context=dissertations

Nearly a year after the announcement of the NAFTA negotiations, fast-tracking passed on May 24, 1991.55 With fast-track a reality, the various parties prepared for negotiations by assembling negotiating teams. Salinas opted for a highly centralized negotiation structure. Mexico's trade ministry (SECOFI), under Jaime Serra's leadership, would run negotiations (Torres 2010). **Mexican chief negotiator, Herminio Blanco, was** soon discovered as **ill-prepared for substantive discussions on NAFTA issues** (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). **Von Bertrab (1997) recalled selecting his negotiation team based on personal characteristics rather than professional experience**, electing to choose members from his *camarilla* – **most of whom were U.S. educated**. There were also several who had connections to international financial institutions, with one member from the IMF, Ildefonso Guajardo, who pursued graduate studies at Arizona State University and the University of Pennsylvania. Two other members were from the World Bank – Harvard-educated Eduardo Wallentin and Luis de la Calle who holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Virginia. The U.S. team was more decentralized, including members from several government departments handling their respective sections of the trade negotiations (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). Canada, having used a centralized structure in the CUFTA negotiations, switched to a strategy in between that of Mexico and the United States.56 For both Carla Hills and Jaime Serra, the goal was to reach a broad agreement quickly, but Michael Wilson was more defensive and wished to maintain most of the earlier CUFTA provisions (Rohter 1990; Magnusson et al. 1991).57 Michael Wilson stated that Canada's intentions were to prevent renegotiating bilateral trade agreements with the United States.58 **NAFTA negotiations were held secretly** and a high-security clearance was needed to even review the notes of the meetings (Mayer 1998; MacArthur 2000). The secrecy was intended to keep the negotiations out of the public eye. **Despite the lack of transparency to the public, the business community was able to work closely with negotiators** and received frequent updates. In an interview with Mayer (1998:116), an official of the Mexican Embassy expressed Mexico's concern over major concessions made to the United States: This [nationalist backlash] was always on our minds. That we would be charged with giving up the country. That's why we had to do it with support of the business community ... It was essential to build political support to defuse fears that we were giving up too much. Official NAFTA negotiations began on June 12, 1991, during hard economic times for both the United States and Canada, while the Mexican economy was experiencing economic growth.59 Bush's approval ratings dropped throughout the negotiations adding another obstacle to the passing of NAFTA.60 With guidance from Salinas, Serra outlined Mexico's initial negotiation stance by listing five areas not up for negotiation: (1) reducing Mexican control over the petroleum sector; (2) no guaranteeing of supplies to countries; (3) reducing state monopoly in distribution; (4) no including of risk contracts; and (5) creating foreign retail outlets (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). Negotiations began slowly, but the imminent U.S. presidential election heightened the urgency of passage despite U.S. preoccupation with the Uruguay Round.61 The three countries struggled to get close to a final agreement on agriculture, intellectual property rights, financial services, accession, and investment.62 **Since the United States and Canada already had a free trade agreement, it was Mexico who wanted membership, and the United States was in a position to obtain concessions from Mexico** (Vaghefi 1993). **The Mexicans began by seeking**

protections typically desired by developing countries, but the United States would not budge for anything less than comprehensive liberalization, specifically it opposed Mexico's wish to leave energy and financial services out of the agreement (Fox 1991; Cameron and Tomlin 2000). **Since the Mexicans believed in the philosophy of neoliberal economics, they quickly capitulated and abandoned their opening position on non-negotiable areas** (Marois 2008). The Dallas Jamboree, held from February 17 to 21, 1992, was a major round of negotiations that led to significant concessions, primarily by the Mexican team (Robert 2000). Erroneously, the Mexicans perceived the jamboree as the end game, but in retrospect, it was quite early in negotiations. Mexican negotiator Blanco wrote a memorandum that instructed his negotiators to "show your cards, get to the bottom, there is no tomorrow" (Cameron and Tomlin 2000:107). One of the most significant concessions was in agriculture that removed tariffs on corn, ultimately affecting the lives of millions of Mexican peasants and consumers, while this also came in the same year that Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution was amended (Long 2015). The United States argued that if Mexico did not endorse comprehensive free trade of all agricultural products, access to the major U.S. consumer market would not be made available for winter fruits and vegetables (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). **The decision to put corn on the table was unilaterally made by Salinas, as was the case for all major concessions, highlighting the centralized, authoritarian nature of Mexico's negotiation team**. Only the small details of the negotiations were left to the assigned negotiators. Canada was nonplussed by the concessions and refused to liberalize across the board, desiring protections for their dairy and poultry sectors.63 U.S. and Mexican negotiators used crafty language to allow Mexico to give concessions on investment that arguably did not violate the constitution.64 They avoided violation of Mexico's constitution by semantically rearranging the agreement rather than making any substantial changes.65 The Mexican negotiators also abandoned permanent caps on foreign investment in the banking sector, much to the dismay of the banking industry (Whyte 1992; Cameron and Tomlin 2000). **The Mexican secretary of finance desired to quickly wrap the agreement up, yet these concessions, rather than bringing the parties closer to an agreement, led to the U.S. team demanding more** (Cameron and Tomlin 2000).66 **Mexico's impatience resulted in many large concessions made too early in the game**. NAFTA was the goal with little emphasis on the terms of the agreement. Some of **Mexico's impatience was due to the volatility of the peso, and its strength appeared to be tied to the success of NAFTA**, as it fluctuated with the negotiation process.67 Mexico's authoritarian political structure littered with its *camarillas* weakened Mexico's negotiating power rather than strengthening it.68 **Mexican team members were heavily committed to trade liberalization, likely due to their similar educational backgrounds, and, according to one anonymous Mexican negotiating advisor, they had little understanding of the advantages of protectionism for the Mexican economy** (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). The fact that Mexico needed NAFTA more than the United States, with arguably no other viable options, created the most important power imbalance between these two negotiating countries (Blears 1993). After Dallas, Mexico reorganized its negotiation team given the performance at the Dallas Jamboree. In interviews with Cameron and Tomlin (2000), several Mexican negotiators expressed concern over the information flows among the various negotiators. Very few people actually knew what was going on in every sector of the negotiations, and the hierarchical structure of the Mexican team led to too many concessions early in the negotiations. Von Bertrab (1997) describes the differences between the U.S. and Mexican negotiation structure. For Mexico, its organization was very centralized where information was concentrated at the top and the various task groups knew very little about what was going on in the other groups. Furthermore, upper management kept most of the information about the negotiations concealed from the public. For the United States, management was much more decentralized with various experts responsible for different sectors of the trade deal. The United States was also much more open with its information, at least among the negotiators in the trade deal. Mexico's centralized style allowed them to make much quicker decisions since there were fewer people to consult. Although von Bertrab (1997) seemingly describes this as a strength, many of the Mexican negotiators interviewed found it to be more of a weakness (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). Mexico's reorganization focused on bringing in more people to negotiate and relieving many of the negotiators from handling large portions of the negotiations, rather than addressing the problems with information flow.

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The Mexican secretary of finance desired to quickly wrap the agreement up, yet these concessions, rather than bringing the parties closer to an agreement, led to the U.S. team demanding more (Cameron and Tomlin 2000).66 Mexico's impatience resulted in many large concessions made too early in the game. NAFTA was the goal with little emphasis on the terms of the agreement. Some of Mexico's impatience was due to the volatility of the peso, and its strength appeared to be tied to the success of NAFTA, as it fluctuated with the negotiation process.67 Mexico's authoritarian political structure littered with its *camarillas* weakened Mexico's negotiating power rather than strengthening it.68 Mexican team members were heavily committed to trade liberalization, likely due to their similar educational backgrounds, and, according to one anonymous Mexican negotiating advisor, they had little understanding of the advantages of protectionism for the Mexican economy (Cameron and Tomlin 2000). The fact that **Mexico needed NAFTA more than the United States, with arguably no other viable options, created the most important power imbalance** between these two negotiating countries (Blears 1993).

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The agricultural section of **NAFTA** was particularly interesting in that it was the only part of the agreement that was bilateral rather than trilateral. The **U.S.-Mexico agreement actually had fewer protections than the U.S.-Canadian agreement** despite Mexico's status as a developing nation. Many of the major changes to agriculture were also done as part of the NAFTA sales package, primarily the amendment to Article 27 which **put an end to the *ejido* system and effectively privatized the countryside.** Furthermore, the poor economic performance after implementation of NAFTA translated into serious harms for many small farmers, probably more so than any other group in Mexico. Together, **these policies created a neoliberal** agricultural **model that displaced and impoverished peasants while enriching TNCs**. The struggles of **the rural poor were further complicated by poor nutrition**, induced by the changes to food production. Lastly, **Mexico's new focus on importing many staple foods left it helpless to feed its own population when global food prices increased.**

