

R2R

We affirm resolved: The deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea's best interests.

Our First and Only Contention is Deterring North Korean Aggression.

Warden at the SAIC in 2017 explains:

The Kim regime has consistently pursued reunifying the Korean peninsula under Pyongyang's terms. To achieve these objectives, the Kim regime has attempted to maintain a military sufficient to achieve unification, and deter U.S. and ROK aggression with a combination of military capabilities. Pyongyang demonstrated in 1950 that it was willing to use military force and run risks to try to achieve unification.

As a result, Warden writes:

War remains a real possibility based on the unique nature of the North Korean system, the massive forces arrayed in close proximity on both sides of the DMZ, the extensive militarization of North Korean society, and the extent of the Kim regime's military preparations.

Missile defenses are the only thing deterring a North Korean provocation. This is for two reasons.

First, deterrence through the alliance.

Hill of University of Denver explains this June that:

North Korea seeks nothing less than to decouple the US-South Korean alliance - a split that would enable the reunification of the Korean Peninsula on Kim's terms and set the stage for an invasion. If North Korea had long-range nuclear weapons, it might be

able to change the strategic calculus, by threatening to launch a nuclear attack on the US mainland in response to US intervention on the Korean Peninsula.

However, domestic missile systems offer sufficient protection. Pellerin at the Department of Defense in 2017 finds:

The defense system that protects the United States from ballistic missile attacks now outpaces the threat from adversaries.

To prevent North Korea from seizing the opportunity, the US needs to demonstrate that it stands by its ally. Missile defense is the strongest way to reaffirm the US commitment. Karako at the CSIS in 2017 explains:

In the absence of defenses, the United States might have to choose between Seoul and San Francisco. Even some limited protection of the United States against long-range missiles strengthens American resolve. By reducing the costs of conflict with an ICBM-capable adversary, strong homeland missile defenses can improve the credibility of US security guarantees to allies.

Second, deterrence through uncertainty.

North Korea must achieve a quick victory if it is to attack. Goure at the Lexington Institute in 2015 explains:

Pyongyang knows the consequences of failing to achieve its offensive objectives rapidly and decisively. It has spent 60 years deploying capabilities expressly directed at ensuring that, should war come again, it can execute a decisive first strike.

This is why their first strike strategy would be to overwhelm military bases with a missile strike and cut off reinforcements. Missile defense systems protect these bases and deny North Korea the ability to attack. Warden explains:

North Korea's goal would be to disrupt the flow of forces to the Korean peninsula. Deploying layered missile defenses to protect U.S. and allied forces involved in a war on the Korean peninsula would challenge North Korea's strategy by making it more difficult for Pyongyang to achieve a nuclear effect on a target. Pyongyang may well calculate that the risk of escalation is too high and choose restraint.

Sankaran at the University of Maryland in 2017 furthers:

Missile defense is expected to intercept a significant fraction of an early salvo of missiles, thereby giving the U.S.–ROK forces sufficient time to respond. Missile defense systems could offer a valuable capability to preserve important military assets, thereby strengthening overall deterrence.

THAAD and other missile defense systems are effective enough to prevent a successful North Korean attack. The Economist in 2017 finds:

A layered defence consisting of South Korea's Patriot system and THAAD would destroy 90% of incoming land-based missiles.

That makes South Korea significantly safer than it would be without missile defense.

Daewoo of the Sejong Institute in 2017 finds that:

Deploying the THAAD and patriot systems will save 700,000 civilians for intercepting two nuclear missiles.

Thus, we affirm.

Cut Cards

Deterrence

Warden, a policy analyst at the SAIC, in 2017 explains:

Warden 17 John K. Warden [policy analyst on the Strategic Analysis & Assessments team at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) in Arlington, Virginia], 3-2017, “North Korea’s Nuclear Posture: An Evolving Challenge for U.S. Deterrence”, Proliferation Papers //DF

