

Clempner Ranch PF April 2019 Blocks


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A2 World Bank Loans

1. India already has enough geopolitical clout to influence institutions like the world bank for more loans, it has the world's second biggest population and is the biggest democracy. That's why the Times of India '18 finds that in the status quo India is the second biggest receiver for world bank loans.
2. The Economic Times '19 writes that the types of loans the World Bank gives in general to India are not adequate for what the country needs. In the past the funding had been effective at poverty reduction, but now India has demographically shifted to become more middle income and the World Bank finances only a tiny fraction of India's needs.
3. If India does get a disproportionate amount of the loans then if anything it is just taking away the benefits they talk about from other countries who they hog them, and this is crucial because those other countries needs the loans a whole lot more because they have a limited amount while India already receives a huge supply.

<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-second-largest-recipient-of-world-banks-loans/articleshow/64536636.cms>



<https://outline.com/aY58sM>- Economic Times '19

India has been the largest recipient of WB financing. It has received over \$100 billion, a little more than half of it in IBRD loans and the rest in IDA. India's IDA eligibility will end soon. IFC has invested almost \$ 15 billion from its own and associated sources. **This has, no doubt, helped India. But the World Bank Group is now a small contributor to India's development needs. What low middle-income countries like India, whose per capita income is around \$2,000, need are huge amounts of capital to propel their development in an inclusive and sustainable manner and ensure they are not stuck in a 'middle-income trap'.** The World Bank must be re-oriented in five ways to help: The IBRD part of the institution for which it was originally set up has grown less relevant but needs to be revived. The **World Bank's loans now typically, provide a tiny fraction of those financing needs – especially in middle-income countries like India.**

A2 Modi Reelection (Good)

1. If Modi does get reelected it only amplifies our impact, the Times of India from case says that Modi has a hardline stance on the Kashmir looking to strip away rights and ramp up aggression. That's why in the last 5 years there has been a 94% increase in number of security forces killed and a 177% increase in terrorist incidents. If Modi wins he will continue this aggression and coupled with membership will intensify the conflict in Kashmir even more.

- 2.
3. Will not affect the voting base for Modi, if you vote for foreign policy issues, you already vote for Modi.
4. Forbes '19 finds that Modi is already on track for repeat victory this year and the BJP will still hover around a majority in Lok Sabha. This is why Russel of Express News this week reports that most experts and polls believe Modi will win the slim majority. He doesn't need the UNSC to propel him to victory.
5. Turn. Modi bad for 2 reasons.
 - a. Subramanya of The Washington Post writes that Modi's domestic policy destroyed small businesses and abandoned privatization. This is why he finds that India has not surpassed its natural growth rate at all under Modi. BBC 19' thus concludes that due to Modi, poverty is a 45 year high.
 - b. The Economic Times reports that Modi has increase the debt by 50 percent, and has cut social spending to deal with this. For example The Business Standard 18' finds that education spending has been cut by 3 percent in Modi's term and slashed universal elementary school education.

Reuters

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-election-issues-factbox/factbox-key-issues-in-indias-massive-general-election-idUSKCN1RM05P>

Modi's national security record was spotlighted by an aerial clash with arch foe Pakistan, triggered by a February suicide attack in disputed Kashmir that killed 40 Indian paratroopers and was claimed by an Islamist militant group based in the neighbor. Modi's Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) says the decision to send warplanes to Pakistan to bomb a purported training camp, in India's first such aerial strike since 1971, is proof of Modi's muscular stance against what New Delhi calls Islamabad's backing for militants. Prime Minister Imran Khan has said no militant group will be allowed to operate from Pakistan's soil for attacks abroad. **But surveys showed the hostilities, through February and March, appear to have boosted Modi's support among voters.**

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/markrosenberg/2019/04/16/modi-on-track-for-repeat-victory/#2f93e44eb039> - Forbes

As we have predicted for over 4 months, Indian PM Modi remains on track to retain the premiership as voting in India's seven-phase general election kicked off this past week (the election period is slated to conclude on 19 May). Per our full election Insight from 20 March, both our Mass Support Risk and Institutional Stability Risk indicators jointly point toward a repeat Modi victory, albeit with reduced seat share for the BJP and the governing NDA in the Lok Sabha. While rising

socio-economic concerns -- and concerns surrounding unemployment in particular -- have taken a toll on Modi's once sky-high popularity and increased Mass Support Risk, recent developments on the geopolitical/security front -- most notably the February 2019 Puwalma attack -- have helped offset these dynamics by enabling Modi to capitalize on his role as the political standard bearer of Hindu nationalism to advance in the polls amidst a period of heightened Ethno-Religious Risk that began in early Q4 2018.

The figure above tracks the current trajectory for Mass Support Risk (solid line) versus that forecast on 20 March (dashed line), displaying relatively little change (note the tight y-axis scaling).

This trend -- along with the overall forecast of a repeat Modi victory -- dovetails with polling data released this past week indicating that Modi's coalition continues to hover close to the majority seat-share mark in the Lok Sabha (272 seats). Previously, we argued that while our data weakly

supported a NDA majority, the signal was not strong enough for a conclusive prediction, and that remains the case. Either way, while surpassing the majority mark would enable Modi's coalition to form a new government without hassle, it would nevertheless fall substantially short of the landslide 330 seats it obtained in 2014.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/01/15/modi-has-failed-reform-indias-economy-populist-tricks-are-all-he-has-left/?utm_term=.dbdee7a8d429

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-47068223>

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/indias-debt-up-50-to-rs-82-lakh-crore-in-modi-era/articleshow/67593687.cms>

Tightening the education purse strings The Narendra Modi government has been reducing spending on education (budget estimates) — it dropped from one per cent of the country's income in the government's first Budget in 2014-15 to 0.62 per cent in 2017-18. **Its share in the Budget too has been slashed from 6.15 per cent to 3.7 per cent.** The share of Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, a national programme for universal elementary education, in the total allocation dropped to 29 per cent in 2017-18 from 31 per cent in 2016-17, which was two per cent less than the previous year.

A2 Increasing Legitimacy (of the UN)

2 Turns

1. Adding more members like India does not make the UNSC more legitimate, there has to actually be concrete actions to be taken to show that adding India made the council more effective. Unfortunately, Global Policy '15 finds that expanding the council to add more members would just increase gridlock amongst members and lead to political sclerosis. This would decrease legitimacy of the council even more as the world would think "that even with reforming the council nothing happened, and thus it can probably never be bettered."
2. Foreign Policy '09 finds that although adding more members like India would make the council more representative of the world, it wouldn't solve the reason why the legitimacy of the council is weakening, which is the lack of effective conflict resolution. Rather they find legitimacy would actually decrease, because countries like India could pass resolutions against Pakistan and other enemies, and in their eyes legitimacy decreases.

James Paul and Céline Nahory, July 13, 2015, Theses Towards a Democratic Reform of the UN Security Council, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-reform/41131.html?itemid=916>

Reformers sometimes ask: how can even the best-organized Council function effectively and fairly in a world where great powers, like Tyrannosaurs, stalk the global landscape? Powerful governments that claim to champion "freedom," "democracy," and "good governance," have been known to behave despotically in the international arena, bending small states to their will and acting in violation of international law. **Such powers sit in the Council and cannot be expected to solve problems that they themselves have created. This can be called the "foxes guarding the chicken coop" problem. Some reform proposals, couched in democratic language, would multiply this problem -- enlarging the oligarchy by adding five or six other powerful governments. More permanent members would scarcely make the Council more representative, accountable, transparent, legitimate or even-handed. Self-interest, not democracy, motivates these membership claims and a Council loaded with more permanent members would suffer from gridlock and political sclerosis.**

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/09/23/think-again-the-u-n-security-council/>

Don't be so sure. It has become a constant refrain at U.N. headquarters that the Security Council is anachronistic. And in many ways, it is. Japan, the organization's second-largest financial contributor, deserves a permanent council seat, as do rising economic stars India and Brazil. In the near future, the British and French seats should be combined into a seat for the European Union, a change that would give a regular voice to Germany and boost the EU's aspiration for a common foreign policy.

These reforms would help the council more accurately reflect the world's power distribution. But reorganization alone would not greatly increase respect for the body worldwide. Many of the crises and conflicts that the UNSC confronts spring from either rogue regimes or uncooperative non-state actors for whom the council's composition is all but irrelevant. Tyrants in Burma, militias in eastern Congo, and Al Qaeda disciples won't be impressed by a revamped council. And in some cases, an expanded council would even introduce new legitimacy problems. Imagine, for example, a council with India as a permanent member that passed resolutions condemning Pakistan. From Islamabad, the new council would certainly look less legitimate than it does today.

A2 Increasing Legitimacy (of India)

1. Global Policy '15 finds that expanding the council to add more members would just increase gridlock amongst members and lead to political sclerosis. This would decrease legitimacy of the council even more as the world would think "that even with reforming the council nothing happened, and thus it can probably never be bettered. This is crucial as India's legitimacy will significantly decrease if they create less policy, especially from their allies who will look to actions they create.
2. The Diplomat '15 writes that global challenges for India will not be solved through a unsc seat, due to the fact that most multilateral initiatives that have occurred recently have all been symbolic. Rather, they find that the most effective solutions come from bilateral relations, with the most breakthroughs coming for India through one on one talks.

<https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/indias-infatuation-with-the-un-security-council/>

The challenges for India in the global arena are not going to be solved with a UNSC seat. In fact, other than the symbolism of gaining veto power – itself of questionable utility – most multilateral forums around the world today have become mere events, with most breakthroughs on trade, security, and other issues relevant to India largely coming through bilateral negotiations. For example, the historic carbon emissions agreement between the U.S. and China was achieved on a bilateral level, and now will be showcased at the crucial Paris climate talks later this year. Climate change is a global undertaking, but two of the biggest contributors reached a deal on a heavily contested issue on a one-to-one level. The UNSC is a WWII holdover. Do France and the U.K. today really deserve to be on the UNSC, while Germany, the biggest economy in Europe, and Japan, the third biggest in the world, are not? The UN and UNSC have for far too long ignored economic realities and the political drift to the east, highlighted by the recent European dash to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). **India has a long-standing wish to be a UNSC member, as a symbol and as a calling card of its "arrival." But rather than chasing membership of a fancy club, India should focus its diplomatic capital on bilateral forums.**

A2 NSG membership

1. Chaudhury of The Economic Times 18' writes that 10 countries oppose India's bid to join the NSG. Chaudhury concludes that the main reason is India not being part of the NPT, which all

NSG members are required to be a part of- no country wants to undermine their organization and set the precedent that you can ignore global treaties and join exclusive groups. The National Interest 16' adds other non proliferation hardliners see India as a geopolitical risk and bringing nothing to the table, so cannot come to a consensus on adding India.

