

We negate; resolved: NATO should strengthen its relationship with Ukraine in order to deter further Russian aggression.

**Observation One:** NATO must look toward what benefits themselves and what forwards their purposes. To that end, NATO would not take an action that is more harmful than beneficial. Therefore, the round must default to a cost-benefit analysis. Moreover, the primary purpose of NATO is protection of its member nations. Outside of those nations, **NATO explains**

A decision reached by consensus is an agreement reached by common consent, a decision that is accepted by each member country. This means that **when a "NATO decision" is announced, it is the expression of the collective will of all the sovereign states that are members of the Alliance.**

Therefore, if member nations are opposed to Ukrainian intervention, then there is no scenario to affirm.

**Observation Two:** The resolution's use of the word 'strengthen' indicates that there must be some new level of interaction between Ukraine and NATO, not merely existent cooperation. In addition, absent significant reasons to affirm, the baseline costs associated with such actions should be reason enough to default to the Con.

**Contention One:** NATO promotes a harmful power sharing complex.

**Sub-point A:** NATO politics.

### Marko Papic explains

Though some recommendations do target issues that plague the alliance, they fail to address the unaddressable, namely, the lack of a unified perception of threats and how those threats should be prioritized and responded to. Ultimately, **the credibility and deterrent value of an alliance is rooted in potential adversaries' perception of the alliance's resolve.** During the Cold War, that resolve, while never unquestioned -- the Europeans were always skeptical of U.S. willingness to risk New York and Washington in a standoff with Russia over European turf -- was strong and repeatedly demonstrated. The United States launched proxy wars in Korea and Vietnam largely to demonstrate unequivocally to European governments -- and the Kremlin -- that the United States was willing to bleed in far corners of the planet for its allies. U.S. troops stationed in West Germany, some of whom were in immediate danger of being cut off in West Berlin, served to demonstrate U.S. resolve against Soviet armor poised on the North European Plain and just to the east of the Fulda Gap in Hesse. **Recent years have not seen a reaffirmation of such resolve, but rather the opposite** when the United States -- and NATO -- failed to respond to the Russian military intervention in Georgia, a committed NATO aspirant though not a member. This was due not only to a lack of U.S. forces but also to Germany's and France's refusal to risk their relationships with Russia over Georgia.

### Nikolas Gvosdev furthers

The Ukraine crisis is demonstrating that EU solidarity only extends so far, and that **key EU nations are still unwilling to completely jeopardize their own beneficial links with Russia.** Britain is happy to impose stronger sanctions on Russia—as long as financial transactions aren't targeted. France is loath to give up on defense sales, while Germany does not want to jeopardize its position in the Russian energy industry. The EU Parliament may want to suspend important projects with Russia like the South Stream pipeline, but individual EU countries and companies are moving ahead regardless. Moreover, the rise of nationalist parties throughout Europe, promoting not a unified single European entity but "a Europe of the fatherlands," puts increasing pressure on governments to work to defend national interests. And **if national interests are served by preserving good relations with Russia, then there will be increased reluctance to join in EU efforts to pressure Moscow over Ukraine.**

But the underlying reality is that NATO and EU members, for the most part, have been looking for excuses not to get involved in confronting Russia, and parsing obligations and definitions of attack is part of that process. NATO and EU expansion was sold to many of the existing members as a low-cost, no-risk venture—extending security assurances that no one expected would ever be called in. Putin's gamble is that he can compel the West to draw a definitive line in the east beyond which the Euro-Atlantic community will not go. So far, it is paying off.

Ukraine recognizes this and also doesn't want to join NATO. **Parag Khanna in his book *The Second World* elaborates**

Europe delivers not just grand illusions but also practical solutions. Whereas America's approach to democracy promotion in Ukraine – backing one party relentlessly – led to an entrenched and complacent regime, European parliamentary groups and NGOs support multiple political parties, thus building a stable democratic foundation. Because European governance systems are themselves parliamentary (not presidential, as in the United States), their strategy ultimately serves Western goals better. Furthermore, while American-led NATO used to be the tip of the West's spear, paving the way for EU membership by absorbing not entirely qualified countries into the alliance, the EU's gravitational pull has become far stronger and less controversial. "It's not just Russia which has halted NATO expansion," reminded a presidential adviser keen to assert his country's sovereignty, "but we Ukrainians are also divided about military partnerships which involve subjugation to the United States – the same way [they] we feel about Russia." Yet even the pro-Russian premier Yanukovich is keen on EU membership, since as senior Russian parliamentarian Vladimir Ryzhkov conceded, the EU is "the most successful model in history."