The Kim regime has consistently pursued two primary objectives: ensuring the survival of the Kim family and its loyalists and reunifying the Korean peninsula under Pyongyang’s terms. To achieve these objectives, the Kim regime has attempted to eliminate internal threats to the regime, maintain a military sufficient to achieve unification, and deter U.S. and ROK aggression with a combination of military capabilities.⁴⁹ Pyongyang demonstrated in 1950 that it was willing to use military force and run risks to try to achieve unification, but has been deterred from trying again for the last sixty years. The U.S. Department of Defense assesses that “**North Korea uses reunification with South Korea as a key component of its national identity narrative to validate its strategy and policies,** and to justify sacrifices demanded of the populace. However, North Korea’s leaders almost certainly recognize that achieving reunification under North Korean control is, for the foreseeable future, unattainable.”⁵⁰ Yet the Kim regime has nonetheless been willing to use coercive diplomacy to achieve more limited revisionist objectives. Pyongyang has regularly attempted to use military threats and violent provocations to consolidate power domestically, influence politics in South Korea, gain diplomatic advantages, and extract political and economic concessions.⁵¹

As a result, Warden writes:

Warden 17 John K. Warden [policy analyst on the Strategic Analysis & Assessments team at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) in Arlington, Virginia], 3-2017, “North Korea’s Nuclear Posture: An Evolving Challenge for U.S. Deterrence”, Proliferation Papers //DF

Even if the optimists are correct and North Korea is unlikely to invade South Korea, there are still a number of ways renewed hostilities on the Korean peninsula could start and escalate. According to In-Bum Chun, who served as a Lieutenant General in the Republic of Korea Army, “**War remains a real possibility based on the unique nature of the North Korean system, the massive forces arrayed in close proximity on both sides of the DMZ, the extensive militarization of North Korean society, and the extent of the Kim regime’s military preparations.**”⁶¹ A low-level provocation— similar to the many NLL clashes or the August 2015 landmine incident— could escalate. With a more advanced nuclear weapons arsenal, Pyongyang is likely to be more confident that it can provoke and coerce to gain a psychological advantage in diplomacy and extract concessions.⁶² Politics in Pyongyang will provide incentives to pursue provocations, and many in Seoul are eager to teach North Korea a lesson. South Korean defense experts at a 2015 unofficial dialogue indicated that “after five years of North Korean provocations, Seoul is itching to strike back at North Korea

We are on the brink of a major North Korean military action. Missile defense systems are the only thing keeping them at bay, and it does so for two reasons.

First, deterrence through the alliance.

Hill of University of Denver explains this June that:

Christopher R. Hill (University of Denver). "North Korea's Real Strategy." June 20, 2017.

<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/north-korea-nuclear-program-invasion-by-christopher-r-hill-2017-06>

DENVER – North Korea's quest for nuclear weapons is often depicted as a "rational" response to its strategic imperatives of national security and regime survival. After all, the country is surrounded by larger, supposedly hostile states, and it has no allies on which it can rely to come to its defense. It is only logical, on this view, that Kim Jong-un wants to avoid the mistake made by Iraq's Saddam Hussein and Libya's Muammar el-Qaddafi, both of whom would still be alive and in power had they acquired deliverable nuclear weapons. In fact, **North Korea's appetite for nuclear weapons is rooted more in aggression than pragmatism. North Korea seeks nothing less than to decouple the United States from its South Korean partner – a split that would enable the reunification of the Korean Peninsula on Kim's terms.** In other words, North Korea does not want only to defend itself; it wants **[and] to set the stage for an invasion of its own.** Of course, such a scenario is, in many ways, the stuff of fancy. But to be a North Korean today is not necessarily to accept the world as it is. And North Korean propaganda continues to reiterate the view that the Korean Peninsula consists of one people, sharing one language and one culture, indivisible – except by outsiders like the US. By this logic, the North needs to find a way to discourage those outsiders from intervening in the peninsula's affairs. As it stands, the US-South Korea relationship operates on the basis of something like the North Atlantic Treaty's collective-defense clause, Article 5: any North Korean aggression against South Korea will, it is assured, be met by the combined forces of South Korea and the US. Such a counterattack would be decisive, ensuring the total destruction of the North Korean regime. **If North Korea had long-range nuclear weapons, however, it might be able to change the strategic calculus, by threatening to launch a nuclear attack on the US mainland in response to US intervention on the Korean Peninsula.** The US might intervene anyway, launching its own devastating attack on North Korea. But it might also choose not to risk casualties on its own soil. If the US did shirk its collective-defense responsibilities, South Korea would still have plenty of recourse against its northern neighbor. After all, South Korea's conventional forces are far better trained, equipped, and motivated than their North Korean counterparts. But it is hard to say whether the North Koreans know that. Like many dictatorships before them, they may be the first to believe their own propaganda – in this case, that they can succeed against a South Korean foe that is not buttressed by American military might.