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Many Mexicans migrated to the United States due to poverty and lack of work, but this was not the only cause of migration. Many Mexicans faced extreme political violence which later gave birth to armed opposition, further perpetuating the cycle (Bacon 2013). Political repression often took place during worker protests and strikes, exacerbating the poor working conditions in Mexico, especially after the NAFTA negotiations started. **Since Mexico's major selling point for NAFTA was its cheap labor, it took extreme measures to keep wages down**. Many indigenous groups, such as the Triquis, are excluded from any autonomous decision making about their own communities, and have to fight nearly everyone for any autonomy. Miner unions are another example of groups that experienced severe repression (see Fischel and Nelson 2010). When repression did not manifest, the firms often used mass firings to control worker unrest (Bacon 2006; 2013). In the years following NAFTA, Mexican officials actively decimated unions.191 U.S. officials even authored some of the deregulation policy in Mexico in order to secure cheap labor. These harsh anti-union tactics also increased in the United States, victimizing many Mexican immigrants. The criminalization of immigrants commonly manifested itself in immigration raids where the primary goal was union busting (Bacon 2008). Since 2008, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency has been heavily involved in arresting immigrants.192 Unfortunately, criminalizing immigrants fails to take into account the various factors influencing their decisions (or lack thereof) to relocate in the first place. Most immigrants who are criminalized in the United States come from regions of the world that are poverty stricken (Bacon 2008). When considering Mexican immigrants, NAFTA played an integral role in creating the conditions of poverty and unemployment (Zepedea et al. 2009; Gonzalez 2011; Weisbrot et al. 2014; Laurell 2015). Most notably, NAFTA reduced the price of corn in Mexico rendering many corn farmers without their livelihoods and desperate (Browning 2013). Pair these circumstances with the widespread civil unrest and repressive state tactics to control opposition groups, many Mexicans had little choice but to seek both physical and economic security elsewhere (Blecker 2003; Lacey 2007; Petras 2010). For those Mexicans who still had work, the repression led to lower wages and weaker unions, and for many occupations, the workplace conditions were abysmal and life-threatening (Bacon 2008; 2013). Mexicans faced a conundrum: Should they stay in Mexico with no work or, at best, precarious employment, or should they seek work in the United States where they would be considered criminals? Many Mexicans chose the latter, or had no choice, but to migrate. **Another cause of migration was abrupt and cruel forced dislocation** (Bacon 2013)**. One example where this happened was on mineral-rich lands. Salinas changed the Mexican mining laws in preparation for NAFTA, another often overlooked policy change designed to attract foreign investment and support for NAFTA. The new law stated that resources must be utilized, and thus mandated exploitation of resources. Consequently, resource extraction firms were granted the authority to demand that entire towns be vacated for extraction.** Later administrations such as Calderón's made several concessions to mining companies in exchange for financial reimbursement (Bacon 2012). The same story repeated itself throughout Mexico where mining companies promised jobs and economic development only to bring displacement, environmental degradation, and mistreatment of workers (Bacon 2013). Mexicans who entered the United States faced a series of new problems. **NAFTA functioned as "an instrument of displacement," producing "a huge labor reserve in Mexico," and providing Mexicans with "no alternative but to migrate"** (Bacon 2013;19, 59). Many of the displaced *campesinos* found work in the meatpacking industry with some of the most dangerous working conditions imaginable (see Bacon 2008; 2013). The border region was a popular place to settle because it was still close to home and populated mainly by Mexicans (Garcia 2006). These Mexicans suffered from poor health care since they could not afford U.S. health care insurance, and reentering Mexico to obtain affordable health care was perilous. Many of the families were able to build their own homes through the *colonia* housing project, but these houses were often small with several problems such as uneven and unpaved streets, high flood risks when it rained, and dangerous neighborhoods ridden with drug trafficking.193 In addition, families who wished to move were often unable to sell their homes. Some men commuted to work as far away as Detroit and Chicago and were gone for weeks or months at a time, leaving the women to care for their children, the household, and continue to work their own full-time jobs. Racism and anti-Mexican rhetoric is another problem. Proposition 187 demonstrated strong U.S. racism towards Mexicans that would not even grant some basic human rights, such as the right to health care and education, and U.S. legislation passed in 1997 intensified the deportation efforts in the United States (Kopinak 1998). Despite the xenophobic rhetoric that suggested undocumented workers were a drain on the economy, studies actually showed that they provided economic benefits (Brown 1997; National Immigration Forum 1997).

Bacon, David. "Canadian Mining Goliaths Devastate Mexican Indigenous Communities and Environment." Truthout. 25 July 2012. <https://truthout.org/articles/canadian-mining-goliaths-devastate-mexican-indigenous-communities-and-environment/> //RJ

Federal acquiescence to Goldcorp reflects the policy of Mexico's four past administrations of virtually giving away the country's mineral wealth. **In 1992, Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari modified the country's mining law.** This was the same year that **he also changed Mexico's land reform law to allow the sale of former communal (ejido) lands.** Both were changes intended to allow foreign corporations to invest in huge projects in Mexico and to protect those investments. A year later, just before the North American Free Trade Agreement took effect, the ceiling on the amount of foreign investment that could be allowed in "strategic" industries (like mining) was eliminated.

Changes continued under Salinas' successors, with both the PRI's Ernesto Zedillo and the PAN's Vicente Fox increasing the number of mining concessions given to foreign corporations like Goldcorp and to huge Mexican mining cartels like Grupo Mexico. Taxes on mining operations were eliminated. Companies only had to make a symbolic payment for each hectare of land granted in their concessions.

According to Carlos Fernandez-Vega, whose business column "Mexico SA" ("Mexico, Inc.") runs in the left-wing Mexico City daily La Jornada, the amount of land given in concessions reached 25 million hectares at the end of Fox's presidency in 2006 and then more than doubled, to 51 million, in just the first four years of his successor Felipe Calderon. "In the two PAN administrations, about 26 percent of the national territory was given to mining consortiums for their sole benefit," he charges. In 2010, Fernandez Vega explains, Calderon granted four million hectares in concessions, in exchange for which the Mexican government received $20 million (US). The foreign and domestic corporations given the concessions made $15 billion that year (a 50 percent increase from the previous year). Those earnings were 750 times what they paid for the concessions.

Fernandez-Vega based his column on a study by Mexican academics Francisco López Bárcenas and Mayra Montserrat Eslava Galicia of the Autonomous Metropolitan University (UAM) in Xochimilco, called "Minerals or Life." The Mexican Constitution, with its roots in the Revolution of 1910-20 and the nationalist government of Lazaro Cardenas of the late 1930s, puts forward goals for mining and other economic activity. They include, Barcenas Lopez and Eslava Galicia state, "using natural resources for social benefit, creating an equitable distribution of public wealth, encouraging conservation and achieving a balanced development for the country leading to improved conditions of life for the Mexican people." **The new mining law**, however, **says any potential resource must be utilized, which gives the exploitation of resources preference over all other considerations.**

Trew, Stuart. "NAFTA: 20 Years of Costs to Communities and the Environment". Council of Canadians. Mar. 2014. https://content.sierraclub.org/creative-archive/sites/content.sierraclub.org.creative-archive/files/pdfs/0642-NAFTA%20Report_05_low.pdf //RJ

NAFTA provided the ingredients **for an explosion of dangerous foreign mining activity in Mexico**. In anticipation of the agreement, the Mexican government 5 ratified several national laws that facilitated the entry of Canadian and U.S. mining corporations into Mexico. For example, a constitutional amendment in 1991 allowed Mexican peasants to sell previously communal lands to private owners (including foreign corporations) without significant regulatory oversight or protection against abuse. **This gave North American mining companies easy access to Mexico's lands and mineral resources**.26 As a result, **mining activities and foreign mining investments expanded considerably** in the **post-NAFTA** era. For instance, **over the past 20 years the Mexican government has granted more than 25,000 mining concessions**. Approximately **28 percent of Mexico's land is now devoted to mineral extraction** and is largely **under control of transnational mining companies** based primarily in Canada, U.S., and Mexico.27 Annual extraction rates have doubled since NAFTA was signed.28 While **the increase in mining concessions** was a boon to Canadian and U.S. mining companies, it **was devastating for the environment**. Mining requires explosives and toxic substances that are known to contaminate water and land. **Thanks to** the post-**NAFTA** increase in mining, **Mexico has become the world's leading importer of toxic sodium cyanide**, which is both used in mining and is a major source of water contamination. **Mining in Mexico has released 43,000 tons of pollutants** into the environment between 2004 and 2010, many of them carcinogens.29 Finally, as discussed below, **the rights of foreign mining corporations were strongly protected under NAFTA's investment chapter**, while **NAFTA's environmental side-agreement has not required Mexico to better regulate the** harmful **environmental impacts** of runaway extraction.

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Exporting products to a country below their production value is referred to as product dumping. NAFTA did not impose penalties for subsidies, unlike the World Trade Organization, and thus provided the opportunity for U.S. product dumping in Mexico. For example, Wise (2009) examined the production of eight agricultural exports—corn, soybeans, wheat, rice, cotton, beef, pork, and poultry–subsidized by the U.S. government. Overall, Wise finds that both U.S. policies and subsidies affected the competitiveness of U.S. exports. The United States exported many crops at dumping-level prices (or below production costs). **The cost to Mexican producers was monumental** for corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, and rice, **resulting in a combined loss of $9.7 billion from 1997 to 2005**, with corn accounting for around 66 percent of the total loss. Since livestock producers used cheap corn and soybeans as feed, Mexican livestock producers lost an estimated $3.2 billion over the same period. When all eight products are combined, **the losses account for 10 percent of all Mexican agricultural exports and are greater than all Mexican tomato exports, one of the primary crops designated to replace corn.** Dumping margins increased significantly after 1996, with all eight products having positive dumping margins (higher for crops than livestock), and product prices fell. Ironically, corn production in Mexico increased, while the other crops all showed a decline in production.168

Timothy A. **Wise**, 2010, Global Development and Environment Institute, **Tufts University** "The impacts of U.S. agricultural policies on Mexican producers" //JN

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Subsidizing_Inequality_Ch_8_Wise.pdf

The Mexican government has shaped its agricultural policies during a time of severe adjustment, which was ushered in by the opening of the Mexican economy under NAFTA. It was widely recognized at the beginning of NAFTA that Mexico had geographically-based comparative advantages in supplying o -season fruits and vegetables to a hungry U.S. market. U.S. producers maintained clear advantages over their southern neighbors in many staple crops and meats, with yields much higher than their Mexican counterparts and with large exportable surpluses. This posed clear risks to Mexico's large smallholder population, many of whom relied on crops that competed with U.S. imports proposed for liberalization. NAFTA's liberalization of agricultural trade produced the expected results, with more staple crops and meats owing south and seasonal fruits and vegetables owing north (for background, see de Ita 2008; Romero 2009; Zahniser and Crago 2009). **NAFTA reduced tariffs and quotas on a wide range of products**, with some sensitive products allowed longer transition periods to eliminate existing protections, up to 15 years. Not all of these transition periods were followed – most notably corn in Mexico's case – but the last of the transition periods came to a close on January 1, 2008. In agriculture, tariffs and quotas have now largely been eliminated. **Not so agricultural subsidies**. NAFTA did not discipline subsidies, in contrast to WTO negotiations which in agriculture have treated domestic farm **subsidies** as **[are] one of the three "pillars" of trade-distorting agricultural protection**, the other two being export subsidies and tariffs. **U.S. farm subsidies since NAFTA have dwarfed Mexico's**, and many of those subsidies are for crops the United States exports to Mexico (Wise 2007). This has prompted charges that the level playing field **NAFTA** was supposed to create **is** in fact **tilted heavily in favor of the U**nited **S**tates. How have U.S. agricultural policies a ected Mexican producers in an economic environment of liberalized trade? We analyzed eight heavily supported commodities – corn, soy-beans, wheat, cotton, rice, beef, pork, and poultry – that compete with Mexican production and that have seen **increases in U.S. exports to Mexico of** between 159% and **707%** since the early 1990s. Together they represent 52% of the value of U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico. We examined the extent to which those products were exported to Mexico at prices below production costs between 1997 and 2005. We look at those years because the period begins a er NAFTA's liberalization was largely implemented *and* a er the 1996 U.S. Farm Bill, which caused significant changes to U.S. production and prices by bringing a great deal of land back into agricultural production. The period under study ends before the recent run-up in commodity prices. Our goal was to estimate the **costs to Mexican producers of domestic farm prices driven down by below-cost imports from the United States. We estimate the costs at $12.8 billion** from 1997-2005 for the eight products (in constant 2000 US dollars), 10% of the value of all Mexican agricultural exports to the United States. **Corn producers were by far the most heavily affected, with $6.6 billion in losses, an average of $38 per metric ton, or $99 per hectare**. This is more than the average per-hectare payment to small-scale producers under the Procampo subsidy program.

