

Resolved: The United States should end its arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

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OVERVIEWS

W Future wars outweighs

1. At the end of the day, even if you buy their entire argument about Yemen, you're always going to be voting for our case over theirs off of how many people we affect. As Pollock explains, the cause of Saudi Arabia's current proxy war in Yemen was Saudi fear of Obama's drawback from the region in 2015. Basically, in 2015, Obama said Saudi Arabia, we're going to scale back arms sales, get our troops out of the region, and we want you to deal with Iran yourselves. Pollock concludes that if US presence disappeared, Saudi Arabia and allies would attack Iran out of fear. If you don't want to see the current crisis in Yemen get worse, see more proxy wars, or a regional war down the line that will affect the 246 million people living in the Middle East, vote neg.

A2 NS' overview

A2 Russia/China arms sales

1. Caverly explains in 2018 buying from other countries would cost a fortune, require years of retraining, greatly reducing military power. Furthermore, Guay explains that arms from any non-US country are just less effective, which is why Saudi Arabia hasn't threatened to switch.
2. On China specifically, The SCMP in 2018 further explains that China wouldn't sell the arms so as not to anger the US during the trade war.
3. On Russia, Bowler of the BBC in 2018 explains that US arms exports are 58% higher than Russia's, and while US exports grew by 25% over the past four years, Russia's fell by 7.1%. They can't fill the gap.

A2 Stockpiles

1. Freeman reports that Saudi Arabia uses air strikes not ground troops in Yemen, which is key because Chatzky from case says Saudi planes are US dependent during their life cycle for maintenance, which goes away in the aff world. Stockpiles don't matter without the planes to use them.
2. Henningan of TIME explains that Saudi Arabia uses its arms to deter Iran, which is crucial, because they lose their deterrent by spending their stockpile, making it is more likely Saudi Arabia would scale back their engagement in Yemen instead.

A2 Saudi Arabia will build their own

1. Stratfor gives three reasons why Saudi Arabia can't do this.
 - a. Defense companies can't locally source materials
 - b. The industry can't compete internationally

c. Staff shortages due to poor education And, at best, our opponents impact to Saudi Arabia making their own weapons by 2030, meaning we still save lives up until that point.

Stratfor'S Senior, 11-9-2018, "Saudi Arabia Lays the Foundation for a Defense Industry of Its Own," Stratfor, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/saudi-arabia-defense-industry-weapons-imports-vision2030> While Saudi Arabia has certainly laid the groundwork for its defense industry and has made some early progress in developing it, guiding the sector to maturity will be no simple matter. It is one thing to agree on paper to significant technology transfers and local job creation, but it is another to effectively implement such deals. Struggles by defense companies to satisfy stipulations within pending agreements that mandate local sourcing of services and raw materials have led to contract delays. It has also proved particularly difficult for defense companies with well-established and staffed manufacturing plants in the United States and Europe to set up assembly lines in Saudi Arabia, despite the relative simplicity of assembly compared with full manufacturing. A particular problem those companies have run into has been in finding a sufficient number of Saudis who have both the necessary technical skills and the willingness to work on a factory floor. The shortcomings of the Saudi educational system have forced defense companies to conduct their own staff training, causing delays and adding costs. In fact, the choice of who would lead SAMI provides an illustrative point of the larger issue. Taking the helm as CEO of the state-owned defense company was not a Saudi, but rather Andreas Schwer, a German citizen and former head of combat systems at Rheinmetall AG.

W.J. Hennigan, 10-18-2018, "What Makes the U.S.-Saudi Relationship So Special? Weapons, Oil and 'An Army of Lobbyists'," Time, <http://time.com/5428669/saudi-arabia-military-relationship/> The arrangement falls under the U.S. Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia, which is led by a two-star American general. The mission is primarily designed to bolster Saudi Arabia against arch-rival Iran in order to assert power and influence in the Middle East. "We have other very good allies in the Middle East, but if you look at Saudi Arabia: They're an ally and they're a tremendous purchaser of not only military equipment, but other things," Trump said Wednesday in the Oval Office. It was the President's latest attempt to trumpet \$400 billion in business deals that his administration signed in May 2017 during a two-day visit to Saudi Arabia. The eye-popping figure includes \$110 billion in military sales, which analysts point out is misleading because it represented letters of interest and not firmed-up contracts.

State Map, xx-xx-xxxx, "U.S. Security Cooperation With Saudi Arabia," U.S. Department of State, <https://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2019/288671.htm> As a result of U.S. security cooperation, the Kingdom has foiled numerous terrorist attempts against Saudi and foreign

targets, and has been able to successfully deter external attacks. The United States remains committed to providing the Saudi armed forces with the equipment, training, and follow-on support necessary to protect Saudi Arabia, and the region, from the destabilizing effects of terrorism, countering Iranian influence, and other threats. Toward that end, the United States will continue to collaborate with Saudi Arabia to improve training for special operations and counterterrorism forces, integrate air and missile defense systems, strengthen cyber defenses, and bolster maritime security.

<https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/A-Realists-Rationale-for-a-World-without-Nuclear-Weapons.pdf> Deterrence would not vanish in such a world; it would merely change in character. Conventional US military forces would still have the capability to threaten risks and impose costs that would outweigh the benefits an adversary might hope to achieve from conventional aggression and would thereby deter the aggression in the first place. Some adjustments would be needed, to be sure. The United States would have to devote adequate resources to its conventional forces, and allies would likely have to contribute something more toward their own defense. But the safety of a world without nuclear arms compares favorably to the risks the United States and the world will run if nuclear weapons remain.

Airplanes not ground troops Samuel Perlo-Freeman, xx-xx-xxxx, "Who is arming the Yemen war? (And is anyone planning to stop?)," No Publication, <https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2018/02/28/who-is-arming-the-yemen-war-and-is-anyone-planning-to-stop/> Saudi Arabia leads the coalition, and appears to conduct the majority of the air strikes, and lead the naval blockade of Yemen that is a major factor in the growing humanitarian catastrophe. However, Saudi Arabia does not have a significant presence of ground troops in Yemen, although some are present in Aden. The Saudi government stated at the beginning of the campaign in March 2015 that they were deploying 100 warplanes to the conflict, but more recent figures for the number of men, warplanes and naval vessels committed are not readily available.

OV We are bad at judging the consequences of our actions

1. The CATO institute writes that the underlying assumption of arms sales is that the US can accurately predict what the impact of its arms sales will be. This is a poor assumption. From case, CATO goes on to explain that countries receiving US arms sales are more likely to initiate conflict, case in point example being Saudi Arabia's interventions into Yemen, Tunisia, Syria, and Qatar. Furthermore, Walt of Harvard in 2015 asserts that the US has for decades been the leading source of global instability leading Velasco to conclude in 2013 that regional actors are 3.5 times more likely to achieve peace when foreign intervention isn't present. If we really want peace in the

region, we need to look to past precedent not predictions. And the predictions say arms sales cause more harm than good.

<https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-836.pdf>

MANAGING THE BALANCE OF POWER: THE ILLUSION OF CONTROL. The hidden assumption underlying the balance of power strategy is that the United States will be able to predict accurately what the impact of its arms sales will be. If the goal is deterrence, for example, the assumption is that an arms sale will be sufficient to deter the adversary without spawning an arms race. If the goal is to promote stability, the assumption is that an arms sale will in fact reduce tensions and inhibit conflict rather than inflame tensions and help initiate conflict. These assumptions, in turn, depend on both the recipient nation and that nation's neighbors and adversaries acting in ways that don't make things worse. As it turns out, these are often poor assumptions

OV Not dependent on US

1. Saudi Arabia could easily switch to buying arms from another country. Indeed, Davies of the Guardian in 2018 explains that if there was a freeze in Saudi-US relations, "Riyadh could, for example, simply switch its purchases to other major arms exporters such as Russia and China." Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute in 2018 furthers that although systems between US and Russian weapons, for example, would not be compatible, because Saudi Arabia is so oil-rich they could easily purchase all new systems from the Russians without a hassle. In fact, Woody of Business Insider finds in October that Saudi Arabia is already testing a pivot toward Russian systems, such as turning down offers to buy THAAD from the US in favor of Russian-made air-defense systems. In fact, in some cases, Russian weapons are on par with those of the US, such as their warplanes.

Anna Borshchevskaya, 12-20-2017, "The Tactical Side of Russia's Arms Sales to the Middle East," Jamestown, <https://jamestown.org/program/tactical-side-russias-arms-sales-middle-east/> Another practical consideration is that many local military personnel in the MENA region have trained on Russian weaponry and feel comfortable operating it. As one American source familiar with the situation explained it, "If you have an AK-47, why change to an M-16?"[xvi] For example, helicopters are especially crucial to Egypt's anti-Islamist campaign; and according to first-hand pilot accounts, Russia's less expensive helicopters fit Egypt's needs well. Overall, Russian attack helicopters are not necessarily superior technologically, but they bring heavy firepower to a fight. They may fare worse in a contested air space, but the Sinai airspace is not contested. The Russian MiG-29 is a highly advanced aircraft, easier to maintain than an

American one, and cheaper than an F-22[xviii] (which the US is currently not even exporting).

Glen Carey, 3-2-2018, "Saudis Want to Make Their Own Weapons. Russia Is Eager to Help," Bloomberg,

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-02/saudis-want-to-make-their-own-weapons-russia-is-eager-to-help>

In case they're reluctant to do so, the Saudis are making it clear that they have other options. They're already planning to buy the Russian S-400 air-defense system, under a deal that would let them manufacture related products at home. The prospect of more such agreements is likely to alarm American policy makers, who worry about losing ground to Russia and China in the Middle East.

Christopher Woody, 10-8-2018, "The Saudis still haven't locked in the massive arms deals Trump touted, and they're still talking to Russia about its advanced S-400 air defense system," Business Insider,

<https://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabia-hasnt-signed-us-arms-deals-talking-to-russia-about-s-400-2018-10>

In a sign of Trump's continued emphasis on arms sales as a component of US foreign policy, White House senior adviser and Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner personally intervened with Lockheed to secure a 20% discount for the air-defense system. **Yet Riyadh let a September 30 deadline to wrap up that purchase come and go, according to The Post.** A Saudi official told The Post that the kingdom was still "highly interested" in the deal. "Like any military purchase," the official added, "there are negotiations happening which we hope will conclude in the quickest means possible." Perhaps more concerning for US officials is Saudi Arabia's continued interest in the Russian-made advanced S-400 air-defense system. According to The Post, the Saudis have resisted US requests to disavow their interest buying the S-400 and have continued talks with Moscow. Saudi Arabia would be only the latest ally with interest in the Russian-made air-defense system.

A2A2 Don't have the money

1. 34.4 trillion in natural resources
2. Royal family alone is worth 1 trillion. Ez switch.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Saudi_Arabia

- 1.
- 2.

With a total **worth** of US\$34.4 trillion, **Saudi Arabia** has the second most valuable natural resources in the world. In 2016 the **Saudi** Government launched its **Saudi** Vision 2030 to reduce the country's dependency on oil and diversify its economic resources. **Saudi Arabia** has the largest economy in the Arab world.

Deirdre Shesgreen,, 10-16-2018, "US weapons sales a flashpoint as President Trump presses Saudi Arabia over missing journalist," USA TODAY,
<https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/10/16/u-s-weapons-sales-saudis-flashpoint-debate-over-missing-journalist/1661290002/>

Secondly, Spindel says, it's unlikely that Saudi Arabia would turn to China or another U.S. competitor to fill its weapons orders if the U.S. cancels any coming sales. Much of Saudi's current weapons systems are American-made; any additions from Russia or China would not be compatible. "These arms don't talk to one another, so it can be hard to have a wholesale change in who supplies your weaponry," she said. It would be extremely expensive for Saudi Arabia to switch systems, "so the U.S. actually does have a lot of leverage here," she added.

But others said the Saudis could turn to another country as a diplomatic slap to the U.S. – and because money is not a real obstacle to the oil-rich country. "If we canceled, they would buy from the Russians and the Chinese because they can afford it and it would send us a message," Danielle Pletka, senior vice president for foreign and defense policy at the American Enterprise Institute, a center-right think tank, said Saudi Arabia. "It would decrease our leverage and we don't have someone else" in the region to partner with on other vital foreign policy matters.

Rob Davies, 10-15-2018, "How much damage can Saudi Arabia do to the global economy?," Guardian,
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/15/how-much-damage-can-saudi-arabia-do-to-the-global-economy>

The alliance stands to benefit US employers such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Electric and ExxonMobil. Some of the firms are reported to have expressed concern to Trump already about the impact that a freeze in Saudi-US relations might have. Riyadh could, for example, simply switch its purchases to other major arms exporters such as Russia and China.

Trump's trip to the Arabian peninsula last year also yielded an agreement that the kingdom's Public Investment Fund, which manages its vast oil wealth, would invest in US infrastructure programmes. The PIF is to stump up \$20bn of a \$40bn pot overseen by the global asset manager Blackstone. The fund, however, has yet to gather any serious momentum

A2 GENERAL ARGUMENTS

A2 PMCs

1. Mitigate - Boggs of Washington University furthers in 2008 that on countless occasions PMCs have faced the same legal immunity as the military.
2. Turn - Sullivan of the Connecticut Law Review finds in 2010 that PMCs are more accountable than non governmental military because they fear negative publicity that could hurt their ability to compete in the market.

Sullivan 10 (CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW VOLUME 42 FEBRUARY 2010 NUMBER 3, "Private Force / Public Goods" SCOTT M., Assistant Professor of Law, LSU, <http://connecticutlawreview.org/documents/ScottM.Sullivan-PrivateForce-PublicGoods.pdf>)KM

On the other hand, there are non-formalist influences on institutional behavior that make PMCs more inclined than the public military to disclose. The most substantial is the moderating and disciplining effect of the commercial market that encourages disclosure and the protection of reputation as a legitimate entity. **PMCs are repeat economic actors. The success of their work is judged not only by the effectiveness of their work, but also whether they perform that work in a way that does not draw negative publicity to their sponsor.** Like an umpire in the World Series, their name is only called when something has gone wrong. People do not care about whether a prison is privatized if it is functioning properly. The public is uninterested in Blackwater contractors who guard State Department personnel until those contractors are engaged in an incident deemed inappropriate. **Thus, PMCs are highly responsive to questions impacting their larger commercial reputation.** Reputational concern extends to all of a company's operations no matter the location or client. In the words of one company official, "[w]hen we sneeze in Africa, we get a cold in Asia."²¹⁵ The hiring process of PMCs reflects a concern that the personnel utilized by those companies satisfy the highest standards of professionalism. Institutional concerns, shared by contemporary public militaries (largely reflecting the norms of their surrounding societies), have greatly influenced how PMCs view the currency of their reputation.²¹⁶ In Sierra Leone, one private security firm refused to engage in offensive operations against the country's rebels due to a concern that the firm would be accepting a "mercenary" tag that would affect future employment with large Western states and the U.N.²¹⁷ **he largest customers of PMCs and the standards that they require in the execution of their contracts shape PMC standards.**²¹⁸ **In the context of the current security situation, the United States and major international non-governmental organizations like the U.N. control corporate operating and performance standards.**²¹⁹ **The possibility of a negative incident tainting a contractor is much higher than in the public system. When public soldiers engage in an apparent unlawful shooting of civilians, as in Haditha, their blame is individualized and generally perceived by the public as not implicating the military as a whole.**²²⁰ **A similar incident by PMC personnel is perceived as evidence of a larger socialized problem with the use of contractors.** In the context of the Abu Ghraib scandal, polls indicate that the public accepted the explanation of military and civilian assertions that the acts of prison guards reflected

"a few bad apples."²²¹ The opinion of the contractors acting as interrogators was much more likely to reflect a larger concern that implicated the entire company.

Boggs 08 (PHD-Poli/Sci @ Berkeley, Prof @ Washington University in St. Louis, UCLA, USC, UC, Irvine, and Carleton University in Ottawa, Fast Capitalism vol 4.1, 8) ET https://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/4_1/boggs.html

In Iraq, where Blackwater and other PMC personnel enjoy immunity from prosecution, few U.S. troops have been prosecuted for crimes that have far exceeded anything attributed to the PMC's. As with My Lai in Vietnam, the well-known instances of torture at Abu Ghraib prison stand out as exceptional, brought to light by media exposes after being dismissed or covered up by the military. Several low-level prison guards were tried and convicted, a few receiving stiff sentences, while officers in decision-making positions (not to mention Washington officials) never faced legal consequences. **Similar operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were spared criminal sanctions. Even more illuminating is the case of Marine atrocities at Haditha, on November 19, 2005, where 24 defenseless Iraqi civilians were slaughtered in the aftermath of a roadside bombing.** This episode came to light thanks to a Time magazine report of March 16, 2006, after prolonged

military efforts to cover up the atrocities. Shamefully, six of eight Marines charged had their cases dismissed at court-martial while a seventh, Lt. Col. Jeffrey Chessani (the highest-ranking officer accused) was exonerated by a military judge at Camp Pendleton. Only one defendant remained – Lt. Andrew Grayson – accused not of murder but of dereliction of duty.[18] Coverups made it virtually impossible to prosecute serious offenses. **Here as in many other cases the much-hyped “rules of engagement” failed to protect Iraqi civilians from murder at the hands of American occupying troops,** bIn yet another instructive episode, a Marine hearing officer at Camp Pendleton recommended against court-martialing Sgt. Johnny Winnick for manslaughter and assault in the shooting deaths of two Syrians and the wounding of two others in Iraq. Instead, the process was to involve nonjudicial punishment for dereliction of duty, leading to nothing more than a demotion and reprimand. **In June 2007 Winnick opened fire on Syrians whose truck stopped near the Lake Tharthar region, continuing to shoot even after the men were down and incapacitated.** No evidence was presented that the four men were planting a bomb, as Winnick claimed. Prosecution would have followed the charge that Winnick violated rules of engagement requiring “positive identification” that someone is committing a “hostile act” or has shown “hostile intent”. At the preliminary hearing in Camp Pendleton, a defense expert successfully argued that rules of engagement are inevitably vague and confusing to frontline troops – even though, in this instance, the Syrians had already been rendered defenseless. One of Winnick’s attorneys, Daniel Conway, said: “Our Marines deserve the benefit of the doubt when they make good-faith decisions to use force in self-defense during combat. Sgt. Winnick is a standup Marine, and he’s eager to get back to work.”[19] Of course the idea that “good-faith decisions” are being made in “self-defense” could be made for troops under virtually any battlefield circumstances. **The point here is that, on the ground, levels of “immunity” in Iraq extend as much to regular military troops as to PMC’s.**

A2 Sanctions trade-off

1. Sanctions are never going to happen. The Guardian in 2018 explains that after the murder of Khashoggi, Trump, although he did implement sanctions on individuals in the country, he refused to sanction the country as a whole as he didn’t want to punish the entire country. As long as this is the case, sanctions are never going to be implemented against the country.

Guardian Staff, 11-20-2018, "Donald Trump stands with Saudi Arabia – statement in full," Guardian,

<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/nov/21/donald-trump-stands-by-saudi-arabia-khashoggi-statement-in-full>

Donald Trump has issued a statement through his press secretary on his decision not to impose sanctions against Saudi Arabia, despite calls for him to do so over the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, saying that while the crown prince “could very well” have had knowledge of the murder, Saudi trade and support against Iran, was too important to compromise. Here is his statement in full:

A2 Vision 2030

1. The Middle East Eye gives X reasons why Vision 2030 is never going to materialize.
 - a. Poor historical precedent. The MEE cites nine similar past plans that have failed to produce an outcome. “The kingdom has yet to build any serious industrial infrastructure, beyond some basic petrochemical, plastic and food processing plants.”
 - b. Bad investment strategies, which is a huge component of funding the plan. At times of booming prices, Riyadh usually invests its cash surpluses internationally. When oil plummets, they rush to liquidate their positions. This has resulted in a disastrous record of public fund investments over the decades, evident in the narrow contribution of those investments to the national GDP.

- c. Poor national education. The Saudi education system hardly delivers the most basic skills of Arab literacy and numeracy, despite its astronomical budget, which was more than \$53 billion in 2017 budget.

Overall, the MEE concludes that once again, Saudi Arabia is just looking for a quick fix to a complex problem.

Mee Correspondent, 8-1-2017, "Saudi's economy: Why Vision 2030 will fail," Middle East Eye, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/saudis-economic-future-six-problems-it-needs-solve-vision-2030-plan-1907352248>

But at least nine of those plans have failed miserably in realising that objective. The kingdom has yet to build any serious industrial infrastructure, beyond some basic petrochemical, plastic and food processing plants. The results from the latest – and 10th - development plan, the National Transformation Plan (NTP), remain to be seen. It is a five-year vision, running from 2015 till 2020, that forms the first phase of the much bigger Vision 2030, the Saudi government's long-term diversification strategy.

A government that has always relied on the easy money of oil sales is inadequately positioned to lead the post-oil era. Riyadh lacks the cultural capacity to govern in a different world. Oil sales produce constant and rapid flows of cash, in contrast to the pro-investment approach, which is a much more daunting long-term mechanism for money creation.

The Saudi government has a track record of indiscipline when it comes to allowing investments to pay dividends. At times of booming prices, Riyadh usually invests its cash surpluses internationally. When oil plummets, they rush to liquidate their positions.

This approach fails to stand the test of time, resulting in a disastrous record of public fund investments over the decades. This is evident in the narrow contribution of those investments to the national GDP.

These are the fundamental skills needed for entry-level employment, including literacy, numeracy and basic information and communication technology; then the people-centred skills such as communication. Finally, there are the conceptual and thinking skills such as research, analysis, problem-solving, planning, critical thinking and creative abilities.

But the Saudi education system hardly delivers the most basic skills of Arab literacy and numeracy, despite its astronomical budget, which was more than \$53 billion in 2017

budget. This is a ridiculous figure, given the poor outcomes, as is evident from the widespread unemployability of its graduates. As an opinion writer for Mideast Posts reported in 2012: Saudi Arabia, due to the nature of its political system, has always resorted to what it perceives as easy options.

A2 Middle Eastern NATO

1. Delink - Historic precedent says no. Mouchantaf of the Carnegie Middle East Center think tank says that, quote, “The idea of an Arab NATO is wholly unconvincing. It will simply not happen.” Groups in the region like the GCC or Saudi Arabia and the UAE have failed to every agree to a joint defense capability, so he concludes that “there is no evidence to suggest they can now organize something as ambitious as an Arab NATO.” Furthermore, even if such a group did exist, Mouchantaf says that existing alliances, such as the anti-terror Islamic cooperation, have produced no results and are essentially useless.
2. Delink - The region is home to too many differences. Werleman of the Middle East Eye in 2018 explains that because threat perceptions and security concerns can change quickly, any alliance would be prone to falling apart. He concludes that “the Trump administration is attempting to devise a military solution to a political problem - something that has been tried and failed many times already.”
3. Turn - A Middle Eastern NATO would actually increase tensions. Bandow of CATO in 2018 writes that this alliance would allow countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia to use the US to force their agenda on their neighbors and compel other countries to lean toward Iran to form a counterbalance while inadvertently increasing tensions.

Doug Bandow, 11-26-2018, "Why America Should Say No to an Arab NATO," Cato Institute, <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-america-should-say-no-arab-nato>

In fact, such an alliance appeals to Saudi Arabia and the Emirates precisely because it would become a mechanism for them to enlist Washington to force their agenda on their neighbors. Of the states suggested for MESA membership, they possess the largest economies, most active militaries, and closest relationships with Washington. They already have Bahrain and Egypt on their payrolls. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi also have led an unsuccessful effort to isolate Qatar to end its independent foreign policy. An “Arab NATO” could formalize their objectives. Finally, Turkey, currently vying with Saudi Arabia for regional leadership, might lean toward Iran in an attempt to promote more balance.

Cj Werleman, 8-1-2018, "Trump's ‘Arab NATO’ idea is doomed to fail," Middle East Eye, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/why-arab-nato-doomed-fail-25089679>

The Intercept recently learned of a Saudi-led plot to invade and conquer Qatar in 2017. "The plan, which was largely devised by the Saudi and UAE crown princes and was likely some weeks away from being implemented, involved Saudi ground troops crossing the land border into Qatar, and, with military support from the UAE, advancing roughly 70 miles towards Doha," according to the Intercept.

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The Saudi-Emirati axis: United against Gulf unity

This, again, demonstrates how threat perceptions and security concerns of Gulf Arab states are far from being homogenous, and can change quickly.

If Iranian-led sectarianism is viewed by the Sunni Gulf Arab states as the primary security threat, then these states would be better served by alleviating the concerns of their Shia minorities and granting equal rights and responsibilities to all their citizens.

To this end, the Trump administration is attempting to devise a military solution to a political problem - something that has been tried and failed many times already.

Chirine Mouchantaf, 8-29-2018, "What are the chances an 'Arab NATO' will work?," Defense News,

<https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2018/08/29/what-are-the-chances-an-arab-nato-will-work/>

"The idea of an Arab NATO is wholly unconvincing. It will simply not happen," said Yezid Sayegh, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center think tank. "It is less than four years since a grand anti-terror Islamic coalition was announced by Saudi Arabia and backed by the same countries, but nothing came of it despite some quiet, practical cooperation," he added. "The GCC has failed time and again to agree a joint defense capability, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not even been able to wage a properly coordinated war in Yemen, so there is no evidence to suggest they can now organize something as ambitious as an Arab NATO."

A2 Influence

1. Delink - The US has never cared about human rights. Whitney of Truthout in 2017 writes that the US backs over 73% of the world's dictatorships with military assistance. Given that these countries are still dictatorships, and also, that the US clearly doesn't care who they back, it is clear that the US has no influence or doesn't even care to have influence over the domestic, non-military policies of these countries. Thus, Chatzky of the Council on Foreign Relations concludes in 2010 that selling or not selling the arms is not going to affect Saudi policies on democracy, women, or anything else.

Rich Whitney, 9-23-2017, "US Provides Military Assistance to 73 Percent of World's Dictatorships," Truthout,

<https://truthout.org/articles/us-provides-military-assistance-to-73-percent-of-world-s-dictatorships/>

The truth is not easy to find, but federal sources do provide an answer: No. According to Freedom House's rating system of political rights around the world, there were 49 nations in the world, as of 2015, that can be fairly categorized as "dictatorships." As of fiscal year 2015, the last year for which we have publicly available data, the federal government of the United States had been providing military assistance to 36 of them, courtesy of your tax dollars. The United States currently supports over 73 percent of the world's dictatorships!

Andrew Chatzky, 9-24-2010, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea>

Still, one good reason to move ahead with the sale is that there is no good reason not to. Though some might oppose it on grounds of disliking the Saudi political system, selling or not selling the arms is not going to affect Saudi policies on democracy, women, Islam, or anything else one whit. Moral purity would be purchased at the price of reduced American regional influence.

A2 Women driving

1. Delink - Absolutely no link to the US. Al-Khamri of Al Jazeera in 2018 says that recent human rights developments in Saudi Arabia are not linked to the US. For instance, the decision to let women drive was part of a pragmatic plan to boost the economy. Other changes are moves made by crown prince Mohammed bin Salman to increase foreign investment in non-oil jobs in order to fulfil the provisions of Vision 2030. This isn't linked to whether or not the US is supplying arms or not.

