**April Aff File**

# Framing

# Argument Answers

## Pakistan

### Weighing

1. **Strength of link:** Indo-Pak conflict is deeply and culturally rooted in many ways, as well as a result of burgeoning Hindu nationalism in domestic Indian politics. It’s highly unlikely this is the brink to prevent conflict.

### Topshelf turn

1.**Turn: Rousseau ’14 of American University** explains that in the wake of increased international Indian influence China responds by increasing its investments into Pakistan, specifically designed to weather its political and economic woes. This is critical as, **Bajoria ‘8 of the CFR** explains that the reduction of economic woes is seen as one of the best ways to reduce the issue of terrorism within Pakistan.

Richard Rousseau, Contributor,5-14-2014, How China and Pakistan Shift the Balance of Power in South Asia, Diplomatic Courier, https://www.diplomaticourier.com/2014/05/14/how-china-and-pakistan-shift-the-balance-of-power-in-south-asia/, //CJ

**As India becomes a more powerful player in the global hierarchy** and strengthens ties with the United States—despite occasional setbacks—**China construes that it is in its best interest to turn towards Pakistan** to fend off the Indo-U.S. alliance in South and East Asia. Former Pakistani Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani traveled to China in May 2011 to mark the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Described as “higher than mountains and deeper than oceans”, these bilateral relations are crucial to both Beijing and Islamabad. At a time when Central and South Asia, particularly Pakistan, are under intense scrutiny for their contribution to the fight against extremism and terrorism, the great powers have been keeping a close eye on evolving Pakistani-Chinese relations. After Bin Laden’s assassination, China was perhaps the only powerful country that openly expressed its support for Pakistan for having its territorial integrity violated. During his visit to Pakistan in December 2010, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (2003-2013) stated,“Pakistan has made huge sacrifices and an important contribution to the international fight against terrorism, that its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity must be respected, and that the international community should understand and support Pakistan’s efforts to maintain domestic stability and to realize economic and social development.” Wen added that **China** wishes to be an “all-weather strategic partner” and **is “ready to assist Pakistan and its population to weather their political and economic troubles.’”**

With Sumit,10-20-2008, The Capital Interview: ’Fighting Terrorism is Pakistan’s Own War’, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/interview/capital-interview-fighting-terrorism-pakistans-own-war, //CJ

In a rare move, we saw the military briefing the Pakistani parliament and some leaders of the opposition recently on the ongoing efforts to fight militancy in the tribal areas. Was there a consensus reached about what is going to be the country’s policy on fighting terrorism going forward? Pakistan is in the process of transformation from authoritarianism to democracy, and it was an important moment in Pakistan’s history that Pakistan’s parliament was taken into confidence about a military strategy, military operation, and plans. I think that the great majority of Pakistan’s elected leaders believe firmly that **fighting terrorism is Pakistan’s own war, and the war is being pursued with tremendous vigor**. "I think that the great majority of Pakistan’s elected leaders believe firmly that fighting terrorism is Pakistan’s own war." Pakistan will look at all possible avenues of bringing an end to terrorism. This includes engaging reconcilable elements in Pakistan’s border regions with Afghanistan. It **[which**]**includes offering social, economic development in what is one of the most remote and undeveloped areas of our region.** And, it involves military measures against those who do not accept the contemporary way of life, want to impose their views on others by force, and continue to engage in violence and terrorism.

### Terminal Nonunique

**1. Terminal Defense: Filkins ’19 of the New Yorker** that India and Pakistan exist in a period of endless escalation and de-escalation which has led to no change within the conflict since 1998. There are three reasons why a war would never break out

Dexter Filkins,2-28-2019, Why the War Between India and Pakistan for Kashmir Burns On, New Yorker, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-the-war-between-india-and-pakistan-for-kashmir-burns-on?fbclid=IwAR3NSugS-sWCw\_aMvnUXGQKWQSS0kp2rwQ8dD5aJjhwPLMQjnHbgHklTxJA, //CJ

The spark of the present crisis was an attack on February 14th by a suicide bomber on a convoy of Indian security forces. It killed at least forty. Responsibility was claimed by Jaish-e-Mohammed, a militant group that is formally banned in Pakistan but operates there nonetheless. Following the attack, the Indian government initiated a series of retaliatory measures aimed at punishing the group, including air strikes on Pakistani territory. On Wednesday, the Pakistani military said that it had shot down two Indian planes and captured one of the pilots. What happens next? We don’t know, of course. But **even as the catalysts for each crisis may be different, the basic parameters of the Indian-Pakistani conflict remain mostly unchanged.** The fight is over Kashmir, which, like the rest of India and Pakistan, split apart when its British colonizers departed, in 1947. Sovereignty over Kashmir was disputed; Pakistan occupies about a third of it, and India most of the rest. While Pakistan and India are split roughly along Muslim-Hindu lines, Indian Kashmir—known officially as Jammu and Kashmir—remains India’s only Muslim-majority state. Both India and Pakistan claim each other’s Kashmiri territories as their own. That has set the stage for every war and skirmish since 1947. A long-running insurgency in Indian Kashmir has been supported—often openly—by the Pakistani military**. Insurgent attacks have killed thousands, and have sucked the Indian Army, which has employed repressive measures to combat them, into a quagmire. The cycle is endless: insurgent bombs beget Indian reprisals, which beget Pakistani militancy, which sparks Indian retaliation.**

### AT: Peace Now

1. **Non-unique:** Tensions in the region are only rising. **Slater ’19 of the Council on Foreign Relations** writes that India and Pakistan have become increasingly aggressive against one another, and Pakistani terrorist groups have flourished, risking all-out war. In fact, **Marlow ’19 of Bloomberg** confirms that India and Pakistan are now performing tit-for-tat airstrikes, a level of aggression unseen since the two countries went to war in 1971.


Joanna Slater, 4-10-2019, "Conflict Between India and Pakistan," Global Conflict Tracker, https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-and-pakistan // JJ  
With continued violence in Kashmir and a heightened threat of terrorist activity by Pakistan-based militant groups, tensions and concerns over a serious military confrontation between nuclear-armed neighbors India and Pakistan remain high. In February 2019, an [attack on a convoy](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-47290107) of Indian paramilitary forces in Indian-controlled Kashmir killed at least forty soldiers. The attack, claimed by Pakistani militant group Jaish-e-Mohammad, was the [deadliest attack in Kashmir](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/world/asia/pulwama-attack-kashmir.html) in three decades. Since taking office in August 2018, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan has [signaled](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/kashmir-core-issue-must-be-resolved-through-talks-5-things-imran-khan-said-about-india/articleshow/65151367.cms) a willingness to hold talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to improve relations and resolve core issues, including Kashmir. In September 2018, Khan sent a letter to Modi [proposing](https://www.dawn.com/news/1434062) talks between the countries’ respective foreign ministers at the UN General Assembly; after initially agreeing to talks, India [canceled](https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-slams-india-for-cancelling-new-york-talks/4582773.html) the meeting. Background Territorial disputes over the Kashmir region sparked two of the three major Indo-Pakistani wars in 1947 and 1965, and a limited war in 1999. Although both countries have maintained a fragile cease-fire since 2003, they regularly exchange fire across the contested border, known as the [Line of Control](https://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2016/09/30/what-is-the-line-of-control-the-short-answer/). Both sides accuse the other of violating the cease-fire and claim to be shooting in response to attacks. An uptick in border skirmishes that began in late 2016 and continued into 2018 [killed](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/villagers-flee-india-pakistan-trade-heavy-border-fire-180225175630432.html) dozens and [displaced](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/18/world/asia/kashmir-shelling-family.html) thousands of civilians on both sides of the Line of Control. In 2014, after India’s then newly elected Prime Minister Modi [invited](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27554193) then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to attend his inauguration, there were hopes that Modi's government would pursue meaningful peace negotiations with Pakistan. However, after a brief period of optimism, relations turned sour once more when India [canceled](https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/19/world/asia/india-cancels-talks-after-pakistani-envoy-meets-with-separatists.html) talks with Pakistan’s foreign minister in August 2014 after the Pakistani high commissioner in India met with Kashmiri separatist leaders. A series of openings continued throughout 2015, including an unscheduled December [meeting](https://tribune.com.pk/story/1001510/fence-mending-ice-melts-as-nawaz-modi-shake-hands/) on the sidelines of the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris. This led to a [meeting](https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/indo-pak-nsas-meet-in-bangkok-discuss-terrorism-jk/) between national security advisors in Bangkok a few days later, where the Kashmir dispute was discussed. Later in December, Prime Minister Modi made a surprise [visit](https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/pm-modi-lands-in-lahore-on-a-surprise-visit-meets-pak-pm-nawaz-sharif/) to Lahore to meet with Prime Minister Sharif, the first visit of an Indian leader to Pakistan in more than a decade. Momentum toward meaningful talks came to an end in September 2016, when armed militants [attacked](https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/18/asia/india-kashmir-attack/) a remote Indian Army base in Uri, near the Line of Control, killing eighteen Indian soldiers in the deadliest attack on the Indian armed forces in decades. Indian officials [accused](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/19/world/asia/17-indian-soldiers-killed-by-militants-in-kashmir.html) Jaish-e-Mohammad, a group with alleged ties to the Inter-Services Intelligence—Pakistan’s main intelligence agency—of being behind the attack. Later in September 2016, the Indian military [announced](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/30/world/asia/kashmir-india-pakistan.html) it had carried out “surgical strikes” on terrorist camps inside Pakistani-controlled territory across the Line of Control, while the Pakistani military denied that any such operation had taken place. Militants launched attacks in October 2017, against an [Indian paramilitary camp](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-41479633) near Srinagar, and in February 2018, against an [Indian army base](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/11/world/asia/jammu-base-attack.html) in the Jammu region, which killed five soldiers and a civilian. These attacks came amidst a period of increased cross-border shelling along the Line of Control, with more than three thousand reported violations in 2017 and nearly one thousand in the first half of 2018. Violent demonstrations and anti-India [protests](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/world/asia/kashmir-india-pakistan-unrest.html) calling for an independent Kashmir also [continued](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/19/world/asia/kashmir-india-rebels.html); over three hundred people including civilians, Indian security forces, and militants were killed in attacks and clashes in 2017. After months of Indian military operations targeting both Kashmiri militants and demonstrations, India [announced](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/india-calls-ceasefire-kashmir-holy-month-ramadan-180516172240117.html) in May 2018 that it would observe a cease-fire in Kashmir during the month of Ramadan for the first time in nearly two decades; operations [resumed](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/southasia/2018/06/india-resumes-military-operations-kashmir-180617170344005.html) in June 2018. In May 2018, India and Pakistan agreed to a [cease-fire](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/world/asia/india-pakistan-kashmir-truce.html) along the disputed Kashmir border that would restore the terms of their [2003 agreement](https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/06/09/pakistan-and-indias-revival-of-ceasefire-agreement-2003-and-need-to-formalize-it/). The diversion of jihadi fighters and proxy groups from Afghanistan to Kashmir threatens to further increase violence along the border. If another Mumbai 2008-style attack, where Lashkar-e-Taiba fighters rampaged through the city for four days, killing 164 people, were carried out by Pakistan’s militant proxies, it could trigger a severe military confrontation between the two nuclear-armed states.

Iain Marlow, 2-27-2019, "Pakistan Prime Minister Calls for Talks With India After Jets Shot Down", Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-27/after-air-strike-neighbors-seek-ways-to-de-escalate-tension // JJ  
India said Pakistan had attempted to target military installations in response to New Delhi’s attack on Tuesday on a Jaish-e-Mohammed training camp. "The Pakistani aircraft was seen by ground forces falling from the sky on the Pakistan side," Foreign ministry spokesman Ravessh Kumar said at a briefing in New Delhi. Ghafoor, in turn, denied a Pakistani jet had been lost. "This is unprecedented territory -- we haven’t had tit-for-tat air strikes between India and Pakistan since the 1971 war," said Anit Mukherjee, a former Indian Army major and assistant professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, by phone. "We don’t know what will come from this. But it seems like Pakistan has given a response. And there have been casualties -- captures, deaths."

### AT: Plebiscite Now

1. **Delink:** A plebiscite is impossible. **Goel ’19 of The Quint** writes that India would prevent any referendum from occurring.

<https://www.thequint.com/explainers/kashmir-plebiscite-india-pakistan-explained>



### ~~~LINK LEVEL~~~

### AT: (Link) Emboldens India

1. **Non-unique:** The U.S. has already taken action to embolden India. **Chaudhary ’19 of the Hill** writes that the United States’ has functionally endorsed India in its actions against Pakistan. If support from one of the largest superpowers on the planet wasn’t enough to embolden India to go to war, Security Council membership won’t.

2. **Turn: Singh ’17** finds that new permanent members on the UNSC are subject to intense scrutiny and a long period of review, which means that India is more likely to behave. In fact, by placing India in the global spotlight and hinging their continued membership on good behavior, India would likely turn away from harsh aggression towards Pakistan and towards more peaceful and reasonable options.

[3. **Delink:** No matter how emboldened India becomes **Clary ’13 of the Stimson Center** notes that Indian military and governmental officials consider a militaristic response they are paralyzed from doing anything. This is because, **Narang of MIT** explains that India and Pakistan coexist in a place of asymmetrical escalation because the costs of any escalation from India will be responded with the full force of a nuclear barrage, and neither side is willing to be the first one initiate a conflict both sides have been effectively and sustainably deterred since 1986.

4. **Non-unique:** The US has never discouraged India from attacking and in fact, **Haniffa 19** of **US Affairs** explains that follow recent skirmishes, the US came out encouraging India to strike Pakistan. If the argument relies on the perception of/reality of international support, the response outweighs on probability because after being given the green light by the US, we still have not seen full out nuclear war & uniqueness controls the direction of the internal link at the point where we already see international support for India attacking, the odds that a marginal increase in that support cause nuclear war whereas they are not currently being checked by an international institution. The only risk that they slow down their nuclear escalation toward Pakistan is by checking their power through the UNSC (this is weighing with the Singh turn below)].

Shamila N. Chaudhary, 2-28-2019, "Better late than never: US comes to its senses on India-Pakistan conflict", TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/432031-better-late-than-never-us-comes-to-its-senses-on-india-pakistan // JJ  
“We [support](https://thehill.com/opinion/international/we%20support%20India%E2%80%99s%20right%20to%20self-defense) India’s right to self-defense,” U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton said after Pakistan-based militant organization Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked Indian paramilitary forces in Kashmir on Feb. 14. We should all remember this statement as the moment Bolton reset India-Pakistan relations as we’ve known them since 1947. Once a deliberate and cautious backchannel intermediary on security flare-ups between the nuclear-armed rivals, the United States has taken yet another step back from Pakistan and one closer to India. What happens when the United States gives up its traditional role for one that, according to some in Pakistan, exacerbates the conflict? The consequences of that approach play out as we speak. This week’s Indian retaliatory strike in Balakot, Pakistan represents just the third [instance](https://theprint.in/defence/balakot-is-the-first-time-one-nuclear-power-has-used-air-strikes-on-anothers-territory/198384/) in history that a nuclear power has hit another nuclear power with conventional forces. The rarity of the situation should concern the United States, but a shifting geopolitical environment inevitably draws the Americans closer to India, regardless of the details of the current flare up. India proves useful in American attempts to contain China, which only continue to strengthen. Also, the complete U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan means the United States will rely on Pakistan less for use of its transit routes to support the war, expanding the political space to exert greater U.S. pressure on Pakistan’s links to anti-India militants.

Christopher Clary,12-20-2013, The Stimson Center, https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Deterrence\_Stability\_Dec\_2013\_web\_1.pdf, //CJ

In November 2008, individuals trained and equipped in Pakistan carried out a three-day LeT siege of Mumbai, killing almost 173 people including Indian, British, American and Israeli citizens. The level of direct Pakistan state involvement is murky, but the LeT is a group that has been historically protected and funded by the state. Once again, India’s government — at the time led by the Congress Party’s Dr. Manmohan Singh — **contemplated its military retaliatory options**. An investigative journalistic account two years after the attack discovered that at the height of the deliberations in the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) “**the Prime Minister then wanted to know if there was a chance Pakistan could misjudge a conventional strike by India and trigger a nuclear response. There was near silence. …** The larger consensus was that you could not be sure about Pakistan’s response. It is reliably learnt that it was this uncertainty which halted Indian strategists from fully backing any military response.”15 **Thrice since 1998, then, India’s leaders have been paralyzed after overt conventional and terrorist attacks from elements within Pakistan.** India’s nuclear weapons, and its posture of assured retaliation, are not oriented to deter limited or terrorist attacks — nuclear weapons are largely useless in such a role. But **Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and its posture of first use or “asymmetric escalation,” do deter India’s ability to retaliate with significant conventional military power, which generates a pattern of India being forced to absorb spectacular attacks from Pakistan with little ability to respond.**

**Limited war operations before Pakistan countermobilized conventional and nuclear assets were contemplated**, but General Padmanabhan argued that **such strikes would be “totally futile” in achieving any reasonable objectives,** and the only effective response was to “smash [Pakistan].”94 But as Lt. Gen. Sood (ret.) concedes, if India had executed the June offensives and “sever[ed] Punjab and Sindh with its conventional forces . . . Pakistan would use nuclear weapons in that scenario.”95 Hence, once the window for limited retaliatory options passed, senior Indian ofªcials said that “Vajpayee feared that a fullscale military response... could precipitate a wider conºagration. Although Vajpayee believed that the risk of nuclear war was small, he nonetheless saw no advantage in precipitating a crisis of which it might be an outcome.”96 Ganguly and Hagerty conclude that “the fear of Pakistan’s resort to a possible nuclear threat was paramount in the minds of Indian decision-makers, thereby inhibiting a resort to all-out war.”97 Pakistan’s asymmetric escalation posture thus paralyzed India’s leaders: the only available retaliatory option capable of achieving any practical military objectives risked provoking nuclear escalation and was therefore off the table. India’s frustration with Pakistan-backed ag

Vipin Narang,3-10-2009, No Publication, https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.38, //CJ

In this article I examine these questions both theoretically and empirically, with specific analysis of the South Asian case. Theoretically, I identify various regional power nuclear postures—catalytic, assured retaliation, and asymmetric escalation—and hypothesize that they may have different deterrence effects. In South Asia all three postures have been adopted and have interacted with each other, making the India-Pakistan dyad an excellent candidate for probing the differential effects of regional power nuclear postures. Unlike India, which has maintained an assured retaliation nuclear posture, Pakistan shifted from a catalytic nuclear posture to an asymmetric escalation posture following India’s May 1998 nuclear tests. This shift allows me to isolate the effects of nuclear posture in an India-Pakistan enduring dispute that has many ªxed effects over time. **I analyze every** **India-Pakistan militarized crisis since 1986 and ªnd that the asymmetric escalation posture has been uniquely “deterrence optimal” for Pakistan, directly deterring Indian conventional military power on multiple occasions.** But the adoption of this particular posture—not just the acquisition of nuclear weapons—has enabled Pakistan to more aggressively pursue longstanding, limited revisionist objectives against India (the strategy of bleeding India by a “thousand cuts”), with little fear of signiªcant retaliation. Much of the security literature on South Asia, most notably advanced by Sumit Ganguly and Paul Kapur,2 has focused on whether the mere introduction of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent has induced stability or instability over the past ten years. Examination of the nuclear postures adopted by India and Pakistan, however, yields a more ªne-grained understanding of how particular operationalizations of nuclear capabilities generate different conºict dynamics, setting scope conditions for when instability may be more or less acute.3 The theoretical contribution of these ªndings is that, in South Asia and perhaps beyond, nuclear postures matter; they systematically produce differential deterrence and stability effects.

Aziz Haniffa, 2-17-2019, "U.S. gives green light for India to launch strikes against terrorist havens in Pakistan," IndiaAbroad, [https://www.indiaabroad.com/us\_affairs/u-s-gives-green-light-for-india-to-launch-strikes/article\_0c32150a-331b-11e9-9d18-177ff5e89e52.html //](https://www.indiaabroad.com/us_affairs/u-s-gives-green-light-for-india-to-launch-strikes/article_0c32150a-331b-11e9-9d18-177ff5e89e52.html%20//) RM

WASHINGTON,D.C.—Strong condemnation by the Trump administration and U.S. lawmakers from both sides of the aisle of the horrific terrorist attack in Kashmir that killed at least 41 Indian military police, was fast and furious, with senior administration and Congressional sources also disclosing that **the U.S. has** essentially **given India the green light to carry out surgical strikes against terrorist safe havens in Pakistan, particularly the bases of the Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lakshar-e-Tayiba terrorist groups that exclusively target India.** These sources acknowledged that **the U.S. indicating to India that it would have no qualms against New Delhi going after these groups — including those on the U.S.’s Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list — was indeed a far cry from earlier times when Washington would call for restraint when tensions between India and Pakistan would exacerbate in the wake of terrorist attacks by Pakistan-based, armed militant groups.** JEM has claimed responsibility for the latest attack, the worst in more than three decades. The sources also pointed out that the Pulwama attack had taken place hardly a week after the chief of the U.S. Central Command Gen. Joseph Votel informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that militants continuing to operate out of Pakistani territory undermines regional stability and exacerbates tensions with India. “Militants operating out of Pakistan and Afghanistan continue to threaten Afghan stability, as well as stoke tensions between Pakistan and India,” Votel said, and complained that Pakistan, for all of its promises, has still not eradicated the safe havens and support it continues to provide to provide to militant groups responsible for terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and India. He asserted, “This cross-border instability and violence generates tension along both sides of the border," and informed the lawmakers that the suspension of the massive American security assistance to Pakistan has not been reinstated. When asked as to what lent credence to their contention that the U.S. has given India the green light to go after these terrorist groups operating from Pakistani territory in the aftermath of the most recent attack, the sources pointed to U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton’s conversations with his Indian counterpart Ajit Doval on Feb. 15, where he had informed the latter that **the Trump administration “strongly supports India's right to self-defense,” and would stand behind New Delhi in whatever action it decides to take**. According to the sources, senior administration officials, including Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in recent weeks had made clear to Pakistan that it must “dismantle all of its safe havens for terrorist groups,” that launch attacks in Afghanistan and India and that these warnings had been reiterated to Islamabad by senior military officers like Votel and others in their interactions with the hierarchy of the Pakistani army. These officials had also kept the U.S. Congress apprised of the continuing threat that these safe havens hosted by Pakistan continued to pose for the region, particularly during their testimony during their Congressional appearances and defending the administration decision to cut off all security and military assistance to Pakistan. **They acknowledged that Bolton’s conversations with Doval and that of other U.S. officials also declaring that the U.S. strongly support’s India’s right to self-defense, in diplo-speak unequivocally meant that India “has got to do what it’s got to do,” in the wake of these deadly terror attacks. However**, the sources said **that this did not “necessarily mean a radical change of policy” in terms of the U.S. traditionally calling on India to exercise restraint and lauding India for its restraint in the aftermath of earlier attacks, and pointed to the fact that in recent years and before the advent of the Trump administration—when U.S.-Pakistan relations had further deteriorated with the cut-off of all aid to Islamabad -- President Obama had also made it clear both publicly and privately that if Pakistan did not rein in terrorists operating from its territory, the U.S. would have no compunctions in going after them.**

**Singh 17** (Yoshita Singh, 3-9-2017, "India offers to give up veto 'for now' for UN Security Council seat," Rediff, [https://www.rediff.com/news/report/india-offers-to-give-up-veto-for-now-for-un-security-council-seat/20170309.htm DoA 3/19/19](https://www.rediff.com/news/report/india-offers-to-give-up-veto-for-now-for-un-security-council-seat/20170309.htm%20DoA%203/19/19))

We are, as a matter of respect, willing to consider them and have them tabled along with our proposals in a composite text,” the statement said, adding that for the nations’ and UN’s credibility to be sustained, it is time for “honest engagement and exchange on the basis of a text.” The bloc said it believes there is an “imbalance of influence” within the Security Council between the permanent and non-permanent members and expansion only in the non-permanent category is not going to solve the problem. “It will actually widen the difference between permanent and non-permanent members even more, tilting further the scales in favour of a dispensation that was valid in the special situation in 1945 but is no longer now,” the G4 statement said. Akbaruddin said a “balanced enlargement” in both categories is necessarily the only way to ensure an equilibrium that reflects the current situation and any reform that does not address expansion of both categories will be “incomplete and futile”. “Expansion of non-permanent membership is a solution which adds to the size without addressing the malaise that afflicts the Council,” he said in the statement. The statement suggested that new permanent members can be democratically elected through an appropriate initial election process and subjected to mandatory and detailed review process after a specific time-period so as to ensure accountability. Some member states have “conflated and confused” regular elections to the Council with accountability, the G4 said. “Ensuring a perpetual campaign mode is not the best form of accountability,” it said.

### AT: (Link) Great Power Status

1. **Non-unique: Saran ‘18 of the** **World Economic Forum** writes India is on already track to become the great power of the Indo-Pacific, due to its increasing economic and political influence. India will be a world power in a few years, regardless of Security Council membership.

2. This obviously isn’t the brink for great power status.

Samir **Saran**, 7-23-**2018**, "India's future as a world power depends on 4 key relationships," World Economic Forum, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/07/india-power-democratic-geostrategic-relationships/> // RM

In the 2040s, India is [expected](https://qz.com/903982/pwc-report-indias-economy-will-surpass-that-of-the-us-by-2040/) to surpass the United States (in PPP terms) and become the world’s second largest economy, behind China. **Alongside this Indian emergence, the international order is undergoing significant change as well, with power increasingly diffused among states as a new, multipolar geostrategic landscape begins to emerge with fresh layers of complexities. These developments have the potential to position India as the world’s most influential democracy in the second half of the 21st century, giving it the ability to shape the Indo-Pacific region and the dynamically evolving global order**. From the Indo-Pacific region to the world: At the Shangri-La Dialogue earlier this year, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi delivered a speech in which he [argued](http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime_Ministers_Keynote_Address_at_Shangri_La_Dialogue_June_01_2018) that **the “destiny of the world will be deeply influenced by the course of developments in the Indo-Pacific region**”. This bold claim has come within the context of both growing economic opportunity and expanding strategic challenges for the region. Sheer numbers alone elevate the importance of the Indo-Pacific and its influence across the world. It is now home to more than 65% of the world’s population who collectively produce more than 60% of global GDP. Over half the world’s trade passes through this region, and it hosts the fastest-growing armada of naval fleets along with seven nuclear powers. This region will also have a disproportionately high contribution to global growth in the decades ahead and will therefore ink the pen that scripts the new terms of trade, financial flows and investments, growth, humanitarian assistance, and peace and security. Even as this redistribution of wealth and power propels this region to the global high table, a position it long enjoyed up to the 15th century, the multiplicity of old and emerging actors, and their varied interests within the region and beyond are spurring greater unpredictability and new anxieties. There are simply no reliable 20th-century templates to manage such a simultaneous rise of multiple actors and interests in a region. China, which was the first mover, now finds itself having to deal with the pushback to its own expansive plans, as well as with propositions from other initiatives such as the "Quad" (comprising of India, the US, Japan and Australia) that seek to steer the region’s future. There is little doubt that new pathways to a new order need to be discovered soon. Modi’s speech at Shangri-La signalled New Delhi’s acceptance of this reality, and its willingness to embrace greater responsibility in anchoring a "rules-based democratic order" in the region. Indeed, as a rising economic power with [favourable](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6911544.stm) demographic conditions - in 2020, the average age in India will be 29 years old (compared to 37 in China) - **India is well positioned to shape the future of the Indo-Pacific**. India’s vision for the region: India’s geostrategic vision for the Indo-Pacific is unique. It rejects pitting China against the Quadrilateral Initiative in a zero-sum competition "between free and repressive visions of world order", as the American [vision](https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf) postulates. It also rejects the Chinese proposition, which creates perverse dependencies through economic statecraft and military coercion in a manner better suited to the Cold War era. Instead**, India is positioning itself to take a different path - one that does not see the world in binaries, bifurcated between partners and allies on one side, and competitors and adversaries on the other. India offers an opportunity for engagement and dialogue to all states, big and small, democratic and authoritarian, advanced or developing. The new vision moves away from conceptions of non-alignment or strategic autonomy, tools of foreign policy that may have outlived their corresponding geopolitical utility.** When Prime Minister Modi [stated](http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime_Ministers_Keynote_Address_at_Shangri_La_Dialogue_June_01_2018) that "the Indo-Pacific region is not a limited club of members", he signalled New Delhi’s intention to lead a new configuration of states, guided by communities that yearn for development, markets that require connectivity and nations that seek security. The strategy calls for India to lead by example and show that as its capabilities rise over the coming decades, it will not abandon certain norms that reflect uniquely Asian democratic tendencies, open and transparent economic governance, and non-interventionist security paradigms. **Four steps for India to take: To put in place a vision that shapes the region and attracts others, India needs to script its own expectations from four key relationships. First, New Delhi should define its 'China policy'.**It needs to determine what it is looking for from Beijing and make clear what it will refuse to put on the negotiating table. At Shangri-La, Modi made clear that no nation can unilaterally "shape and secure" an Indo-Pacific order. Delhi must be prepared to enforce this statement of fact as a baseline norm. An Asian ethic cannot be scripted by China alone, whether it is on infrastructure connectivity or managing security disputes. The economic prosperity of the region will be implicated by the strength of the India-China partnership. **Second, New Delhi should develop a clear policy toward the US.**Thus far, New Delhi has essentially muddled through, deferring to Washington regarding policy in the region. India must answer whether it is ready, willing and able to play a larger role in defining a vision for the concert of democracies in the region and beyond. If, as Prime Modi recently indicated, the answer to all these is "yes", New Delhi needs to put forth a more confident proposition for Washington to support. Is it now time to hand the baton over to India? **Third, New Delhi must rethink its engagement with its neighbours, particularly around two existing regional architectures. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), an eight-member union meant to advance economic and regional integration, is in tatters. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), a seven-member organization meant to promote economic cooperation and trade, has turned into a forum for talk rather than action. Unless India presents a clear, enticing proposition to its neighbours, it will be hard-pressed to shepherd a new strategic vision in the larger region. Finally, Delhi must engage more vigorously with the global institutional framework**. At the World Economic Forum in January, Modi [warned](http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl%2F29378%2FPrime_Ministers_Statement_on_the_subject_Creating_a_Shared_Future_in_a_Fractured_Word_in_the_World_Economic_Forum_January_23_2018) of a "gap between the old systems of [international] institutions and the needs of many developing countries", echoing Delhi’s age-old grievance with the Atlantic institutions and a new sense that India must help close this 'gap'. **India’s pivotal role in the Indo-Pacific will be bolstered through its co-ownership of the institutions created by the developed world and in making them work in coherence with the new institutions such as the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, in which India has significant stakes. India’s Indo-Pacific vision exemplifies its ambition of being a "leading power". Even so, it is merely the beginning of a decadal journey, which will see India shoulder the expectations that befit the world’s largest democratic economy. To do this, Delhi must constantly reassess the dimensions of change underway, visualize the possibilities that are on offer, anticipate the attendant risks and author the new order arising out of Asia.**

### AT: (Link) Regional Heg

1. **Non-unique/Turn:** Accordingto **Pardesi 15,** India is so vital to the security of the region that it is already a great regional power and empirically, this security is so important to that of the world that it is a world power. Moreover, if it’s scalar and they become “more” powerful if you affirm, that is a good thing because **Pardesi** continues that the future of security and diplomacy lies within regionalism, something India is promoting in the region through their power.

Manjeet S. **Pardesi**, 3-16-**2015**, "Is India a Great Power? Understanding Great Power Status in Contemporary International Relations," Taylor & Francis, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14799855.2015.1005737?scroll=top&needAccess=true> // RM

**After noting India’s somewhat ambiguous status in the international hierarchy of states, as well as the imprecise conceptualization of the term great power, this article proposed a threefold criterion to ascertain whether or not a given state classifies as a great power in contemporary international relations. It has been argued that in order to be accorded the status of a great power, a given state must have security-related and economic interests in a world region outside of its home region, it should have the capabilities to promote these interests in this region outside of its home region, and that it must not only seek the status of a great power in that region, but it must also be accorded that status by the other great powers active in that region as well as the regional states concerned. It was empirically shown that India fulfills this threefold criterion with respect to Southeast Asia.** This is not merely a semantic exercise to have India counted as a great power; analysts are now arguing that **no security order in Asia will be viable without India’s active participation.** In other words, **India has emerged as a great power in contemporary international relations because it has effectively transcended beyond its home region in South Asia.** This research has opened up the possibility of empirically evaluating if there are any other regions in the current international system where India meets these requirements for the rank of a great power. The Indian Ocean Region (including the Persian Gulf, East and Southeastern Africa, Australia and the Indian Ocean states of Southeast Asia) is another potential world region where India already does or may soon acquire the status of a great power. **Given the rise of regionalization in international relations, the region-based approach to great power status allows us to better understand the security dynamics of different world regions, while also allowing us to take a regional approach to the concept of polarity. With the growing importance of Southeast Asia in the US pivot to Asia to manage the rise of China and the acceptance by the Southeast Asian states of India as a factor in the security affairs of the region, India has emerged as a great power in Asia after transcending its home region of South Asia.**

### AT: (Link) India Vetoes Peace

1. **Delink:** The U.N. no longer affects the Indo-Pak conflict. **Haider ’19 of DAWN** writes that the U.N. has already removed itself from the Kashmir dispute entirely.