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The typical **NAFTA story concerning agriculture is one of struggling small**- to medium-scale **farmers** and prospering agricultural producers tied to TNCs.167 Effectively, **NAFTA removed Mexican tariffs** on a variety of crops, most importantly corn, eliminated most supports for small farmers, **and allowed the United States to subsidize its agricultural sector without penalty**. **The amendment of Article 27** of the Mexican Constitution, **combined with other changes** in the agricultural sector, were also made in the lead up to NAFTA. All of these policies **came together to create the perfect storm crippling smaller scale corn farmers**. NAFTA impacted corn more than any crop (Rivera, Whiteford, and Chávez 2009). In 1990, corn accounted for a third of Mexico's agricultural production. In comparison, the United States produced 14 times more corn than Mexico. **After implementation of NAFTA, cheap U.S. corn flooded the**

Mexican market and decreased farmers' income from corn by 66 percent (Wise 2009). From 1994 to 2008, Mexican corn imports from the United States more than tripled, according to the USDA, and more than quadrupled, according to the Mexican Agricultural Secretariat (Browning 2013). **Many farmers found growing corn no longer sustainable (Public Citizen 2001) with entire towns being abandoned as their farmers could not compete with heavily-subsidized U.S. corn production (Clark 2006)**.

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The new NAFTA agricultural strategy replaced traditional crop diversity and sustainability with monocropping and tied agricultural exports to Wall Street speculation (Mendieta 2006). **Venture capitalists began investing enormous amounts of money in biotechnology**, which has typically taken the form of genetically modified (GM) crops or seeds (Dibner, Trull, and Howell 2003). The United States strongly supported intellectual property rights domestically, and efforts to homogenize these rights globally (Pechlaner and Otero 2010). NAFTA effectively furthered this goal. TNCs began their quest to patent various genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Although GMOs have been met with criticism, the United States has pushed for deregulation of biotechnologies and sided with industry against GMO critics. In addition to blocking regulations on transgenic crops, such as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the United States, joined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, has praised transgenic crops as a panacea for world hunger (Gillis 2004). President Bush charged African governments and members of the European Union for causing starvation by not allowing U.S. imports of GM high-yield crops (Fleischer 2003). **One of the most pressing concerns about using GM crops is** that they cross-pollinate with landraces (naturally evolved seeds/crops), thus **destroying biodiversity by creating a single species**. Some scientists were predicting that **even if farmers only planted a single row dedicated to GM corn, a large majority of corn would turn GM within seven years** (Mendieta 2006). Some researchers even experienced backlash when studying GMOs. When one researcher, Ignacio Chapela, attempted to publish his findings with David Quist on GMOs that showed GM corn contamination happening in Mexico, his article was accepted, but later unprecedentedly rejected by *Nature* (Ross 2004).181 The North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC; 2004a) found, much to U.S. chagrin, that transgenics contaminated some Mexican landraces, and will likely be irremovable from Mexico's ecosystem.182 Most scientists weighing in on the GM corn debate are opposed to GM corn because of the threat to biodiversity.183 Yet, these scientists did not oppose biotechnology, rather they rejected weak regulation and industry priorities. Industry sought control over seed by passing a new law in 2007 that required all seed, even native seed, to be registered in a national seed catalogue before they could be sold. **Paired with intellectual property rights, peasants' ability to plant seed was restricted, especially considering the cross-pollination of GM crops**. Seed producers charged farmers for using their seed even if it was saved or exchanged. **With the influx of primarily U.S. GM corn under NAFTA, farmers lost control and access to seeds fundamentally important to their survival** (Harvey 2003). GMOs could be banned in Mexico, but required a scientific basis under Article 26 of the Secretariat of the Convention on Biodiversity. Yet, this evidence was particularly hard to come by because no evidence really existed for or against GM corn and its health impacts (Fitting 2011), not to mention the harsh ridicule experienced by some scientist studying GMOs. On another side of the GMO debate, Mexican citizens have fought back against GMOs by filing a major lawsuit in 2013. The lawsuit has been challenged an astonishing 93 times in 17 different federal courts.184 The outcome of such lawsuits is pertinent to the overall health of corn diversity, which is of paramount importance given that corn is ranked as the second most important crop globally (Cummings 2002). Although peasants have been disparaged for continuing to use "lower-yielding" traditional seed, at least four reasons exist as to why they would continue this practice despite its appearance as inefficient (Fitting 2011). First, traditional seeds can be reused every growing cycle, while GM corn seed would need to be repurchased from seed sellers. Thus, the seed patents have prevented poorer farmers from growing traditional crops. When their traditional seed is cross-pollinated by the GM seed, they are required to pay user fees to the seed owners. Second, smallholders trust particular traditional seed variants that have proven to grow well in particular climates and conditions. Third, many traditional seed variants grow without the use of pesticides and fertilizers, while GM corn seed requires these for optimal results, leading to soil degradation. Fourth, peasants prefer the taste and texture of their traditional corn varieties. TNCs, allied with the United States, have been invested in the sale of GM crops in other countries which has been quite successful considering the United States leads the world in GM crop exports (McAfee 2008). Although this alliance argues for the superiority of GM crops, their claims are not supported by the empirical evidence.185 In spite of the empirical evidence, the World Bank still pursues a GM crop strategy, and the corporate-driven biotechnology strategy has appeared to work (Otero 2008). By 2008, Mexico ranked 13th in the world in total transgenic acreage.186 Mexico's food consumption overall remained relatively similar after NAFTA (Otero and Pechlaner 2009). However, once food consumption is broken down by protein, vegetables, and fats, it is apparent that protein came to replace some of the vegetable consumption in Mexico. Ironically, NAFTA allowed fruit and vegetable exports to increase in Mexico, but this apparently signifies that average Mexican consumers were not benefiting from this with their dwindling purchasing power, rather large agroexporters were pocketing these profits. Although transgenics are praised by proponents as the panacea for world hunger, as noted earlier, cheap imports did little to help Mexico protect itself against the exorbitant increases in corn prices during 2008. By the late 2000s, several studies concluded that major problems are associated with corporate-driven biotechnology including rises in pesticide use, extreme bias towards TNCs, and few benefits experienced by small farmers or those who are hungry (McAfee 2008; Otero and Pechlaner 2009). Since most of the GM crops are engineered to be pesticide resistant, they often are paired with pesticides to get the highest yields. However, pesticide use has increased to a dangerously high level that is harmful to both humans and the environment (Thrupp 1998).

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NAFTA's revision of intellectual property rights gave rise to biopiracy, the exploitation of fauna and flora by claiming ownership via patents. In ethnocentric fashion, **the United States patented old knowledge long held by indigenous farmers in a form of biopiracy** (Shiva 2000). In addition to the new GM crop innovations, TNCs have taken out patents on seed used for centuries (Press and Washburn 2000). The "Enola" bean is probably the best-known case of biopiracy. **The case of the "Enola" bean demonstrates how these new intellectual property laws have been detrimental to indigenous and peasant groups** (Carlsen 2003). Larry Proctor purchased bean seed in Mexico and harvested a common yellow bean endemic to Sinaloa, Mexico. Later, he acquired a patent from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office on the yellow bean, naming it "Enola" after his wife. **Bean farmers in Mexico increased exportation of the beans to the United States after NAFTA and this exportation was shaping into one of the few Mexican farmer success stories. Then, Proctor demanded six cents on every pound to be paid to his company**, Pod-Ners, for use of the patented bean. In response, Rio Fuerte farmers abandoned the profitable bean as they saw no other choice. Such patents have been predominantly held by wealthy nations much to the detriment of developing country farmers. OECD nations accounted for 97 percent of all patents (Mexico only nominally a part of this), and patented production contributed about half of these countries' GDPs (RAFI 2000; UN Development Programme 2000). Furthermore, **TNCs hold over 90 percent of all technology and product patents**. Although the patent on the "Enola" bean was later ruled invalid by the U.S. Court of Appeals, it was allowed to stand for an entire decade, about half the life of the patent.187

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https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.google.com/scholar?start=20&q=+%22nafta%22+%22empirical%22&hl=en&as_sdt=0,5&as_ylo=2017&httpsredir=1&article=4173&context=dissertations
Keleman (2010) qualitatively assessed several institutions and programs with the majority of findings suggesting negative effects for rural farmers often due to exclusion. He concluded that the neoliberal agricultural policies actually made conditions more difficult for small-scale farmers. He suggested government support for maize diversity conservation is necessary given the lack of collective cohesion among small farmers.170 In other words, **the lack of transitional support left farmers to fend for themselves in a viciously competitive post- NAFTA economy flooded with cheap U.S.-subsidized corn**. Although neoliberalism revolved around a rhetoric of removing governmental intervention, **the government simply changed its intervention methods establishing connections with the private sector** (Radcliffe 2005). Instead, **a few large firms remained**

after massive consolidation and raked in enormous profits with virtual monopolies, while corn farmers suffered (Public Citizen 2014). TNCs such as Cargill, Maseca, and Minsa were favored under these policies, and particularly by NAFTA (Liverman and Vilas 2006; Aguilar Soto 2007; Appendini 2014). In addition to transnational food producers, **transnational food retailers benefitted from NAFTA by seizing control of 75 percent of the market by 2001** (Chávez 2009). Mexico's **northwest region was particularly favored for post-NAFTA agricultural growth given its rare irrigated lands produced higher and more stable yields** (Scott 2010), while the non- irrigated sector is more erratic since it experiences more climate-induced crop failures (Sweeney et al. 2013). **Poor rural farmers were overwhelmingly located on rain-fed land, while the Northwest continued to experience growth in market share. Thus, the NAFTA strategy left the small farmers further behind. In particular, the Free and Sovereign State of Sinaloa disproportionately received much of the government funding for farm subsidies** (Scott 2010; Eakin, Buasch, and Sweeney 2014). According to one Trust Funds for Rural Development (FIRA) informant, Sinaloa subsidies accounted for 16 percent of national agricultural finances. FIRA (2006) officially claimed that possibly over a quarter of the corn production cost in Sinaloa was subsidized by farm subsidies. In another analysis, Sinaloa was found to be the main beneficiary of federal policies, receiving more than 12 percent while only 4 percent went to the nation's agricultural workers (Scott 2010). Some programs contributed extremely large portions of their funds to Sinaloa. **For example, the Ingreso Objective program allocated 68 percent of its budget to Sinaloa subsidies** (Appendini 2014). These subsidies created a Sinaloa monoculture that often flooded the market with corn.