To prevent North Korea from seizing the opportunity, the US needs to demonstrate that it stands by its ally. Missile defense is the strongest way to reaffirm the US commitment. Karako at the CSIS in 2017 explains:

Karako 17 Thomas Karako [senior fellow with the International Security Program and the director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies], 2017, "Missile Defense and the Nuclear Posture Review," Strategic Studies Quarterly,

http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-3/Karako.pdf //DF

A second objective that missile defense complements in the US nuclear posture is the assurance of allies. The viability of US security commitments presupposes that the United States will remain willing and able to come to the defense of its allies and avoid becoming decoupled from them. In this respect, both defenses of the American homeland and regional defenses can support assurance. **In the absence of defenses, the United States might have to face the** proverbial **choice between trading New York for Berlin**, or Los Angeles for Taipei. Military action against regional threats from Libya and Iraq, for instance, might have carried a significantly greater degree of risk had they possessed intercontinental-range missiles. **Even some limited protection of the United States against long-range missile blackmail might therefore stimulate American resolve.** Such a risk to the basic international order and US projection of power informs the long-standing US opposition to Iranian and North Korean ICBMs. **By reducing the costs of conflict with an ICBM-capable adversary, strong homeland missile defenses can improve the credibility of US security guarantees to allies.**²⁵

The US domestic missile defense system is effective enough to protect the country

Pellerin 17 Cheryl Pellerin, 6-8-2017, "Officials: U.S. Missile Defense System Outpaces Threat," U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,

<https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1208062/officials-us-missile-defense-system-outpaces-threat/> //DF

The defense system that protects the United States from ballistic missile attacks now outpaces the threat from adversaries out to 2020, and the Defense Department is advancing the capability to stay ahead of the threat into the future, defense officials said on Capitol Hill yesterday. Thomas H. Harvey III, acting assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities, and Missile Defense Agency Director Navy Vice Adm. James D. Syring testified before the House

Armed Services Committee's subcommittee on strategic forces, discussing fiscal year 2018 missile defense posture and priorities. The department continues efforts to sustain and modernize homeland missile defense capabilities so the nation stays ahead of the threat while providing an effective, integrated and interoperable regional missile defense capability, Harvey said. "The U.S. homeland is currently protected by the ground-based midcourse defense system --

the GMD system. Improving the capacity, reliability and effectiveness of the GMD system is one of our highest priorities," he added. Funding for 2018 Harvey told the panel that the fiscal 2018 proposed budget -- which Syring said in his written testimony requests \$7.9 billion for the Missile Defense Agency -- would fund a redesigned exo-atmospheric kill vehicle and long-range discrimination radar. It would also help to lay the groundwork for a new radar in Hawaii, continue funding for advanced discrimination center technology and space-based kill assessment programs, and remain on track to complete deployment of remaining interceptors in Alaska by the end of this year to bring the total to 44, the assistant secretary said. "We're also moving forward with efforts to bolster our defenses against advanced cruise missiles," he added. Allies and Partners From a regional standpoint, Harvey said, the 2018 budget request continues the deployment of missile defenses tailored to threats in Europe, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region. "In Europe, we would continue to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach, EPAA, and work in close collaboration with our NATO allies to develop an advanced network of sensors and interceptors," he said. The EPAA addresses the threat from Iranian short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to U.S. troops and interests in Europe. The budget request supports the Aegis Ashore system scheduled for deployment in Poland in the 2018 time frame, Harvey said, noting that NATO allies have committed to spend more than \$1 billion on NATO ballistic missile defense command and control, and many U.S. allies are improving national BMD capabilities. "In the Asia-Pacific, our force posture includes Aegis BMD-capable ships along with Patriot batteries deployed in Japan and South Korea, and the recent deployment of [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] to South Korea. We've also converted the THAAD battery deployment to Guam to permanent status in response to North Korean threats," he added. The United States maintains a robust ballistic missile defense presence in the Middle East, including land- and sea-based assets deployed in defense of forward-located forces and those of allies and partners, Harvey said. Looking ahead, the assistant secretary said, means ensuring that the U.S. investment strategy and priorities "balance the needs of addressing the most dangerous threats we confront today while positioning ourselves to respond to emerging threats over the next decade." Outpacing the Threat In his testimony before the panel, Syring showed and narrated a video of the May 30 ground-based interceptor test over the Pacific Ocean, submitting his written statement for the record in lieu of an opening statement. The day after the May 30 interceptor test, Syring said during a phone briefing with reporters that the interceptor tested outpaced the threat to the United States through 2020. The intelligence community gives us a body of evidence about where they think