2. **Non-unique:** Even if the U.N. were interested, **Al Jazeera ’19** writes that India has turned them down. It doesn’t need a seat on the UNSC to do so.

3. **Analytical delink:** China would veto any aggressive measures, just as they did recently when India tried to get a Pakistan terrorist group labeled a threat.

4. **Link turn:** If this does happen, it’s far preferable to a military solution. **Dalton ’16 of the Carnegie Endowment** writes that India’s resolution of the Kashmir conflict through internationally isolating Pakistan and creating a coalition of states against it would be more effective and less escalatory than their current military policy.

**This outweighs:** In either world, India is going to try to punish Pakistan. However, **uniqueness controls the direction of the link**: military solutions have only served to escalate the situation – it’s time for a new approach.

Aman Y. Thakker,3-29-2018, “India at the United Nations: An analysis of Indian multilateral strategies on international security and development”, ORF, https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-at-the-united-nations-an-analysis-of-indian-multilateral-strategies-on-international-security-and-development/, //CJ   
While India continues to remain committed to engaging constructively at the UN, it finds that cooperation on issues of international security at the UN is limited by an asymmetric distribution of benefits and costs, and advocacy for a shorter time horizon for debate on these issues. These factors contribute **significantly to India’s success on issues of international development, and lack thereof on issues of international security.** These factors also lead India to adopt different strategic multilateral approaches on negotiations over climate change policy and the 2030 Agenda when compared to its approach to negotiations on passage of the CTIT, or for expansion and reform of the Security Council. As **India continues to emerge as a key player in the international system**, it will have to address the strategies of engagement and improve upon them. **Success in achieving India’s objectives on** counterterrorism and **Security Council reform will not only reinforce India’s status as an emerging power, but also add greater credence to its reputation as a committed multilateral partner, furthering its soft power.**

Toby Dalton, George Perkovich,9-19-2016, Pakistan and India: The Art of Peace, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/09/19/pakistan-and-india-art-of-peace-pub-64638, //CJ   
To the extent that if India’s covert activities in Pakistan became apparent to Pakistan and the wider world, India could lose reputation and political leverage over Pakistan, as many Indian commentators have pointed out in the wake of Modi’s Independence Day speech. An exceptionally experienced counsellor to several Indian prime ministers told us, “It is not in our interest to have people think we are little different from the ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence] ... if Pakistanis assert we are just like them … the international community will say ‘they both do it’, and the pressure falls off Pakistan.” If the **Indian government persists in the belief that it can manage Kashmir as an internal matter, without Pakistan’s negotiated cooperation, New Delhi will be unable to build an international coalition.** Contrary to military options, **utilising diplomatic, economic and other means of international censure in a strategy of non-violent compellence may be a better way to motivate Pakistan. The punitive benefits of a non-violent strategy may be less direct than military action but it also comes with far lower risks of an escalating military conflict. With a clear comparative advantage over Pakistan in economic clout and soft power, India could utilise these tools to isolate Pakistan internationally in response to another major terrorist attack. However, in order to be successful with this strategy, India would have to develop** greater deftness in **international coalition-building**. The Indian government’s own behaviour in Kashmir, and willingness to address grievances there, would need to be positive enough to make outside powers feel they will not be accused of hypocrisy if they side with India against Pakistan. Overall, India and Pakistan are approaching rough symmetry at three levels of competition: covert, conventional and nuclear. One of the countries may be more capable in one or more of these domains, but each has now demonstrated enough capability in all three to deny the other confidence that it can win more than it loses at any level of this violent competition. India drove Pakistani forces out of Kargil but Pakistani conventional and nuclear capabilities prevented India from escalating the war. India mobilised its forces massively after the 2001 attack on the parliament and Pakistan took some steps to curtail terrorist groups but the balance of power made neither of them want to fight. Despite trying to develop the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, India did not respond militarily to the 2008 attack on Mumbai; but Pakistani authorities have hinted to us and others that damage to Pakistan’s reputation and vulnerability to Indian destabilisation efforts made Pakistan take unspecified steps that have prevented further Mumbai-like attacks since 2008. Pakistan subsequently also tested a short-range nuclear missile with the stated intention to deter Indian army incursions that might follow another cross-border terror incident. This condition of rough balance and deterrence across the spectrum of conflict amounts to an unstable equilibrium. Any number of actions by leaders and non-officials, taken by mistake or on purpose, could destabilise it. **The basic balance in useable force creates an opportunity for leaders to take steps to stabilise and pacify the India-Pakistan competition. Diplomacy and dealmaking cannot shift balances of power and deterrence but they can solidify them through explicit agreements that clarify expectations and standards of behaviour.** Two recent examples demonstrate that bargaining can result in stable outcomes that address the core concerns of contending parties. In August 2016, the government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) signed a comprehensive peace agreement to end the civil war there. This agreement followed years of secret negotiations and a series of interim steps, including mutual paying of reparations to victims of the conflict and a commitment by FARC to end its relationship with the drug trade on which it had relied for funding. In July 2015, after similarly lengthy talks, the P-5 plus Germany reached a landmark nuclear deal with Iran to address concerns that Tehran was pursuing nuclear weapons. **Such agreements – essentially, negotiated accommodations – raise the costs for any authorities that would subsequently violate them. This is all the more relevant when major outside powers have a stake in the stabilisation that has been achieved. China and the United States both have great interests in stability between Pakistan and India.** Both could be expected **to press India and Pakistan to uphold any agreements, to contribute to fact-finding if there are disputes over compliance, and to reward both states by increasing investment and urging others to do so, when the security establishments in India and Pakistan demonstrate commitment to stabilisation.** Notwithstanding some intermittent high-level diplomatic engagements with Pakistan, including Modi’s own dramatic visit to Lahore in December 2015, the Indian government has toughened its position on Kashmir. This, too, should not be surprising given the doubts voiced by Indian officials about the intentions of the Pakistani security establishment. Yet, if the Indian government persists in the belief that it can manage Kashmir as an internal matter, without Pakistan’s negotiated cooperation, **New Delhi will be unable to build an international coalition that would significantly raise the cost for Pakistan of future major attacks on India.** Indeed, by acting as if there is nothing to negotiate with Pakistan, Indian leaders would encourage proponents of violence in Pakistan and discourage international players who would like to fully embrace India, but are reluctant to do so if India insists that they reject Pakistan at the same time. India has the power, the habits of mind and institutions to sustain a war of attrition with Pakistan. But India cannot achieve its ambitions to be a global power if it remains bogged down in such a war. The analysis presented in Not War, Not Peace? shows that there **are no clear solutions that India can unilaterally pursue to end the threat of violence from Pakistan.** Some are more likely to be effective, at greater or lesser risk and cost, for India and Pakistan. But only a combination of Indian coercive and non-violent capabilities, paired with a willingness to bargain, can motivate Pakistan to remove the threat of violence. And just as threat of force alone will not work for India, neither will support or tolerance of anti-India terrorism enable Pakistan to get what it wants from India. **Both have to demonstrate willingness to compromise through bargaining, which is only possible if both reassure each other that they are eschewing violence.** **It is up to Indian and Pakistani leaders and societies,** with encouragement **from the international community, to find a combination that will work for them.**

Masood Haider, 2-26-2019, "Has UN chief washed his hands of Kashmir dispute? ", DAWN, https://www.dawn.com/news/1466124 // JJ  
NEW YORK: To all intents and purposes, United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres appears to have washed his hands of making further efforts to promote a dialogue between India and Pakistan that would pave the way for the resolution of the internationally-recognised Kashmir dispute that continues to spawn tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. Obviously, he is under great pressure from India not to get involved on Kashmir. India’s strategic relations with the United States also strengthen New Delhi’s voice and the role at the UN. The Indians don’t want any UN or outside meddling in the Kashmir dispute and have been unsuccessfully trying to take it off the agenda of the Security Council, which has passed a series of resolutions since 1948 that promised self-determination to the Kashmiris. On Jan 18, when asked at his new year press conference about his failure to promote a dialogue between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan to settle their outstanding disputes, the UN chief said something that some analysts took it to mean that he was actually abandoning his efforts in that direction. “I’ve been offering my good offices in relation to the dialogue between the two countries that, until now, had no conditions of success,” a frustrated Gutteress said. But promoting a comprehensive settlement of the Kashmir dispute is Guterres’ primary responsibility — there are UN resolutions calling for the exercise of the right of self-determination by Kashmiri people through a UN-supervised plebiscite. Even when India was beating war drums in the wake of the Feb 14 Pulwama attack, Gutteres only called for restraint on both sides, saying his good offices were available — knowing fully well that India won’t accept the offer. Offer of good offices is not the only option a UN secretary general in a situation threatening international peace and security. He/she can use diplomatic skills and power of persuasion to convince belligerents to come to the negotiating table. Worse, the secretary general has the option under the UN Charter to report the issue to the Security Council. Article 99 of the Charter says, “The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.” Frantic letters from Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi urging the UN chief play a role in defusing the escalating tensions stemming from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s threats to teach Pakistan a lesson also failed to move him. “It’s disappointing. The inaction on part of UN makes it look bad,” an Asian diplomat said. Over the years, Indian diplomats have been aggressively campaigning to knock the ‘K’ word out of UN documents and to prevent any discussion of the dispute in various international fora, leaving Pakistan the only country to raise the issue. There was a time when more than a dozen countries used to speak in support of Kashmiris’ right to self-determination after the Kashmir dispute was raised by Pakistan in the annual sessions of the UN General Assembly. Not any more. But then Pakistan had in its line-up some outstanding practitioners of the art of diplomacy who framed effective narratives for the country. At one stage Pakistan was named as one of the seven power brokers at the United Nations by The New York Times. Now Pakistan’s role has declined following unstable situation at home, and allegations of the country’s links with terrorist groups, especially the Haqqani network and Jaish-e-Mohammed. So much so that in 2011, Pakistan, which in 1975 defeated India to secure a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, just managed to scrape through in 2011 while contesting against Kyrgyzstan. Also, Pakistan’s points of view went abegging during Nawaz Sharif’s government, which had no foreign minister, and the prime minister, who kept the portfolio with him, had serious problems in communicating in English with world leaders and international media representatives.

Al Jazeera, 2-20-2019, "Pulwama attack: UN chief urges India, Pakistan to defuse tensions", Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/pulwama-attack-chief-urges-india-pakistan-defuse-tensions-190220091805765.html // JJ  
But India has long rejected outside offers to mediate on Kashmir issue and has maintained that the border differences should be resolved in bilateral talks. India and Pakistan, who have fought two wars over Kashmir, control parts of the Muslim-majority region. "Never, this is not what India wants. India has always rejected mediation," former Indian diplomat Krishan Chander Singh told Al Jazeera. Echoing Singh's line on mediation, Vishnu Prakash, a retired Indian diplomat, said Pakistan needs to end support to "terrorism". "India will take all possible measures now to make sure that this does not happen again. For this, we have to take multiple measures, including economic, political and military," Prakash told Al Jazeera from New Delhi. On Tuesday, India [rebuffed](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/india-allegations-pakistan-evidence-khan-190219082756101.html) Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan's offer to investigate the latest attack as a "lame excuse". "We demand Pakistan to stop misleading the international community and take credible and visible action against the perpetrators of Pulwama terrorist attack and other terrorists and terror groups operating from areas under their control," a statement by the Indian foreign ministry said. "It is a well-known fact that Jaish-e-Mohammed and its leader Masood Azhar are based in Pakistan. These should be sufficient proof for Pakistan to take action." A top military commander of India has accused Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy agency of "controlling" the suicide attack that has caused outrage in the country, with the [chorus for war](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/fear-grips-kashmiris-living-india-deadly-suicide-attack-190216150244206.html) dominating social media space.

### AT: (Link) Sino-Pak Relations

1. **Non-unique:** **Cheema ’15 of Foreign Policy News** writes that China and Pakistan are already close allies. In fact, **Cheema** writes that they recently established a $46 billion economic corridor together.

Zumra Cheema, 11-25-2015, Geostrategic importance of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Foreign Policy News, http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/11/25/geostrategic-importance-of-china-pakistan-economic-corridor/, //CJ  
At the end of cold war, with the emergence of multi-polar system at international arena, process of globalization got impetus. Resultantly, interdependence among states increased and now states have begun to develop their diplomatic relations with each other on the basis of their geostrategic and geopolitical interests. Likewise, **Pakistan and China,** who are considered as two “all weathered” strategic and diplomatic partners in South Asia, **decided to enlarge their relationship in broader spectrum**. In the past, generally they did cooperate with each other in political and military affairs but over the time, **they felt the need to develop economic ties with each other to gain compatibility in the changing dynamics of the international milieu.** Therefore, they started cooperating with each other in commerce and trade. The bilateral cooperation in almost every field of life strengthened the relations to get deeper with the passage of time and both countries celebrated year 2011 as “Pak-China friendship year”. Recently, **Pakistan and China signed** a mega project called as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (**CPEC**)**, as an endorsement and continuation to the enhancing bilateral friendly ties between the two countries. The CPEC project is being viewed as very beneficial not only for the states involved but also for the region as well. Regional connectivity and economic development are two major aspects of the project. Furthermore, the land-locked Central Asian countries and Afghanistan will get short and easy access towards the warm-watered Indian maritime under the implementation of CPEC .The project will prove helpful to tackle the menace of terrorism from the region as well, which is a major risk for the security and stability of the region. Moreover, through the economic uplift of Pakistan under CPEC, there are chances for the betterment of India-Pakistan relations.** Likewise, there is probability of stability in Afghanistan, because China would easily access and invest in Afghanistan through the stability and improved infrastructure of Pakistan. Therefore, **Pakistan’s President Nawaz Sharif called CPEC as a “Game-Changer” and “Corridor to Peace” for the region**. The project has tremendous importance for a weaker country like Pakistan. **Pakistan and China signed 51 agreements worth of $46 billion under CPEC**, The four main areas of collaboration between the two countries are; infrastructure, transportation, energy, and industrial cooperation. The route of the CPEC has not yet been confirmed, and all that is certain for the moment is its reach from Kashgar to Gwadar. The CPEC also has immense importance for China. China considers CPEC as “flagship project” because through this project China will get easy and short routed reach towards the Middle East, Africa and Europe. Additionally, China’s market will further boost up, and it will become economically stronger. China can also counter the US dominance in the region through the accomplishment of CPEC. China can play a significant role in the Asian region in terms of economic uplift and regional stability being emerging as an economic giant and future super power. China will also get the chance to develop its North-western province Xinjiang, which is an under developed area. In Xinjiang separatist movement has started by Uyghur’s Muslims. Thus, China wants to develop the socio-economic framework of that region. Only in this way, China can curtail aggressive sentiments against its central government. China sees US “pivot to Asia” strategy against its fundamental interests. China has view that US wants to hamper its progress and development by improving cooperation and making alliance with rising powers (India, Singapore, Malaysia, North Korea and other East-Asian countries) so that it can keep its supremacy and hegemony in the South-Pacific region. Another Chinese concern over CPEC is to find an alternative to Strait of Malacca. The South-China Sea, which is a rich source of resources and a way towards Strait of Malacca is being disputed among China and other Southeast Asian countries. China imports largest part of its oil supply through the Strait of Malacca, so it has some reservations that, if other East Asian countries make alliance against China, then they can impose naval blockade on narrow Strait of Malacca and can choke China economically. Along keeping in view the importance of CPEC, both the countries should keep various challenges and constraints under consideration. Administrative issues, political instability, militancy problems and resentment in the domestic labor force in Pakistan are some of the major challenges, which could impede the proper execution of CPEC. All of these issues need to be address for smooth implementation of the project. In the past, Pakistan and China have achieved various difficult plans, which were appeared unattainable due to the involved challenges and risks. The Karakorum Highway is an exemplary to the fact. Currently, there is a need to have better understanding between both participant countries to achieve expected results. Both countries would have to join hands to assure security situation at the workplace of the project. Moreover, there is a need to achieve proper public support, therefore, **both countries should make clear to their people that the project has huge importance for both countries**. This will further catalyze the speedy and timely completion of the CPEC.

### AT: (Link) Sino-Pak Mil Aid

1. **Non-unique:** China always has an incentive to provide Pakistan with military aid and exert its influence in the region, as **Cheema ’15 of Foreign Policy News** writes that China and Pakistan are already close allies; in fact, they recently established a $46 billion economic corridor together. This is why **Bloomberg ’18** confirms that Pakistan is already overwhelmingly reliant on China for military support.

Bloomberg, 8-1-2018, "China's $2 Billion Pakistan Loan Shows Desire to Keep Khan Close," https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-01/china-s-2-billion-pakistan-loan-shows-desire-to-keep-khan-close // JJ  
While cricketing legend Imran Khan attempts to form a coalition government, China has stepped up to reinforce a geopolitical alliance that shapes the South Asian nation’s policies toward the U.S. and India. The announcement caused Pakistan’s rupee to [jump](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-31/pakistan-woes-too-deep-to-make-rupee-bounce-more-than-fleeting) the most in nearly a decade as Khan takes power with an economy in chaos. The gesture speaks to Pakistan’s overwhelming reliance on China as a source of financial, diplomatic and military support at a time when U.S. President Donald Trump has cut military aid to Islamabad. Ultimately, Khan may not have a choice. Pakistan’s powerful military has continued to push its civilian counterparts for [close ties](https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2018-07-27/skeptical-india-wonders-if-pakistan-army-backs-khan-peace-push) with China in order to ensure the flow of more than $60 billion in loans for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor infrastructure projects. “There is a deep, far-reaching political consensus in Pakistan for a continued strong partnership with Beijing,” said Michael Kugelman, a senior associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington. “This is especially true now, with Pakistan’s relationship with America facing an uncertain future.”

Zumra Cheema, 11-25-2015, Geostrategic importance of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Foreign Policy News, http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/11/25/geostrategic-importance-of-china-pakistan-economic-corridor/, //CJ  
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The bilateral cooperation in almost every field of life strengthened the relations to get deeper with the passage of time and both countries celebrated year 2011 as “Pak-China friendship year”. Recently, **Pakistan and China signed** a mega project called as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (**CPEC**)**, as an endorsement and continuation to the enhancing bilateral friendly ties between the two countries. The CPEC project is being viewed as very beneficial not only for the states involved but also for the region as well. Regional connectivity and economic development are two major aspects of the project. Furthermore, the land-locked Central Asian countries and Afghanistan will get short and easy access towards the warm-watered Indian maritime under the implementation of CPEC .The project will prove helpful to tackle the menace of terrorism from the region as well, which is a major risk for the security and stability of the region. Moreover, through the economic uplift of Pakistan under CPEC, there are chances for the betterment of India-Pakistan relations.** Likewise, there is probability of stability in Afghanistan, because China would easily access and invest in Afghanistan through the stability and improved infrastructure of Pakistan. Therefore, **Pakistan’s President Nawaz Sharif called CPEC as a “Game-Changer” and “Corridor to Peace” for the region**. The project has tremendous importance for a weaker country like Pakistan. **Pakistan and China signed 51 agreements worth of $46 billion under CPEC**, The four main areas of collaboration between the two countries are; infrastructure, transportation, energy, and industrial cooperation. The route of the CPEC has not yet been confirmed, and all that is certain for the moment is its reach from Kashgar to Gwadar. The CPEC also has immense importance for China. China considers CPEC as “flagship project” because through this project China will get easy and short routed reach towards the Middle East, Africa and Europe. Additionally, China’s market will further boost up, and it will become economically stronger. China can also counter the US dominance in the region through the accomplishment of CPEC. China can play a significant role in the Asian region in terms of economic uplift and regional stability being emerging as an economic giant and future super power. China will also get the chance to develop its North-western province Xinjiang, which is an under developed area. In Xinjiang separatist movement has started by Uyghur’s Muslims. Thus, China wants to develop the socio-economic framework of that region. Only in this way, China can curtail aggressive sentiments against its central government. China sees US “pivot to Asia” strategy against its fundamental interests. China has view that US wants to hamper its progress and development by improving cooperation and making alliance with rising powers (India, Singapore, Malaysia, North Korea and other East-Asian countries) so that it can keep its supremacy and hegemony in the South-Pacific region. Another Chinese concern over CPEC is to find an alternative to Strait of Malacca. The South-China Sea, which is a rich source of resources and a way towards Strait of Malacca is being disputed among China and other Southeast Asian countries. China imports largest part of its oil supply through the Strait of Malacca, so it has some reservations that, if other East Asian countries make alliance against China, then they can impose naval blockade on narrow Strait of Malacca and can choke China economically. Along keeping in view the importance of CPEC, both the countries should keep various challenges and constraints under consideration. Administrative issues, political instability, militancy problems and resentment in the domestic labor force in Pakistan are some of the major challenges, which could impede the proper execution of CPEC. All of these issues need to be address for smooth implementation of the project. In the past, Pakistan and China have achieved various difficult plans, which were appeared unattainable due to the involved challenges and risks. The Karakorum Highway is an exemplary to the fact. Currently, there is a need to have better understanding between both participant countries to achieve expected results. Both countries would have to join hands to assure security situation at the workplace of the project. Moreover, there is a need to achieve proper public support, therefore, **both countries should make clear to their people that the project has huge importance for both countries**. This will further catalyze the speedy and timely completion of the CPEC.

### AT: (Link) Threatens Pakistan

1. **Non-unique/link turn:** **The Financial Times ’19** writes that, as India aggresses militarily, Pakistan already feels threatened by the possibility of conflict. In contrast, **Dalton ’16 of the Carnegie Endowment** writes that India’s resolution of the Kashmir conflict through internationally isolating Pakistan and creating a coalition of states against it would be more effective and less escalatory than their current military policy.

**This outweighs:** In either world, India is going to try to punish Pakistan. However, **uniqueness controls the direction of the link**: military solutions have only served to escalate the situation – it’s time for a new approach.

Stephanie Findlay, 3-26-2019, "Pakistan’s Imran Khan fears more military hostilities with India," Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/508aa184-4f8d-11e9-b401-8d9ef1626294 // JJ  
Pakistan prime minister Imran Khan fears India has been gripped by “war hysteria” that threatens to unleash further hostilities in the run-up to its neighbour’s national elections. “I’m still apprehensive before the elections, I feel that something could happen,” Mr Khan said at his office in Islamabad in the wake of the most serious conflict between the nuclear-armed countries in decades.  Mr Khan voiced his fears during an interview with the Financial Times in which the former cricket captain also promised to resurrect Pakistan’s economy and denied that the country had become a client state of China. He insisted that Pakistan did not have any links to Jaish-e-Mohammad, the terror group that launched a deadly attack on an Indian paramilitary police convoy in the Kashmir region last month. Instead, Mr Khan cast Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, as the aggressor for launching a subsequent missile strike that brought the two countries close to war.

### AT: I/L – Nationalism

1. **Delink:** **Zakaria ’12 writes in his book “The Post American World” (pg 181)** that even nationalism is extremely diluted in the Indian government because India is politically fractured; the Hindu caste immediately rises to oppose nationalist policy.

### AT: I/L – UN Negotiations

1. **Delink:** According to **Rajan ’05 of Michigan State**, the Simla agreement – signed by both countries – prevents the two from negotiating through a third party. Indeed, **Al Jazeera** writes that India, absent membership on the Security Council, has been able to prevent the U.N. from mediating the conflict.

2. **Non-unique:** The U.N. is not uniquely necessary to solve these disputes. In the past, **Sardar ’08 of the Institute for Regional Studies** writes that India and Pakistan have gone to other tribunals and used other forms of mediation to agree on territorial compromises.

3. **Outweigh on timeframe:** Even if there is a temporary peace, it never accomplishes much. Every single time, the U.N. has negotiated, it’s failed because India or Pakistan has backed out. In fact, since there is no enforcement mechanism, **Hilali ’97 of the Small Wars Journal** writes that, historically, India has backed out of every U.N. resolution related to Kashmir.

[4. **Turn;** The fact that negotiations cannot happen right now and India is the main impediment to them means that the only hope of achieving functional negotiations is to change the status quo by putting India on the security council, as **Singh ’17** explains that new permanent members are subject to intense scrutiny and a detailed review process. This forces India to behave in the spotlight, and is the only risk of cooperation, as they would have an incentive to not violate the principles of the UN, the very same organization that they now control.]

Sheila Rajan, January 2005, "The Prospect of Third-Party Mediation of the Kashmir Dispute: Is There A Way to Re-engage India in a Facilitated Discussion?”, Michigan State College of Law, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d570/96d1a60d4e1018393bb563d330f94f676bed.pdf // JJ  
The Simla Agreement provides the most recent legal articulation of viable dispute resolution techniques for the Kashmir issue. The Simla agreement is a result of the 1971 war between India and Pakistan during the secession of East Pakistan to form Bangladesh.43 India’s approach to postwar negotiations, after this altercation, marked a significant change in position regarding international involvement in future resolution of the Kashmir issue. Pakistan entered postwar negotiations in a weak strategic position, having incurred considerable territorial and population losses.44 Therefore, the Simla agreement, in many ways, represents India’s interests in the best means of resolving of the Kashmir conflict. The Simla agreement makes several significant alterations to the terms and conditions upon which resolution may be reached. Art. 1, sec. (ii) of the agreement requires the nations “settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them” and that neither side “unilaterally alter the situation.”45 The Simla agreement provides provisions for the temporary maintenance of peace, but does not purport to resolve the issue.46 The agreement vaguely provides for meetings by “respective Heads” to “discuss further the modalities and arrangements of the establishment of durable peace.”47 The agreement further delineates the “line of control”, rather than the ceasefire line as the recognized partition of the state.48 The Simla agreement establishes bilateral negotiations as the primary means of dispute resolution of the Kashmir conflict. As a result of the Simla agreement neither nation may unilaterally present the conflict to the United Nations or any other outside party for assistance in resolution. Assuming both parties came to the table with a genuine interest in generating movement toward settlement by taking responsibility and making concessions, bilateral negotiations are the optimal means of reaching mutual agreement. Absent this genuine motivation, strict interpretation of the agreement indicates that a perpetual stalemate may be maintained so long as one party refuses to negotiate. The limitation on each party against unilaterally altering the status quo may be exploited by either side to freeze the situation in Kashmir. This type of stalemate will have a negative impact across the board.

Al Jazeera, 2-20-2019, "Pulwama attack: UN chief urges India, Pakistan to defuse tensions", Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/pulwama-attack-chief-urges-india-pakistan-defuse-tensions-190220091805765.html // JJ  
But India has long rejected outside offers to mediate on Kashmir issue and has maintained that the border differences should be resolved in bilateral talks. India and Pakistan, who have fought two wars over Kashmir, control parts of the Muslim-majority region. "Never, this is not what India wants. India has always rejected mediation," former Indian diplomat Krishan Chander Singh told Al Jazeera. Echoing Singh's line on mediation, Vishnu Prakash, a retired Indian diplomat, said Pakistan needs to end support to "terrorism". "India will take all possible measures now to make sure that this does not happen again. For this, we have to take multiple measures, including economic, political and military," Prakash told Al Jazeera from New Delhi. On Tuesday, India [rebuffed](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/india-allegations-pakistan-evidence-khan-190219082756101.html) Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan's offer to investigate the latest attack as a "lame excuse". "We demand Pakistan to stop misleading the international community and take credible and visible action against the perpetrators of Pulwama terrorist attack and other terrorists and terror groups operating from areas under their control," a statement by the Indian foreign ministry said. "It is a well-known fact that Jaish-e-Mohammed and its leader Masood Azhar are based in Pakistan. These should be sufficient proof for Pakistan to take action." A top military commander of India has accused Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy agency of "controlling" the suicide attack that has caused outrage in the country, with the [chorus for war](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/fear-grips-kashmiris-living-india-deadly-suicide-attack-190216150244206.html) dominating social media space.

Syed Sardar, Autumn 2008, Institute of Regional Studies, “CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION APPROACH TO INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT”, Regional Studies, https://www.academia.edu/2333339/Conflict\_Transformation\_Approach\_and\_the\_Kashmir\_Issue\_A\_new\_Perspective // JJ  
International arbitration has been used in settling conflicting claims over the Rann of Kutch, about 8400 square miles situated between Pakistani province of Sindh and Indian province of Gujarat. Originally an extension of the Arabian Sea, the Rann area was closed off and got converted into a salty marsh. The Partition plan did not provide a clear division of the area. Pakistan claims the 31 northern half of the Rann measuring about 3,500 square miles. For Pakistan it is supposed to be a lake rather than a marsh so it holds that the international norms of boundary demarcation of lakes should apply to it. On the other hand, India rejected Pakistan’s claim arguing that there had been a well established boundary running along the northern edge of the Rann in the pre-partition maps thus claiming full title to the disputed area.(64) Up to 1960 the dispute remained unresolved but dormant. Later, in 1965, the dispute culminated in a military engagement. The boundary question was referred to the India-Pakistan Western Boundary Case Tribunal chaired by a Swedish judge, Gunnar Lagergren. Alec Bebler of Yugoslavia was appointed by India, and Nasrollah Entezam of Iran by Pakistan while the Swedish judge was jointly selected by the other two judges. Both sides agreed before the tribunal that their dispute should be limited to the boundary to the north. In February 1968, the tribunal awarded 350 square miles area to Pakistan. Prime minister Indra Gandhi at first contended but later accepted the award in the spirit of arbitration.(65)

**Kaul 07** (Dushyant Kishan Kaul, researcher writing with the World Mediation Organization, “Kashmir Conflict: The Role of Mediation and International Law in Dispute Resolution”, 2007, [http://worldmediation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/paper-19-for-WMO.pdf DoA 3/27/19](http://worldmediation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/paper-19-for-WMO.pdf%20DoA%203/27/19) )


One of the most serious consequences of this insurgency was the mass exodus of the minority Kashmiri Pandits. Pretty much the entire community was wiped out by 1990 and this strengthened Pakistan’s demand to take control over the Muslim majority in Kashmir. The secular voices were attacked and these extremist movements actually swayed many peoples. It is strongly suggested that Pakistan played a major role in propelling this divide. India has repeatedly sent out a message to its neighbor to stop this state-sponsored terrorism. Pakistan has retorted saying India has failed to abide by Security Council Resolutions and denies any funding of fundamentalists and terrorist groups. It is interesting to note that India and Pakistan failed to seek third party negotiations to come to a solution, largely due to their fear of a repeat of the Security Council mediation episode, which proved to be a failure. The legal framework needed to be looked at rather than approaching the dispute from a political viewpoint, something that the Council failed to do. Post 1990, a series of talks between the neighboring counterparts took place and in 1997, eight working groups were formed to resolve the Kashmir issue, only to be thawed by the Kargil war in 1999. The UN was approached first in 1947, no concrete progress can be said to have taken place in Indo-Pak relations. The reason lies in the Security Council treating this as a political conflict instead of a legal one. This has given India and Pakistan a certain amount of political leverage over the state and the Council has had to accede to the demands from both nations owing to their differing political standpoints on the issue. Tracing the historical genesis of this dispute has naturally made the UN a fair mediator. However, it has been unable to take a permanent stance on the developments since. What was required was a far more strict approach to the issue. For instance, ceasefire violations by Pakistan on numerous occasions have not been met with no-nonsense response as was needed. Likewise, India has indeed refrained from carrying out the democratic mandate of a plebiscite to carry the idea of self-determination to its conclusion. Instead of leveling allegations time and again, bilateral negotiations ought to have been respected and adhered to. That being said, India has on the receiving end of a series of attacks that makes cooperation that much harder

Hilali, A. Z. (1997). Kashmir dispute and UN mediation efforts: An historical perspective. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 8(2), 61–86.doi:10.1080/09592319708423174 // JJ  
The history of the Kashmir negotiations is marked by a series of failures, lack of trust and mutual suspicion on the part of both Pakistan and India. Several times negotiations took place but ultimately ended without constructive result. India never accepted any proposal concerning demilitarisation and holding a plebiscite in Kashmir. In this perspective Kashmir is still a most important irritant between India and Pakistan. However, the trouble of Kashmir is wholly indigenous and India's stand on the issue is morally bankrupt and politically indefensible. Throughout the earlier years till the present day the Kashmir has been a source of misery, tension, instability and bloodshed in South Asia. India had no hesitation in backing out from all commitments and is not willing to accept UN resolutions. India claims that UN resolutions have lost their relevance. Although UN resolutions (13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949) are undisputed and an inviolable principle - the principle of the right of selfdetermination, which forms the cornerstone of many international charters and declarations designed to establish national and human rights around the world on firm foundations. The two resolutions determine the nature of the Kashmir dispute and are a lasting order of the UN's highest body against Indian attempts to subjugate a nation and occupy its land. As for the plebiscite, it is an option given to the people of Kashmir by the world to exercise their free will and determine their future.