### **Sub-point B: Re-ignition of the Cold War.**

First, Russia is shifting back to the East. **Ankit Panda reports** of a partnership between Russia and China According to a report in RIA Novosti, the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has suspended all contacts with NATO due to the crisis in Ukraine. Russia's preeminent status as a leader in CSTO effectively guaranteed that the organization would have to sever ties with NATO, given the impasse over Russia's annexation of Crimea and its current coercive position on the eastern Ukrainian frontier. CSTO Secretary-General Nikolai Bordyuzha told a press conference, "For now we will not be making any efforts to establish contact with NATO, due to their stance during the Ukrainian crisis."

### **Panda continues**

One report in the Belarussian Telegraph Agency further cites Bordyuzha as stating that, after several failed attempts at cooperating with NATO, the CSTO will look towards the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and China. "We are also about to start cooperating with other organizations that take care of security matters in the Asian region," he said. Bordyuzha [and] also referred to Iran as a burgeoning partner for the CSTO.

Second, NATO continues its zero-sum view of Ukraine. **Robin Sheperd explains**

In the rapidly moving and highly unpredictable situation in Ukraine, we need to be clear about one thing that is constant: Ukraine is a fundamentally unstable political-national construction; a product of a centuries-old tug of war between empires competing for hegemony, without any of them being able to effect a viable long-term settlement that is not enforced by one form or another of authoritarian rule.

### **Contention Two: NATO escalation undermines Russo-West cooperation.**

Any NATO response to the Ukraine crisis can and will be seen as escalation by Russia. **Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in an interview**

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in an interview with the Kremlin's satellite news network Russia Today that any attack on Russian interests amidst the tumult in eastern Ukraine would be considered an attack against Russia, comparing

Russia's stance to its military incursion in the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia.

"If [Russia were] we are attacked, [Russia] we would certainly respond", Lavrov said. "If our interests, our legitimate interests, the interests of Russians have been attacked directly, like they were in South Ossetia for example, I do not see any [there is no] other way but to respond in accordance with international law."

Additionally, Russia remains very wary of the West. **George Friedman of Stratfor Intelligence writes**

The Russians are convinced that the uprising in Kiev was fomented by Western intelligence services supporting nongovernmental organizations and that without this, the demonstrations would have died out and the government would have survived. This is not a new narrative on the Russians' part. They also claimed that the Orange Revolution had the same roots. The West denies this. What is important is that the Russians believe this. That means that they

believe that Western intelligence has the ability to destabilize Ukraine and potentially other countries in the Russian sphere of influence, or even Russia itself. This makes the Russians wary of U.S. power.

This means that any Russian actions we have already observed in response to Western measures would likely also escalate.

One example is Russia's recent announcement to cease space cooperation by 2020, which is problematic because **Robert Wright writes**

Professor Mark Sims of the University of Leicester, who has been involved in nine space missions including as mission manager of the unsuccessful Beagle 2 Mars lander, says: "Space has not been an area where international politics has really played a role since the end of the cold war and it is an obvious area where Russia's expertise and technological knowhow is very important."

He says the decision by Moscow to target the supply of rocket engines to the US "could potentially hit all space programmes quite seriously" if it were allowed to escalate.

**George Putic concludes**

With diminishing public support and ever-shrinking budgets for sending human crews on deep space missions, officials realize that international cooperation is a necessity.

Space brings about technical innovation and economic growth. Absent cooperation, these cannot occur.

This can balloon to other areas of potential cooperation. **Sven-Eric Fikenscher of Harvard University's International Security Program writes**

Washington needs to make a decision about its foreign-policy priorities, if tensions in eastern Ukraine are not reduced. Giving the events in Ukraine priority over all other international developments is a hazardous strategy. Negotiations have gotten us nowhere, and way more assertive steps against Russia are not likely to make Putin give in, since he seems to be determined not to lose his influence over eastern Ukraine and eager to demonstrate Russia's power. Furthermore, a much tougher stance on Russia might backfire easily, since Moscow might react by undermining fundamental American national-security interests. The dual approach of enacting targeted sanctions against Russia on the one hand and engaging Moscow on the other is messy and troublesome. And yet, there is no better alternative for the time being.