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After **NAFTA furthered the trend of reducing government supports for the development of agriculture, and the availability of loans also declined**, Arizpe (2014) contends that **individuals** in the countryside who **were faced with bankruptcy had four choices: work as wage laborers in agriculture, obtain a higher education to attempt to climb the socio-economic ladder, migrate to the United States, or enter the drug trade.** Agricultural laborers experienced some of the worst working conditions in the world facing deterioration of health, poverty, and repressive treatment (Bernet, Francis, and Lara Flores 2008). When rural families are able to send their children away to universities, it often results in high-skilled, unemployed workers who seek work in the United States and Canada (Arizpe 2006). If they are unable to escape their hometown, they often have nothing to do and suffer from many problems (Arizpe 2014). For those who seek migration to the United States, the new policies have made the passage much more dangerous**. For many rural Mexicans, the drug trade was the only real alternative because when government funding was lost, drug traffickers invested in the abandoned countryside**. Although the drug trade may have been a safety valve at first, some peasants began to collaborate with the traffickers who were funding social welfare programs and financing schools and hospitals (Rochlin 1997). NAFTA made unique contributions to the drug war and escalation of violence that followed in Mexico. **First, NAFTA destroyed corn peasants' ability to grow for subsistence, forcing them to find new livelihoods** (Rivera, Whiteford, and Chávez 2009)**. Some turned to illicit crop growing** and other illegal activities (Dube, García Ponce, and Thom 2014). Many traditional peasants were attracted to growing illicit crops considering the decline in prices of licit crops (Watt and Zepeda 2012). Second, **large-scale displacement and widespread poverty created major waves of civil protest and acts of dissidence by the opposition to the new neoliberal economic model culminating in NAFTA** (Rochlin 1997; Cuninghame and Corona 1998; Bacon 2004). NAFTA ineffectively addressed the poverty and unemployment in Mexico while unintentionally making the black market attractive (Zepeda et al. 2009; Weisbort et al 2014; Laurell 2015). **Third, NAFTA linked the U.S.-Mexican highway**

system together and increased the flow of goods across the border, providing the infrastructure for the drug trade (Andreas 2001; Paley 2014). **The opening of the borders provided the opportunity for the insatiable demand for drugs** in the neighboring United States to spark a brutal turf war over supply (Watt and Zepeda 2012). Without U.S. demand, the drug war would not be lucrative considering how extremely low Mexico's domestic demand for drugs was prior to NAFTA. Fourth, long-standing political and military corruption in Mexico involving the drug trade was further integrated with U.S. government and business elites who had profitable connections to the drug trade (Reyes 2011; Paley 2012). Lastly, the neoliberal economic model culminating in NAFTA, needed defending which was done under the guise of the war on drugs (Watt and Zepeda 2012; Paley 2014).

Dube, Oeindrila, Omar García-Ponce, and Kevin Thom. "From maize to haze: Agricultural shocks and the growth of the mexican drug sector." Journal of the European Economic Association 14.5 (2016): 1181-1224. <https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/maize-haize-agricultural-shocks-growth-mexican-drug-sector_1.pdf> //RJ

Maize price fluctuations will impact rural households in different ways depending on their production and labor supply choices. First and foremost, such changes directly impact households that initially produce and sell maize. These households must decide how much labor to allocate to crop cultivation, market labor, and leisure. Jointly with this time allocation problem, they must decide how much land and time to devote to each possible crop. **A fall in the price of maize will tend to increase drug crop cultivation as the result of both a substitution and an income effect. It will provide agricultural households an incentive to substitute the production of other crops for the production of maize. At the same time, this will make households poorer, increasing their incentives to spend more time and effort on income-generating activities** as the marginal value of wealth increases. **As the price of maize falls, both forces will push maize-producing households in the direction of greater drug production**.

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However, drug crop planting is only the first step in the narco-trafficking chain. After harvest, drug crops are subsequently processed and transported to international markets through the operations of drug cartels. Moreover, **violence may accompany this chain as cartels fight for control of these activities**. Thus, **we** also examine post-cultivation outputs and **find that adverse maize price shocks led to greater seizures of raw marijuana and opium gum** (the paste used to manufacture heroin). In addition, **we estimate a negative relationship between maize prices and cartel presence, as well as killings perpetrated by these groups** in connection with the drug war over 2007-2010. These results suggest that **cartels fight to control economically depressed territories where farmers are willing to supply more illicit crops**. As such, our findings suggest that **shocks affecting rural households can exert downstream impacts on the industrial organization of violence**, including the operations of drug cartels.

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Previous journalists and researchers have noted the connection between maize prices and activity in the drug sector (Bucardo et al. 2005; Ronquillo 2011; Castillo García 2012), but Dube et al. (2014) provide the most compelling argument. In their study, they found that **the precipitous decline in maize prices in the 1990s was linked to both marijuana and opium cultivation in areas suited for growing maize, many of the same areas devastated by NAFTA.** Drug seizures and criminal detentions for drugs also were connected to the price of maize. Most troubling, maize prices were associated with large increases in drug- related homicides. **They estimated for every 10 percent increase in maize prices, drug war killings could be reduced 8 percent.** All of these findings suggest that **a rise in maize prices lowers the opportunity costs involved with the drug trade.** NAFTA quotas and Chinese exports explained the majority of the variation in corn prices (84%). Thus, **by reducing corn prices, NAFTA had a significant impact on the rise of illicit drug activity in Mexico**. These effects of maize prices span the entire narco-trafficking chain from increasing cultivation of illicit crops to fatal violence over the drug trade. NAFTA proponents must ask themselves if such violence mitigates any of the potential gains from free trade.

Dube, Oeindrila, Omar García-Ponce, and Kevin Thom. "From maize to haze: Agricultural shocks and the growth of the mexican drug sector." Journal of the European Economic Association 14.5 (2016): 1181-1224. < https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/maize-haize-agricultural-shocks-growth-mexican-drug-sector_1.pdf> //RJ

The estimates in Columns (4)-(7) of Table 8 suggest that **reductions in the price of maize produce a significant increase in drug war killings** across categories, with the largest effect in the sub-category of executions. The coefficients suggest that **the 8 percent increase in the maize price** over 2007-2008 **led to 7 percent fewer total drug war killings** and 6 percent fewer executions, among municipios at the 90th versus 10th percentile of the maize suitability distribution. The coefficients in Columns (6)-(7) imply equivalent e§ects of 3 and 1 percent fewer deaths from confrontations and cartel attacks, respectively.

Nisivaco, Thomas. "NAFTA and its effect on corn, migration and human rights in Mexico." (2017). http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1240&context=etd //RJ

Small farmers suffered the most from NAFTA with its downward pressure on prices and the loss of government subsidies. The sudden drop in corn prices directly affected the small farmers by depriving them of the income they needed to continue to farm and take care of the basic necessities of their homes and families. While post-NAFTA **the domestic price for corn has fallen, the price of corn-based foods, especially a Mexican staple the tortilla did not decrease;** in fact, **it has increased 279%** according to Pital. The reasons for this are twofold: first, and most important, tortilla prices were effectively subsidized until 1996, when manufacturers were able to transfer their increased costs to consumers. Second, **the Mexican tortilla market is a monopoly where basically the two large companies control the market and operate like cartels, using their market power to set higher prices**. Some small farmers increased their production of corn by taking over land they did not own, usually in protected areas and with adverse environmental consequences, such as deforestation and soil erosion, so they could meet the rising costs of feeding themselves and their families due to tortillas becoming more expensive.

Gerardo **Otero** (2011): Neoliberal Globalization, NAFTA, and Migration: Mexico's Loss of Food and Labor Sovereignty, Journal of Poverty, 15:4, 384-402 //JN
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10875549.2011.614514

Although this definition builds on the main elements of FAO's "food security," the proposed concept gives a more precise definition of *food vulnerability*. Although **Mexico used to be self-sufficient and even export surpluses, NAFTA** and neoliberalism **turned it into a food-import dependent nation**. By 2005, rice imports made up 72% of domestic consumption, whereas wheat imports were 59%, maize 23%, and beans 9% (González Chávez & Macías Macías, 2007). Further, Mexico's agricultural trade deficit with the United States is unreciprocated. Overall, since NAFTA has been in place, 84% of Mexican exports were destined to the United States, with a maximum of 89% in 2005 (González Chávez & Macías Macías, 2007, p. 58). The greatest grain imports to Mexico are soybeans, maize, wheat, barley, rice, and sorghum. Conversely, the main Mexican exports to the United States are vegetables (most notably, tomatoes, followed by green chilies and peppers), which have grown remarkably since the start of NAFTA; barley beer; and fruit (e.g., avocados, lemons/limes, and grapes). Although Mexican exports have indeed grown considerably, the main food suppliers of the United States continues to be the European Union, first, and Canada, second. Conversely, two main destinations of U.S. exports are Canada and Mexico, followed by Japan and the European Union (FAOSTAT, various dates, countries and commodities). In short, **Mexico's growing dependence on its northern neighbor is not reciprocal as its agricultural trade is considerably more diversified**. It may be expected that Mexican producers have benefited massively from the increased agricultural exports. In fact, only 20,000 of seven million agricultural producers are the most dynamic, however. Although there are 32,000 firms in the food industry, only 1,692 engage in exports, and only **300 firms account for 80% of all exports** (González Chávez & Macías Macías, 2007, p. 58). Another possible beneficiary of Mexico's increased imports of cheaper food are consumers, but as suggested, **consumer food prices have actually doubled** from 1993 to 2007 (e.g., up 733% for tortillas and 736% for white bread) in relation to general inflation (up 357%) **since NAFTA's implementation**. **The minimum wage has deteriorated by 21% in real terms** during the same period (González Chávez & Macías Macías, 2007, pp. 67–68). Therefore, unlike in Canada, Mexican consumers have not benefited from trade liberalization.

Carlsen, Laura. [Director of the Americas Program at the Center for International Policy]. "Under NAFTA, Mexico Suffered, and the United States Felt Its Pain." New York Times. New York Times, 24 November 2013. Web. Accessed 18 May 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/11/24/what-weve-learned-from-nafta/under-nafta-mexico-suffered-and-the-united-states-felt-its-pain>

Nafta has cut a path of destruction through Mexico. Since the agreement went into force in 1994, the country's annual per capita growth flat-lined to an average of just 1.2 percent -- one of the lowest in the hemisphere. Its real wage has declined and unemployment is up.

As heavily subsidized U.S. corn and other staples poured into Mexico, producer prices dropped and small farmers found themselves unable to make a living. Some two million have been forced to leave their farms since Nafta. At the same time, consumer food prices rose, notably the cost of the omnipresent tortilla.

As a result, 20 million Mexicans live in "food poverty". Twenty-five percent of the population does not have access to basic food and one-fifth of Mexican children suffer from malnutrition. Transnational industrial corridors in rural areas have contaminated rivers and sickened the population and typically, women bear the heaviest impact.

Not all of Mexico's problems can be laid at Nafta's doorstep. But many have a direct causal link. The agreement drastically restructured Mexico's economy and closed off other development paths by prohibiting protective tariffs, support for strategic sectors and financial controls.