the threat is today and where it will evolve by 2020. We design tests specifically to incorporate the attributes of that threat today and what the intelligence community predicts it will be in say three

years," he added. In his written testimony, Syring said the MDA 2018 budget request will continue the development of reliable, increasingly capable, and state-of-the-art defenses against ballistic missiles for the nation, deployed forces, allies and international partners. "Everything that this committee has supported over the last four years," he told the subcommittee, "has been targeted toward a near-term -- which is now part of the program of record and a fielded set of capabilities -- a mid-term and a far-term capability." Mid-term is defined by 2020, he added, "and everything that we are working on and fielding is to stay ahead of the threat by 2020."

JJ Suh (The Asia-Pacific Journal). Missile Defense and the Security Dilemma: THAAD, Japan's "Proactive Peace," and the Arms Race in Northeast Asia. Published 4/27/17. <http://apjif.org/2017/09/Suh.html>.

The THAAD system, particularly its radar AN/TPY-2, deployed in South Korea acquires significance in this strategic context. If North Korea should succeed in developing an ICBM and launch it against the U.S. continent, its trajectory would follow the great circle that goes through Alaska, making Fort Greely the ideal location for an anti-ballistic

missile system. An AN/TPY-2 radar **[The THAAD batteries] in the South can detect an ICBM launch and relay its trajectory to the GMD** in Fort Greely. In addition, if the North should attempt an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack by flying the device southward, the radar could serve as a critical early detection system and THAAD's interceptor missiles can be employed to shoot down the EMP device during its ascent.⁶ The following maps show the two possible paths that North Korea's ICBM or satellite could take to reach the U.S. continent.

Second, deterrence through uncertainty.

However, North Korea must achieve a quick victory if it is to attack. Goure at the Lexington Institute in 2015 explains:

Goure 15 Daniel Gouré, Ph.D., 3-30-2015, "U.S. Should Deploy THAAD Missile Defense To South Korea," Lexington Institute,
<http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/u-s-should-deploy-thaad-missile-defense-to-south-korea//DF>

Detering aggression requires, at a minimum, creating uncertainty in the mind of the aggressor state that it can win quickly, if at all. Beyond this, the defender also must convince the would-be aggressor that he faces the certainty of suffering unacceptable costs, if not military defeat. This was the approach the U.S. and its allies took with respect to deterring the Soviet Union. Over decades, the West continually upgraded and shaped its conventional and nuclear forces so as to make it clear to Moscow that it couldn't achieve a rapid conventional victory nor a disarming nuclear first strike. The essential elements of a deterrence strategy remain the same in the 21st Century. What has changed are the capabilities available both to the prospective aggressors in their efforts to develop a first strike advantage and the nations seeking to deter them. **Nowhere are the challenges associated with deterring a prospective aggressor clearer than on the Korean peninsula. The regime in Pyongyang knows better than most the consequences of failing to achieve its offensive objectives rapidly and decisively. It has spent the 60-plus-years since the 1953 armistice developing and deploying capabilities expressly directed at ensuring [that], should war with its neighbor to the south come again, it can execute a decisive first strike.** Some 60 percent of North Korea's Army is deployed within easy striking distance of South Korea's capitol, Seoul, along with approximately 13,000 pieces of artillery and rocket launchers. Pyongyang also has a 100,000-man-strong Special Operations Corps that could flood the South for the purpose of paralyzing communications and movement.

This is why their first strike strategy would be to overwhelm military bases with a missile strike and cut off reinforcements. Missile defense systems protect these bases and denies North Korea the ability to attack. Warden explains:

Warden 17 John K. Warden [policy analyst on the Strategic Analysis & Assessments team at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) in Arlington, Virginia], 3-2017, "North Korea's Nuclear Posture: An Evolving Challenge for U.S. Deterrence", Proliferation Papers //DF