Hilali, A. Z. (1997). Kashmir dispute and UN mediation efforts: An historical perspective. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 8(2), 61–86.doi:10.1080/09592319708423174 // JJ  
The United Nations Commission's plan for a ceasefire and Truce Agreement was formalised in its resolution of 13 August 194848 which proposed that: Question of the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite; a plebiscite will be held when it shall be found by the commission that the ceasefire and truce arrangements set forth in parts I and II (regarding the ceasefire and withdrawal of Pakistani troops in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, respectively) of the Commission's Resolution of 13 August 1948 have been carried out and arrangements for the plebiscite have been completed; the Secretary General of the United Nations will in agreement with the commission, nominate a 'plebiscite administrator' who shall be. a personality of high international standing and commanding general confidence.49 The two governments agreed to issue ceasefire orders within four days of both governments' acceptance of the resolution and the commission would appoint military observers to supervise observance of the ceasefire orders. It was included in plans for the Pakistani government to secure the withdrawal of the tribesmen who were in the state for military purposes. After these had left, and as Pakistan's regular forces were being withdrawn, the bulk of Indian troops were also to be evacuated in stages as agreed upon by the commission. Only those were to remain which would be necessary to maintain law and order. The commission did not attempt to establish machinery for a plebiscite and only called upon the parties to reaffirm the principle that the future state of Kashmir would be determined in accordance with the will of the people. Disagreement between India and Pakistan over such phrases as the status of 'Azad Kashmir', what 'the bulk of Indian troops' meant, and who 'local authorities' were resulted in a virtual deadlock of the situation as the commission departed from Geneva on 19 September 1948 and India resumed its military offensives in the same month.

Karen Wellens, 1990, “Resolutions and Statements of the United Nations Security Council 1947-1989 : A Thematic Guide”,

<https://books.google.com/books?id=lsyOVH6E-PEC&pg=PA325&lpg=PA325&dq=1965+september+22+unsc+pakistan+india&source=bl&ots=-vzfR9wIXf&sig=ACfU3U0qn5idxiHj1yT1nrv6QUvJwsU9Zw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiB8ZCTs4rhAhVMqlkKHdAkCww4ChDoATAAegQIChAB#v=onepage&q=1965%20september%2022%20unsc%20pakistan%20india&f=false> // JJ



**Singh 17** (Yoshita Singh, 3-9-2017, "India offers to give up veto 'for now' for UN Security Council seat," Rediff, [https://www.rediff.com/news/report/india-offers-to-give-up-veto-for-now-for-un-security-council-seat/20170309.htm DoA 3/19/19](https://www.rediff.com/news/report/india-offers-to-give-up-veto-for-now-for-un-security-council-seat/20170309.htm%20DoA%203/19/19))

We are, as a matter of respect, willing to consider them and have them tabled along with our proposals in a composite text,” the statement said, adding that for the nations’ and UN’s credibility to be sustained, it is time for “honest engagement and exchange on the basis of a text.” The bloc said it believes there is an “imbalance of influence” within the Security Council between the permanent and non-permanent members and expansion only in the non-permanent category is not going to solve the problem. “It will actually widen the difference between permanent and non-permanent members even more, tilting further the scales in favour of a dispensation that was valid in the special situation in 1945 but is no longer now,” the G4 statement said. Akbaruddin said a “balanced enlargement” in both categories is necessarily the only way to ensure an equilibrium that reflects the current situation and any reform that does not address expansion of both categories will be “incomplete and futile”. “Expansion of non-permanent membership is a solution which adds to the size without addressing the malaise that afflicts the Council,” he said in the statement. The statement suggested that new permanent members can be democratically elected through an appropriate initial election process and subjected to mandatory and detailed review process after a specific time-period so as to ensure accountability. Some member states have “conflated and confused” regular elections to the Council with accountability, the G4 said. “Ensuring a perpetual campaign mode is not the best form of accountability,” it said.

### ~~~IMPACT LEVEL~~~

### AT: IP Conventional War

1. **Delink:** **Khan ’12 of the Eurasia Review** writes that both powers are too afraid a war would escalate to a nuclear one, so they won’t risk it. This is what happened in 2001 – even after a terrorist attack on their parliament, India mobilized its armed forces but refrained from attacking because the costs would be too high.

Ikram Khan, Eurasia Review, 3-25-2019, "Nuclear Pakistan: Defence Vs Energy Development – OpEd", http://www.eurasiareview.com/26072012-nuclear-pakistan-defence-vs-energy-development-oped/ // JJ  
We must be clear that nuclear weapons are here to maintain peace and stability between Pakistan and India. Pakistan was forced to run its nuclear weapon program due to India’s nuclear weapon program and its hegemonic ambition. Pakistan has long said that its nuclear weapon program is security driven. While on other hand Indian nuclear weapon program is not security driven, rather it is based on its regional and global aspirations. The security threats still exist for Pakistan, but due to its credible nuclear deterrence Pakistan is capable of crushing such threats or plans. In the recent past, the tragedy, which many historians remember as the “Fall of Dhaka”, carries some lessons for us to be learnt. If India could intervene at that time, then it is quite possible it could intervene in Baloachistan. Now the nuclear capability of Pakistan deters India from perusing any kind of intervention because of the fear of perceived consequences. It is Pakistan’s credible nuclear deterrence capability that effectively neutralizes any ill intent of its opponent against its integrity and sovereignty. It is evident that after the December 13, 2001 terrorists attack on Indian Parliament, India mobilized its armed forces to attack on Pakistan, but refrained from doing so as it realized that any such irrational action would lead to a nuclear war. The same was the case after Mumbai attacks on November 26, 2008 – the nuclear deterrence prevailed and it prevented the likelihood of an all out nuclear war in South Asia. It is our national responsibility that we should strengthen our strategic institutions with our moral support, rather unnecessarily criticizing the sincere efforts of our strategic community. Learn by heart: the stronger is our the national defense, the stronger would be the national development and, vise versa, the stronger is our national development, the stronger will be that of the national defense. Nuclear weapons prohibit the leaders to take any irrational steps, even a minor one, which can lead towards nuclear war. The Cuban Missile crisis 1962 was the occasion when a war was imminent between USSR and the USA. It was only the credible threat of nuclear use that directed the political leadership of both superpowers to defuse the crisis with political means.

### AT: IP Nuke War

1. **Delink: Ganguly ’08 of Harvard University** writes that mutually assured destruction ensures the costs of war are too high for either party to risk it, which is why no recent conflict has led to nuclear war.


Sumit Ganguly, 2008 , "Nuclear Stability in South Asia", Harvard University Press, International Security vol. 33, no. 2, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nuclear-stability-south-asia // JJ  
An examination of the onset, evolution, and termination of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises between India and Pakistan suggests that nuclear deterrence is robust in South Asia. Even though the 1999 crisis erupted into a war, its scope and dimensions were carefully circumscribed. Despite its conventional capabilities, India chose not to cross the Line of Control (the de facto international border in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir), and it avoided horizontal escalation of the conflict. India’s restraint cannot be attributed either to timely U.S. intervention or to a concern about avoiding a bellicose international image. Instead a highly jingoistic regime, which had defied international public opinion the previous year through a series of nuclear tests, chose to exercise restraint because of Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons. In 2001, despite grave Pakistani provocation through a series of terrorist attacks, India could only respond with a strategy of coercive diplomacy.

### AT: IP Miscalc

1. **Delink:** Miscalc isn’t an issue. **The Arms Control Association ’18** writes that India has two separate hotlines to calm tensions and avoid large-scale conflict. **DH News** confirms that this hotline has been empirically successful – for instance, de-escalating ceasefire breaches in 2018.

Arms Control Association, April 2018, "Hotline Agreements", https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Hotlines // JJ  
India–Pakistan Nuclear Hotline In 2004 India and Pakistan agreed to set up a telephone hotline between the most senior officials in their foreign ministries respectively to prevent a nuclear incident. The two states have fought three wars since they both gained independence in 1947, and were dangerously teetering on the brink of nuclear conflict in 2002. In 2004, along with the establishment of the hotline, both states limited command and control structures, and reaffirmed that each side would continue to uphold the moratorium on nuclear tests. After the 2008 Mumbai attacks from Pakistan had upset the relations between the two states. Three years later in 2011, India and Pakistan set up a “terror hotline”. The hotline warns each party state of possible militant attacks and moves them to restore the trust between each other.

DH News, 5-29-2018, "India, Pak agree to stop ceasefire breach", Deccan Herald, https://www.deccanherald.com/international/pak-india-dgmos-agree-no-ceasefire-violations-hotline-contact-army-672314.html // JJ



### AT: Water War

1. **Delink:** Guruswamy ’19 of The Asian Age writes that India cannot physically turn off water to Pakistan.

2. **Delink:** This is an empty threat. If they were to cut off water, India would actually flood their own country, according to **Romshoo ’19 of the University of Kashmir**, in the Kashmir valley.

3. **Delink:** **Romshoo** continues that the Indus Water Treaty enjoys high popular support, and breaking it would anger Nepal and Bangladesh, which is why the two countries went to war twice in the 1900s and never once cut off the other’s water supply.

4. **Outweigh on timeframe:** **Romshoo** writes that it would take 10 years to dam up these rivers.

Mohan **Guruswamy**. 4-3-2019, "India can’t turn off Indus water flow to Pak," The Asian Age, <https://www.asianage.com/opinion/columnists/230219/india-cant-turn-off-indus-water-flow-to-pak.html>

After the Uri incident, Prime Minister Narendra **Modi said: “Blood and water cannot flow together**.” Now the BJP’s PM-in-waiting Nitin Gadkari has chipped in by saying that India will cut off water to Pakistan. This must be music to the shakha crowd, but it is far from reality. By implication Mr Gadkari was **repeating the old threat that India would retaliate, this time for Pulwama, by turning off the spigots of the three western rivers of the Indus basin that flow unhindered into Pakistan and sustains most of its agriculture and power generation. The truth is that the flow of blood can be stopped, but water will continue to flow.**The Indus river system has a total drainage area exceeding 11,165,000 sq km. It is the 21st largest river in the world in terms of annual flow. It is also Pakistan’s sole means of sustenance. The British had constructed a complex canal system to irrigate the Punjab region of Pakistan. Partition left a large part of this infrastructure in Pakistan, but the headwork dams remained in India, fuelling much insecurity among the Punjabi landowning elite in that country. The World Bank brokered the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan after many years of intense negotiations to allocate the waters of the Indus river basin. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and President Ayub Khan signed the treaty in Karachi on September 19, 1960.  The World Bank brokered the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan after many years of intense negotiations to allocate the waters of the Indus river basin. After the Uri incident, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said: “Blood and water cannot flow together.” Now the BJP’s PM-in-waiting Nitin Gadkari has chipped in by saying that India will cut off water to Pakistan. This must be music to the shakha crowd, but it is far from reality. By implication Mr Gadkari was repeating the old threat that India would retaliate, this time for Pulwama, by turning off the spigots of the three western rivers of the Indus basin that flow unhindered into Pakistan and sustains most of its agriculture and power generation. The truth is that the flow of blood can be stopped, but water will continue to flow. The Indus river system has a total drainage area exceeding 11,165,000 sq km. It is the 21st largest river in the world in terms of annual flow. It is also Pakistan’s sole means of sustenance. The British had constructed a complex canal system to irrigate the Punjab region of Pakistan. Partition left a large part of this infrastructure in Pakistan, but the headwork dams remained in India, fuelling much insecurity among the Punjabi landowning elite in that country. The World Bank brokered the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan after many years of intense negotiations to allocate the waters of the Indus river basin. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and President Ayub Khan signed the treaty in Karachi on September 19, 1960. According to the IWT, control over the three “eastern” rivers — the Beas, the Ravi and the Sutlej — was given to India, while control over the three “western” rivers — the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum — to Pakistan. Since Pakistan’s rivers flow through India first, the treaty allowed India to use them for irrigation, transport and power generation, while laying down precise regulations for India building projects along the way. The treaty was a result of Pakistani fears that, since the source rivers of the Indus basin were in India, it could potentially create droughts and famines in Pakistan, especially at times of war**. Since the ratification of the treaty in 1960, India and Pakistan have fought three wars, but the flow of water as per the treaty was not hampered even for a single day**. On the face of it the pact is seen as generous to Pakistan as it gives the lower riparian state 80 per cent of the water of the western rivers. **But the reality is that IWT makes a virtue of a necessity, as it is the geography of the region that decides this rather than any altruism**. The main Kashmir Valley is just 100 km wide at its maximum and 15,520.30 sq km in area. While the Himalayas divide the Kashmir Valley from Ladakh, the Pir Panjal range, which encloses the Valley from the west and the south, separates it from the great plains of northern India. This picturesque and densely settled Valley has an average height of 1,850 meters above sea level but the surrounding Pir Panjal range has an average elevation of 5,000 meters. Thus, **the Pir Panjal range stands between the Kashmir Valley and the rest of the country and is an insurmountable barrier that precludes the transfer of water anywhere else. And neither do the contours of the Kashmir Valley allow for more waters to be stored in any part of it. Since the waters cannot be stored or used by diversion elsewhere, it has to keep flowing into Pakista**n. Of the three western rivers “given” to Pakistan, the Indus, which debouches from Indian territory near Kargil, then flows almost entirely in Pakistan-controlled territory. The Jhelum originates near Verinag near Anantnag, and meanders for over 200 km in the Kashmir Valley before it enters Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. After flowing through Srinagar, it fills up the Wular Lake and then traverses past Baramulla and Uri into PoK. The hydel projects constructed on it supply most of the electricity to the Valley.   The Chenab, also known as the Chandrabhaga, originates in Lahaul Spiti in Himachal Pradesh and flows through the Jammu region into the plains of Pakistani Punjab. The catchment area of the Chenab is elongated and narrow and is mostly in India. But the Chenab runs through deep valleys and the river drops by as much as 24 meters per km, imposing physical constraints and huge economic costs on harnessing it.The three eastern rivers allocated to India by the IWT are the Beas, Ravi and Sutlej. These waters sustain agriculture in Punjab and to some extent Haryana, and are substantially used. What enters Pakistan is usually just enough to keep the stream flushed. But nevertheless Pakistan has from time to time blamed India for its floods to the sudden and deliberate release of storage gates. Despite this, **the IWT has worked exceedingly well for both countries, and both are loathe to disturb it. Even when India and Pakistan went to war in 1965, 1971 and over Kargil in 1999, the waters flowed without interruption. The fact is that the IWT works because it suits both countries by making a virtue of the geography.** The Pulwama incident has fuelled much anger within India and the Narendra Modi government, which rode to power promising to deter Pakistani-origin terrorism in India by threatening retribution is now hard pressed to deliver. After Uri, it discovered that there is a wide yawning gap between promise and reality. The PM’s pre-election speeches are now being played back to him to taunt him. The Modi government is flailing for options short of the use of arms. Thus, the somewhat exasperated suggestion seemingly made by the Modi government that it would take a relook at the treaty. It can take a relook it till kingdom come, but the reality remains the same. As Dr Shakil Ahmad Romshoo, head of earth sciences at the geology and geophysics department of the University of Kashmir, recently said: “**Let us assume we stop the water supply for the sake of argument. Where would the water go? We do not have infrastructure to store this water. We have not built dams in J&K where we can store the water. And being a mountainous state, unlike Tamil Nadu or Karnataka, you cannot move water to another state.So you cannot stop the water technically.”**

Dr. Shakil Ahmad Romshoo, 2-22-2019, "'If you stop water to Pakistan, you will flood J&K," https://www.rediff.com/news/interview/if-you-stop-water-to-pakistan-you-will-flood-jk/20190222.htm // JJ  
What can be the implications for Pakistan if we stop the water? You cannot do that and let us assume we stop the water supply for the sake of argument. Where would the water go? We do not have infrastructure to store this water. We have not build dams in J&K where we can store the water. And being a mountainous state, unlike Tamil Nadu or Karnataka, you cannot move water to another state. So you cannot stop water technically. Take another example of water flowing from Uttarakhand or Himachal Pradesh. We do not leave this water to Pakistan, but use it in Rajasthan. Will there be flooding in India if we stop the river waters from entering Pakistan? Yes, the Kashmir valley will flood as will Jammu. You just don't have the storage capacity. We never developed diversion canals which could have taken this water to some other state. In Kashmir you do not need too much water for irrigation purposes. If you look at the Indus Waters Treaty, India is entitled to store water, but has failed to develop that infrastructure in J&K. The People's Democratic Party has always stated that J&K suffers losses because of the Indus Waters Treaty. That is a different aspect. If you see this treaty you will find that the people of J&K can use the water for non-consumption. We can use it for electricity. We cannot have dam projects. Even the National Conference had argued that this treaty was negotiated during 1960 and that the people of J&K were not taken into confidence and their government should be given compensation. These political parties were objecting because there are several restrictions on the usage of water.

Dr. Shakil Ahmad Romshoo, 2-22-2019, "'If you stop water to Pakistan, you will flood J&K," https://www.rediff.com/news/interview/if-you-stop-water-to-pakistan-you-will-flood-jk/20190222.htm // JJ  
Will the World Bank step in if India abrogates this treaty? For many reasons it is not possible. Both countries are happy about this treaty. There are so many trans-boundary rivers in the world and countries have to find a mechanism to share water. All over the world the Indus Waters Treaty is referred as our most successful treaty. In the last 55 years India and Pakistan have gone to wars in 1965 then 1971 and Kargil too, but nobody spoke in past about scrapping this treaty. At this moment we are sharing water with Bangladesh and Nepal too. If we scrap this treaty we will scare these countries as well. So you should check out who is talking about scrapping this treaty. These are military generals or hawks. I don't think officially this is India's position.

Dr. Shakil Ahmad Romshoo, 2-22-2019, "'If you stop water to Pakistan, you will flood J&K" https://www.rediff.com/news/interview/if-you-stop-water-to-pakistan-you-will-flood-jk/20190222.htm // JJ  
There is a belief that scrapping this treaty would teach Pakistan a lesson. Technically, it is not possible. Even if you put infrastructure to do so, it will take you 10 to 15 years to build (canals to divert the water). J&K is a mountainous state and you will have to build canals to take the water out of the state.

### AT: India Starts War

1. **Delink: Sawhney ’19 of The Wire** writes that India doesn’t have the capability or political will for war.

2. **Delink:** **Sawhney** continues that India would never go to war because a) Pakistan would retaliate, making the costs too high, and b) China would get involved, risking India’s destruction.

Pravin Sawhney, February 28, 2019, "Narendra Modi Knows War With Pakistan Is Not an Option," Wire, https://thewire.in/security/narendra-modi-pakistan-india-pulwama-war // JJ  
A war by India is ruled out for a number of reasons. India does not have the capability, capacity and political will for war. A war is much more than localised army action on the Line of Control; it involves the air force and numerous enablers like space, cyber, electronic (to jam communications) and so on. It is certain that any crossing of the LoC by the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force (IAF), or the use of stand-off weapons or long-range artillery guns from within our own territory, would be met with an equal response from Pakistan. Moreover, a war between India and Pakistan would quickly involve China too in some form. Since the Pakistan Army is responsible for security of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which is the designated flagship of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative, the People’s Liberation Army’s support to General Headquarters, Rawalpindi against India is assured. For example, the recent United Nations Security Council statement condemning Jaish-e-Mohammed for the dastardly Pulwama attack was delayed because [China was keen](https://thewire.in/diplomacy/pulwama-unsc-statement-india-us-china) that the phrase ‘state of Jammu and Kashmir’, which Indian wanted, be replaced by India-administered Kashmir, which suited Pakistan.

### AT: Pakistan Starts War

1. **Delink:** Pakistan won’t start the war. **Jadhav ’14 of Reflector** writes that Pakistan would, in all likelihood, lose any Indo-Pak war, so it would never take the risk. This is historically backed, as **Rajagopalan ‘17** explains that Pakistan has responded to perceived Indian aggression by backing down because the Indian military has huge strategic advantages and has 7 times more military funding than Pakistan. Pakistan is rational and has no interest in escalation.

2. **Delink:** **Aamir ’19 of the South China Morning Post** writes that Pakistan can’t afford to aggress on the border, as it is in the depths of an economic crisis.

3. **Delink:** An act of aggression wouldn’t spiral into all-out war. **Satish ’16 of OMICS International** writes that, regardless of Pakistan’s provocations, India is deterred from significantly retaliating because Pakistan has threatened them with nuclear weapons.

Adnan Aamir, March 2, 2019, "Why India and Pakistan will not go to war any time soon," South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2188233/india-and-pakistan-are-not-going-war-any-time // JJ  
Moreover, Pakistan cannot afford to be adventurous on its eastern border given its own state of crisis. Pakistan is in the midst of a [severe economic crisis](https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2180498/pakistan-secures-further-us2b-funding-china-avoid-economic) – the country is facing a severe devaluation of its currency and running out of foreign exchange reserves to pay for imports. After assistance [from China](https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2180498/pakistan-secures-further-us2b-funding-china-avoid-economic) , Pakistan has now turned to [Saudi Arabia](https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/2169911/desperate-pakistan-welcomes-saudi-arabias-us6-billion-bailout) to keep its economy functioning. Therefore, on the eve of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s [visit to India](https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/2186992/saudi-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-agrees-work-india), Pakistan has no incentive to sanction an attack against Indian paramilitary forces. Pakistan cannot afford an intense confrontation with India due to its economic woes.

Pranaav Jadhav, 10-21-2014, "Conventional war unlikely between Indo-Pak nations", Reflector, http://www.reflector-online.com/opinion/article\_bc0be81a-58b0-11e4-be30-001a4bcf6878.html // JJ  
Finally, let us come to the nuclear and one-on-one debate between India and Pakistan. Pakistan has a history of surprising its opponents; it has fought three official wars against India, in 1965, 1971 and 1999, all considerably won by India. Pakistan could have an initial advantage if it surprises India like it did in Kargil, but India’s military may still substantially decimate Pakistan. How do the numbers stack up? India’s defense budget ranks 8th in world with approximately $50 billion, while Pakistan’s ranks 27th with a $5 billion budget. Approximately 1.25 billion people live in India, and over 180 million live in Pakistan. India’s field troops in 2013 were close to 2 million over Pakistan’s 600,000. India has close to 90 nuclear warheads, over Pakistan’s 30 to 50, and finally, India has 1.26 million square miles of land versus Pakistan’s 307,374 square miles. A rational guess you can safely make is there is no comparison between the two countries. It will be unaffordable for Pakistan to kick-start a conventional war with India; an initial advantage cannot guarantee a victory. And therefore as most political scientists predict, a war is very unlikely between two nuclear powers in the Southeast Asian region. India is committed to never using nuclear weapons first, and Pakistan is unlikely to do so as well.

Satish OMICS International,1-29-2016, India s Major Power Status and its Impact on the Relations with the Neighbors Pakistan and China, https://www.omicsonline.org/open-access/india-s-major-power-status-and-its-impact-on-the-relations-with-theneighbors-pakistan-and-china-2151-6200-1000157.php?aid=68460, //CJ

**India and Pakistan were engaged in the wars at regular intervals since 1965, 1971, 1998 due to Pakistan’s support to the extremist ant insurgents in the disputed Indian Territory Jammu and Kashmir.** The unrest continues after nuclear tests from both sides in the year of 1998 following the Islamabad’s statement by Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed that, ‘We will not hesitate to use any weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity’. Major terrorist attack on Jammu and Kashmir in Oct 2001 followed by the attack on Parliament in Dec 2001 threatened the war, though merely resulted in major military manoeuvres by India, code-named Operation Parakram [1]. The lack of military retaliation by India despite grave provocation seems to suggest that India is successfully deterred by Pakistan’s nuclear capability and this in turn only fuels the eagerness of some elements within Pakistan to provoke India. Pakistan has adopted an “asymmetric nuclear escalation posture”, which has deterred Indian conventional military power and thus enabled Pakistan’s ‘aggressive strategy of bleeding India by a “thousand cuts” with little fear of significant retaliation’. If we will try to compare these states, Pakistan is not even one fourth of India while checking the numbers India is more than four time of Pakistan in size and in terms of population it is 8 times greater than Pak [2]. “As Pakistan averages only 300 miles in width, it is susceptible to a central assault that would split the country in two. A number of important Pakistani cities are close to the international border in the Indus River basin. **As Pakistan is thus extremely vulnerable to conventional attack by India’s larger military, it defines such an attack as an existential threat to the Pakistani state** [3].” Pakistani Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai thus outlined that Pakistan would use its nuclear weapons if: India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory; India destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land or air forces; India blockades Pakistan in an effort to strangle it economically; or, India pushes Pakistan into a state of political destabilization. This asymmetric escalation posture is designed for a rapid first use of nuclear weapons against conventional attacks, thus leaving India without the ability to punish terrorist attacks through conventional retaliation [4]. As elements within Pakistan continue to provoke India, this creates an extremely dangerous imbalance reliant on India’s restraint to maintain peace. Vipin Narang notes that, ‘Scholars who study the South Asian nuclear balance have argued that if a limited clash between India and Pakistan were to expand into a full-scale conventional war, escalation to the nuclear level would likely result’. Most of the “war-game” scenarios played out by the US military also foresee any conventional conflict between India and Pakistan escalating to the use of nuclear weapons within the first 12 days

**Rajagopalan 2017** (Rajesh Rajagopalan, Professor of international politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, “Escalate to deter the Pakistan Army,” May 5 2017, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/escalate-to-deter-the-pakistan-army/> DoA 3/29/19)

**India's reluctance to escalate so far is surprising for two reasons. One is that, logically, it is the stronger state that has the option to escalate.** India's conventional military superiority [may not be as great](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2015.1014473) as it should be given that [**India's GDP**](http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf)**is almost eight times as large as Pakistan's and India’s military budget is about**[**seven times**](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/04597222.2016.1127567)**larger** but **it is clearly the stronger side in the equation. And in a short offensive with specific territorial targets** (such as the Haji Pir pass, for example), **India's current superiority should be sufficient, especially since India should be able to gain tactical surprise**. **The Pakistan army** may know that India is gearing up for an attack along the LoC, but **it will not know where that attack might come. In short, the stronger side has more options, and a bigger margin for error, and India needs to recognise it. The second is that despite all the rhetoric about Pakistan's propensity to escalate, Rawalpindi has repeatedly chosen not to escalate. In Kargil, when India employed its air force, Pakistan complained and warned of escalation dangers but chose not to escalate. And the Pakistan army simply abandoned its Northern Light Infantry (NLI) troops. Similarly, in 2016, India's surgical strike did not lead to any escalation by the Pakistan army, despite almost two decades of constant threats to escalate.** In between, there have been repeated artillery duels and cross-LoC raids, not one of which the Pakistan army escalated**. If the Pakistan army was really so trigger-happy to escalate, it has had plenty of opportunity. That it has not so far escalated suggests that Pakistan army leadership knows that it will face significant and disproportionate cost if it escalated.**Indian military superiority might not be great enough to give it an easy win over Pakistan, but it is difficult to imagine Pakistan winning either. This is the key issue. **To the extent that Pakistan cannot win, there is little incentive for the Pakistan army to escalate. Much of the argument about escalation between India and Pakistan is based on the assumption that the Pakistan army will climb all these steps on the ladder, doubling-down on a losing bet until escalation reaches the nuclear level. But each of these steps represent an expensive and irrational gamble, and the Pakistani army leadership is not irrational. They have made bad bets** — Operation Grand Slam and Kargil definitely were — **but they have shown no propensity to double down when their initial gamble failed. Rather, they have usually chosen to walk away and find another game to play. Pakistan army's behaviour is perfectly rational: as is well-recognised, its domestic legitimacy is built on its role as defender of the Islamic Republic against India. If it cannot perform this basic duty, its domestic legitimacy will suffer, as will its outsized role in national politics, economy and society.** **It is not without reason that Pakistan disowned the NLI troops in the Kargil war or refused to acknowledge that India had conducted a retaliatory strike last year. More than anything else, the Pakistan army fears defeat at Indian hands. Despite its rhetoric, it fears escalation because escalation carries with it the very real possibility of a just such serious defeat.**Much like a Haka [**war dance**](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yiKFYTFJ_kw)**, Pakistan's threats are designed to intimidate but are not actual predictors of behaviour. It is this fear of escalation, which the Pakistan army has masked behind bombastic threats, that India needs to exploit. It gives India a clear deterrence leverage. But it also requires India to look to the actual behaviour of the Pakistan army leadership rather than assume that Rawalpindi's rhetoric is an indicator of how they will behave.**

### AT: 1999 Proves

1. **Delink:** The 1999 conflict was contained. **Ganguly ’08 of Harvard University** confirms that while the 1991 crisis led to a war, India and Pakistan avoided escalating the conflict much further. **This is exactly our narrative**: as the costs of war have increased, conflicts have gotten less and less likely. The mid-20th century wars between India and Pakistan were much more severe, because the costs were lower. Now, India won’t risk inciting conflict at all.

Sumit Ganguly, 2008, "Nuclear Stability in South Asia", Harvard University Press, International Security vol. 33, no. 2, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nuclear-stability-south-asia // JJ  
An examination of the onset, evolution, and termination of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises between India and Pakistan suggests that nuclear deterrence is robust in South Asia. Even though the 1999 crisis erupted into a war, its scope and dimensions were carefully circumscribed. Despite its conventional capabilities, India chose not to cross the Line of Control (the de facto international border in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir), and it avoided horizontal escalation of the conflict. India’s restraint cannot be attributed either to timely U.S. intervention or to a concern about avoiding a bellicose international image. Instead a highly jingoistic regime, which had defied international public opinion the previous year through a series of nuclear tests, chose to exercise restraint because of Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons. In 2001, despite grave Pakistani provocation through a series of terrorist attacks, India could only respond with a strategy of coercive diplomacy.

### BL: BMD Solves MAD

1. **The Economic Times ’18** writes that Pakistan developed capabilities to subvert BMD systems.

The Economic Times, 10-19-2018, "India's decision to buy S-400 missile system will further destabilise region: Pakistan”, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indias-decision-to-buy-s-400-missile-system-will-further-destabilise-region-pakistan/articleshow/66285174.cms // JJ  
The Foreign Office also claimed that following the May 1998 nuclear tests by both sides, Pakistan had proposed a Strategic Restraint Regime in the region, advocating against the acquisition of BMD systems due to their destabilizing effect. "Indian rejection of this proposal forced Pakistan to develop capabilities which render any BMD system ineffective and unreliable," it said. Pakistan remains fully confident of its ability to address threats from any kind of destabilizing weapon system, the Foreign Office said.

## Sino-Indian Conflict

### AT: Sino-Indian War

1. **Delink:** **Das ’09 of TVP** writes that China will never go to war with India because

a) the two nations are interdependent on one another, and

b) China would face the wrath of the international community.

2. **Delink:** Despite skirmishes persisting for decades, war has not and will not break out between China and India. This is because **Markey 15** of the **Council on Foreign Relations** outlines a number of conditions that have to be met before war is even possible.

a) A series of disputes must happen either in quick secession or simultaneously

b) US policy-making and preventive efforts must fail and

c) All efforts at communication between the two countries – which have succeeded every time there was a skirmish in the recent past – must fail.

Even if all of these things happen, Markey continue that full-out warfare is unlikely as the United States will immediately work to limit the costs of confrontation, meaning the greatest risk is merely the potential for “dozens of deaths.”

Saurabh Das, 8-24-2009, "China Not A Threat to India," TVP, http://theviewspaper.net/china-not-a-threat-to-india/ // JJ  
China is a major economic and military power in Asia as well as in the world. China’s vested interest in Taiwan and in the South China Sea is known to the entire world. China almost started the process of knocking Taiwan out but fortunately because of 2008 Olympics it had to abort the bid. China’s clash with Vietnam is also known to the world and so its resolve to own Spartley islands, politically or forcibly. China is already busy in Xinjiang region trying to calm the Uighur separatist movement and trying its best to hold Tibet. The military intervention in Taiwan is a possibility in any day now and war of words with Vietnam has already started. So China is too busy in other matters which are, for that country, are much more important than engaging India. Secondly, India’s relation with China is improving and the fruit of it is the recognition of Sikkim as an integral part of India, which China was reluctant to accept in the past. The joint military exercise with India which was held last year shows that the Chinese mindset that it doesn’t consider India as its enemy. Thirdly, India is a big market for Chinese goods and India contributes a significant share in China’s economy. Both India and China complement each other economically as China is a major hardware producer while India produces software which are complementary to each other. Both China and India are global powers and do have considerable influence in Asia. So even if China plans to attack India it has to think about the considerable economic price it has to pay at the cost of its national interest. Fourthly, India is now a global player and if China attacked India, it has to face the wrath of all developing as well as developed nations. China is already facing criticism about the Tibet issue. Tiananmen Square has already brought in lots of negative publicity and the nature of the Chinese government’s secrecy and closeness is under discussion. So by attacking India, China will be in trouble and India is equally prepared and India will not submit like 1962. Indian Army is the third largest army in the world and is respected worldwide in terms of its operation capabilities. Indian Air Force pilots are some of the best pilots and India does have a Navy which can do considerable damage to any country in Asia. Moreover India is now capable of hitting Beijing and Shanghai with nuclear bombs which is enough to deter China from attacking India.