Weisbrot, Mark, Stephan Lefebvre, and Joseph Sammut. *Did NAFTA help Mexico? An assessment after 20 years*. No. 2014-03. Center for Economic and Policy Research (**CEPR**), 20**14**. //JN
http://cepr.net/documents/nafta-20-years-2014-02.pdf

It is now 20 years since NAFTA went into effect, bringing Mexico into a new commercial agreement with the United States and Canada. At the time it was argued, and forecast, that the agreement would boost Mexico's growth and development. **This paper compares the performance of the Mexican economy with that of the rest of the**

region over the past 20 years, based on the available economic and social indicators, and with its own past economic performance. Among the results: **Mexico ranks 18th of 20 Latin American countries in growth of real GDP per person**, the most basic economic measure of living standards. From 1960-1980, Mexican real GDP per person almost doubled, growing by 98.7 percent. By comparison, in the past 20 years it has grown by just 18.6 percent. **Mexico's per capita GDP growth of just 18.6 percent over the past 20 years is about half of the rate of growth achieved by the rest of Latin America. If NAFTA had been successful in restoring Mexico's pre-1980 growth rate –** when developmentalist economic policies were the norm – **Mexico today would be a relatively high income country, with income per person significantly higher than that of Portugal** or Greece. It is unlikely that immigration reform would be a major political issue in the United States, since relatively few Mexicans would seek to cross the border. According to Mexican national statistics, **Mexico's poverty rate of 52.3 percent in 2012 is almost identical to the poverty rate of 1994. As a result, there were 14.3 million more Mexicans living below the poverty line as of 2012** (the latest data available) **than in 1994**. We can use the poverty statistics of the UN Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLAC) to compare Mexico's poverty rate with the rest of Latin America. These statistics are computed differently and show a decline in poverty in Mexico. However, according to these measures, **the rest of Latin America saw a drop in poverty that was more than two and a half times as much as that of Mexico**: 20 percentage points (from 46 to 26 percent) for the rest of Latin America, versus 8 percentage points (from 45.1 to 37.1 percent) for Mexico. Real (inflation-adjusted) **wages for Mexico were almost the same in 2012 as in 1994**, up just 2.3 percent over 18 years, and barely above their level of 1980. Unemployment in Mexico is 5.0 percent today, as compared to an average of 3.1 percent for 1990-1994 and a low of 2.2 percent in 2000; these numbers seriously understate the true lack of jobs, but they show a significant deterioration in the labor market during the NAFTA years. NAFTA also had a severe impact on agricultural employment, as U.S. subsidized corn and other products wiped out family farmers in Mexico. From 1991-2007, there were 4.9 million Mexican family farmers displaced; while seasonal labor in agro-export industries increased by about 3 million. This meant a net loss of 1.9 million jobs. The very poor performance of the Mexican economy contributed to a surge in emigration to the United States. From 1994-2000, the annual number of Mexicans emigrating to the United States soared by 79 percent. The number of Mexican-born residents living in the United States more than doubled from 4.5 million in 1990 to 9.4 million in 2000, and peaked at 12.6 million in 2009. NAFTA was just one variable among others that could account for Mexico's poor economic performance over the past 20 years. However, it appears to be related to other economic policy choices that have negatively affected the Mexican economy during this period. The IMF notes that "Mexico competes directly with China in the U.S. market, where China accounts for 23 percent of U.S. imports and Mexico accounts for 12 percent." This is a very tough competition for Mexico for a number of reasons. First, Mexico was and remains a higher-wage country than China. Second, China has maintained a commitment to a competitive exchange rate, in effect fixing this exchange rate against the dollar or (since 2005) a basket of currencies. The Mexican central bank by contrast has, as the IMF notes, "a firm commitment to exchange rate flexibility." In other words, the Mexican Central Bank will raise or lower interest rates as necessary to reach its target inflation rate (3 percent), and let the exchange rate go where it may. This means that Mexico's exchange rate is unlikely to be competitive with China's, which further worsens its cost disadvantage. The Mexican Central Bank's form of rigid inflation targeting also adds a large element of unpredictability to the exchange rate, which has a negative impact on foreign direct investment; foreign investors will find it difficult to know how much their assets or output will be worth internationally in the future. China has other advantages that make it a formidable competitor for Mexico in the U.S. market: the Chinese government owns most of the banking system in China, and can therefore ensure that its most important exporting firms have sufficient access to credit. In Mexico, by contrast, 70 percent of the banking system is not only private but foreign-owned. The Chinese government also has an active industrial policy that enables it to help its exporting firms in various ways, and spends vastly more on research and development – both in absolute terms and as a percentage of its economy.

Dr. Steve **Suppan**, November 6th, 20**17**, Do no harm?: NAFTA, non-regulation of GMOs and Mexican agriculture, Institute for Agriculutre and Trade Policy, https://www.iatp.org/blog/201711/do-no-harm-nafta-non-regulation-gmos-and-mexican-agriculture //DZ

However, some Mexican agricultural leaders are not resigned to the fate of increasing food dependence on U.S. GE exports under NAFTA 2.0 rules. Mexican farm leader (and former IATP board member) Victor Suarez Carrera published an essay in Hagamos milpa (Let's make corn in our land) (Semillas de Vida: March 2017) with a well-described title, "How can we achieve food self-sufficiency?: a new technological revolution with farmers but without GMOs." (The essay updates a 2013 presentation he made to the National Association of Commercial Enterprises of Agricultural Producers, for which he serves as executive director.) The essay begins "Our country's food dependence is intolerable." He outlines how governmental policies to support farmer knowledge and public academic science would contribute to making Mexico far less dependent on imports for basic grains, including corn and wheat. He writes that **under current** government **policies** and failure to invest in Mexican agriculture, **imported food dependence had gone from 24 percent of consumption in 1982 to 46 percent in 2016. Under Business as Usual policies, including NAFTA, that import food dependency would increase to 80 percent by 2030, with the loss of millions of more family farmers. Increasing food import dependency is a U.S. "Cold War" policy that continues, with new agricultural production technologies, to this day.** In a 1997 IATP essay, I quoted a 1957 statement by Senator Hubert Humphrey: "I have heard here this morning that people may become dependent on us for food. I know that was not supposed to be good news, because before people will do anything, they have got to eat. And if you are really looking for a way to get people to lean on you and to be dependent on you, in terms of their cooperation with you, it seems to me that food dependence would be terrific." Food import dependency has long been a "soft power" tool in the arsenal of U.S. diplomacy. However, the use of that tool can have very negative "blowback" effects for its user. Spikes in food export prices, together with climate change reduced domestic food production, were drivers of political and economic destabilization throughout Northern Africa from 2008-2011. The overthrow of those governments provided fertile ground for extremist militias, including members of Al Quaeda. Closer to home, according to the Agricultural Policy Analysis Center, unmanaged oversupply of U.S. agricultural production for export drives down crop prices for U.S. farmers and increases U.S. tax payer subsidies of U.S. agribusiness. Agricultural supply, if properly managed would help to mitigate the degradation of soil health and water quality, among other environmental costs kept off the USDA agricultural export balance sheet. It is not too late for Mexico and the United States to avoid the economic and environmental damage to agriculture, farm families and rural communities that NAFTA 2.0 would lock in. The major risks for sustainable agriculture and rural communities in Mexico, are not only greater food import dependency and more forced migration of Mexican farm families. Additionally, Mexican food security would depend on genetically engineered mono-cultures that have developed widespread weed resistance in the United States. The application of the new genetic engineering techniques to horticulture and row crops are likely to incorporate "stacked traits," including crop resistance to proprietary herbicides and pesticides. In Mexico City, I outlined the damage caused by the drift of Dicamba herbicide to non-resistant soy (and even trees!) in 3.6 million acres. And Dicamba was the "solution" to glyphosate resistant Super-weeds! U.S. farms benefit minimally from exporting ever more products to Mexico. The farmers must sell their corn and other agricultural raw materials to U.S. agribusiness at prices below the cost of production and hope that income from non-farm jobs and various government payment programs will compensate them enough to keep them from losing the farm. The $2.5 billion in corn sales to Mexico in 2015-2106 benefit the exporters. If the next Farm Bill incorporated supply management measures to increase prices paid to farmers and NAFTA 2.0 contained enforced measures to prevent dumping, both U.S. and Mexican agriculture would have a better price and policy environment to practice sustainable agriculture and be paid fairly for its products.

Paley 3/12 (Dawn Paley, Masters in Journalism from the University of British Columbia and BA in arts and women's studies and first nations studies from Simon Fraser University, "Corn on the Border: NAFTA and Food in Mexico," 13 March 2013, http://upsidedownworld.org/main/mexico-archives-79/4183-corn-on-the-border-nafta-and-food-in-mexico, AL)

The fight against genetically modified corn has been ongoing since the first evidence of GM corn was discovered. Some say this corn was introduced in Mexico through aid programs, where farmers were given corn seeds without being warned that they were genetically modified seeds.¶ According to Greenpeace Mexico, **the world's largest agro-business outfits, like Monsanto, Pioneers, and Dow Agribusiness, have put pressure on Mexico's new president, Enrique Peña Nieto, to allow commercial planting and harvesting of genetically modified corn**. A recent action to keep up the pressure against genetically modified corn saw tens of thousands march in Mexico City as well as a rotating hunger strike under the enormous Angel of Independence Statue.¶ "We believe that the only relation that we, as the growers, have with Mother Earth are the natural seeds," hunger striker Francisco Jiménez Murillo told Democracy Now! "We have to remember that Mexico has 60 distinct varieties of corn that we have cultivated over the last 10,000 years, and with this, we have fed the world. It is a struggle for the life and health of our country."¶ The struggle for food sovereignty and health is one that is reflected in every facet of life in Mexico. These days, markets like the one around the corner from where I live face stiff competition from big box grocery stores popping up all over the country. In 2011 alone, Wal-Mart opened one store a day in Mexico and Central America.¶ In the face of these changes, some farmers organize against genetically modified seeds, others get by, planting traditional crops, while still others have packed up and moved away, mostly to the US, but others to Canada, where they work to earn remittances for their families. **The changes to Mexico's agricultural and food systems over the past 30 years have been severe, but they are not irreversible.**

Wise, Timothy. "Policy Space for Mexican Maize: Protecting Agro-biodiversity by Promoting Rural Livelihoods." Global Development and Environment Institute. Feb. 2007. http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/07-01MexicanMaize.pdf

My own research and that of many others has documented the negative impact that neoliberal economic policies in general, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in particular, have had on Mexico's small-scale maize producers. The Mexican government unilaterally waived most of the import restrictions built into NAFTA's 15-year transition to full liberalization in maize trade and failed to avail itself of other opportunities to protect or promote small-scale maize farming. As a result, **corn imports from the United States increased three-fold after NAFTA, prices dropped by nearly half, and 2.5-3 million poor farmers in Mexico have found themselves under increasing economic pressure** (Nadal and Wise 2004). **While the United States increased its support for agriculture – roughly doubling its commodity support budget – Mexico's farm programs declined dramatically. The two countries' support for maize farmers in particular followed a similar trend, with U.S. support rising 48% in real terms to $8.3 billion in 2004, while Mexico's inflation-adjusted subsidies declined 39% to $842 million** (OECD 2005). Since 1997, the United States has exported its corn to Mexico and the rest of the world at prices estimated to be nearly 20% below average farmer costs of production, one definition of "dumping" (Murphy, Lilliston et al. 2005).