2. **If their evidence is about china**

- a. China is in direct opposition to India joining the UNSC- they are not going to all of a sudden respect a country because they signed a piece of paper to join a council China doesn't fully support.
 - b. The Times of India 19' confirms that China has and will continue to block India from joining the NSG not because of legitimacy, but because Pakistan has not gotten membership and China wants its ally on board before India. O/W on probability- India has joined tons of credible organizations but still gotten blocked by China bc of this.
 - c. Neog of The National Interest 16' writes that China blocks India because it does not want India to catch up with it militarily which is why she finds China keeps coming up with random excuses to block India- legitimacy or respect doesn't matter at all.
3. Pan of The Council on Foreign Relations explains that the US already started a bilateral deal with the same benefits with India; no unique impact to joining at all.
 4. Turn. The India Times 18' writes that Indian NSG membership would legitimize India as a nuclear power by increasing its power over Pakistan, and thus threaten stability and peace in Asia. This is why Chouglay of Global Risk Insights 16' writes that India's initiation into the NSG would end Indo-Pakistan peace negotiations and increase mistrust. (tie into neg= ending negotiations supercharges link into neg)
 5. Turn- Iqbal 16 of Dawn writes that India joining the NSG causes a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan because it causes Pakistan to fear losing its geopolitical status and increases the chance of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/nine-more-countries-had-opposed-indias-bid-to-join-nsg-reports/articleshow/52958297.cms>

State-run Chinese English Daily The Global Times has claimed in an editorial published on Tuesday that **nine more countries had opposed India's bid to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).** "The NSG had a plenary meeting in Seoul last week, and all members participated in a special conference on Thursday evening about the accession of **non-participants of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) into the NSG.** At least 10 countries, including China, opposed their bid," the editorial said

The edit page article asserted that lack of India's membership of the NPT was the primary obstacle for Delhi's membership to the elite club. "Since its foundation in 1975, all NSG members shall be NPT signatories. This has become the primary principle of the organisation. Now India wants to be the first exception to join the NSG without signing the NPT. It is morally legitimate for China and other members to upset India's proposal in defense of principles," the Global Times noted.

<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/china-signals-it-will-continue-to-block-india-from-nsg/articleshow/67766022.cms>

Some observers believe that China would try to keep India out of the NSG as long as its close ally, Pakistan, is regarded as unsuitable for NSG membership.

<https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-india-will-be-kept-out-the-nuclear-suppliers-group-16444>

This is why tying India's entry with that of Pakistan's is an effective delay tactic. Incidentally, keeping India out of the NSG keeps Pakistan out as well—so much for the China-Pakistan “all weather” friendship. Equating Indian membership with Pakistan could also **allow China to balance the scale by having another powerful voice oppose India's commercial moves in the nuclear sphere. For China, therefore, keeping India out of the NSG necessitates campaigning for Pakistan, in order to assert its geopolitical interests, and avoid a possible India-China hyphenation or equivalence.**

<https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-india-will-be-kept-out-the-nuclear-suppliers-group-16444>

Second are **the difficult-to-call votes—the so-called “non-proliferation hardliners.”** Those in question have been known to offer principled opposition to Indian NSG membership in the past, as demonstrated by Austria and Ireland during negotiations for the 2008 NSG waiver to India. While India has made some diplomatic overtures in the intervening period to acquire their votes for membership, whether they will finally capitulate remains to be seen. These countries are important because the NSG operates on consensus—each member has an equal vote. **There is no common understanding as to why India's admission is a good or a bad thing, or which of these reasons should take precedence. Some are unwilling to allow an Indian exemption because of the precedent it would set for future membership. Some have questioned the value that India's admission to the NSG would bring. For some others, it is a geopolitical gambit. Such differences can hold up consensus-building.**

<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-india-nuclear-deal>

India would be eligible to buy U.S. dual-use nuclear technology, including materials and equipment that could be used to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium, potentially creating the material for nuclear bombs. It would also receive imported fuel for its nuclear reactors.

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indias-entry-into-nsg-will-break-india-pakistan-nuclear-balance-chinese-official-media/articleshow/52773535.cms>

In a second article in as many days, state-run 'Global Times' highlighted China's vocal opposition to India's entry into the 48-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and concerns that its all weather-ally Pakistan will be left behind because "entry into the NSG will make it (India) a 'legitimate nuclear power'".

India's entry into the NSG will "shake strategic balance in South Asia and even cast a cloud over peace and stability in the entire Asia-Pacific region", the article said.

<https://globalriskinsights.com/2016/07/nuclear/>

However, **the wider implications of India's initiation into the NSG is less positive.** Ultimately **it has isolated Pakistan and put an end to any future talks between Pakistan and India, at least for now. This move could also push Pakistan closer to China.** India's current economic, and in some cases, political rival. The USA's reluctance to let Pakistan into the NSG as well, which Pakistan is now requesting, shows the underlying suspicions and mistrust of Pakistan. This stems from Pakistan's past history with groups such as the Taliban and figures such as Osama bin Laden. It's also a result of long-running issues in Pakistan such as corruption and the power of the military.

A2 FDI

1. India is not some developing world country, they aren't just going to get onto the council and just take FDI from countries to vote for them. This is especially true as Mukherjee '13 finds that Indian policymakers see the UN as place to expand the country's influence and national interests.
2. **If their evidence is about china---** China literally opposes indian membership onto the council and is already actively blocking resolutions that benefit india on the council. If India rotates onto the council they wouldn't just send FDI to a country they know they are at arms with on the council.
3. The DW in '16 writes that India's deregulation of the economy through things like bringing more foreign investment has contributed to vast inequality inside of India. Indeed, the Hindu '16 writes that certain regions in India get a majority of investment, which is why Mumbai and Delhi receive 50% of overall FDI while the whole state of Odisha only receives 1% of total FDI flows, concluding that this leads to income and regional inequality. QRIUS '18 finds that regional inequality in India directly reduces access to social safety nets for the poorest people, and intensifies class divisions along caste and gender. This is why the Overseas Development Institute finds that countries with higher inequality need the twice the amount of growth in order to reduce poverty. By strengthening the inequality you make it much harder to take out the 276 million people living in poverty in India.

Mukherjee '13

<https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.epw.in/journal/2013/29/special-articles/india-and-un-security-council.html>
Shyam Saran lays out the simple logic behind this observation, "India sees its interest best served in a rule-based, multilaterally structured and democratically governed international system. The UN is obviously the logical platform for such a system, although its limitations and infirmities are all too evident".¹² Whereas Nehru's faith in the UN might have been utopian (to the detriment of Indian interests), Indian policymakers today are far more pragmatic, viewing the UN as one avenue among others through which to advance India's international interests. In this sense, India has matured into a responsible stakeholder in principle, though it is a long way off from navigating the multilateral system for its own benefit as other major powers do

<https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-driving-inequality-in-india/a-18998489>

In the early 1990s, India unleashed a set of historic measures - **including the deregulation of markets, a cut in import tariffs and an opening up of certain sectors for foreign investment - aimed at boosting the economy. While market-friendly reforms have succeeded in pulling millions of Indians out of poverty, economists say a significant proportion of the population is not reaping the benefits of economic growth. This, in turn, has led to a small elite owning a high share of the nation's wealth. For instance, Credit Suisse estimated in a 2014 report that the richest one percent of India's population controls about 53 percent of the country's wealth.** Even central bank governor Raghuram

Rajan has criticized the rise in inequality - an issue that has gained prominence not only in India, but also across the world.

<https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/The-foreign-hand-isn%E2%80%99t-enough/article14626733.ec>
e

The employment effects of investment undertaken in an urban settlement differ from that in a semi-urban and rural settlement. Just as India competes with other countries, Indian States compete among each other to get FDI; the regional distribution is very unequal. As the U.S. Ambassador to India, Richard Verma, said while visiting Bhubaneswar in January 2016, **“While private investment from the U.S. continues, Odisha has to compete with other Indian States and countries like Singapore through ease of doing business to raise the volume.” Clearly, Mumbai and Delhi (which includes areas around them) dominate the other regions by obtaining close to 50 per cent of the overall FDI equity inflow whereas Odisha receives less than 1 per cent. FDI inflows therefore worsen existing regional inequalities by making the rich regions richer and poor regions poorer (as the workers migrate in search of employment).**

<https://qrius.com/rising-income-inequality-economic-system/>

The concentration of extreme wealth at the top is not a sign of a thriving economy. It is a symptom of a system that is failing the millions of hardworking people on poverty wages who make our clothes and grow our food. The distributional effects of the economic growth play a significant role in determining the long-term development trends and socio-economic well-being of the citizens. **The rising income inequality has developmental implications. It leads to slower poverty-reduction and undermining the sustainability of economic growth. The extremely wealthy can avoid taxes which impedes the government’s ability to raise revenues. This adversely impacts social spending to reduce social inequalities in health, education and employment. India already fares poorly in this area.**

Economic inequality can also intensify a range of social problems. Inequality leads to increased crime and workplace accidents. Inequality in India also stems from class, caste and gender inequalities. It worsens the gender pay gap and increases discrimination against women. India ranks 125 out of 159 countries in the Gender Inequality Index. In a range of indicators, including mean years of schooling, gross national income per capita and labour force participation rates, Indian women lag significantly behind Indian men. Cumulative effects of such inequality will worsen their deprivations.

Milanovic (2002) argues that increased financial integration through FDI raised the demand for semi-skilled labour but not for unskilled labour, as a minimum skill level is required for production. Hence, it is the skilled or semi-skilled labour that benefited from liberalisation, while unskilled labour was increasingly marginalised by it. This would also mean further increasing poverty levels among unskilled labour as they would be working at lowest/subsistence wage level.