Daniel S. **Markey**, 11-18-**2015**, "Armed Confrontation Between China and India," Council on Foreign Relations, [https://www.cfr.org/report/armed-confrontation-between-china-and-india //](https://www.cfr.org/report/armed-confrontation-between-china-and-india%20//) RM

**The China-India relationship is remarkably stable in many ways.** Bilateral summits and new multilateral groupings often bring the two Asian giants together in common cause. **Both sides clearly appreciate the value of peace as a way to expand their trade and investment ties and to enable a continued focus on economic development at home.** Yet important differences and suspicions persist; some date back to 1962, when India lost a short but decisive war to China. Others relate to the rising global ambitions, military capabilities, and political and economic influence of these two Asian neighbors. Although **Beijing and New Delhi have repeatedly demonstrated a mutual desire to prevent conflict and mitigate tensions when they arise and have avoided a serious violent clash since 1967**, the potential for their relationship to deteriorate is ever present. **No single issue or crisis is likely to produce this result. However, a series of disputes in quick succession or their simultaneous emergence could lead to an armed confrontation worse than any since the 1960s.** **A border clash could inflict dozens of casualties**, jolt global markets, hurt regional economic growth, and undermine cooperative China-India efforts on regional and global issues of concern to the United States, including counterterrorism and counterpiracy, even if both sides managed to avoid a more serious military escalation. Every year, China and India claim hundreds of incursions by the other across the line separating them in the Himalayas. **The United States has a major interest in preventing armed confrontation between China and India. If preventive efforts fail, however, U.S. policymakers should work to limit the immediate costs of a confrontation and to avoid unnecessary new points of friction with Beijing.** But in doing so they should seek to resolve the crisis on terms that favor a closer U.S.-India partnership.

The Contingencies: Under normal circumstances, **India and China** are likely to **have sufficient desire and capacity to prevent any single point of friction from sparking a military crisis.** Yet if more than one dispute were to unfold at the same time, the risk of escalation would grow as positions taken in one conflict could complicate the management of another. Leaders would have stronger political and strategic incentives to avoid backing down, fearing the costs of domestic opinion and sacrificed leverage on the other dispute. Of the conceivable differences that could arise between China and India, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is the most likely theater for an armed confrontation. Three other conceivable disputes have the greatest potential to aggravate tensions and spark a crisis that could result in military escalation. Skirmish along the LAC. Every year, China and India claim hundreds of incursions by the other across the line that separates them in the Himalayan region, near the politically sensitive areas of Kashmir and Tibet. Many of the flare-ups can be traced to the practical challenge of managing a contested border in difficult, mountainous terrain; over time, **forces on both sides have developed signals to warn the other and avoid deadly clashes.**

### AT: Chinese Retaliation

1. **Delink:** **China Daily ’05** writes that China actually does support India’s bid for the Security Council, so they would have no reason to retaliate. **Pillalamarri ’15 of the Diplomat** confirms that China views India on the UNSC as a benefit, because they vote similarly in international decisions. In addition, China views India as an unbiased counterweight to usher in a multipolar world.

2. **Delink:** This argument doesn’t make any sense. **Schaefer ’97 of the Heritage Foundation** writes that, in order to add India to the Security Council, an amendment would have to be approved by all of the P5 members. In a world where India has permanent membership, China had to have approved it.

Brett Schaefer, Heritage Foundation, 9-22-1997, "The United States Should Oppose Expansion of the U.N. Security Council", https://www.heritage.org/report/the-united-states-should-oppose-expansion-the-un-securitycouncil-0 // JJ  
Expanding the Security Council requires an amendment to the U.N. Charter. It must be approved by two-thirds of the General Assembly, including all permanent members of the Security Council, and be ratified by their legislatures. In the case of the United States, the amended charter must be passed by two-thirds of the Senate, some members of which have been highly critical of the Clinton Administration's plan. Senate leaders should put President Clinton on notice that they will reject any amendment to the U.N. Charter that includes an enlarged Security Council. Pressure to Expand the Security Council During the drafting of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council was described as the first among six equal bodies in the U.N. system, including the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice. The Security Council, however, indisputably is the U.N.'s premier political body, both because it is charged with maintaining international peace and because the General Assembly must abide by its resolutions. Nearly every important U.N. decision must originate in or be approved by the Security Council. For example, the Council nominates candidates for Secretary General as well as new members of the General Assembly. It also is the only body that can initiate U.N. peacekeeping missions and impose economic sanctions.

China Daily, April 12, 2005, "China tells Japan: Face up to history", No Publication, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/12/content\_433525.htm // JJ  
"Japan must adopt an earnest attitude and appropriate ways to deal with major principled issues concerning the feelings of the Chinese people," he said, "The Japanese have to do more things conducive to enhancing mutual trust and maintaining the relations between the two countries, rather than doing the reverse." China supports India's bid for UNSC seat Wen said China supports India's bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. "We fully understand and support the Indian aspiration to play an even bigger role in international affairs and in the UN," Premier Wen said while addressing a question at a press conference before winding up his four-day visit to India. He said he had conveyed the support to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during their talks here. China attaches "great importance" to India's role in both international and regional affairs, Wen said, adding "India is a very populous developing country and also a very important developing country".

Akhilesh Pillalamarri, The Diplomat,2-13-2015, China Should Back India for a Permanent UN Security Council Seat, Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-should-back-india-for-a-permanent-un-security-council-seat/, //CJ

On Thursday, multiple Indian media outlets were abuzz with the ‘story’ that the Chinese government had stated that it had no objections to India and Brazil joining the United Nations Security Council as permanent members. **While this story was, in fact, not true, and an exaggeration, the recent Chinese position is that India should play a greater role at the United Nations.** **This position was articulated at a recent meeting between the Chinese, Russian, and Indian foreign ministers in China. Despite the lack of explicit Chinese support for an Indian bid to join the UNSC as a permanent member, India should make the most of China’s favorable position to press China to support its bid. India and China often vote together at international forums despite their bilateral differences and border disputes. Moreover, an India on the UNSC would provide a neutral and independent counterweight to other powers, and would help usher in a more multipolar world**, as many Chinese analysts wish for. Despite being a liberal democracy, India has supported Russia and China on issues of non-interference in the affairs of other states and would help balance the UNSC away from the Western bloc. China would be more favorable towards an Indian bid or a larger Indian and Brazilian role at the U.N. than the bids of Japan and Germany. Japan and Germany, along with Brazil and India form the G4 nations grouping, an informal agreement among the four nations to support each other’s bids to join the Security Council. However, their bids are all opposed by regional rivals, such as Pakistan for India’s bid, and Argentina for Brazil’s bid.

## IMF Conditionality

### AT: IMF Loan Now

1. **Delink:** Modi’s policies have been exceptionally effective at promoting economic growth, and the IMF agrees. **Mourdoukoutas ’18 of Columbia University** writes that, according to the IMF, India’s economy has been hailed as on track to beat China. This means that a) India doesn’t need a loan, and b) the IMF certainly isn’t interested in giving them one when there are far poorer countries.

Panos Mourdoukoutas, Professor of Economics at Columbia University, April 21, 2018, "India's Economy On Track To Beat China", Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2018/04/21/indias-economy-on-track-to-beat-china/#577de2675136 // JJ  
Prime Minister Narendra Modi may be unpopular among Indian citizens lined up in front of empty ATM machines lately, but his policies seem to have helped the Indian economy regain momentum and be on track to beat China’s economy. On economic growth rates that is. The Indian economy is expected to grow at an annual rate of 7.4% in 2018 and 7.8% in 2019, according to a recently [released](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2018/03/20/world-economic-outlook-april-2018) IMF Economic Outlook. India’s economy is “lifted by strong private consumption as well as fading transitory effects of the currency exchange initiative and implementation of the national goods and services tax,” notes the report. “Over the medium term, growth is expected to gradually rise with continued implementation of structural reforms that raise productivity and incentivize private investment.” India’s projected 2018-19 growth rates are well above China’s 6.6% and 6.4% over the same period. And things could get even worse for Chinese economic growth over the long-term, due to the continued rise of the country’s nonfinancial debt. “Over the medium term, the economy is projected to continue rebalancing away from investment toward private consumption and from industry to services, but nonfinancial debt is expected to continue rising as a share of GDP, and the accumulation of vulnerabilities clouds the medium-term outlook,” notes the IMF report.

### AT: Conditions Good

1. **Turn: Chossudovsky ’93 of the University of Ottawa** writes that conditions on IMF loans to India in the 90s forced India to give up fertilizer subsidies, pushing millions of farmers into poverty.

Michel Chossudovsky, Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Ottawa, March 6, 1993, "India Under IMF Rule", Economic and Political Weekly, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4399453.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae1223dc710d8906a7b851195bd36d334 // JJ  
In India, more than 70 per cent of rural households are smal and mainal fanrers or landless farm workers representing a population of over 400 million people. In irrigated areas, agricultural workers are employed for 200 days a year, and in rain- fed farming for approximately 100 days. The phasing out of fertiliser subsidies (an explicit condition of the IMF agreement) and the increase in the prices of farm inputs and fuel is pushing a large number of small and medium sized farmers into bankruptcy. In turn, millions of landless farm workers belonging to the scheduled and backward castes-already well below the official poverty line-will be crushed by the new economic policy. These are 'the untouchables of economic policy' For the upper-caste elites, the scheduled castes are people who really do not matter, the im- pact of the IMF's 'economic medicine' on these sectors of the labour force has been carefully overlooked. For the IMF and the government, there are no 'exit policies' for the unorganised sectors: "the cottage in- dustries have no problems because the wages will go down".3

## Peacekeeping



### Weighing

1. **Turns Case:** **The UN ’19** reports iN a GrApHiCaL cHArT that India really only provides slightly more than 6% of overall peacekeepers. This means that, in either world, there will be a significant number of peacekeeping operations. The question is whether we can reform them.

2. **Strength of link:** **Rappa ’18 of the Global Peace Operations Review** writes that peacekeeping is globally declining for a variety of other reasons: some naturally winding down, budgets decreasing, global pressure.

3. **Timeframe:** We’ve denied India a seat on the UNSC for years and they haven’t actually retaliated.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/1_summary_of_contributions_16.pdf>



[Ryan **Rappa**; Global Peace Operations Review. “Reversing the Trend: UN Peacekeeping in 2017” March 28, 2018. <https://peaceoperationsreview.org/thematic-essays/trends-un-peacekeeping/>]

Recently, however, this trend has reversed**. Peacekeeping forces are down to about 92,000 as of January 2018. While certain countries like China have continued to step up the number of peacekeepers and dollars they contribute, the overall trend has been downsizing, which started in 2015 and accelerated in 2016 and 2017. This is in part due to pressure from the U.S. and other member states to reduce the scope of UN activities and budgets, but the main driver in 2017 and early 2018 appears to be the natural winding down of several longstanding peacekeeping missions, including UNMIL in Liberia, MINUSTAH in Haiti, and UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire. A few missions saw reductions in authorized troop levels as well, notably UNAMID in Darfur and MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. After the closure of UNMIL on March 30, 2018, there will be 14 ongoing peacekeeping missions, down from 16 in 2016.**

### AT: Ends Peacekeeping

1. **Delink:** India isn’t being altruistic when they provide peacekeepers. They benefit too, which means these are empty threats and they won’t actually stop doing so. There are two ways India benefits:

A. **Cabuyao ’14 of the School of International Studies** writes that because India is able to further its national interests, and look good in the eyes of major international players through committing peacekeepers.

B. **Taneja ’15 of The Diplomat** writes that these missions help India train its troops, improving combat readiness.

2. **Analytical delink:** The U.N. isn’t just going to let peacekeeping operations fail. If India weren’t supplying these troops, other countries would be.

3. **Link turn:** The **Stanley Foundation** explains that India doesn’t want to see peacekeeping end, they just want to use smarter tactics to reform it. For example, **Day ’19 of World Politics Review** reports that the UN could use data-based methods to systemically track peacekeeping efforts and save more lives. But only if India has a seat on the UNSC, can they push for these reforms.

**Stanley Foundation**, <https://www.stanleyfoundation.org/articles.cfm?id=769&title=A%20Smarter%20Approach> // RM

If **a withdrawal is out of the question**, **then India’s only recourse against the dangers of peacekeeping is a smarter approach to its present and future contributions. India will likely take more care in choosing new missions by instituting a reform process.** Another key strategy, and challenge, will be encouraging other countries to step up their contributions. **India does not want to see UN peacekeeping end, nor does it want to play any role in weakening the foundations of present or future missions.** The South Sudan attack has not unleashed a wave of cynicism in India. Instead**, it has highlighted the changing nature of peacekeeping as India seeks to start what will hopefully be a worldwide discussion about a smarter approach to using blue helmets.**

[Day 19] Peacekeepers should adopt techniques the UN is already using to become more efficient

Adam Day, 02-28-19, Can Data Save U.N. Peacekeeping?, No Publication, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/27479/can-data-save-u-n-peacekeeping, // ZMC  
The U.N.’s Department of Peace Operations has taken some steps toward better use of data. The Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise, or SAGE, in theory has begun to allow peacekeeping to track incidents systematically and begin developing a system of data-driven protection. Other innovations, such as the Comprehensive Performance Assessment System, which is beginning to focus U.N. monitoring and evaluation more on impact, and other new IT platforms are gradually strengthening data collection and may eventually lead to “smart peacekeeping.” And the U.N.’s internal office of oversight has made efforts to track protection responses with the large amounts of data that can be extracted, with great effort, from the system. In some places, like Haiti, tech-driven peacekeeping has already shown promising results. So data can be put to work. But if peacekeeping is to show that the billions of dollars it spends patrolling war-torn countries does in fact save lives, it should systematically use the cheap and easy tools at its disposal. Transitioning from a paper fragmentary order to an electronic one would be an easy and cheap first step, allowing the U.N. to track its patrols in real time and compare responses to incidents as they are reported. Other steps, such as GPS trackers on U.N. troop vehicles, would build an even more sophisticated picture of when and where the U.N. is acting to carry out its protection mandate. This is already being done for civilians in the U.N., with electronic movement of personnel forms and GPS trackers in civilian vehicles. It would be easy and cheap to apply these simple tools to the troops. Using data to tell a story of peacekeeping may not be popular. Troops that do not patrol much, or that refuse to leave their barracks during an attack, will have nowhere to hide when the press—and hopefully the secretary-general—comes for them. Many troop contributors may not like the idea of being under the spotlight, but those are almost certainly the underperformers. In contrast, the thousands of peacekeepers who regularly respond to protection threats in a fast, effective manner should welcome this opportunity to showcase their work, as should the secretary-general’s Action for Peacekeeping initiative. With this minimal shift toward smart peacekeeping, the U.N. has an opportunity to show clearly that it does save lives.

[**Priscilla Cabuyao; S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies**; UN Peacekeeping: Bangladesh, India and Pakistan’s Troop Contributions; June 18, 2014; http://www.e-ir.info/2014/06/18/un-peacekeeping-bangladesh-india-and-pakistans-top-troop-contributions/]

For almost a decade, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India have consistently been the top 3 contributors of troops for UN peace operations. It is ideal to think that this trend is a clear manifestation of the three states’ pure commitment to international peacekeeping. However, **the reality is that UN peacekeeping is an instrument for the top 3 contributors to pursue economic, professional, and political interests. Their active participation in UN peace missions is reciprocated by a number of benefits and rewards.** The international community could regard Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh as valuable, responsible, and reliable supporters of peacekeeping, and this is perfectly fine, however, **it cannot be denied that behind their consistent performance in peacekeeping are motivations and goals that are difficult to disregard and leave behind.**

Kabir **Taneja** (Scholar at The Takshashila Institution). “India's Infatuation With the UN Security Council.” The Diplomat, 27 April 2015, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/indias-infatuation-with-the-un-security-council/>.

Of course, South Asian countries are not participating entirely out of altruism. **India takes advantage of what UN peacekeeping missions offer. The missions are a chance to bolster the combat readiness at UN expense**; for Bangladesh, they are an opportunity for airmen to get some flying time. In 2013, two Indian peacekeepers died in South Sudan after Neur rebels targeting the majority ethnic Dinka community, which sought shelter at the base, attacked their UN compound. In fact, **both South Sudan and Sudan are diplomatically important to India – Sudanese oil fields were the first overseas fields to receive Indian investment – and they remain an integral part of New Delhi’s diplomatic maneuvering against China in Africa.**

### AT: Peacekeeping Bad – General

1. **Internal link defense:** Peacekeeping may be harmful, but India’s peacekeepers aren’t. **Mishra** **’06 of the Indian Journal of Political Science** writes India has an eye to the interests of the developing world, which is why its peacekeepers are far less violent, and look for diplomatic solutions to crises in places like Somalia and Mozambique.

Manoj Mishra, June 2006, "India’s Permanent Membership of the UN Security Council: Changing Power Realities and Notions of Security", The Indian Journal of Political Science, pg. 343-354, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41856221.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A89d205da252a7ad291ce18142480eed9 // JJ  
India's geo-strategic interests in the stability of newly emerged nation-states of Africa, and their well-being has also been more than adequately demonstrated by India's contributions and participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Congo, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Liberia, and Rwanda. In Somalia Indian soldiers remained for a long period and did the finest job, while West European countries and the US obsessed with classical notions of security withdrew their forces as soon as the situation took a dangerous shape, which was nothing but a reflection of their deeds. But it was realized that the same performance cannot be replicated everywhere as situations differ. In case of Sierra Leone, India contributed 3000 soldiers, which has been the ever highest from Indian side. It is argued there were no strategic interests that India had during this operation. Elections have been conducted in Mozambique after years of conflict mainly due to India's efforts (Nambiar, 1995: 13). All these instances substantiate the point that India has found its national interests in the peace and stability, development, maintenance of close political and cultural links with the states in the Afro- Asian region. Secondly and most importantly, a country can have only Third World security perspective if its national interests flatly square with Third World security interests.

### AT: Peacekeeping Bad – Sexual Assault

1. **Delink:** They’re only giving you half of the story. **Blah ’17 of the Journal of Strategic Analysis** writes that India has encouraged a policy of zero tolerance among its peacekeepers, which is why no U.N. peacekeepers from India have violated these rules since 2015.

[Montgomery **Blah** (2017). *India’s Stance and Renewed Commitment to UN Peacekeeping. Strategic Analysis, 41(3), 257–272.*doi:10.1080/09700161.2017.1295605. http://sci-hub.tw/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700161.2017.1295605?src=recsys&journalCode=rsan20]

However, **there have been a few cases of misdemeanours committed by Indian armed forces deployed as peacekeepers. A UN report revealed that Indian peacekeepers were accused of sexual exploitation and abuse in three cases during 2010–2013**. In this context, while participating at a debate on peacekeeping operations at the UN headquarters in November 2015, M**ember of Parliament Rahul Kaswan lamented that such abuse scarred the lives of men, women and children, and stated that India took note of such cases with the utmost seriousness.** **India asked the UN to ensure zero tolerance while dealing with cases of sexual exploitation in peacekeeping operations**, which disgraced and embarrassed the world body.29 These few cases notwithstanding, **Indian peacekeepers have not been deterred from maintaining international peace and security. In fact, according to the latest report of the UN Secretary-General on the special measures required to protect people from sexual abuse and exploitation, no Indian peacekeepers were involved in any wrongdoing for the period beginning from January 1 to December 31 2015 or only the year of the report i.e. 2015.**

## Council Clog

### Weighing

1. **Magnitude:** The Security Council is already very, very inefficient. Any increase in inefficiency is marginal.

2. It’s preferable for the Security Council to make better, delayed decisions than more immediate but destructive ones.

### AT: Efficient Now

1. **Non-unique:** **DePetris ’16 of The National Interest** writes that the Council has functionally become a “debating society”, where the P5 can agree on little. This is why the war in South Sudan raged on for so long, because the major powers on the Council couldn’t agree on a solution.

Daniel R. DePetris, 9-22-2016, "The Collapse of the UN Security Council", National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/the-collapse-the-un-security-council-17800> // JJ  
Although the 2016 U.N. meetings seem quite similar compared to others held over the last several years, this week’s debate comes at a time when the international community is inundated with problems in virtually every region of the world. With the exception of a landmark peace agreement that ended five decades of conflict in Colombia, every region is experiencing some degree of threat that could spiral to a whole new level if the international community as a whole and regional governments in particular are unable to find a way to address them. The list is endless and depressing: a humanitarian abomination in Syria and daily terrorist attacks in Iraq; the rise of anti-immigration parties in Europe and the biggest challenge to the EU since its foundation; a North Korea on a full tear towards a permanent nuclear weapons capability; Russia flexing its military and diplomatic muscle in the former Soviet Union; and China increasingly carving out more territory for itself in the South China Sea. The United Nations was created nearly seventy years ago to ensure that crises that pop up around the world are either mitigated to the greatest possible extent or are solved in a way that doesn’t promote further conflict. After tens of millions of people perished in World War II, the last thing the world wanted was a return to a full-scale armed conflict that produced nothing but more death and societal destruction. At the top of the U.N. pyramid, of course, is the Security Council — a body of the world’s most geopolitically vibrant countries, each with a veto, responsible for the “ [maintenance of international peace and security](http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/index.html) ” in global politics. If an armed conflict, a natural disaster, an atrocity committed by a government, or a nuclear weapons breakout occurred somewhere around the world, it is up to the Security Council to determine the best course of action in a unified and collective way. And in theory, every U.N. member state is required to uphold the council’s decisions. Today, it isn’t a stretch to say that the Security Council is not living up to those obligations. Indeed, what was originally thought to be a body where conciliation and unity between the world’s major powers would avert further war has changed into a forum that resembles a meaningless debating society. But what’s even worse than a meaningless debating society is one whose membership is composed of highly antagonistic actors constantly at each other’s throats regardless of the issue. On Syria, the rivalry and differences of opinion between the United States, France, and the U.K. on one side and Russia on the other has had a devastating impact on the Council’s work in general and on the Syrian civil war in particular. When the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. [accuses Moscow](http://usun.state.gov/remarks/7437) of duplicitous, hypocritical behavior in public and walks out of the chamber when Russia’s Ambassador gets up to speak during a meeting, the outcome is not only a deterioration in relations between two major powers but a further impediment to the Security Council’s work. On South Sudan, a nation that has undergone such a horrific civil war over the past two and a half years that no one knows the full scale of the casualties, [debate over an arms embargo](http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/05/last-call-to-cash-in-on-a-vicious-civil-war-south-sudan-arms-embargo/) on all parties to the conflict degenerates into a never-ending delay with no decisions made other than to do more of the same — a delay that allows the South Sudanese government and the rebel movement the opportunity to acquire more weapons and ammunition for further fighting down the line. On nuclear non-proliferation, the Security Council hasn’t done much of anything. Nuclear weapons reductions are the purview of Washington and Moscow, and if both are reticent to agree to further decreases in their arsenals and launch pads, there isn’t much the Security Council as a body can do about it. North Korea presents an altogether different conundrum for the Security Council. While the five permanent members all agree that stopping Kim Jong-un from further nuclear and ballistic missile testing and working towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the long-term goal, commitment towards that goal varies depending on where one sits in the neighborhood. And even when the Security Council passes comprehensive sanctions regimes on Pyongyang like they did [this past March](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2270.pdf) , implementation is a completely different story. The purpose of pointing out all of these trouble spots is not to argue that the world is on fire. It isn’t; global poverty is steadily declining, more countries in the developing world are finding it a priority to address climate change as a top-tier national security issue, and democratic systems of governance are still the name of the game. The reason, rather, is to rehearse a tired argument that is nonetheless getting more prescient by the day: the Security Council has lost its luster and is no longer the elite decision-making body that its members often advertise. Instead, it’s the international equivalent of the U.S. Congress — nasty words, politicization, and an inability to be pragmatic in order to achieve something of far greater significance than oneself. Solutions will be hard to come by. Enlarging the Security Council’s permanent membership in order to better conform to the 21st Century has long been a desire for those who want better representation in the system, but enlarging it could create more discord and gridlock if the rules and bylaws aren’t changed in the process. I don’t know what the solution would be, but acknowledging what the problem is a good the first step. Kevin Rudd, Australia’s former prime minister, [has written](https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/IPI-ICM-UN-2030-Chairs-Report2FINAL.pdf) that “while the UN today is not broken, it is in trouble.” The Security Council, as part of the U.N., is just as bad.

### AT: (Link) Slows Down

1. **Turn:** **Agarwal ’18 of the Observer Research Foundation** writes that India is pushing to reform the peacekeeping process and accelerate the proceedings of the Security Council.

Pallav Agarwal, 12-10-2018, "70 years of peacekeeping: Achievements, challenges and need for reforms," ORF, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/70-years-of-peacekeeping-achievements-challenges-and-need-for-reforms-46135/ // JJ  
It is against the idea of a more robust peacekeeping and wants greater allocation of funds. India wants that the UNSC should decide peacekeeping operations within 30 days or a maximum period of 90 days in order to avoid tragedies because of delays. India also wants the involvement of experts from various fields in peacekeeping in order to better deal with emerging challenges. There should also be a sound exit policy for peacekeepers. New Delhi has a huge role to play when it comes to introducing reforms to peacekeeping. The Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping Operations, part of the A4P initiative, has highlighted the crucial areas for reforms. For instance, improving the safety of peacekeepers, holding them accountable for their actions, strengthening protection provided by peacekeeping forces, and finding political solutions to conflicts and enhancing the political impact of peacekeeping. India should take advantage of its rising global stature and should take a lead in order to make this arm of the UN more effective.

### AT: (Link) Spills Over

[See AT: spillover below]

### AT: I/L – Decreases Legitimacy

1. **Strength of link weighing:** **Ross ’16 of the Guardian** writes that there are many alternative causes to UN collapse: failings of the Secretary-General, and the world is no longer ordered by states -- yet the UN treats non-state actors as irrelevant.

Carne Ross, 3-10-2016, "The UN is failing. Is it heading the way of the League of Nations?", Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/mar/10/un-failing-league-of-nations-isis-boko-haram // JJ  
As good a place as any to witness the slow decline of the post-second world war global “order” is the [UN security council](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/17/70-years-un-security-council-key-moments) – if they would let you in, which they won’t. Don’t bother with that rarefied organ’s “public” meetings. None of its real diplomatic business is conducted in the open. In a reflection of the state of the world, the security council, which is charged with the maintenance of international peace, is busier than ever. Years ago, the council met for a few hours once or twice a week. These days it meets all day, often at night and weekends too. Overworked diplomats discuss an ever-lengthening agenda of crises, from North Korea to [Libya](https://www.theguardian.com/world/libya). The long list of meetings and committees may demonstrate the council’s energy in addressing the manifold factors behind modern conflict but it also reflects the council’s failure: it doesn’t take a diplomat to see that insecurity is spreading. Then there’s the semiotics. Once limiting itself to crisp, pointed decisions (such as its demands for Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories), its resolutions have grown ever longer and less intelligible. The council has designed five or six (no one can say with certainty) different categories of its public statements. There used to be one. Heads of UN missions tell me they cannot understand the confused mandates the council has given their peacekeepers. Governments I have advised say they have no idea of the meaning of resolutions directed at them. There are many reasons behind the [UN’s inability to stop the devastating war in Syria](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/21/medecins-sans-frontieres-plea-for-civilian-bombings-syria-stop), but it’s not good enough merely to blame Russia, as western diplomats tend to do. The disturbing truth is that the world’s primary institution to deal with war is not working. The basic problem is that the council’s founding premise of a world ordered by states no longer holds. Conflicts involving [al-Shabaab](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/29/somalia-attacks-signal-escalation-of-al-shabaab-offensive), [Boko Haram](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/04/join-us-or-die-birth-of-boko-haram) or [Islamic State](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/07/isis-planning-enormous-and-spectacular-attacks-uk-counter-terrorism-chief-warns) originate from particular local circumstances but often have regional and global reach and consequence. Designed to prevent and arbitrate state-to-state conflict, the council has failed to adapt to an entirely different world. On 12 September 2001, when I was part of the British delegation, I joined other shocked diplomats in the council chamber to condemn the previous day’s attacks. Long before that awful day in New York and Washington, the nature of political violence and global insecurity had already altered forever. But the council’s arrogant presumption that governments decide and the rest abide has not changed. The failure of governments and their multilateral institutions is epic. What seemed then like episodic and geographically limited threats have now morphed into permanent war, insecurity and extremist violence on almost every continent. Unfortunately, most of the debate about reform at the UN misses the point. Discussion revolves around the stale questions of new permanent members of the security council or restrictions on the use of the veto. Both are desirable but neither will happen soon – or fix the deeper problem. If we’re not careful, the UN will collapse into irrelevance, much as the [League of Nations](https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/nov/06/guardians-league-of-nations-susan-pedersen-review) failed in its day. This year, a successor to Ban Ki-moon will be appointed. We need a tough and independent secretary general who will give impartial and specific recommendations to the council, without fear or favour to the prejudices of the [“P5” permanent veto-wielding members](http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/), and with one over-riding prerogative: the protection of civilian life. In one notorious example, the head of UN peacekeeping failed to pass on warnings to the security council of [imminent genocide in Rwanda](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/714025.stm) because he believed its members didn’t want to hear them. An independent secretary general would long ago have demanded a ceasefire in [Syria](https://www.theguardian.com/world/syria) with clearly spelt-out consequences, including coercive sanctions, for those who breached it. Likewise, an international conference to agree and implement a timetable for the two-state solution for Israel/Palestine, a requirement endorsed repeatedly by the council and every member state of the UN. The secretary general would need the freedom to appoint a strong, experienced team, with appointment on merit and not the traditional divvying-up of senior jobs among the P5, a practice that institutionalises their unhealthy dominance, not only within the council but also of the secretariat and the information it conveys to the council. Officials have admitted that certain UN reports are edited by permanent members before delivery to the security council (I did it myself once). There are taboo issues, such as [Chechnya](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/23/chechen-leader-ramzan-kadyrov-threatens-whole-of-russia-opposition-warns) or tensions in the [South China Sea](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/28/whats-behind-beijings-drive-control-south-china-sea-hainan), which are banished from the council’s agenda because it is “understood” but never publicly admitted that certain powerful countries forbid their discussion. In recent years, it was confrontation over Kashmir that brought the world closest to nuclear war, yet mention of this hotspot is tacitly prohibited too. The UN investigations into its failure to prevent mass killings in Rwanda, [Srebrenica](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/04/how-britain-and-us-abandoned-srebrenica-massacre-1995) and Sri Lanka all identified serial weaknesses, both political and institutional. But no one should be confident that such tragedies will be competently addressed in future. The need for a brave and decisive new secretary general is literally a matter of life and death, in fact many deaths. Despite the claim that the security council now holds more public meetings than ever, the vast majority of its substantive negotiations are conducted in private. I spent four and a half years in the council and never saw a good reason why most of its deliberations should remain closed to public scrutiny except to disguise the frequent superficiality and poverty of its debates (though occasionally privacy may help negotiation). Televising parliaments has improved democracy. Diplomats should be judged by what they say: a weak form of accountability but an improvement on its total absence today. Transparency in the diplomatic dealings at the UN would render the resulting decisions more comprehensible and thus legitimate. The public would be more engaged, for instance, when the council discusses aid delivery to [besieged towns in Syria](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/11/madaya-more-starvation-deaths-as-aid-convoys-head-to-besieged-syrian-town). People might begin to care about what happens at the UN. Finally, there’s one simple reform the council could put in place tomorrow. It can listen to the people and parties affected by its decisions. When the council discusses Syria, Libya or [Somalia](https://www.theguardian.com/world/somalia), you can safely assume Syrians, Libyans or Somalis will not be present. It is indefensible that, despite the reality that almost all its agenda concerns conflict between “non-state” groups, the security council still only allows states to address it, and even that is not frequent practice when they are not members of the council. On rare occasions the council grants an audience to non-state parties – but only those it approves of. It should be routine practice that legitimate and representative parties present their views before the council takes decisions about their futures. After all, they know their countries – and conflicts – best. Diplomats should get used to dealing with more eclectic groups who must be persuaded if there is to be peace. Ending conflict requires multiple stakeholders in the room. This kind of work takes patience; it is already practised by the better mediators and diplomats. They understand that sometimes unwieldy coalitions and repeated rounds of talking (and listening) are more likely to effect peace than over-negotiated pieces of paper that almost no one reads. These improvements do not require the UN charter to be rewritten: they are already stated within it. There’s way too much deference to decades of musty and antediluvian tradition at the UN; a few determined and gutsy diplomats could make these changes happen. Beset by new forms of conflict, the world outside its gloomy chambers demands that the UN lets in some light.