First, the United States and its allies should challenge North Korea's ability to conduct limited nuclear strikes. If nuclear threats were to fail and North Korea used nuclear weapons to coerce the United States and its allies, **Pyongyang might launch a nuclear strike** with one or two nuclear weapons **against a relatively remote military target such** as a U.S. surface action group or a military base on Japan. **Such a strike would have a significant military impact and demonstrate North Korean resolve,** but would allow North Korea to argue that it exercised restraint. **North Korea's goal would be to disrupt the flow of forces to the Korean peninsula** and scare Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul while demonstrating willingness to control its nuclear use. **Deploying layered missile defenses to protect U.S. and allied forces involved in a war on the Korean peninsula**

would challenge North Korea's strategy by making it more difficult for Pyongyang to achieve a nuclear effect on a target with only a handful of weapons.⁹⁰ The United States has already taken steps in this direction by deploying a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in Guam and Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors aboard Aegis cruisers.⁹¹ In addition, the United States is making arrangements to deploy an additional THAAD battery in South Korea, cooperatively developing a new SM-3 interceptor with Japan, and pursuing additional technologies that are likely to make its missile defenses more reliable and cost effective. South Korea is also planning to develop its own indigenous missile defense system. **If the United States and its allies have a credible layered defense in place, North Korea, when considering nuclear use against U.S. and allied forces or bases in the theater, would be forced to choose between a large nuclear strike that is more likely to penetrate missile defenses,** but, because of its size, would increase pressure in the United States to respond more forcefully, on the one hand, **and no nuclear use on the other. Given those options, Pyongyang may well calculate that the risk of escalation is too high and choose restraint.**

Sankaran at the University of Maryland in 2017 furthers:

Sankaran 17 Jaganath Sankaran [Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland], 2-6-2017, "Missile defense and strategic stability: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea," Contemporary Security Policy, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2017.1280744> //DF

Conceivably, **the deterrence of the American nuclear umbrella might dissuade North Korean use of nuclear force** (O'Neil, 2005, pp. 327–338). **However, the North Korean missile threat outlined above must be taken seriously and a credible defense against such threats is needed. In a major military contingency for the U.S. ROK alliance, North Korea could potentially launch hundreds of SCUDs into South Korean cities and military bases simultaneously.** The North Koreans have recently demonstrated another worrisome capability. On March 26 2014, North Korea test fired two medium-range Nodong missiles, one day after a trilateral South Korea–Japan–U.S. meeting ("NK's March missile," 2014). Particularly worrisome about this test were the launch tactics. **Instead of flying a nominal trajectory with a range of 1500 kilometers, the Nodong flew a modified trajectory for a distance of only about 650 kilometers** ("NK's March missile," 2014). **It was apparently launched at a steeper (i.e. lofted) angle, rose to an altitude higher than usual and fell back down with a much higher speed. Such a missile trajectory would likely be quite difficult to defend using the** Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-2/3) point defense batteries already in place. As reported, according to an anonymous senior South Korean military source, by carrying out such a test, North Korea appears to have come up with a way not to be caught by either the South Korean or American missile interception system when launching an attack against South Korea with its midrange missiles. ("NK's March missile," 2014) **A THAAD system would likely have a better chance of handling missile trajectories when "launched at high trajectories (i.e. arcing at a high angle and reaching a high altitude relative to the ground distance traveled)"** (Grisafi, 2015). With a presumed capability to have an intercept range of 200 kilometers with a maximum altitude ceiling of approximately 150 kilometers, **THAAD would, in principle, be able to execute intercepts earlier when the North Korean Nodong missile would be more vulnerable** (Kasper & Balle, 2014). Missile defense, however, cannot provide 100% guaranteed defense against every incoming missile. Rather, **missile defense is expected to intercept a significant fraction of an early salvo of missiles, thereby giving the U.S.–ROK forces sufficient time to respond.** The presence of THAAD will not eliminate the missile threat that U.S.–ROK forces might face from North Korea. Specifically, a single THAAD battery⁴ is likely sufficient to defeat a barrage of a small number of threat missiles. North Korea, on the other hand, is believed to possess 250–300 Nodong missiles that can be launched in a short time window (The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2015, p. 64). Even with an idealized ratio of one interceptor for every missile, one or two THAAD batteries would only be able to provide only limited protection to critical civilian and military assets. A large North Korean attack salvo of hundred(s) of missiles could still cause severe damage to alliance forces or civilian populations. Nevertheless, **THAAD along with the Patriot systems could offer a valuable capability to preserve important military assets, thereby strengthening overall deterrence.**

The THAAD and other missile defense systems are effective enough to prevent a successful North Korean attack. The Economist in 2017 finds:

"Why China is wrong to be furious about THAAD." The Economist. 23 Mar. 2017. Web. 17 Jul. 2017.