<https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/4539.pdf>

Halving income poverty by 2015 is possible, so long as policies are in place to induce broader-based growth paths. And growth does not have to be as high as forecast if the growth path becomes broader-based; developing countries overall will meet the target if they achieve the 3% per capita real average growth rates that they had between 1965 and 1997. Growth is important but attaining the poverty targets depends crucially on action being taken by developing country governments and donor agencies to influence the qualitative nature of the growth path, including policies to ensure that growth is rooted in sectors of the economy in which the poor are able to participate, in order to create conditions for rising labour productivity by increasing the rate and efficient use of investment and policies to improve openness. **Our results also point to the critical role of income inequality. The prospects for reducing poverty are much better in low-income inequality countries than high inequality countries. The latter are unlikely to attain the target even if growth is rapid and broad-based; they need growth rates about twice as high as low inequality countries to meet the income-poverty target.**

A2 Peacekeepers (Cutting if no membership)

1. T For example, Williams writes that India wants to keep ahead of Chinese influence in peacekeeping and wants to continue to be a world power. Also, Mohan of The GPPI explains that peacekeeping allows India to build relations and secure resources in Africa and other places, increasing their global profile.
2. **Hample of George Washington University** writes that peacekeeping operations improve Indian troop readiness and help the Indian army. They aren't cutting anytime soon. That's why even after losing the most troops in the world, India hasn't cut.
3. Institute for Political Science '14 analyzes the current trends around the peacekeeping discussion in India and concludes 2 things.
 - a. That even though there is frustration with the PKO program India has not decreased their peacekeeper contributions they have only increased them.
 - b. Even if the main goal for India is to use peacekeepers is to achieve UNSC membership they would never use their forces conditionally, as it would spark huge backlash from the council.
4. Turn. **Brookings '18** finds that peacekeeping is seen as something only developing countries do and that as long as India continues to use peacekeepers they can never been seen as a standalone great power. This is crucial as if India is given a huge power status by being on the UN, then they would lose the incentive to continue these operations.
5. According to their logic if India gets onto the council and achieves their goal of using peacekeepers, which is to get permanent membership, they would lose the incentive to use peacekeepers because they have no strategic use to them.

<https://www.stanleyfoundation.org/articles.cfm?id=769&title=A%20Smarter%20Approach>

Like many countries, India began contributing to UN missions for two overarching reasons: first, to provide training for its soldiers and second, to improve its clout within the international community—which was especially true for New Delhi since it had its eye on a very specific, very significant prize, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. **Now half a**

century after India joined its first peacekeeping mission, the country's calculus has begun to change—the incentives that first held true for the country are no longer relevant. After decades of missions, the training benefits for India's soldiers have plateaued, and a Security Council seat may be too ambitious a dream. But a number of factors have kept India from pulling out—maybe the most important as a reaction to the resurgence of China as a world power. While Beijing was against any involvement in

peacekeeping operations in the past, it has had a change of heart. The number of Chinese peacekeepers is nowhere near India's, but it is growing. **Much like India in its early peacekeeping days, China was swayed by the opportunities that sending troops abroad provided such as training its soldiers and increasing its standing in the international community. Another issue that will likely keep Indian peacekeepers on UN missions in the future is New Delhi's continued goal to be a world power. In many regards, India's bureaucracy is slow to articulate—much less execute—the country's foreign policy strategies, making peacekeeping one of the South Asian giant's few foreign policy strategies that is both highly visible and well executed. If**

a withdrawal is out of the question, then India's only recourse against the dangers of peacekeeping is a smarter approach to its present and future contributions.

India will likely take more care in choosing new missions by instituting a reform process. Another key strategy, and challenge, will be encouraging other countries to step up their contributions. India does not want to see UN peacekeeping end, nor does it want to play any role in weakening the foundations of present or future missions. The South Sudan attack has not unleashed a wave of cynicism in India. Instead, it has highlighted the changing nature of peacekeeping as India seeks to start what will hopefully be a worldwide discussion about a smarter approach to using blue helmets.

<https://www.gppi.net/2016/10/04/modernizing-indias-approach-to-peacekeeping-the-case-of-south-sudan>

Over the last several decades, **India's security interests have moved beyond the subcontinent, in response to its growing economic and geopolitical interests.**

This is especially evident by its increasing engagement with Africa. At the Third India-Africa Forum Summit in October 2015, India and many African nations acknowledged the potential benefits of expanded trade and economic ties and greater security cooperation. With this recognition, and the long-standing presence of Indian peacekeeping troops on the continent, **India has a notable opportunity to raise its profile both in Africa and**

globally. However, to do so, the country must employ a strategic, holistic approach to peacekeeping that is more in line with its current foreign policy.

To bolster regional security cooperation, protect its long-term interests, and compete with other rising powers like China, India can and should add conflict prevention and mediation to its peacekeeping toolbox. The need for such an approach is most apparent in South Sudan, where renewed unrest and an unfolding humanitarian crisis threaten India's economic, political, and peacekeeping goals.

<https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14781158.2014.908836?journalCode=cp ar20>

This led us to look into other factors that might motivate or obstruct the prolongation of India's peacekeeping policies. One of these factors is the issue of burden-sharing. **There are indeed signs of a growing frustration with this development, particularly in light of the simultaneous tendency of overambitious UN mandates. As a result, Indian policy-makers became more assertive in demanding institutional remedies. Yet despite a lack of substantial reforms and a widening asymmetry of national contributions, Indian policy-makers, until today, have decided to increase rather than decrease the number of deployed Indian peacekeepers.** A public goods perspective is, therefore, incongruent with India's past behaviour. Only a significant shift of India's national role conceptions, much graver than the partial questioning of some ideals, could probably change this in the future. Our analysis finally focussed on the possibility of private benefits as driving factors behind Indian contributions. **While a case can certainly be made for some economic and military benefits, these factors seem to be insignificant in the end. What appears to be an important driving factor, instead, is India's aspiration to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. We doubt, however, that India will ever take the extraordinary step of making its peacekeeping contributions contingent on UNSC reform. That would be perceived as blackmail by developing nations while the permanent members of the UNSC would not feel threatened that much.** It also bears mentioning that none of the other candidates for UNSC permanent membership has so far dared to employ similar strategies.

Anit Mukherjee, Brookings Institute, October 20, 2015, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/at-the-crossroads-india-and-the-future-of-un-peacekeeping-in-africa/> At the crossroads: India and the future of UN peacekeeping in Africa

In recent times however there has been a growing debate about India's continued role in peacekeeping operations. Many question the benefits accruing to India from its considerable investment of manpower and military resources. Highlighting the "poorly equipped, mandated and governed operations" characterising UN peacekeeping, Nitin Pai and Sushant Singh argue in The Indian Express that continued participation is not commensurate to the results-either through obtaining a seat on the UNSC or in obtaining "great power status". **Moreover,**

observing that peacekeeping is mostly carried out by troops from developing countries, they argue that keeping such company means that India “cannot be taken seriously as a standalone great power at the UN.”

A2 Peacekeepers (Increasing Funding)

1. **The Global Observatory ‘18** finds that the UN has already decided to cut the peacekeeping budget with, cuts being 3-7% of last year's budget. This is crucial as the size of the overall budget is already being cut, adding India won't just automatically increase funding (the UN general assembly has to vote on that), rather the share of the budget gets spread out so India can pay its share.
2. Just because they are permanent members does not necessarily mean that they huge amounts for funding, for example the UK and France only pay for 6% of the budget while Russia only pays 3% of the pko budget. Furthermore the UN assembly takes into account things like debt, per capita income for countries, and share of the global economy (which is smaller for India compared to other p5 members) , so India will not pay huge significant share. Their evidence just says that India will assume all responsibilities in terms of funding, but they don't say how large that responsibility is or if India will go above and beyond.
3. 0 clarity how much money, how many more missions, how many more troops.

<https://theglobalobservatory.org/2018/09/peacekeeping-budget-approval-cuts-questions-unaddressed/>
The United Nations recently approved its budget for peacekeeping for 2018-19 as well as a **slew of longer-term reform proposals**. Just short of \$6.7 billion has been committed thus far, with a further sum for the second half of the UN's mission to Darfur (UNAMID) due in December and likely to take the final total to around \$7 billion. **This sum represents a roughly 7 percent cut on last year's budget—although further payments to UNAMID may make the final cut closer to 3 percent.**

<https://theglobalobservatory.org/2018/09/peacekeeping-budget-approval-cuts-questions-unaddressed/>



Breaking it down, each country's contribution to the UN regular budget is based on a formula that, in theory, represents a country's "capacity to pay." The formula starts by using a country's share of global gross national income (GNI). Then, adjustments are applied, taking account of where a country is relative to average global income per head and indebtedness. A minimum floor is applied and a ceiling for Least Developed countries and the largest contributor (i.e. the U.S.). Quartz concisely summed it up, explaining: "In brief, the UN considers gross national income, population, and debt burden in determining the percentage of the total budget and each Member State must pay to fund general UN operations. That budget is known as the 'regular budget.'"

It's important to note that each country's dues to the UN peacekeeping budget are determined

through the formula for the regular budget, plus additional adjustments. Most countries receive additional discounts dependent on their levels of income – discounts that are made up for by the Permanent Members of the Security Council who pay a premium reflecting their privileged position of having de-facto control over creating the mandates of peacekeeping missions.

**World's 10 Biggest Economies*:
Size of Economy vs. Projected Share of the UN Budget**

Country	Global Economy Share	Regular Budget Share	Peacekeeping Share
USA	23.575	22	27.880
China	14.730	12.005	15.214
Japan	6.789	8.564	8.564
Germany	4.823	6.090	6.090
United Kingdom	3.616	4.567	5.788
France	3.507	4.427	5.610
Brazil	2.752	2.948	0.590
India	2.624	0.834	0.167
Italy	2.620	3.307	3.307
Russia	2.194	2.405	3.048

*Based on historical data used to calculate UN Scale

A2 Peacekeepers (Incentivizing others to send)

1. This argument is just false. **The majority** of peacekeepers come from the “underrepresented” countries they talk about. The Passblue ‘19 finds that Africa, Latin America, and Asia account for 90% of military and police personnel sent to peacekeeping operations. These countries have existing motivations, like gaining legitimacy and getting financial compensation, to send peacekeepers no matter what, they don’t care about a lack of a voice.
 - a. Indeed the International Studies Quarterly ‘16 finds that significant internal issues drive the motivation for less developed countries to send peacekeepers. They empirically link two issues to peacekeeping contributions a)the need for a funded and trained military to respond to national securities b)limiting the ability of the military to stage coups.
 - b. This incentive to maintain internal stability in these countries will outweigh any harm of not being able to get a voice on the council, it is a matter of state survival.
2. India has always said they supported the developing world probably in order to just garner support and make it seem like their seat would have a wide impact. However India on the council is much more likely to pursue what’s best for them. Mukherjee ‘13 finds that Indian policymakers see the UN as place to expand the country’s influence and national interests. This is why Carta Internacional ‘10 finds that the drive for permanent membership would drive India to become a status quo power and have little support for the developing world. That’s why they conclude poor regions all around the world have been opposed to Indian membership.
3. University of Missouri ‘17 writes after analyzing 40 conflict resolutions passed by the UNSC, the permanent members do not send missions according to their self interests. The council isn’t even against these countries, they are actively reacting to the right of the conflicts.