Hana Al-Khamri, 6-24-2018, "Why did Saudi Arabia lift the driving ban on women only now?," No Publication,

<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/saudi-arabia-lift-driving-ban-women-180621203632446.html>

The Saudi leadership has rather pragmatic reasons to allow women to drive. **First of all, the lifting of the driving ban is part of a plan to boost Saudi Arabia's economy and decrease government social provision.**

Low oil prices have put a strain on the state budget and the authorities have had to cut government jobs that many Saudis have long relied on. The Saudi authorities are now trying to push more citizens, including women, towards private sector employment. They seem to believe that the lifting of the ban would make it possible for more women to join the workforce and revitalise the country's economy in line with Vision 2030, which aims to have women's participation in the workforce at 30 percent by 2030. Furthermore, there have been dramatic changes within the House of Saud in recent years which had to be legitimised through a major PR campaign. Last year, Mohammed bin Salman - then just 31-year-old - became crown prince and embarked on major changes in Saudi domestic and foreign policies. After isolating and oppressing opponents and critics, he worked on constructing an image of himself as a charismatic popular leader within Saudi Arabia and abroad. **He decided to use the women's rights issue as a tool**

to win over the hearts and minds of young Saudis, as well as the kingdom's foreign allies. In other words, the lifting of the driving ban is nothing more than a PR stunt and an economic policy. This is why the leaders of Saudi Arabia refuse to involve women's rights activists in this process.

A2 PRO

A2 US

A2 Israel alliance

1. Delink - Israel doesn't care about arms sales. Thomas of the Congressional Research Service in 2017 explains that Israel is toning down its opposition to US arms sales. We'd further extrapolate that this is the case due to Israel beginning to supply arms to Saudi Arabia itself.

Clayton Thomas Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional Research Service, October 11, 2017, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44984.pdf> Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

In addition, the large package of arms sales to Saudi Arabia announced during President Trump's May 2017 visit to the kingdom has reportedly raised Israeli anxieties, with advocacy groups voicing concern and several ministers suggesting that the United States did not consult with **Israel** in advance.⁹⁴ Still, **opposition to the Saudi proposal appears muted in comparison to similar packages proposed in the past.**

A2 Legality

1. Delink - The UN Arms Treaty is nonbinding. It literally says that "any nation is free to set its own standards for the import, export, and transfer of arms."
2. Ending arm sales to Saudi Arabia is not ending arm sales to other nations. The US will continue to sell arms to other nations like Iraq, Taiwan, and Qatar. The illegality of arm sales is not solved by affirming the resolution.

UN Arms Treaty

Ted Bromund, The Daily Signal, "5 Fundamental Flaws in the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty", 07/23/12, <https://www.dailysignal.com/2012/07/23/5-fundamental-flaws-in-the-u-n-arms-trade-treaty/>

Any nation is free to set its own standards for the import, export, and transfer of arms. If the nations of the world genuinely want higher standards, they can have them right now. The fact that they do not means that many of them are not negotiating the ATT in good faith. And that, in turn, means that the treaty will not constrain them after they sign it. The idea that there is a vast illicit arms trade in the world is a myth: Most arms trafficking is done with the knowledge and the connivance of governments, which describe it as illicit to conceal their culpability (or, on occasion, their administrative incapacity). The U.S. should never negotiate, support, sign, or ratify treaties that are based fundamentally on a lie.

A2 Greentech

1. Nonunique - The switch to green tech is already happening. Dudley of Forbes finds in 2018 that green tech will be competitive with fossil fuels by 2020 and cheaper in a few years. As a result, Richardson of Forbes writes in 2017 that there has been an \$8.7 trillion boom in sustainable investments and that for every five dollars one goes to sustainables.
2. Delink - Due to a lack of international support, cutting arms sales wouldn't be enough to change the trajectory of climate changes. Reed of the New York Times in 2017 that because countries like India and China have a huge role in determining the success of global climate change combat, without actors like them changing their ways, US efforts are as good as nonexistent.

Dominic Dudley, xx-xx-xxxx, "Renewable Energy Will Be Consistently Cheaper Than Fossil Fuels By 2020, Report Claims," Forbes,
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2018/01/13/renewable-energy-cost-effective-fossil-fuels-2020/#219b49c24ff2>, 8-8-2018

The cost of renewable energy is now falling so fast that it should be a consistently cheaper source of electricity generation than traditional fossil fuels within just a few years, according to a new report from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). The organisation – which has more than 150 member countries – says the cost of generating power from onshore wind has fallen by around 23% since 2010 while the cost of solar photovoltaic (PV) electricity has fallen by 73% in that time. With further price falls expected for these and other green energy options, **IRENA says all renewable energy technologies should be competitive on price with fossil fuels by 2020.** Globally, onshore wind schemes are now costing an average of \$0.06 per kilowatt hour (kWh), although some schemes are coming in at \$0.04 per kWh, while the cost of solar PV is down to \$0.10 per kWh. In comparison, the cost of electricity generation based on fossil fuels typically falls in a range of \$0.05 to \$0.17 per kWh.

Richardson'17

David W. Richardson, Managing Director, Impax Asset Management, 1-12-2017, "Op-Ed: Warren Buffett, Bill Gates and Jack Ma are betting big on this sector," CNBC,
<https://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/12/warren-buffett-bill-gates-are-investing-in-clean-energy-commentary.html>, 8-8-2018

Washington watchers who see a gloomy future for environmental issues may be missing something Wall Street already sees: **an \$8.7 trillion boom in sustainable investments.** One of every five dollars invested in the U.S. today **targets sustainable investments.** Not to be outdone, private capital is flowing there too. Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg, Jeff Bezos, Jack Ma and other tech titans recently committed \$1 billion to launching a [new, low carbon energy fund](#). Warren Buffett's company is busy investing in new solar and wind energy projects, including the world's largest solar plant. **And 84 major corporations have pledged to source 100 percent of their energy from renewables going forward. All of this investment activity may seem counterintuitive.** After all, the incoming Trump administration has vowed to reverse environmental regulations, and his Cabinet is being packed with old-school fans of fossil fuels. Despite this, big global trends like climate change are hastening investment in technology solutions to environmental problems. Many investors recognize this opportunity and are thinking "green" – as in the color of money.

Reed, Stanley. "Shift to Lower-Carbon Energy Is Too Slow, I.E.A. Report Warns." The New York Times, The New York Times, 21 Dec. 2017,

www.nytimes.com/2015/11/10/business/energy-environment/shift-to-lower-carbon-energy-is-too-slow-report-warns.html.

“Even as the world shifts toward lower-carbon forms of energy, the changes are happening so slowly to keep global temperatures from rising to dangerous levels in the coming decades, an international research group warns in a report released on Tuesday. And low oil prices could make the problem worse by slowing the planet’s transition to cleaner and more efficient cars, trucks, and aircraft, according to the report, by the International Energy Agency. The group represents nearly 30 countries and aims to promote secure and environmentally sustainable global energy. “Now is not the time to relax,” Fatih Birol, the agency’s executive director, said in a statement accompanying the report. **The group, based in Paris, said in its annual “World Energy Outlook” that Asian countries like India and China could play a big role in determining how successfully the world combats climate change.”**

A2 Wind power

1. Nonunique - Drouin of Yale finds in 2018 that the US wind power industry is already accelerating and will see significant growth in the coming decade. This is for two reasons:
 - a. First, advances in turbine technology and construction are making wind farms more viable.
 - b. Second, states are pushing for wind farms, and the farms are also receiving \$18.5 million in funding tax credits from the federal government.

For these reasons, Drouin concludes that 25 wind projects are already being planned in the status quo.

Drouin '18

Roger Drouin, 1-11-2018, "After an Uncertain Start, U.S. Offshore Wind Is Powering Up," Yale Environment 460,7-15-2018, <https://e360.yale.edu/features/after-an-uncertain-start-u-s-offshore-wind-is-powering-up?//FS>

After years of false starts and delays, **the offshore wind industry in the United States finally seems to be gaining some momentum.** Although far behind the burgeoning offshore wind energy industry in Europe, companies such as Statoil, Avangrid, and Ørsted are joining other wind energy developers — both from the U.S. and Europe— to pursue a slate of projects along the U.S. coast. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, **more than 25 offshore wind projects** with a generating capacity of 24 gigawatts **are now being planned**, mainly off the U.S. Northeast and mid-Atlantic coasts. And although some of these projects may not be built, and only one commercial offshore wind farm has actually been constructed —the tiny, five-turbine “Block Island Wind” project off Rhode Island — **analysts say that U.S. offshore wind is expected to enjoy significant growth in the coming decade.** “The real nuts-and-bolts of making this industry happen are going to come together in 2018,” says Stephanie McClellan, director of the University of Delaware’s Special Initiative on Offshore Wind. **Several key factors are driving the long-awaited takeoff of U.S. offshore wind: Sophisticated turbine technologies** and economies of scale **are driving down costs; advances in construction are allowing wind farms to be built in deeper water** farther offshore, significantly lessening the public’s concern about seeing turbines close to the coast; **states** across the Northeast and the mid-Atlantic, as well as California and Hawaii, **are pushing development of offshore wind projects;** and some European wind turbine manufacturers, as well as several U.S. firms, have decided to locate research, development, and wind turbine production

facilities in the U.S. And to the surprise of some companies and renewable energy analysts, **the Trump administration** — which has aggressively promoted the development of fossil fuels over renewable energy — **seems to be supporting the offshore wind energy sector.** Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke, whose department oversees the federal Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, endorsed offshore wind in his proposed fiscal year 2018 budget and praised the leasing of federal waters to Avangrid for the Kitty Hawk project as a “big win.” In December, U.S. Secretary of Energy **Rick Perry announced the creation of a consortium to develop innovative offshore wind technologies. Ninety percent of the announced \$18.5 million in federal funding for the consortium will go to research and development, largely to decrease turbine costs and improve turbine efficiency.**

President Trump, who once disparaged many aspects of wind power, could still decide to throw up roadblocks to the offshore wind industry. But for now, analysts are cautiously optimistic about the sector’s prospects, especially since Congress’s recently passed tax reform bill preserves tax credits for the wind energy industry for several more years.

A2 MIC Military-industrial complex

1. Delink - Saudi sales are just a drop in the bucket for the US. For instance, Macias of CNBC in 2018 quantifies that Lockheed Martin predicts that sales to Saudi Arabia will total less than 1.5% of its sales in 2019, which is marginal. The military industrial complex will just continue to exist.
2. Delink - Even if the US ceases to sell Saudi Arabia weapons, this only means that another country will sell them weapons and grow the military industry in their country instead. At best, the Pro just shuffles around the problem and offloads it onto a government that is probably prepared even less to deal with an influx of military lobbying money.

A2 Yemen

A2 Countries with weapons more aggression

1. Alt-causal - Countries who want to be at war get more weapons.

A2 W - Land mines

1. Arab News 19’ - Land mines were planted by the Houthi militia and in fact, Saudi Arabia currently clears mines, and has removed 26,609 to date.

Arab News, 2-16-2019, "Saudi project removes 26,609 land mines in Yemen," <http://www.arabnews.com/node/1424536/saudi-arabia%20Saudi%20project%20removes%2026,609%20land%20mines%20in%20Yemen>

JEDDAH: The Saudi Project for Landmines Clearance in Yemen launched by the King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center (KSRelief), removed 64 anti-personnel mines, 1,430 anti-vehicle mines, 85 explosive devices and 955 unexploded ordnance during the second week of December.

The mines were planted by the Iranian-backed Houthi militia in Yemen. In the last week of November, members of the project managed to dismantle some 1,462 land mines to reach 6,677 mines planted by the Houthi militia in schools and residential areas throughout the month.

The militia has attempted to hide the land mines via several methods, which has led to the death or severe injury of children, women and elderly men. Since the beginning of the project, 26,609 mines have been removed.

A2 W - Drones

1. Mitigate. Civilians are killed at extremely low rates. Bergen of CNN explains in 2012 that the estimated civil death rate is close to zero. This is for two reasons:
 - a. First, drones can linger for longer periods of time over targets, meaning they take longer to determine whether civilians are around
 - b. Second, the drone program has come under congressional oversight, meaning that there is an added layer of accountability.

Thus, Saletan of Slate furthers in 2015 that drones are the safest form of war in modern history, as they are seven times safer for civilians than alternatives.

2. Turn - Drones decrease terror attacks. Sarhabi of the International Quarterly Studies quantifies in 2016 that drone strikes are associated with a five percent decrease in terrorist attacks. This is because strikes take terrorist leaders off the battlefield which helps degrade these organizations, rendering them less lethal, more vulnerable to defeat, and more likely to end faster than groups that did not suffer leadership decapitation. Sarhabi concludes that killing insurgent leaders increases the probability that governments will defeat insurgents by 25 to 30 percent.

, Patrick B., and Anoop K. Sarbahi. "The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan." *International Quarterly Studies* 60, no. 2 (2016): 203-19.

doi:10.1093/isq/sqv004.

The 2FESL result in column 4 of Table 3 estimates that **drone strikes are associated with about a five-percentage point decrease in terrorist +attacks.** This result is statistically significant at conventional levels. From 2007 through 2011, the agencies suffered roughly 0.88 militant attacks per week on average. During weeks in which a drone strike occurred, agencies experienced 0.68 attacks on average... Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the estimate presented in column 5 of Table 3 suggests that **the lethality of militant attacks declined by an average of nearly 25 percentage points in a given week in which a drone strike occurred.**

sarbahi 15

<http://patrickjohnston.info/materials/drones.pdf//SC>

The second mechanism by which drones could reduce terrorism is through “degradation.” This mechanism would suggest that **drone strikes reduce terrorism by taking terrorist leaders, and other “high-value individuals”**

(HVIs), off the battlefield. The loss of individuals with valuable skills, resources, or connections hinders a terrorist organization's effectiveness, including its ability to continue producing violence at the same rate it had before losing its lost key HVIs. Killing core and affiliated al-Qaida leaders is the stated objective of drone strikes.⁸ Drone strikes have resulted in the deaths of many top terrorist leaders. In late 2012, the U.S. administration claimed to have eliminated at least two-thirds of the top 30 al-Qa'ida leaders in Pakistan and Afghanistan during the first three years of President Obama's first term in office.⁹ The estimates compiled by New America Foundation suggest that by August 2014 drone strikes in Pakistan accounted for the killing of 64 militant leaders. The list includes 38 high-level al-Qai'da functionaries and several al-Qai'da-affiliated and Taliban group leaders.(New America Foundation 2015). An emerging political science literature has begun to assess the effects of "leadership decapitation"—the killing or capture of militant leaders or other HVIs—using more 8 comprehensive datasets and sophisticated statistical methodologies and research designs. The literature on leadership decapitation has largely focused on evaluating the effect of killing or capturing top insurgent or terrorist leaders on outcomes like the probability of group collapse, mortality, and attack rates. 10 Scholars of leadership decapitation have come to different conclusions. **On the one hand, using large-N approaches, Johnston (2010) and Price (2012) both find evidence that removing the top leaders of insurgent and terrorist groups helps degrade these organizations, rendering them less lethal, more vulnerable to defeat, and more likely to end quickly than groups that did not suffer leadership decapitation.** Using a different dataset and dependent variable, Jordan (2009, 2014) argues that decapitating terrorist organizations is ineffective because it rarely results in their collapse. Jordan further argues that decapitation may have counterproductive effects when used against terrorist organizations whose goals involve religion—as do al-Qa'ida's, the TTP's, and the Haqqani Network's—particularly when these organizations are large and old (relative to the average terrorist organization in her dataset). 11 We expect drone strikes that kill terrorist leaders will be associated with reductions in terrorist attacks. **Previous research has demonstrated that conducting effective terrorist activities requires skilled individuals, many of whom are well-educated and come from upper middle-class backgrounds** (Krueger 2007; Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Berrebi and Klor 2008). Indeed, scholars have found that a disproportionate number of jihadi militants were trained as engineers (Gambetta and Hertog 2009). In the context of northwest Pakistan, where militant freedom of movement is 10Scholars disagree about the conceptualization and measurement of these variables. On leadership decapitation and terrorist group collapse, see Jordan (2009, 2014). On decapitation and group mortality, see Price (2012). For a critique of the empirical strategies used in scholarship on leadership decapitation, see Johnston (2012). 11**These claims are difficult to assess because Jordan's methodology is unsuited to enable the evaluation of such hypotheses. Jordan only selected cases in which leadership decapitation occurred. Consequently, it is impossible to know if terrorist groups that suffer leadership decapitation are more or less likely to collapse than those that do not.** For a general description of this methodological problem, see Ashworth (2008). 13 limited by the threat of drone strikes, we expect that militant groups will find it difficult to replace senior leaders killed in drone strikes because recruiting and deploying their replacements, perhaps from a foreign country with an active Salafi-jihadi militant base, will be costly and difficult. This is not to say that leaders killed in drone strikes are irreplaceable. On the contrary, **other militants are likely to be elevated within their organization to replace them. But we anticipate that on average, these replacements will be lower-quality than their predecessors. We thus predict that the loss of leaders will be associated with the degradation of terrorist organizations; specifically, in their ability to organize and produce violent attacks in the short term.** To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we examine three different measures of militant violence: the frequency of attacks, the lethality of attacks, and the number of attacks on tribal elders. The results, which are presented in Table 3, do not support Hypothesis 1—that drone strikes are associated with increased terrorism. On the contrary, they support our thesis, Hypothesis 2: **Drone strikes are associated with a decrease in militant violence.** We find no evidence in support of the competing hypothesis (Hypothesis 1)—that drone strikes increase violence. These substantive effects of drone strikes on these measures of militant violence are presented in Figure 4

Peter **Bergen**, Cnn National Security Analyst, and Jennifer Rowland, Special To Cnn, 7-14-2012, "Civilian casualties plummet in drone strikes," CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2012/07/13/opinion/bergen-civilian-casualties/index.html//SC>

The New America Foundation has been collecting [data about the drone attacks](#) systematically for the past three years from reputable news sources such as the New York Times and Reuters, as well as Pakistani media outlets such as the Express Tribune and Dawn.

According to the data generated by averaging the high and low casualty estimates of militant and civilian deaths published in a wide range of those outlets, the estimated civilian death rate in U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan has declined dramatically since 2008, when it was at its peak of almost 50%. [Not just for military use, drones turn civilian](#) Today, for the first time, **the estimated civilian death rate is at or close to zero.** Over the life of the drone program in Pakistan, which began with a relatively small number of strikes between 2004 and 2007, the estimated civilian death rate is 16%. Peter Bergen And in the Obama administration, between 1,507 and 2,438 people have been killed in drone strikes. Of those, 148 to 309, or between 10% and 12%, were civilians, according to the New America Foundation data. The drop in the number of civilian casualties since 2008 came as a result of several developments, one of which was a directive issued from the White House just days after President Obama took office, to tighten up the way the CIA selected targets and carried out strikes. Specifically, Obama wanted to evaluate and sign off personally on any strike if the agency did not have a "near certainty" that it would result in zero civilian casualties. **The CIA began utilizing smaller munitions for more pinpoint strikes. And drones can now linger for longer periods of time over targets, ascertaining whether civilians are around the target area, than was the case several years ago. The drone program has also come under increasing congressional oversight in the past couple of years,** a [layer of accountability](#) that one former CIA official said was unheard-of when he left the agency in 2009. Members of the Senate and House intelligence committees now hold monthly meetings at CIA headquarters to watch video recordings of specific drone strikes, as well as to review the intelligence upon which CIA agents on the ground in Pakistan based their target selection. In a letter to the Los Angeles Times in May, the chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-California, wrote that "Committee staff has held 28 monthly in-depth oversight meetings to review strike records and question every aspect of the program including legality, effectiveness, precision, foreign policy implications and the care taken to minimize noncombatant casualties." And Maj. Gen. Ghayur Mahmood, a commander of Pakistani troops in North Waziristan, where the majority of drone attacks take place, last year conceded publicly that "Myths and rumors about U.S. Predator strikes and the casualty figures are many, but it's a reality that many of those killed in these strikes are hardcore elements, a sizeable number of them foreigners." Pakistani officials now rarely base their criticism of U.S. drone strikes on the incidence of civilian casualties and instead point, quite reasonably, to another objection: the U.S. violation of Pakistan's national sovereignty. The Obama administration maintains that international law does not prohibit the use of lethal force against an active enemy "when the country involved consents or is unable or unwilling to take action against the threat." **And many U.S. officials have argued that the unprecedented precision of drones makes them by far the most effective weapon for striking a target and for avoiding civilian casualties.** Conventional warfare against the Taliban and allied groups such as al Qaeda in Pakistan's northwest would arguably result in far higher civilian death tolls. Amnesty International reported in 2010 that 1,363 [civilians died in fighting](#) (PDF) between insurgents and Pakistani security forces in the tribal regions in 2009, compared with the estimated 103 to 223 civilians who were reported to have been killed in U.S. drone strikes in 2009, according to the data compiled by the New America Foundation. The drone program persists, in part it seems, just because it can. The Pakistanis complain about the drones' infringement of their national sovereignty and yet have never shot down the relatively slow-moving drones with their F-16 fighter jets. Then-CIA Director Leon Panetta said a year ago that the U.S. is "within reach of strategically defeating al Qaeda." That point seems to have come, yet the drone strikes rumble on.

William Saletan, 4-23-2015, "Civilian Deaths Would Be Much Higher Without Drones," Slate Magazine, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2015/04/u_s_drone_strikes_civilian_casualties_would_be_much_higher_without_the_m.html

The New York Times takes the same grim view. "Every independent investigation of the strikes has found far more civilian casualties than administration officials admit," [says](#) the paper. It calls the latest news "a devastating acknowledgment for Mr. Obama, who had hoped to pioneer a new, more discriminating kind of warfare." The outrage is understandable. But these two deaths, tragic as they are, don't change the fundamental truth: **For civilians, drones are the safest form of war in modern history. As I've documented before,** they're more discriminating and more accurate. If you want to minimize civilian casualties, getting rid of drones—and steering warfare back to bombing and shelling—is the worst thing you could do. Look at the record in Pakistan. The harshest tally of drone strikes, maintained by the [Bureau of Investigative Journalism](#), says drones have killed 2,449 to 3,949 people there, including 423 to 962 civilians. If you work with the low-end figures, that's a civilian casualty rate of 17 percent. Its figures imply a civilian casualty rate of 8 percent to 12 percent in Pakistan and 8 percent to 9 percent in Yemen. A third count, maintained by the [Long War Journal](#), indicates a 5 percent civilian casualty rate in Pakistan (once Weinstein and Lo Porto are added to the tally) and 16 percent in Yemen.

Compare those numbers with any other method of warfare. Start with an apples-to-apples comparison: the **Bureau of Investigative Journalism's analysis of "other covert operations"** in Yemen. According to BIJ's methodology, this category consists of nondrone attacks by U.S. forces, **"including airstrikes, missile attacks and ground operations."** BIJ counts **68 to 99 civilian deaths** in these operations, among 156 to 365 total casualties. **That's a civilian casualty rate of 27 percent to 44 percent: three times worse than drone strikes in the same country.** Or look at the bureau's data from Somalia. For drones, the BIJ counts 23 to 105 casualties, of whom zero to five were civilian. For other covert operations, the BIJ counts 40 to 141 casualties, of whom seven to 47 were civilian. If you go with the low-end numbers, drones have a perfect record in Somalia. If you go with the high-end numbers, **drones are seven times safer than the alternatives.** In the past month, hundreds of civilians have died in Yemen. But **the culprit isn't drones. It's old-fashioned airstrikes and artillery fire, courtesy of Saudi Arabia and its Arab partners.** The campaign got off to a **roaring start**, with attacks on **schools, hospitals, houses, mosques, a market, a dairy factory, and a refugee camp.** As of April 14, the U.N. reported **at least 364** civilian deaths. During this time, the BIJ counted four drone strikes in Yemen, resulting in 13 to 22 fatalities. None of them were civilian. Before the emergence of drones and other precise weapons, war was **far more dangerous** for ordinary people. In World War II, an estimated 40 to **67 percent** of the dead were civilians. In Korea, the estimate was **70 percent**. In **Vietnam**, it was about **one civilian** for **every two enemy combatants**. In the Persian Gulf War, it **may have been no better**. In Kosovo, it **seems** to have been **worse**. In Afghanistan, civilian deaths have been estimated at 60 to **150 percent** of Taliban deaths. In Iraq, civilians account for **more than 80 percent** of the casualties. To be fair, these were full-blown wars. You can argue that the better alternative to drone strikes is diplomacy, not invasion. **But you ought to credit drones, conversely, for providing a military alternative to all-out war.** Last summer, Israel took **extraordinary measures** to avoid killing innocent people in Gaza. But the results were **still horrific**. According to a **postwar investigation by the Associated Press**, Israel's 247 airstrikes on residential buildings killed 844 people. Of these, 508 were women, children, or men aged 60 or older, "all presumed to be civilians." If, in exchange for that presumption, you posit that every dead man between the ages of 16 and 59 was an enemy combatant, that's still a 60 percent civilian casualty rate. A broader U.N. tally, counting 1,483 Palestinian civilians among 2,205 total casualties of the war, puts the rate at 66 percent. In the current war against ISIS, the U.S. and its allies claim to have carried out more than 3,000 airstrikes and killed **more than 8,000 ISIS fighters** with **zero confirmed civilian casualties**. But **nobody trusts** those numbers. As of April 10, Airwars, a website dedicated to investigating the casualties, had compiled claims of 470 to 565 civilian deaths, of which **240 to 300** were credible based on "reasonable indications." The site also says at least 110 deaths, "with varying levels of certainty," have been attributed to friendly fire. If you look at long-term data from Pakistan, you'll see a clear trend. **Since 2012, drone strikes have declined. But civilian fatalities, at a far more acute rate, have virtually disappeared.** A year ago, BIJ **reported**, "In the past 18 months, reports of civilian casualties in attacks on any targets have almost completely vanished ... despite a rise in the proportion of strikes that hit houses." By contrast, BIJ noted that in the previous six months, "the Pakistan military has carried out several large-scale bombings on suspected militant targets, including in urban areas. Scores of civilians have reportedly been killed."

A2 W - Blowback

1. Nonunique - From the invasion of Iraq to the creation of Al-Qaeda and ISIS, it is pretty clear that anti-US sentiment in the region is not just a consequence of Saudi Arabia. Anti-US sentiment runs deep because of historic US intervention in unnecessary wars.

2. Delink - The US isn't to blame. The National Interest writes in 2018 that the humanitarian crisis that currently ranges from the famine to lack of medical supplies has been caused by the Houthi rebels, not the United States. Thus, even if the US steps out of the situation, anger will continue.

Fatima Alasarar, 7-25-2018, "Yemen Is Bad but It Would Be Worse Without U.S. Involvement," National Interest,

<https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/yemen-bad-it-would-be-worse-without-us-involvement-26801>

The Houthi government's total neglect of sanitation services, and its failure to maintain and repair sewer and water infrastructure, has contributed to the deepening of the cholera epidemic. Additionally, the Houthi have confiscated food, medicine, and critical life-saving medical equipment to give to militia members or to sell on the black market at wildly inflated prices. Also, they have widely used landmines and the forced recruitment of child soldiers, many of whom are under fifteen years of age, all of which further compounds Yemen's humanitarian crisis. In contrast, areas that the Saudi-led coalition have restored to Yemeni government control do not suffer the same disastrous conditions that civilians in Houthi-controlled regions are experiencing.

A2 W - Warplanes

1. [MAINTENANCE] When we sell a weapon to Saudi Arabia, we also guarantee that Lockheed Martin will maintain it, which is why we're currently locked into plane maintenance until 2023.
2. [SPARE PARTS] Roblin of Georgetown University in 2019: there are plenty of nations that can produce spare parts for the F-16 like India who Saudi Arabia has really good relations with. Rodolfo of AN News finds in 2016 that 60% of spare parts are produced in Saudi Arabia. More and more are being produced locally, as such Al Arabiya writes that in 7 years there was a 2980% increase in the number of parts manufactured locally.
3. [INTEROPERABILITY] Telegraph - UK supplies 50% of planes to Saudi Arabia which they fly alongside US planes, indicating that interoperability is not an issue.
4. Russia can fill the void. The Jamestown Foundation explains in 2017 that for instance, the Russian MIG-29, a highly advanced warplane, is easier to maintain than an American one and cheaper as well. In fact, the Atlantic explains that in 2013, the US assumed that Egypt would suffer if the US cut off their supply of airplanes and plane maintenance. Unfortunately, what happened instead, was that Insinna writes in 17 that Egypt now just buys Russian planes. In fact, Russian planes have proliferated over the middle east, which is why Insinna reports that countries like Egypt, Qatar, and Algeria are buying Russian-made fighter jets.