## Prolif

### Weighing

1. **Strength of link:** There are a litany of other factors that affect whether or not a country develops nuclear weapons. For instance, domestic political sentiment, materials and capability, etc.


2. **Timeframe:** It takes decades to develop nuclear weapons.

### AT: Encourages Others to Prolif

1. **Non-unique:** They argue we’re endorsing all of India’s actions by supporting India in any way, but we’ve already done so. **Zakaria ’08 writes in his book “The Post-American World”** that the U.S. has already offered India a nuclear agreement, effectively normalizing its nuclear status and cementing relations between the two countries.

2. **Analytical delink:** This argument just doesn’t make any sense. The U.S. has retaliated against almost all other countries that have proliferated – countries have no reason to expect they would be treated like India is.

3. **Nonunique:** The internal link into their argument is upholding the legitimacy of the NPT, however, **Pedraza ’12 of the POR** explains that the NPT has begun to rapidly deteriorate in legitimacy this is because there is no international institution regulating it, as well as the discriminatory nature of the policy, that has pushed the unstable treaty to its demise. **Tannewald ’13 of the Watson Institute** confirms that the NPT is rapidly losing credibility as non-nuclear states have begun to feel unequally obligated while nuclear powers maintain their weapons.



Shamila N. Chaudhary, 2-28-2019, "Better late than never: US comes to its senses on India-Pakistan conflict", TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/432031-better-late-than-never-us-comes-to-its-senses-on-india-pakistan // JJ  
“We [support](https://thehill.com/opinion/international/we%20support%20India%E2%80%99s%20right%20to%20self-defense) India’s right to self-defense,” U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton said after Pakistan-based militant organization Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attacked Indian paramilitary forces in Kashmir on Feb. 14. We should all remember this statement as the moment Bolton reset India-Pakistan relations as we’ve known them since 1947. Once a deliberate and cautious backchannel intermediary on security flare-ups between the nuclear-armed rivals, the United States has taken yet another step back from Pakistan and one closer to India. What happens when the United States gives up its traditional role for one that, according to some in Pakistan, exacerbates the conflict? The consequences of that approach play out as we speak. This week’s Indian retaliatory strike in Balakot, Pakistan represents just the third [instance](https://theprint.in/defence/balakot-is-the-first-time-one-nuclear-power-has-used-air-strikes-on-anothers-territory/198384/) in history that a nuclear power has hit another nuclear power with conventional forces. The rarity of the situation should concern the United States, but a shifting geopolitical environment inevitably draws the Americans closer to India, regardless of the details of the current flare up. India proves useful in American attempts to contain China, which only continue to strengthen. Also, the complete U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan means the United States will rely on Pakistan less for use of its transit routes to support the war, expanding the political space to exert greater U.S. pressure on Pakistan’s links to anti-India militants.

Jorge Morales Pedraza ,6-1-2012, (PDF) Is the NPT an Effective International Instrument to Stop Nuclear Proliferation Without the Establishment of an International Organisation to Supervise the Implementation of its Provision?, ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260103818\_Is\_the\_NPT\_an\_Effective\_International\_Instrument\_to\_Stop\_Nuclear\_Proliferation\_Without\_the\_Establishment\_of\_an\_International\_Organisation\_to\_Supervise\_the\_Implementation\_of\_its\_Provision, //CJ

The different obligations between these two groups of States are very clear and by no means can be qualified as “balanced and non-discriminatory”. Article VI **calls nuclear-weapon State parties to begin negotiations with the purpose of pursuing nuclear disarmament, but regrettably without specifying when these negotiations should begin and conclude,** and the period during which the destruction of all nuclear weapons and the closure of all nuclear weapon production facilities should be carried out. Based on the wording of Article VI, nuclear-weapon State parties consider that they are not obligated to show now the necessary political will to begin, as soon as possible, negotiations of specific nuclear disarmament measures at the multilateral level and under strict international supervision, as requested many times by the international community. These countries have the opinion that they can fulfil their obligations under Article VI through bilateral agreements and unilateral actions. **It is evident that this group of States enjoys, under the current NPT’s provisions, certain privileges considered by many countries as completely discriminatory and unacceptable in the light of international law and the equality of States.** In this unique situation, the Canberra Commission in its report (1995) stressed the following: “**Nuclear weapons are held by a handful of States, which insist that these weapons provide unique security benefits, and yet reserve uniquely to themselves the right to own them. This situation is highly discriminatory and thus unstable; it cannot be sustained. The possession of nuclear weapons by any State is a constant stimulus to other States to acquire them”. Undoubtedly, the discriminatory character of the NPT is one of the main causes of the difficulties that this Treaty is now facing, which are impeding the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. These difficulties are putting in danger not only the existence of such regime, but also international peace, security and stability. In addition, there is no international organisation with the mandate of supervising the implementation of all Treaty’s provisions by its States parties, impeding an impartial verification on how these States are fulfilling its obligations and commitments**. The responsibility of supervising the exclusively peaceful uses of all nuclear programs in all NPT States parties has been assigned to the IAEA, organisation that was created in 1957, several years before the entered into force of the NPT, with a very specific mandate: the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under strict international control in order to avoid the military use of these materials.

Nina Tannenwald,9-16-2013, Justice and Fairness in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, Cambridge Core, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/justice-and-fairness-in-the-nuclear-nonproliferation-regime/DCE093FB8C2C5F3F743454F99EE8E4A1, //CJ

How much do these claims of justice matter? On one hand, we can be struck by how much the issues of justice and fairness continue to pervade negotiations over the NPT. Not surprisingly, **weaker parties appeal to fairness and justice considerations more often than stronger parties.** On the other hand, the nonproliferation regime has continued to persist over forty-five years despite ongoing complaints about discrimination and unfairness. Perhaps the fairness discourse is simply “cheap talk” and the NPT regime could just continue to muddle along. But as this essay has suggested, **unaddressed grievances about inequities in the regime have real consequences for outcomes: nonnuclear states that actually support the NPT are reluctant to agree to additional nonproliferation obligations that would strengthen the regime, including stronger safeguards, strengthened provisions on withdrawal from the treaty, and proposals regarding multinational fuelcycle arrangements**. Most critically, **the nuclear powers are unable to get the NNWS to care more about the noncompliance of Iran and North Korea,** the issue of most importance to the United States and its allies. Not all of this unwillingness can be traced to the nuclear powers’ foot-dragging on disarmament, of course. **Security threats or economic interests may also play a role in the reluctance of nonnuclear states to take on new obligations.** Nevertheless, **the evidence is strong that nonnuclear states withhold cooperation on nonproliferation because proposed new measures are perceived to impose unfair obligations**, not because such measures would be ineffective. As the Brazilian delegate to the April 2013 NPT PrepCom stated, “The measure of success of any review cycle . . . is whether it contributes to reducing the basic asymmetry inherent in the NPT. . . . We should therefore shun attempts to further increase the imbalance between the rights and obligations of NWS and NNWS.” **With the asymmetry unaddressed, the legitimacy of the regime is in the process of eroding, as is quite clear from the hedging strategies of various middle powers. Legitimacy is the generally held belief that a particular institution or rule is valid, appropriate, or proper and thus ought to be obeyed. Equity is a defining dimension of legitimacy. The legitimacy of the NPT is based on a principled justification of a temporary inequality, and a balancing of norms, rights, and obligations designed to limit, and ultimately eliminate, the fundamental discrimination of the regime.** The time horizon for resolving the inequality may be distant, but it cannot be nonexistent. Progress toward disarmament is important, as Nina Rathbun argues, because it “strengthens the legitimacy of the regime by creating the expectation that the special rights of the nuclear weapon states will end at some point in the future.” For the majority of states, the legitimacy of further nonproliferation measures, therefore, is dependent on progress on disarmament.

### AT: Encourages Indian Prolif

1. **Mitigate the impact:** **Kurshid et al ‘18** finds that, due to limited materials, India can produce only up to 1,044 nuclear weapons. This calculation assumes that they use civilian nuclear power generators and plutonium generators – they even note that the estimate is generous - meaning that even this estimate is rather high. The amount of weapons they can produce is finite so a slight increase in proliferation can’t change everything.

2. **Nuq/alt causal:** according to the **Nuclear Threat Initiative ‘16**, India has been growing their nuclear arsenal as a result of conflict with Pakistan. They conclude that that growth is not bound to stop soon, meaning a) it is unrelated to joining the UNSC but b) uniqueness controls the direction of the link at the point where they are already increasing proliferation the impact is minimal at best.

3. **Delink:** India sticks to the no first strike policy. **Siddiqui ‘19** of **Reuters** explains that while both India and Pakistan have comparable nuclear arsenals, India has vowed not to strike absent Pakistani threats or strikes. Consequently, **Siddiqui** concludes that if nuclear war were to break out, it would almost certainly be at the hands of Pakistan, not India. This means that proliferation doesn’t actually increase the risk of nuclear war unless they also prove that Pakistan proliferates and becomes more likely to strike. Even so, it’s not true that Indian proliferation leads to Pakistani proliferation as the **Arms Control Association ‘18** writes that Pakistan develops nukes primarily to counter India’s conventional military threat, not their nuclear threat.

4. **Nuq**; **Andleeb ‘18** of **Modern Diplomacy** explains that India has been on an increasing trend of developing nuclear weapons, noting that this trend is expected to continue going forward as they have already put aside money for further development. Uniqueness controls the direction of the link y’all know where I’m going with this.

[Syed Sadam Hussain Shah](https://thebulletin.org/biography/syed-sadam-hussain-shah/), [Syed Javaid **Khurshid**](https://thebulletin.org/biography/syed-javaid-khurshid/), 11-2-**2018**, "Estimating India’s nuclear weapons-producing capacity," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, <https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/estimating-indias-nuclear-weapons-producing-capacity/> // RM

**Using a different set of theoretical assumptions, and what we consider to be very credible mathematical formulas, we found that contrary to previous estimates, India has the capacity to produce many more nuclear weapons than generally assumed. We estimate that India could produce 1,044 nuclear weapons (914 plutonium-based and 130 uranium-based nuclear weapons), if one includes reactor grade materials from non-military programs in India, as well as that from the country’s weapon-grade nuclear material production program.**

**Nuclear Threat Initiative**, August **2016**, "Indian Nuclear Weapons Program," No Publication, <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/india/nuclear/> // RM

The country tested its first nuclear device in May 1974, and remains outside both the [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)](https://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/treaty-non-proliferation-nuclear-weapons/) and the [Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)](https://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty/). However, India has a facility-specific [safeguards](https://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/safeguards/) agreement in place with the [International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)](https://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/international-atomic-energy-agency/) and a waiver from the [Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)](https://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/nuclear-suppliers-group/) allowing it to participate in global civilian nuclear technology commerce. **India has a sizable and growing nuclear arsenal,** primarily **because of decades of conflict with neighboring Pakistan, which also possesses nuclear weapons.**

Zeba **Siddiqui**, 3-1-**2019**, "Factbox: India and Pakistan," U.S., [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-pakistan-nuclear-factbo/factbox-india-and-pakistan-nuclear-arsenals-and-strategies-idUSKCN1QI4O5 //](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-pakistan-nuclear-factbo/factbox-india-and-pakistan-nuclear-arsenals-and-strategies-idUSKCN1QI4O5%20//) RM

**India has a “no first use” policy, meaning it has pledged to not strike first**. It aims to make retaliatory strikes so powerful that an opponent would be unable to strike back. **Pakistan has not stated a “no first use” policy and there is little known about its nuclear doctrine. “Pakistan tends to use its nuclear capabilities to act as a deterrent for any kind of military intervention by India**,” said Grace Liu, a research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. “**If there had to be a first use between India and Pakistan it would seem that it would be by Pakistan**,” she said.

**Arms Control Association**, June **2018**, "Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance," No Publication, [https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat //](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat%20//) RM

China, India, and Pakistan are all pursuing new ballistic missile, cruise missile, and sea-based nuclear delivery systems. In addition, **Pakistan has lowered the threshold for nuclear weapons use by developing tactical nuclear weapons capabilities to counter perceived Indian conventional military threats.** North Korea continues its nuclear pursuits in violation of its earlier denuclearization pledges.

**Andleeb**, H. (**2018**). Shifting Disposition of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia. Modern Diplomacy. Retrieved 22 March 2019, from <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/12/04/shifting-disposition-of-nuclear-deterrence-in-south-asia/> // RM

Furtherance in conventional aspects may also provide justification to each side for launching nuclear weapon. India is continuously expanding its conventional arsenals according to the reports India is a leading buyer of conventional arms. Between 1999 and 2006, India totaled $22.4 billion in arms sales agreements, according to a 2007 report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service. That total made India first among all developing arms buyers during that period. India became the leading global arms importer in the period from 2007 to 2011, accounting for ten percent of total arms imports. **This trend is expected to continue, with an increase in defense spending. It is clear from the reports that India is continuously pursuing it malicious ambitions that are highly unfavorable for the region. The steps which have been taken by the India in furtherance of conventional aspects may damage the stability of the region.** It would also not be wrong to mention that actually India is confusing the purpose of deterrence. As a bigger state of the region India should lead from the front for the exploration of new horizons of Confidence Building Measures (CBM’S) with Pakistan in order to strengthen the stability of the region.

### AT: Topshelf Prolif Bad

1. **Turn: Suzuki ’15 of Dublin University** explains that, because proliferation increases the cost of war, it decreases violence. This is why **Tepperman ’09 of Newsweek** writes that, historically, nuclear weapons have led to the longest stretch of peace in almost all of human history.

Jonathan Tepperman, 8-28-2009, "How Nuclear Weapons Can Keep You Safe," Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/how-nuclear-weapons-can-keep-you-safe-78907 // JJ  
A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why--and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way--you need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side--and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button--and everybody knows it--the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring--because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time." The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it.

Akisato Suzuki, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, "Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests", Research & Politics 2:2, April-June 2015, Sage Journals//CJ

**The main findings reveal that the optimist expectation of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict is empirically supported**:9 first, a **larger number of nuclear states on average decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict; and second, there is no clear evidence that the emergence of new nuclear states increases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict**. Gartzke and Jo (2009) argue that nuclear weapons themselves have no exogenous effect on the probability of conflict, because when a state is engaged in or expects to engage in conflict, it may develop nuclear weapons to keep fighting, or to prepare for, that conflict. If this selection effect existed, the analysis should overestimate the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear proliferation in the above model. **Still, the results indicate that a larger number of nuclear states are associated with fewer disputes in the system. This conclusion, however, raises questions about how to reconcile this study’s findings with those of a recent quantitative dyadic-level study (Bell and Miller, 2015). The current paper finds that nuclear proliferation decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict**, while Bell and Miller (2015) find that **nuclear symmetry has no significant effect on dyadic conflict, but that nuclear asymmetry is associated with a higher probability of dyadic conflict. It is possible that nuclear proliferation decreases conflict through the conflict-mitigating effects of extended nuclear deterrence and/or fear of nuclear states’ intervention**, to the extent that these effects overwhelm the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear–asymmetrical dyads. Thus, dyadic-level empirics cannot solely be relied on to infer causal links between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict. The systemic-level empirics deserve attention.

**Waltz 2k**—Kenneth, pol sci prof at Berkeley (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter/Spring 2000, Interviewed by Jeremy Goldberg & Parag Khanna “Interview: Is Kenneth Waltz Still M.A.D. about Nukes?”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia_winspr00f.html>)

Journal Let’s turn our attention to the nuclear situation in South Asia. **While nuclear weapons may have arguably helped stabilize the contentious relationship between India and Pakistan**–no war has been fought since the introduction of nuclear weapons in the early 1970s–**many observers worry that nuclear stability may not hold. What do you see as the prospects for stability?**Waltz **Stability in the subcontinent now exists; it had not existed since World War II and the partition of India and Pakistan. Now with nuclear weapons on both sides, India and Pakistan can no longer fight even a conventional war over Kashmir, as former General Beg and former General Sardarji both admitted. But we still fear instability**such as the intractable dispute over the Kashmir. **Yet the bitterness between the United States and the Soviet Union was deep**enough during the Cold War, **and deterrence worked. Why would India and Pakistan be different? Does India and Pakistan’s common border increase the risk? Probably not**in a modern world where there are airplanes and missiles that can reach anywhere. What difference does it make that you’ve got a common border as long as it’s perfectly easy for the two countries in an adversarial relationship to reach each other? **Geographic proximity may shrink warning time, but nuclear deterrence does not depend on being able to react with split–second timing**. What’s the hurry? If you have received a damaging blow from another country and you’re going to retaliate, what difference does it make if you retaliate now, ten minutes from now, or tomorrow?**A country still has that same fear of the retaliation, and it’s that fear of retaliation that deters.**

### AT: I/L – Irrationality

1. **Internal link defense:** Irrational leaders probably would have developed nuclear weapons anyway.

2. **Internal link turn:** **Forsyth ’12 of the University of Denver** explains that nuclear weapons actually moderate aggressive leaders by raising the costs of their actions.

Forsyth ’12 [James Wood Forsyth Jr., PhD, currently serves as professor of national security studies, USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He earned his PhD at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver. He has written on great-power war, intervention, and nuclear issues, “The Common Sense of Small Nuclear Arsenals,” Summer, Strategic Studies Quarterly, http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/summer/forsyth.pdf]   
Whatever its logical shortcomings, it is important to stress that deterrence worked—it kept the Cold War “cold” and allowed international life to go on without a catastrophic nuclear war. After 70 years, most analysts agree on the basic dynamics of deterrence, and the contemporary debate regarding deterrence, when not addressing the problem of nonstate actors, tends to pivot on force structure considerations. 19 Here, the behavior of states with small nuclear arsenals is instructive. As previously mentioned, most states with nuclear arsenals have not acquired large numbers of nuclear weapons. Instead, they appear content with a relatively small arsenal capable of warding off an attack as well as dissuading others from interfering in their internal and external affairs. But of the two roles nuclear weapons seem to play—deterrence and dissuasion—is one more important than another? For India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons play a decidedly deter­ rent role. But if one were to free Britain of its NATO obligations, who exactly would Britain be deterring today? What about France? Neither of these countries is as hard-pressed in the security arena as India or Pakistan, yet both hold on to nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons still “hold power at bay,” one must wonder whose power is being held at bay and how. It is important not to overinterpret this. Nuclear weapons serve a purpose. How else can one explain why nine states have them, while others appear to want them? But what purpose do they serve, in general? To answer that question, one must look at what nuclear weapons do for states. Among other things, nuclear weapons socialize leaders to the dangers of adventurism and, in effect, halt them from behaving or responding recklessly to provocation. 20 Statesmen may not want to be part of an international system that constrains them, but that is the system that results among nuclear powers. Each is socialized to the capabilities of the other, and the relationship that emerges is one tempered by caution despite the composition, goals, or desires of its leaders. In short, nuclear weapons deter and dissuade.

### AT: I/L – SS >> Accidents

1. **Delink:** **Waltz ’00 of UC Berkeley** writes that small nuclear states don’t require extensive beaurocracy and are exceedingly cautious with their nuclear weapons.

Kenneth Waltz, Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, vl nl, Winter/Spring 2000, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia\_winsprOOf.html, accessed 8/11/02   
The new proliferants are mainly, but not entirely, weak states. Pakistan and India are good examples of new nuclear powers that are going to have only a small number of nuclear warheads. The United States has at least seven thousand strategic nuclear warheads. If you have thousands of nuclear warheads\* then you need elaborate bureaucracies to control the arsenal. But if you have ten nuclear warheads or fifty, you are going to cherish those nuclear warheads. You obviously feel that you need them, and therefore you have every reason to be very careful. The accidents and near-accidents that have taken place with nuclear warheads have been, as far as I know, accidents on the part of the major nuclear powers and not the small ones.

## Spillover

### Topshelf Colonialism Turn

1.**Turn:** The UN was founded in colonialism and remains that way today, **Jackson ‘9 of Berkeley** explains that continued exclusion of countries like India is the pillar for which P5 members can wield worldly power over formerly colonized nations. **Gorman ’17 of the University of Waterloo** explains that for India, and other developing nations continued denial from the UNSC have institutionalized their status in post-colonial positions of sufferance.

Marissa Jackson ,1-17-2009, Berkeley Journal of African-American Law & Policy, https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1096&amp;context=bjalp, //CJ

The Empire 's New Clothes: Colonialism defined, Colonialism Refined, Colonialism Dead and Revived **The current world order seems to be almost entirely a product of colonialism.** 20 For example, even though African nations have achieved independence from their colonial rulers, international law-uti posseditis21- requires that the colonial boundaries which created these nations still be respected. This should come as no surprise because **the largest organ of international law-The United Nations-is a colonial creation. It is an entity in which the world's former colonial powers and the United States wield much more influence than formerly colonized nations**.22 Despite the end of formal colonialism throughout most of the world, colonial history is still celebrated worldwide. In Barcelona, at the city's port, tourists take photos under the monumental statue of Christopher Columbus, erected to pay tribute to his "discovery" of America. In New York City, Columbus Circle is a city landmark, transportation hub and shopping complex. The landmark is complete, with statues of overweight, nude Native Americans and statues of Columbus himself. In the subway tunnels under Columbus Circle, murals created by New York City public school students celebrate the so-called discovery of America by Christopher Columbus. One mural stands out, a depiction of very sad Native Americans, for whom Columbus' arrival was no cause for **celebration. A central feature of colonialism is its ability to hide. For colonialism of any form to be successful, and immune from the protests of the colonized, it must be an unmarked standard. Because colonialism creates power for the colonizer, it allows the colonizer to create knowledge.23 The colonizer can therefore tell the colonized that it is, in fact, free, even as the colonized sits in shackles. For this reason, colonialism parades itself as the pinnacle of civilization despite the base, inhumane horrors with which it is naturally 24 accompanied. Even today, colonialism still has supporters such as Dinesh D'Souza, who maintain that colonialism "immeasurably enriched" the colonized, and their descendants. 25 D'Souza also argues that colonial oppression made it possible for colonized peoples to experience freedom by giving them something to fight against 6-an argument that is unconvincing at best, but also itself fundamentally colonial.** According to Ania Loomba, "By the 1930s, colonies and ex-colonies covered 84.6 percent of the land surface of the globe."27 She defines **modem**, European **colonialism as "the conquest and control of other people's land and goods'** 28 and the "midwife that assisted at the birth of European capitalism." 29 Loomba also contends that the colonialism's "geographical sweep, and... heterogeneous practices and impact over the last four centuries" make it difficult to "theorise". 3 Loomba's definition is helpful, but only focuses on physical theft of property and resources. This Note focuses more broadly on power and domination, and therefore broadly **conceptualizes colonialism as an extension of a nation's sovereignty, and the maintenance thereof which infringes on the sovereignty of other nations or peoples. This extension can be one of territory or of sovereignty, and therefore includes imperialism and neo-colonialism**.

Daniel Gorman, 4-19-2017, UN History Project, University of Waterloo, https://www.histecon.magd.cam.ac.uk/unhist/image-of-the\_month/image\_of\_the\_month\_Apr17.html, //CJ

The Janus-faced nature of India’s engagement with the UNSC was most evident concerning Jammu and Kashmir. The First India-Pakistan War began on 26 October, 1947, after Pakistani-supported Pathan tribesmen rebelled and marched towards Srinagar, the Jammu and Kashmir capital, to overthrow its ruler, the Maharaja Hari Singh. He responded by seeking Indian support, which Nehru gave at the price of ceding Jammu and Kashmir to India. Nehru sent troops to Jammu and Kashmir, and on 1 January 1948, on the advice of Lord Mountbatten (then India’s Governor General), submitted the dispute to the UNSC under Article 35 of the UN Charter, claiming Pakistani aggression. After hearing charges and counter-charges from each side, the UNSC passed Resolution 38 (requesting each side to de-escalate) and Resolution 39, which established a three-member UN Commission on India-Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate the facts on the ground. UNCIP operated from 1948-1950. The British diplomat Sir Owen Dixon (UN Representative for India and Pakistan) administered UNCIP, with the former League of Nations refugee director Eric Colban as Principal Secretary. UNCIP military observers, such as the American and Canadian shown in the above photograph, were responsible for mediating a ceasefire between Indian and Pakistani forces, and facilitating demilitarization ahead of the planned plebiscite on Jammu and Kashmir’s sovereign status. Whereas Resolutions 38 and 39 were measures of arbitration, Resolution 47 (21 April 1948) signalled the UNSC’s intervention into sovereign relations for the purposes of ensuring international peace. Resolution 47 recommended a plebiscite to determine Kashmir’s accession to either state, to be overseen by a UNSC-appointed plebiscite administrator. It also established the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to observe and report ceasefire violations (accepted by each state under the Karachi Agreement, 27 July 1949). With the recent mass violence of Partition in mind, the UNSC also included provisions for the protection of minorities in Jammu and Kashmir, and the right of “all citizens of the state who have left it on account of disturbances…to return to their homes and to exercise their rights as such citizens.” The Kashmir dispute challenged the core UN Charter principle of territorial integrity. The UNSC struggled with how to mediate the Kashmir crisis without appearing partial to either side, an early indicator of how its politicization could compromise its ability to deliver on its Charter security responsibilities. One ad hoc response was the involvement of international civil society actors. The experience of international relief in India during the Second World War, and then before and immediately after Partition, was an important precedent. Among the very few aid workers whom both Pakistan and India allowed across the border to provide relief to refugees and displaced persons after Partition were Quaker relief workers, including Gandhi’s friend Horace Alexander, deemed neutral on religious grounds. Kashmir was also important personally to Nehru, whose family were Kashmiri Brahmins. He believed that the incorporation of the Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir into India would validate his secular, pluralist national-vision. The Indo-Pakistan dispute undermined this goal. It also complicated India’s 1949 campaign for election to a non-permanent UNSC seat. As he told the Canadian High Commissioner to India, J.D. Kearney, and other correspondents, Nehru was deeply disappointed with the UNSC resolutions in the belief that they favoured Pakistan. The UNSC’s refusal to defend Indian sovereignty in what Nehru believed was a clear violation of Article 35 of the UN Charter left him concerned about its greater utility as an instrument for maintaining international peace? Beyond allowing UNCIP and UNMOGIP continued, India resisted further international intervention in the Jammu and Kashmir dispute on the grounds that it was a sovereign matter. Recourse to this argument ironically aligned India with the colonial powers’ standard defense when their colonial administrations were attacked at the UN. The dispute over Jammu and Kashmir continues today. Given India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities, it is one of the world’s most dangerous territorial disputes. It can also produce almost farcical conflicts, as in the Jammu and Kashmir Criminal Investigation Department’s investigation in October, 2016, into whether 123 pigeons brought across the border from the Punjab into Jammu were designed for espionage. While **UNSC membership continues to preoccupy India’s foreign policy** elite, some Indian observers have recently declared the UNSC redundant. They have lobbied for India to instead pursue bilateral relations and membership in new sites of global governance outside the transatlantic orbit, such as the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Such views are a response to **the UNSC’s history of impasse and indecision, but also reflect India’s historical involvement in** “South-South” networks of **international governance** dating to Nehru’s Asian Relations conference in 1947**. For India, the UNSC has at various times been an international venue which has accorded it international status and influence, a forum in which India and other developing countries have remained in postcolonial positions of sufferance, and an institution that could be ignored or bypassed as the country pursued a position of leadership** in Afro-Asian governance networks.

### AT: (Link) Justifies G4 Membership

1. **Delink:** G4 members can’t use India’s membership as a justification for theirs, because India is uniquely qualified. **Pillalamarri ’15 of the Diplomat** writes that India and Brazil are the only G4 countries who really measure up to the P5 economically and population wise and who have underrepresented regions. Out of those, India is the only one not facing regional opposition.

2. **Delink:** Even if they did have a justification, justifications are irrelevant. Countries like China respond to the geopolitical implications of India’s bid, not their theoretical arguments about legitimacy. Even if G4 countries have a slightly stronger argument, that doesn’t necessitate others supporting them.

**3. Delink:** India would join separately from other reforms such as admitting the G4 countries because **Okochi ’17** finds that it has been historically impossible for all of the current P5 to reach consensus on the UNSC due to their diverging interests, as membership bills are never agreed upon. Just because we fiat India entering doesn’t mean we get to bypass gridlock and admit other countries.

Akhilesh Pillalamarri, The Diplomat, 2-13-2015, "China Should Back India for a Permanent UN Security Council Seat", Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-should-back-india-for-a-permanent-un-security-council-seat/ // JJ  
India and Brazil have long had the strongest bids, due to their sizes, populations, economies, and the fact that their regions (South Asia and Latin America) are unrepresented as Security Council permanent members. India’s bid in particular is strong as it only faces significant opposition from Pakistan and some misgivings on the part of China. Brazil, on the other hand, faces opposition from other Latin American countries like Mexico and Argentina. Japan, in particular, has faced the opposition of its neighbors including China and both the Koreas. It is highly [unlikely](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-japan-will-never-be-permanent-member-the-un-security-11014) that Japan will join the Security Council as a permanent member anytime soon due to China’s ability to veto such a proposal. Furthermore, as the recent Japanese hostage debacle in Syria has demonstrated, Japan is simply not ready to wield the diplomatic and military clout that comes with being a permanent member of the Security Council. India, on the other hand, has the best chance of joining the Security Council. Whenever and however this proposal is made to India, India should accept it, even it if means joining the Security Council without the other G4 countries. That would be in India’s long term interest and worth any short-term animosity with the other G4 powers, which would be brief at most. Indeed, China had previously [implied](http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article2233806.ece) that it would support India’s bid if it were de-linked from Japan’s bid. India is one of the [largest contributors](https://www.pminewyork.org/pages.php?id=1985) to the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces and as of 2014, had the second largest troop contribution to peacekeeping missions. In order to attain a permanent seat, India would need the support of all five of the current permanent members. The United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France have all said that they [support](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council#Japan) India’s bid. With the notable exception of Pakistan (as to be expected), many U.N states would be unopposed to India’s bid. Some states, however, remain wary of the overall reform this would require to the U.N. system. India should convince China that its presence on the U.N. Security Council is not only vital to India’s long term interests but to China’s as well. An agreement with China should then be quickly translated into an actual position at the Security Council, regardless of the bids of Brazil, Germany, Japan, or a member from Africa or the Arab world.

**Okochi 17** (Olufunke Christiana Okochi, from the University of Regina, Reforms in the United Nations’ Security Council: A Case Study of Nigeria, <https://ourspace.uregina.ca/bitstream/handle/10294/7737/Okochi_Olufunke_200267741_MA_JS_Spring2017.pdf> , DoA 3/19/19)

Though there have been calls for reform over the years, the UN General Assembly began to debate UNSC reforms in 1993 (Global Policy Forum, 2015). However, this remains a complex issue, likely to be debated well into the future. Each of the four proposals studied in Chapter 4 lays out its reasons for reform and presents its suggested approach to these expansions. However, they each have challenges to their adaptation. A common challenge is consensus. It has thus far been impossible to achieve consensus from all other UN members on any reform, including the two proposals put forward by the UN High Level Panel in its report. Even if any proposal does obtain the consensus needed from the UN General Assembly, it is likely to be very difficult to achieve consensus from all the P5, an important and necessary step to achieving ratification. This will be made even more difficult with proposals that require amendments to the use of the veto or veto rights. Members of the exclusive P5 group on the Council are unlikely to give up or share their rights to the veto and may veto any proposals put before them for a vote, if they disagree with its terms. In view of all of the above, this study thus concludes that it would be very difficult to reform the UNSC membership, particularly by expanding or amending its permanent membership structure. However, if this is to be considered, a possible approach may be to identify and examine criteria from reform proposals (e.g. the criteria identified from the four proposals in this thesis) and use these as a basis for determining membership eligibility. 90 Nigeria, its Role in Africa and Potential in the United Nations As earlier stated, the criteria used for this exercise was derived from all four reform proposals examined in Chapter 4. It includes measures such as a country’s

### AT: (Link) Reform Inherent

1. **Delink:** Full reform will never happen; even if this is the current proposal, it’s not the most likely one to pass. **Gowan ‘17** explains that no matter what, China has made gridlock inevitable by opposing the G-4 reforms. If not China, **Cartensen ‘18** explains that self-interest will remain a permanent roadblock in UNSC reform. Regional rivals oppose all the G4 members joining the Council – China opposing Japan, Pakistan opposing India, Argentina opposing Brazil, and Italy and Spain opposing Germany.

Even if India joins, China will not stop their opposition to Japan’s ascent to power. Insofar as China will still maintain a veto seat, India’s presence won’t change anything.

2. **Link turn:** Other reforms are unlikely and if anything, India joining makes reforms less likely. **Apps ‘18 of** **Reuters** explains that the council is so deadlocked that reforms will almost certainly not happen. The primary reason for this, he cites, is that council members are unwilling to share power. If India joins and they are forced to share power, they will become more entrenched in their opposition to reform.