4. The Foreign Affairs '19 writes that most of the troops the UN come from are given from the developing world, however these troops are extremely under trained and lack basic resources. They have to prove why these pko's are effective not just why sending more is always good.
5. University of Colorado '18 writes that as more and more members contribute to send their peacekeepers, it dilutes the pay for peacekeeping forces amongst each country and reduces their incentive to contribute resources. That's why they find as the number of contributing countries increases, it increases the UN's difficulty in fully staffing missions. Overall adding more countries to the mix magnifies the problem they talk about.

<https://www.passblue.com/2019/02/12/why-developing-nations-send-so-many-troops-to-un-peace-ops>
Africa, Asia and Latin America provide more than 90 percent of military and police personnel to United Nations peace operations and contribute about 15 percent of the budget. China, hardly a legitimate representative of the Global South as the world's second-largest economy and a permanent member of the Security Council, inflates the budget number because its financial contribution is two-thirds of the latter's total — second to the United States. The West foots the bill, **but since the late 1990s, when even traditional peacekeeping became more dangerous, industrialized countries have been unwilling to send their own personnel where risks are high and national interests low. Therefore, the West makes use of what could be described as “hired help” from the Global South.** This reality does not necessarily imply a more supportive multilateral approach by developing countries, or that they are hesitant to exploit their overwhelming presence of boots on the ground to pursue their own interests. **There are three main explanations why countries from the Global South have contributed to UN peace operations: regional cooperation; recognition and prestige; and financial benefits**

<https://www.isanet.org/Publications/ISQ/Posts/ID/5385/Who-Keeps-the-Peace-Understanding-State-Contributions-to-UN-Peacekeeping-Operations>

Many of these states must balance an interest in funding sizeable militaries to counter security threats while also recognizing that member-state militaries can pose threats to civilian control of the government via coups d'état. Nigeria and Pakistan are emblematic of this, as both have faced interstate challenges to their security and have had direct experiences with military coups. States facing these internal and external threats should seek to implement security policies that attempt to improve the ability of their armed forces to defend the nation from external threats and also limit the risk posed by the military itself. **We thus argue that UN PKO contributions are linked to these two security challenges that are especially acute in less developed and stable countries: (1) funding and maintaining a capable and ready military when faced with a threat to national security and (2) limiting the ability of the military to jeopardize civilian control of government. Contributing troops to peacekeeping operations offers security dividends that help ameliorate both challenges.** Using a global dataset of UN member-state contributions to peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War era, we show that **a somewhat paradoxical relationship exists between the ability of the UN to provide security via peacekeeping and the level of insecurity in the UN's own member-states needed to motivate their personnel contributions.** Thus, in a more general sense, this research reveals that the provision of security by peacekeeping operations to their host states is at least partially dependent upon higher levels of insecurity elsewhere in the international system.

Mukherjee '13

<https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.epw.in/journal/2013/29/special-articles/india-and-un-security-council.html>
 Shyam Saran lays out the simple logic behind this observation, “India sees its interest best served in a rule-based, multilaterally structured and democratically governed international system. The UN is obviously the logical platform for such a system, although its limitations and infirmities are all too

evident".¹² Whereas Nehru's faith in the UN might have been utopian (to the detriment of Indian interests), Indian policymakers today are far more pragmatic, viewing the UN as one avenue among others through which to advance India's international interests. In this sense, India has matured into a responsible stakeholder in principle, though it is a long way off from navigating the multilateral system for its own benefit as other major powers do

<https://ri.fgv.br/sites/default/files/publicacoes/10d7bc9faa.pdf> - Carta Internacional

At the same time, Brazil and India are the most active advocates for UN Security Council expansion. * is creates a dilemma for both actors. Allied to, and many times the leaders of, developing countries without any perspective to be included into a powerful international institution such as the UN Security Council, **both Brazil and India profess to defend the disenfranchised. Their effort to become permanent members, however, is likely to turn them into status quo powers, and it is unclear in how far they would continue to support the voice of the poor once they form part of the ruling oligarchy class. In fact, several poor countries in all regions of the world have actively sought to prevent Brazil and India from entering the UNSC as permanent members, and African countries –arguably the most disadvantaged and the least integrated into international structures – have been the most obstinate with regard to expansion**

<https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/legitimacy-and-the-un-security-council-agenda/0828DD82320603D0DEE0D154BB36C0AD>

Is the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) a legitimate organization? Do the veto powers legitimately pursue international security, or do they protect their narrow national interests? One way to evaluate the legitimacy of the UNSC is through its agenda. Does it address the most significant conflicts in world politics? Or is it influenced by the national interests of the veto powers?

This article addresses these questions with a dataset that includes the number of UNSC meetings held and resolutions passed on 40 conflicts from 1991 to 2013. This analysis provides evidence for the legitimacy of the UNSC— conflicts with more refugees and more deaths are significantly more likely to be on the agenda. The analysis does not support critics of the UNSC—the national interests of the veto powers, measured as arms sales to and trade with the conflict participants, do not significantly alter the UNSC agenda.

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-12-11/crisis-peacekeeping>

Since the UN does not have its own pool of soldiers, it must rely on the goodwill of its member states to provide them. Countries are reluctant to risk the lives of their troops in conflicts in which they have no stake, and so it often takes months for the UN to muster the forces it needs. When it finally does, **it almost always ends up with poorly trained and poorly paid soldiers from developing countries. (In 2018, the top troop contributors to the UN were Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Rwanda.) These troops are often poorly equipped, too—forced to get by without helicopters and to make do with outdated vehicles.**

https://scholar.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=psci_facpapers

How do free riding and the collective action problem affect peacekeeping personnel provision in particular? **Countries who contribute personnel weigh their concerns for collective goods provision with the possible private benefits of contribution.² This means that an important consideration for a potential contributor is the number of other countries it expects to also contribute peacekeeping personnel.** From an ideal collective goods provision standpoint, one country contributes all peacekeeping personnel (being largely motivated by the potential benefit of doing so). However, as long as the number of contributors is small, private gains are more likely to be captured by individual contributors. **As the number of actors contributing resources increases, contributor-specific benefits become more diluted. This incentivizes free riding and**

generates higher mission shortfalls, because having a larger number of contributors reduces the marginal gains for a country of adding one additional troop, observer, or police officer to the mission. We therefore expect more problems in fully staffing UN missions as the number of contributing countries increases.

A2 Peacekeepers (Reforms)

1. Gowan of The World Politics Review '19 reports that security council refuses to share authority over peacekeeping mandates and power, which is why Gowan concludes the UNSC will never change the way it handles PKOs anytime soon. This is why the last reform method, A4P, was shot down by the P5 even after it started peace negotiations.
2. Novosseloff of Global Observatory '18 explains that any peacekeeping reform always takes the form of an impasse because of a lack of P5 consistency in terms of implementation, mandates, and related policy. In fact, we'd contend India only muddles reform, as Mukherjee '13 finds that Indian policymakers see the UN as place to expand the country's influence and national interests. This means India is only going to act more independently and want things their way- adding more members, if anything, reduces the chance of reform.
3. We outweigh on strength of link - they dont give any contextualization of what reform is going to be passed, and even if they do they need to prove two things
 - a. All p-5 members are supportive of the reform
 - b. The majority of non permanent members support it as well.

<https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/27500/is-the-u-n-security-council-marginalizing-itself-over-peacekeeping>

Nonetheless, it is hard not to see **December's impasse over A4P in the Security Council as a sign that the body is unlikely to rejig the way it handles peace operations anytime soon.** And the more **the P-5 refuse to share their authority over mandate issues,** the more other powers will look for ways to respond to crises through mechanisms other than the U.N.

<https://theglobalobservatory.org/2018/04/peacekeeping-basics-is-not-backwards/>

During the March 28 open debate of the Security Council on peacekeeping, member states expressed a general and genuine desire to reform and at last tackle some of the issues that have remained unresolved for some twenty years, but their intentions often run up against the intricacies of political, administrative, and logistical implementation. As pointed out by Richard Gowan, "While most Council members agree that UN operations are overstretched in theory, they continue to push the organization to take on more conflict management duties in practice." **In the end, any peacekeeping reform remains incremental at best and often takes the form of an impasse** in the short term. The question is, why?

A2 Peacekeepers Impact level

1. Reuters '14 writes that due to the fact countries on missions never want to risk their troop's lives and that mandates were weak and lacked authority, missions have become ineffective. The CrisisGroup '08 furthers that there is a lack of political will to address the roots of violence and they conclude a force of peacekeepers is only as effective as the plan to solve the conflict. This is crucial as Yale '03 finds that a large troop deployment without a strong mandate is never going to resolve the conflict because troops won't have an ineffective way to actually solve the conflict. That's why in places like Rwanda where there were huge troop forces, they had little authority to stop violence. They have to prove
 - a. The effective mandate comes in the first place to give authority
 - b. That countries are actually willing to use their troops to effectively intervene
2. The Crisis Group furthers that even though peacekeeping can keep forceful disarmament for a short period of time to de-escalate, it creates a vacuum that needs to be filled. If that vacuum is not filled the same forces in the original conflict will quickly regain and expand their control. That's why they conclude that peacekeeping is just a band aid solution. Empirically Weinstein of Cgdev finds after analyzing wars in Africa, where a majority of peacekeeping operations are in the status quo, finding that UN interventions only prevent a quarter of conflicts from erupting in 10 years, effectively meaning they fail 75% of the time to create long term peace.
3. Hegre evidence about saving 150 k lives, saying the probability of a risk of conflict decreased from 6 to 2% not that big.
4. Evidence should focus 21st century. Brosig of The Stability Journal explains that recent deployments in the 21st century have changed character- for example, they are deployed in situations of continued fighting, in absence of a reliable peace agreement, and to become targets.
5. Need to analyze more than just death. Brosig of The Stability Journal continues that while casualties reflect short term efficacy, if the conflict is not stabilized or cooled in the long term by peacekeepers, deaths still occur through other factors such as poverty, instability, and corruption.
6. **If they read Fortna-** Cunningham of Columbia University explains that Fortna limits analysis to wars fought between 1945 and 1989 because peacekeeping in wars was quite rare in this period, so she can capture the effect of these indicators in the absence of peacekeeping.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-peacekeepers-civilians-idUSBREA4F0M220140516>

Countries interviewed for the report that provide peacekeepers for U.N. operations said the risk to their troops was higher than they would accept. Some of them have entirely ruled out the use of force. The biggest troop contributors are India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Rwanda. **“The reality is that the United Nations cannot fully protect civilians while the troop contributing countries do not instruct their contingents to do all they can,** including using force as a last resort when civilians are under attack before them,” U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services, Carman Lapointe, told the Fifth Committee on Tuesday. **The report found that operational and political constraints within missions were at odds with their legal authority and mandate to act and that**

some missions “perceived themselves as weak, outnumbered and stretched across vast areas, making the use of force only a paper option.”