Al Arabiya, "Saudi Arabia says it produces nearly 65 million military spare parts locally - Al Arabiya English",
<http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/economy/2018/01/30/Saudi-Arabia-says-it-produces-nearly-65-million-military-spare-parts-locally.html>

He further pointed out that total number of the local manufactured parts in the past years did not exceed 182 items in 2010, but through the direction and support of the government, the number of products manufactured locally reached about 5,427 items in 2017. more than 65 million pieces of these items were made with more than 12 local projects in Saudi Arabia.

Verocy News, "Saudi Arabia's MBS steps up implementation localization defense industry SAMI - VEROCY", April 11, 2018,
<https://verocy.com/saudi-strategic-upd/saudi-arabias-mbs-steps-up-implementation-localization-defense-industry-sami/>

The increased pressure put on defense contractors, manufacturers and suppliers, by Riyadh is clear and at present effective. The mission of setting up a top class domestic defense and security industry, in a country formerly known as one of the world's largest arms buyers, is feasible but will need to take a long-term approach. Even that MBS has stated in public that this is needed to diversify the economy, the challenges will be immense. With the new strategy, Saudi Arabia will try to change the fact that until now 99% of the Saudi defense spending is outside of the country, which is annually between \$50-70 billion. The drivers are clear, the outcome not yet. For Riyadh not only economics are playing a role. MBS's entourage clearly understands that the Kingdom is currently facing severe regional threats while its military engagement in Yemen, Syria and other places, are potentially threatening arms deals with Western countries. In addition to US Congress, European governments, such as UK, Germany or France, are being pressured by NGOs and politicians to block arms deals with Saudi Arabia or other regional players. With a highly developed local defense industry, part of these dangers could have been mitigated. Even that **Riyadh could be hitting the arms bazars of China, India, South**

Africa or Russia (or FSU members), there still is a preference for US-European weapons-systems or technology. The combination of setting up a new high-profile defense organization SAMI, in combination with access to UAE defense contractors, decreases the need to go Full Monty to Moscow. In addition to SAMI, which is led by Andreas Schwer, former head of combat systems at Germany's Rheinmetall AG, Riyadh also has set up the General Authority for Military Industries. GAMI is a government body with broad powers in military procurement as well as research and development. SAMI and GAMI are both fully able to clear the mind of international defense contractors in way that on all minds will be the fact

"that if they want to continue selling to one of the world's top military spenders, they will have to locate more manufacturing in Saudi Arabia." At the same time, **the Saudi defense industry is already working to develop its own technology. King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST), the government's R&D arm, has 40 engineers working on short-range ballistic missiles and laser-guided bombs. More is likely to follow.**

Rodolfo C., Arab News, 2-2-2019, ["60% of military spare parts manufactured by Saudis",
[http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/news/887086, 2-1-2019\]jzl](http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/news/887086, 2-1-2019]jzl)
60% of military spare parts manufactured by Saudis

Sebastien Roblin, Warisboring, 1-4-2019, ["Why an Indian F-16 Fighting Falcon Will Be Such a Big Deal", <https://warisboring.com/why-an-indian-f-16-fighting-falcon-will-be-such-a-big-deal/>,
2-1-2019]jzl

While it is easy to dismiss this danger by insisting that IFF technology and proper management of the battle space will keep track of which side the aircraft belong to, historically plenty of warplanes have been shot down due to misidentification by friendly forces—even when they weren't flying the same type of plane. On the other hand, moving the F-16 production line to India could allow New Delhi to cut off the supply of vital spare parts for Pakistani F-16s. However, in reality **many F-16 components are already built by different sub-manufacturers dispersed across the globe, so it's not clear how effective an Indian F-16 embargo would prove.**

Con Coughlin, Defence Editor10, 5-5-2015, "Saudis' UK-made war jets outnumber RAF's",
Telegraph.co.uk,

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11584269/Saudis-UK-made-war-jets-outnumber-RAFs.html>

Of these about 50 per cent are British-made Tornados and Eurofighters that have been sold to the Saudis over the past 30 years as part of the controversial al-Yamamah arms deal negotiated with BAE Systems, which makes the aircraft.

The Saudis have also spent an estimated £2.5 billion upgrading their fleet of 73 Tornados, which have been at the forefront of the bombing campaign using their British-made Paveway IV and Storm Shadow bombs.

By contrast, British military experts estimate that the RAF, which has seen the number of front line combat squadrons cut from about 30 at the time of the First Gulf War to seven, could muster just 36 Tornado GR4 bombers if it had to undertake a similar air campaign.

Olga Khazan, 8-20-2013, "What Would Happen If We Did Cut Off Aid to Egypt?," Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/what-would-happen-if-we-did-cut-off-aid-to-egypt/278856/>

But losing America's support would cost the Egyptian military two critical factors: training and maintenance, which together make up about a third of the value of our aid. Other than simply offering them more helicopters and guns, the U.S. invites Egyptian military officers to come stateside for training and development, which ostensibly helps them do things like fight terrorists in the Sinai peninsula. We also help them keep their weapons operational: When we give them a new F-16, for example, we also guarantee that Lockheed Martin will help them maintain it. "If the U.S. company won't provide that service, these things might not one able to fly," said David Schenker, director of the program on Arab politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Valerie Insinna, 11-9-2017, "Middle East fighter jet sales to surge over the next 5 years," Defense News, <https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/dubai-air-show/2017/11/09/middle-east-fighter-jet-sales-to-surge-over-the-next-5-years/>

Egypt has been diversifying its fighter inventory over the past several years, and it's currently taking delivery of the Dassault Rafale from France and the MiG-29 from Russia, said Bisaccio, who noted that a buy of 12 to 24 more Rafales was likely. In late October, Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi met with French leaders in an effort to push the deal forward. **Qatar** has also greatly expanded its fighter force, buying 24 Rafales in 2015 and signing a deal for 36 F-15s earlier this year. Most recently, the country signed a letter of agreement in September for 24 Eurofighter Typhoons, but that order now appears to be shaky, Bisaccio said. "I think the crisis with their neighbors has kind of shaken them a bit," he said. "They're not terribly concerned

about a supplier for fighter jets, but just having these three separate ones ... means they do hedge against problems down the road.” **Algeria** typically buys Russian-made aircraft and is likely to continue that trend, said Sobolev. Russian media outlets have claimed that Algeria plans to buy 12 Sukhoi Su-34s — an order that could expand to 40 aircraft — but War Is Boring reported late last year that Russia has no plans to export the Su-34 to Algeria. Avascent also predicts Morocco could invest in four or more fighter jets to keep up with its neighbor Algeria. It currently flies the F-5 and the F-16, which could point to an order for more F-16s.

Anna Borshchevskaya, 12-20-2017, "The Tactical Side of Russia's Arms Sales to the Middle East," Jamestown, <https://jamestown.org/program/tactical-side-russias-arms-sales-middle-east/> Another practical consideration is that many local military personnel in the MENA region have trained on Russian weaponry and feel comfortable operating it. As one American source familiar with the situation explained it, “If you have an AK-47, why change to an M-16?”[xvi] For example, helicopters are especially crucial to Egypt's anti-Islamist campaign; and according to first-hand pilot accounts, Russia's less expensive helicopters fit Egypt's needs well. Overall, Russian attack helicopters are not necessarily superior technologically, but they bring heavy firepower to a fight. They may fare worse in a contested air space, but the Sinai airspace is not contested. The Russian MiG-29 is a highly advanced aircraft, easier to maintain than an American one, and cheaper than an F-22[xvii] (which the US is currently not even exporting).

A2 W - Airstrikes

1. Nonunique - Knights of the Washington Institute finds in 2018 that stopping arm sales would not slow Saudi Arabia's air campaign as they could keep bombing at its current rate for several years without any more precision guided munitions.

Knights, 11-5-2018, "U.S.-Saudi Security Cooperation (Part 1): Conditioning Arms Sales to Build Leverage," No Publication,

<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-saudi-security-cooperation-part-1-conditioning-arms-sales-to-build-lev, 1-19-2019>

Sales of air-delivered precision-guided munitions (PGMs) are another lightning rod issue in the bilateral security relationship. Following the 2009-2010 round of hostilities with the Houthis, the kingdom sought to refresh its stock of antipersonnel bombs with a large order of 1,300 U.S.-built CBU-105 sensor-fused weapons (a higher-reliability submunition that manufacturers say does not qualify as a cluster bomb due to its low malfunction rate). Yet by November 2015, eight months into the current war, the Saudis had used up nearly 2,600 PGMs, according to strike metrics compiled by The Washington Institute. In response, the Saudis requested a \$1.29 billion package comprising around 19,000 air-delivered PGMs, an order that began delivery in July 2017. In addition to that package, the Senate narrowly approved a new \$500 million commercial sale of PGMs to Riyadh in June 2017—the first installment in a mammoth \$4.46 billion series of air-launched munition deals that would provide the Saudis with 104,000 U.S. PGMs in the next half decade. Riyadh may be accelerating its purchases in anticipation of a prolonged war in Yemen and the potential loss of U.S. sales down the road. According to Washington Institute data collected in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, the kingdom's forces have used around 14,500 munitions since March 2015, almost all PGMs, with the average rate gradually declining from 333 PGMs per month in 2015 to 270 per month this year. The U.S. munitions currently arriving in Saudi Arabia were ordered in November 2015, when Riyadh recognized it might need new PGMs by 2019, but the intervening years have seen few signs of a PGM shortfall. **Based on a rough sense of prewar stocks and a constant dribble of replacements, Riyadh could probably keep bombing at its current rate for several years even if all new U.S. PGM deals were rejected.** Thus, while cutting off such sales may be a good way to signal U.S. displeasure or publicly distance Washington from the war, **the data indicates that it would not meaningfully slow the air campaign anytime soon.** With U.S.-provided bombs used in many of the war's deadliest civilian fatality incidents, Congress has ample rationale to block, delay, or condition future arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Depending on the results of this week's election, the Senate's cross-party, forty-seven-seat opposition to such sales could become a majority. Saudi intransigence on the Khashoggi case or Yemen peace talks could also flip more senators into supporting a joint resolution against new weapons packages. In

all likelihood, the president would veto any such resolution unless Congress can show that it has carefully weighed the costs—in terms of both neglecting the legitimate security needs of a long-term partner and harming America's status as a security ally and arms vendor. To address these concerns, the U.S. government should apply some common-sense guidelines:

A2 W - Bargaining chip

1. Delink - Asking Saudi Arabia to change doesn't create change. For instance, Pompeo in 2017 got Saudi Arabia to agree to follow a no-strike list in exchange for the US to continue supplying arms. Unfortunately, Watkins in 2018 of the New York Times writes that Saudi Arabia has continued to regularly ignore the list, most notably killing students in a school bus with a bomb in 2018.

Derek Watkins, 12-27-2018, "Saudi Strikes, American Bombs, Yemeni Suffering," No Publication,

<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/27/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-war-tactics-yemen-humanitarian-crisis.html>

The Saudis and their chief ally, the United Arab Emirates, fight principally from the air. Armed with American-made warplanes and bombs, they have carried out thousands of airstrikes on Houthi targets but also on hospitals, weddings and funerals. Their pilots typically fly high to avoid enemy fire, which reduces the accuracy of strikes. They regularly ignore a voluminous no-strike list. The United States backed the coalition from the start with sales of weapons and bombs, midair refueling of warplanes over Yemen, and intelligence. After the funeral attack in 2016 killed 155 people, the Obama administration blocked sales of precision-guided munitions. But the United States continued to refuel coalition warplanes. In May 2017, the Trump administration overturned the missile ban, amid a new weapons deal.

A2 I - War crimes

1. Recognize that this argument is just wiping the U.S. hands clean of innocent victim's blood. Our opponents don't actually stop the war crimes in the Middle East but just take U.S. finger prints off. There is no benefit to the Middle Eastern people, the U.S. would just feel a bit better about themselves.

A2 I - Water infrastructure

1. Nonunique - Yemen was running out of water regardless of if Saudi Arabia came in or not. The World Bank finds in 2010 finds that a rapid transition in farming tech is burning underground water reserves super fast. Yemen is entirely dependent on their reserves of groundwater for survival in the next two decades groundwater reserves are going to completely run out.
2. Delink - Saudi doesn't need future US military to completely choke the country off. According to a Reuters report in 2017 that a Saudi blockade and embargo on oil blocked Yemen's ability to pump water into countries. New tech from the US isn't needed since they have the capacity already.

Helen Lackner. "Yemen in Crisis." iBooks. "YEMEN IN CRISIS Autocracy, Neo-Liberalism and the Disintegration of a State"

As population increases annually by 3 percent, this quantity reduces proportionately, because the basic water resource remains unchanged. Yemen is almost exclusively dependent on ground water. The renewable aquifers depend on annual and more long-term rainfall. Greater use of irrigation pumps in agriculture has contributed not only to the depletion of the shallow renewable aquifers but also to that of the fossil aquifers. As agriculture is estimated to use close to 90 percent of Yemen's water, and 70 percent of the country's population live in rural areas, it is essential to develop sustainable water management policies if Yemenis are to continue living in the country's urban and rural areas." In addition, although often used for drinking, water collected from surface sources (wells, springs, irrigation pumps) is mostly heavily polluted. The extremely rapid spread of cholera in 2017 in urban and rural areas, has once again confirmed the important role of water in the transmission of disease. In 2010, the World Bank estimated that Yemen's ground water reserves are likely to be depleted in about three decades.² Of course there are regional differences, but overall, those areas with the greatest water shortage are also those with the highest population density. "

Reuters Editorial, 11-17-2017, "Three Yemen cities run out of clean water due to lack of fuel for...", U.S., <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-blockade/three-yemen-cities-run-out-of-clean-water-due-to-lack-of-fuel-for-pumps-icrc-idUSKBN1DH1Q2>

"The water and sewage systems in Hodeidah, Saada and Taiz stopped operating because of a lack of fuel," the head of the ICRC in Yemen, Alexandre Faite, said in the statement. The coalition closed all air, land and sea access to Yemen on Nov. 6 following the interception of a missile fired towards the Saudi capital, saying it had to stem the flow of arms from Iran to its Houthi opponents in the war in Yemen. The United Nations has said the **blockade** could lead to "untold thousands" of deaths, and that its partial lifting by the Saudi-led coalition is not enough. Iolanda Jacquemet, an ICRC spokeswoman in Geneva, said the shutdown of water services was a very bad sign for the fight against cholera, which had been on the wane for weeks in Yemen, although new cases are still running at about 2,600 per day. "We're very scared that cholera might come back," she said, noting that the huge outbreak, which has sickened over 900,000 people, started in the capital Sanaa in April just 10 days after the sewage treatment plant had stopped working for lack of fuel.

A2 I - Famine

1. Ending arms sales to Saudi Arabia doesn't end the famine for two reasons.
 - a. The famine isn't Saudi Arabia's fault. The BBC reports in 2018 that Houthi rebels are the ones preventing food aid from reaching people under its control, resulting in 20 million Yemenis being food insecure.
 - b. The damage has already been done. Shepp of Intelligencer writes in 2018 that even if the blockade was lifted and the war ended in Yemen, Yemen is already in ruins, millions are starving, and alleviating this catastrophe would require more

than just peace to solve it. He concludes that quote, “cease-fires don’t cure cholera.”

Jonah Shepp, 10-6-2018, "The Trump Administration’s Call to End the Yemen War Is Too Little, Too Late," *Intelligencer*,

<http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/11/u-s-call-to-end-the-yemen-war-is-too-little-too-late.html>

But let’s imagine for a moment that all parties are acting in good faith here, that the U.S. is taking this seriously, that the Khashoggi scandal has got the Saudis scared enough to do what we tell them, that a cease-fire is in effect by December, the blockade [is] lifted immediately, and a peace deal signed by next summer. What then? Yemen is in ruins, millions are already starving, and cease-fires don’t cure cholera. Alleviating this humanitarian catastrophe and rebuilding Yemen’s infrastructure while maintaining peace would require a massive international effort under the auspices of the U.N.

Un, 12-31-2018, "Yemen rebels 'stealing food from hungry'," *BBC News*,

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-46722502>

The World Food Programme has demanded Yemen's rebel Houthi movement stops diverting desperately needed food aid from people in areas under its control. A survey by the UN agency said people in the capital Sanaa had not received rations to which they were entitled. The WFP said lorries were illegally removing food from distribution areas, with rations sold on the open market or given to those not entitled to it. There was no response from the Houthis, but they have denied diverting aid. The UN says some 20 million Yemenis are food insecure and that 10 million of them do not know how they will obtain their next meal. Yemen has been devastated by a conflict that escalated in 2015, when a Saudi-led coalition intervened after the Houthis seized control of much of the west of the country and forced President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi to flee abroad.

A2 I - Civilian casualties

1. Non-unique - The war in Yemen would continue even without US arms sales. Goldenberg of the *National Interest* writes in 2018 that because “Saudis view the threat in Yemen is crucial to their interests,” US pressure to end the war will not create real change. In fact, if the US ceased arms sales, casualties would increase in two ways.
 - a. Worse weapons. Goldenberg continues that Saudi Arabia will buy weapons from other countries or use less sophisticated weapons and tactics that will result in the deaths of even more civilians.
 - b. Lack of US oversight. The *National Interest* in 2018 writes that right now, the US military is identifying civilian facilities for the coalition to avoid airstriking while US-built missile defense systems are preventing civilian population centers from being struck by Houthi rebels.

2. Turn - Some influence better than none. As stated in case by Lang, US pressure led to the current peace process taking place in Saudi Arabia, which Edroos says is currently looking both promising and encouraging. Unfortunately, what Caverly tells us is that if the US were to cease selling arms, our relationship with Saudi Arabia would be permanently ruptured, meaning this influence would go away.
3. Turn - Maintaining the peace talks with the Houthis. Hudson explains in 2018 that “the coalition led by Saudi Arabia is on the verge of a major victory that could push the [Houthi] rebels into an enduring cease-fire by retaking control of port Hodeidah, the main supply line from Iran. Indeed, Al Jazeera explains in December that “[Houthi rebels have begun] withdrawal the port.” Unfortunately, removing weapons from Saudi Arabia would mean taking the pressure off the Houthis, which will reignite the Yemen conflict as Lamki explains in 2018 “[Negotiations in Sweden show that the] Houthis will only respond to force.”

Fatima Alasrar, 7-25-2018, "Yemen Is Bad but It Would Be Worse Without U.S. Involvement," National Interest,

<https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/yemen-bad-it-would-be-worse-without-us-involvement-26801>

The war against Iran and the Houthis is also linked with the United States’ war on terror, which is supported by Congress, specifically the fight against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), an organization that is based in Yemen and is widely considered to be the most dangerous of al-Qaeda’s remaining regional affiliates. For example, the Saudi-led coalition helped to build the elite anti-Houthi Southern Security Belt forces. These United Arab Emirates–trained Yemeni units have, alongside Emirati special forces, fought AQAP. Last year, they pushed them out of the Shabwah Governorate, where, six years ago, a U.S. drone successfully targeted one of the al-Qaeda terrorists responsible for the 2000 attack on the USS Cole. In addition, the U.S. military plays a critical role in safeguarding Yemeni civilians by identifying nonmilitary and civilian facilities for the coalition so that these are not accidentally targeted by air strikes. This intelligence support has not prevented civilian casualties altogether, but it has almost certainly reduced their number. Also, American-produced Patriot missile defense systems have allowed the coalition to intercept dozens of Houthi ballistic missiles fired against Saudi, Emirati, and Yemeni civilian population centers. American involvement also bolsters ties between the U.S. military and the militaries of its Arab allies and these relationships are a key tool of U.S. power and influence if America is to remain globally relevant.

Ilan Goldenberg, 12-5-2018, "Give Saudi Arabia a Take It or Leave It Deal," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/give-saudi-arabia-take-it-or-leave-it-deal-37902>

Walking away from supporting the Saudi-led war in Yemen and ending U.S. mid-air refueling might give Washington the moral high ground, but it will do little to stop the killing. The Saudis

view the threat in Yemen as crucial to their interests, so U.S. pressure to end the war altogether will fall short of causing real change. To the Saudis, the threat of Iran establishing a foothold on their southern border is much more vital to their interests than procuring U.S. weapons. Rather than walk away from Yemen, they will buy Russian bombs or use less sophisticated weapons and tactics that will kill even more civilians. Americans will have washed our hands of a morally unacceptable situation, but civilian deaths and the threat of famine will actually get worse, and the world will look on and do nothing. The only approach worse than walking away is what the United States is currently doing—giving the Saudis a blank check. Supporting the Saudis with intelligence, refueling, weaponry and minimal guidance on protecting civilians has failed at preventing civilian casualties.

Jaber Al Lamki, 12-18-2018, "Sweden success proves Houthis will only respond to force," CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/18/opinions/yemen-peace-talks-houthis-opinion-intl/index.html>

The last week's developments were encouraging and we are thankful to UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths for coordinating them. But the coalition and the Yemeni government know this enemy better than anyone else and that the hardest work lies ahead. The Houthi rebels have shown this week they will only respond to force, and so we must continue to be strong in order to finish this war for good.

No Author, 12-29-2018, "Yemen rebels begin withdrawal from Hodeida port ," No Publication, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/yemen-houthis-start-redeployment-hodeidah-part-plan-181229075656108.html>

Yemen's Houthi rebels have started to redeploy inside the port city of Hodeidah as part of the United Nations-sponsored peace agreement signed in Sweden earlier this month, a UN source and a spokesperson for the group said on Saturday.

The Houthis have agreed with the Saudi-backed government to implement a ceasefire in Hodeidah city and withdraw their respective forces.

Pro-government forces are also supposed to pull back from parts of the city they recaptured in an offensive they launched with the backing of a Saudi-led coalition on June 13.

Quinnipiac, 7-3-2018, "America Wins if Houthi Rebels Lose in Yemen," No Publication, https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2018/07/03/america_wins_if_houthi_rebels_lose_in_yemen_137412.html

The deadly civil war in Yemen has reached a climax after three ugly years. No one can know for sure, but it looks like the coalition led by Saudi Arabia is on the verge of a major victory that could push the Iranian-backed rebels into an enduring cease-fire.

The legitimate Yemeni government, backed by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, is poised to retake control of the vital port of Hodeidah, Yemen's fourth-largest city and its principal port on the Red Sea. Yemen depends on imports to survive and Hodeidah is the port of entry for most outside goods. International aid groups worry a long-term siege there could disrupt the already-limited flow of medicine and food into the country. But the pain is worth the gain – especially for U.S. interests – because of Hodeidah's strategic importance.

A2 Saudi Arabia

A2 Other countries stopping

1. Their evidence is outdated. Janiaud reports on January 3 that the Spanish government will sell arms deals they previously suggested they would freeze. Al Jazeera furthers in 2018 that the UK and France won't cut off arms sales since Saudi Arabia represents more than 50% of their total arms exports.

Alex Janiaud, January 3, 2019,

<https://www.investorchronicle.co.uk/shares/2019/01/03/instability-in-saudi-arabia/> Investor's Chronicle, Instability in Saudi Arabia

French exports of major weapons to Saudi Arabia were worth \$174 million in 2015 but dropped to \$91 million in 2016 and \$27 million last year.

The value of Spanish exports also dramatically decreased in that time period, but the Spanish government confirmed this year it would go ahead with arms deals it had previously suggested it would freeze, bowing to pressure from Spanish manufacturers, according to reports.

Stasa Salicanan, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, January 2018,

http://studies.aljazeera.net/mritems/Documents/2018/1/22/435b5cc4bb214fa6a634f76e2b5cd96e_100.pdf The Growing Arms Deals in the Gulf: Existential Need or Fear Politics?

But it is highly unlikely that other European states with important stakes in selling arms to the Gulf will follow this trend. This may be especially true for the UK and France whose exports to Saudi Arabia (and other Gulf States) represent 50% or more of their total arms exports.

Stopping these exports would thus be a huge blow to their respective defence industries.

A2 Relations weak squo

1. Delink - The Trump administration in 2017 signed the United States Saudi Arabia arms deal confirming the sale of over 110 billion in weaponry and the relations continued as Lucas of Fortune(18) states the U.S signed another 15 billion dollar arms deal. Our relations are fine.

Saudi Arabia will buy \$15 billion worth of American missiles and arms, the U.S. Department of State said Wednesday. The two countries signed letters of offer and acceptance documents on Monday, MSNBC reports. The deal covers 44 Lockheed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ground launchers, missiles and related equipment and dates to 2016. The missiles could help shield Saudi Arabia from Iranian ballistic missiles. The U.S. Congress approved the purchase in 2017 before Saudi agents murdered journalist Jamal Kashoggi. Since then Germany and other American allies have suspended arms sales to Saudi Arabia, which is also prosecuting a war in Yemen that has bombed, starved, and killed by disease enough people to stall global progress on eliminating poverty.

A2 Leverage

1. Delink - It's historically never worked. Biscassio of Defense Security Monitor finds in 2018 that when the US tried to put pressure on Egypt by cutting arm sales it failed as they were able to buy from France.
2. Turn - Arm sales strengthens democracy by giving the US diplomatic leverage. Thrall 18 of the CATO Institute explains that the United States has sold arms to Saudi Arabia and has in turn promoted democratic values through diplomatic initiatives.

Forecast International, 1-24-2019, "Egypt Leverages Diversified Arms Suppliers to Escape U.S. Pressure," Defense Security Monitor,

<https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/wordpress/2018/07/10/egypt-leverages-diversified-arms-suppliers-to-escape-u-s-pressure/>, 1-24-2019

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (R) meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) in Cairo, December 2017. Source: Russian presidency website. Earlier this month, La Tribune reported that France and Egypt are moving forward on negotiations for another sale of Dassault Rafale fighter jets to the Egyptian Air Force.[i] Cairo and Paris are said to be negotiating on a new agreement for the sale of up to two dozen Rafales to Egypt, on top of the initial group of 24 ordered in 2015.

Furthermore, Egypt may procure another two Gowind 2500 corvettes and is interested in French drones and helicopters.

The deepening Egyptian-French relationship comes as the volume of U.S. sales to Egypt has waned. In 2013, in the months after the Egyptian military overthrew President Mohamed Morsi, the U.S. announced a hold on the sale of “certain large-scale military systems” and military assistance to Egypt, “pending credible progress toward an inclusive, democratically elected civilian government through free and fair elections.” [ii] The U.S. continued the sale of spare parts for previously supplied systems, but otherwise suspended the delivery of major hardware, largely in line with U.S. law regarding military coups,[iii] though the Obama administration did not formally acknowledge Morsi's overthrow as such.