The income impacts were dramatic as well. Survey results suggest that **between 1993 and 2005, commercial producers saw their incomes, adjusted for inflation, decline by more than 40%. Subsistence producers saw their real incomes fall by half. By other accounts, real incomes in the region fell over 70% from 1993-2005. In 2000, 90% of the Soteapan working population was earning less than two minimum wages, a common Mexican standard for extreme poverty.**

What policy space exists within Mexico's existing international obligations to construct an alternative set of policies that could support traditional, biodiverse maize production? **NAFTA**, with its impending final phase-out in 2008 of allowed protections for maize, beans, and a few other products, **remains the most formidable obstacle to formulating new policies.** The Mexican farmers movement's call for a renegotiation of NAFTA's agriculture provisions, particularly for white maize and beans, is well justified. **To protect and promote traditional maize farming, the Mexican government needs the power to impose import restrictions on cheap corn flooding Mexican markets from the United States. These are, of course, precisely the measures that NAFTA proscribes.**

Patten, Daniel J. PHD, Western Michigan University, "Dangerous Deals: A Case Study of NAFTA as a Criminogenic Policy." (2017). //JN

https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.google.com/scholar?start=20&q=+%22nafta%22+%22empirical%22&hl=en&as_sdt=0,5&as_ylo=2017&httpsredir=1&article=4173&context=dissertations

NAFTA and the neoliberal policies altered the agricultural model in North America resulting in Mexico's reliance on U.S. food imports, ultimately destroying Mexico's food sovereignty (Suárez 2008). In addition, the newly imported foods were high in sugar and fats transitioning many Mexicans to an unhealthy diet, resulting in a major health and obesity epidemic (Otero et al. 2015). The neoliberal policies also favored TNCs producing agricultural goods on a massive scale, while forcing most small-scale farmers out of business and/or off their land (Public Citizen 2014). **Revisions of intellectual property rights under NAFTA created a structure for TNCs to keep a stranglehold on patents and further unemployment among farmers** (Shiva 2000). Most of the **new jobs that replaced those lost were often seasonal and/or had poorer working conditions** (Weisbrot et al. 2014). **Little help was offered to these struggling farmers**, and no transitional support was built into NAFTA (Keleman 2010: Fernández et al. 2012). The agricultural model embedded in NAFTA, and the neoliberal policies preceding it, also contributed to the degradation of the environment. **The rapid increase in the use of GM crops threatened biodiversity**, specifically corn landraces (Mendieta 2006). A new focus on monocropping and concentrated mass agricultural production on irrigated land led to soil erosion, depletion of external inputs, air, water, and soil contamination, and major illnesses (Alieri and Nicholls 2004; Gliessman 2007). Under the guise of environmental conservatism, **TNCs removed the indigenous from their land** (Barreda 2003) a**nd exploited the environment for profit through environmental services, bioprospecting, and ecotourism** (Carlsen 2004). The new neoliberal production model which provided TNCs with lax environmental enforcement (Carrillo and Schatan 2006) also added to the air and water pollution in Mexico (Gallagher 2004; Lipford and Yandle 2010), and toxic waste often collected in poor *maquiladora* communities (Simon 2014). **Deforestation was a result of poor farmers attempting to cultivate more land to compensate for their losses** (Soto 2012), **and others engaged in the trade of endangered animals in the black market** (Rosenberg 2004). **NAFTA even provided TNCs with the ability to sue sovereign governments when the people stood up for themselves**.217 Faced with the poor economic and environmental outcomes of NAFTA and other neoliberal policies, average Mexican citizens often choose to immigrate to the United States (Bacon 2013) or joined the drug trade (Dube et al. 2014). Both choices were quite dangerous, often resulting in death. After NAFTA, the United States heavily militarized its southern border (Nevins 2002), and death among Mexican immigrants traversing the border tripled (Massey et al. 2002). In the United States, ICE agents executed immigration raids which effectively suppressed both immigrants and unions (Bacon 2008). **While immigrants were exploited, TNCs prospered from guest worker programs** (Gonzalez 2008). For those who elected to enter the drug trade, commonly to make ends meet (Dube et al. 2014), many died after Calderón militarized the government's efforts against the drug trade (Cave 2012). While Mexico's government put on a pretense of combating drugs, they frequently profited from their partnership with drug cartels (Paley 2012) and offered near immunity to its military to quell any opposition, tying them to drugs without trial (Gibler 2011b). The later policies of the SSP and the Mérida Initiative appeared to be ways of protecting the neoliberal economic model solidified by NAFTA (Watt and Zepeda 2012). The increased military power brought by these policies provided Mexico the ability to violently repress any threat to the economic model using the guise of drug trafficking. This chapter has now established the link between NAFTA and its subsequent social harms to which it played a varying degree of importance. Most of the social harms documented in this chapter can be classified as human rights violations (HRVs) by simply using the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a guideline. Conservatively, an argument can be made that Articles 11, 13, 17, 23, 25, and 27 were violated.218 Thus, these HRVs are considered criminal outcomes resulting from the specific nature of NAFTA described in Chapter 6 that being undemocratic, heavily influenced by a TCC, and incorporating repression of any opposition. Given that NAFTA contributed to these outcomes, it is concluded that NAFTA is a criminogenic policy not just for its formation which made criminal outcomes likely, but also due to the realized adverse outcomes that actually came to fruition documented in this chapter. The next chapter will conclude this dissertation by summarizing the main argument, discussing its limitations, and suggesting directions for future research.

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https://www.sciencedirect.com/sdfe/pdf/download/eid/1-s2.0-S0007681303000107/first-page-pdf

Sargent, John. Boom and bust: is it the end of Mexico's maquiladoras? 2003

The most visible sign that all is not well between these two NAFTA partners has been the recent performance of the maquiladora industry. A highly controversial form of foreign direct investment, **maquiladoras**, or "maquilas," **have traditionally been able to import raw and intermediate inputs from any part of the world, process those goods in Mexico, and then export the final product without having to pay Mexican duties.** In October 2000, according to INEGI (2002), maquila employment reached an all-time high of 1,338,970. From November 2000 until December 2001, however, employment fell by 257,444, and **during 2001 total maquila production contracted by 9.2 percent**. This decline is especially startling when evaluated through a historical lens. From the beginning of the program in 1965 through 2000, maquila employment suffered aggregate job losses in only two years (1975 and 1982), and those losses never surpassed 9,000 employees.

https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03891.pdf
US General Accounting Office. "Mexico's Maquiladora Decline Affects US - Mexico Border Communities and Trade; Recovery Depends in Part on MExico's Actions". Jul 2003.
The phasing out of maquiladora benefits as part of NAFTA was also cited by industry associations as a major factor in the decrease in maquiladora production and employment. When NAFTA was signed in 1993, it envisioned fundamental changes to the maquiladora model. The most significant of these changes was embodied in **Article 303 of NAFTA,** which **eliminated duty drawback** (or refunds of duties)24 **for inputs of non-NAFTA origin as of January 1, 2001**, if the final products incorporating these inputs are to be subsequently exported to another NAFTA country. For various reasons, notwithstanding the 7-year grace period provided, the maquiladoras did not develop a network of domestic suppliers in Mexico. As a result, implementation of **Article 303 has adversely affected the competitiveness of maquiladoras that rely on non-NAFTA suppliers for inputs and resulted in closure of some maquiladora firms.**

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2002-04-28/the-decline-of-the-maquiladora
Smith, Geri. "The Decline of the Maquiladora" Bloomberg. Apr 2002.
No wonder some foreign investors are searching out friendlier climes. **A total of 350 maquila plants have closed down since the start of 2001, leaving 240,000 Mexicans out of a job**--**nearly one-fifth of the industry's entire workforce**. More often than not, Mexico's loss is China's gain--or Vietnam's or Guatemala's. Meanwhile, many executives wonder why authorities are not doing more to stop the defections. "If the Mexican government doesn't do something about this quickly, they're going to kill the goose that lays the golden egg," says Richard N. Sinkin, managing director at InterAmerican Holdings Co., a San Diego firm that advises companies on manufacturing in Mexico.

http://carib-export.com/obic/documents/10b_e.pdf]
10 benefits of the WTO trading system. World Trade Organization. 1995.
Often, job prospects are better in companies involved in trade. In the United States, 12 million people owe their jobs to exports; 1.3 million of those jobs were created between 1994 and 1998. And those jobs tend to be better-paid with better security. In Mexico, the best jobs are those related to export activities: **sectors which export 60 per cent or more of their production, pay wages 39% higher than the rest of the economy and maquiladora (in-bond assembly) plants pay 3.5 times the Mexican minimum wage.**

Patten, Daniel J. PHD, Western Michigan University, "Dangerous Deals: A Case Study of NAFTA as a Criminogenic Policy." (2017). //JN
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.google.com/scholar?start=20&q=+%22nafta%22+%22empirical%22&hl=en&as_sdt=0,5&as_ylo=2017&httpsredir=1&article=4173&context=dissertations

