

We negate.

Contention 1 is the really cold war

According to Robertson of Newsroom,  
the Arctic Circle has an estimated 90 billion barrels of undiscovered oil and 1,670 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas.

Ryan of the University of Dayton in 2010 explains,  
The US claim under article 76 [of UNCLOS] would add an area in the Arctic roughly equal to the area of West Virginia.

Accession to UNCLOS establishes a legal platform for U.S. companies to drill in the arctic.

He furthers,  
companies want the legal certainty that would be secured through the Convention's procedures in order to engage in oil, gas, and mineral extraction

Gardner in 2012 explains,  
Lockheed Martin has said investment in the region "is only going to be secured within the established treaty-based framework." bi-lateral treaties won't cut it.

The impact is accelerating climate change.

Walsh of Time finds in 2012 that,  
Methane and black carbon, two potent greenhouses gases, will likely be emitted in significant amounts.

The EPA furthers in 2016 that,  
Methane has a impact on climate 28–36 times more potent than that of carbon dioxide

For this reason Wadhams of Yale writes in 2016 that,  
warming in the Arctic is equivalent to a 25 percent boost in global CO2 emissions, and could add as much as 50 percent to the global healthing effect.

The canadian government quantifies in 2018 that, climate change will kill 250,000 people per year from malnutrition. By 2030, the effects could push 122 million people into poverty

climate change is expected to contribute to approximately 250,000 additional deaths per year from malnutrition, [and] malaria, by 2030, up to 122 million more people could be forced into extreme poverty due to the effects of climate change

Mckinnon of Greenpeace furthers in 2015 that scenarios of Arctic oil exploration are consistent with at least 5 degrees Celsius of global warming – a level widely considered to be disastrous.

He concludes now more than ever, pressure and action is critical to ensure [companies] never produces oil from the U.S. Arctic Ocean.

## **Contention two is stability**

### **US presence is currently maintaining stability**

Stashwick 17 identifies the historical success of the current strategy by writing,

The United States [hard power] is the most promising opportunity to ensure[s] that competition between the United States, China, and other claimants does not escalate into military conflict. The U.S. presence in the South China Sea began expanding in the late 1990s and since then the region's territorial disputes have largely frozen.

In fact, Valencia of the Diplomat 18 writes that the most contentious disputes between the United States and China have now reached a state of 'new normalcy'. It concludes that because of current US policy, China will not occupy new land areas and will not threaten or use force against other claimants or commercial proxies.

The US is in a position of strength right now, but acceding to UNCLOS would destroy America's strategic position in two ways.

### **The first is approving international violations**

Acceding signals approval as The [AEI in 2017](#) finds,

Herein lies a major danger in U.S. ratification of UNCLOS [is] In adopting, promoting, and acting on new interpretations of international law, China [who is] is attempting to upset the status quo and establish new norms of maritime behavior. By signing up to UNCLOS, the United States might unintentionally signal[s] approval of [China's] these errant interpretations.

**Problematically,**

Glaser 11 confirms , "Beijing would not be satisfied by appeasement; [and that] concessions would [only encourage] more demanding policies on offshore islands and the South China seas."

## Second is constraining US dominance

[Bolton 11 of the Wall Street Journal](#) writes that,

With China emerging as a major power, **ratifying the treaty now would encourage Sino-American strife, constrain U.S. naval activities, and do nothing to resolve China's expansive maritime territorial claims.** At issue is China's intensified effort to keep America's military out of its "Exclusive Economic Zone," a LOS convention that affords coastal states control over economic activity in areas beyond their sovereign, 12-mile territorial seas out to 200 miles. Properly read, LOS recognizes exclusive economic zones as international waters, but **China is exploiting the treaty's ambiguities to declare "no go" zones in regions** where centuries of state practice clearly permit unrestricted maritime activity. Take the issues of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, both by air and sea. **[UNCLOS] is silent on these subjects in the exclusive zones, so China claims it can** regulate (meaning **effectively prohibit**) **all** such **activity**. Beijing also brazenly claims—exploiting Western green sensibilities—that U.S. naval vessels pollute China's exclusive zone, pollution being an activity the treaty permits coastal states to regulate out to 24 miles. **China wants to deny American access to its nearby waters so it can have its way with its neighbors.** Beijing is building a network of "anti-access" and "area denial" weapons such as integrated air defenses, submarines, land-based ballistic and cruise missiles, and cyber and anti-satellite systems designed to make it exceedingly hazardous for American ships and aircraft to traverse China's exclusive zone or peripheral seas. If the Senate ratifies the treaty, we would become subject to its dispute-resolution mechanisms and ambiguities. Right now, since we are the world's major naval power, our conduct dominates state practice and hence customary international law—to our decided advantage.

## Indeed Pham '17 finds that

The U.S. should continue the deliberate, calibrated, and quiet campaign of presence operations and freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS), a principle of customary international law, to challenge China's excessive and contested maritime claims in the SCS. Otherwise, **failing to conduct routine operations** in the aftermath of the Arbitral Tribunal ruling, particularly FONOPS, **would** send the wrong strategic signal and further **embolden Beijing.** Consider eventually expanding FONOPS to other nations and holding "combined (multi-national)" exercises to underscore the universal maritime right of all nations to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law permits.

## The impact is 2 fold:

The first is Trade.

**The tension created in the region would be devastating for trade. Crabtree '16 of CNBC writes that “over \$5 trillion of annual trade [passes] through the region and 1.5 billion people reliant on economic activity for food and jobs,”**

This is incredibly important when it comes to food shipments. Specifically, [Hoffman of Forbes in 2018](#) explains, the South China Sea is a unique choke-point in global trade. When tensions increase, trade becomes disrupted which decreases the supply and spikes the prices of products.

Problematically, PBS in 2011 contextualizes last time food prices spiked,

A record high price in many food staples is pushing millions into poverty and contributing to unrest in countries like Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, World Bank President [Robert Zoellick](#) said this week. In January, global food prices hit their highest point in the 20 years since the United Nations first started tracking the cost of food. The spike in prices has **[it] pushed about 44 million people into extreme poverty** since June, said Zoellick, speaking prior to a meeting of G-20 finance ministers in Paris Feb. 18-19.

The second impact is a conflict in the South China Sea.

Khalilzad in 2011 writes that,

Khalilzad, 2011 – former director of planning at the Defense Department [Zalmay February 8, 2011 The Economy and National Security Accessed July 29 <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad?page=1> The National Review Online]

If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. **Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats.** Under this scenario, there would be a **heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict.** Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, **[without the US,] hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions.** As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing's economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China's strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, **China's expansive territorial claims** — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — **have roiled its relations** with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, **[but] the United States is the [MOST] most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.**

**Preventing a conflict is crucial,** as [The National Interest](#) further quantifies that in a conflict, Millions would die

Thus, negate.