Less than two years later, the U.S. reversed its position. Notably, this decision followed the Egyptian presidential elections in 2014 that delivered 95 percent of the vote to President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.[iv] Perhaps in recognition that President Sisi was here to stay, and worried about damage to the long-term U.S.-Egypt alliance, U.S. President Barack Obama announced in March 2015 that he would “lift executive holds that have been in place since October 2013 on the delivery of F-16 aircraft, Harpoon missiles, and M1A1 tank kits.”[v]

This reversal in policy came without any of the intended changes in Egypt that the Obama administration had initially sought. Even so, despite the end of the self-imposed suspension, the U.S. has for the most part not been able to cash in on major arms sales to Egypt. Maintenance and overhaul support continue, landing regular work for American firms, and some new deals have been reached. In September 2016, for example, the U.S. State Department approved the sale of eight MPQ-64F1 Sentinel radars to Egypt, and in November 2017, Raytheon

received a contract to produce the radars for Cairo.[vi] But since President Sisi took office, **Egypt has turned to Russia and France for the big force modernization contracts.**

From Russia, Egypt purchased dozens of MiG-29M/M2 fighter jets and Ka-52 attack helicopters. The Egyptian military introduced Antey-2500 surface-to-air missile systems into service and is to procure T-90S/SK main battle tanks. France has sold Mistral helicopter carriers (initially destined for Russia) to Egypt, along with a FREMM frigate, several Gowind 2500 corvettes, and Rafale fighter jets. Further

contracts with both countries are planned, and these sales will deepen Egypt's bilateral relations with these countries for years to come. Egypt's turn to France and Russia for arms sales demonstrates several important features of the arms trade in general. President Sisi's ability to buy from suppliers other than the U.S. limited Washington's ability to directly pressure his decision-making on a sensitive subject, that being the nature of Egyptian elections. The success of a Muslim Brotherhood candidate in 2012 spooked the Egyptian military leadership, which in the aftermath of Morsi's ouster has not been amenable to a repeat democracy experiment. The

Brookings Institution's Shadi Hamid observed that the 2013 massacre of supporters of deposed President Morsi signaled the end of the "Arab Spring" itself.^[vii]

Rather than bow to American pressure on an issue core to his domestic concerns, President Sisi chose to lessen his dependence on Washington by inking multibillion-dollar arms

contracts with American arms competitors. Diversifying arms suppliers is a financially expensive endeavor and can lead to interoperability issues within a military and between partner militaries. But politically, it allows flexibility and preserves a measure of independence from any one supplier in particular. Furthermore, American national security interests prevented Washington from more aggressively pressuring Cairo. The 2013 hold on arms sales noticeably exempted the supply of spare parts and support. Completely cutting off military assistance to Egypt was out of the question, however, as doing so would result in both short-term damage to the Egyptian military and long-term damage to U.S.-Egyptian relations. In the short term, Egypt's military readiness would take a hit. Egypt is engaged in a counterinsurgency effort against Islamic State-linked militants in the Sinai and these operations would be negatively impacted were Egypt unable to continue receiving support for its American-supplied equipment. With quiet cooperation from Israel, Egypt has made use of heavy equipment in the Sinai, such as American-supplied F-16s and Apache helicopters,^[viii] to combat militant groups. Over the longer term, as a direct consequence of meddling in Egyptian military readiness, the U.S. would have been perceived at best as an untrustworthy supplier and poor security partner, cementing an Egyptian shift to partners perceived to be more reliable. Washington's ability to influence Egypt on humanitarian matters, always tenuous, would further erode.

Trevor Thrall. "Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy", Cato Institute, March 13 2018, <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy>

"American influence is thought to be most potent in cases where the United States provides a nation with a large share of its military capabilities. In the wake of U.S. pressure to halt Israeli defense exports to China, for example, an Israeli official acknowledged, "If the United States, which provides Israel with \$2 billion in annual military aid, demands that we will not sell anything to China — then we won't. If the Americans decide we should not be selling arms to other countries as well — Israel will have no choice but to comply."⁴¹ The United States has used arms sales to try to encourage states to vote with the United States at the UN, to support or adopt pro- Western and pro-U.S. foreign policies, to convince Egypt and Israel to accept peace accords, and to gain access to military bases in places such as Greece, Turkey, Kenya, Somalia, Oman, and the Philippines. After the Cold War, the United States also sought to tie arms transfers to human rights and democratization efforts in client states.⁴²"

A2 Drone strikes

1. Delink - The US doesn't sell drones to Saudi Arabia. Thomas of the Congressional Research Service in 2018 explains that Saudi Arabia gets drones from Russia and China, not the United States, because the US dislikes sharing sensitive military technology like drones.
2. Turn - Drones decrease the rate of terror attacks. Sarhabi of the International Quarterly Studies quantifies in 2016 drone strikes are associated with a five percent decrease in terrorist attacks. This is because strikes take terrorist leaders off the battlefield which helps degrade these organizations, rendering them less lethal, more vulnerable to defeat, and more likely to end faster than groups that did not suffer leadership decapitation.

Sarhabi concludes that killing insurgent leaders increases the probability that governments will defeat insurgents by 25 to 30 percent.

sarbah15

<http://patrickjohnston.info/materials/drones.pdf//SC>

The second mechanism by which drones could reduce terrorism is through “degradation.” This mechanism would suggest that **drone strikes reduce terrorism by taking terrorist leaders, and other “high-value individuals” (HVIs), off the battlefield.** The loss of individuals with valuable skills, resources, or connections hinders a terrorist organization’s effectiveness, including its ability to continue producing violence at the same rate it had before losing its lost key HVIs. Killing core and affiliated al-Qaida leaders is the stated objective of drone strikes.⁸ Drone strikes have resulted in the deaths of many top terrorist leaders. In late 2012, the U.S. administration claimed to have eliminated at least two-thirds of the top 30 al-Qa’ida leaders in Pakistan and Afghanistan during the first three years of President Obama’s first term in office.⁹ The estimates compiled by New America Foundation suggest that by August 2014 drone strikes in Pakistan accounted for the killing of 64 militant leaders. The list includes 38 high-level al-Qai’da functionaries and several al-Qai’da-affiliated and Taliban group leaders.(New America Foundation 2015). An emerging political science literature has begun to assess the effects of “leadership decapitation”—the killing or capture of militant leaders or other HVIs—using more comprehensive datasets and sophisticated statistical methodologies and research designs. The literature on leadership decapitation has largely focused on evaluating the effect of killing or capturing top insurgent or terrorist leaders on outcomes like the probability of group collapse, mortality, and attack rates. ¹⁰ Scholars of leadership decapitation have come to different conclusions. **On the one hand, using large-N approaches, Johnston (2010) and Price (2012) both find evidence that removing the top leaders of insurgent and terrorist groups helps degrade these organizations, rendering them less lethal, more vulnerable to defeat, and more likely to end quickly than groups that did not suffer leadership decapitation.** Using a different dataset and dependent variable, Jordan (2009, 2014) argues that decapitating terrorist organizations is ineffective because it rarely results in their collapse. Jordan further argues that decapitation may have counterproductive effects when used against terrorist organizations whose goals involve religion—as do al-Qa’ida’s, the TTP’s, and the Haqqani Network’s—particularly when these organizations are large and old (relative to the average terrorist organization in her dataset). ¹¹ We expect drone strikes that kill terrorist leaders will be associated with reductions in terrorist attacks. **Previous research has demonstrated that conducting effective terrorist activities requires skilled individuals, many of whom are well-educated and come from upper middle-class backgrounds** (Krueger 2007; Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Berrebi and Klor 2008). Indeed, scholars have found that a disproportionate number of jihadi militants were trained as engineers (Gambetta and Hertog 2009). In the context of northwest Pakistan, where militant freedom of movement is high, scholars disagree about the conceptualization and measurement of these variables. On leadership decapitation and terrorist group collapse, see Jordan (2009, 2014). On decapitation and group mortality, see Price (2012). For a critique of the empirical strategies used in scholarship on leadership decapitation, see Johnston (2012). ¹¹**These claims are difficult to assess because Jordan’s methodology is unsuited to enable the evaluation of such hypotheses. Jordan only selected cases in which leadership decapitation occurred. Consequently, it is impossible to know if terrorist groups that suffer leadership decapitation are more or less likely to collapse than those that do not.** For a general description of this methodological problem, see Ashworth (2008). ¹³ limited by the threat of drone strikes, we expect that militant groups will find it difficult to replace senior leaders killed in drone strikes because recruiting and deploying their replacements, perhaps from a foreign country with an active Salafi-jihadi militant base, will be costly and difficult. This is not to say that leaders killed in drone strikes are irreplaceable. On the contrary, **other militants are likely to be elevated within their organization to replace them. But we anticipate that on average, these replacements will be lower-quality than their predecessors. We thus predict that the loss of leaders will be associated with the degradation of terrorist organizations; specifically, in their ability to organize and produce violent attacks in the short term.** To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we examine three different measures of militant violence: the frequency of attacks, the lethality of attacks, and the number of attacks on tribal elders. The results, which are presented in Table 3, do not support

Hypothesis 1—that drone strikes are associated with increased terrorism. On the contrary, they support our thesis, Hypothesis 2: **Drone strikes are associated with a decrease in militant violence**. We find no evidence in support of the competing hypothesis (Hypothesis 1)—that drone strikes increase violence. These substantive effects of drone strikes on these measures of militant violence are presented in Figure 4

Clayton Thomas Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional Research Service, October 11, 2107, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44984.pdf> Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

U.S. reluctance or inability to share sensitive military technology, particularly in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones), has periodically opened opportunities for other suppliers like Russia. Top military officials from the two nations had a meeting in Moscow in April 2017 at which Saudi Arabia, according to a Russian government account, provided a list of possible arms procurement requests.⁴⁸ That was followed by a state visit by King Salman to Moscow in October 2017, the first ever by a Saudi monarch, during which Saudi Arabia reportedly agreed to a number of arms procurements, including S400 missile defenses.⁴⁹ China has also contemplated greater arms sales to Saudi Arabia, partly a legacy of its reported covert ballistic missile sales to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s.⁵⁰ On a state visit to Beijing in March 2017, **King Salman and President Xi Jinping signed a series of agreements worth \$60 billion, including a deal to construct a Chinese factory in the kingdom that will manufacture military UAVs for Saudi Arabia's expanding drone fleet.**⁵¹ Canada signed a \$15 billion deal for armored vehicles with Riyadh in 2014.⁵²

A2 Spillover

IS THEIR EVIDENCE SPECIFIC??

1. Mackintosh of [CNN](#) in 2018: the United Arab Emirates is "recklessly" supplying militias and other factions waging war in Yemen with an array of advanced weaponry→ and they and Iran fuel the vast majority of the arms spillover in Yemen

A2 State-sponsored terrorism

1. Delink - Groups like ISIS aren't getting their arms from Saudi Arabia. Aljazeera reports in 2017 that 90% of ISIS weapons originated from China, Russia, and Eastern Europe. That means that only a minority of their weapons originated for Saudi Arabia, which were probably mainly collected by looting or other measures – not trade.
2. Delink - Saudi Arabia has always opposed terrorism. The Guardian reports in 2015 that Saudi Arabia was behind the formation of a 34-state Islamic military coalition to combat terrorism. In fact, the Congressional Research Service writes in September that the Saudi government views Al Qaeda and ISIS as direct threats to Saudi national security, with 2,093 Saudis currently fighting terrorist organizations in conflict zones. Sloat of the

Belfer Center for International Affairs in 2016 specifically identifies multiple assassination attempts against the Saudi Leadership by Al-Qaeda as the root of Saudi leadership's deep hatred for terrorism and the creation of the largest and most efficient counter-terrorism program in the world.

3. Delink - Even if weapons do get into terrorist hands, Dudley of Forbes finds that overall, terrorism is in decline. He quantifies that the number of deaths caused by terrorist have fallen 27% from last year, and the number of attacks decreased 23%

Dominic Dudley, Forbes, "Terrorism In Decline: Number Of Deaths By Terrorist Groups Falls For Third Year In A Row", Dec 5, 2018,

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2018/12/05/terrorism-in-decline/#63b31322203c>

Is the world starting to get to grips with the scourge of terrorism? There are at least some hopeful signs. Last year, the number of deaths caused by terrorist groups was 18,814, 27% less than the year before and the third consecutive year of improvement. At the same time, the number of attacks fell by 23%. These numbers come from the Global Terrorism Index 2018, compiled by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) and published today. According to the index, most countries saw their situation improve last year, with 94 countries showing a decline in the impact of terrorism, compared to 46 countries where the problem got worse. The countries with the greatest improvements were Iraq and Syria where the number of deaths fell by 5,500 and 1,000 respectively. The situation was also markedly better in Europe, where the number of deaths fell by 75%. France, Belgium and Germany all saw significant improvements, although Spain deteriorated. Members of Iraq's Rapid Response military unit take part in counter-terrorism training at a military base inside Baghdad International Airport on December 4, 2018. (Photo: AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/AFP/Getty Images)GETTY The positive developments in these regions is in large part a consequence of the decline of Islamic State (also known as ISIL or ISIS), which has now been largely defeated in its home territory of Iraq and Syria and is, as a consequence, less able to mount deadly attacks in Europe. "ISIL has lost much of its attractiveness due to its military defeats and weakened capabilities to mount attacks in Europe," says Steve Killelea, chairman of IEP. "Increases in counter-terrorism funding, combined with better surveillance techniques, have also contributed to the steep reduction of deaths in Europe from terrorism. ISIL is losing its ability to plan and coordinate larger scale terrorist attacks, as a result of lessened capabilities and increased counterterrorism measures."

No Author, 12-14-2017, "ISIL weapons traced to US and Saudi Arabia," No Publication, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/isil-weapons-traced-saudi-arabia-171214164431586.html>

About 90 percent of weapons and ammunition used by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as **ISIS**) **originated in China, Russia, and Eastern Europe, with Russian-made weapons outnumbering those of any other country. "These findings support widespread assumptions that the group initially captured much of its military material from Iraqi and Syrian government forces,"** said the report.

Amanda Sloat, 7-21-2016, "The myth of Saudi support for terrorism," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/myth-saudi-support-terrorism>
Further, the kingdom has suffered a number of assassination attempts against the Saudi leadership by al Qaeda. Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, the kingdom's anti-terror chief, was targeted at least four times, most recently in August 2010, as were others. These attacks have caused the U.S. government to declare AQAP the most dangerous al Qaeda affiliate in the world.

And this is where the martial perspective comes in: To respond to these terrorist attacks, Saudi Arabia has created one of the largest and most efficient counter-terrorism programs in the world, both in its own right and in collaboration with the United States and its other strategic allies. Major military and security reconfigurations and appropriations have taken place over the last two decades at the cost of tens of billions of dollars.

Congressional Research Service, ", " No Publication, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf>
The Saudi Arabian government states that it views Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda affiliates, the Islamic State (aka ISIS/ISIL or the Arabic acronym Da'esh), other Salafist-jihadist groups, and their supporters as direct threats to Saudi national security. The U.S. government has described the Saudi government as "a strong partner in regional security and counterterrorism efforts," 40 and has reported that the Saudi government has taken increased action since 2014 to prevent Saudis from travelling abroad in support of extremist groups or otherwise supporting armed extremists. In 2016, the Saudi Ministry of Interior reported that there were "2,093 Saudis fighting with terrorist organizations in conflict zones,

Reuters In Dubai, 12-14-2015, "Saudi Arabia announces 34-state military alliance to fight terrorism," Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/14/saudi-arabia-announces-military-alliance-terrorism>

Saudi Arabia has announced the formation of a 34-state Islamic military coalition to combat terrorism, according to a statement published on the state news agency, SPA. "The countries here mentioned have decided on the formation of a military alliance led by Saudi Arabia to fight terrorism, with a joint operations centre based in Riyadh to coordinate and support military

operations,” said the statement, which was released on Tuesday. In a rare press conference, Saudi Arabia’s crown prince and defence minister, Mohammed bin Salman, said that the campaign would “coordinate” efforts to fight terrorism in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt and Afghanistan, but offered few concrete indications of how military efforts might proceed.

A2 ISIS

1. Drum finds in 2019 that ISIS troops and influence has faded to the point that America is beginning to withdraw from Syria and the surrounding area. The terrorist group has been torn apart and the last of its land has been taken back. Clearly, ISIS is no longer perceived as much of a threat as it once was – don’t let them try to inflate the issue.

Kevin Drum, 01-11-2019, "Hooray! ISIS defeated!," Mother Jones,
<https://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2019/01/hooray-isis-defeated/>

A few days ago **National Security Advisor John Bolton said we wouldn’t be withdrawing from Syria until ISIS was defeated. The U.S. military said Friday that it has begun withdrawing troops from Syria,** initiating a drawdown that has blindsided allies and sparked a scramble for control of the areas that American troops will leave. U.S. forces have “begun the process of our deliberate withdrawal from Syria,” read a statement from the U.S.-led coalition.

A2 Arms race

1. Delink - Arms races don’t lead to war. Diehl of the Journal of Peace Research explains that in 77% of the cases of major power wars, arms buildups didn’t precede them, and the two cases where they did were World War I and World War II, not regional conflicts. He concludes that there is no statistically significant correlation between arms races and wars.
2. Turn - A nuclear arms race would be way worse. As outlined in case, Roubini says that if the US failed to sell Saudi Arabia arms, they would turn to nuclear weapons for a sense of security, which the Arms Control Association says would set off a nuclear arms race in the region. If you want to prevent nuclear proliferation and the consequences of that, you’re going to be voting neg not aff.

Paul Diehl of the Journal of Peace Research. "Arms races and escalation: a closer look." Journal of Peace Research 20.3 (1983): 205-212.

https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/68822/10.1177_00223433830?sequence=2

“The determination of a mutual military buildup or its absence for each dispute was combined with the outcome of that dispute and the aggregated results are presented in Table II. **No meaningful covariation exists here between mutual military buildups and dispute escalation. Only 25 % of the disputes which were preceded by a mutual military buildup escalated to war, while almost 77% of the major power wars constituting this sample population were preceded by periods in which there was no incidence of joint and rapid spending increases by the protagonists.** Of the three disputes which fit the escalation hypothesis, one is World War I and the other two led to the Second World War. However, even these cases raise questions about the impact of mutual arms buildup on the outbreak of war. There were five other disputes prior to World War II which were preceded by this type of buildup and yet did not escalate to war. This suggests that the cases which support the escalation model might only be the product of a spurious association. Overall, it appears that most serious disputes do not involve previous dual military spending increases and most serious disputes do not escalate to war; but there does not seem to be any connection between these facts. The Yule’s Q value is .36 indicating a much weaker positive relationship than Wallace reported. However, the more conservative 0 coefficient is only .11 and the Chi-square value is not significant at any meaningful level.”

A2 CON

A2 General

A2 Sanctions interpretation

1. Sanctions are never going to happen. The Guardian in 2018 explains that after the murder of Khashoggi, Trump, although he did implement sanctions on individuals in the country, he refused to sanction the country as a whole as he didn’t want to punish the entire country. As long as this is the case, sanctions are never going to be implemented against the country, even if arms sales decreased.

Guardian Staff, 11-20-2018, "Donald Trump stands with Saudi Arabia – statement in full," Guardian,

<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/nov/21/donald-trump-stands-by-saudi-arabia-khashoggi-statement-in-full>

Donald Trump has issued a statement through his press secretary on his decision not to impose sanctions against Saudi Arabia, despite calls for him to do so over the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, saying that while the crown prince “could very well” have had knowledge of the murder, Saudi trade and support against Iran, was too important to compromise. Here is his statement in full: “America First!

The world is a very dangerous place! The country of Iran, as an example, is responsible for a bloody proxy war against Saudi Arabia in Yemen, trying to destabilize Iraq’s fragile attempt at democracy, supporting the terror group Hezbollah in Lebanon, propping up dictator Bashar Assad in Syria (who has killed millions of his own citizens), and much more. Likewise, the Iranians have killed many Americans and other innocent people throughout the Middle East. Iran states openly, and with great force, “Death to America!” and “Death to Israel!” Iran is considered “the world’s leading sponsor of terror. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia would gladly withdraw from Yemen if the Iranians would agree to leave. They would immediately provide desperately needed humanitarian assistance. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has agreed to spend billions of dollars in leading the fight against Radical Islamic Terrorism.”

A2 Houthi win bad

1. Not true. UNC in 2019 explains that Houthis are Zaydi Shiites, which are very different from Iranian Shiites, who are tolerant and often worship together with Sunnis. Furthermore, UNC reports that despite Saudi claims, there is little evidence that Iran has provided any significant military assistance to the Houthis. The Washington Post concludes that Iran hasn't given the Houthis enough weapons to have any influence over the conflict.
2. Turn - Iran didn't invest in the war before Saudi got in and would follow Saudi's example to pull out. Bazzi 18 writes that Iran has only stepped in the region because they know Saudi will continue to pour way more money into the conflict than Iran will while ensuring a stalemate.
3. Turn - The Houthis being in control would lead to a greater chance of international aid. Edroos in 2018 explains that Yemenis need aid from extremely liberal organizations like the UN. We would argue this means the Houthis would need to treat citizens well to get help from the international community, and at the very least, have much better interest in making sure the country is stable than the US or Saudi Arabia.

Faisal Edroos, 12-25-2018, "Mohammed al-Houthi: We want a united and democratic Yemen," No Publication,

<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/houthis-mohammed-al-houthi-united-democratic-yemen-181225104212165.html>

For the proposal of the government, yes, we submitted it as an initiative, I presented and submitted it to the Security Council, as well as to the UN envoy and others. We presented the formation of a government, the holding of elections and other steps. As for how would that government be and what it would look like, this is subject to an agreement, through dialogue with other international parties, through agreement with those who were mentioned in the initiative, taking into consideration the domestic situation of local Yemeni parties. God willing, the situation for the government, if it is composed of technocrats so as not to be subject to quotas and partisan tendencies, will be sound and it will be a government that can manage the transition phase and move on to elections. It will have a specific programme and mechanisms to implement it from the first time it meets.

Mohamad Bazzi. September 2018. "The United States Could End the War in Yemen If It Wanted To," Atlantic,

<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia/571465/>

While the Saudis are quick to blame Iran for the war, several researchers, including Thomas Juneau, a professor at the University of Ottawa and a former analyst at Canada's Department of National Defense, have shown that the Houthis did not receive significant support from Tehran before the **Saudi intervention in 2015. Iran has stepped up military assistance to the Houthis** since the war, and Hezbollah has begun sending military advisers to train the Yemeni rebels. But the costs of this assistance fall far short of those incurred by Saudi Arabia and its allies. For **Iran, the Yemen conflict is a low-cost way to bleed its regional rival.** The Saudis and Emiratis have largely ignored international criticism of civilian deaths and appeals for a political settlement—and the Trump administration's latest signal of support shows that strategy is working. Investigations by the UN and other bodies have found both the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition responsible for potential war crimes. But air strikes by the Saudis and their allies "have caused most of the documented civilian casualties," the UN concluded in a report last month. On August 9, the Saudi coalition bombed a school bus in the northern town of Dahyan, killing 54 people, 44 of them children, and wounding dozens, according to Yemeni health officials.

William A., xx-xx-xxxx, "America's Yemen Policy," No Publication,
<http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2019/02/americas-yemen-policy/>

There are several problems with Saudi policy. First, Riyadh asserts that Yemen is a threat to the kingdom because Iran is providing direct support to the Houthis as Shiite coreligionists hostile to the Sunni Saudis. However, Houthis are Zaydi Shiites, quite different from Iranian Shiites. In practice they are quite tolerant, often worshipping together with Sunnis. Moreover, despite Saudi claims, there is little evidence that Iran has provided any significant military assistance to the Houthis. The Saudis have imposed a naval blockade on Yemen, so, for example, the rockets that were fired on Riyadh by the Houthis and identified as Iranian probably were supplied before the conflict and captured by the Houthis.

A2 War ending

Yemen war is ending

1. Delink - Yemen war's end is not in sight. In William just hours ago explains that "an end to the conflict is not in sight." He explains that "although Houthi-Saudi cease fire talks have been held with the help of UN mediators. The Saudi leadership is reluctant to settle without a complete Houthi defeat and the Houthis are unwilling to give up their gains without achieving some of their aims"

William A., xx-xx-xxxx, "America's Yemen Policy," No Publication,
<http://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2019/02/americas-yemen-policy/>

As 2019 begins, an end to the conflict is not in sight, although Houthi-Saudi cease fire talks have been held with the help of UN mediators. The Saudi leadership is reluctant to settle without a complete Houthi defeat and the Houthis are unwilling to give up their gains without achieving some of their aims. Nor are there any signs that that President Trump will take a strong stand against Saudi Arabia. Unlike President Kennedy, who used his best diplomats to urge Saudi restraint in Yemen, President Trump has not had a U.S. ambassador to Riyadh since he took office (although one was finally nominated in December).

An end to the fighting will probably require an agreement among the Yemenis to rectify the local grievances that led to the start of the violence in the first place. An effective mediator might help achieve that, but the Yemenis themselves, not outsiders, must agree to lay down arms.

A2 Other arms sources

1. Delink - It would be too costly for Saudi Arabia to shift their arms supplier. Caverly of the New York Times explains in 2018 that transforming the Saudi military to use the technology of other countries like Russia or China would cost a fortune, require years of retraining, and greatly reduce its military power for a generation because the military is currently set up to conform to US standards.
2. Delink - Arms from other countries are less sophisticated. Guay of The Conversation in 2018 explains that arms from any non-US country are just less effective, which is why they are usually cheaper. This is why any Saudi threat to switch from US arms sales would not be credible and also why Saudi Arabia has not made such a threat to date.
3. Delink - Dewan of CNN in 2018 writes that following the killing of Khashoggi and the war in Yemen, countries are actually decreasing how many arms they sell to Saudi Arabia or pulling out entirely, like Germany and the United Kingdom. When it comes to countries like China and Russia, they right now already supply so few arms, that Russia isn't even included in databases of arms sales.
4. Weighing - Still immoral to create and sell the weapon that kills someone even if someone else would have sold the weapon anyway. Taking part in what essentially amounts to the genocide of Yemenis is deeply immoral.

Angela Dewan, Cnn

Graphics By Henrik Petterson, Cnn, 11-23-2018, "These are the countries still selling arms to Saudi Arabia," CNN,

<https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/22/middleeast/arms-exports-saudi-arabia-intl/index.html>

A number of countries have restricted arms sales to Saudi Arabia since the kingdom began airstrikes on Yemen in 2015, in a war that the UN describes as the world's worst man-made humanitarian disaster.

Calls for more restrictions on arms exports have been growing, particularly in Europe, since the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Turkey last month. US President Donald Trump, however, has repeatedly pointed to the US' lucrative arms deals with the Saudis as a reason to stand by the kingdom. Denmark and Finland on Thursday became the latest countries to suspend new arms deals with Saudi Arabia. Denmark's Foreign Ministry said it was freezing new deals over both Khashoggi and Yemen, while the Finnish Foreign Ministry mentioned only Yemen. Finland also banned new arms sales to the United Arab Emirates, which is part of the Saudi-led coalition in the conflict. Their announcements came just two days after Germany said it was stopping all arms transfers to the kingdom. Denmark and Finland are not major suppliers of weapons to Saudi Arabia, but Germany

certainly is. It had already suspended new arms deals to Saudi Arabia, but on Monday it widened that ban to include the transfers of weapons on existing orders as well. So where is Saudi Arabia getting its weapons from? Arms deals are often done in secret or with little publicity. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) tries to track deals involving major weapons, and a database of Saudi imports from the last decade shows the United States as the biggest supplier, followed by the United Kingdom, France, Spain and then Germany. But a lot of exporters still selling to the Saudis have dramatically decreased their supply in recent years. The United Kingdom, for example, transferred arms worth an estimated \$843 million in 2016 but almost halved that value to \$436 million last year, according to SIPRI. (The database uses values constant with 1990 prices to eliminate currency fluctuations and inflation.) French exports of major weapons to Saudi Arabia were worth \$174 million in 2015 but dropped to \$91 million in 2016 and \$27 million last year. The value of Spanish exports also dramatically decreased in that time period, but the Spanish government confirmed this year it would go ahead with arms deals it had previously suggested it would freeze, bowing to pressure from Spanish manufacturers, according to reports. US dwarfs other exporters Despite these decreases, the overall value of Saudi weapons imports actually increased by 38% between 2016 and 2017. That was almost entirely because of a huge uptick in transfers from the United States, which almost doubled its exports in terms of value from \$1.8 billion to \$3.4 billion in that time. Germany also multiplied its exports from \$14 million to \$105 million, although it is expected to be much lower this year following its suspension. Overall, no country comes close to the United States in major weapons supply. Over the past five years, for example, the US accounted for 61% of major arms sales to the Saudis. The UK was a distant second, with a 23% share, while France, in third place, was a mere 4%. **In a statement on Tuesday, Trump said that canceling major arms contracts with the Saudis would be foolish, and that "Russia and China would be the enormous beneficiaries" if the US halted its sales. China supplies a negligible amount of major weaponry to Saudi Arabia, SIPRI data shows, but it is on the increase. Russia supplies so little it is not included in the organization's database. "Russia has tried hard in the past 10 to 15 years to get into the large Saudi arms market, but it has not been very successful.**

Terrence Guay, 10-19-2018, "Arms sales to Saudi Arabia give Trump all the leverage he needs in Khashoggi affair," Conversation,

<https://theconversation.com/arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-give-trump-all-the-leverage-he-needs-in-khashoggi-affair-104998>

The second problem with Trump's argument is that armaments from Russia, China or elsewhere are simply not as sophisticated as U.S. weapons, which is why they are usually cheaper – though the quality gap is quickly decreasing. To maintain its military superiority in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia has opted to purchase virtually all of its weapons from American and European companies.