Although Mexico implemented several actions and policies in the years surrounding the NAFTA negotiations and leading up to its implementation, they must be understood as consequences of NAFTA since they were adopted to prepare the Mexican economy for the free trade agreement. For example, in face of all the government expenditure cuts, **Mexico increased its anti-drug spending ninefold** from 1987 into the 1990s (Andreas 1998a). At the end of de la Madrid's presidency, he announced drug trafficking as a threat to national security which is a rare claim in Mexican society. Salinas continued pursuing drug traffickers primarily to appease the United States and amp up the national security apparatus to mollify investor concerns. The militarization of the police force and involvement of the Mexican military grew as a solution to drug trafficking. Narco-corruption among state officials in Mexico remains an issue today, and drug trafficking and enforcement issues will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 7. **By the end of Salinas' term, a conservative estimate of around 86 percent of state enterprises were privatized, most during his presidency** (Moody 1995). Ironically, Oppenheimer (1998) sardonically points out **that Salinas opened the Mexican economy** to such an extreme that Mexicans were eating their own cultural foods ill-prepared by Taco Bell. **Land reforms characterized another major aspect of the Salinas restructuring** that will be covered in a later section. Due to the intensification of the privatizing efforts and other neoliberal modifications, unions that had long been controlled with corporatist methods became problematic to the Mexican state and potential U.S. investors. However, with Salinas' bold economic and political promises, the PRI rebounded in 1991 with PRI candidates winning 61 percent of the votes in the elections for federal senators and state governors. With this political victory, Salinas was able to 148 17 make law unilaterally without appeasing oppositional parties (Dillon and Preston 2004). Even President Bill Clinton (Auerswald, Duttweiler, and Garofano 2003) and the U.S. press (Dillon and Preston 2004) endorsed Salinas, thus furthering his political and economic legitimacy. With Salinas's image as an economic savior and lack of oversight, he was free to deal with the unions. **Salinas disregarded article 12323 of the constitution that protected workers' rights, particularly their right to organize and strike, by cracking down on union workers in order to subdue labor resistance to neoliberal policies**. Since Salinas and his cabinet members saw Mexico's competitive advantage and their leverage at the bargaining table as cheap labor and lax corporate regulations, **unions only stood in the way of Mexico making its case as being a strong free trade partner to the United States. In response, Salinas went after major union bosses and declared a war against unions** (Kim 1995)…. Once again, the U.S. and other foreign media hailed Salinas as a national hero and competent leader maintaining peace during a tumultuous time in Mexico (Grunwald 1991). The wave of privatization enticed foreign investments along with empowering the PRI government's control over the Mexican people. Once union and labor opposition was quashed, the Salinas government was free to privatize nearly any industry deemed necessary. Corporate constituents of the PRI government benefited greatly from these tactics, particularly billionaire Carlos Slim Herú who made a fortune. *The amendment of article 27 of the constitution was just another step in this strategy of privatization that moved land from the poor to the wealthy. Faced with pressure by the United States, IMF, and World Bank, the Mexican government followed a path of austerity commonly paired with trade liberalization by further reducing the social programs it had in place* (Stanford 1994; Barry 1995). *In the years leading up to NAFTA, President Salinas reformed agrarian society by allowing an inflow of agricultural imports, removing or reducing most agricultural subsidies, withdrawing or shrinking tariffs on most products, and guaranteed prices were no longer given for any crops other than maize and beans* in 1990 (Foley 1995). For instance, Mexico dissolved ANAGSA, a public insurance 150 17 agency that provided programs for crops to help with losses, BANRURAL – a rural development bank – declared it would only loan to profitable peasant farmers (Foley 1995), and the state ended a history of subsidizing affordable necessities for farmers such as water, electricity, fertilizer, and pesticides (Hewitt de Alcántara 1976). When the Mexican government withdrew their political and economic support for peasant organizations, U.S. companies ceased to offer financial credits to these organizations as well (Stanford 1994). In 1992, a constitutional amendment to article 27 ended 70 years of land reform and established the groundwork for privatization of ejido lands (McGuire 2015). The ejido system was established by the Mexican Constitution of 1917 after the Mexican Revolution. An ejido is a large piece of communal land available to landless farmers for cultivation. Historically, wealthy land owners would lease lands to these farmers. With the establishment of the ejido system, peasants could petition their government to expropriate the land from wealthy landowners which, if successful, would make the land publicly owned. Thus, ejidatarios, members of an ejido, would retain land rights as long as they used the land for farming, however, they did not own the land. Land redistribution under this article was a large part of Mexican history (Sanderson 1984). After the Mexican government deemed the ejido a failed system in the face of the 1982 debt crisis, advocates of neoliberalism pushed for full privatization of rural lands and abolishment of the ejido.

The amendment to article 27 revoked peasants' right to petition for land reducing the fears of foreign investors (Foley 1995). Corporations, although previously banned from land tenure, were now free to purchase agricultural land, and only 33 percent of the ejido plus one member were needed to make changes in property relations. Proponents of privatization saw this move as beneficial for ejidatarios because they now owned some piece of land, and could use or 151 17 sell it for profit. Many producers experienced an increase in competition simultaneously as costs were rising….*The United States also played an integral role in influencing land reform policy in Mexico prior to NAFTA*. Hendrix (1995) states that, according to the Wall Street Journal, the amendment to article 27 was enacted to directly allow the Mexican Department of Agriculture and Water to "enlist the Chicago Board of Trade, Merrill Lynch, Spatts, and several other brokerage houses and Mexican financial institutions as consultants to create a new agricultural commodities market" modeled after the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. A primary goal was to convert ejidos to private property, in turn creating international partnerships for foreign investment. Thus, U.S. foreign investors were directly behind, or at least heavily supported, major agrarian reforms in Mexico prior to NAFTA.

Kim, Dongwoo. "Modernization or Betrayal: Neoliberalism in Mexico." Constellations 4.1 (2013). https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C10&q=modernization+or+betrayal%3A+neoliberalism+in+mexico&btnG=

Carlos Salinas trampled the workers' rights, one of the key victories of the Mexican Revolution enshrined in the Constitution of 1917, as part of his neoliberal economic agenda. The article 123 of the Constitution of 1917, among many other things, guarantees the right of the workers, whether employed by public or private enterprises, to organize and strike; it states that "[t]*oda persona tiene derecho al trabajo digno y socialmente útil; al efecto, se promoverán la creación de empleos y la organización social de trabajo, conforme a la ley*."29 **Salinas' brutal crackdown on union workers**, which completely contradicted the article 123, **symbolized the continuation of the PRI government's betrayal and oppression**. For Salinas, the crackdown of the unions was a necessary step before the implementation of his neoliberal policies. **In the context of free trade with Canada and the United States, the "competitive advantage" of Mexico consisted of "cheap labor" and "a minimum of state intervention in the economy," and thus the labor had to be subdued before anything else**.30 According to Mark Eric Williams, most of the scholars agree that the "weak labor opposition," diluted in the CTM, was one of the key characteristics of the Mexican industry that allowed Salinas to implement his privatization policies.31 However, the labor leaders who wielded significant influence in Mexican society, such as Joaquín Hernández or Agapito Gónzalez definitely posed a threat to Salinas' agenda and hence it was necessary for him to overcome this opposition beforehand. Instead of negotiation, which would have been preferred in *modernized* countries and more in line with the Constitution of 1917, Salinas chose a rather *caudillo* and PRI method of resolving conflicts: brutal crackdown.

The arrest and sentencing of Joaquin "La Quina' Hernandez demonstrates the undemocratic and classical PRI method of dealing with dissidents which completely disregards the article 123 of the constitution. Carlos Salinas launched a war against the unions with the controversial arrest of "La Quina" in January of 1989. Galicia was the de-facto leader of the union of Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) that represented the interests of more than 200,000 workers.32 Hernández staunchly opposed the privatization of the petroleum industry and this belief was echoed when he said that "the oil should always be in the hands of the Mex-i-cans."33 Hence, he was an enemy who had to be overcome by Salinas in order to privatize one of the greatest industries of Mexico. Eventually, Hernández was arrested on January 10th, 1989 on charges of corruption and possession of firearms.34 Expectedly, Hernández's arrest sparked a series of strikes across the nation, which were quickly subdued by the federal government. Hernández "acquiesced" to the charges laid against him when the chief commander of the Federal Judicial Police threatened to harm his family, and was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison.35 PEMEX was then gradually privatized—eventually having its petrochemical plants out for sale (open to both domestic and foreign buyers) in early 1993.36 Subsequently, Salinas went after the dockworkers' union in Veracruz and another prominent labor leader Agapito González Cavazo, a day before his union was scheduled to protest against the *maquiladora* plants owned by the American investors.37 The foreign media regarded Salinas as a competent leader who maintained the stability of the country—and commented that Mexico was being well prepared for the neoliberal market economy.38 However, the brutal crackdown of the union leaders and their strikes demonstrate Carlos Salinas' disregard for the promises of the PRI government embedded in Article 123 of the Constitution of 1917.

Anderson, Sarah. “Happily Ever NAFTA?” Foreign Policy. Nov. 2009. http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/09/happily-ever-nafta/

NAFTA offers a rocky road map for the Americas. More than eight years of monitoring reveal that, yes, the accord has boosted investment and trade, just as the negotiators promised. And yes, increased international competition may have helped fuel the dramatic rise in labor productivity rates during the 1990s, particularly in Mexico and the United States. But **workers, communities, and the environment in all three countries have suffered from the agreement's flaws. In Mexico,** for example, 50 percent **productivity growth didn't prevent an 11 percent slide in real manufacturing wages between 1994 and 2001,** according to a Global Policy Network study by Mexican labor economist Carlos Salas. The U.S. government reports that **even in nominal dollar-value terms, Mexican manufacturing wages were no higher in 2000 than in NAFTA's first year and considerably lower than in 1981,** prior to Mexico's sweeping free market reforms.

Weisbrot, Mark, Stephan Lefebvre, and Joseph Sammut. *Did NAFTA help Mexico? An assessment after 23 years*. No. 2017-03. Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), 2017. //JN

http://cepr.net/documents/nafta-20-years-2014-02.pdf

If NAFTA had been successful in restoring Mexico's pre-1980 growth rate — when developmentalist economic policies were the norm — **Mexico today would be a high income country**, with income per person significantly higher than that of Portugal or Greece. It is unlikely that immigration reform would have become a major political issue in the United States, since relatively few Mexicans would seek to cross the border. ● **According to Mexican national statistics, Mexico's poverty rate of 55.1 percent in 2014 was higher than the poverty rate of 1994. As a result, there were about 20.5 million more Mexicans living below the poverty line as of 2014** (the latest data available) than in 1994. ● The rest of Latin America saw a drop in poverty that was more than five times as much as that of Mexico: 21 percentage points (from 46 to 25 percent) for the rest of Latin America, versus 3.9 percentage points (from 45.1 to 41.2 percent) for Mexico.