3. **Delink:** In order for reform to pass, an agreement would have to dilute it to the point of inefficacy. **Evans ‘15 of the** **World Economic Forum** writes that in order to come to an agreement, countries like China, the US, and Russia would demand that the definition of war crimes not be too wide, take serious investigation, and that they get a veto if they claim it impacts their national safety. This is critical because it means that vetoes won’t really be stopped as countries like the US can always claim national security qualms.

Richard **Gowan**, 9-11-**2017**, "U.N. Security Council Reform Is Dead. That’s Still a Problem," No Publication, [https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/23677/u-n-security-council-reform-is-dead-that-s-still-a-problem //](https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/23677/u-n-security-council-reform-is-dead-that-s-still-a-problem%20//) RM   
**New Delhi has campaigned for a permanent seat on the council as part of a “Group of 4,” along with Brazil, Germany and Japan**. **The G-4,** as the group is known, **was highly active at the start of this decade, but while it still exists, all its members now seem skeptical that they can make much progress**. In 2015, **China used all its diplomatic leverage to kill off a well-intentioned initiative by Jamaica’s ambassador to the U.N. to put new life into talks on council reform.** The proposal—to compile a new document outlining different powers’ positions on the issue—was hardly earthshaking, but **Beijing was not willing to countenance any step that could result in its old foe Japan moving an inch closer to a permanent seat.** **China’s push to halt this limited initiative has had a chilling effect on all ensuing discussions of council reform. U.N. diplomats suspect that if they push for any advances on the issue, they will incur Beijing’s wrath. Few imagine that the Trump administration, which needs Chinese cooperation in the Security Council over North Korea, has any interest in council reform of its own. Deadlock seems inevitable.**

James **Cartensen**, 12-5-**2018**, "Self-Interest and Regional Rivalry Ensure UN Security Council Reform Remains Elusive," CNS News, [https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/james-carstensen/self-interest-and-regional-rivalry-ensure-un-security-council-reform //](https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/james-carstensen/self-interest-and-regional-rivalry-ensure-un-security-council-reform%20//) RM

Kleinsmith agreed **reform was long overdue**, but said **self-interest and nationalism were key roadblocks. Increasing the UNSC’s size or adding more permanent members, such as the G4 nations, was not in the self-interest of either the current P5 or regional competitors of the G4. Germany, Brazil, Japan and India have long proposed the number of permanent seats be increased by six seats – for themselves and two African nations.** (Nigeria and South Africa are sometimes proposed.) **But the proposal is not supported by their regional rivals – Italy and Spain in the case of Germany**, Pakistan vis-à-vis India, **Argentina in the case of Brazil, and most evidently, China in the case of Japan.** “President Trump may be harshly criticized for his nationalistic policies of Making America Great Again, but every other country continues to act in within their own self-interest and the UNSC members are no exception,” said Kleinsmith.

Peter **Apps**, 9-25-**2018**, "Commentary: An imperfect U.N. is still the world’s best hope," U.S., [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apps-un-commentary/commentary-an-imperfect-un-is-still-the-worlds-best-hope-idUSKCN1M51TF //](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apps-un-commentary/commentary-an-imperfect-un-is-still-the-worlds-best-hope-idUSKCN1M51TF%20//) RM

**Decades of attempts to reform the U.N. Security Council are** – like the Council itself on issues such as Syria, the South China Sea and wider human rights – **comprehensively deadlocked. The five permanent members – Britain, France and the United States on one side, Russia and China the other – are increasingly at loggerheads. Other emerging powers such as India and Brazil want permanent access, but there seems little or no road map to obtaining it. Those five permanent members have minimal incentive to share power, and no one can agree which other states should be allowed to join them.**

Gareth **Evans**, 2-5-**2015**, "Should the UN Security Council veto be limited?," World Economic Forum, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/02/should-the-un-security-council-veto-be-limited/> // RM

Back in 2001, **France**[**floated a proposal**](http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/vetorestraintparis21jan25i15rev.pdf)**that the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P5) should voluntarily refrain from using their veto power when dealing with mass-atrocity crimes. And now**, in the lead-up to the commemoration of this year’s 70th anniversary of the UN, French President François Hollande’s **government is actively pursuing the idea again**. Could such an arrangement really work? The predictable initial response is to dismiss the possibility out of hand. As Australia’s wartime prime minister, Ben Chifley, once famously remarked, “The trouble with gentleman’s agreements is that there aren’t enough bloody gentlemen**.” It is indeed hard to believe that Russia and China, in particular, would be accommodating.** **Russia**, for example, **has**[**exercised vetoes**](http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick)**more than 100 times** since 1946, most recently – and unhappily – four times since 2011 to block resolutions intended to halt the carnage in Syria. Nor has **the United States**, **which has used its veto some 80 times** (most frequently, in recent years, on Israel-related issues), shown much enthusiasm, notwithstanding its generally strong stand on genocide and related cases. **Only the United Kingdom** (which, like France itself, last resorted to the veto in 1989) **has given any hint of support for the French initiative**. The right to veto was the price demanded by China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the US for joining the UN. No one believes that a formal Charter amendment to abolish or limit this right is remotely likely. But international pressure on the P5 has been mounting for the last 15 years – and especially since the General Assembly’s unanimous embrace in 2005 of the [“responsibility to protect”](http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml) (R2P) principle. Advocates of the French position want these countries to forswear their veto when a clear majority supports proposed action to mitigate the risk of a mass-atrocity crime. Distaste for the blocking of the Syrian resolutions has been particularly intense, and, at last count, 68 countries had given explicit support to the French proposal in various UN forums. The moral argument that the veto should not be used in cases of mass-atrocity crimes is overwhelming. The P5 have obligations under the UN Charter, as well as international humanitarian and human rights law, not to undermine the effectiveness of the UN or that body of law. And the political argument against using the veto in these situations – that it jeopardizes the credibility and legitimacy of the Security Council, whose structure is already seen as not reflecting the geopolitical realities of the twenty-first century – should also weigh heavily on the P5. But **is it possible to craft a veto-restraint proposal to which all of the P5 can agree**? In January, at a conference I attended in Paris that brought together French policymakers and international experts, it became clear **that a draft agreement could meet most, if not all, objections. But it would need to have at least three key elements**. **First, the agreement would have to define the relevant cases clearly** **– neither too widely nor too narrowly** – and build on well-established R2P language. The definition might be something like “situations where populations are suffering, or at imminent risk of, genocide, other crimes against humanity, or major war crimes.” **Second, an agreement would need to include a mechanism to determine when such cases had actually arisen.** This would need to be speedy, provide some assurance of objective assessment, and ideally generate strong concern across a wide cross-section of the international community. One way to meet these needs would be to have a double trigger. The first requirement would be a certification, communicated to the Security Council by the UN Secretary-General and his Office of Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and R2P (which has the necessary resources, expertise, and credibility) that the case meets the agreed definition. The other would be a request for veto-restraint by at least 50 member states, including at least five members from each of the recognized geographical groupings. **A third key element, unattractive ethically but** probably **necessary politically to win the support of the US and others, would be a provision allowing any P5 member to veto when it claimed a “vital national interest” to be at stake.** The consolation is that trying to rely on such an escape clause in most atrocity cases would not pass the laugh test. Could Russia and China really have used it to veto Security Council resolutions on Myanmar and Zimbabwe in, respectively, 2007 and 2008? Even given the intensity of Russia’s political and military relationship with Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, could it really claim that a resolution would place its own vital interests at risk?

### AT: Spec: Japan

1. **Delink:** In order to receive permanent membership, India would need China’s support. **Harris ‘14 of the National Interest** writes that even if other nations prove successful in their bid for permanent membership, China will always veto Japan. Because China holds a veto, it doesn’t matter if other countries support Japan because China has the sole power to end their search. In 2005, tens of thousands of demonstrators in China marched against Japan gaining a seat. This is a long standing rivalry that cannot be quelled by India joining the UNSC.

Thus, **Pillalamarri ’15 of The Diplomat** writes that China will only support India’s bid if it were de-linked from Japan’s. Thus, India’s membership doesn’t inherently mean Japan’s, as well.

[The **Economic Times 18** continues that in fact, India’s push for Japan to join with them is the biggest roadblock to Indian membership. China will only approve India joining if Japan doesn’t come with it. **(be careful reading this because if they frontline the defense well it magnifies the link to Japan joining bad)]**

Peter **Harris**, 8-4-**2014**, "Why Japan Will Never Be a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council," National Interest, [https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-japan-will-never-be-permanent-member-the-un-security-11014 //](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-japan-will-never-be-permanent-member-the-un-security-11014%20//) RM

Unlike Abe’s others attempts to bolster **Japan’s** international security posture, however, the **bid for permanent membership of the UNSC is something that China is able to block with relative ease.** **As an existing permanent member of the council, China wields a veto over any proposals to alter its composition.  Japan’s permanent membership is therefore not possible without Chinese consent. As such, Japan’s membership of the P5 is a non-starter,** but Japanese ambitions on the world stage will nevertheless redound to the fraught Sino-Japanese relationship.  [During](http://www.researchgate.net/publication/236823930_Youth_and_Nationalism_in_Japan/file/e0b495266203e0f7b4.pdf) previous discussions about reform of the UN in April 2005, “tens of thousands of demonstrators marched on the streets of major Chinese cities, throwing stones and other objects at the Japanese Council’s Office and vandalizing Japanese stores and restaurants.”  A decade on, domestic disgust at perceptions of Japanese hawkishness—stoked by state-controlled media—have hardly abated in China. For years, Japan has proceeded cautiously and relatively successfully when it comes to pressing its case for reform of the UNSC.  Tokyo has the support of many nations large and small, and has made common cause with both Brazil and India (and [Russia](http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/meet0505.html), for that matter)—China’s supposed allies in the BRICS bloc.  **But Japan’s efforts never will be enough.  There is only one vote that matters when it comes to determining Japan’s future as a prospective permanent member of the Security Council and it is to be found in Beijing, not anywhere in Latin America.  Another round of non-permanent membership is thus the best that any number of Abe’s diplomatic offensives can buy.**

**Economic Times**, 7-12-**2018**, "India's UNSC alliance with Japan biggest mistake: Chinese media," [https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indias-unsc-alliance-with-japan-biggest-mistake-chinese-media/articleshow/49042814.cms //](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indias-unsc-alliance-with-japan-biggest-mistake-chinese-media/articleshow/49042814.cms%20//) RM

**BEIJING: India's alliance with**[**Japan**](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/Japan)**, Germany and Brazil to press for a permanent seat in the expanded**[**UN Security Council**](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/UN-Security-Council)**is "a biggest mistake", an article in the state-run Chinese daily said today.** "This year marks the 70th anniversary of the UN, and appeals for UN [Security Council](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/Security-Council) (UNSC) reform are becoming increasingly louder," Liu Zongyi, research fellow at the state-run Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, wrote in an article published in the Global Times. The G4 nations namely Brazil, India, Germany and Japan, are the most active in calling for a change, it said. Since the UN General Assembly on September 14 adopted a negotiating text, setting the stage for talks on the reform, "some Indian media acclaimed that the nation's bid for permanent UNSC seat has been boosted. However, in reality, it will take a long time to discuss only the wording of this document," the article said. Despite the Indian media's warm responses to the move, Japan, rather than India, has played the most active role in seeking a permanent seat within the G4 bloc, it said. "**Indian politicians, academics and media insist China as its biggest obstacle in winning the seat. Beijing as a UNSC permanent member has not openly supported New Delhi's UN aspiration.** India, taking this as an excuse, pressures China through every possible means," it said. "In fact, **India's biggest mistake is to ally itself with Japan**, Germany and Brazil. First of all, these three countries have opponents in the region. **Japan's bid for permanent membership will definitely invite strong opposition from China** and [South Korea](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/South-Korea)," it said. **China has been maintaining for long that it is a mistake on the part of India to join Japan specially, whose candidature Beijing opposes for historical reasons. China has not gone beyond saying that Beijing understands New Delhi's aspiration to play a bigger role in the UN.**

Akhilesh Pillalamarri, The Diplomat, 2-13-2015, "China Should Back India for a Permanent UN Security Council Seat", Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-should-back-india-for-a-permanent-un-security-council-seat/ // JJ  
India and Brazil have long had the strongest bids, due to their sizes, populations, economies, and the fact that their regions (South Asia and Latin America) are unrepresented as Security Council permanent members. India’s bid in particular is strong as it only faces significant opposition from Pakistan and some misgivings on the part of China. Brazil, on the other hand, faces opposition from other Latin American countries like Mexico and Argentina. Japan, in particular, has faced the opposition of its neighbors including China and both the Koreas. It is highly [unlikely](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-japan-will-never-be-permanent-member-the-un-security-11014) that Japan will join the Security Council as a permanent member anytime soon due to China’s ability to veto such a proposal. Furthermore, as the recent Japanese hostage debacle in Syria has demonstrated, Japan is simply not ready to wield the diplomatic and military clout that comes with being a permanent member of the Security Council. India, on the other hand, has the best chance of joining the Security Council. Whenever and however this proposal is made to India, India should accept it, even it if means joining the Security Council without the other G4 countries. That would be in India’s long term interest and worth any short-term animosity with the other G4 powers, which would be brief at most. Indeed, China had previously [implied](http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article2233806.ece) that it would support India’s bid if it were de-linked from Japan’s bid. India is one of the [largest contributors](https://www.pminewyork.org/pages.php?id=1985) to the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces and as of 2014, had the second largest troop contribution to peacekeeping missions. In order to attain a permanent seat, India would need the support of all five of the current permanent members. The United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France have all said that they [support](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council#Japan) India’s bid. With the notable exception of Pakistan (as to be expected), many U.N states would be unopposed to India’s bid. Some states, however, remain wary of the overall reform this would require to the U.N. system. India should convince China that its presence on the U.N. Security Council is not only vital to India’s long term interests but to China’s as well. An agreement with China should then be quickly translated into an actual position at the Security Council, regardless of the bids of Brazil, Germany, Japan, or a member from Africa or the Arab world.

### AT: Spec: Brazil

1. **Delink:** **Pillalamarri ’15 of The Diplomat** writes that Brazil’s own region doesn’t support its candidacy. It’s highly unlikely this would happen.

2. **Delink:** Brazil doesn’t even want a seat anymore. According to **Bosco ‘18 of the** **Wilson Quarterly**, new Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro is part of a rising populist movement opposed to the United Nations. In fact, on the campaign trail he even vowed to leave the United Nations as it “serves no purpose.”

David **Bosco**, Fall **2018**, "For the UN, a Rise in Populism Reveals an Old Challenge," No Publication, <https://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/the-fate-of-the-international-order/for-the-un-a-rise-in-populism-reveals-an-old-challenge/> // RM

But the U.S. president’s inadvertent comic relief could not dissipate the cloud created by what senior UN officials see as rising populism, nationalism, and anti-multilateral sentiment in several corners of the globe. The American president’s version gets by far the most attention, but he is hardly alone. **From Italy to the Philippines to Hungary and now Brazil, a generation of leaders is rising that harbors an active distaste for the United Nations and other parts of the global architecture**. Last spring, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán used a new UN agreement on migration as a foil in local elections; posters appeared across the country rejecting the body’s interference on migration policy. Italy’s Matteo Salvini, now serving as deputy prime minister, [recently described](http://www.ansa.it/english/news/2018/09/10/italy-to-weigh-cutting-un-funding-says-salvini_ecf723c5-5c7a-4ed0-9a93-5435dd070b7d.html) the UN as “an organization that costs billions of euros,” funding “waste, embezzlement, and theft.” Others have been even more hostile. **During a campaign stop, Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro**[**pledged to leave**](https://www.plataformamedia.com/en-uk/news/politics/interior/if-im-elected-president-i-will-leave-the-un-says-bolsonaro-9735658.html)**the United Nations, which he said “serves no purpose.**” As is his wont, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte topped them all, suggesting that several UN officials should be [fed to crocodiles](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/03/12/duterte-goes-war-un-threatens-throw-rights-team-crocodiles/).

Akhilesh Pillalamarri, The Diplomat, 2-13-2015, "China Should Back India for a Permanent UN Security Council Seat", Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-should-back-india-for-a-permanent-un-security-council-seat/ // JJ  
India and Brazil have long had the strongest bids, due to their sizes, populations, economies, and the fact that their regions (South Asia and Latin America) are unrepresented as Security Council permanent members. India’s bid in particular is strong as it only faces significant opposition from Pakistan and some misgivings on the part of China. Brazil, on the other hand, faces opposition from other Latin American countries like Mexico and Argentina. Japan, in particular, has faced the opposition of its neighbors including China and both the Koreas. It is highly [unlikely](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-japan-will-never-be-permanent-member-the-un-security-11014) that Japan will join the Security Council as a permanent member anytime soon due to China’s ability to veto such a proposal. Furthermore, as the recent Japanese hostage debacle in Syria has demonstrated, Japan is simply not ready to wield the diplomatic and military clout that comes with being a permanent member of the Security Council. India, on the other hand, has the best chance of joining the Security Council. Whenever and however this proposal is made to India, India should accept it, even it if means joining the Security Council without the other G4 countries. That would be in India’s long term interest and worth any short-term animosity with the other G4 powers, which would be brief at most. Indeed, China had previously [implied](http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article2233806.ece) that it would support India’s bid if it were de-linked from Japan’s bid. India is one of the [largest contributors](https://www.pminewyork.org/pages.php?id=1985) to the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces and as of 2014, had the second largest troop contribution to peacekeeping missions. In order to attain a permanent seat, India would need the support of all five of the current permanent members. The United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France have all said that they [support](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform_of_the_United_Nations_Security_Council#Japan) India’s bid. With the notable exception of Pakistan (as to be expected), many U.N states would be unopposed to India’s bid. Some states, however, remain wary of the overall reform this would require to the U.N. system. India should convince China that its presence on the U.N. Security Council is not only vital to India’s long term interests but to China’s as well. An agreement with China should then be quickly translated into an actual position at the Security Council, regardless of the bids of Brazil, Germany, Japan, or a member from Africa or the Arab world.

### AT: Spec: Germany

1. **Non-unique:** France pretty much does everything Germany would do, and Germany has a lot of power already on the Security Council. In fact, **UNRIC ’19** writes that France and Germany have decided to share the Council presidency.

2.**Turn: Beal ’19 of Stanford** explains that Germany as a permanent member would actually be a good thing, as it has recently become committed to international cooperation and reform. In fact, Germany actively and vocally opposed the UNSC sanctions/intervention upon Iraq as well as being the single largest global leader in the “humanitarian and economic reconstruction of Iraq” to provide a lasting framework for stability. In addition, Germany has started more than 470 developmental aid projects across the globe in places from El Salvador, Sierra Leone, and Pakistan.

UNRIC, Feb 22 2019, "Security Council: a dual presidency between France and Germany to defend multilateralism", United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe (UNRIC), https://www.unric.org/en/latest-un-buzz/31308-security-council-a-dual-presidency-between-france-and-germany-to-defend-multilateralism // JJ  
France and Germany will consecutively chair the United Nations Security Council in March and April. The two countries have decided to coordinate their efforts by jointly preparing the Council's work plans for these two months. As a founding member of the United Nations in 1945, France holds a permanent seat on the Council and therefore has the right of veto. Germany is a non-permanent member and was elected to serve on the Security Council from 2019 to 2020. The Security Council is composed of 15 members: 5 permanent members and 10 non-permanent members, each elected for 2 years. The two working programmes of these countries reflect their values as well as those of the European Union. The main objective of this "dual presidency" is to defend multilateralism which the French and German foreign ministers stated, "is experiencing perhaps its gravest crisis since its emergence after the Second World War". In the document of their joint statement, Germany’s Heiko Maas and France’s Jean-Yves Le Drian note that "more people are rejecting it as too expensive, acting as though global problems such as climate change, migration and cybersecurity could be successfully tackled at national level.” "The rivalry among major powers and growing nationalism have resulted in an increasingly fragmented world order – in political, economic and social terms," the two ministers added. "To counter this trend, like-minded states must make common cause and double their efforts to promote multilateralism. France and Germany intend to lead the way.” The two consecutive Presidencies will also focus on the protection of humanitarian personnel and respect for international humanitarian law, commitment to peace and conflict resolution and women's rights as well as women’s increased participation in peacekeeping.

David Beall 3-28-2019, “Germany’s Inclusion as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council: Breaking Free from its Historic Subservience” <https://web.stanford.edu/class/e297a/Germany%27s%20Inclusion%20as%20a%20Permanent%20Member.doc//CJ>

Viewed as a pillar of strength within a community of smaller nations in Europe, Germany has not bowed to international pressure to persuade the UN Security Council for a quick decision regarding the attack on Iraq**. Working with other Council members for a compromise over the Iraqi issue, rather than let the US use the Council for its own ends, Germany hoped a resolution could be created that included the cooperation of all involved parties**. Besides being backed by Berlin, such a resolution was also backed by Paris and Moscow: leaving the United States impatient for a decision. Though Schroeder and **Germany were against a war in Iraq**, Schroeder commented that “‘Germany has always been prepared to fulfill its international obligations, under the United Nations’” (Eddy). Although Germany would disagree with a resolution issuing a declaration of war against Iraq, Germany would stand up and support any UN resolution. **Unlike the United States and other permanent members, who use the Security Council for their own political gains and the sanctioning of an UN-legitimatized war, Germany would back UN resolutions that it disputed, despite differences in political opinions. Germany, therefore, would set aside discrepancies in international political ideals to uphold the greater good of the world.** Germany would not agree to a resolution against Iraq, due to the fact that all “peaceful means [had] not been exhausted” in the disarmament of Iraq and Saddam Hussein (Germany Rejects). Certainly not pacifist by nature, Germany was impelled to take action in Kosovo in 1999 and Afghanistan in 2001, because all other alternatives had failed. Regarding the Iraq issue, Germany maintained the fact that Chapter VI of the UN Charter was not fully depleted, and therefore there was still a possibility of peaceful negotiations, and a peaceful ending. The United States, on the other hand, hoped to use it political dexterity to dissuade other members of the Council from continuing peaceful options. The US hoped to enact the UN military powers of Chapter VII and engage in war with Iraq with the backing of the UN,. **Germany’s even-temperedness in quarrelsome times and its ability to value UN resolutions and standards over its own political ideals makes itself a fine candidate for permanent membership on the Security Council**. With the recent splits that occurred in the Security Council over involvement in Iraq, supporters of expanding the Council have become more vocal as of late. Hoping expansion would curb such splits, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has stated he’s in favor of a larger, more diverse Security Council (Warren). On par with their most recent alignment over the United States decision to take military action against Iraq, French President Jacques Chirac has given Germany his backing. Outside of the Security Council, **Germany participates in a large number of humanitarian and other developmental projects. Germany is a top fifteen donator to UNICEF, an international children’s fund introduced by the United Nations at the end of World War II; at the end of 2002, Germany had increased its contributions to UNICEF by 17.5 percent (UNICEF). Germany’s humanitarian efforts are a high priority in their global policy.** Working closely with a multitude of UN agencies, **German relief groups provide food, housing, education, and medical care to those in need across the globe. As an active participant in the World Food Program, Germany has recently established its own mission in Rome, Italy, and also contributes financially through the United Nations and the European Union. Germany also provides assistance in the form of emergency relief; in 2001, Germany’s Federal Foreign Office Task Force for Humanitarian Aid agency provided funding for over 470 aid projects which totaled 67.1 Euro.** Most of the aid was directed to the Balkans, but **countries all over the world received aid: El Salvador, Palestine, and Sierra Leone are some of the many. Not including the United Nations, Germany still undertakes an active role in world wide humanitarian efforts (**Humanitarian). In October of this year, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder continued to announce his desire for Germany to have permanent member status on the Security Council at the UN General Assembly. Schroeder stated “on behalf of Germany, I repeat that we are prepared to take on more responsibility in the framework of such a reform” and insists that such membership should include veto power (Warren). Chancellor Schroeder, along with his German ministry, believes the next stage of UN involvement resides heavily in the reconstruction of Iraq. Supporting the humanitarian efforts of the UN in Iraq, **Germany has devoted** to **help in the “humanitarian and economic reconstruction of Iraq, and in training the country's police officers” (Warren). According to German officials, the enlarging of the United Nations’ role in world affairs would help to facilitate a healthier, more peaceful environment for all nations involved. Also, to help foster a greater positive growth in UN involvement in world issues,** Germany claims that European Union needs to further integrate on the supra-national level. Such integration would help encourage a better foreign policy for all of Europe not only Germany. Germany has risen from the ashes of World War II to become a leading power in Europe and the rest of World. Originally set up to prevent and ultimately stop the Nazi advancement over Europe, Asia, and Northern Africa, the United Nations has progressed to take a much larger role in world events, and Germany has been a part of this progression. Not only a leader in humanitarian efforts and financial contributions for aid relief, Germany has also been a major contributor to the Security Council, the strongest branch of the United Nations. As recently as February of 2003, Germany headed the Security Council during turbulent times, as the United States pressed for a resolution that declared an attack on Iraq. Standing strong under US pressure for a quick resolution, Germany vowed not to let the superpower use its political power for its own gains. Germany’s current involvement with the UN and their willingness to help in other avenues, besides monetary aid, demonstrate the point Chancellor Schroeder has been preaching for the past three years: Germany is ready for a permanent seat on the Security Council. Out contributing four of the five permanent members on the council, Germany is long overdue to take its permanent member status. Over the last fifty years, Germany has risen to one of the top European powers, becoming a prominent leader in the European Union**. As a devout supporter of United Nations expansion in overall world involvement and as an advocate of a more cohesive European Union, Germany should be the next permanent member admitted to the UN Security Council.**

### AT: > War

1. **Non-unique:** France pretty much does everything Germany would do, and Germany has a lot of power already on the Security Council. In fact, **UNRIC ’19** writes that France and Germany have decided to share the Council presidency.

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### AT: Spec: Africa

1. **Delink:** Africa will never actually get a seat. **Johnson 19** explains that the countries vying to join the UNSC work like a queue, not a package, and Africa is at the back of this queue. This is the case because a) Africa habitually pays fees late and abuses resources, b) Russia is opposed to South African candidacy because they oppose Israel, and c) any “package deal” would be such that a western ally like India is added alongside a Russia-China ally, and none of the countries in Africa are a solid Russia-China ally.

RW **Johnson**, 2-24-**2019**, "The ANC`s UN Security Council pipedream," No Publication, [https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/the-ancs-un-security-council-pipedream //](https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/the-ancs-un-security-council-pipedream%20//) RM

There is a financial question too. As of 2012-2013 the UN spent $5.152 billion in direct costs and another $7.8 billion in peace-keeping. Today, the total costs are closer to $20 billion a year. The top contributor is the USA (22%), followed by Japan, China, Germany, France, the UK, Brazil, Italy, Russia and Canada. The problem is that over half the national contributors are chronic bad and late payers. On the other hand there are some conspicuously good payers – Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, the UAE, and Australia, for example. A glance at that list suggests why **Japan, Germany and Brazil are among the top candidates for any extra seats on the UNSC. Now that the Indian economy is growing so fast one must expect India to move powerfully into that club of top payers too. China, which used to be a long way down the list of contributors, has very deliberately stepped up its contributions** – it is now the second biggest contributor to peace-keeping operations as well as the third biggest contributor overall – and it is clear that there is a general acceptance that he who wishes to call the tunes must help pay the piper. **This creates a particular problem for would-be African candidates for the UNSC. Many African countries are among the bad and late payers** while no one at the UN is unaware that Africa gobbles up, year after year, the lion’s share of peace-keeping costs. That is to say, **Africa is the place which creates much of the troubles and whose own institutions are so weak that the AU has to depend on donations from Western countries to be able to function**. **This puts it right at the back of the queue.** **Is South Africa really, seriously wanted to make a bid for a permanent UNSC seat, it would behave very differently. For a start it would stop wasting its money paying an exorbitant contribution to the AU and for a nonsense like the Pan-African Parliament, beef up its armed forces so that it could play a bigger peace-keeping role, and up its contributions to the UN. It would also stop supporting Maduro, Cuba and other Third World dictators, revert to Mandela’s human rights-based foreign policy and stop attacking Israel**. It should remember that **a hostile attitude to Israel would not only provoke a US veto but would also upset Russia.** **Putin is very proud of the fact that Russian is the second language of Israel and is a frequent visitor there and a good customer for Israeli technology. Moreover, these days Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan and Egypt are all friendly with Israel**. Given that South Africa is not a Muslim state, the clever position would be a policy of strict neutrality towards Israel. However, **not even** such **disciplined behaviour would get round the fact that there is a long queue of countries – India, Brazil, Japan and Germany - whose claims to a permanent UNSC seat would have to be settled before the question of such a seat for South Africa even got onto the agenda.** And, as one can see, all these countries currently face deadlocks of their own, **so there is little immediate likelihood of any change at all. Even if that changes – as it may in time – there is no chance of Africa getting two permanent seats on the UNSC.** If change does come it would be likely to take the shape of a package deal which would not threaten the positions of any of the five existing UNSC members. That is to say, if you add an extra “Western” state then add an extra friend for China-Russia too. The trouble is that while there are plenty of possible “Western” candidates, it is hard to see who, apart from North Korea, would be a reliable member of the China-Russia camp. And no matter how many wacky meetings Donald Trump has with Kim Jong-un, one suspects one will never see Pyongyang on the UNSC.

### AT: Increase Temp. Seats

1. **Delink:** This won’t ever occur, because America opposes this reform. **Bosco ’15 of Foreign Policy** writes that the U.S. gains from a limited nonpermanent member bloc, because it means the permanent members are able to gain more power.

David Bosco, September 29, 2019, "The United States Doesn’t Want to Reform the U.N. Security Council," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/29/the-united-states-doesnt-want-to-reform-the-u-n-security-council/ // JJ  
Behind the scenes, however, U.S. diplomats have been content to watch the different factions in the U.N. General Assembly squabble. When Washington has bestirred itself, it has been to signal its opposition to any hasty moves. America’s lethargy reflects the reality that, rhetoric aside, U.S. leaders aren’t convinced that council reform is in the national interest. The United States has an awfully good deal on the Security Council. On many issues, it can use the council to help share burdens, amplify its voice, and endow policies it favors with the force of international law. When Washington doesn’t find the council convenient, the veto power means it can work around the body without risking an official reprimand. The Security Council’s cozy size — the number of nonpermanent members hasn’t increased since 1965 — is also conducive to American interests. Divided by region and interests, the ten rotating nonpermanent members are rarely able to operate as an effective bloc. That leaves the veto-wielding five mostly in charge of the council’s agenda. When they can agree, the rest of the council almost always follows behind. In many respects, preserving the status quo is Washington’s best option. The diplomacy of likely new members, including Brazil, India, and South Africa, has been frustrating to U.S. policymakers. During the Libya intervention, these countries complained about what they perceived as America’s abuse of its council mandate. Susan Rice, then the U.N. ambassador, was unimpressed. “We’ve learned a lot,” she said of emerging-power diplomacy, “not all of it encouraging.” The prickliness of these emerging powers likely sapped whatever limited energy the Obama administration had for Security Council reform.

### AT: Veto Reform

1. **Delink:** This is a pipe dream. Articles 108 and 109 of the [United Nations Charter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Charter) grant the P5 veto over any amendments to the Charter, requiring them to approve of any modifications to the UNSC veto power that they themselves hold.

## Regionalism

### Weighing

1. **Strength of link weighing:** **Ross ’16 of the Guardian** writes that there are many alternative causes to UN collapse: failings of the Secretary-General, and the world is no longer ordered by states -- yet the UN treats non-state actors as irrelevant.