That is why the U.S. has significant leverage in this aspect of the relationship. Any Saudi threat to retaliate against a ban on U.S. arms sales by buying weapons from countries that have not raised concerns about the Khashoggi disappearance would not be credible. And is probably why, despite worries in the White House, such a threat has not yet been made.

Jonathan D. Caverley, 10-12-2018, "Opinion," No Publication,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html>

Saudi Arabia is in the middle of a major war, and more than 60 percent of its arms deliveries over the past five years came from the United States. The Saudi military relies not just on American tanks, planes and missiles but for a daily supply of maintenance, training and support, such as intelligence and refueling. In the longer term, almost all of Saudi Arabia's remaining exports come from Europe. To truly squeeze Saudi Arabia, a coordinated embargo — much like the one now in place against Russia — would be necessary but relatively easy. European governments already feel strong domestic political pressure not to export to regimes like Saudi Arabia. **Transforming the Saudi military to employ Russian, much less Chinese, weapons would cost a fortune even by Gulf standards, would require years of retraining and would greatly reduce its military power for a generation.**

Russia cannot produce next-generation fighter aircraft, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles for its own armed forces, much less for the export market. China has not produced, never mind exported, the sophisticated aircraft and missile defense systems Saudi Arabia wants.

A2 EU

1. Delink - Europe won't sell to Saudi Arabia. Jones of the Guardian in October reports that the EU passed a resolution to impose a EU-wide arms embargo on Saudi Arabia. Countries like Germany have already done so.
2. [A2 UK] - Guardian reports in 2018 that they're selling weapons like missiles and bombs. But without small arms and airplanes you can't actually use these systems. That's where it is key that the US is the supplier of warplanes to Saudi Arabia because if we can cut off the flow of these weapons, we pull ahead. Further delink this argument, because Tilford of Foreign Policy writes in 2018 that Brexit is going to destroy the British economy, which would severely undercut their ability to do arms sales.
3. [A2 France] Business Wire further explains that military expenditure is on the decline, falling by 4% in 2017. This is crucial because it means France doesn't have the industry necessary to support arms sales to Saudi Arabia at the rate the US does.

Continuing To, 10-3-2017, "Future of the France Defense Industry," No Publication,

<https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20171003006243/en/Future-France-Defense-Industry---Market-Attractiveness>

French military expenditure, which stands at US\$44 Billion in 2017, declined at a CAGR of -4.04% during the historic period, attributed mainly to the erosion in Euro-Dollar exchange rates

It is however anticipated to register a CAGR of 3.03% during the forecast period to value US\$51 Billion in 2022. The country, being a permanent member of the UN Security Council and NATO, is one of the highest contributors and therefore this active participation in international affairs requires higher spending on the defense sector.

French domestic defense industry, in spite of being highly advanced and satisfying the majority of its military requirement, relies on foreign imports for advanced technology equipment such as sensors, engines, and transport aircraft. In addition, the French defense industry also takes part in technology transfer programs with countries like the US and Italy. Even though the US remains the largest supplier of arms to France, the country has recently begun to import from other European countries such as Germany and Sweden. Furthermore, France's commitment to the European Union encourages a policy of giving priority to European manufactured equipment and this policy is expected to result in a shift in focus from the US to other European countries during the forecast period.

Simon Tilford, 9-11-2018, "A No-Deal Brexit Will Destroy the British Economy," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/02/a-no-deal-brex-it-will-destroy-the-british-economy/>

A No-Deal Brexit Will Destroy the British Economy

The magical wing of the Conservative Party believes that Britain can crash out of the European Union painlessly. It is leading the country into a recession. .

But it's increasingly possible that they won't—largely because Britain continues to demand a privileged relationship with the EU that Brussels will not, and probably cannot, agree to. That leaves the country on a path toward a no-deal divorce, which could also cost the United Kingdom its unity in addition to its economic health.

At present, trade between Britain and the rest of the EU is seamless. There are no checks at borders or tariffs, and London-based firms can buy goods and components from suppliers based in Belgium as easily as they do from those in Birmingham. Seamless trade means that U.K. manufacturers are embedded in a web of pan-European, just-in-time supply chains.

Jamie Doward, 6-23-2018, "UK 'hides extent of arms sales to Saudi Arabia'," Guardian,

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/23/uk-hides-arms-trade-saudi-arabia--yemen>

Britain has consistently said that it keeps all arms exports under close scrutiny and that licensing is made on a case-by-case basis. But now a freedom of information request reveals that for the last five years, Britain has been selling Storm Shadow and Brimstone air-to-surface missiles and Paveway IV bombs to the Saudis under what are known as Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs), which the government says are for the export of "less sensitive goods".

Unlike specific licences, OIELs allow an unlimited number of consignments over a fixed period, typically between three and five years. There is no obligation to publish the total value of the licence after it expires. "Open licences remove the need for the seller to obtain prior approval for each export," said Andrew Smith of Campaign Against Arms Trade, which submitted the FOI. "It's an opaque system which has been used to shift extremely sensitive weaponry to the Saudi regime."

Jones

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/25/meps-back-call-for-eu-members-to-halt-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia>

Theresa May is under fresh pressure to suspend UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia over the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi after the European parliament called on all EU member states to follow a lead set by Germany. **Berlin has halted arms sales to Saudi and Angela Merkel has urged allies to do the**

same in condemnation of what she has described as a “monstrous” killing inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

MEPs voted on Thursday on **a non-binding resolution further demanding a unified move** by the bloc’s 28 member states **to “impose an EU-wide arms embargo on Saudi Arabia”**. May has so far resisted such calls, insisting that the UK government already has strict rules on arms exports. According to the Department for International Trade led by Liam Fox, the UK exported arms and equipment worth at least £1bn to Saudi Arabia last year. Since the Saudi-led war in Yemen began in 2015, UK arms exporters have earned £4.6bn from sales to the regime.

A2 China

1. Delink - China isn’t viable. Caverly of the New York Times in 2018 writes that “China has not produced, never mind exported, the sophisticated aircraft and missile defense systems Saudi Arabia wants.”
2. Delink - China doesn’t have the size for it. The SCMP in 2018 writes that China’s total arms sales last year were 20 million whereas US sold 3.4 billion dollars worth of arms to Saudi Arabia. China wouldn’t be able to fulfil the requests of Saudi Arabia.
3. Delink - China doesn’t want to offend the US. The SCMP in 2018 further explains that China will not get involved with selling arms to Saudi Arabia in order to avoid further tensions with the Trump administration during the current trade war.

South China Morning Post, 10-22-2018, "Trump fears China could replace US in arms sales to Saudi. He shouldn't,"

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2168849/china-may-seek-boost-ties-saudi-arabia-it-cant-fill-us-arms>

But in the military realm, China’s arms exports to Saudi Arabia lag far behind those of the US and its European allies. Beijing exported only around US\$20 million in arms last year compared to US\$3.4 billion from Washington, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a Swedish think tank.

[...]

“I think China is likely to keep a low profile on this issue and see how it plays out before directly addressing it

South China Morning Post, 10-22-2018, "Trump fears China could replace US in arms sales to Saudi. He shouldn't,"

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2168849/china-may-seek-boost-ties-saudi-arabia-it-cant-fill-us-arms>

Robert Mason, director of the Middle East Studies Centre at the American University in Cairo, said China would not want to get involved at this stage to avoid further tensions with the Trump administration.

“I’m sure China will be interested to expand relations if and when US-Saudi ties deteriorate. However, Saudi policy looks set to shift to admitting to the accidental killing of Jamal Khashoggi inside its consulate in Istanbul, and I’m sure they will try to de-escalate during Secretary Pompeo’s visit,” he said. “It is unlikely the US will change a decades-old policy favouring close economic and security ties with the Kingdom, including considerable counterterrorism cooperation and the containment of Iran, over this one incident.”

Jonathan D. Caverley, 10-12-2018, "Opinion," No Publication,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html>

Transforming the Saudi military to employ Russian, much less Chinese, weapons would cost a fortune even by Gulf standards, would require years of retraining and would greatly reduce its military power for a generation. Russia cannot produce next-generation fighter aircraft, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles for its own armed forces, much less for the export market. China has not produced, never mind exported, the sophisticated aircraft and missile defense systems Saudi Arabia wants.

A2 Russia

1. Delink - Russia isn't viable. Caverly of the New York Times in 2018 writes that “Russia cannot produce next-generation fighter aircraft, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles for its own armed forces, much less for the export market.”
2. Delink - Russia empirically doesn't produce enough weapons. Bowler of the BBC in 2018 explains that US arms exports are 58% higher than those of Russia's, and while US exports grew by 25% over the past four years, Russia's fell by 7.1%. Russia can't fill the gap.

Tim Bowler, 5-10-2018, "Which country dominates the global arms trade?," BBC News, <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-43873518>

"The US has been open to supplying arms to a large variety of recipients, and there are a large number of countries ready to acquire weapons from the US," says Mr Wezeman.

The US's arms exports are 58% higher than those of Russia, the world's second-largest exporter. And while US arms exports grew by 25% in 2013-17 compared with 2008-12, Russia's exports fell by 7.1% over the same period.

It is Middle East states that have been among the US's biggest customers - Saudi Arabia tops the list - with the region as a whole accounting for almost half of US arms exports during 2013-17.

Jonathan D. Caverley, 10-12-2018, "Opinion," No Publication,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html>

Transforming the Saudi military to employ Russian, much less Chinese, weapons would cost a fortune even by Gulf standards, would require years of retraining and would greatly reduce its military power for a generation. Russia cannot produce next-generation fighter aircraft, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles for its own armed forces, much less for the export market. China has not produced, never mind exported, the sophisticated aircraft and missile defense systems Saudi Arabia wants.

A2 Middle Eastern Impacts

A2 Saudi provides stability

4. Clearly not the case because the Middle East is far from stable. From case, CATO goes on to explain that countries receiving US arms sales are more likely to initiate conflict, case in point example being Saudi Arabia's interventions into Yemen, Tunisia, Syria, and Qatar.
5. The internal link into this contention is that being sold less arms would hurt Saudi Arabia's current amount of power. However, we would contend that in an aff world, the amount of power Saudi Arabia has wouldn't decrease, it would stay the same. Henningan of TIME explains that Saudi Arabia uses its arms to deter Iran, which is crucial, because they lose their deterrent by spending their stockpile, making it is more likely Saudi Arabia would scale back their engagement in Yemen instead. By preserving their current military capabilities, there would be no power vacuum in the Middle East.

W.J. Hennigan, 10-18-2018, "What Makes the U.S.-Saudi Relationship So Special? Weapons, Oil and 'An Army of Lobbyists'," Time,

<http://time.com/5428669/saudi-arabia-military-relationship/> The arrangement falls under the U.S. Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia, which is led by a two-star American general. The mission is primarily designed to bolster Saudi Arabia against arch-rival Iran in order to assert power and influence in the Middle East. "We have other very good allies in the Middle East, but if you look at Saudi Arabia: They're an ally and they're a tremendous purchaser of not only military equipment, but other things," Trump said Wednesday in the Oval Office. It was the President's latest attempt to trumpet \$400 billion in business deals that his administration signed in May 2017 during a two-day visit to Saudi Arabia. The eye-popping figure includes \$110 billion in military sales, which analysts point out is misleading because it represented letters of interest and not firmed-up contracts.

A2 US Hegemony

2. Turn - The US makes the world worse when it tries to act as a global policeman. Mearsheimer of UChicago writes in 2016 that deeper US leadership does not create peace. Walt of Harvard in 2015 gives the reason why: The US has for decades been the leading source of global instability because the US is really bad at predicting the consequences of its actions. Additionally, regional actors know the situations better. Thus, Velasco concludes in 2013 that regional actors are 3.5 times more likely to achieve peace when foreign intervention isn't present.

John Mearsheimer is R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. AND Stephen Walt is Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, August 2016, Foreign Affairs, The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior US strategy, p. 70

Another argument holds that the U.S. military must garrison the world to keep the peace and preserve an open world economy. **Retrenchment, the logic goes, would renew great-power competition, invite ruinous economic rivalries, and eventually spark a major war from which the United States could not remain aloof. Better to keep playing global policeman than risk a repeat of the 1930s.** Such fears are unconvincing. For starters, this argument assumes that deeper U.S. engagement in Europe would have prevented World War II, a claim hard to square with Adolf Hitler's unshakable desire for war. Regional conflicts will sometimes occur no matter what Washington does, but it need not get involved unless vital U.S. interests are at stake. Indeed, the United States has sometimes stayed out of regional conflicts-such as the Russo-Japanese War, the Iran-Iraq War, and the current war in Ukraine-belying the claim that it inevitably gets dragged in. And if the country is forced to fight another great power, better to arrive late and let other countries bear the brunt of the costs. As the last major power to enter both world wars, the United States emerged stronger from each for having waited. Furthermore, recent history casts doubt on the claim that U.S. leadership preserves peace. Over the past 25 years, Washington has caused or supported several wars in the Middle East and fueled minor conflicts elsewhere. If liberal hegemony is supposed to enhance global stability, it has done a poor job. Nor has the strategy produced much in the way of economic benefits. Given its protected position in the Western Hemisphere, the United States is free to trade and invest wherever profitable opportunities exist. Because all countries have a shared interest in such activity, **Washington does not need to play global policeman in order to remain economically engaged with others.** In fact, the U.S. economy would be in better shape today if the government were not spending so much money trying to run the world.

Stephen Walt, Belfer Professor of International Relations @ Harvard, Foreign Policy, What Do Politicians Mean by "Global Leadership," 9-4-2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/04/what-do-politicians-really-mean-by-global-leadership/>, DOA: 9-5-15

For instance, one could argue that global leadership is necessary to "preserve stability" in key regions like Europe, Asia, or the Persian Gulf. There's a solid case for that, but notice that in recent years **the United**

States has been a leading source of instability in some of these places. It has done an especially good job of destabilizing the Middle East (see under: Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Gaza, etc.), and the initially successful effort to stabilize Europe by expanding NATO backfired when we (and the Europeans) got greedy and went too far east, thereby triggering the current crisis with Russia. If one of the candidates wants to make the “stability” argument, they need to say a lot more about exactly how the United States can reinforce regional peace instead of pouring gasoline on regional conflicts.

Velasco, Juliana, "Regional Organizations And The Durability Of Peace" (2013). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 2701.

<http://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/2701>

With a significance of 0.027, **regional organizations were found to be roughly 3.5 times more likely to craft an agreement that ceases hostilities** for at least five years. Furthermore, although regional organizations did not reach statistical significance upon testing hypothesis four, it was discovered that contrary to the hypothesis that intractable conflicts were far less likely to end in peace, territory is the most difficult incompatibility to end peacefully, when controlling for third party involvement. Additional regressions also showed that when controlling for all other variables, regional organizations are 6.728 times more likely to craft an agreement that ceases hostilities between dyads for a period of at least five years.

A2 General stability

1. The US is not going to solve the Middle East. Lynch from GWU in 2017 concludes that Trump’s diplomatic and economic overtures to the Middle East will have no impact on stability since Middle Eastern conflicts are internal - the conflict cannot be resolved from the outside. In fact, you can turn this argument since US presence only makes conflicts worse. Bandow of Forbes writes in 2014 that every time America intervenes, it increases and spreads the mess it has created, ranging from interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan to our war on terror.

Doug Bandow, 6-16-2014, "U.S. Meddling Inflames Middle East Conflicts: America Should Stop Trying To Fix Iraq, Syria, And Everywhere Else," Forbes,
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2014/06/16/u-s-meddling-inflames-middle-east-conflicts-america-should-stop-trying-to-fix-iraq-syria-and-everywhere-else/>

American intervention has broken pottery all over the Middle East. Every time the U.S. attempts to repair its last accident, it increases and spreads the mess. It is time for a different approach. One in which Washington does not attempt to micromanage the affairs of other nations. In which Washington practices humility.

Marc Lynch is professor of political science at The George Washington University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Winter 2017, Washington Quarterly, Beilligerent Minimalism: The Trump Administration and the Middle East,

https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWO_Winter2017_Lynch.pdf

That does not, however, mean that **the Middle East will not change. The internal contradictions** of today's Middle East, including intense domestic instability in almost every Arab country and the **destabilizing effects of multiple unresolved wars**, may weaken those structural constraints on the new administration and open the possibility for more fundamental changes to regional order. **But it will not be because of Trump's policies—or any initiatives from outside the region—it will fundamentally be because of structure—or changes from within the region—as has been true for decades.** Trump is the third consecutive new president to come to office vowing fundamental change in America's Middle East policy. Both George W. Bush and Barack Obama came to office

A2 Invading Qatar

1. Delink - Their warrant just doesn't make sense. My opponents are trying to tell you that all it took were some kind words from Rex Tillerson for Saudi Arabia to step down against Qatar. In a news report by PressTV, it's revealed that Tillerson didn't even need to threaten Saudi Arabia to make them stop. Insofar as this is the case, it is pretty clear that other factors were at play that prevented Saudi Arabia from invading, as their will to do so was obviously weak.
2. Delink - Saudi Arabia didn't and wouldn't invade for non-US reasons. Prince in 2018 explains that left out of the popular narrative surrounding Qatar is that Saudi Arabia realized that both Turkey and Iran would come to Qatar's assistance, both economic and militarily, serving as a deterrent to Saudi Arabia.
 - a. This is where you can turn their argument because Prince goes on to explain that Saudi Arabia has quote "found courage" to take more aggressive moves against their adversaries, and of course, Iran after Trump's visit. He concludes that US support is the cause of increased tension in the region.

Afp), 8-1-2018, "PressTV-Exposed: Saudi, UAE planned to capture Doha," No Publication, <https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2018/08/01/569942/saudi-uae-qatar-plot>

According to two former US Department of State officials, the Saudi-UAE plan "was likely some weeks away from being implemented" when former US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson halted it.

"Tillerson made a series of phone calls urging Saudi officials not to take military action against the country," said the report.

"In the calls, Tillerson, who dealt extensively with the Qatari government as the CEO of Exxon Mobil, urged Saudi King Salman, then-Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir not to attack Qatar or otherwise escalate hostilities, the sources told The Intercept. Tillerson also encouraged Defense Secretary Jim Mattis to call his counterparts in Saudi Arabia to explain the dangers of such an invasion," it added.

It cannot be an accident that the Saudis have “found courage” to take more aggressive moves against their Arab adversaries and of course, Iran in the aftermath of the Trump visit. It is nothing short of pathetic that after having encouraged Saudi sectarianism that has grown into a full blown crisis, ie, that Trump is THE CAUSE of the increased tension, that now in a statement that can only be described as lame and insincere, that the Trump Administration has “offered to mediate” to cool down the flames they have previously set in motion. Another example of how the president and his entourage don’t have a clue as to how to deal with the region...even less so than Obama.

View from the Left Bank: Rob Prince's Blog, 8-2-2018, "Postscript to “Is Saudi Arabia Preparing To Invade Qatar?” Fourteen Months Later,"

<https://robertjprince.net/2018/08/02/postscript-to-is-saudi-arabia-preparing-to-invade-qatar-fourteen-months-later/>

Tillerson’s Qatar intervention was more the “straw that broke the camel’s back,” the last in what was a series of growing tensions over the direction of U.S. foreign policy. In any case, although he lost his job as a result, all indications are that Tillerson, with a little help from Mattis, was able to derail the Saudi plans to invade Qatar.

Left out of the article, and of importance, complicating the situation for Washington as well as the Saudi invasion plans, both Turkey and Iran came to Qatar’s assistance, both economically and militarily. A Saudi led invasion would have thus led very possibly to a regional war. This was another factor in Tillerson’s efforts to bridle Riyadh’s regional military ambitions.

A2 US proxy against Iran

1. Delink - Saudi Arabia isn’t a great proxy against Iran. Al-Rasheed of the Washington Post writes that Saudi Arabia is barely winning the proxy war in Iran and increasing

Saudi intervention has only increased Iran's sway with Houthi rebels. That's really problematic insofar as polarization is creating an even more violent Yemen.

Al-Rasheed, Madawi. "Five Myths about Saudi Arabia." The Washington Post, WP Company, 1 Nov. 2018,
www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/five-myths/five-myths-about-saudi-arabia/2018/11/01/3de61f8c-dc5a-11e8-b732-3c72cbf131f2_story.html?utm_term=.15c53f5da1df.

But Saudi Arabia is not a great U.S. partner in this contest. Despite a bonanza of spending on weapons and military tech — it is the world's third-largest buyer of armaments — **the Saudi regime cannot fight a war alone and can't even effectively confront Iran in a proxy conflict.** **In 2015, the Saudis launched a war in Yemen in part to halt Iranian influence on their southern border.** Almost four years later, **the Saudis have succeeded only in destroying the country, increasing Iran's sway among the Houthi rebels there and making Saudi cities vulnerable to Houthi missiles.**

Khashoggi, Jamal. "Saudi Arabia Is Creating a Total Mess in Lebanon." The Washington Post, WP Company, 13 Nov. 2017,
www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/11/13/saudi-arabia-is-creating-a-total-mess-in-lebanon/?utm_term=.9c799590eef3.

As if we Arabs need another crisis in our shattered world — but that's exactly what's coming after the mysterious resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri from Riyadh last Saturday and declarations from the Saudi royal court that Iran has officially crossed a red line. Now **Saudi Arabia has created a problem for itself with some of its staunchest allies: the Sunnis of Lebanon. Even the Sunnis are aligning with different sects, some who are not friendly to Riyadh, to demand the return of Hariri,** also a Sunni. It will be impossible to elect a new prime minister in Lebanon unless Hariri is returned. That is a new predicament that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, also known as MBS, has created — and now needs to solve. Saudi Arabia has its justification to declare war against Hezbollah: The kingdom, as the young Saudi hawk and minister Thamer al-Sabhan recently declared, no longer distinguishes between the group and the Lebanese government.

A2 Iran is a threat

1. Delink - Iran does not pose a threat. Bandow of CATO in 2018 explains that Iran poses no threat to America and the region's stranglehold on oil has been broken by the US. Iran doesn't threaten its neighbors and even the crown prince of Saudi Arabia has dismissed

it, stating that “Iran is not a rival to Saudi Arabia. Its army is not among the top five armies in the Muslim world.

2. Delink - Iran isn't interested in a war with Saudi Arabia. Serjole in 2017 explains that for Iran, an escalation of the proxy wars into an actual war would be counterproductive for three reasons.
 - a. They're currently winning all anti-Saudi Arabia campaigns, ranging from Iraq, Syria, to Yemen.
 - b. Attacking the birthplace of Islam, with the two most holy sites of Mecca and Medina would be propaganda suicide in the region.
 - c. Iran's regional influence is already at a high, especially after the 2015 nuclear deal and has allowed Iran to host foreign leaders like Putin and Macron.

Serjole concludes that The Islamic Republic, finally within sight of its goal of becoming the region's dominant power, considers a direct military confrontation with the House of Saud — which they believe to be on the verge of collapse — as far from desirable.

3. This is where you can turn the argument, because the only world in which you see a war is in theirs for two reasons.
 - a. Iran perceives an actual threat. Salicanan of Al Jazeera in 2018 reports that the Saudi-US alliance and the transfer of arms are only adding to Iran's perception of a threat against Saudi Arabia. To decrease this fear, the US needs to get out of the region.
 - b. Saudi Arabia feels it has enough power to invade Iran. From case, CATO goes on to explain that countries receiving US arms sales are more likely to initiate conflict, case in point example being Saudi Arabia's interventions into Yemen, Tunisia, Syria, and Qatar. US arms actually embolden Saudi Arabia to start conflicts, not end them.

Kay Armin Serjoie, 11-9-2017, "The Last Thing Iran Wants Is Full-On War with Saudi Arabia. Here's Why," Time,

<http://time.com/5016809/iran-saudi-arabia-mohammed-bin-salman-yemen-proxy/>

For Iran, an escalation of the proxy wars into a direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia would be counterproductive to say the least, especially since events on the ground are going their way, at least for the time being. And attacking the birthplace of Islam, with the two most holy sites of Islam, in Mecca and Medina, would be akin to propaganda suicide in the Islamic World, with the potential for uniting every Muslim in the world against them. It's no accident that Saudi kings style themselves as “The Custodian of The Two Holy Mosques.” Today, Iran has much more to lose than it did a decade and a half ago. Before the American wars following 9/11, the Islamic Republic had been boxed in by the Taliban's Afghanistan to the east and Saddam Hussein's Iraq to the west. At that time, international concern over its nuclear

program was making Iran a pariah state, its only regional ally being Syria, and the sections of Lebanon where Hizballah held sway. **But now, especially after the 2015 nuclear deal it reached with global superpowers, the influence of the Islamic Republic runs high in many Middle Eastern capitals, and beyond. Tehran played host to Russian President Vladimir Putin and hopes to have French President Emmanuel Macron pay an official visit, in what would be a first since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.** Barely a week goes by without the Islamic Republic's most travelled foreign minister, Javad Zarif, either hosting foreign diplomats or visiting them around the world. The Islamic Republic, finally within sight of its goal of becoming the region's dominant power, considers a direct military confrontation with the House of Saud — which they believe to be on the verge of collapse — as far from desirable. Discretion, in their view, is the better part of valor.

Stasa Salicanan, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, January 2018,
http://studies.aljazeera.net/mritems/Documents/2018/1/22/435b5cc4bb214fa6a634f76e2b5cd96e_100.pdf The Growing Arms Deals in the Gulf: Existential Need or Fear Politics?

Political and ideological rivalries among several ambitious players in the Gulf region perpetuate perceived fear and instability, and breed escalation. Geopolitical tensions between the two 'heavyweights', Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the new Gulf crisis have accentuated the region-wide arms build-up since mid-2017. This paper probes into how the perceptions of threats have solidified an endless pursuit of arms purchases. The Saudis seem to be countering Iran's quest for regional dominance and have increased their arms expenditure. Similarly, the Iranians remain sceptical about the Saudi-US alliance, which add to the decades-long perceived 'threats' against the Islamic Republic . The complexity of historical rivalries and the dynamics of the new Gulf crisis have hindered the possibility of an alternative balance of power, much less a region free of instability. The civilian devastation in Yemen has provoked a moral dilemma in Europe for delivering arms to the Saudi-led Arab Alliance and indirectly fuelling war atrocities.

Doug Bandow, 11-26-2018, "Why America Should Say No to an Arab NATO," Cato Institute, <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-america-should-say-no-arab-nato>
Iran poses no threat to America, even though President Trump sometimes sounds like he believes the former to be the superpower and the latter to be the weak, vulnerable, and isolated victim. Moreover, the Persian Gulf is relatively unimportant today. The region's oil stranglehold has been broken by America's emergence as a huge energy producer and the development of alternative supplies elsewhere. Nor does any hegemonic enemy—like the Soviet Union of old—threaten to control the Middle East and its resources. Furthermore, the president's other concern, Israel, is a nuclear-armed regional superpower which doesn't need Washington's military support. Moreover, against the U.S. administration's claims, Tehran doesn't even

seriously threaten its neighbors. Only in the nightmares of administration hawks and their friends in Riyadh is Iran on the march. The latter's economy is a wreck, ruling regime is unstable, its military is weak, its allies are pitiful, and international friends are sparse. Talk of some sort of empire including unstable Iraq, divided Lebanon, ravaged Syria, and the nightmare of Yemen is a parody of serious analysis. Forgetting his talking points during an interview, Even MBS dismissed Tehran's potential: "Iran is not a rival to Saudi Arabia. Its army is not among the top five armies in the Muslim world. The Saudi economy is larger than the Iranian economy. Iran is far from being equal to Saudi Arabia."