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/problem-peacekeeping>

Conflicts such as those in Sudan, Somalia, Chad, and the DRC are mostly extreme manifestations of power struggles over resources, land, and political representation, combined with problems of ethnic marginalization and state collapse. Their resolution or settlement can only be found in negotiated political agreements that tackle the roots of the conflicts. The protection of civilians must be part of a political strategy that reduces short- and long term risks for the population while addressing the need for immediate life-saving actions. **Yet, tragically,**

peacekeeping missions dispatched to “protect civilians” have in the past lacked, and still today lack, the support, courage, and/or means to address the political rationales behind the violence. The military component of a peacekeeping mission is only as effective as the mission’s political masters make it. When asked last year if the 26,000-person force approved for Unamid by the UN Security Council were sufficient, Salim Ahmed Salim, the AU’s Special Envoy for Darfur,

rightly responded that what matters is **“not how large a force it is but what they have come to defend,”** since **“without an agreement on peace, even a force of 50,000 can’t change the situation here radically.”** **A UN Security Council peacekeeping mandate with civilian protection provisions can only be implemented in the context of a political agreement. And the implementation of a mandate depends on the will to interpret it politically and to enforce it with the means provided.**

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/problem-peacekeeping>

Finally, military operations usually create a void that needs to be filled by reformed government structures. Any peacekeeping force engaged in forceful disarmament of militias and area domination can only carry out these activities for a few days. Once a vacuum is created, it has to be filled by agreed state structures. If not, the same or other armed groups will quickly regain or expand their territorial control. The protection of civilians can only be successful operationally in partnership with the state. There is no way around that. Sadly, in

Darfur and beyond, the world seems more willing to contribute money to humanitarian efforts than to tackle the causes of conflicts. **Peacekeeping missions are often used as a Band-Aid for complex conflicts, and are rarely equipped to do the political work that is vital to addressing the causes.** In complex emergencies such as those facing the DRC, Sudan, and Somalia, the hostage population can only be sustainably protected if an effective political strategy accompanies the deployment of peacekeeping operations.

<http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01241/WEB/IMAGES/PCP3779S.PDF>

Moreover, the effects of peacekeeping troops per square km on the probability of participatory peace success are negative (though non-significant).²¹ This might seem jarring, but it is actually consistent with our theory. **A large troop deployment with a weak mandate is a sure sign of lack of commitment by the Security Council and creates an impediment for effective intervention.** This result is influenced by one observation – **Rwanda— where we had a large troop deployment (in per capita terms) with no authority to intervene to stop the violence.** Large numbers of troops per capita in monitoring missions (observer missions and traditional PKOs) actually reduce the chance of peacebuilding success (examples are Cyprus, Lebanon, Rwanda). **Such deployments are inefficient and potentially counter-productive. The large troop deployment with a narrow mandate in monitoring operations indicates, on the one hand, that the Security Council recognizes the severity of the conflict and, on the other hand, that it is unwilling or unable to give those troops an adequate mandate to resolve the conflict.**

https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/2731_file_WP57.pdf

Table 2 examines the variation in war outcomes in Africa during the same period. **Using a strict definition of a stable peace – war does not recur within 10 years of the conflict coming to an end – the data confirm Licklider’s earlier findings. In the absence of a UN intervention, 46% of civil wars do not recur. When the UN gets involved, only a quarter of wars do not resume.** Importantly, neither intervention nor non-intervention appears particularly well-suited to reducing low-levels of political violence which, while they do not rise to the level of civil war, nonetheless impose significant costs on political stability and the prospects for development. (Insert Table 2)

A second finding emerges from this quick look at the African data. **The evidence suggests that UN intervention makes rebel victories substantially less likely. 33 Clearly, the involvement of external actors favors negotiated settlements over military victories, but as we turn to the cases in the next section, the fact that UN interventions have a particular bias against rebel victories may emerge as a cause of concern.**

<https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.576/>

Second, we **focus on the more recent deployments from 2000–2015. This is justified because although the character of missions has changed, the literature has not fully reflected this. Current missions are much more likely to be deployed in situations of continued fighting and/or in the absence of a reliable peace agreement** (CAR, DRC, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan). The latest missions are more likely to use force and become targets themselves of insurgents, rebels or terrorist groups (Dersso 2016). This makes the question of what kind of peace, peacekeeping is bringing even more compelling than in the case of deployments after a peace deal has been brokered (such as in Burundi, Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Sierra Leone). An evaluation of the recent operations is important because it is not self-evident that the results of previous statistical analyses will apply to the new realities in which peacekeepers aim at stabilising a country while facing continued security threats.

<https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.576/>

First, the **majority of quantitative studies operate from a rather simple conceptualization of security and peace which measures conflict abatement by counting battle deaths. Social unrest, riots, high crime rates or political instability are ignored, even though they can have an equally negative effect on peace and security.** Therefore, we apply 11 indicators measuring security within mission hosting countries in order to map the wider security environment in which missions are deployed and assess their possible effects on this environment. Today, we have a much more complete and comprehensive data basis on which to measure security at country level (Clayton et al. 2017).

<http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/Cunningham%20review%20in%20RIO.pdf>

Fortna needs to first demonstrate that peacekeepers are not just picking easy conflicts. She does this by developing a statistical model to test how various indicators thought to make peace more or less stable affect the duration of peace. **She limits her analysis to wars fought between 1945 and 1989 because peacekeeping in civil war was quite rare in this period, so she can capture the effect of these indicators in the absence of peacekeeping.** Fortna then tests how these same indicators affect the likelihood of peacekeeping in conflicts after the Cold War. S

A2 Reforms

1. No contextualization on reform - they just say there is misrepresentation in the council and it needs to have the champion of the developing world join. We don't know India's impact
2. A2 legitimacy!

A2 Foreign Aid (India Receives)

1. India does not rely on aid. Devex '14 finds that India has emerged as a significant aid donor, with a 55% difference in total aid given and received. As countries see India as a country that is diverging away from aid, the incentive to buy their vote using aid significantly decreases.
2. India has spent 20+ years trying to get on the UNSC, once they get onto the council they won't just sit back and let people buy their vote. Rather Mukherjee '13 finds that Indian policymakers see the UN as place to expand the country's influence and national interests. The p5 would see India, especially under Modi, as a country with its own agenda that is not easily influenced and susceptible to economic incentives. There is a reason why the p5 doesn't send aid to a country like China who still uses developmental assistance, because they know it will never take the bite on aid.
3. The New York Times '12 finds that India has now felt it has reached a position of global power and is now looking to reject the idea of "rich countries giving aid to poorer ones". India will never become reliant on aid on the council, it is fundamentally against its ideologies. Indeed, the Hindu '18 writes that India has increasingly become paranoid about foreign aid coming with strings attached and trying to undermine the indian state. That's why they find India has been defunding thousands of foreign ngos.
4. The WEF '15 finds that aid around most of the world has done little reduce poverty. This is because huge amounts of aid given to countries only allows the government to ignore the voice of the people because they do not need to rely on them for tax revenue. This is why Grode finds that after analyzing developing countries around the world, including India, that developmental assistance fails to increase growth or decrease the income disparity.
5. Dreher '16 finds that since Politically motivated aid, the type of aid given by UNSC members, is sent with little incentive for effectiveness and creates complacency in the recipient country it is actually on net bad. That's why they find that countries that serve on the council and receive aid have half the growth rate they had when they were outside the council. Prefer this evidence over their general aid because it specifically analyzes politically motivated aid from within the UNSC and its impact.
 - a. If India gets onto the council they will vote against the US continuously on UN resolutions, as according to the National Interest '18 the voting alignment for both countries is only 17%. This is crucial as Voxeu finds that Trump is moving to cut off aid to countries that vote against their interest in the UN Security Council, in fact in the past when Yemen voted against the US in the unsc, they got 70 million dollars less in aid.

<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d8ee/e8716aa28e292e096cfe70b42907d763ae6c.pdf>

This paper examines the effect of official development aid (ODA) on income inequality in developing countries. Using data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, we use a country fixed-effects approach to address endogeneity issues. **We find no significant effect of ODA per capita on inequality in**

developing countries. We therefore conclude that, consistent with previous research in the field,

ODA does not significantly contribute to the economic growth and development of developing

nations, nor does it appear to decrease income disparity. This analysis adds to the body of literature

by using a county fixed-effects approach to analyze the effect of ODA per capita on GINI, something not common in the literature, to obtain our result showing no significant effects.
<https://www.devex.com/news/in-latest-indian-budget-aid-spending-dwarfs-aid-receipts-82915>
The budget reveals that the Indian government's foreign aid expenditures will reach \$1.3 billion in 2014-15 — more than double New Delhi's anticipated net foreign aid receipts of \$655 million that financial year. According to Indian government figures, the South Asian country has been giving more aid than it has been receiving since 2012-13. **The gap between New Delhi's foreign aid expenditures and receipts has widened significantly, from just 1 percent in 2012-13 to 55 percent in 2013-14.** (Based on figures from the [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development](#), however, India remains a net ODA recipient).