Carne Ross, 3-10-2016, "The UN is failing. Is it heading the way of the League of Nations?", Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/mar/10/un-failing-league-of-nations-isis-boko-haram // JJ  
As good a place as any to witness the slow decline of the post-second world war global “order” is the [UN security council](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/17/70-years-un-security-council-key-moments) – if they would let you in, which they won’t. Don’t bother with that rarefied organ’s “public” meetings. None of its real diplomatic business is conducted in the open. In a reflection of the state of the world, the security council, which is charged with the maintenance of international peace, is busier than ever. Years ago, the council met for a few hours once or twice a week. These days it meets all day, often at night and weekends too. Overworked diplomats discuss an ever-lengthening agenda of crises, from North Korea to [Libya](https://www.theguardian.com/world/libya). The long list of meetings and committees may demonstrate the council’s energy in addressing the manifold factors behind modern conflict but it also reflects the council’s failure: it doesn’t take a diplomat to see that insecurity is spreading. Then there’s the semiotics. Once limiting itself to crisp, pointed decisions (such as its demands for Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories), its resolutions have grown ever longer and less intelligible. The council has designed five or six (no one can say with certainty) different categories of its public statements. There used to be one. Heads of UN missions tell me they cannot understand the confused mandates the council has given their peacekeepers. Governments I have advised say they have no idea of the meaning of resolutions directed at them. There are many reasons behind the [UN’s inability to stop the devastating war in Syria](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/21/medecins-sans-frontieres-plea-for-civilian-bombings-syria-stop), but it’s not good enough merely to blame Russia, as western diplomats tend to do. The disturbing truth is that the world’s primary institution to deal with war is not working. The basic problem is that the council’s founding premise of a world ordered by states no longer holds. Conflicts involving [al-Shabaab](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/29/somalia-attacks-signal-escalation-of-al-shabaab-offensive), [Boko Haram](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/04/join-us-or-die-birth-of-boko-haram) or [Islamic State](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/07/isis-planning-enormous-and-spectacular-attacks-uk-counter-terrorism-chief-warns) originate from particular local circumstances but often have regional and global reach and consequence. Designed to prevent and arbitrate state-to-state conflict, the council has failed to adapt to an entirely different world. On 12 September 2001, when I was part of the British delegation, I joined other shocked diplomats in the council chamber to condemn the previous day’s attacks. Long before that awful day in New York and Washington, the nature of political violence and global insecurity had already altered forever. But the council’s arrogant presumption that governments decide and the rest abide has not changed. The failure of governments and their multilateral institutions is epic. What seemed then like episodic and geographically limited threats have now morphed into permanent war, insecurity and extremist violence on almost every continent. Unfortunately, most of the debate about reform at the UN misses the point. Discussion revolves around the stale questions of new permanent members of the security council or restrictions on the use of the veto. Both are desirable but neither will happen soon – or fix the deeper problem. If we’re not careful, the UN will collapse into irrelevance, much as the [League of Nations](https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/nov/06/guardians-league-of-nations-susan-pedersen-review) failed in its day. This year, a successor to Ban Ki-moon will be appointed. We need a tough and independent secretary general who will give impartial and specific recommendations to the council, without fear or favour to the prejudices of the [“P5” permanent veto-wielding members](http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/), and with one over-riding prerogative: the protection of civilian life. In one notorious example, the head of UN peacekeeping failed to pass on warnings to the security council of [imminent genocide in Rwanda](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/714025.stm) because he believed its members didn’t want to hear them. An independent secretary general would long ago have demanded a ceasefire in [Syria](https://www.theguardian.com/world/syria) with clearly spelt-out consequences, including coercive sanctions, for those who breached it. Likewise, an international conference to agree and implement a timetable for the two-state solution for Israel/Palestine, a requirement endorsed repeatedly by the council and every member state of the UN. The secretary general would need the freedom to appoint a strong, experienced team, with appointment on merit and not the traditional divvying-up of senior jobs among the P5, a practice that institutionalises their unhealthy dominance, not only within the council but also of the secretariat and the information it conveys to the council. Officials have admitted that certain UN reports are edited by permanent members before delivery to the security council (I did it myself once). There are taboo issues, such as [Chechnya](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/23/chechen-leader-ramzan-kadyrov-threatens-whole-of-russia-opposition-warns) or tensions in the [South China Sea](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/28/whats-behind-beijings-drive-control-south-china-sea-hainan), which are banished from the council’s agenda because it is “understood” but never publicly admitted that certain powerful countries forbid their discussion. In recent years, it was confrontation over Kashmir that brought the world closest to nuclear war, yet mention of this hotspot is tacitly prohibited too. The UN investigations into its failure to prevent mass killings in Rwanda, [Srebrenica](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/04/how-britain-and-us-abandoned-srebrenica-massacre-1995) and Sri Lanka all identified serial weaknesses, both political and institutional. But no one should be confident that such tragedies will be competently addressed in future. The need for a brave and decisive new secretary general is literally a matter of life and death, in fact many deaths. Despite the claim that the security council now holds more public meetings than ever, the vast majority of its substantive negotiations are conducted in private. I spent four and a half years in the council and never saw a good reason why most of its deliberations should remain closed to public scrutiny except to disguise the frequent superficiality and poverty of its debates (though occasionally privacy may help negotiation). Televising parliaments has improved democracy. Diplomats should be judged by what they say: a weak form of accountability but an improvement on its total absence today. Transparency in the diplomatic dealings at the UN would render the resulting decisions more comprehensible and thus legitimate. The public would be more engaged, for instance, when the council discusses aid delivery to [besieged towns in Syria](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/11/madaya-more-starvation-deaths-as-aid-convoys-head-to-besieged-syrian-town). People might begin to care about what happens at the UN. Finally, there’s one simple reform the council could put in place tomorrow. It can listen to the people and parties affected by its decisions. When the council discusses Syria, Libya or [Somalia](https://www.theguardian.com/world/somalia), you can safely assume Syrians, Libyans or Somalis will not be present. It is indefensible that, despite the reality that almost all its agenda concerns conflict between “non-state” groups, the security council still only allows states to address it, and even that is not frequent practice when they are not members of the council. On rare occasions the council grants an audience to non-state parties – but only those it approves of. It should be routine practice that legitimate and representative parties present their views before the council takes decisions about their futures. After all, they know their countries – and conflicts – best. Diplomats should get used to dealing with more eclectic groups who must be persuaded if there is to be peace. Ending conflict requires multiple stakeholders in the room. This kind of work takes patience; it is already practised by the better mediators and diplomats. They understand that sometimes unwieldy coalitions and repeated rounds of talking (and listening) are more likely to effect peace than over-negotiated pieces of paper that almost no one reads. These improvements do not require the UN charter to be rewritten: they are already stated within it. There’s way too much deference to decades of musty and antediluvian tradition at the UN; a few determined and gutsy diplomats could make these changes happen. Beset by new forms of conflict, the world outside its gloomy chambers demands that the UN lets in some light.

### Regionalism Bad

1. **Turn: Patrick ’12 of the Council on Foreign Relations** writes that regional organization are susceptible to the same issues of beaurocracy and gridlock as the U.N.; worse, though, they are liable to be dominated by local hegemons working in their own interests, and lack institutional, technical, and material resources.

Stewart M. Patrick, 3-23-2012, "The UN Versus Regional Organizations: Who Keeps the Peace?," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/un-versus-regional-organizations-who-keeps-peace // JJ  
Regional approaches are no panacea. At first glance, regional organizations provide an attractive alternative, or complement, to an overstretched and sometimes dysfunctional United Nations. They are presumably more familiar with the sources of the relevant conflict and more invested in its solution. On the other hand, regional bodies are also vulnerable to domination by local hegemons, who may seek to hijack collective action for their own purposes. Moreover, regional organizations can suffer from the same debilitating collective action problems that bedevil the UN—including a tendency to take refuge in bland consensus reflecting the lowest common denominator, as well as a temptation for free-riding. Capacity building must be a priority. In addition, the aspirations of regional organizations often outstrip their ability to deliver. The AU is a case in point. Despite the creation of its own Peace and Security Council, the organization [suffers](http://www.cfr.org/african-union/african-unions-conflict-management-capabilities/p26044) from troubling institutional, professional, technical, logistical and material gaps. Consequently, burden sharing can easily devolve into “burden shifting”—as the international community places unrealistic expectations on unprepared regional bodies. These organizations will only fulfill their potential if outside players—including the United States—seek to nurture their capacities. The United States must adapt its diplomacy to rising regionalism. The State Department tends to approach conflict management through the lens of bilateral relationships, while giving short shrift to relevant regional organizations. (Indeed, it was only in 2009 and 2011, respectively that the United States sent its first resident ambassadors to the AU and ASEAN). Meanwhile, State’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs, continues to focus overwhelmingly on the United Nations, though it is beginning to reach out to some regional entities. More effective U.S. engagement will also require changing the professional incentives of foreign service officers, to reward expertise in and diplomatic postings to regional organizations.

### AT: Regionalism Now

1. **Non-unique:** **Williams ’17 of George Washington University** writes that regional organizations still rely on Security Council membership for legitimacy. Thus, he writes that the biggest regional organizations have undertaken only a small fraction of the U.N.’s role.

Paul D. Williams, February 2017, “Global and Regional Peacekeepers: Trends, Opportunities, Risks and a Way Ahead," George Washington University, Global Policy Journal, https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/book\_pdf/Discussion\_Paper\_Series\_Kahler\_et%20al\_Global\_Regional\_Governance\_OR%20%281%29.pdf // JJ  
The UN Security Council has used its authority more frequently to support regional peace operations. In recent years, it has become more likely that the UN Security Council will authorize regional peace operations. According to the list in the appendix, it was not until 1995 that the UN Security Council authorized a regional peace operation: NATO’s force in Bosnia, the Implementation Force (IFOR).14 Since then, the UN Security Council has authorized just over 40 percent of regional peace operations. This suggests that in the post–Cold War era, regional organizations undertaking peace operations increasingly value the additional legitimacy—and sometimes legality—that comes with receiving authorization from the UN Security Council. Moreover, this means most of the peace operations conducted by regional organizations since the end of the Cold War have generally conformed with the rules of the UN system rather than tried to break or bypass them.

Paul D. Williams, February 2017, “Global and Regional Peacekeepers: Trends, Opportunities, Risks and a Way Ahead," George Washington University, Global Policy Journal, https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/b/1590/files/2018/08/Global-and-Regional-Peacekeepers-TrendsOpportunities-Risks-and-a-Way-Ahead-2ivzj6t.pdf // JJ  
Potential disadvantages of regional peacekeepers Regional organizations suffer from many of the same constraints and problems faced by UN peace operations as well as other distinct disadvantages. Geographic proximity to a conflict does not automatically generate a regional consensus on how to respond. As Diehl (2007, pp. 540–541) has pointed out, although ‘one might expect regional organizations to have an advantage over the United Nations because their membership is more homogenous’, in fact, the ‘most common threats to regional peace – internal threats – are exactly those least likely to generate consensus’. Immediate neighbors often have different views on how a local conflict should be resolved, which often has repercussions for the deployment of any peace operation. This might encourage a tendency for forum shopping, where great powers or powerful local actors seek more pliable peacekeepers. Russia’s preference to support CIS rather than UN peacekeepers in the Caucasus or Sudan’s demand, reiterated in Security Council resolution 1769, that any peacekeeping force in Darfur must retain its ‘predominantly African character’, are examples. A related point is that regional organizations can be particularly susceptible to the pull of partisan interests, especially those associated with a regional hegemon such as Nigeria in the Economic Community of West African State s (ECOWAS) or Russia in the CIS. Because of the inability of regional organizations to act against their most powerful members, regional peace operations ‘are unlikely to be authorized in conflicts that directly involve the global powers or regional powers’ (Diehl, 2007, p. 543). Instead, local hegemons have often used regional arrangements to legitimize their activities in conflicts that are relevant to them rather than those going on inside their borders. This kind of manipulation was clearly evident in the Nigerian-led ECOWAS operations in Liberia (1990) and Sierra Leone (1997), the Russian-led CIS operations in Georgia (1994), and the Australian-led Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) operation in the Solomon Islands (2003). Compared to the United Nations, regional organizations lack experience in conducting peace operations. Even the AU and EU, the busiest regional organizations, have undertaken only a small fraction of the operations conducted by the UN. In some cases, the regional organizations in question, such as NATO and the PIF, have also lacked provisions in their charters authorizing peace operations. Regional organizations, with the possible exceptions of NATO and EU, operate with relatively small bureaucracies and budgets and lack the administrative, logistical, and command structures necessary to manage large-scale military operations. The problem is, as Diehl (2007, p. 546) noted, that ‘merely having the authority to carry out a conflict management activity is not enough if the organization lacks the requisite resources [financial, political, and military] to take effective action’. A poorly equipped and funded peace operation can generate its own problems. Indeed, a serious deficiency of mission support structures has been identified as one of the major failings of the APSA and, consequently, the AU’s peace operations (Lotze, 2016). The United Nations’ assessed contributions for peacekeeping are a sustainable form of financial support for peace operations, far better than most regional alternatives. In addition, the UN has developed peacekeeping standards in training and equipment that are lacking in many regional organizations. Another problem stems from the uneven levels and types of regionalization evident around the globe. In particular, some parts of the world, including areas of intense confrontation such as across the Middle East and Central and South Asia, have no regional organizations capable of conducting significant peace operations. Attempting to subcontract the United Nations’ responsibilities to the regional level in such areas could have disastrous effects. As the former head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations warned, regionalization can encourage an ‘only in my backyard’ approach that spells trouble for regions that lack the necessary capacities (Guehenno, 2003). Finally, although the UN Security Council faces several significant problems, no other organization can consistently generate as much international legitimacy for its missions as the UN. This is part of the reason why regional peace operations seek authorization from the Security Council (Williams, 2013). As then UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (1999, p. 306) concluded in 1995, if regionalization threatened to weaken the internationalist basis of the UN, it should be treated as a ‘dangerous’ idea.

### AT: (Link) Compete with U.N.

1. **Delink: Genser ’18 of the Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect** writes that having the UN Security Council and regionalism are not mutually exclusive at all, as the two often work together. Examples range from the African Union to the Six Party Talks with North Korea. In fact, **Abdrakhmanov ’18 of the U.N.** writes that, recognizing the increasing number of conflicts worldwide, the Security Council is moving towards working with regional actors.

[2. **Analytic:** The UNSC exists now, but it is ineffective. Insofar as their evidence specifies that its existence is what pushes out regional actors, its collapsing now doesn’t mean that regional actors will flourish, it only means that UNSC is ineffective, so there is no guarantee that regional actors will fill the vacuum.]

Jared Genser, September 2018, "The UN Security Council’s Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect: A Review of Past Interventions and Recommendations for Improvement", Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/un-security-council-application-of-r2p-jared-genser.pdf // JJ  
This briefing paper is a summary of a more detailed law review article recently published in the University of Chicago Journal of International Law. 1 An examination of eleven case-studies shows that there are three conditions that emerge as being determinative for whether the Security Council successfully or unsuccessfully implements R2P. First, there is either no obstruction by the government committing mass atrocity crimes, or, if government obstruction does take place, an interested P5 country provides the political will to overcome this obstruction. Second, cooperation exists between regional organizations—like the African Union (AU)—or neighboring regional powers and the Security Council to coordinate a response. And third, the Security Council has at its disposal a rapid response capacity to react to the perpetration of atrocity crimes in an efficient and effective manner to protect civilians. When any of the identified conditions is absent, implementation is generally unsuccessful. Given these conditions, specific recommendations are made for strengthening international institutions so that implementation of R2P by the Security Council in the coming decades will better save civilian populations from mass atrocity crimes. ROLE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL In the 2009 report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon presented three pillars to define how to implement R2P within the UN system. These Pillars are: (1) Pillar I, asserting that every state has a responsibility to protect its populations against mass atrocity crimes, which are defined as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity; (2) Pillar II, affirming that the wider international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist states in meeting their Pillar I responsibility; and (3) Pillar III, confirming that if a state manifestly fails to protect its population, the international community must take appropriate collective action in a timely manner and in accordance with the UN Charter. The Secretary-General delivered his report to the General Assembly, where it enjoyed broad support.

[…]

Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, and Libya demonstrate the varying degrees to which government obstruction or cooperation may play out in the face of a mass atrocity situation. In Mali, the sitting government requested intervention from French troops and UN assistance to deal with the crisis, meaning the Malian transitional government actively welcomed international assistance. Both Côte d’Ivoire and Libya demonstrate the Security Council’s actions when faced with obstruction. While the illegitimate government in Côte d’Ivoire resisted international intervention, the legitimate and democratically-elected president welcomed assistance from the Security Council, similar to the situation in Mali. Libya presented a different set of issues, however, as Muammar Qaddafi opposed and obstructed outside assistance as he actively perpetrated atrocity crimes against his own people. There, interest from the United States, United Kingdom, and France, strongly supported by regional organizations, provided political will and military possibility to act even in the face of Qaddafi’s obstruction. Therefore, government obstruction in all three R2P cases where the Security Council successfully mobilized action was either absent or overcome through P5-level interest. Further, these cases demonstrate the vital importance of cooperation between regional organizations and the Security Council to determine the best response given the nature of the crisis in each country. In Côte d’Ivoire and Mali the AU and Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) acted efficiently and effectively to condemn the outbreak of violence and atrocity crimes. ECOWAS was particularly active, calling on the Security Council to authorize or strengthen UN missions to help protect civilians in affected states. In Libya, the regional Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and League of Arab States played a major role in requesting the UN to authorize a protective no-fly zone. Taking into account other sources of input—such as civil society, the General Assembly, and the Human Rights Council—the Security Council’s subsequent resolutions were supportive of regional organizations and in line with their recommendations. Importantly, the Security Council seized and maintained its leadership role as the international body to implement R2P action while authorizing missions and deploying resources in line with the recommendations of regional authorities. Finally, all three cases illustrate the importance of a rapid response capacity for the Security Council to act timely and decisively in the face of humanitarian crises. In Côte d’Ivoire, the UN had a peacekeeping mission on the ground with which the Security Council could engage by expanding and strengthening its mandate. In Mali, military capacity came from the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission, with the support of ECOWAS. And in Libya, the military capacity came from a coalition of member states. In all cases, response capacity existed so that troops and resources could be deployed rapidly following the Security Council decision.

Kairat Abdrakhmanov, January 18, 2018, "Amid Rising Number of Conflicts Worldwide, Security Council Presidential Statement Underlines Urgent Need for Advancing Preventive Diplomacy Tools, Practices," No Publication, https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13168.doc.htm // JJ  
Expressing concern over the growing number of conflicts worldwide, the Security Council today underlined an urgent need for redoubled efforts for prevention and resolution. In presidential statement S/PRST/2018/1, presented by Kairat Abdrakhmanov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan and Security Council President for January, members underlined a profound need to focus on, among other things, advancing further conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy tools, practices and efforts, and ensure their most effective use. The Council underscored the importance of peacebuilding and emphasized the need for engaging and collaborating with regional actors in policy related and country-specific issues in the advice made by the Peacebuilding Commission. It also acknowledged the significant role of the Commission and United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Offices. Reiterating that United Nations cooperation with regional and subregional organizations was critical to contributing to the prevention of the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, the Council emphasized the importance of creating potential for scrutinizing closely complex, multifaceted and case-specific relationships of security and development. It also underlined the importance of promoting the ability of the United Nations to deliver on its founding determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. It placed an emphasis on conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy, peacebuilding and sustaining peace, sharing best practices and formulating forward-looking recommendations and strategies on them in light of the increasingly transnational nature of the causes, consequences and contributing factors of conflict. Causes included terrorism, armed group activities, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and organized crime and trafficking of conventional weapons, in particular small arms and light weapons. In addition, the Council underlined that addressing conflicts could include measures to rebuild trust by bringing together Member States around common goals. It stressed the necessity of addressing the root causes of conflicts and recalled that the prevention of conflict remained a primary responsibility of States. The 15-member organ further recalled the primary responsibility of States to protect civilians and to respect and ensure the human rights of all individuals within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction, as provided for by relevant international law. It further reaffirmed the responsibility of each individual State to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

**McDonald and Patrick 10** (Kara C. McDonald and Stewart M. Patrick, fellows at International Affairs, “UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests”, The Council on Foreign Relations, <file:///Users/hattiebilson/Downloads/UNSC_CSR59.pdf> }

The UNSC’s relevance is not declining; it remains the premier multilateral institution for matters of international security. To be sure, UN member states exploit a range of frameworks—including regional organizations, ad hoc coalitions, and interest-based partnerships—to advance their national and collective security. Examples range from the African Union to the Six Party Talks on North Korea. But in the last five years, the UNSC has spent comparatively less time rubber-stamping diplomatic agreements made outside its chambers and more time forging agreements within its own ranks. UNSC Resolution 1701 to end the Lebanon war, the P5+ Germany negotiations on Iran, and the UNSC’s sanctions against North Korea are all examples. The UNSC’s continued relevance is also illustrated by states’ desire to serve on it. Every October, the UNGA is filled to capacity when delegations elect the new rotating UNSC members amid an orgy of vote-buying. Even countries that make a profession of attacking the UNSC’s credibility nonetheless spend millions trying to gain a seat—suggesting that, at a minimum, it retains prestige.6

**Express News Service**, Indian news outlet, "African Union backs India’s UNSC bid," The Indian Express, July 7, 2007, [http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/african-union-backs-indias-unsc-bid/204068 DoA 3/14/19](http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/african-union-backs-indias-unsc-bid/204068%20DoA%203/14/19))

African Union backs India’s UNSC bid With the 53-member African Union extending its support, India's hope for a permanent seat in the expanded United Nations Security Council was bolstered on Friday. The support came after External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee met Alpha Oumar Konar, the Union's Chairperson, on the last day of his three-day visit to Ethiopia. Mukherjee, during the meeting, also discussed the ways and means to take forward cooperation between India and the African countries. "We discussed ways and means of further strengthening the India-Africa partnership," the statement issued by the Foreign Minister said. As part of strengthening ties, Mukherjee on Friday signed pilot projects on tele-education and tele-medicine. "This is a positive example of South-South Cooperation which uses IT and space technology and generates a multiplier developmental effect," the statement said. The visit also saw India and Ethiopia signing several important agreements, including one to promote bilateral investments and to enhance cooperation in the fields of science and technology and education. While the Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA) was signed to step up trade ties between India and Ethiopia, the two sides also decided to speed up finalisation of Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement. "Our bilateral relationship is to be further diversified and expanded," the statement added.

### \*AT: Spec: African Union

[Express News: they support India on UNSC]

**Express News Service**, Indian news outlet, "African Union backs India’s UNSC bid," The Indian Express, July 7, 2007, [http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/african-union-backs-indias-unsc-bid/204068 DoA 3/14/19](http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/african-union-backs-indias-unsc-bid/204068%20DoA%203/14/19))

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### AT: I/L – Peacekeeping

1. **Turn:** **Williams ’17 of George Washington University** writes that regional peacekeepers are underequipped and lack experience. They also work in favor of local hegemons, as opposed to keeping the peace; for example, the Solomon Islands and Georgia.

Paul D. Williams, February 2017, “Global and Regional Peacekeepers: Trends, Opportunities, Risks and a Way Ahead," George Washington University, Global Policy Journal, https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/b/1590/files/2018/08/Global-and-Regional-Peacekeepers-TrendsOpportunities-Risks-and-a-Way-Ahead-2ivzj6t.pdf // JJ  
Potential disadvantages of regional peacekeepers Regional organizations suffer from many of the same constraints and problems faced by UN peace operations as well as other distinct disadvantages. Geographic proximity to a conflict does not automatically generate a regional consensus on how to respond. As Diehl (2007, pp. 540–541) has pointed out, although ‘one might expect regional organizations to have an advantage over the United Nations because their membership is more homogenous’, in fact, the ‘most common threats to regional peace – internal threats – are exactly those least likely to generate consensus’. Immediate neighbors often have different views on how a local conflict should be resolved, which often has repercussions for the deployment of any peace operation. This might encourage a tendency for forum shopping, where great powers or powerful local actors seek more pliable peacekeepers. Russia’s preference to support CIS rather than UN peacekeepers in the Caucasus or Sudan’s demand, reiterated in Security Council resolution 1769, that any peacekeeping force in Darfur must retain its ‘predominantly African character’, are examples. A related point is that regional organizations can be particularly susceptible to the pull of partisan interests, especially those associated with a regional hegemon such as Nigeria in the Economic Community of West African State s (ECOWAS) or Russia in the CIS. Because of the inability of regional organizations to act against their most powerful members, regional peace operations ‘are unlikely to be authorized in conflicts that directly involve the global powers or regional powers’ (Diehl, 2007, p. 543). Instead, local hegemons have often used regional arrangements to legitimize their activities in conflicts that are relevant to them rather than those going on inside their borders. This kind of manipulation was clearly evident in the Nigerian-led ECOWAS operations in Liberia (1990) and Sierra Leone (1997), the Russian-led CIS operations in Georgia (1994), and the Australian-led Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) operation in the Solomon Islands (2003). Compared to the United Nations, regional organizations lack experience in conducting peace operations. Even the AU and EU, the busiest regional organizations, have undertaken only a small fraction of the operations conducted by the UN. In some cases, the regional organizations in question, such as NATO and the PIF, have also lacked provisions in their charters authorizing peace operations. Regional organizations, with the possible exceptions of NATO and EU, operate with relatively small bureaucracies and budgets and lack the administrative, logistical, and command structures necessary to manage large-scale military operations. The problem is, as Diehl (2007, p. 546) noted, that ‘merely having the authority to carry out a conflict management activity is not enough if the organization lacks the requisite resources [financial, political, and military] to take effective action’. A poorly equipped and funded peace operation can generate its own problems. Indeed, a serious deficiency of mission support structures has been identified as one of the major failings of the APSA and, consequently, the AU’s peace operations (Lotze, 2016). The United Nations’ assessed contributions for peacekeeping are a sustainable form of financial support for peace operations, far better than most regional alternatives. In addition, the UN has developed peacekeeping standards in training and equipment that are lacking in many regional organizations. Another problem stems from the uneven levels and types of regionalization evident around the globe. In particular, some parts of the world, including areas of intense confrontation such as across the Middle East and Central and South Asia, have no regional organizations capable of conducting significant peace operations. Attempting to subcontract the United Nations’ responsibilities to the regional level in such areas could have disastrous effects. As the former head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations warned, regionalization can encourage an ‘only in my backyard’ approach that spells trouble for regions that lack the necessary capacities (Guehenno, 2003). Finally, although the UN Security Council faces several significant problems, no other organization can consistently generate as much international legitimacy for its missions as the UN. This is part of the reason why regional peace operations seek authorization from the Security Council (Williams, 2013). As then UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (1999, p. 306) concluded in 1995, if regionalization threatened to weaken the internationalist basis of the UN, it should be treated as a ‘dangerous’ idea.

## Elections

### AT: Modi Loses Now

1. **Non-unique:** **Lam ’19 of the South China Morning Post** writes that Modi is poised to win the election and has 60% favorability. This is for three reasons.

a. **Media Madness.** **Inamdarmarch ’19 of Quartz India** writes that Modi has complete control over the media. He and the BJP control the narrative and are able to effectively manipulate voters.

b. **Good Growth. Lam** writes that India’s economy is booming – in particular, the Bombay Stock exchange crossed the 39,000 benchmark for the first time.

c. **Nervous Nationalism. Gettleman ’19 of the New Yrok Times** writes that, in the wake of the recent skirmishes in Kashmir, Modi has capitalized on nationalist sentiment and a desire for strong leadership to make critical inroads with undecided voters.

d. **A fractured opposition party.** According to **SCMP ’19**, there is no strong leader to oppose Modi.

Overall, **The Economist ’19** confirms that Modi has won a decisive victory in a critical state eleciton, and has regained his electoral momentum.

South China Morning Post, 5-19-2019, "India votes: how elections are a tragedy in world’s largest democracy," South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/letters/article/3006186/elections-india-real-tragedy-worlds-largest-democracy // JJ  
The true catastrophe for India is that we have highly qualified professionals, but we do not have capable leaders to challenge the status quo. We have Mr Modi, whose performance in the past five years has been average to mediocre, and then there is Mr Gandhi who is just [unable to present](https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3004912/indian-election-cow-vigilantes-gst-job-losses-voters-should-have) a cogent profile of himself or a coherent vision of the India he will build. So Mr Modi seems powerful purely because the opposition cannot position a strong leader, who is intellectually able and street smart enough to sway the masses with the right appeals and rhetoric. Herein lies India’s tragedy.

The Economist, March 11, 2019, "The party of Narendra Modi wins a decisive victory in Uttar Pradesh," Economist, https://www.economist.com/asia/2017/03/11/the-party-of-narendra-modi-wins-a-decisive-victory-in-uttar-pradesh // JJ  
ONE television channel calls it a TsuNaMo. The term, playing on the initials of India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, is apt. In the most politically critical of five state elections whose result was announced on March 11th, Mr Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) all but drowned its rivals in a tide of its trademark orange. The capture of some 312 out of 403 seats in the state assembly of Uttar Pradesh was not merely a result of harder work, superior organisation and a more aggressive message. Indian pundits, a normally quarrelsome bunch, are virtually unanimous in crediting Mr Modi himself as the biggest vote-getter. Having won power in 2014 on a wave of hope for change, Mr Modi’s government had begun to lose momentum and the prime minister himself his aura of invincibility. In particular his abrupt move in November to scrap higher-denomination currency notes, which caused widespread hardship for little evident gain, raised doubts about Mr Modi’s competence. But now his hawa, meaning wind—as in a political tail-wind—is back. From one end of the Britain-sized state to another, voters proudly declared confidence that Modi-ji is the man to sort out India’s myriad woes.

Jeffrey Gettleman, Vindu Goel and Maria Abi-Habib, 3-11-2019, "In India’s Election Season, a Bombing Interrupts Modi’s Slump," The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/world/asia/modi-india-election.html // JJ  
But one bombing in Kashmir, and weeks of military brinkmanship with Pakistan afterward, appears to have interrupted Mr. Modi’s slump. A young suicide bomber [blew up a military bus](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/world/asia/pulwama-attack-kashmir.html?module=inline) in Kashmir on Feb. 14, killing more than 40 troops. The group Jaish-e-Muhammad, which operates from Pakistan and is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States, claimed responsibility. Mr. Modi ordered airstrikes on Pakistan, which he blamed for the attack, and Pakistan struck back. Never before, experts said, had two nuclear-armed nations bombed each other. From the outside, Mr. Modi was widely criticized as being willing to risk war for even the chance at a political boost. And when an Indian pilot was captured in Pakistani territory — and [was then quickly returned in a good-optics moment for Pakistan](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/world/asia/pakistan-india-pilot-kashmir.html?module=inline) — some international analysts thought Mr. Modi’s military adventurism had backfired. But that’s not how it has played out within India. Political analysts say that Indians are rallying behind Mr. Modi again, and that he seems to be making crucial gains among independent and undecided voters. The fact that India’s airstrikes probably missed their targets, and that a fighter jet was shot down by Pakistan, doesn’t seem to matter to most Indians. Their country was hit, and Mr. Modi hit back. “Even if they go below the seven seas, I will find them,” Mr. Modi said in a speech this month, referring to terrorists. “To settle the score is my habit!” Some of his supporters in India see Mr. Modi’s aggressive stance not as pandering for votes, but as a return to his old passion and focus. “Whatever our criticisms about him regarding the economy and jobs, at the end of the day he has done an incredible job of delivering justice for the martyrs,” said Prapti Bhattacharya, a law student and first-time voter. “Before this, I would have voted for Congress,” the leading opposition party, she said. “Now I’m voting for Modi.” The Pakistan crisis “has provided him with a golden narrative,” said Milan Vaishnav, the director of the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “The thing about a national security crisis is that it plays up decisiveness, leadership and nationalism. These are three characteristics he often touts.”

Nikhil Inamdarmarch, March 12, 2019, "How Narendra Modi has almost killed the Indian media," Quartz India, https://qz.com/india/1570899/how-narendra-modi-has-almost-killed-indian-media/ // JJ  
The Modi era coincided with an exponential rise in the use of social media in India, a medium that this government exploited to the hilt to target critics, [mobilise public opinion](http://time.com/5512032/whatsapp-india-election-2019/), and use tags like “anti-national,” to discredit anyone showing a hint of circumspection with the state narrative. It is estimated that between 2016 and 2018 alone, the number of [Indians using social networks grew](https://www.statista.com/statistics/278407/number-of-social-network-users-in-india/) from 168 million to 326 million, making it a handy tool for the ruling party to spread half-truths and fake news through a cobweb of unofficial accounts and unleash trolls to attack journalists who tried to counter them. As a result, reporters in India have over the past five years regularly had their mobile numbers circulated on WhatsApp groups, and been subjected to a deluge of sexually explicit messages, death and rape threats, and other forms of online intimidation. “The pattern of trolling has led many to speculate whether there is an organising hand at work. There is. The BJP has a wide network of volunteers and paid workers scattered across the country and in their offices in Delhi’s Ashoka Road which sends daily instructions on WhatsApp. Each troll has a contact point in the Ashoka Road central cell,” [Swati Chaturvedi](https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/india/bjps-troll-army-bullies-abuses-and-fights-dirty-with-narendra-modi-as-the-general-1.1541941374832), journalist and author of I Am a Troll: Inside the Secret World of the BJP’s Digital Army, wrote in the Gulf News. But the government hasn’t always hidden behind the smokescreen of social media. There have been more blatant attempts to arm-twist media proprietors. [Raiding news channels](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/05/world/asia/india-ndtv-raids-narendra-modi-prannoy-roy.html?mcubz=3), boycotting prime-time debates, and stopping government advertising—a significant source of revenue for the industry—have been among the common tactics used by the Modi regime. Unwillingness to toe the line has often led to high-profile editorial sackings.