A2 Saudi Arabia Impacts

A2 Cyberattacks

1. This isn't even within the grounds of the debate. [Merriam-Webster](#) defines an arms deal as "an agreement to buy or sell *weapons*." Cyber defense definitely doesn't qualify as a weapon. We could cancel our arms deal with Saudi Arabia but continue to sell them cyber defense utilities.
2. Non-unique: Even if the United States government ends their arms deals with Saudi Arabia that doesn't stop independent contractors from doing business with them. Indeed, top defense contractors like [Raytheon](#) and [Booz Allen Hamilton](#) are partnering with Saudi Arabia to boost the nation's indigenous cyber defense capabilities.
3. Investment is solving back. Indeed, their own source, [Lynch of Fifth Domain](#) reports in 2018 that following the 2012 attack, the Saudi government invested significant resources through both domestic and international measures to advance cybersecurity capabilities. The Kingdom has [established](#) the National Cyber Security Authority to centralize operations, significantly increasing [national security](#).
4. Hiring is solving back. [The Oxford Business Group](#) explains in 2018 that Saudi Arabia is implementing the NISS, which addresses shortages by training more workers and adopting more women into the field. [Halzack of the Washington Post](#) furthers that this is an issue that will be solved by the laws of economics. Wages will increase to compensate for the lack of workers, and more people will enter the field for higher wages, eliminating the shortage problem.

1. The United States isn't playing that big of a role in Saudi Arabia's cybersecurity capabilities. In 2016, the United States sold just \$50 million in cyber security to the kingdom. However, [Global Risk Insights](#) explains that strengthening cyber security is a key component of Vision 2030, which is why their indigenous cybersecurity market is set to grow to \$3.48 billion or

nearly 70x what the US provides. Even further, they report that the industry set to grow nearly 60% larger. The United States really isn't necessary.

2. Moreover, these efforts have been successful. [Arabian Business News](#) explains in 2016 that Saudi Arabia faced 60 million cyberattacks in a single year or 160,000 attacks per day, with 1,000 of those being on [critical infrastructure](#). However, with increased investment, Saudi Arabia has successfully sustained all of them which is why my opponents can't give you a single example besides one from 7 years ago of a hacker actually succeeding in their attacks.

3. Specifically on the oil industry, [Siciliano of the Washington Examiner](#) reports just two months ago that Saudi Aramco, the largest oil company in the world, has just signed a deal with U.S. defense giant Raytheon to form a jointly-owned company to boost cybersecurity. You prefer this analysis for two reasons (1) It's more recent than all of my opponents' evidence and (2) it means that even if the US *government* stops working with Saudi Arabia, they'll still have massive cyber-defense capabilities by continuing to work with US *contractors*.

A2 Hodeidah

1. Delink - Voa news reports two days ago that the cease-fire is being abided by in Hodeidah and that the UN has stated that "Saudi-led coalition airstrikes made the fighting worse and deepened what U.N. officials call the world's worst humanitarian disaster."
2. Turn - Saudi pressure makes the Houthis more extremist in two ways. First, the Economist in 2015 explains that the Houthis fear that Saudi is trying to place a puppet ruler over the country which means that as long as Saudi has its feet in the water they will keep fighting and never give up. The second is revenge. Saudi bombs and civilian casualties cause local groups to band together to strike back against the government.
3. Their argument is basically that we should bomb a port in Yemen until the Houthi rebels leave. **McKernan of the Independent** gives you two reasons this is bad
 - a. Putting this type of military pressure on the Houthis makes them less compliant with peaceful negotiation, decreasing the chance of a permanent end to conflict
 - b. In an urban area like Hodeidah, there is a disproportionate impact on civilians because the Houthis are known to heavily mine territory when they leave it

Bethan McKernan, The Independent, "Battle for Hodeidah: How the destruction of one Yemen port could send millions into famine", May 29, 2018,

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/ramadan-yemen-war-latest-hodeidah-port-famine-houthi-imports-un-a8374811.html>

"Further military pressure on the Houthis may have the reverse effect of making them less amenable to enter proposed peace negotiations, since they will be in a weaker position," Elisabeth Kendall of Oxford University

said. Retaking Hodeidah could potentially open a pathway to finally retaking the Yemeni capital of Sanaa from the rebels – but that does not mean Houthi capitulation, Dr Kendall added. Read more Parents forced to watch their children starve to death in Yemen "The Houthis' heartlands in Yemen's north have been pulverised after well over a decade of [guerrilla] war. They have every reason to defy military logic and

keep fighting. Military gains may be of short term use." **The human cost of winning the city of 600,000 people back could be catastrophic, several aid organisations have warned. The Houthis are known to heavily mine territory as they exit it.** Irin News reported earlier this month that UN operational plans to evacuate 5,000 civilians to safer areas ahead of the fighting "floppe". "An additional 340,000 people could be displaced should Hodeidah come under attack," said Bhanu Bhatnagar, a Save the Children spokesperson. "The fighting is also likely to be protracted and the possible use of explosive weapons in densely populated urban areas will have a disproportionate impact on the civilian population."

Economist "Saudis enter the fray." MARCH 26, 2015

The air strikes have already laid bare the divisions caused by the Houthis' rise. In Yemen's south and in the central belt, territories home to mainly Sunni populations, people are cheerleading the Saudi-led campaign. They are hoping it will halt progress of the Houthis, who had looked set to enter oil-rich Mareb, in central Yemen, as well as Aden, until the strikes were launched. The anti-Houthi groups' interest is not whether or not Mr Hadi—a man who ceded control of the capital without a fight six months ago—has legitimacy; rather that the Houthi menace be brought to heel. *In the north of the country many are dismayed by the foreign bombardment, including some of the Houthis' sternest critics: they believe it will only lead to more fighting.* "Saudi Arabia is fucking our country," says a Sunni tribesman who spent the night covering with his family in Sana'a as blasts echoed through the capital. *Many Yemenis believe Saudi Arabia will happily reduce their country to dust to defeat their enemies. For the Houthis, the Saudi-led operation is a public-relations coup. They have long accused Mr Hadi of working for the interests of foreign powers. In a vitriolic and paranoid speech on March 20th their leader, Abdelmalek al-Houthi, accused the Gulf Arab states and America of plotting to destabilise the country in order to reinstall Mr Hadi as a puppet leader.*

No Author, xx-xx-xxxx, "Saudi-led coalition hits Yemen drone site," No Publication, <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/saudiled-coalition-hits-yemen-drone-site/news-story/3e6aa49b0a4eef900344e8cf29625aa9>

The United Nations is trying to implement a ceasefire and troop withdrawal agreement in Hodeidah, the main entry point for most of Yemen's imports and aid.

The truce has largely held in the city, which is controlled by the Houthis with thousands of coalition-backed forces massed on the outskirts. In other areas of Yemen, the poorest Arabian Peninsula nation, fighting has escalated, including in Sanaa.

Voa News, 1-30-2019, "Saudi Coalition Threatens Force to Prod Yemen Rebels to Abide by Cease-Fire," VOA, <https://www.voanews.com/a/saudi-coalition-threatens-force-to-prod-yemen-rebels-to-abide-by-cease-fire/4766365.html> The Saudi-led coalition in Yemen says it is ready to use "calibrated force" to prod Houthi rebels into abiding by the cease-fire in the port city of Hodeida.

"To preserve the cease-fire and any hope for the political process, the U.N. and the international community must press Houthis to stop violations ... and move forward on withdrawal from Hodeida as agreed," UAE Foreign Minister Anwar Gargash said Wednesday.

The UAE is a key member of the coalition supporting the Yemeni government in trying to reclaim control from the Iranian-backed Houthis.

The rebels and Yemeni officials reached a cease-fire deal for Hodeida in December. The rebel-controlled port is the major entry point for food and other humanitarian relief for suffering Yemeni civilians.

All sides promised to withdraw their forces from the city but have been slow to implement the deal. There have been occasional flare-ups of gunfire.

But the rebels and coalition have started carrying out the prisoner exchange that was part of the cease-fire deal.

Saudi-led coalition airstrikes made the fighting worse and deepened what U.N. officials call the world's worst humanitarian disaster, with nearly 80 percent of Yemeni civilians lacking enough food, fuel and medicine.

A2 Strait of Bab El

1. Delink - The area is protected. Coffey 18 writes that Japan, Italy, China, Qatar, and the French all have strong military presence in the Strait. Even if Saudi can't protect the area others actors will.
2. Delink - The US can step in. Coffey 18 continues that the United States has their only permanent military base in the region in Djibouti which is the country bordering the Strait. Furthermore, The National 19 writes that the United States 5th navy has pledged to defend both the Strait of Hormuz and Strait of Bab from Iran or other nations closing trade routes.

Luke **Coffey**, July **2018**. "Bab el-Mandeb: The U.S. Ignores the Most Dangerous Strait in the World at Its Peril," Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/bab-el-mandeb-the-us-ignores-the-most-dangerous-strait-the-world-its-peril>

The Bab el-Mandeb strait is a strategic waterway located between Djibouti and Yemen that links the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. At its narrowest, it is only eighteen miles across. Exports from the Persian Gulf and Asia destined for Western markets must pass through the strait before passing through the Suez Canal. It is also perhaps the most dangerous and geo-politically contested strait in the world. The civil war in Yemen and the border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti means that constant conflict surrounds the strait. In recent years the United States,

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the European Union have all conducted counter-terrorism and counter-piracy operations in the region. Furthermore, the

Americans, Chinese, Germans, French, Qataris, Emiratis, Saudi Arabians, Japanese, and Italians all have some form of military presence near the Bab el-Mandeb.

Luke Coffey, July 2018. "Bab el-Mandeb: The U.S. Ignores the Most Dangerous Strait in the World at Its Peril," Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/bab-el-mandeb-the-us-ignores-the-most-dangerous-strait-the-world-its-peril>

The two countries straddling the Bab el-Mandeb, Djibouti and Yemen, are hardly beacons of stability. The tiny African republic of Djibouti is plagued with political corruption, economic incompetence, and international intrigue. For instance, Djibouti President Ismael Omar Guelleh helped himself to a fourth five-year term in 2016 after parliament dubiously eliminated a constitutional two-term limit in 2010. According to The Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom Djibouti ranks 171 out of 180 countries scored in economic freedom. Power also remains heavily concentrated in the president's hands and, in recent years, there has been no noticeable progress on reducing government corruption. Even with all the economic and political problems facing Djibouti, it has been courted by many outside powers due to its strategic location on the Bab el-Mandeb. It **is home to America's only permanent military base in Africa, Camp Lemonnier.**

France, Italy Germany, and Japan already have military presences of varying strength there. Last year, China opened its first permanent overseas military base in Djibouti. Even though the base was initially billed as a "logistics supply facility," it can handle up to ten thousand troops, and Chinese marines have used it already stage live fire exercises involving armored vehicles and artillery

National, 2-7-2019, "US navy pledges to keep shipping routes open in face of Iranian threats,"

<https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/us-navy-pledges-to-keep-shipping-routes-open-in-face-of-iranian-threats-1.768331>

A top US naval commander has pledged to defend critical shipping routes through the Red Sea and Arabian Gulf from Iranian threats, whose "malign interests" play a destabilising role across the region. "We stand ready to protect the flow of commerce and freedom of navigation" in the region, **US 5th Fleet commander** Vice Admiral Scott Stearney told reporters on Sunday. Speaking during a teleconference from the 5th Fleet's headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, Vice Admiral Stearney was **responding to recent threats to global shipping at the narrow choke points of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab Al Mandeb.**

A2 Safer tech for Yemen

1. Delink - Macaskill of the Guardian finds in 2016 that their airstrikes have shown to repeatedly target schools, hospitals, and other civilian sites. He quantifies more than one-third of all Saudi-led air raids have hit civilian sites. This has two implications either
 - a. Our tech isn't accurate
 - b. Our tech is accurate but Saudi Arabia doesn't take the necessary precautions.

This is important, because Antidze of Reuters explains in 2015 that NATO and US air campaigns are prone to killing civilians. However, in contrast, Russian strikes are more often on target, such as in the 2008 conflict in Georgia where Russian strikes were extremely precise. The CSIS gives the warrant, which is that Russia is actively making major advancements in the field of precision guided missiles and Russia is overall working to modernize their military strategy.

2.

CSIS Missile Threat, 6-14-2018, "Missiles of Russia,"

<https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/russia/>

As the heir to the substantial Soviet missile arsenal, Russia boasts the widest inventory of ballistic and cruise missiles in the world. Russia remains a major power in the development of

missiles of all kinds, and Russian strategic rocket forces constitute a significant element of Moscow's military strategy. Russian missiles perform a wide variety of missions, from anti-access/area denial in local conflicts to delivery of strategic nuclear weapons across continents. A significant modernization program continues in Russia, producing new variants of both ballistic and cruise missiles with significant new capabilities. Russia is also making major advancements in the field of precision guided cruise missiles.

Margarita Antidze, 10-26-2015, "Before Syria, Russia struggled to land air strikes on target," U.S.,

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-bombing-idUSKCN0SK1WF20151026>

Other militaries also kill civilians with misdirected air strikes. This happened multiple times in NATO and U.S. air campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya and Kosovo.

Just this month a U.S. air strike on a hospital in the Afghan city of Kunduz killed at least 23 people, according to the charity running the hospital.

In Georgia, Russian strikes were often on target, helping its military quickly overwhelm the Georgian armed forces. In one example, a strike on a radar station near the capital, Tbilisi, significantly reduced Georgia's air defense capability.

More than one-third of all Saudi-led air raids on Yemen have hit civilian sites, such as school buildings, hospitals, markets, mosques and economic infrastructure, according to the most

comprehensive survey of the conflict. The findings, revealed by the Guardian on Friday, contrast with claims by the Saudi government, backed by its US and British allies, that Riyadh is seeking to minimise civilian casualties. The survey, conducted by the Yemen Data Project, a group of academics, human rights organisers and activists, will add to mounting pressure in the UK and the US on the Saudi-led coalition, which is facing accusations of breaching international humanitarian law. It will refocus attention on UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia, worth more than £3.3bn since the air campaign began, and the role of British military personnel attached to the Saudi command and control centre, from which air operations are being mounted. Two British parliamentary committees have called for the suspension of such sales until a credible and independent inquiry has been conducted. What is happening in Yemen and how Saudi Arabia's airstrikes are affecting civilians - explainer Read more Saudi Arabia disputed the Yemen Data Project figures, describing them as "vastly exaggerated", and challenged the accuracy of the methodology, saying somewhere such as a school building might have been a school a year ago, but was now being used by rebel fighters. **The independent and non-partisan survey, based on open-source data, including research on**

the ground, records more than 8,600 air attacks between March 2015, when the Saudi-led campaign began, and the end of August this year. Of these, 3,577 were listed as having hit military

sites and 3,158 struck non-military sites. Where it could not be established whether a location attacked was civilian or military, the strikes were classified as unknown, of which there are 1,882 incidents. Saudi Arabia intervened in March 2015 to support the Yemeni government against Iran-backed Houthi rebels in control of the capital, Sana'a. The UN has put the death toll of the 18-month war at more than 10,000, with 3,799 of them being civilians. Aftermath of Yemen hospital following airstrike that killed at least 11 people in August Human rights organisations in Yemen have documented repeated violations by the Houthis, including the use of landmines and indiscriminate shelling. Human Rights Watch noted this year that Yemeni civilians had "suffered serious laws of war violations by all sides". The Yemen Data Project has chosen to focus exclusively on the impact of the air campaign, rather than fighting on the ground, citing the difficulty of gaining access to frontline fighting and impartial information. **One of the most problematic findings of the survey for Saudi Arabia is the number of reported repeat attacks. While some attacks on civilian sites can be explained away as**

mistakes or being the location of military camps in densely populated areas such as Sana'a, repeated strikes on school buildings and hospitals will add to demands for an independent investigation. One school building in Dhubab, Taiz governorate, has been hit nine times, according to the data. A market in Sirwah, Marib governorate, has been struck 24 times

A2 THAAD

1. Delink - American missile defense isn't suited to the problems facing Saudi Arabia. Fisher of the New York Times writes in 2017 that for instance, an investigation conducted by the newspaper revealed that a missile that the US and Saudi government's claimed had been successfully intercepted really flew unimpeded over Saudi defense and almost hit the Riyadh airport, concluding that Saudi Arabia overstates the effectiveness of missile defense.
2. Delink - Saudi Arabia already has all the THAADs it needs. Tori of the Israel Times finds in 2018 that Saudi Arabia secured 44 THAADs in November. This means that stopping arm sales have no effect as the 30 days Congress has to stop arm sales has passed.
3. Delink - Saudi Arabia is getting missile defense systems from other countries like Russia and Israel. Brummer of the BIN in 2018 further elaborates that Saudi Arabia has purchased Israel's Iron Dome missile defense system, meaning Saudi Arabia is going to have comprehensive missile defense even in a world without US arms sales to the region.

Toi Staff, 11-8-2018, "US finalizes \$15 billion sale of missile defense system to Saudi Arabia," No Publication,

<https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-finalizes-15-billion-sale-of-missile-defense-system-to-saudi-arabia/>, 1-21-2019

Saudi Arabia will purchase a \$15 billion missile system from the American defense giant Lockheed Martin, a US State Department spokesperson told Reuters on Wednesday. A last-minute push by Washington to close the deal included a phone call between US President Donald Trump and Saudi King Salman, according to the news wire. The parties signed off on the purchase of 44 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) launchers, missiles, and related equipment on Monday. The deal, which has been in the works since December 2016, appeared at risk, following pressure from Congress to downgrade US ties with Saudi Arabia, after the CIA concluded that Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman had ordered the brutal murder of US-based Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October. But Trump stood by Riyadh nonetheless, suggesting, in defense of his policy, that Israel would face major regional difficulties in the Middle East were it not for the stabilizing presence of Riyadh. "If you look at Israel, Israel would be in big trouble without Saudi Arabia," Trump said Monday. "So what does that mean, Israel is going to leave? You want Israel to leave? We have a very strong ally in Saudi Arabia." Earlier this month, in Israel's first public comments on the murder of Khashoggi, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that, while the killing was "horrendous," it was still necessary to preserve stability in the Arab kingdom.

Fisher, Max, et al. "Did American Missile Defense Fail in Saudi Arabia?" The New York Times, The New York Times, 4 Dec. 2017,

www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/04/world/middleeast/saudi-missile-defense.html.

Instead, evidence analyzed by a research team of missile experts appears to show the missile's warhead flew unimpeded over Saudi defenses and nearly hit its target, Riyadh's airport. The warhead detonated so close to the domestic terminal that customers jumped out of their seats. **Governments have overstated the effectiveness of missile defenses in the past, including against Scuds. During the first Gulf War, the United States claimed a near-perfect record in shooting down Iraqi variants of the Scud. Subsequent analyses found that nearly all the interceptions had failed.** Had it failed in Riyadh as well? The researchers scoured social media for anything posted in that area and time frame, looking for clues. The pattern of missile debris littering Riyadh suggests missile defenses either hit the harmless rear section of the missile or missed it entirely. "You shoot five times at this missile and they all miss? That's shocking," she said. "That's shocking because this system is supposed to work."

Brummer, David. "Saudi Arabia Reportedly Purchases Israel's Iron Dome Missile System." Breaking Israel News | Latest News. Biblical Perspective., Breaking Israel News | Latest News. Biblical Perspective., 13 Sept. 2018, www.breakingisraelnews.com/113759/saudi-arabia-israel-iron-dome/.

Reports have surfaced – in Arabic language newspapers, such as the London-based Al-Khaleej Online – as well as Israel-based news outlets that **Saudi Arabia has purchased Israel's Iron Dome missile defense system. There are several elements to the supposed deal – which the Saudis sought – to better-protect them against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen.** It is thought that the United States helped mediate the deal, which included further plans to reach an agreement on broad military cooperation between the two countries. The Al-Khaleej story – published on Thursday – cited "high-level diplomatic sources" as revealing that **Riyadh had purchased the Israeli system**, with counter claims that Israel was highly reluctant to sell the Iron Dome to an Arab nation. There was no confirmation by Saudi officials, and Israeli security officials strongly denied the report, the Haaretz daily said. The deal is thought to be worth tens of millions of dollars, with the first stage of the deployment – along Saudi Arabia's border with Yemen – to be completed by December. The Saudis are attempting to create either a deterrence or protective capability against Iran-backed Houthi rebels who have launched missile attacks against Riyadh and Saudi targets with increasing frequency.

A2 Proliferation

1. Delink - Not a possibility for Saudi Arabia. The Middle East Forum explains that "has nowhere near the level of indigenous technical capacity needed to produce, maintain, or deploy nuclear weapons. No long-term strategy for developing its nuclear sector has been publicly issued, nor does Riyadh possess the necessary institutional support (across regulatory, technical, and legal fields) to effectively retain nuclear deployments."

2. Delink- Lippman explains in 2011 Saudi wont nuclearize for two reasons.
 - a. Relies on global markets so they can't become an outlaw state/ Fear of sanctions
 - b. Saudi know it would cause massive instability so on net would be bad for the Kingdom
3. Delink - If Saudi Arabia did decide they're going to need a bomb, US pressure wouldn't stand in the way of it. Guzansky explains that it would take an existential threat for Saudi Arabia to go nuclear which means that even in the face of losing the United States, it would build nuclear weapons to reduce risks and maintain the kingdom. Furthermore, Guzansky writes that there is no precedent for a state like China or Russia to give nuclear technology to a state like Saudi Arabia.

Lippman, Middle East specialist and scholar at the Middle East Institute, 11 (Thomas, "Saudi Arabia's Nuclear Policy," <http://www.susris.com/2011/08/05/saudi-arabia%E2%80%99s-nuclear-policy-lippman/>)

It is highly unlikely, however, that Saudi Arabia would wish to acquire its own nuclear arsenal or that it is capable of doing so. King Abdullah's comments should not be taken as a dispositive statement of considered policy. There are compelling reasons why Saudi Arabia would not undertake an effort to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, even in the unlikely event that Iran achieves a stockpile and uses this arsenal to threaten the Kingdom. Money is not an issue — if destitute North Korea can develop nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia surely has the resources to pursue such a program. With oil prices above \$90 a barrel, Riyadh is flush with cash. But **the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons would be provocative, destabilizing, controversial and extremely difficult for Saudi Arabia, and ultimately would be more likely to weaken the kingdom than strengthen it. The kingdom has committed itself to an industrialization and economic development program that depends on open access to global markets and materials; becoming a nuclear outlaw would be fatal to those plans.**

Pursuing nuclear weapons would be a flagrant violation of Saudi Arabia's commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and would surely cause a serious breach with the United States. Saudi Arabia lacks the industrial and technological base to develop such weapons on its own. An attempt to acquire nuclear weapons by purchasing them, perhaps from Pakistan, would launch Saudi Arabia on a dangerously inflammatory trajectory that could destabilize the entire region, which Saudi Arabia's leaders know would not be in their country's best interests. The Saudis always prefer stability to turmoil. Their often-stated official position is that the entire Middle East should become an internationally supervised region free of all weapons of mass destruction.

Yoel Guzansky, xx-xx-xxxx, "Questioning Riyadh's Nuclear Rationale: Saudi Arabia's Atomic Ambitions," Middle East Forum,

<https://www.meforum.org/3512/saudi-arabia-pakistan-nuclear-weapon>

Although there has never been a precedent of one state selling or transferring actual nuclear warheads to another, there is the precedent of exchange of nuclear technology between Pakistan and North Korea[21] as well as proliferation of forbidden nuclear equipment and know-how to countries including Iran and Libya and possibly Syria or Saudi Arabia.[22] As Tehran progresses, Riyadh is likely to exert more pressure on Islamabad to fulfill its presumed commitments. It is by no means certain that Pakistan will yield to Saudi pressure and inducements, but it is impossible to rule out the deployment of Pakistani fighter jets or surface-to-surface missiles with nuclear warheads, controlled by Pakistan, on Saudi soil.

Yoel Guzansky, xx-xx-xxxx, "Questioning Riyadh's Nuclear Rationale: Saudi Arabia's Atomic Ambitions," Middle East Forum,

<https://www.meforum.org/3512/saudi-arabia-pakistan-nuclear-weapon>

Heavy U.S. pressure is likely to be brought to bear on the Saudis not to acquire nuclear capabilities. Indeed, it seems that, at present, the price Riyadh is likely to pay should it acquire military nuclear capabilities might outweigh the advantages of such a move. But strategic interest, motivated by considerations of survival, could have the upper hand. Should it seem that the kingdom's vital security interests are threatened, it may prefer to take a series of steps, including obtaining a nonconventional arsenal, to reduce risks and ensure the continuity of the House of Saud.

Yoel Guzansky, xx-xx-xxxx, "Questioning Riyadh's Nuclear Rationale: Saudi Arabia's Atomic Ambitions," Middle East Forum,

<https://www.meforum.org/3512/saudi-arabia-pakistan-nuclear-weapon>

Due to its extremely limited research and development capabilities and know-how, Riyadh's possible nuclear pursuit is likely to be done with external help and acquisition of an off-the-shelf deterrent. It has nowhere near the level of indigenous technical capacity needed to produce, maintain, or deploy nuclear weapons. No long-term strategy for developing its nuclear sector has been publicly issued, nor does Riyadh possess the necessary institutional support (across regulatory, technical, and legal fields) to effectively retain nuclear deployments. Therefore, it might partner with China or Pakistan or both, which have the necessary technological and human infrastructures.

A2 Fighting terror

1. Delink - Saudi Arabia doesn't fight terror. The Associated Press reports in 2019 that instead of fighting terrorists, Saudi Arabia pays terrorists to leave cities. They bribe terrorists to stop fighting.
2. Delink – According to CATO in 2018, there is little evidence that military intervention stops terrorism, concluding that given the experience of the United States since 2001, there is little reason to expect that additional arms sales to countries like Saudi Arabia, will reduce terrorism.
3. Turn - In fact, you can turn this argument, because Al-Thani of the Washington Post in 2018 reports that “Saudi Arabia [is] aiding terrorists in Yemen” by providing terrorists with weapons, money, and safe passage. The best way to decrease this weapon aid specifically would be to cut off arms sales. Furthermore, Beirut of the Independent finds in 2017 that US arms are ending up in ISIS's hands in suspiciously high numbers through Saudi Arabia, with ISIS possessing more US weapons than “would have been available through battle capture alone,” leading researchers to conclude that Saudi Arabia is arming ISIS with US weapons.

4. [Shinkman of U.S. News](#) explains that even if we defeat it in one spot, it will create a diaspora of more splinter groups that are just as dangerous. [Serena of RAND in 2016](#) finds that these splinter groups are arguably much harder to deal with, as they are already practiced in strategy, tactics, and violence, and will continue to kill Americans, thereby not solving the original problem. Thus, [Bergen of Mother Jones](#) writes that empirically, large scale U.S. military intervention yields a 607% increase in the average incidence of terrorist attacks and a 237% increase in fatality rate.

CATO

<https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-836.pdf>

Second, there is little evidence from the past 16 years that direct military intervention is the right way to combat terrorism. Research reveals that military force alone “seldom ends terrorism.”⁵⁰ This comports with the American experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the war on terror to date. Despite regime change, thousands of air strikes, and efforts to upgrade the military capabilities of friendly governments, the United States has not only failed to destroy the threat of Islamist-inspired terrorism, it has also spawned chaos, greater resentment, and a sharp increase in the level of terrorism afflicting the nations involved.⁵¹ Given the experience of the United States since 2001, there is little reason to expect that additional arms sales to countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Qatar, or the United Arab Emirates will reduce terrorism, much less anti-American terrorism specifically

Bethan Mckernan Beirut @Mck_beth, 12-15-2017, "Isis arms traced back to America and Saudi Arabia," Independent,

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-us-saudi-arabia-arms-fighters-jihadis-military-capability-enhanced-weapons-syria-terrorism-a8112076.html>

An extensive field investigation into the origins of Isis’ weaponry in Syria and Iraq has found that weapons supplied by the US and Saudi Arabia to the Syrian opposition often ended up in the jihadis’ hands, enhancing the “quantity and quality” of their armaments.