Mukherjee '13

<https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.epw.in/journal/2013/29/special-articles/india-and-un-security-council.html>
Shyam Saran lays out the simple logic behind this observation, "India sees its interest best served in a rule-based, multilaterally structured and democratically governed international system. The UN is obviously the logical platform for such a system, although its limitations and infirmities are all too evident".¹² Whereas Nehru's faith in the UN might have been utopian (to the detriment of Indian interests), Indian policymakers today are far more pragmatic, viewing the UN as one avenue among others through which to advance India's international interests. In this sense, India has matured into a responsible stakeholder in principle, though it is a long way off from navigating the multilateral system for its own benefit as other major powers do

<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-america-and-india-really-be-strategic-partners-29967>

India and the United States have historically been at odds in the UN, especially during the Cold War when India served as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement. The end of the Cold War and demise of the Non-Alignment Movement have not appreciably closed divisions between New Delhi and Washington, even after the civil nuclear deal. **Of the nearly 1000 resolutions that were passed between 2005 and 2017, the two countries concurred on 13 percent of resolutions (as measured by them voting the same way, or both being absent from the vote). Looking further back, Indo-U.S. voting alignment increased only slightly from 13 percent in 1990 to 17 percent in 2017. The extent of India's alignment with the United States is below that of Russia, and around the same as that of China.**

[http://kai-gehring.net/files/articles/Dreher,%20Eichenauer,%20Gehring%20\(2018%20WBBER\)%20Geopolitics,%20Aid%20and%20Growth.pdf](http://kai-gehring.net/files/articles/Dreher,%20Eichenauer,%20Gehring%20(2018%20WBBER)%20Geopolitics,%20Aid%20and%20Growth.pdf)

According to column 2, for any increase in DAid, the effectiveness of this change in aid disbursements decreases with the share of the period the recipient country has spent on the UNSC two periods before (i.e., when the aid has been committed). **The causal effect of a one percentage point increase in aid as a percentage of GDP on yearly economic growth is 0.64 percentage points higher if the recipient has not served on the UNSC compared to if it has served two years (i.e., 1/2 of the four-year period). Compared to the average growth rate of about 1.34 percentage points in our sample, this is a substantial reduction of almost half the average growth rate.** The results thus support our hypothesis that aid committed during times of short-term political importance is indeed less effective.

<https://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/a-global-shift-in-foreign-aid-starting-in-india/>

Sixty years later, Britain's decision to pull the plug on funding to India was met with little more than a shrug by India's political class. "We don't really need the aid," P. Chidambaram, the finance

minister, said last week. “We have accepted it in the past, but I think both countries have agreed that we can emphasize on trade rather than aid.” Part of the reason for such nonchalance, analysts say, is that British aid to India, which amounts to \$450 million per year and is used primarily in health care and education, is small. Last year, the finance minister at the time, Pranab Mukherjee, reportedly dismissed the funds as “peanuts” compared to India’s own spending. (Mr. Mukherjee is now the president of India.) Indeed, in recent years, India has ramped up its spending on social welfare programs, including a large rural employment scheme and a food subsidy system, aimed at lifting its millions out of poverty. **But perhaps more significant is the fact that India now sees – and projects – itself as a global power and a partner to developed nations like Britain, rejecting the traditional model of rich nations aiding poor ones. “Aid is past, trade is future,”** Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid recently said.

<https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/pride-and-foreign-aid/article24822860.ece>

Then there is the argument that foreign aid comes with strings attached. Yes, it has in the past, especially developmental assistance from Western nations or the World Bank. Aid and loans often came with demands of economic restructuring or resetting governance priorities, and an occasional sermon on human rights. But there is again a fundamental difference between such funding and humanitarian assistance. Hence the argument that UAE’s disaster relief to Kerala would come with strings attached is ludicrous. Abu Dhabi’s rationale for offering aid to Kerala is straightforward: the Malayali population in UAE has been crucial in its development, and the aid offer is a recognition of that bond. **A related issue is the paranoia displayed by successive governments in New Delhi about the ‘foreign hands’ constantly trying to undermine the Indian state. This has increased over the years, particularly under the current regime: consider the manner in which it cancelled the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA) licenses of thousands of NGOs, including Greenpeace and Amnesty, depriving them of foreign funding.** Ironically, even as New Delhi vows to continue the policy of not allowing foreign humanitarian aid, and of restricting the activities of foreign-funded NGOs, it recently amended the FCRA to allow foreign funding of Indian political parties

<https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/10/does-foreign-aid-always-help-the-poor/>

Deaton, an economist at Princeton University who studied poverty in India and South Africa and spent decades working at the World Bank, won his prize for studying how the poor decide to save or spend money. But his ideas about foreign aid are particularly provocative. **Deaton argues that, by trying to help poor people in developing countries, the rich world may actually be corrupting those nations’ governments and slowing their growth. According to Deaton, and the economists who agree with him, much of the \$135 billion that the world’s most developed countries spent on official aid in 2014 may not have ended up helping the poor.**

Think of it this way: In order to have the funding to run a country, a government needs to collect taxes from its people. **Since the people ultimately hold the purse strings, they have a certain amount of control over their government. If leaders don’t deliver the basic services they promise, the people have the power to cut them off. Deaton argued that foreign aid can weaken this relationship, leaving a government less accountable to its people, the congress or parliament, and the courts.** “My critique of aid has been more to do with countries where they get an enormous amount of aid relative to everything else that goes on in that country,” Deaton said in an interview with Wonkblog. **“For instance, most governments depend on their people for taxes in order to run themselves and provide services to their people. Governments that get all their money from aid don’t have that at all, and I think of that as very corrosive.”**

<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d8ee/e8716aa28e292e096cfe70b42907d763ae6c.pdf>

This paper examines the effect of official development aid (ODA) on income inequality in developing countries. Using data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, we use a country fixed-effects approach to address endogeneity issues. We find no significant effect of ODA per capita on inequality in developing countries. **We therefore conclude that, consistent with previous research in the field, ODA does not significantly contribute to the economic growth and development of developing nations, nor does it appear to decrease income disparity.** This analysis adds to the body of literature by using a county fixed-effects approach to analyze the effect of ODA per capita on GINI, something not common in the literature, to obtain our result showing no significant effects.

the resolutions adopted either unanimously or without a vote. With regard to aggregate of 113 adopted resolutions (41 percent) that gave rise to a division, India cast an affirmative vote on 101 (89 percent) of them. Significantly, on not more than a dozen times did India stand aside without joining the concurrent majority, and has not voted against any resolution, and resorted to abstentions only to express its reservations. Remarkably, India was never a loner in abstaining as it always had the company of other Council members on many occasions. The **Indian behaviour herein clearly points to a systematic effort to display a constructive, rule of law abiding and a democratic majority building state in a global, multilateral setting like the Security Council.**

[http://kai-gehring.net/files/articles/Dreher,%20Eichenauer,%20Gehring%20\(2018%20WBBER\)%20Geopolitics,%20Aid%20and%20Growth.pdf](http://kai-gehring.net/files/articles/Dreher,%20Eichenauer,%20Gehring%20(2018%20WBBER)%20Geopolitics,%20Aid%20and%20Growth.pdf)

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A2 Multilateralism is good

1. Brookings '18 finds that the status quo is not a “multipolar world”, rather it is a world where a few select powers rule the international stage, they conclude that this means any successful multilateral effort will only succeed if the big powers support the initiative. However, they find China uses multilateralism selectively, the UN is internally divided, India could get make efforts with influence but is still pursuing unilateral policies. And most importantly the US is questioning multilateral institutions as a whole. This is crucial as they find that preserving global governance is hinged on the US.

<https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/can-multilateralism-survive/>

An international order that rests on three and a half legs does not quite live up to the multipolar hype. This holds important implications for efforts to revive multilateralism. In particular, because the world is not quite multipolar, it is not structurally as conducive to a multipolar multilateralism as many have assumed. **To survive, multilateralism will need the support of the big players.** Many have been hoping that China would put its weight behind a multilateral world order, **but China's leaders seem prepared to use multilateral structures only when it suits them. The EU, for its part, clearly has a strong multilateral bent, but it is weakened by internal divisions.** If it were to overcome them, it could be the champion of multilateralism we need; for now, however, it is too divided. **India could become an important advocate of multilateralism, but it is currently pursuing unilateral policies and still lacks the requisite international influence. This leaves the U.S., still, as the linchpin of global cooperation. Coalitions can be built to address particular issues or on a regional basis; but preserving—let alone deepening—the existing system of global governance will be impossible without U.S. support. At a time when the U.S. is increasingly resisting and even actively undermining international cooperation, this is a source of serious concern.** After all, as Robert Kagan

recently pointed out, in today's deeply interconnected world, we need rules and institutions to govern markets and economic activity more than ever. This will only become more obvious as new technologies like artificial intelligence and genetic engineering pose political and ethical issues that must be addressed on an international level.

A2 UN Aid good

1. Forbes '13 writes that UN adopted MDG in 2000, which is set of goals to reduce societal problems through incentivizing trillions of dollars through UN action and individual state action. However nothing has happened because of these programs. Columbia '13 writes after a statistical analysis that there has been no acceleration in solving MDG goals since 2000. The only goal that actually saw progress was debt relief, while things like infant mortality, per capita income, and HIV had no significant change in progress.
2. They have to prove how it just increases when India gets onto the council, the general assembly will have to vote on increasing the budget for foreign aid first and that is unlikely to happen due to US opposition to aid and UN aid specifically.

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2013/08/26/sorry-u-n-countries-are-poor-thanks-to-bad-policy-not-a-lack-of-cash/#7569d0ed53f5>

In 2000 government leaders adopted the United Nations Millennium Declaration. Participants set a number of objectives—called the Millennium Development Goals—for reducing extreme poverty by 2015. The chief tool was expected to be foreign aid. Along the way the **UN established the Millennium Project “to develop a concrete action plan for the world to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and to reverse the grinding poverty, hunger and disease affecting billions of people.”** The U.N. staged summits, produced reports, and adopted **“a global action plan.”** Tens of billions of dollars were pledged for the cause. Few Americans would begrudge additional money for foreign assistance if the outlays actually reduced poverty. **However, the record of more than six decades of financial transfers running in the trillions of dollars—from the U.S., other nations, the U.N., and other organizations, such as the multilateral development banks—is failure. Foreign “aid” turned into foreign hindrance, creating long-term dependency while reinforcing self-defeating collectivist economic strategies and subsidizing authoritarian political systems.** The only correlation to growth turned out to be reform, which is discouraged when aid relieves the pain of failure.

https://mpira.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48793/1/MPRA_paper_48793.pdf

The general result was that there was no trend in statistically significant accelerations in the MDG indicators after 2000. Rather the results for all four sets of reported analysis were consistent in that about **half of the MDG indicators exhibited no acceleration or deceleration during the time period from 1992 to 2008 and about one-third exhibited accelerations BEFORE 2001. Contrarily, nearly all of the control indicators had no change (neither acceleration nor deceleration) during the time period.** It should be emphasized that the control indicators were identified based on data availability and other control indicators may exist that serve as more appropriate controls. **The only MDG indicator that had a statistically significant acceleration in progress in 2001 or after for all four datasets was Indicator 8D (Debt Service). MDG indicators 1B (GDP per person employed), 4A (Infant Mortality Rate), 4A (Under-five mortality rate), and 6A (HIV prevalence among population aged 15-24 years) all had statistically significant accelerations in 2000 or earlier for all four sets of analysis**

A2 IMF good

1. India already has enough geopolitical clout to influence institutions like the IMF for more bailouts, it has the world's second biggest population and is the biggest democracy, that's why India was bailed out in '91. Their evidence is just analyzing non permanent members who
 - a. Are most of the time smaller countries who don't have much international clout
 - b. Who aren't strong allies of Western European nations and the US like India is, who are the biggest influencers in the IMF.
2. Reuters '18 finds that after india gave a 32 billion bailout package, india is stopping any other bailout packages in the future and leaving the banks to fix themselves. Even if they prove the probability increases they have to prove intent to get loans.