<https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21719485-deployment-american-anti-missile-system-south-korea-does-not-threaten-chinas-nuclear>

America says it has repeatedly offered Chinese officials technical briefings on the radar's capabilities and limitations. They have shown little interest, possibly because they do not really disagree about the threat THAAD represents. Chinese military analysts have boasted of China's ability to "blind" THAAD (meaning to incapacitate it through electronic interference)—a further indication that the outrage is politically motivated. It is also wrong to suggest that THAAD does nothing to protect South Korea from the North. In a paper for 38 North, a website, Mr Elleman and Michael Zagurek calculate that **faced with 50-missile salvoes, a layered defence consisting of South Korea's Patriot system and two THAAD batteries** (another may be deployed when it is available) **would probably destroy 90% of incoming land-based missiles. The threat that one of the 10% getting through might be carrying a nuclear warhead would not be eliminated. But South Korea is a lot safer with THAAD than without it.** It is more likely, however, that China, always resentful of the presence of American troops so near its borders, sees an opportunity to use THAAD to weaken America's alliance with South Korea. It may hope that its bullying might yet pressure South Korea's next president into reversing the deployment. If that is the intention, however, it has probably overplayed its hand, raising Korean hackles with its blatantly coercive methods.

That makes South Korea significantly safer than it would be without missile defense.

Daewoo of the Sejong Institute in 2017 finds that:

Lee Daewoo "Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)" Director of Security and Strategy Studies Department 14 Apr 2017 Web. 15 Aug. 2017.

http://www.sejong.org/board/bd_news/22/egofiledn.php?conf_seq=24&bd_seq=3737&file_seq=8561

Meanwhile, the safety of the local residents living in the area of deployment has also been confirmed through various methods. The THAAD radar safety assessment has been carried out at the same level with TPY-2 radar and was concluded to be safe. That is, it was confirmed that the radar had no negative repercussions for the milieu, air, soil, animals, and vegetation. To detect a long distance, the THAAD battery will be deployed at a high altitude, and radar will be operated more than 5 degrees above ground. It will keep a 100 meters clearance distance, and will be deployed at the inner part, at least 500m inside the base. Obviously, even though there are costs to bear, **deploying THAAD (and PAC-3) will save** around 340,000 civilians for intercepting one North Korean nuclear missile and **700,000 civilians for intercepting two nuclear missiles.** As such, there are 4 sufficient reasons to deploy THAAD in South Korea. Need for an additional THAAD deployment: Since THAAD's radar could sweep 120 degrees frontward, at least two batteries are needed to defend South Korea. However, this is under the condition that the THAAD radar is not positioned toward the West Sea, therefore China. Three THAAD batteries are purportedly required to defend the whole of South

Avoiding a military outbreak is in South Korea's best interests. Chong at Hankuk University in 2016 explains:

Chong 16 Chong Jin Oh [Professor Dr., Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Fulbright Visiting Professor State University of New York], 2016, "NEO-COLD WAR IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA: RISING TENSION BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA," Review of International Law and Politics //DF

North Korea's recent provocation and South Korea's tough reaction are escalating the tension in the region to Cold War levels. North Korea's twin provocations of a fourth nuclear test on January 6 and a long-range rocket launch on February 7 both dramatically escalated tensions on the divided peninsula while simultaneously adding fuel to the already crackling fire of U.S.-China rivalry in East Asia. These two events have brought conspicuous change - and an uncertain future - to the Korean Peninsula. The current South Korean government reaction's has broken

from precedent and now tension in the Korean Peninsula is like a runaway train. In the past, South Korea has taken a defensive realist policy not unlike that of neighboring China. This is mostly because **South Korea has no interest in any type of military confrontation with the North. A conventional military conflict would certainly result in a victory for South Korea**, especially with almost assured U.S. aid, **but would devastate the capital Seoul, which sits only 40 km from the demarcation line**. Accordingly, China and **South Korea had a shared security interest in preventing war in the Korean Peninsula**. However, continuous aggressive military gestures on the part of North Korea are shifting the region's security paradigm. China seems to be continuing its traditional protective policy towards North Korea, a stance which has disappointed the South Korean government. Many South Korean commentators are arguing that, in refusing to join in international efforts to punish Pyongyang, China has shown itself not interested in preventing the rise of nuclear-armed North Korea, but rather interested in preserving North Korea's role as a strategic regional asset for Chinese interests. It is obvious that China has an interest in maintaining the status quo in the Korean peninsula, as North Korea acts as a physical buffer for China. North Korea could possibly be forced to abandon its nuclear aspirations if China were to impose harsh economic sanctions but China fears that this would result in internal collapse of the North Korea regime which would eventually lead to loss of their buffer zone.