Otero Gerardo, Simon Fraser University, Neoliberalism Revisited, 1996. //JN

https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/5923936/NeoLiberalism_Revisited.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1528336482&Signature=tMiUHzXIcwQkVMGs%2FjBYExAqXQ4%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DNeoliberalism_revisited_Economic_restruc.pdf#page=93

Maquiladoras are assembly plants that import parts and supplies duty-free into Mexico and export their production, largely to the United States. The U.S. government supported the setting up of export assembly operations through tariff items *806.30* and *807.00,* which assess import duties only on the value added of work done abroad when U.S.-origin components are sent overseas for assembly and then returned to the United States. The Mexican government also cooperated by permitting duty-free entry of all materials and equipment used in the maquiladoras, and it authorized 100 percent foreign ownership of the enterprise, provided that the entire output was exported. **The number of maquiladora plants in Mexico grew from *620* in *1980* to over *2,000* by *1992*. The personnel employed** in Mexican maquiladoras during this period **expanded from 100,000 to *518,000*** (BID, *1993),* and according to forecasts, that figure will grow to *600,000* by the end of the century. Total maquiladora exports soared from almost *$2.5* billion in *1980* to $10.1 billion in *1988.* Imported inputs in the latter year were *$7.8* billion, resulting in a net value-added figure for Mexico of *$2.3* billion, which corresponds almost entirely to Mexican labor costs. This was equivalent to about one-third of the value added for all of Mexico's manufactured exports. To the direct employment of *450,000* in *1990,* Weintraub *(1990:1146)* estimated that one must add a similar amount of indirect employment in related industries. Assuming an average family size of five, maquiladora jobs thus contributed to the income of more than *5* million Mexicans by *1995.*

Holman, John. “NAFTA: How ‘Ghost’ Unions Exploit Workers in Mexico.” Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera, 1 September 2017. Web. Accessed 17 June 2018. <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/08/nafta-ghost-unions-exploit-workers-mexico-170831110315826.html>

There is a reason for that. The Trump administration believes low Mexican wages make for unfair competition for their own workforce and lure in companies that instead might have set up in the United States. With the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the negotiating table again after 23 years, the Trump administration, when they are not threatening to pull out of the trade deal, is looking to even up the playing field. The focus on salaries is likely to continue into the second round of renegotiations taking place in Mexico itself from September 1st to 5th. But while the US administration's concerns over Mexican workers' rights might not be altruistic, they do contain a basic truth. Mexican workers are, on average, the worst paid of the 35 countries in the OECD. Wages have stagnated.

According to Mexico's National Autonomous University (UNAM), the real value of the country's minimum salary has dropped 60 percent in the past 30 years.

The reasons for that are complex, but labour expert Maria Xelhuantzi Lopez of UNAM says one issue lies at the centre of it all.

"The cause of the low salaries in Mexico is that there aren't any unions that are regulating the working conditions or the salaries," she says.

Since the 1980s, a phenomenon has exploded in Mexico - "protectionist" trade unions.

The unions work like this: a national or international company sets up in Mexico, and nine times out of 10, according to Lopez, rather than allowing the workers to actually form their own union, the company hires lawyers to produce a protectionist union.

These unions - which exist only on paper - sign a "collective" contract with the company and becomes the legal representative of the workers.

"They are paper unions - ghosts - because legally they exist, they cover all the legal requisites, but the workers aren't included in the process," Lopez says.

"Experts agree that 90 percent of the unions in the country (follow this model)," Lopez says.

It is clear, she says, why these protectionist unions have become so popular with employers. "What they do is to keep salaries low, maintain precarious labour conditions, keep workers rights to the minimum and increase the profits of the company," she says.

Lopez says they are often formed before workers are even hired and always operate "behind their backs".

Hansen, Lawrence Douglas Taylor, and L. Douglas. "The origins of the Maquila industry in Mexico." Comercio exterior 53.11 (2003): 1-16. http://revistas.bancomext.gob.mx/rce/magazines_en/24/6/tayl1103.pdf

The maquila industry has come to characterize, in large part, Mexico's northern border region due to the accelerated changes which its presence in this region has brought about in terms of population growth, subsidiary or supporting industries, trade businesses and services. Although it remains heavily concentrated in this region, over the last two decades it has also increasingly spread throughout the country's interior. The term "maquiladora industry", which is commonly used to refer to the production sharing operations carried on by transnational companies and their assembly plants located in low wage regions around the globe 1 , is somewhat of a misnomer. This term is derived from the word maquila, of Spanish origin, which in its earliest usage referred to the act of grinding wheat brought by farmers to the miller to be converted to flour. It was also used to define the portion of grain retained by the miller in exchange for this service. The word subsequently evolved in meaning and became used to designate "any particular activity in an industrial process, such as assembly or packaging effected by a party other than the original manufacturer."2 Maquila, thus defined, means a process that describes a broad industry involving a wide variety of goods and services. **The modern maquiladoras constitute assembly operations for products which, after processing, are re-exported to the U.S. and other countries.3**

Hansen, Lawrence Douglas Taylor, and L. Douglas. "The origins of the Maquila industry in Mexico." Comercio exterior 53.11 (2003): 1-16. http://revistas.bancomext.gob.mx/rce/magazines_en/24/6/tayl1103.pdf

The maquiladora industry had its real beginning in the Border Industrialization Program, which was inaugurated in May 1965, and formally instituted in October 1966. The BIP originated as a response by the Mexican government to the cancellation by the U.S., in December 1964, of the Bracero Program, as a result of pressure from domestic labour unions.27 The Bracero Program, officially called the First International Migrant Labor Agreement/Primer Acuerdo Internacional de Trabajadores Migratorios, had been initiated in 1942 due to the need to obtain Mexican labourers as a substitute for the great numbers of U.S. males who were entering the armed services at that time. The program's cancellation aggravated the problems of unemployment in the border areas. In the larger border cities, such as Ciudad Ju·rez, Tijuana, and Mexicali, between 40 and 50 percent of the population was unemployed. Many braceros who could no longer work in the U.S. elected to remain in northern Mexico instead of returning to their places of origin in the south.28

Trew, Stuart. “NAFTA: 20 Years of Costs to Communities and the Environment”. Council of Canadians. Mar. 2014. https://content.sierraclub.org/creative-archive/sites/content.sierraclub.org.creative-archive/files/pdfs/0642-NAFTA%20Report_05_low.pdf //RJ

NAFTA provided the ingredients **for an explosion of dangerous foreign mining activity in Mexico**. In anticipation of the agreement, the Mexican government 5 ratified several national laws that facilitated the entry of Canadian and U.S. mining corporations into Mexico. For example, a constitutional amendment in 1991 allowed Mexican peasants to sell previously communal lands to private owners (including foreign corporations) without significant regulatory oversight or protection against abuse. **This gave North American mining companies easy access to Mexico’s lands and mineral resources**.26 As a result, **mining activities and foreign mining investments expanded considerably** in the **post-NAFTA** era. For instance, **over the past 20 years the Mexican government has granted more than 25,000 mining concessions**. Approximately **28 percent of Mexico’s land is now devoted to mineral extraction** and is largely **under control of transnational mining companies** based primarily in Canada, U.S., and Mexico.27 Annual extraction rates have doubled since NAFTA was signed.28 While **the increase in mining concessions** was a boon to Canadian and U.S. mining companies, it **was devastating for the environment**. Mining requires explosives and toxic substances that are known to contaminate water and land. **Thanks to** the post-**NAFTA** increase in mining, **Mexico has become the world’s leading importer of toxic sodium cyanide**, which is both used in mining and is a major source of water contamination. **Mining in Mexico has released 43,000 tons of pollutants** into the environment between 2004 and 2010, many of them carcinogens.29 Finally, as discussed below, **the rights of foreign mining**

corporations were strongly protected under NAFTA's investment chapter, while **NAFTA's environmental side-agreement has not required Mexico to better regulate the** harmful **environmental impacts** of runaway extraction.

Leech, Garry. "Capitalism: A Structural Genocide." Zed Books Ltd. Google Books, 26 April 2012. Web. Accessed 18 June 2018. https://books.google.com/books?id=qmhjDgAAQBAJ&pg=PT43&dq=NAFTA+mining+leads+to+displacement&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiG5I3Vo6zbAhWIylkKHUbMDh4Q6AEIJjAA#v=onepage&q=NAFTA%20mining%20leads%20to%20displacement&f=false

Some Mexicans chose to fight capital's expansion of its spheres of production and circulation under NAFTA. When the Zapatistas took up arms in 1994, they sought to ignite a national uprising in order to seize state power. When the national uprising failed to materialize, the Zapatistas switched their focus to the gaining of autonomy for their communities in the Lacand6n Jungle in Chiapas. While the Zapatistas have established impressive examples of participatory democracy at the community level and have made some social gains, particularly in the provision of prenatal health care to expectant mothers, they are nevertheless under increasing threat from capital.il Zapatista communities are surrounded by constantly expanding mining and oil exploration, agrofuel production and so-called ecotourism initiatives that threaten the quasi-autonomy the Zapatistas have enjoyed over the past fifteen years.2 Consequently, while many activists laud the Zapatista uprising as the first 'post-modern revolution' because of its attempts to initiate radical change at the grassroots level without seizing state power, the struggle could just as easily be viewed as an illustration of the limitations inherent in attempting to create an alternative society within broader capitalist structures. After all, under NAFTA's favourable investment conditions, US and Canadian mining companies have displaced thousands of peasants and gained control over more than a million hectares of land in the state of Chiapas.13 While the Zapatistas fought against NAFTA, many of Mexico's displaced peasants joined the exodus of poor people from various parts of the country to cities in northern Mexico that were experiencing a boom in the manufacturing sector during the early years of the trade agreement. By 2000, NAFTA had created 700,000 manufacturing jobs in maquiladoras, or assembly plants, and the massive displacement of peasants from the countryside to the cities ensured a sufficient army of surplus labour to keep wages low — an average of $1.74 an hour.1 But by 2003, more than 300,000 of those jobs had moved overseas, primarily to China, where the interests of capital were being better served through labour costs that were even lower than in Mexico.15

Even at its height, NAFTA failed to create enough new manufacturing jobs to accommodate the newly displaced peasant population. Furthermore, many of the new jobs created simply replaced existing manufacturing jobs that were lost due to NAFTA. It is estimated that during the first decade of the free-trade agreement some 28,000 small and medium-sized businesses shut down because of their inability to compete with the cheap consumer products being imported and sold by multinational companies such as Wal-Mart that had begun operating in Mexico.16 Ultimately, total manufacturing employment throughout the country declined to 3.5 million by 2004, from a high of 4.1 million in 2000.11' The displacement of peasants in Mexico has paralleled a similar process throughout Latin America where farmers are impacted not only by neoliberal agricultural policies, but also by the opening up of natural resources to multinational corporations, particularly in the oil and mining sectors. Throughout the region, indigenous communities are engaged in a struggle to preserve their traditional — and often sustainable — ways of life against multinational mining companies that seek to exploit the natural resources situated in their territories. In almost every country in which these struggles are occurring, the mining companies are backed by liberal democratic governments that see foreign investment and the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources as essential for achieving economic growth.

Sub-point B is Resource Extraction.

Patten '17 outlines that Mexico changed their mining laws to gain support for NAFTA, stating that resources must be utilized and thus mandated exploitation of resources. Thus, Trew '14 of the Council of Canadians describes that NAFTA provided for a rapid expansion of mining activity in Mexico, as the government gave out 25,000 permits in the past 20 years for land to transnational mining companies, concluding that 28% of all land in Mexico is now exploited for resource extraction. Unfortunately, Patten '17 impacts that these resource extraction firms were granted the authority to forcefully vacate entire towns, displacing them with no alternative but to migrate.