<https://in.reuters.com/article/us-india-banks/india-pushes-state-banks-to-find-own-funding-sources-after-32-billion-bailout-idINKCN1H91FJ>

A massive \$32 billion bailout package for India's dominant state-run banks will not happen again and lenders will have to find their own funding by selling non-core assets and merging with each other, a senior government official said on Monday. Twenty-one banks, majority owned by New Delhi, account for more than two-thirds of the banking assets in Asia's third-biggest economy. These lenders also account for close to 90 percent of soured loans in the banking sector. Last October, the finance ministry announced a state-bank rescue plan worth 2.11 trillion rupees (\$32.41 billion) - \$14 billion of which it is in the process of injecting as a first tranche - to help banks set aside enough for their bad loans and boost credit growth in an economy where banks are the main source of funding. **"My message is no more recapitalization. Whatever has happened, has happened. Clean up on your own," the official who oversees the state banking sector told Reuters.**

<https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/imf-leadership-what-the-united-states-should-do/>

An even more basic problem at the IMF and World Bank needs attention. **Because of historical and political inertia, Western European nations and even the United States exert voting influence and control of Executive Board constituencies disproportionate to those of developing nations.** If the IMF and World Bank are to be perceived as legitimate, responding equitably to all the world's people, adjustments in the relative sizes of countries' quotas and voting powers to mitigate those imbalances are needed. Such adjustments will be politically complex. Realistically, they cannot be made in the near future. What can be done now is to reform the procedures for leadership selection.

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/india-banking-bailout-cost-manageable-imf/articleshow/57296801.cms>

The cost of recapitalising India's struggling banks would be affordable even under a negative scenario, the International Monetary Fund said on Wednesday, urging government steps to strengthen the financial system. **Weighing into a renewed debate on tackling India's \$130 billion in stressed loans, the IMF said "recapitalisation costs should be manageable" at between 1.5 and 2.4 percent of forecast GDP. Of that total, the government's share would be between 1.0 and 1.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) over the four years to March 2019,** assuming that 40 percent of loans have to be provided against. India's finance ministry earlier backed a call by the Reserve Bank of India to set up a "bad bank", saying urgency was needed to address troubled loans weighing on the banking sector.

A2 India stops R2P

1. The ET '18 finds 2 things

- a. Much of the international community has lost faith in the doctrine of R2P following in, as Russia and China saw the interventions in Libya as a disguise for state building initiatives. That's why Bajora of The Council on Foreign Relations 13'writes that Russia has vowed to block any future R2Ps. Foreign Policy '18 looks into the future writing there is little to no likelihood of an R2P intervention in the future, proved by the lack of intervention in Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar. India won't be blocking any doctrines other p5 members are already keen to do that.
- b. Even without a R2P doctrine countries will took military actions. After failing to get authorization of the UNSC, the UK, France, and the US conducted the biggest intervention yet against Assad. The conversation '14 furthers that that these strikes have shown that states are increasingly becoming comfortable with the idea of force without UN authority, and with the strikes gaining lots of international support, is way on its way to become accepted. Even if India does initiate any new blocks to r2ps the rest of the p5 will take actions they deem, fit.

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/09/the-end-of-human-rights-genocide-united-nations-r2p-terrorism/>

Regardless of whether it was right or wrong, there is very little likelihood of another R2P intervention in the foreseeable future. Syria, Yemen, and the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya in Myanmar have demonstrated that all too painfully.

<https://www.cfr.org/background/dilemma-humanitarian-intervention>

Russian officials have vowed to block further efforts at Security Council-endorsed interventions even amid humanitarian suffering.

"The international community unfortunately did take sides in Libya and we would never allow the Security Council to authorize anything similar to what happened in Libya," Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov told Australian TV in January 2012. Increasingly the intervention in Libya is becoming regarded as unique, and there appears to be less of an appetite for destroying the baseline order in states, regardless of how odious a state may be, says Stewart M. Patrick, CFR senior fellow and director of the program on international institutions and global governance. "Libya has exposed fissures within the international community and brought to the fore conflict not only in the Security Council permanent members but also among many developing countries that have long been lukewarm about the concept" of R2P, Patrick says.

Chesterman, Simon, R2P and Humanitarian Intervention: From Apology to Utopia and Back Again (August 1, 2018). Robin Geiß & Nils Melzer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook on the International Law of Global Security (Oxford University Press, Forthcoming). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224116>

The speed with which the language of R2P permeated the UN and the wider global system has been extraordinary, though this has been primarily in the nature of a political rather than legal transformation. A later section highlights the present challenges faced by R2P, evident in the partially successful operation in Libya and the dismally ineffective response to the ongoing crisis in Syria. A final section makes some tentative projections about the future — in which the language of R2P appears likely to continue its spread, but **weariness of intervention on the part of Western states and the rise of Asian states defending a conservative notion of sovereignty will dampen the conversion of words to action.**

https://sanctionsandsecurity.nd.edu/assets/114209/lopez_sanctions_brief.pdf

The cases where sanctions have been applied to protect populations experiencing on-going or impending mass atrocities are few and have produced mixed results. **The UN Security Council imposed various targeted sanctions in 2005 in the case of Darfur, and in Côte d'Ivoire and Libya in 2011.** The Darfur case exemplifies all that can go wrong during the sanctions design process. A Security Council draft

resolution aimed at sanctioning more than thirty persons responsible for killings in Darfur faced serious opposition and ultimately listed only four individuals when passed. The UN debate went on so long prior to sanctions imposition that whoever was to face financial sanctions almost surely avoided them. If Darfur was too little, too late and unconnected to other diplomatic pressure, **Côte d'Ivoire and Libya were the first direct Responsibility to Protect (R2P) sanctions measures. Each ultimately gave way to military means of stifling the killing power of a former ruler and a falling one.**

A2 Stops Appeasing to China (Naval Stuff)

1. The Epoch Times '19 finds that in the status quo India has taken a much more aggressive stance against China under Modi, who has been building bases in the Indian Ocean to counter China's navy and near the South China Sea in places like the Malacca Strait. They aren't appeasing to China any more that was Mohan Singh's policy, under Modi they have become much more assertive and nationalistic. Indeed the ORF '18 finds that India has become increasingly alarmed with China's naval rise and has made it a goal to contest China. That's why they conclude that the turf war between both navies is set to grow.
2. India is trying to get into other organizations in the status quo that require Chinese approval for example in places like the NSG which China is blocking them from. Even if India joins onto the council they will always cede influence to China according to their link.

<https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/china-military-rise-indian-challenge/>

Though the Indian National Security Advisor has tried to allay the fears engendered by the "string of pearls" theory, the Indian strategic community remains wary of China's ultimate intentions.

[7] Indian Navy is particularly alarmed by China's growing naval presence in the region. [8] China's anti-piracy operations in Gulf of Aden and other out of area operations have also raised hackles in India. But the rivalry also extends to waters beyond Malacca. If for China, Indian Ocean is not an Indian lake, New Delhi's imperative is to contest impressions in Beijing that the waters east of Malacca automatically fall under latter's sphere of influence. India's naval engagement in the East, therefore, has also been a reaction to China's expansion in the Indian Ocean Region. The turf war between the two navies, as both nations further prosper and seek greater role in regional dynamics, is only set to grow.

https://www.theepochtimes.com/india-navy-set-to-open-third-base-in-strategic-islands-to-counter-china_2776229.html

India's navy will open a third air base in the far-off Andaman and Nicobar islands on Jan. 24 to beef up surveillance of Chinese ships and submarines entering the Indian Ocean through the nearby Malacca Straits, military

officials and experts said. **New Delhi has grown concerned over the presence of China's larger navy in its neighborhood, as well as the network of commercial ports Beijing is building in an arc stretching from Sri Lanka to Pakistan** that India fears could become naval outposts. **The Indian military has seized upon the Andamans, which lie near the entrance to the Malacca Straits, to counter the Chinese challenge,**

deploying ships and aircraft since Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office in 2014 with promises of a more muscular policy.

A2 Indian Multilateralism against China (South China Sea)

THERE AINT GONNA BE WAR:

<https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/04/article/xi-duterte-in-a-cordial-but-uneasy-embrace/>

1. It's already happening in the squo. The Business Line '18 finds that because china has become increasingly assertive in the indo-pacific, India and the US have taken constructive dialogue to discuss engagement with Japan, Australia, and ASEAN nations to stabilize the region. Indeed Live Mint '18 writes that all these countries enforced their security commitments to the indo-pacific, with multiple exercises occurring near Guam and in the pacific region.
2. Guardian '15 finds that there is lack of unity when it comes to multilateralism against China. Countries like Vietnam, the philippines, India, and Taiwan are all militarizing the South China Sea and international law, while at the same time telling China to stop their military activities. This hypocrisy allows China to shake off any international pressure to stop their actions.

<https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/world/to-counter-china-india-us-to-work-with-australia-japan-asean-to-secure-indo-pacific-region/article24924733.ece>

With China increasingly asserting its presence in the Indo-Pacific, India and the US in their first 2+2 dialogue have discussed engagement with Japan, Australia and ASEAN nations to secure the seas and the skies in the region, a senior Trump administration official has said. External Affairs Minister Sushma

Swaraj and Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman held the crucial talks with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Defence Secretary James Mattis in New Delhi on September 6. **While China claims almost all of the resource-rich South China Sea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan have counter claims over the area. China recently deployed anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-surface missile systems in the disputed South China Sea amid frequent forays by US naval and surveillance aircraft over the region to assert the freedom of navigation.**

<https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/NHkV318RpGwL49EyicmZHN/Countering-China-in-the-IndoPacific.html>

Security cooperation between Japan, India, the US and Australia is on the rise. At the recently concluded Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the defence ministers of Japan, the US and Australia reiterated their shared commitment to the Indo-Pacific region. It was closely followed by Japan-India-US Malabar exercises in Guam. Japan, India, the US and Australia will also join Rimpac (Rim of the Pacific) exercises commencing on 27 June. India and the US are planning to hold the

first two-plus-two dialogue (between their foreign and defence ministers) in Washington on 6 July.