Pre-Emptive Strike

Gehrke at the Washington Examiner in 2017 reports:

Gehrke 17 Joel Gehrke, 9-9-2017, "Lindsey Graham: Trump 'told me' he's willing to launch pre-emptive North Korea attack," Washington Examiner, <http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/lindsey-graham-trump-told-me-hes-willing-to-launch-pre-emptive-north-korea-attack/article/2631153> //DF

President Trump is "willing" to launch a pre-emptive strike on North Korea to prevent the regime from having the capability to strike the United States with a nuclear weapon, according to a top Senate Republican. Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., said Thursday **our policy has changed dramatically" under Trump, who doesn't want North Korea to be allowed to develop the technology required for a nuclear strike on the United States**. Graham added he wants Congress to vote to authorize the use of military force against North Korea, even though he believes Trump doesn't need the permission. "We cannot allow the capability to mature in North Korea that could put every American sitting in the crosshairs of a nuclear attack by a very unstable, provocative leader of North Korea," Graham told conservative talk show host Hugh Hewitt. "We're going to deny that capability, and our policy has changed dramatically, and we're trying to make sure that our allies and our enemies know that." Graham is a traditional Republican foreign policy hawk of the sort Trump denounced during the 2016 presidential campaign, but he maintained he and the president agree on the new North Korea policy.

Thankfully, missile defense systems give Trump a way out. Karako at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2017 explains:

Thomas Karako (Senior Fellow at the Strategic Studies Quarterly). "Missile Defense and the Nuclear Posture Review." Fall 2017. [http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-3/Karako.pdf?utm_source=Strategic+Studies+Quarterly&utm_campaign=bee7b014af-SSQ+Fall+2017+Campaign&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4b8d69edd5-bee7b014af-214545441&mc_cid=bee7b014af&mc_eid=\[UNIQID\]](http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-3/Karako.pdf?utm_source=Strategic+Studies+Quarterly&utm_campaign=bee7b014af-SSQ+Fall+2017+Campaign&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4b8d69edd5-bee7b014af-214545441&mc_cid=bee7b014af&mc_eid=[UNIQID])

Crisis stability. **Missile defenses may improve crisis stability by providing the United States courses of action other than preemption or retaliation. In the days prior to North Korea's 2006 Taepodong-2 launch, some former senior officials recommended a preemptive US strike against the North Korean missile site.**¹⁵ **The existence of a limited US homeland missile defense capability, however, provided President Bush with an alternative to preemptively striking North Korea's launch facilities. Such a defensive posture creates options for decision-makers that can contribute to stability.** A more recent example of missile defense contributing to crisis stability occurred in October 2016, when two or more anti-ship cruise missiles reportedly were

fired at the USS Mason as it sailed off the coast of Yemen. Instead of being hit, the ship employed defensive systems and was unharmed.¹⁶ Absent these active defenses, the United States could have been drawn further into the conflict. Instead, the United States was able to assess what had taken place and limit its response to a reprisal with a cruise missile strike.¹⁷ Raising the threshold for attack. Missile defenses also serve the purpose of raising the threshold for aggression for an adversary wishing to pursue coercive escalatory threats or actual strikes against the United States. Denying adversaries a “cheap shot” option against the American homeland or military forces may deter them from taking such actions. Missile defenses therefore can change the calculus of potential adversaries. They can create uncertainty about the effect of an escalatory threat or attack and thereby help thwart adversary escalation strategies. Buying time and creating options. Missile defense also buys time and creates otherwise unavailable options for decision-makers. Even limited and imperfect defenses create time and space for diplomacy or to attrite adversary missile forces with other means.¹⁸ In so doing, pressure to strike adversary launchers prior to launch is thereby relaxed.¹⁹ Difficulties of Scud hunting during the Gulf War demonstrated that relying on preemption alone, in addition to potentially creating instabilities, may be unreliable, especially if an adversary deploys mobile missiles.²⁰

If Trump wants to launch a preemptive strike, he can. Wellerstein at the Washington Post in 2016 explains:

Alex Wellerstein, 12-1-2016, "No one can stop President Trump from using nuclear weapons. That's by design.," Washington Post

https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/12/01/no-one-can-stop-president-trump-from-using-nuclear-weapons-thats-by-design/?utm_term=.ab34cd976f54 //DF

All year, the prospect of giving the real estate and reality TV mogul the power to launch attacks that would kill millions of people was one of the main reasons his opponents argued against electing him. “A man you can bait with a tweet is not a man we can trust with nuclear weapons,” Hillary Clinton said in her speech accepting the Democratic presidential nomination. She cut an ad along the same lines. Republicans who didn't support Trump — and even some who did, such as Sen. Marco Rubio (Fla.) — also said they didn't think he could be trusted with the launch codes. Now they're his. When **Trump [has]** takes office in January, he will have **sole authority over more than 7,000 warheads. There is no failsafe. The whole point of U.S. nuclear weapons control is to make sure that the president — and only the president — can use them** if and **whenever he decides to do so**. The one sure way to keep President Trump from launching a nuclear attack, under the system we've had in place since the early Cold War, would have been to elect someone else.

Any pre-emptive strike on North Korea would cause a war. The Economist in 2017 reports:

Economist 17 8-5-2017, "How to avoid nuclear war with North Korea," Economist,

<https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21725768-there-are-no-good-options-curb-kim-jong-un-blundering-war-would-be-worst-how> //DF

President Donald Trump has vowed to stop North Korea from perfecting a nuclear warhead that could threaten the American mainland, tweeting that “it won't happen!” Some pundits suggest shooting down future test missiles on the launchpad or, improbably, in the air. Others suggest using force to overthrow the regime or pre-emptive strikes to destroy Mr Kim's nuclear arsenal before he has a chance to use it. Yet it is just this sort of military action that risks a ruinous escalation. Mr **Kim [Jong Un]'s bombs and missile-launchers are scattered and well hidden. America's armed forces**, for all their might, **cannot reliably neutralise the North Korean nuclear threat before Mr Kim has a chance to retaliate. The task would be difficult even if the Pentagon had good intelligence about North Korea; it does not**. The only justification for a pre-emptive strike would be to prevent an imminent nuclear attack on America or one of its allies.

Extras

With the North recently having acquired the ability to hit the US, allies in the region will be concerned about decoupling. Wolfsthal in 2017 writes in Foreign Policy Magazine:

Wolfsthal 17 Jon Wolfsthal, 7-12-2017, "How to Reason With a Nuclear Rogue," Foreign Policy, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/12/north-korea-nukes-icbm-test-nuclear-weapons/> //DF

First, we must decide what we want to deter North Korea from doing with its newly acquired capabilities. My personal list starts with making clear that North Korea can never use nuclear weapons or missiles, and that it should not conduct any live fire tests with nuclear weapons.

With the North having acquired the ability to hit the United States, allies in the region will be concerned about what is known in deterrence speak as "decoupling." **Now that North Korea can hit American territory, leaders in Japan and South Korea will understandably worry whether the United States will trade Seattle to protect Seoul**, or risk Los Angeles for Tokyo. Paris and Berlin had the same worry during the cold war, and we eased it only through great effort and investment. Making clear, declaratory statements that America is prepared and willing to back up its allies, and repeating them with conviction, is critical to any successful deterrent and reassurance strategy. Sadly, this is not Trump's forte. He and his cabinet need to get better at it, and soon.

Cottee, a Research Associate at the IISS, in 2016 explains:

Cottee 16 Matthew Cottee [Research Associate in Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy at the IISS], 3-4-2016, "Between a Rock and a THAAD Place," International Institute for Strategic Studies, <https://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2016-9143/march-71d7/between-a-rock-and-a-thaad-place-f193> //DF

From Seoul's perspective, the deployment of [missile defense] the THAAD system could have several symbolic functions. It **would reaffirm American commitment to South Korea at a time when extended deterrence is increasingly questioned**. Overflights by US B-52s, as well as F-22 deployments, are designed to reassure South Korea while also sending a message of strength to Pyongyang. THAAD represents a further declaration of both allegiance and technological superiority. Relatedly, the deployment of an [anti-missile system] advanced system such as THAAD may also undermine calls for indigenous development of nuclear weapons in Seoul, which are justified as a necessary defensive tool against the North.