While most weapons in Isis’ arsenal were captured from the Syrian and Iraqi armies, Conflict Armament Research (CAR)’s report, published on Thursday, found that the number of US and Saudi supplied weapons in Isis’ arsenal goes “far beyond those that would have been available through battle capture alone”.

“Iraq and Syria have seen Isis forces use large numbers of weapons, supplied by states such as Saudi Arabia and the United States, against the various international anti-Isis coalitions that the two states support,” researchers found.

Washington Post 2018

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/08/29/the-united-arab-emirates-and-saudi-arabia-are-aiding-terrorists-in-yemen/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a4dc1eb031e2

At the same time we are reading about the horrific bombing that killed 44 children, new Associated Press reporting from Yemen has laid bare the fact that the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been busy cutting “secret deals with al-Qaida fighters, paying some to leave key cities and towns and letting others retreat with weapons, equipment and wads of looted cash ... hundreds more were recruited to join the coalition itself.” It is rather ironic that while working with al-Qaeda in Yemen, the UAE has been relentlessly demonizing Qatar, the American ally that hosts the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East, accusing it of supporting terrorist groups. While the UAE has been pursuing its own expansionist ambition in Yemen and the Horn of Africa at the expense of regional security, Qatar has been facilitating hundreds of missions through Al-Udeid Air Base against al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and others who threaten peace and stability in the Middle East.

Associated Press Sendsend Me Email Alerts, 1-25-2019, "Saudi Arabia doesn't defeat Al-Qaida terrorists," haaretz,

<https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/saudi-arabia-doesn-t-defeat-al-qaida-in-yemen-they-pay-them-1.6343608>

Again and again over the past two years, a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia and backed by the United States has claimed it won decisive victories that drove Al-Qaida militants from their strongholds across Yemen and shattered their ability to attack the West.

That’s because the coalition cut secret deals with Al-Qaida fighters, paying some to leave key cities and towns and letting others retreat with weapons, equipment and wads of looted cash, an investigation by The Associated Press has found. Hundreds more were recruited to join the coalition itself.

These compromises and alliances have allowed Al-Qaida militants to survive to fight another day — and risk strengthening the most dangerous branch of the terror network that carried out the 9/11 attacks. Key participants in the pacts said the U.S. was aware of the arrangements and held off on any drone strikes.

Mother Jones, 3-1-2007, "Iraq 101: Aftermath – Long-Term Thinking,"

<https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2007/03/iraq-101-aftermath-long-term-thinking/>

Our study

yields one resounding finding: The rate of fatal terrorist attacks around the world by jihadist groups, and the number of people killed in those attacks, increased dramatically after the invasion of Iraq. Globally there was a 607 percent rise in the average yearly incidence of attacks (28.3

attacks per year before and 199.8 after) and a 237 percent rise in the fatality rate (from 501 to 1,689 deaths per year). A large part of this rise occurred in Iraq, the scene of almost half the global total of jihadist terrorist attacks. But even excluding Iraq and Afghanistan—the other current jihadist hot spot—there has been a 35 percent rise in the number of attacks, with a 12 percent rise in fatalities

Clarke, Colin P., xx-xx-xxxx, "This Is the Problem with Trying to Destroy the Islamic State," No Publication,

<https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/07/this-is-the-problem-with-trying-to-destroy-the-islamic.html>

The Islamic State — a splinter of al-Qaeda in Iraq or AQI, which itself was previously a splinter of al-Qaeda — is one of many terrorist organizations that owe their emergence to the fracturing of a pre-existing group. Hezbollah, for example was an offshoot of the Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya (AMAL), formed in the early 1980s with help from Iran in response to Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) coalesced between the late 1970s and early 1980s from an assortment of Tamil rebel groups.

Other prominent splinter groups have flourished in Northern Ireland (the Real IRA), Algeria (the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) and Thailand (the New Patani United Liberation Organization). Splinter groups are often only slight variations on the original groups, with minor differences in ideology but more significant discrepancies over strategy, tactics and the utility of violence.

Paul D., 9-27-2016, "Military Success Against ISIS Will Create 'Terrorist Diaspora'," US News & World Report,
<https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-09-27/military-success-against-isis-will-create-terrorist-diaspora-james-omey-says>

The U.S.-led military strategy to defeat the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria will create a cheaper, nimbler and lethally dangerous version of the terror network in terms of its ability to attack Western targets, top counterterror officials said Tuesday.

"The so-called caliphate will be crushed," FBI Director James Comey told members of Congress Tuesday morning, adding, "Through the fingers of that crush will come hundreds of very dangerous people."

"There will be a terrorist diaspora some time in the next two to five years like we've never seen before."

Comey testified before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs alongside Jeh Johnson, the secretary of Homeland Security, and Nicholas Rasmussen, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center – two organizations founded in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks to prevent another such incident.

A2 Influence

A2 Alliance would end

1. Relations are already dead. Fisher of the New York Times writes in 2017 that US-Saudi ties are already gone as a consequence of the killing of Jamal Khashoggi. American businesses are pulling out. Washington think tanks are rejecting Saudi money. His death, Fisher concludes, is a tipping point that marks the end of strong US/Saudi relations.
2. Even if you do buy their analysis that the relationship still exists, then I'd contend, that if the alliance is as strong as they say it is, cooperation would be inevitable. The US still has a vested interest in the region to maintain a presence for issues such as terrorism and oil, meaning that some degree of cooperation would still be likely. There are three specific areas where the two countries have met in the middle.
 - a. First, the U.S. has consistently prioritized Saudi Arabia's massive exportation of oil.
 - b. Second, both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia want to contain Iran and maintain regional stability. They can still do this by providing intelligence and support.
 - c. Third, they have intertwined business interests. Saudi Arabia is prioritizing economic growth it will not risk this goal because arm sales end.

<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/corporate-americas-deep-ties-to-saudi-arabia/>

The spotlight on Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman over the alleged murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi is also inviting scrutiny of the scores of big U.S. companies that for decades have eagerly sought to do business with the country. The ever-escalating tensions come while the crown prince is attempting to wean his country away from its main economic engine: oil. To do so, he's leading a drive he calls **Vision 2030, whose centerpiece is attracting global investment to Saudi Arabia** -- the goal of the now-controversial Saudi investment conference known as "Davos in the Desert" next week.

But the fallout from Khashoggi's alleged murder is undermining that goal, with a growing number of business leaders and other officials, including U.S. Treasury Secretary Stephen Mnuchin, backing away from the summit. That's putting **American companies already doing**

business in Saudi Arabia in an increasingly tough spot. Those corporations range from defense contractors and automakers to banks and consumer goods companies.

Fisher 2017

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/world/middleeast/jamal-khashoggi-saudi-arabia.html>

Practically overnight, longtime American supporters of the alliance are disavowing it. American businesses are pulling back from the kingdom. Even Washington think tanks, among the most pro-Saudi institutions in the United States, are sending back Saudi money. The murder of Mr. Khashoggi is different. Mr. Khashoggi's murder. His death, maybe more than the sole or even primary cause of the breakdown, appears to be a kind of tipping point. But why this tipping point? Research by the sociologist Ari Adut suggests it may come down to a dynamic called common knowledge: A group becomes much likelier to act against a transgressor when each individual member knows that every other member knows about the transgression. This creates a perceived social pressure to act. It is perhaps why, for instance, society looked the other way for years on sexual assault accusations involving Bill Cosby, then suddenly didn't. The accusations were known, but it was not until a viral stand-up routine made them common knowledge that Mr. Cosby faced consequences. Saudi Arabia's past behaviors were hardly unknown. But there was never common understanding on how to receive them. The country may have been undercutting American policy and values, but it tended to do so on issues that made for polarizing topics in Washington.

Natasha Frost, Oct. 23, 2018

<https://qz.com/1430512/jamal-khashoggis-death-is-unlikely-to-alter-us-saudi-relations/>

Despite the outcry, there's good evidence to suggest that this current "crisis" will become little more than a blip. If any action is taken by the international community or the US, it is likely to be symbolic and short-lived—and Saudi human-rights abuses will continue to be unimpeded. A look at the history of the region shows that even very high-profile cases have had a limited effect on how willing US politicians are to sanction Saudi Arabia: James Gelvin, a history professor at UCLA and author of The Modern Middle East: A History, says that the relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia will be under scrutiny only as long as Khashoggi's death stays in the news. "What's going to happen is that the administration is going to get a lot of pressure," he says. Congress will likely impose minor sanctions and Donald Trump could veto them. Congress could then respond by overriding that veto, Gelvin says. In return, "the Saudis will do something symbolic," such as withdrawing their diplomats from the US. Then, the news cycle will move along, and things will quietly go back to how they were before.

A2 Regional priorities

1. Delink - Saudi Arabia has done nothing to help the US. Caverly of the New York Times in 2018 outlines that “Saudi Arabia has blockaded our ally Qatar” and has failed to fight ISIS and stabilizing Iraq all while accepting US arms. Harris of the New York Times further explains in 2018 that Trump administration officials have been trying for over a year to get Saudi Arabia to lift an embargo against Qatar and to end the war in Yemen. Saudi Arabia has done neither of these things; it’s clear U.S. influence isn’t working right now.

Gardiner Harris, Eric Schmitt and Rick Gladstone, 10-31-2018, "U.S. and Britain Seek Yemen Cease-Fire as Relations With Saudis Cool," No Publication,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/31/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-yemen-cease-fire.html>, 1-27-2019

Robert Palladino, a State Department spokesman, told reporters Wednesday that the call for a cease-fire was “unrelated” to questions over Mr. Khashoggi’s death, and that Mr. Pompeo’s statement was consistent with past efforts to resolve the war. But Middle East experts said the pressure for a cease-fire and the credibility crisis Crown Prince Mohammed is facing over Mr. Khashoggi’s death was no coincidence. “One of the key things that makes diplomacy work is leverage,” said Dennis Ross, a veteran former diplomat who worked for both Republican and

Democratic administrations, “and Pompeo has some leverage with the Saudis now that he didn’t have before.” **”Trump administration officials have**

been trying for more than a year to get Saudi Arabia to lift an embargo against Qatar, a

Gulf neighbor that hosts the largest American air base in the Middle East, and to do

something to end the war in Yemen, which by many accounts is a stalemated disaster. The war has

killed at least 10,000 people, though the United Nations stopped updating the toll two years ago. Repeated efforts by United Nations diplomats to broker peace talks have failed. Mr. Hunt, Britain’s foreign secretary, told the BBC that Mr. Pompeo’s call for a cease-fire was “an extremely welcome announcement.” Martin Griffiths, the United Nations special envoy for the Yemen conflict, also expressed appreciation and said he intended to reconvene talks within a month. “I urge all concerned parties to seize this opportunity,” Mr. Griffiths said in a statement. The unified American and British comments on Yemen signaled an intensifying and coordinated messaging campaign by the Trump administration and its allies that started in earnest with a speech by Mr. Mattis at a security conference in Bahrain on Saturday. In his strongest language to date, Mr. Mattis called for an end to the conflict in Yemen and urged support for a United Nations-led diplomatic effort. “The tragedy of Yemen worsens by the day,” said Mr. Mattis, who also met privately with the Saudi foreign minister, Adel al-Jubeir. “Now is the time to move forward on stopping this war.”

Jonathan D. Caverley, 10-12-2018, "Opinion," No Publication,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/saudi-arabia-arms-sales.html>

To date these sales have not “stewarded our national security.” Beyond its tragic war in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has blockaded Qatar, an ally that hosts the Middle East’s largest American military base. And Saudi Arabia provides little help when it comes to Washington’s real regional priorities, such as fighting the Islamic State and stabilizing Iraq. The Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy specifically de-emphasizes the war on terror to focus on competition with China and Russia.

A2 Yemen

1. Delink - Literally not working. Walsh of the New York Times in 2018 explains that the American government has concluded that Saudi Arabia just won’t listen. The US has given Saudi Arabia specific coordinates of targets who should not be struck, for example, yet Saudi Arabia continued to attack. Saudi Arabia demonstrated quote, “willful disregard of any advice they were getting.”

2. Delink - Trump has no interest. Bazzi of the Atlantic writes in 2018 that the Trump administration has shown little interest in using arm sales as leverage and will continue to support the Saudi-led coalition because the administration perceives the Houthis as a threat as they are backed by Iran.

Declan Walsh and Eric Schmitt, 12-25-2018, "Arms Sales to Saudis Leave American Fingerprints on Yemen's Carnage," No Publication,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/25/world/middleeast/yemen-us-saudi-civilian-war.html>

“In the end, we concluded that they were just not willing to listen,” said Tom Malinowski, a former assistant secretary of state and an incoming member of Congress from New Jersey. “They were given specific coordinates of targets that should not be struck and they continued to strike them. That struck me as a willful disregard of advice they were getting.”

Yet American military support for the airstrikes continued.

Mohamad Bazzi, xx-xx-xxxx, "The United States Could End the War in Yemen If It Wanted To," Atlantic,

<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia/571465/>, 1-26-2019

As public anger over America's role in the Saudi-led war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen has grown, Congress has slowly tried to exert pressure on America's longtime allies to reduce civilian casualties. Last month, a bipartisan group of lawmakers included a provision in the defense-spending bill requiring the Trump administration to certify that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are taking "demonstrable actions" to avoid harming civilians and making a "good faith" effort to reach a political settlement to end the war. Congress required the administration to make this certification a prerequisite for the Pentagon to continue providing military assistance to the coalition. This assistance, much of which began under the Obama administration, includes the mid-air refueling of Saudi and Emirati jets, intelligence assistance, and [billions of dollars](#) worth of missiles, bombs, and spare parts for the Saudi air force. On September 12, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo [assured Congress](#) that the coalition was trying to minimize civilian casualties and enable deliveries of humanitarian aid to Yemen. Yet his claim contradicted virtually every other independent assessment of the war, including a recent [report](#) by a group of United Nations experts and several Human Rights Watch [investigations](#) that alleged the coalition had committed war crimes. Meanwhile, in a [memo](#) Pompeo sent to Congress, **he noted another reason for continued U.S. support for the coalition:**

containing Iran and its influence on the Houthis. Like the Saudis and Emiratis, the Trump administration sees in the Houthis the same sort of threat as other Iranian-backed groups such as

Hezbollah, which has sent thousands of fighters to help Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria. In late August, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations [tweeted](#) a photo that had circulated in

the Arab press of a meeting in Beirut between the Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Houthi officials. **U.S. officials claimed it showed "the nature**

of the regional terrorist threat," and added: "Iranian proxies in Lebanon & Yemen pose major dangers to peace & stability in the entire Middle East." But beyond recent missile attacks on Saudi Arabia—in retaliation for Saudi air

strikes—the Houthis have displayed little regional ambition. Ironically, as the war drags on, the Houthis will grow more dependent [on support](#) from Iran and its allies. **By accepting**

the coalition's cosmetic attempts to minimize civilian casualties, the Trump administration is

signaling to Saudi and Emirati leaders its apparent belief that a clear military victory in Yemen

remains possible. And as long as the coalition believes it can crush the Houthis, there's little

incentive for it to negotiate. Trump, then, has bought into Saudi Arabia's zero-sum calculation: that a military win in Yemen for the kingdom and its allies would be a

defeat for Iran, while a negotiated settlement with the Houthis would be a victory for Tehran. **Blinded by its obsession with Iran, the Trump administration is perpetuating an unwinnable**

war and undermining the likelihood of a political settlement. This current phase of the conflict in Yemen began in September 2014, when the Houthis, a group of Shia rebels allied with Yemen's ousted dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh, forced most of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi's government to flee to Saudi Arabia, and threatened to take over much of the country. In 2015, the Saudi-led coalition went to war in Yemen to restore Hadi to power and roll back the Houthis. Since then, despite thousands of air strikes and an air and naval blockade at a [cost](#) of some \$5 to \$6 billion a month for Riyadh, the Saudi-led alliance failed to dislodge the Houthis from the capital, Sanaa.

While the Saudis are quick to blame Iran for the war, several researchers, including Thomas Juneau, a professor at the University of Ottawa and a former analyst at Canada's Department of National Defense, have shown that the Houthis did not receive [significant support](#) from Tehran before the Saudi intervention in 2015. Iran has stepped up [military assistance](#) to the Houthis since the war, and Hezbollah has begun sending military advisers to train the Yemeni rebels. But the costs of this assistance fall far short of those incurred by Saudi Arabia and its allies. For Iran, the Yemen conflict is a low-cost way to bleed its regional rival. The Saudis and Emiratis have largely ignored international criticism of civilian deaths and appeals for a political settlement—and the Trump administration's latest signal of support shows that strategy is working. Investigations by the UN and other bodies have found both the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition responsible for potential war crimes. But air strikes by the Saudis and their allies "have caused most of the documented civilian casualties," the UN concluded in a [report](#) last month. On August 9, the Saudi

coalition bombed a school bus in the northern town of Dahyan, [killing](#) 54 people, 44 of them children, and wounding dozens, according to Yemeni health officials. For weeks, the coalition defended the airstrike, but on September 1—with the deadline looming for the Trump administration to certify Saudi and UAE efforts to reduce civilian casualties—the coalition [admitted](#) that the bombing was a mistake and that it would “hold those who committed mistakes” accountable. U.S. officials seized on that statement as evidence that the Saudi coalition is willing to change its behavior. But for three and a half years now, there has been “little evidence of any attempt by parties to the conflict to minimize civilian casualties,” [said](#) Kamel Jendoubi, the chair of the UN investigation team that documented war crimes. **[The Trump administration has shown little interest in using arms deals as leverage for a political settlement, or to force the Saudis to take concerns about civilian deaths more seriously. In March 2017, Trump reversed a decision by the Obama administration to suspend the sale of more than \\$500 million in laser-guided bombs and other munitions to the Saudi military.](#)** As more members of Congress expressed criticism of Saudi actions in Yemen, the Senate [narrowly approved](#) that sale. After the Houthis fired ballistic missiles at several Saudi cities in late 2017, the Trump administration again escalated U.S. involvement in the war. *The New York Times* broke the news that the Pentagon had [secretly dispatched](#) U.S. special forces to the Saudi-Yemen border to help the Saudi military locate and destroy Houthi missile sites. Frustrated by the deepening U.S. role, two dozen members of the House [introduced](#) a resolution this week invoking the 1973 War Powers Act, arguing that Congress never authorized American support for the Saudi coalition and instructing Trump to withdraw U.S. forces. Saudi and Emirati leaders want a clear-cut victory in their regional rivalry with Iran, and they have been emboldened by the Trump administration’s unconditional support to stall negotiations. A recent UN effort to hold peace talks between the Houthis, Hadi’s government, and the Saudi-led coalition [collapsed](#) in early September, after the Houthi delegation did not show up in Geneva. Houthi leaders said the Saudis, who control Yemen’s airspace, would not guarantee their safe travel. Days later, Yemeni forces loyal to the Saudi-UAE alliance launched a new offensive aimed at forcing the Houthis out of Hodeidah port, which is the major conduit for humanitarian aid in Yemen. UN officials warn that a prolonged battle for the port and its surroundings [could lead](#) to the death of 250,000 people, mainly from mass starvation. **[After the Trump administration’s endorsement this month, the Saudi-UAE alliance has even less incentive to prevent civilian casualties and new humanitarian disasters. Saudi Arabia and its allies are more likely to accept a peace process if it is clear that the United States won’t support an open-ended war in Yemen and won’t provide the military assistance required to keep the war apparatus going. But Trump has shown little sign of pressuring his Saudi and Emirati allies, least of all over Yemen.](#)** The only realistic check left is in Congress, where more voices are asking why the world’s most powerful country is helping to perpetuate the world’s worst humanitarian crisis

A2 Human rights

1. Delink - Saudi Arabia is losing interest in democracy. Henderson of the Atlantic reports in 2018 that Saudi Arabia has hit the brakes on reform and is violating human rights yet again and is back to arresting activists.
2. Turn - Failing to backpedal arms sales in the face of extreme human rights abuses decreases the leverage the US has. Rogin of the Washington Post in 2018 explains that as a result of the US turning a blind eye to Khashoggi’s murder and continuing to sell arms to the country makes the US look weak as world leaders now know they can act with impunity so long as they are buying American weapons, the completely wrong message to send.

Henderson, Simon. “Saudi Arabia Hits the Brakes on Reforms.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 22 May 2018, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/saudi-arabia-hits-the-brakes-on-reforms/560870/.

[“MbS, it seems, isn’t really interested in change. Arresting the activists is the way that Saudi Arabia would and did behave in the past: In 1990, several dozen women were arrested for driving through Riyadh.](#) But today’s Saudi Arabia is meant to be different, and MbS is supposed to be a different kind of royal. The world’s hopes are on him to create a modern Saudi Arabia, able to detach itself from its conservative theocratic underpinnings. After these latest arrests, his ability to satisfy those hopes is in doubt.”

Josh Rogin, 10-16-2018, "Opinion," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2018/10/16/trump-has-it-totally-and-comp-letely-backwards-on-saudi-arms-sales/>

“The White House seems to be saying that Trump Doctrine is that the U.S. will ignore your human rights abuses, assassinations or war crimes as long as you buy things from us. He’s got it totally and completely backwards,” Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) told me. “What’s the point of being a military superpower if we lose leverage when we do business with another country?”

“What the president doesn’t realize is that this makes him look weak and small. World leaders will now know they can act with impunity so long as they are buying American weapons. That’s an insane message to send,” Murphy said. “The United States should never be boxed in because of who we sell weapons to — countries who buy U.S. weapons should feel enormous pressure to stay on our good side.”

A2 Job creation

1. Mitigate. In the long term, Saudi Arabia plans to create most of these jobs themselves. Reuters in 2017 writes that Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund has announced that Saudi Arabia Military Industries plans to provide over 40,000 jobs by 2030, thus meaning any job creation by US arms sales would happen anyway in the long term.

Reuters Editorial, 5-17-2017, "UPDATE 2-Saudi Arabia launches military industries company," U.S.,

<https://www.reuters.com/article/saudi-security-arms/update-2-saudi-arabia-launches-military-industries-company-idUSL8N1IJ5ZG>

RIYADH, May 18 (Reuters) - Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) on Wednesday announced the launch of a state-owned military industrial company aimed at contributing more than 14 billion riyals (\$3.7 billion) to the Kingdom’s gross domestic product by 2030.

The new Saudi Arabian Military Industries will seek to provide over 40,000 jobs by 2030, the PIF - the kingdom’s top sovereign wealth fund - said in a statement.

The move could alter decades of practice in which Saudi Arabia - one of the world’s largest buyers of foreign arms - and other Gulf Arab states recycled a major part of their oil wealth back into Western economies via arms purchases and investments.

A2 US Impacts

A2 Trade deficit

1. Delink - High trade deficits aren’t a problem. Murphy of the US Chamber of Commerce in 2018 gives the reason why. The US trade deficit expands when the US economy grows faster than those of our trading partners, but do not lead to economic collapse.

Murphy, John G. "Trade Deficit Truths." U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 6 Feb. 2018, www.uschamber.com/series/above-the-fold/trade-deficit-truths.

Historically, the U.S. trade deficit has expanded when the U.S. economy has grown faster than those of our major trading partners, as in the expansions of the 1980s and 1990s. By contrast, the U.S. current account has moved in the direction of a surplus in recessions, as happened in the Great Depression and the 2007-2009 recession. **The U.S. trade deficit reflects broad macroeconomic factors, not foreign trade barriers.**

A2 US hegemony

1. Turn - US arms sales reduce American credibility. Guay of The Conversation writes in 2018 that the US selling arms to Saudi Arabia reveals that the US's motivations are purely economic, which sells American values short and weakens U.S. global credibility.

Terrence Guay, 10-19-2018, "Arms sales to Saudi Arabia give Trump all the leverage he needs in Khashoggi affair," Conversation,

<https://theconversation.com/arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-give-trump-all-the-leverage-he-needs-in-khashoggi-affair-104998>

But despite these moments, the U.S. managed also to maintain its authority by advocating respect for human rights as a global norm during the Cold War, and within many repressive regimes ever since.

With Khashoggi, Trump is choosing to give up that mantle completely by showing his priority is purely economic, regardless of the impact on the United States' global reputation. Such a bald-faced strategy, in my view, sells American values short and weakens U.S. global credibility.

A2 \$450 billion in investment

1. Delink - Imports haven't changed. Greenberg of Politifact clarifies in 2018 that while total US exports to Saudi Arabia totaled 25.4 billion, which in context of the United State's 1.32 trillion dollars worth of exports is minimal, there are no plans in place for Saudi Arabia to increase its imports from the US.
2. Delink - Actual investment levels haven't changed either. The Saudi's promised the deal would kick in when they signed, late 2017. But Andrew Sorkin from the New York Times in 2018 actually finds no fundraising or investment has actually happened to date.

Kate Kelly and Andrew Ross Sorkin, 4-4-2018, "Massive United States-Saudi Infrastructure Fund Struggles to Get Going," No Publication,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/business/blackstone-infrastructure-fund-saudi.html>

Last May, the private equity firm Blackstone announced that it was creating a \$40 billion fund that would invest in infrastructure projects in the United States. The fund's largest backer was the government of Saudi Arabia, which agreed to kick in half the cash. **Ten months later, the highly anticipated fund has yet to complete an initial round of fund-raising, much less start investing in infrastructure.** Although the Saudis promised to contribute up to \$20 billion, Blackstone is required to raise a dollar from other investors for every dollar the kingdom's Public Investment Fund puts in. So far, only two other investors have publicly committed to the fund, with their contributions totaling \$575 million, according to data provider Preqin, which tracks such investments.

25.4 billion/1.32 trillion = 1.9% of our total exports

Jon Greenberg, 10-20-2018, "Donald Trump touts nonexistent \$450 billion in Saudi orders," @politifact, <https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2018/oct/23/donald-trump/donald-trump-touts-nonexistent-450-billion-saudi-o/>

Trump said that Saudi Arabia has ordered \$450 billion from U.S. companies, including \$110 billion in military contracts, representing over a million jobs.

Orders on that scale don't exist. There is no data behind the \$450 billion, and the \$110 billion is a blend of smaller deals in progress, old offers that have not come through, and speculative discussions that have yet to move forward.

Trump's claims about jobs ignores the long runway between signed agreements and actual delivery and payment. He treats spending that could play out over a decade as if it were spent in one year. More importantly, if the \$450 billion in orders is a mirage, the 1 million jobs is equally without substance.

A2 Infrastructure

1. Delink - Schaper of NPR in 2017 reports that US infrastructure has a near failing grade despite billions being poured into it. Our opponents have failed to prove that Saudi money will help the economy at the point where the reverse has been happening for years.

Schaper, David. "Civil Engineers Give U.S. Infrastructure A Near Failing Grade." NPR, NPR, 10 Mar. 2017, www.npr.org/2017/03/10/519593247/civil-engineers-give-u-s-infrastructure-a-near-failing-grade

As Washington debates if and how to pay for repairs to America's aging infrastructure, **a group of civil engineers has put out a report card on the nation's roads, bridges, tunnels, dams and airports. And it's not so good. They give an almost failing grade of D-plus.** NPR's David Schaper joins us now from our studios in Chicago. Hi, David. DAVID SCHAPER, BYLINE: Good morning. MARTIN: D-plus, I mean, not a D - at least it's a D-plus, we should say, not just a D. But how did we get to a D-plus? SCHAPER: Well, the American Society of Civil Engineers puts out this report card every four years. And here's how they break it down. Highways get a D. They're overcrowded, frequently in poor condition and becoming more dangerous. Bad roads cause more wear and tear on our vehicles. These aging roads are full of more cars than they were designed to handle. And that creates more congestion. So on average, engineers say Americans are wasting 43 hours a year sitting in traffic. That's a full workweek, or to put in a more discouraging way, a full week of vacation.