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/29/china-may-fear-reputation-damage-more-than-military-threats-over-south-china-sea>

Public diplomacy initiatives that shame China's conduct also have an important role to play. But they require greater regional solidarity to be truly effective. For instance, the publication of satellite images that track the scale of

China's man-made islands and the use of surveillance flights to record its attempt to cordon off maritime no-go zones have successfully put Beijing's provocative actions in the spotlight. **Yet they've failed to effectively isolate China due to inconsistencies among America's regional allies and partners. Despite calling on Beijing to stop its activities, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan are all actively renovating their own island facilities, albeit on a vastly smaller scale. Meanwhile, India, Malaysia, Vietnam and Thailand endorse Beijing's legal position that foreign military activities can be blocked throughout the entirety of a country's 200-mile exclusive economic zone, rather than just in the 12-mile territorial sea. This disunity has enabled Beijing to shrug off allegations that its South China Sea actions are out of step with the region. All this makes it harder to forge a broader global consensus on China's destabilising behaviour.**

A2 Indian military can check back China

1. Stripes '19 finds that the US military cannot stop in the South China Sea through its military presence there as China has continued to militarize the region due to its vast geopolitical influence in the region, and it's huge economic importance of achieving dominance in the south china sea. This is crucial as the US is fully against China in the status quo and has a much stronger military than India's, if the US can't do anything then India probably can't do anything either.
2. China already has the UK, France, and Japan trying to counter it in the South China Sea and it has failed to let up its aggression. India would just be another country in the mix for China no unique reason as to why they significantly change anything.

<https://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/freedom-of-navigation-ops-will-not-dent-beijing-s-south-china-sea-claims-experts-say-1.575609>

"Our goal is to make sure [China's militarized outposts] doesn't become a tool to operationalize an expansive illegal sovereignty claim," Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security

Randall Schriver told the House Armed Services Committee on March 27. **Nonetheless, sailing through those seas — or flying above**

them as the Air Force had done with B-52 bombers at least three times in March — is probably too

little, too late, said security analyst Paul Buchanan, an American, of 36th Parallel Assessments, a private, nonpartisan, strategic analysis

consulting firm based in New Zealand. **"The horse has bolted," he said during a January interview with Stars and**

Stripes. "The days of confronting the Chinese are long gone. It should have been done 10 years ago.

Island-building has enabled [China] to claim possession of the South China Sea." On that point,

Masayuki Tadokoro, a professor of international relations at Keio University, agreed. "It is too late

to attempt to control China," Tadokoro said during a panel discussion March 7 sponsored by the

Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "If we are to contain China now, it is almost impossible

because of the economic importance of China and also China's geopolitical presence" in the South China Sea, Tadokoro said.

A2 Tensions in the SCS

1. Lauren in 2017 writes that even if the South China Sea were to be closed to trade it wouldn't have a huge impact, as trade would quickly shift to other routes. In fact, she finds that while examining past historical events of closures that trade wasn't affected that much. Prefer this de-link on historical analysis.
2. CP in 2017 writes that if the SCS were to close China would lose 80% of their Oil Imports. China won't close the Sea because it will literally end themselves. Also Logically countries have a vested interest in maintaining trade which a) means there won't be conflict and b) no one will close off trade.
3. Historically their argument should of triggered multiple times over. Trade literally survived when an american and chinese plane collided and the nations were at the brink of conflict, when China ignored the unclos tribunal on South China Sea disputes, and just recently when an American and Chinese ship almost collided together.

Laurenceson-2017

But the other reasons for skepticism are sound. First is the centrality of maritime trade to China's economic development strategy. China depends on maritime trade both on the export and the import side; exported goods go to Japan, the United States, and Europe, while imported materials come from Africa and the Middle East. Disruption to this trade hurts China first and foremost, whether in the medium or the short term. China is a member in good standing of the liberal international maritime order, for the reason that China benefits as much as anyone from that order.

Second, it is not obvious that a closure of the South China Sea to international maritime trade

would have catastrophic, or even significant, economic effects. Based on work by John Quiggin on the [impact of the closure of the Suez](#)

[Canal](#) after the Six Day War, **Laurenceson argues that maritime trade would shift out of the South China Sea in case of a conflict, without incurring severe disruption in anything but the very short term.** Japan and South Korea do not face the problem of routine, peacetime threat to their lines of maritime supply.

China Power-2017- Even if the disturbance isn't short term, the long term disturbance that they would advocate for would be fucking key to fucking over China

China Power Team. "How much trade transits the South China Sea?" China Power. August 2, 2017.

Updated October 27, 2017. Accessed July 9, 2018.

<https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/>

Energy or commodity disruptions could have even more far-ranging economic consequences for the global marketplace. This is especially true for China – the world's top crude oil importer.

In 2016, almost 80 percent of China's oil imports passed through the South China Sea Via the Strait of Malacca.

For an oil-hungry country like China, **a long-term closure would present a worrisome economic and political scenario.**

A2 Tensions → Trade Disruptions

1. Cato Institute; China won't disrupt their own trade
2. India joining isn't gonna magically remove scores of islands, no impact
3. India already conducting drills with West in SCS, they rly can't do much else
4. Modi won't go to war; he'd lose election

<https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/>

Given the significance of the South China Sea for Chinese trade, Beijing may be more inclined to take steps to preserve the free flow of trade than it is to disrupt regional trade flows. Even under extreme hypothetical conditions where Chinese capabilities expanded to the point where it was capable of letting its own commerce pass while stopping that of other countries, **such a move would be risky.**

A2 India-US Relations getting stronger

1. Really non unique. The Hindu Business Line 19' explains that the Trump administration has made India a prominent part of its regional strategy, strategic ties have increased, and the story of relations is in a long term period of success. India is literally one of four nations with a private hotline to the US and has massive economic and arms deals. In fact, Goindi of The American Bazaar confirms that the India alliance is so strong and desired in the US that it is a bipartisan issue with politicians from both sides of the aisle strongly pursuing it for the future.
 - a. They need to give the brightline as to how much stronger the relationship is really going to get, or if its even declined in the first place.
2. 2. The UN is the only place that could hurt current relations. [Shad of The National Interest 18'](#) writes that India is attempting to chart its own path in the UN and as historically at odds with the US there, As a result only votes with the United States 13% of the time. In fact, they find that India has a lower concurrence rate with the United States than Russia and China. This turns their argument, because India would directly clash with US policy and would be the only way to decrease relations- don't deviate from the current trend.

<https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/world/india-us-ties-promoted-in-sustained-manner-by-trump-report/article26851705.ece>

The Trump administration has worked to make India a more prominent part of its regional

strategy, a top American think-tank has said in a report, lauding President Donald Trump for promoting strategic ties with India in a "sustained manner". Asserting that the Trump administration has maintained the success story of US-India relations initiated by George W Bush, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in its report gives the US President a high B+ grade when it comes to America's ties with India. The CFR in its special report **Trump's Foreign Policy are Better Than They Seem said President Trump "deserves credit for promoting strategic ties with India in a sustained manner"**

<https://www.americanbazaaronline.com/2019/03/30/us-lawmakers-advocate-a-strong-relationship-with-india-436859/>

India and the United States have historically been at odds in the UN, especially during the Cold War when India served as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement. The end of the Cold War and demise of the Non-Alignment Movement have not appreciably closed divisions between New Delhi and Washington, even after the civil nuclear deal. Of the nearly 1000 resolutions that were passed between 2005 and 2017, **the two countries concurred on 13 percent of resolutions** (as measured by them voting the same way, or both being absent from the

vote). Looking further back, Indo-U.S. voting alignment increased only slightly from 13 percent in 1990 to 17 percent in 2017. **The extent of India's alignment with the United States is below that of Russia, and around the same as that of China.**

<https://www.americanbazaaronline.com/2019/03/30/us-lawmakers-advocate-a-strong-relationship-with-india-436859/>

US lawmakers from both sides of the aisle have pledged strong congressional support for the relationship with India while underscoring the myriad contributions of the Indian diaspora to American polity, economy and society. Senator Tim Kaine of Virginia, Democratic vice presidential candidate in 2016, declared, **"The relationship is very strong," noting India and the US are connected in culture, democratic traditions, entrepreneurship and innovation.** "And we are connected because the Indian American community in the US and in Virginia is so very strong," he told an enthusiastic gathering on Capitol Hill for a Congressional Reception hosted by the US-India Friendship Council (USIFC). The event, spearheaded by community stalwart Swadesh Chatterjee and supported by the Indian Embassy in Washington, drew a number of Indian American activists to the Senate Russell Building on a Wednesday evening in early Spring. Rep. Brad Sherman of California, Chairman of the powerful House Foreign Affairs Committee, told the audience that he has been serving in Congress for 22 years and has steadfastly "been a proponent of the US-India alliance." The lawmaker is the new Democratic Co-Chair of the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans, popularly called the House India Caucus. "It's not a great joy that India faces security challenges and needs to buy \$15 billion worth of arms," he told the USIFC reception. "Given the challenges that India faces both to the north (China) and to the west (Pakistan), it is not surprising that India has decided to acquire our most advanced weaponry and has been only one of the non-NATO countries to buy the most advanced weaponry from the United States," he said.

A2 Israel Lash Out

1. Israel literally is naming a city after trump, they can't suck his dick any harder than they already have
2. Link is very shady, they can't say when israel is gonna do a 180 and say they hate the US
3. Israel stays committed to the us bc of investors
<https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-launches-investor-visas-for-us-citizens/>
4. AT: shifting electoral base means US voters will become anti israel
 - a. It's just a political prediction, clinton was predicted to win and then choked
 - b. People get more conservative as they grow older
5. No contextualization on what AFF does

A2 Code of Conduct

1. **AMTI '18** notes that China will use ASEAN agreements to their own advantage in three ways
 - a. China will use the COC talks to delay, exploit, and divert focus from any ASEAN consensus on the South China Sea.

- b. China will seek to include unhelpful and imprecise language in the COC which it could then use to justify actions
- c. China will nonetheless claim the COC as a diplomatic success and will use it as cover to avoid criticism while still pursuing its unilateral strategy to control the South China Sea

2.

Huong Le Thu, 7-13-2018, "The Dangerous Quest for a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea," Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, <https://amti.csis.org/the-dangerous-quest-for-a-code-of-conduct-in-the-south-china-sea/>

1. China will use the COC talks to delay, exploit, and divert focus from any ASEAN consensus on the South China Sea;
2. China will seek to include unhelpful and imprecise language in the COC which it could then use to justify its actions;
3. China will nonetheless claim the COC as a diplomatic success and will use it as cover to avoid criticism while still pursuing its unilateral strategy to control the South China Sea.