A2 Tech investment

1. Delink - No reason for companies to move away from US investments. If US investments are so profitable for these Saudi Arabian companies that they've chosen to invest in US tech over anything else, then there is no reason why they'd stop investing if the US stopped selling arms.
2. Delink - Companies are moving away from relying on Saudi investment. Fiegerman of CNN Business in 2018 writes that a growing number of business leaders are distancing themselves from Saudi tech investment following the lengthening list of Saudi human rights abuses.
3. Delink - Companies only take Saudi money specifically out of convenience. Manjoo of the New York Times writes in 2017 that the tech companies Saudi investors target are the most highly valued companies of our era, without immediate need for more money, sometimes even without a plan to spend the money.
4. Delink - Other investors are willing to step in. Hurlburt of NYMag in 2017 explains that "for every dollar the Saudis want to pull out [of Silicon Valley], there's still an American, Chinese or other global investor's dollar eager to get in." Silicon Valley is not at a lack for funds.

Farhad Manjoo, 11-6-2017, "Saudi Money Fuels the Tech Industry. It's Time to Ask Why.," No Publication,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/technology/unsavory-sources-money-fueling-tech.html>

But the tech companies that the Saudis are itching to invest in often do have a choice; they are some of the most highly valued companies of our era, and many of them have no immediate need for more money. For instance: Slack, which raised \$250 million from SoftBank last month, said it had no plans for spending the money and instead had raised it to preserve long-term

“operational flexibility.” But why take it from the Saudis? I suspect it’s the most obvious reason: because the money is there, and no one is making too big a fuss about it.

Seth Fiegerman and Sara O'Brien, Cnn Business, 10-12-2018, "Silicon Valley wrestles with Saudi Arabia ties," CNN,

<https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/12/tech/silicon-valley-saudi-arabia/index.html>

Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi and Virgin Galactic founder Richard Branson joined a growing list of business leaders distancing themselves from the Saudi government amid growing questions about the kingdom's role in the disappearance of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Both Uber and Virgin Galactic had previously turned to Saudi Arabia for vast investments that would once have been impossible on the private market. Uber received a staggering \$3.5 billion in funding from Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund in 2016 and added the Public Investment Fund's managing director to its board, where he still serves today. The next year, Branson and Saudi officials announced the fund intended to invest \$1 billion in Virgin's space companies. At the time of the investments, both companies framed Saudi Arabia as becoming more reform-minded, both in terms of the economy and, in Branson's words, a "more progressive stance on areas such as women's rights."

Heather Hurlburt, 3-14-2017, "The U.S. Has Deep Ties to Saudi Arabia — But Disentangling Ourselves Is Possible," Intelligencer,

<http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/10/us-disentangle-saudi-ties-khashoggi.html>

In recent years, the Saudis’ heavy investment in Silicon Valley has led some observers to warn that the same government that apparently killed one of its own citizens on foreign soil could decide to turn the screws on the U.S. high-tech industry. But in fact, for every dollar the Saudis want to pull out, there’s still an American, Chinese or other global investor’s dollar eager to get in.

U.S.-Saudi economic ties are important — and convenient for whichever party is in power, as both Republican and Democratic presidents have found over the years. But the ties that hold Washington and Riyadh the closest are political.

A2 Petrodollar

1. Delink. **Bulloch of Forbes** - foreign central banks are always going to hold on the US dollars because its stable and easy to exchange, not because of oil
2. Timeframe weighing: **Oil Price** in 2018 finds that we won’t be switching to the petroyuan anytime soon. Two reasons
 1. Traders can’t move the currency out of Shanghai exchange hubs yet
 2. Switching to the yuan requires other countries to gain confidence in the stability of Shanghai’s international energy exchange, which is not so hot rn

3. **Steinbock 18** - USD and Euro still dominate more than 85% of international payments, whereas the Chinese yuan is only used 1% of the time
 1. The oil industry is one part of global trade, its not going change the dynamic of the entire economy

<https://seekingalpha.com/article/4161976-petroyuan-shifts-mean-end-petrodollar-monopoly>

In late March, as international media focused on Trump's tariffs and the prospects of a trade war, renminbi-denominated oil contracts began trading in the Shanghai International Energy Exchange (INE), for the first time. That will foster the rise of petroyuan, which may cause a dramatic shift in global asset allocations as institutional investors begin to diversify into China's onshore bond markets.

Today, the status quo is still very different. The US dollar (USD) and the euro (EUR) still dominate more than 85 percent of international payments, followed by the English pound, Japanese yen, the Swiss franc, Canadian dollar and Chinese yuan (1%) (Figure 1).

Douglas Bulloch, Forbes, "Why the Petro-Dollar Is a Myth, And the Petro-Yuan Mere Fantasy", April 26, 2018, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/douglasbulloch/2018/04/26/the-petro-dollar-is-a-myth-the-petro-yuan-mere-fantasy/#688d72676a14>

Bringing this up to date, it was a long time ago when the link between oil and the dollar mattered much at all beyond the financial returns of non-dollar based oil companies. Since the 1980s, the dollar has been consolidated as the global reserve currency because of the strength and dynamism of the U.S. economy, and oil exporters have demanded to be paid in U.S. dollars because that's the currency they prefer to hold on to.

ZeroHedge, OilPrices, "UBS: Petroyuan Will Undermine US Market Dominance", April 30, 2018, <https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/UBS-Petroyuan-Will-Undermine-US-Market-Dominance.html>

Will this new system change the way oil is traded globally? Probably not in the short term. Traders can't move RMB freely in and out of the Shanghai commodity exchanges yet. That said, it's unclear how much of a roadblock this is given that INE will be based in the Shanghai FTZ. Related: U.S. Oil Exports Are Only Heading Higher Also, even with exchange convertibility, international investors and resource trading companies need to build up enough confidence in the INE as a trading hub. That requires time and, crucially, the tried, tested, and extensive data infrastructure to support the market, which China doesn't have right now.

A2 Oil Prices

1. Delink - Saudi Arabia doesn't control oil prices. Hurlburt of NYMag explains in 2017 that "it has been decades since" the members of OPEC, which include Saudi Arabia, "have been able to agree on measures stringent enough to inflict pain on developed nations like the U.S. In fact, in recent years the Saudis have usually chosen to live with lower oil prices for political reasons."

2. Delink - Saudi Arabia can't raise oil prices without hurting itself more. Wald of the New York Times in 2018 writes that for instance, if Saudi Arabia's national oil company, Saudi Aramco, halted exports to the US, it would primarily hurt Aramco because Aramco owns Motiva, the largest refinery in the US, which is in turn, reliant on Saudi oil. If Aramco tried to raise prices, it would face angry customers in Asia and hurt its own refineries in China and Korea. Wald concludes that "Saudi Arabia is not in a position to threaten the United States economy."
3. Delink - US is headed toward energy independence anyway. Blas of WorldOil reports in 2018 that America is now a net oil exporter, breaking 75 years of continued dependence on foreign oil, marking a pivotal moment toward U.S. energy independence. Safehaven explains in 2017 that America achieved this through breakthroughs in fracking technology.
4. Turn - Higher oil prices result in greater investment and adoption of green technology. 1. Hayes of Investopedia finds in 2015 when low oil prices discourage investment into renewables as makes them less competitive on the market. Markham of UCSA finds in 2012 that generating 80% of US electricity from renewables would reduced emissions by 81%. Valentine of ThinkProgress furthers in 2018 that cutting emissions aggressively could save up to 3 million lives each year by 2100 by reducing pollution.
5. Turn - Dependence on Saudi oil collapses the US's oil supply. Lahn of the Chatham House in 2011 explains that right now, Saudi Arabia's oil and gas demand is growing at 7% per year, which will in a decade, jeopardize the country's ability to export to global markets, which would leave the US in a position of having no oil, unless it can procure its own as soon as possible.

A2 Spikes

[Schmidt 7](#) writes that recent price shocks no longer cause so much harm. Between 2002 and 2007, nominal oil prices have increased by over 100 percent, but world economic activity still grew vigorously and inflation didn't increase.

A2 Flooding

Third, If they were to flood the market, American producers are better able to handle low oil prices than the Saudis. [Cunningham 16](#) finds this is because the U.S. holds more oil reserves than anyone else in the world, including Saudi Arabia.

A2 Shortages

[Stewart](#) continues that if the Saudis were to cut off the US it would actually become more economically viable for US producers to produce oil from higher prices. This happened historically, as [Kemp reports that rising prices helped spur the development of new supplies](#) in Alaska, the North Sea, the Soviet Union and China, which countered the harm.

Adam Hayes, 3-13-2015, "How Low Oil Prices Affect Alternative Fuels," Investopedia, <https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/031315/how-low-oil-prices-affect-alternative-fuels.asp>, 1-26-2019

The recent fall in crude oil prices has been a boon for consumers needing to fill up their cars with gasoline at the pump. The average price of regular gasoline in the United States has fallen from over \$3.50 per gallon to just under \$2.50 a gallon in the past year, an almost 30% drop in price. **But low oil prices could also have some**

unintended consequences. In particular, cheaper oil may make renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power less attractive. When a barrel of crude oil was trading at well over \$100, it made economic sense to explore renewable energy options as viable

alternatives for expensive and dirty fossil fuels. Right now, the United States gets more than two-thirds of its electricity from fossil fuel

sources such as natural gas (28%), coal (20%), and oil (16%). Another 8% of the electricity is generated from nuclear electric power. Only around 10% of America's energy consumption comes from renewable sources including hydroelectric (2.5%), geothermal (0.2%), solar (0.3%), wind (1.6%) or biomass (4.6%). The U.S. Department of Energy publishes estimates of what it costs to produce a kilowatt-hour of electricity by source. Here is a quick breakdown of production costs for 2012 indicates U.S. federal government subsidies are awarded to producers of this type of electricity. Source: US Dept. of Energy PV solar power generation is nearly 14% more expensive than fossil fuels and offshore wind power is nearly 80% more expensive. **As fossil**

fuels prices decline, renewable sources look less attractive from an economic standpoint. While

this may put a damper on the development of alternative fuel sources temporarily, incentives such as government subsidies, pressure from the public and global impacts from climate change still make research and development efforts to cheapen [renewables](#) worthwhile. If oil and fossil fuel prices remain low, technological progress in making more efficient solar panels and wind turbines will be one way to compete effectively in the energy market. In the past few years, photovoltaic cells which power solar panels have become both cheaper and more efficient at turning sunlight into electricity. New materials called [perovskites](#) have been employed to increase efficiency in laboratory tests from 3.8% efficiency in 2009 [to over 20%](#) by 2014. If these materials can be used in conjunction with relatively inexpensive silicon, PV solar generation could increase to produce 50% more energy. If technological progress in energy efficiencies can increase to that extent, these renewable energy sources will be able to compete head on with traditional fossil fuels, even at today's low prices. Likewise, the cost of wind energy generation has [fallen](#) by over 20% per kilowatt-hour over the past decade. One problem that remains even with low-cost renewable energy sources is that solar power generation can only occur when the sun is out, and not on cloudy days or night times. Likewise, wind power only works when the winds are blowing at a sufficient strength. [New research](#) is being undertaken to solve this problem through improvements in battery and energy storage technologies. Renewable energy from green sources such as solar and wind have been more expensive options compared to traditional but polluting fossil fuels such as natural gas and coal. When oil and energy prices were high, it made sense to invest in renewable energy sources, but with the recent fall in crude oil prices, these more expensive alternatives began looking less attractive from an economic point of view. New advances in solar and wind technologies, however, promise to bring down the cost per kilowatt-hour of electricity from green sources down to levels that can compete with, or even out-compete that of fossil fuels.

Katie Valentine, xx-xx-xxxx, "Cutting Carbon Emissions Could Save 3 Million Lives Per Year By 2100, Study Finds," No Publication,

<https://thinkprogress.org/cutting-carbon-emissions-could-save-3-million-lives-per-year-by-2100-study-finds-408ee83e9ad5/>

Reducing greenhouse gas emissions won't just help alleviate climate change — it could also help save millions of lives each year, according to a new study. The study, published Sunday in [Nature Climate Change](#), found **up to 3 million premature deaths**

could be avoided each year globally by 2100 if aggressive emissions cuts are made. By reducing carbon emissions, the study states, the world will also reduce "co-pollutants" such as ozone and particulates. Long-term exposure to these pollutants has been linked to premature death. "It is pretty striking that you can make an argument purely on health grounds to control climate change," [said](#) Jason West, one of the study's lead authors.

Adam Markham, xx-xx-xxxx, "Benefits of Renewable Energy Use," Union of Concerned Scientists,

<https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/renewable-energy/public-benefits-of-renewable-power#.W76ueGRKg00>

For example, a 2009 UCS analysis found that a 25 percent by 2025 national renewable electricity standard would lower power plant CO2 emissions 277 million metric tons annually by 2025—the equivalent of the annual output from 70 typical (600 MW) new coal plants [\[4\]](#). In addition, **a ground-breaking study by the US Department of Energy's National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) explored the feasibility of generating 80 percent of the country's electricity from renewable sources by 2050. They found that renewable energy could help reduce the electricity sector's emissions by approximately 81 percent**[\[5\]](#). Improved public health The air and water pollution

emitted by coal and natural gas plants is linked with breathing problems, neurological damage, heart attacks, cancer, premature death, and a host of other serious problems. The pollution affects everyone: one Harvard University study estimated the life cycle costs and public health effects of coal to be an

Lahn, Chatham House, 2011

https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and%20Development/1211pr_lahn_stevens.pdf

The world's largest exporter of oil is consuming so much energy at home that its ability to play a stabilizing role in world oil markets is at stake. Saudi Arabia's demand for its own oil and gas is growing at around 7% per year. At this rate of growth, national consumption will have doubled in a decade. On a 'business as usual' projection, this would jeopardize the country's ability to export to global markets. Given its dependence on oil export revenues, the inability to expand exports would have a dramatic effect on the economy and the government's ability to spend on domestic welfare and services. Following the political unrest in the Middle East since the start of 2011, the impulse of the Saudi authorities has been to give out more social benefits – including cheap energy. Yet the negligible cost of fuel to consumers is encouraging wasteful consumption and deterring investment in efficiency and alternative energy supplies. In a country powered entirely by domestically produced oil and gas, this is using up precious natural resources as well as having long-term environmental impacts.

Travis Hoiium, 12-8-2016, "Why Rising Oil Prices Are Good for EVs and Renewable Energy," Motley Fool,

<https://www.fool.com/investing/2016/12/08/why-rising-oil-prices-are-good-for-evs-and-renewab.aspx>

If you're a fan of wind power, solar power, electric vehicles, or any other form of alternative energy or transportation, you should be cheering OPEC's recently announced agreement to cut 1.8 million barrels per day in production from both OPEC and non-OPEC countries' supply. Most of the reaction on the stock market related to oil stocks surging, but this is really great news for alternative energy as well.

The reason comes down to the other half of the energy equation we often don't talk about. The simple fact of the matter is that many in the industry are beginning to talk regularly about how quickly the cost of solar energy is falling or how cheap batteries for electric vehicles (EVs) are becoming. But the other side is the fossil fuel energy they're competing against. Higher oil prices make EVs more attractive on a cost basis and will make corporations, consumers, and governments think twice about where they're spending energy dollars in the future. Rising oil prices is the push alternatives need.

If oil prices do rise, I would expect that to have a major impact on the adoption rate of electric vehicles. Tesla is clearly leading the charge there led by the Model S and upcoming Model 3, but General Motors' (NYSE:GM) Chevy Bolt hitting the market later this year will be worth

watching if gasoline heads toward \$4 per gallon again. EVs can justify themselves on economics alone if gas prices rise. It costs about \$12 to fill a Model S with over 300 miles of range, compared to \$40 or more if gas is \$4 per gallon. So, rising gas prices will make EVs more competitive just as low cost EVs hit the market.

Solar and wind energy will also be winners, particularly on the utility side. When wind and solar projects are built, they come with long-term power purchase agreements, setting the price of electricity for a utility. Rising oil prices will be another hard reminder that commodity risk falls on consumers, and with the cost of renewable energy now competitive with fossil fuel across the country, it'll be a risk regulators won't want to ask customers to take.

Safehaven, 11-27-2017, "This New Technology Could Transform the Oil Industry," No Publication,

<https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/this-new-technology-could-transform-the-oil-industry-660251503.html>

OPEC cuts have done little to boost oil prices, and Royal Family arrests are welcome news for oil tycoons the world over, but it's still not what's kept the U.S. on the winning side in this war: Fracking bust the U.S. through the front line, and major advancements in enhanced oil recovery (EOR) are cementing the victory.

This is a sophisticated technology story, and one little-known company might just tell it best because it's sitting on the first-ever technology which has the ability to produce oil from massively untapped U.S. oil sands plays, with price targets for production at around \$22 a barrel.

Javier Blas On 12, 12-6-2018, "U.S. becomes net oil exporter for first time in 75 years," No Publication,

<https://www.worldoil.com/news/2018/12/6/us-becomes-net-oil-exporter-for-first-time-in-75-years>

VIENNA (Bloomberg) -- America turned into a net oil exporter last week, breaking 75 years of continued dependence on foreign oil and marking a pivotal -- even if likely brief -- moment toward what U.S. President Donald Trump has branded as "energy independence."

The shift to net exports is the dramatic result of an unprecedented boom in American oil production, with thousands of wells pumping from the Permian region of Texas and New Mexico to the Bakken in North Dakota to the Marcellus in Pennsylvania.

While the country has been heading in that direction for years, this week's dramatic shift came as data showed a sharp drop in imports and a jump in exports to a record high. Given the volatility in weekly data, the U.S. will likely remain a small net importer most of the time.

Ellen R. Wald, 10-18-2018, "Opinion," No Publication,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/18/opinion/saudi-arabia-economy-united-states.html>

Saudi Arabia cannot embargo or unilaterally raise oil prices for the United States without doing greater harm to its own industry and revenues. If Riyadh directed the national oil company, Saudi Aramco, to halt exports to the United States today, it would primarily hurt Aramco itself. Aramco owns Motiva, the largest refinery in the United States, and Motiva is more reliant on Saudi oil than any other part of America's energy ecosystem. If Aramco tried to raise prices by cutting oil production or exports, it would face irate customers in Asia and hurt its own refineries in China and Korea, too.

A popular American stereotype is that the U.S. is dependent on Saudi oil. We're not. Saudi Arabia accounts for 13 percent of global crude oil production, while the U.S. produces 12 percent. While we're debunking outdated ideas, many Americans — including President Trump — still believe that the Saudi-led Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) controls world production and prices. While its members control about 40 percent of oil production, and 80 percent of proven petroleum deposits, it has been decades since its members have been able to agree on measures stringent enough to inflict pain on developed nations like the U.S. In fact, in recent years the Saudis have usually chosen to live with lower oil prices for political reasons.

A2 Layoffs

1. Mitigate - Most jobs in the US don't depend on Saudi arms sales. Fernandez of Vox explains in 2018 that even if you count all jobs that depend indirectly on the sales of arms totals to less than .5% of the total US labor force and its highly unlikely that any of them, if any, depend directly on weapons sales to Saudi Arabia. Vox concludes that "the relationship between arms sales and jobs is exaggerated."
2. Delink - Even US companies don't think layoffs will materialize if arms sales fall through. Stone of Reuters in 2018 explains that industry executives say that "robust U.S. defense budgets, which account for the majority of their sales, coupled with a record backlog of orders suggest little risk that workers would face layoffs if the Saudi sales package failed to materialize."

Alexia FernáNdez, 11-20-2018, "Trump says selling weapons to Saudi Arabia will create a lot of jobs. That's not true.," Vox,

<https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/17/17967510/trump-saudi-arabia-arms-sales-khashoggi>

Overall, the private US defense industry does directly employ a lot of US workers — about 355,500 in 2016, according to the most the recent estimates from the Aerospace Industries Association. But private-sector defense workers make up less than 0.5 percent of the total US

labor force, and that includes every person whose job depends directly on the sale or production of airplanes, tanks, bombs, and services for the entire US military. It's unlikely that many of them, if any, depend directly on weapons sales to Saudi Arabia, and it's also unlikely that those jobs would vanish if Saudi money disappeared.

Mike Stone, Reuters Oct. 30, 2018, 5, 10-30-2018, "Defense firms say Trump's Saudi arms deal will create 500 American jobs, while Trump claimed as many as 500,000," Business Insider, <https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-saudi-arms-deal-job-creation-2018-10>

Industry executives have argued that without the Saudi package coming through they would have fewer orders to fill, but robust U.S. defense budgets, which account for the majority of their sales, coupled with a record backlog of orders suggest little risk that workers would face layoffs if the Saudi sales package failed to materialize.

A2 Job creation

1. Mitigate - Saudi Arabia not planning to follow through on full plan. CNN in 2018 reports that while Trump has promised a 110 billion dollar arms deal, Saudi Arabia one year later has only signed a letter of offer and acceptance totaling to 14.5 billion dollars in purchases. Thus, any job creation predictions can be severely mitigated by the fact that most of the sales haven't been followed through with.
2. Mitigate - Trump's job predictions are overblown. Stone of Reuters in 2018 explains that defense firms say that Trump's Saudi Arabia arms deal will only create about 500 American jobs, severely undercutting Trump's predictions of job counts totaling 500,000.
 - a. Mitigate - Even Lockheed Martin, Saudi Arabia's largest arms provider, would barely be affected. Macias of CNBC in 2018 quantifies that Lockheed Martin predicts that sales to Saudi Arabia will total less than 1.5% of its sales in 2019, which is marginal.
3. Turn - Capaccio of Bloomberg finds in 2018 that US offers discounted arm sales to Saudi Arabia whenever it threatens not to buy with the most recent being \$3.5 billion. This has two implications.
 - a. First, any of their revenue projections can be mitigated as the U.S. won't sell arms for their full prices.
 - b. Second, arm sales actually hurt consumers as Capaccio furthers that these discounts forces taxpayers to bear greater costs of weapons development.

Anthony Capaccio, 3-21-2018, "Saudi Arms Buyers Won a \$3.5 Billion Discount From the Pentagon," Bloomberg, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-21/saudis-commended-by-trump-as-arms-buyers-won-a-big-u-s-discount>, 1-27-2019

President Donald Trump says the Saudis are a "big purchaser" of American arms. A \$3.5 billion discount they won from the Pentagon last year in buying an anti-missile system for \$15 billion shows they're also adept at tapping into the Pentagon's generosity. Welcoming Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman to the White House on Tuesday, Trump said the kingdom has

completed \$12.5 billion in purchases of planes, missiles and frigates from U.S. companies since his visit to Saudi Arabia last year. **He didn't mention the**

discount granted last April on the Thaad system from Lockheed Martin Corp. The price break, which hasn't previously been reported, was approved after the Saudis claimed the sale could be lost without it. It came in the form of two waivers from a U.S. law requiring foreign purchasers of American weapons to pay part of the Defense Department's costs in developing them. The sale, announced in October, was only the second time the U.S. has allowed the Army's Thaad anti-missile system to be sold for export, after a sale to the United Arab Emirates. The Thaad batteries deployed in South Korea are owned by the U.S. A month after the sale was announced, Russia disclosed that it was selling Saudi Arabia its S-400 air defense system, which it asserts is equal in capabilities to Thaad. The Saudi waivers were the largest yet approved for any nation, based on a Government Accountability Office review published in January of the discounts from 2012 through 2017. **Over those years, the Pentagon approved \$9.2 billion in waivers to allies, mostly from the Middle East,** On the rationale of preventing lost sales. That includes about \$4.5 billion last year, including the Saudi waivers, the first year of the Trump administration, up from about \$500 million in 2016. **The GAO highlighted the \$3.5 billion in waivers without naming Saudi Arabia. A U.S. official familiar with the data, who spoke on condition of anonymity, confirmed the Saudis were the beneficiaries.** Not all of the waivers approved necessarily ended up at the initial amounts cited in the review, according to the GAO. **While the discounted arms sale reflects Trump's priority on building alliances with Saudi Arabia -- and in countering the regional influence of its arch rival Iran -- it raises questions about the policy of giving wealthy nations a break from contributions toward weapons development costs that otherwise would go to the U.S. Treasury.** Taxpayers' Burden **"American taxpayers are footing the bill for billions of dollars for researching and developing the weapons we sell to foreign governments."**

Representative Jackie Speier of California, a Democrat who serves on the House Armed Services Committee, said in a statement. "The Gulf Arab nations are among the richest in the world" so "they can certainly afford it," said Speier, who joined a colleague in requesting the GAO report. Yet the Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation Agency, or DSCA, "repeatedly and without examination bought the absurd claim that paying those reimbursements would cause Gulf nations to call off" deals, said Speier, who added that she's exploring options to tighten oversight of the DSCA. "Carefully Evaluate" Senator Robert Menendez, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in a statement to Bloomberg News that he'll pursue an explanation for the Saudi waivers. "We need to carefully evaluate all our military assistance and arms sales to Saudi Arabia, as we do with any country," the New Jersey senator said. "I plan to ask the Administration why it granted Saudi Arabia a waiver exempting it from reimbursing the United States" for "an expensive missile system, and how this contributes to our national security. I would seriously question this waiver for such a wealthy country," even though "Saudi Arabia remains an important security ally." A law requires foreign buyers of American military systems to reimburse a share of the one-time or "nonrecurring" research and development costs borne by taxpayers. In addition to the risk of lost sales, a waiver can be granted if a potential customer makes a case that the sale will improve "commonality" with the U.S. military through the use of standard weapons. These types of waivers are available for sales to NATO allies, Australia, South Korea and Jordan, the GAO found.

Amanda Macias, 11-26-2018, "Limits on arms sales to Saudi Arabia would likely have little impact on US defense firms' revenue," CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/26/saudi-arms-sale-limits-would-have-slight-impact-on-us-defense-firms.html>

Regarded as America's crown jewel in missile defense systems, THAAD is manufactured by Lockheed Martin but uses a radar supplied by Raytheon.

In addition to THAAD, the kingdom looks to buy Pac-3 missiles, Black Hawk helicopters, munitions, C-130 aircraft and littoral combat ships.

In short, according to the note, Lockheed Martin's at-risk defense sales to Saudi will likely be less than 1.5 percent of its total in 2019.

Mike Stone, Reuters Oct. 30, 2018, 5, 10-30-2018, "Defense firms say Trump's Saudi arms deal will create 500 American jobs, while Trump claimed as many as 500,000," Business Insider, <https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-saudi-arms-deal-job-creation-2018-10>

The order will yield nearly 10,000 jobs in the Saudi ports for maintenance workers, but only 500 new U.S. jobs will be created, according to documents seen by Reuters.

Executives at the several of top U.S. defense companies say Riyadh had wanted much of the military equipment as a way to both develop new domestic industry and to create new jobs and local expertise as a part of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's Vision 2030 initiative to wean the country off oil dependency.

Jeremy Diamond and Barbara Starr, Cnn, 10-13-2018, "Trump's \$110 billion Saudi arms deal has only earned \$14.5 billion so far," CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/12/politics/trump-khashoggi-saudi-arabia-arms-deal-sanctions/index.html>

President Donald Trump says he doesn't want a \$110 billion arms deal he brokered with Saudi Arabia to unravel over allegations the Gulf kingdom murdered a journalist at its consulate in Turkey.

But his comments are missing the mark on a key fact: Saudi Arabia has so far only followed through on \$14.5 billion in purchases.

The deal brokered last year between the US and Saudi Arabia was merely a memorandum of intent to fulfill nearly \$110 billion in arms sales over the next 10 years. As of yet, Saudi Arabia has only signed letters of offer and acceptance -- official purchase agreements that have either already been approved by Congress or in the process of being approved -- for \$14.5 billion in purchases, according to a Pentagon official.