Pok Fu Lam ,4-12-2019, Modi will win the Indian election: critics just need to deal with it, South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/letters/article/3005555/why-narendra-modi-will-win-indias-general-election-simple-most, //CJ

**Narendra Modi will win Indian election: blame games will achieve little Blaming weak opposition leaders and appeals to populism for the likely re-election of India’s prime minister ignores the fact that the people are happy with the government** I read with concern “The Modi blues” and various other articles in This Week in Asia. Most Indians in Hong Kong would concur with the views expressed in Vikram Dravith’s letter, “Why so harsh on Modi and Indian Hindus?”(April 6), and it didn’t take long for you to live up to those claims, with three articles and six pages on Modi and the Indian elections on April 7. The writer made such an effort to interview the opposition Congress and its associates, Praveen Chakraborthy, Jean Dreze and Pallam Raju – but only one person from the BJP camp. Whatever happened to impartiality? **A sure sign of a solid economy is investor confidence and this is evident in the Bombay Stock Exchange crossing the 39,000 benchmark for the first time on April 1. The markets are booming**. The article cited the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies to support the view that **jobs are a priority, but the same organisation in its most recent survey says that 59 per cent of the people in the country are satisfied with the government and that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s popularity remains high**. Having settled on a Modi victory, the article indulges in a blame game – weak opposition leaders, people being swayed on emotive issues and so on. Ever considered that when the majority of the people are happy with their government at the tail end of its term, it could mean that it has been doing a great job? India election: Narendra **Modi’s BJP promises to reserve one-third of seats for women in parliament ‘The BJP is committed to 33 per cent reservation in parliament and state assemblies through a constitutional amendment,’ t**he party said in its election manifesto **The party also promised to inject over US$300 billion for rural development, introduce a pension scheme for small and marginal farmers,** and simplify the GST India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party promised on Monday to reserve one-third of seats in the Indian parliament and state assemblies for women if it returns to power in an election due to begin on April 11. “**Women’s welfare and development will be accorded a high priority at all levels within the government, and the BJP is committed** to 33 per cent reservation in parliament and state assemblies through a constitutional amendment,” the party said in its manifesto. The document by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s right-wing BJP, released with fanfare in New Delhi, balanced nationalist policies with development talk. The party said it was committed to building a grand temple for Hindu god Rama “as soon as possible in a harmonious way” and pass a citizenship bill that would grant Indian nationality to Hindus from neighbouring countries. Under fire from the opposition Congress party for not doing enough for India’s struggling farmers, the party said it would infuse more than US$300 billion for rural development. **It would also extend an annual handout of 6,000 rupees (US$86) and introduced a pension scheme for small and marginal farmers**  Nationalism is our inspiration ... good governance is our mantra,” Modi, 68, said at the launch. “It (the manifesto) is multi-layered and multi-dimensional because our society is very diverse. We can’t have a one-size-fits-all kind of policy. It addresses the needs of all sections of society.” The party also pledged to simplify the goods and services tax (GST) – which disrupted businesses and hurt economic growth when it was introduced by Modi’s government in 2017 – and to revise income tax brackets to help the middle-class if the party retained power. India election: Modi, Gandhi and the Chinese dragon in the room **“We are committed to further revise the tax slabs and the tax benefits to ensure more cash and greater purchasing power in the hands of our middle income families**,” the BJP said. The party’s manifesto comes on the heels of a similar document released by Congress last week, which promised to “create wealth and guarantee welfare” to India’s 1.3 billion people. Indian PM Narendra Modi speaks after releasing the BJP’s election manifesto. Photo: ReutersIndian PM Narendra Modi speaks after releasing the BJP’s election manifesto. Photo: Reuters Indian PM Narendra Modi speaks after releasing the BJP’s election manifesto. Photo: Reuters India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party promised on Monday to reserve one-third of seats in the Indian parliament and state assemblies for women if it returns to power in an election due to begin on April 11. “Women’s welfare and development will be accorded a high priority at all levels within the government, and the BJP is committed to 33 per cent reservation in parliament and state assemblies through a constitutional amendment,” the party said in its manifesto. The document by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s right-wing BJP, released with fanfare in New Delhi, balanced nationalist policies with development talk. From Gandhi to cow vigilantes: a guide to the Indian election The party said it was committed to building a grand temple for Hindu god Rama “as soon as possible in a harmonious way” and pass a citizenship bill that would grant Indian nationality to Hindus from neighbouring countries. Under fire from the opposition Congress party for not doing enough for India’s struggling farmers, the party said it would infuse more than US$300 billion for rural development. SUBSCRIBE TO THIS WEEK IN ASIA Get updates direct to your inbox your email SUBMIT By registering for these newsletters you agree to our T&C and Privacy Policy It would also extend an annual handout of 6,000 rupees (US$86) and introduced a pension scheme for small and marginal farmers. A Modi supporter at a BJP election rally in Assam, India. Photo: Reuters A Modi supporter at a BJP election rally in Assam, India. Photo: Reuters Share: “Nationalism is our inspiration ... good governance is our mantra,” Modi, 68, said at the launch. “It (the manifesto) is multi-layered and multi-dimensional because our society is very diverse. We can’t have a one-size-fits-all kind of policy. It addresses the needs of all sections of society.” The party also pledged to simplify the goods and services tax (GST) – which disrupted businesses and hurt economic growth when it was introduced by Modi’s government in 2017 – and to revise income tax brackets to help the middle-class if the party retained power. India election: Modi, Gandhi and the Chinese dragon in the room “We are committed to further revise the tax slabs and the tax benefits to ensure more cash and greater purchasing power in the hands of our middle income families,” the BJP said. The party’s manifesto comes on the heels of a similar document released by Congress last week, which promised to “create wealth and guarantee welfare” to India’s 1.3 billion people. **Congress had announced 72,000 rupees (US$1,045) each to India’s poorest 250 million families. The BJP, which decimated Congress as it swept to power in 2014, has been riding a nationalistic wave, vowing to protect the country against Pakistan-backed “terrorism”. In February, India and Pakistan faced off in their worst confrontation in years over Kashmir, conducting tit-for-tat air strikes.**

### AT: BJP Lose Now

1. **Non-unique:** **Patanaik ’19 of Reuters** writes that the BJP is already poised to win for two reasons.

a) According **Patanaik**, to voters care more about national security afforded to them by the BJP than economic concerns.

b) **Gilbert ’19 of Vice** writes that the BJP controls the online media – moreso than any other party – and is able to control the narrative.

David Gilbert, 4-11-2019, "Modi's trolls are ready to wreak havoc on India's marathon election," VICE News, https://news.vice.com/en\_us/article/597mwk/modis-trolls-are-ready-to-wreak-havoc-on-indias-marathon-election // JJ  
In 2014, Modi used social media to spread his message and help him win a landslide victory, and [Facebook worked closely](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/inside-facebooks-political-unit-that-enables-the-dark-art-of-digital-propaganda/articleshow/62222158.cms) with the leader to supercharge his online presence and make him [the most-followed world leader](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/inside-facebooks-political-unit-that-enables-the-dark-art-of-digital-propaganda/articleshow/62222158.cms). In the years since, Modi and the BJP have developed their online operation into a sophisticated machine that includes a huge “troll army” of paid and voluntary supporters who help spread the party’s message on platforms like Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter, instantly reaching millions of people. “In the last few years, he has reset the tone and normalized a kind of bigotry and is openly campaigning on sectarian and anti-Muslim grounds,” Rohit Chopra, a media studies professor at Santa Clara University, told VICE News. With internet usage in India exploding — WhatsApp alone has 230 million users in the country — it has never been easier for Modi to shape the narrative, stoke division and spread misinformation. Other parties are following his lead, but nowhere near the scale of the BJP, and experts warn that for all the steps companies like Facebook and WhatsApp have taken, the sheer scale of these elections means those measures are having little to no impact. WEAPONIZING WHATSAPP If 2014 was the Facebook election in India, then 2019 is shaping up to be the WhatsApp election. The BJP began its focus on WhatsApp in 2017 and 2018 local elections, weaponizing the platforms to foment fear and confusion among supporters, which in turn has led to real-world violence, especially in rural areas where access to other sources of information is limited. Though many parties are leaning on WhatsApp to get their message out, the BJP has far and away the most sophisticated operation in place, allowing it to reach even the most remote voters. Last September, the BJP [laid out an ambitious election plan](https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/bjp-plans-a-whatsapp-campaign-for-2019-lok-sabha-election/story-lHQBYbxwXHaChc7Akk6hcI.html) to have 900,000 volunteers create specific WhatsApp groups for each of the country’s polling stations, allowing the party to control the narrative at a granular level. Often these messages push anti-Muslim sentiments that travel far and wide on WhatsApp, increasing the chance of violence. An image of [a man’s body hanged outside a temple](https://twitter.com/RSFBLB/status/1080856820841799680) was shared with the “Vote for Modi” group, with the caption: “One more priest has been murdered, Remember, the jihadis are not going to stop at just this.” [The claims were later shown to be false](https://www.altnews.in/death-of-priest-at-raebareli-temple-communalised-on-social-media/).

Subrat Patnaik, 4-9-2019, "Modi's alliance to win slim majority in Indian election, poll shows," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-election-poll/modis-alliance-to-win-slim-majority-in-indian-election-poll-shows-idUSKCN1RL0U3 // JJ  
NEW DELHI (Reuters) - Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ruling alliance will win a thin majority in a general election that starts on Thursday, an average of four opinion polls showed, with a focus on national security appearing to trump concerns over jobs and farm prices. The coalition led by Modi’s Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is expected to win 273 of the 543 parliament seats at stake, one more than the halfway mark required to rule. In the last election the alliance won more than 330 seats - the biggest mandate in three decades. Most of the polling agencies that released surveys in the last four days said Modi got a boost from recent tension with arch enemy Pakistan after a militant group based there killed 40 Indian policemen in the disputed region of Kashmir in February.

### AT: UNSC Makes Modi Win

1. **Delink:** **Tewari ’18 of ThePrint** writes that rural voters will be the key contested demographic for the Indian elections. Rural voters vote off of things like agricultural subsidies, not diplomatic victory.

2. **Bad Policies Advantage:** According to **The Economist**, Modi is using politically expedient policies to win: in doing so, reducing long term growth, punishing ethnic minorities, and risking war with Pakistan. Modi’s going to win, anyway; it’s far preferable for him to win through securing Council membership than through these destructive policies.

Ruhi Tewari, December 22, 2018, "Sorry urban voters, election 2019 is all about wooing the rural Indian," ThePrint, https://theprint.in/opinion/sorry-urban-voters-election-2019-is-all-about-wooing-the-rural-indian/167583/ // JJ  
The political theatre has shifted to rural India ahead of the 2019 election. The rural voter is in vogue, and has pushed some much-publicised flagship programmes of the Narendra Modi government to the backseat. In the din of farm loan waivers, one doesn’t hear much about Startup India, Make in India or Digital India. It’s safe to say that the political theatre has shifted in the election season. It is rural and not urban India that will be at the centre of the political rhetoric in the run-up to 2019. In what is just a trailer, Congress president Rahul Gandhi, who promised to waive off farm loans in almost all his campaign speeches ahead of the state elections, [has now said that](https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/rahul-gandhi-says-wont-let-pm-rest-till-farm-loans-are-waived-1964299) he “won’t let the Prime Minister sleep” till a nationwide farm loan waiver is announced. Rahul Gandhi knows the rural voter is perhaps the BJP’s biggest worry. The closely-contested Gujarat election last year had shown a clear rural-urban divide, with the Congress [performing better](https://www.rediff.com/news/interview/must-read-why-bjp-lost-rural-gujarat/20171221.htm) than the BJP in the rural areas. And, the 11 December results in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh indicated that the [agrarian anger against the BJP](https://theprint.in/politics/bjps-anti-farmer-policies-led-to-hindi-heartland-loss-says-farmers-body/162093/) is very real. In 2004, the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government lost the Lok Sabha polls after its glamorous ‘India Shining’ campaign failed to cut ice with the rural voters. Reeling from the recent electoral losses, the BJP is now engaged in a ‘who loves the farmer more’ competition with the Congress. With the newly-elected Congress chief ministers in the three states announcing farm loan waivers this week, the BJP [lost no time](https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/gujarat-assam-governments-waive-rural-electricity-bills-farm-loans/story-Aep0xBnQW8Rl3GOJmdJz8N.html) in waiving off farm loans in Assam and rural electricity bills worth Rs 650 crore in Gujarat.

The Economist, February 28, 2019, "India and Pakistan should stop playing with fire," Economist, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/02/28/india-and-pakistan-should-stop-playing-with-fire // JJ  
But unemployment has actually risen during Mr Modi’s tenure, according to leaked data that his government has been accused of trying to suppress (see [article](https://www.economist.com/node/21760227)). The gst was needlessly complex and costly to administer. Other pressing reforms have fallen by the wayside. India’s banks are still largely in state hands, still prone to lend to the well-connected. And as the election has drawn closer, Mr Modi has resorted to politically expedient policies that are likely to harm the economy. His government hounded the boss of the central bank out of office for keeping interest rates high, appointing a replacement who promptly cut them. And it has unveiled draft rules that would protect domestic e-commerce firms from competition from retailers such as Amazon. By the same token, Mr Modi has not sparked the outright communal conflagration his critics, The Economist included, fretted about before he became prime minister. But his government has often displayed hostility to India’s Muslim minority and sympathy for those who see Hinduism—the religion of 80% of Indians—as under threat from internal and external foes. He has appointed a bigoted Hindu prelate, Yogi Adityanath, as chief minister of India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh. A member of his cabinet presented garlands of flowers to a group of Hindu men who had been convicted of lynching a Muslim for selling beef (cows are sacred to Hindus). And Mr Modi himself has suspended the elected government of Jammu & Kashmir, India’s only Muslim-majority state, and used force to suppress protests there against the central government, leading to horrific civilian casualties. As reprehensible as all this is, the Hindu zealots who staff Mr Modi’s electoral machine complain that he has not done enough to advance the Hindu cause (see [article](https://www.economist.com/node/21760243)). And public dissatisfaction with his economic reforms has helped boost Congress, the main opposition party, making the election more competitive than had been expected. The temptation to fire up voters using heated brinkmanship with Pakistan will be huge. Mr Modi has made a career of playing with fire. He first rose to prominence as chief minister of Gujarat when the state was racked by anti-Muslim pogroms in 2002. Although there is no evidence he orchestrated the violence, he has shown no compunction about capitalising on the popularity it won him in Hindu-nationalist circles. With a difficult election ahead, he may think he can pull off the same trick again by playing the tough guy with Pakistan, but without actually getting into a fight. However, the price of miscalculation does not bear thinking about. Western governments are pushing for a diplomatic settlement at the un. If Mr Modi really is a patriot, he will now step back.

### AT: I/L – Modi Tanks Econ

1. **Delink: Panagariya ’18 of Columbia University** finds that Modi’s economic policies have stabilized the economy and reduced inflation. When Modi took office, India was facing an economic crisis; since then, inflation has decreaed from 9.7% to 4.3% and growth has increased from 5.9% to 7.3%, which the **Indo-Asian News Service ’19** finds is the highest rate of average growth combined with the lowest average rate of inflation since India’s liberalization. The reason for this turnaround is Modi’s vast economic reform, including greater labor-market flexibility, the shift to Direct Benefit Transfers, the Goods and Services Tax, and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

**2. Delink: Holland ’19** finds that their inflation scenario is not indicative of Modi’s future plans, but instead reflects short term increases in spending leading up to the elections, which is what their OWN author (Holland) writes.

**Panagariya 18**(Arvind Panagariya, professor of economics and the Jagdish Bhagwati professor of Indian political economy at Columbia University, June 22nd 2018, Foreign Affairs, “Modinomics at Four Why India Is on the Path to Long-Term Prosperity,” [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2018-06-22/modinomics-four DOA 3/29/2019](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2018-06-22/modinomics-four%20DOA%203/29/2019))

**When Prime Minister**[**Narendra Modi**](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2014-06-10/promise-modinomics)**took office in May 2014, India faced major economic challenges. Growth had plummeted to 5.9 percent** during the last two years of the outgoing government, down from a nine-year average of 8.2 percent. During the same two years, **inflation had averaged 9.7**percent. Meanwhile, the government was in the grip of paralysis, unable to rein in corruption or complete large projects and in need of key structural reforms**. Four years later, the**[**Modi**](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2017-03-30/who-narendra-modi)**government has largely succeeded in addressing these problems. On average, inflation has come down to 4.3 percent and growth has climbed to 7.3 percent over the last four years. Bold steps such as the demonetization program in November 2016 have been effective in curbing corruption.** And **the government has introduced numerous efficiency-enhancing initiatives, such as the replacement of a complex set of central- and state-level taxes with a single goods and services tax (GST). Taken together, these policies put India on the path to long-term growth and prosperity.**

**Panagariya 18 continues**(Arvind Panagariya, professor of economics and the Jagdish Bhagwati professor of Indian political economy at Columbia University, June 22nd2018, Foreign Affairs, “Modinomics at Four Why India Is on the Path to Long-Term Prosperity,” [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2018-06-22/modinomics-four DOA 3/29/2019](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2018-06-22/modinomics-four%20DOA%203/29/2019))

**When Modi came to office, momentum for structural reforms had been lost, and little progress had been made**during the preceding five years. **During his tenure, substantial progress has been made in a large number of areas. Although the full list is too long to be fully covered, some key reforms are worthy of note: deregulation of gasoline and diesel prices, further opening to foreign direct investment (FDI), greater labor-market flexibility, the shift to Direct Benefit Transfers (DBT), the Goods and Services Tax (GST), and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC**). Under Modi, India has deregulated gasoline and diesel prices. For too long, state subsidies held down the prices paid by consumers, thereby encouraging wasteful consumption of the products and adding to the fiscal deficit. These subsidies have now been fully eliminated. During the recent rise in crude prices, which led to large increases in retail gasoline and diesel prices, voices were raised from nearly all quarters to lower the prices but the government has refrained from restoring subsidies. During the last four years, the subsidy on liquid petroleum gas, used in cooking, has also been considerably reduced. Modi has also opened India up to greater levels of foreign direct investment (FDI). At the time he came to office, foreign investors considered a relaxation of the FDI cap in the insurance market from 26 percent to 49 percent as a litmus test of his resolve to place India back on the path of reforms. The Modi government has not only delivered on this reform but gone further by opening up defense to FDI. It has also permitted 100 percent FDI in marketing of food products produced in India; high-tech and capital-intensive activities in the railways; manufacturing of medical devices; and the e-commerce marketplace. The last of these items has led to the entry of Amazon and Walmart in India’s e-commerce space. Total FDI flow, which averaged $35 billion during the last two fiscal years of the outgoing government, has risen to $60 billion in the fiscal year ending in March 2017 and $48 billion during the nine-month period of April-December 2017.

**Indo-Asian News Service 2019**(Indo-Asian News Service or IANS is a private Indian news agency, “‘Only NDA has achieved sustained high growth with low inflation: PM Modi”,*India Today* , February 23rd 2019, <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/only-nda-has-achieved-sustained-high-growth-with-low-inflation-pm-modi-1463146-2019-02-23>. DOA: March 29th 2019)

Noting that his government had achieved the unprecedented dual objective of sustained high growth combined with low inflation, Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Saturday said innovation and technology would provide the backbone of "resurgence" for a "new India". Addressing the ET Global Business Summit, Modi said that unlike earlier governments in the post-liberalisation era, **the outgoing National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government had achieved both sustained high growth of over 7 per cent and low single-digit inflation. "The previous government achieved an average annual growth rate of 6.5 per cent with inflation in double digits," he said. "However, between 2014 and 2019, the average annual growth rate has been 7.4 per cent, while the average inflation rate has been 4.5 per cent. Post the liberalisation in 1991, this has been the highest rate of average growth combined with the lowest average rate of inflation**." He said the current transformation underway in the economy was the result of sound macroeconomic fundamentals which is reflected, for instance, in the "increasing bouquet of financing resources

**Holland 2018**(Tom Holland is a former SCMP staffer who has been writing about Asian affairs for more than 25 years, “‘How China Began World War III in the South China Sea”, *SCMP*, December 17th 2018, <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2178095/modis-plans-indias-central-bank-borrow-future>. DOA: March 29th 2019)

First, the state elections. It is not altogether surprising that Modi’s party should have suffered a setback. His popularity took a severe knock after he oversaw a disastrous 2016 attempt to withdraw large-denomination banknotes from circulation, a decision which contributed heavily to a deep slump in the economy’s growth rate last year. But developments such as the unseating last week of Rajasthan’s cow welfare minister suggest the electorate may be turning against Modi’s brand of political Hinduism in favour of Congress’s more secular approach. **This will make Modi all the more eager to engineer an economic pickup ahead of next May’s national vote, by increasing government spending and ramping up state bank lending.** Monday’s resignation of Patel as RBI governor makes both of these more likely. For months now, **Modi’s government has been leaning on the supposedly independent central bank to hand over a portion of its capital cushion**

### AT: I/L – Warming General

1. **Delink:** Modi is pro-environmental policy. **India Today ’18** writes that Modi has been recognized by the UN for his action against global warming. In fact, a lot of the reason why this is because India advocates for developing countries: **Goswami ’18 of the Economic Times** writes that India has called for more funding for developing countries to cope with climate change.

India Today, 10-3-2018, "PM Modi gets UN award, world body chief says India has set example on climate action," India Today, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/pm-modi-gets-un-award-world-body-chief-says-india-has-set-example-on-climate-action-1354557-2018-10-03 // JJ  
United Nations chief Antonia Guterres heaped praise on Prime Minister Narendra Modi's realisation of the dangers of climate change as he handed him the Champions of the Earth award. The Champions of the Earth is a top United Nations honour that recognises contribution in the field of environment and environment protection. "In PM Narendra Modi, we have a leader who realises the issue of climate change and understands the benefits of climate action. He knows the problems and also works to solve them," UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said at the award handing ceremony in New Delhi. "We are recognising a statesman who embodies true leadership," Guterres said, adding that the world needs bold leadership on climate action. Guterres also lauded India in his speech. "I thank India for setting an example and was pleased to present Prime Minister Narendra Modi with the Champions of the Earth Award," the UN chief said. PM Modi, while accepting the award, said that the "honour is the result of the commitment [that] the people of India [have towards] to environment". PM Narendra Modi was awarded the UN honour along with French President Emmanuel Macron. The two leaders were recognised in the Policy Leadership category "for their pioneering work in championing the International Solar Alliance and promoting new areas of levels of cooperation on environmental action". Along with PM Narendra Modi, the Cochin International Airport, which is the world's first fully solar powered airport, too received a similar honour. The airport was awarded in the Entrepreneurial Vision category for "leadership in the use of sustainable energy". PM Modi mentioned the Kochi airport's award in his speech. "This is also a proud moment for India because the Kochi Airport has received an award... It also shows our seriousness towards caring for the environment."

Urmi Goswami, 12-4-2018, "India demands funds for developing countries to fight global warming," Economic Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-demands-funds-for-developing-countries-to-fight-global-warming/articleshow/66941768.cms // JJ  
KATOWICE: India steps into the finance fight. Calls for more credible, accurate and verifiable numbers, and puts forward a plan to achieve that. Finance for developing countries to take measures to slow down global warming is expected to be a flash point at the ongoing talks. It just not the amount of money that rich industrialised countries are providing that is in dispute but a more basic question of accountability and what can be legitimately be described as climate finance. India has consistently raised the issue of funding for developed countries. That has been more in the nature of a demand. At Katowice India, is stepping up this demand. In a discussion paper prepared by the Ministry of Finance, “3 Essential ‘Ss’ of Climate Finance - Scope, Scale and Speed: A Reflection, that was released on the sidelines of the ongoing climate talks, India has turned on the spotlight on the fundamental issues that must be addressed. Drawing attention to the call for urgent climate action in the wake of the special report on 1.5 degrees Celsius by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the paper reiterates that climate actions by developing countries would have to be supported by climate finance flows from developed to developing countries. “The call for enhanced climate actions on the basis of scientific reports is laudable.

### \*AT: I/L – Domestic Warming Policy

1. **nuq/turn:** Gandhi has terrible/worse environmental policy. **Seetha 19** of **Firstpost** finds that while Modi removed some environmental safeguards, Gandhi has campaigned on the promise to remove red tape for startups. Removing red tape means that rather than undergoing bureaucracy, companies can self-declare that they are following environmental regulations. At best its non-unique and India’s environment is fucked either way and at worst it functions as offense for us because their environment is a teensy bit more fucked with Gandhi.

**Seetha**, 3-29-**2019**, "Rahul Gandhi's startup push: Regulatory hurdles in state, local bodies must be removed to make it easier for new ventures," Firstpost, [https://www.firstpost.com/business/rahul-gandhis-startup-push-regulatory-hurdles-in-state-local-bodies-must-be-removed-to-make-it-easier-for-new-ventures-6351131.html //](https://www.firstpost.com/business/rahul-gandhis-startup-push-regulatory-hurdles-in-state-local-bodies-must-be-removed-to-make-it-easier-for-new-ventures-6351131.html%20//) RM

Congress president **Rahul Gandhi has promised to make life easier for startups. If his party comes to power, he has said, it will give new firms a three-year breather from the red tape that strangles all small and medium firms.** He also promised to abolish the angel tax that has caused much heartburn recently. This was a tax, let’s not forget, levied by the previous United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government and it is good that he is now promising to revisit it. **Scything red tape for startups is**, however, **a** far more **significant proposal**. What this means is that startups will not have to get sundry prior permissions before starting a business for three years. In this article in Business Standard, head of the Congress [research team](https://www.business-standard.com/article/elections/rahul-announces-three-year-exemption-from-govt-regulations-for-new-msmes-119032701053_1.html) Rajeev Gowda explained that new entrepreneurs will be exempt from all applicable laws and regulations (barring the Minimum Wages Act and tax laws) for three years from the day they start operations. The proposal probably stems from an initiative of the Congress government in Rajasthan. The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise (Facilitation of Establishment & Operation) Ordinance, 2019 allows entrepreneurs in Rajasthan to start new businesses without having to seek permissions and approvals for three years. This doesn’t mean that they are free to flout norms and laws but **they can submit self-declarations.** After three years, they will have to get all the required green signals within six months. Giving startups more freedom will, without doubt, give entrepreneurship the boost that the economy sorely needs. The Narendra Modi government’s Startup India programme did give a push, but the impact was limited because of the regulatory hurdles startups faced. **The programme allowed self-certification for quite a few regulations related to environmental norms (36 industries did not require environmental clearance under three laws), the Apprenticeship Act and Rules and six labour laws. However, these are central laws and startups did have to deal with a stifling permit-licence raj in states**.

## Misc

### AT: No Veto Power

1. Veto power comes with the permanent membership that India is granted, as **Dabhade ’17** finds that India will only forego veto power if the veto itself is abolished, which is extremely unlikely, but at that point, it does not matter at all in the context of the UNSC.

**Dabhade 2017** (Manish S. Dabhade, Assistant Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Convener of the Indian Diplomacy Research Group, December 15 2017, *Observer Research Foundation*, "India’s pursuit of United Nations Security Council reforms", <https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-pursuit-united-nations-security-council-reforms/>)

**On the most important question of veto, India’s position is fully aligned with the G4, L.69 and Africa who have called for the abolition of veto and *till it exists, it needs to be provided for all members of the permanent category of the Security Council***, which should have all prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership in the permanent category, including the right of veto. (March 2016) **The Indian position is not one of quantity**, viz. **extending it immediately to new permanent members, but talks about quality**, viz., **of introducing restrictions**. India, showing a marked flexibility, has argued that **it supports new members with the same responsibilities and obligations as current permanent members as a matter of principle. It is open to not exercising the veto by new permanent members until a decision is taken during a review process.**

### AT: End Aid to African Countries

1. **Terminal Defense:** They aren’t investing for the hell of it. **Pant ’17 of the Diplomat** explains that India has invested a lot of money into ITEC and a lot of money into infrastructure this is because India wants to foster a robust partnership with the African continent in order to help foster growth.

2. **Turn:** Foreign Aid is actually really bad for 3 reasons.

A) **Mbaku ’13 of the Brookings Institute** explains that infrastructure investment into African countries fail to provide basic and essential infrastructure needs, as the money is just funneled into white elephant projects that only benefit those in power.

B) **Chipaike ’12 of the IJHSS** finds that “infrastructure investment” doesn’t actually go into infrastructure, rather it just leads to resource exploitation and extraction. **Collier of Yale** explains that this has increased conflict in Sao Tome, Nigeria, Angola and Sierra Leone.

C) **Tran ’10** explains that for every dollar into foreign medicine sectors invested, local governments decrease their own spending by up to $1.14 and when this happens the recipient’s country have weaker healthcare. In fact, **Krotz ‘7 of Malecans** explains that out of every dollar invested into the malaryia projected 92 cents went to waste and went back into the pockets of western corporations.

Harsh V. Pant, The Diplomat,10-4-2017, India's Ambitious African Outreach, Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/indias-ambitious-african-outreach/, //CJ

Indian President Ram Nath Kovind is heading to Africa this week on his maiden visit as India’s president and New Delhi has chosen Djibouti and Ethiopia as his destinations. As the Ministry of External Affairs has pointed out “Africa is chosen as the first destination of president’s overseas visit — an indication of the importance attached to the African continent by the current government.” **The** Modi **government has been keen on expanding its profile in Africa, a continent with which India has shared historic ties and one where major powers today are scrambling for influence**. Djibouti is emerging as a key state in the Indian Ocean region. The construction of the Djibouti naval base — China’s first military base abroad — has generated varied reactions around the world. The base is seen as a move pushing China’s own limits to its foreign policy, and underscores its growing security profile in Africa. This new military foray in Africa, as explained by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at a press conference in 2016, was part of China’s willingness to “play a constructive role in the political settlement of international and regional issues, so as to create a more secure and stable environment for China’s development overseas,” and to “take on more international security responsibilities.” Indeed, China’s growing military profile in Africa is following its economic footprint in the continent. It is moving towards an ever more expansive definition of its global interests, pushing New Delhi to create new mechanisms for securing those interests, including its own growing military footprint abroad. Djibouti has been very welcoming of Indian presence in the country and had helped India during the time of evacuation from Yemen in 2015. With Ethiopia, India has had traditional ties and it remains the largest recipient of India’s concessional Lines of Credit in Africa. Both nations are key for India’s Africa outreach. With the India-Africa summit in 2015, the Modi government had signaled its readiness to step up engagement with Africa, a relationship which is centuries old, bolstered by trade across the Indian Ocean and a million-strong diaspora across Africa. **Shared colonial legacy and post-independence development experience have framed India’s relationship with Africa. India’s role as a champion of anti-colonialism and anti-racism after its independence in 1947 drew it closer to the African nations.** Since the end of the Cold War and propelled by China’s growing profile in Africa, **India is re-invigorating its ties with the African continent. The cooperation framework agreed at past India-Africa summits and the Indian initiatives to scale up investment and aid to Africa have underscored India’s aim to foster a robust partnership between New Delhi and the African continent. India today has growing stakes in Africa.** With some of the fastest growing nations in the world, Africa of today is not the “dark continent” of yore. The needs of regional states are divergent and their strengths are varied. **India’s focus over the last few decades has largely been on capacity building on the continent, providing more than $1 billion in technical assistance and training to personnel under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program. India has committed $7.5 billion to African infrastructure, covering 137 projects in more than 40 countries. India has also offered duty-free market access to Africa’s least developed countries**. But India’s trade with Africa remains far below potential. India wants a “developmental partnership” with Africa to be the cornerstone of its economic ties with the region. This also allows India to differentiate itself from the principles on which countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the traditional donors of foreign aid, have based their relations with the recipient nations.

John Mukum Mbaku, Brookings Institute. “Building Opportunities: Addressing Africa’s Lack of Infrastructure.” Brookings: 2012/2013. Accessed: 23 December 2013. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/01/foresight%20africa/foresight\_mbaku\_2013.pdf,//CJ

Most development strategists of the post-World War II period believed that the provision of infrastructure was critical for development in these countries. Such infrastructure included roads (especially farm-to-market roads), bridges, dams, power stations, telephone and irrigation systems, airports, railways and sewage disposal plants (Ostrom et al., 1993). In the 1960s, many foreign assistance strategies developed for African economies emphasized investment in infrastructure, with these structures expected to provide the foundation and wherewithal for significant improvements in agricultural productivity and eventual transition to manufacturing. **As many donors to African countries came to realize, successful infrastructure provision and industrialization required more than providing each country with the financial resources to import physical capital from the developed countries.** Official development aid was usually granted to governments and often tied to the political or economic objectives of the donor country, making it extremely difficult for African countries to fund infrastructure development. Because of these challenges, **most public spending was devoted to inappropriate or unsustainable infrastructure investments—a process that failed to improve agricultural production and foster the economic differentiation that was supposed to help African countries become more competitive globally. In fact, many African governments failed to provide essential infrastructure (e.g., farm-to-market roads, irrigation systems, rural schools) for improvements in agricultural productivity. Instead, these leaders invested in projects that offered significantly high political returns but produced a negative social surplus—so-called “white elephants.” An example of such a project is the Basilica of Our Lady of Peace of Yamoussoukro in Côte d’Ivoire, built between 1985 and 1989 at a cost of $300 million (Elleh, 2002).** As a consequence, today African countries have a serious deficit in the type of essential infrastructure that usually forms the foundation for significant improvements in agricultural productivity—with an efficient agricultural sector providing the wherewithal for eventual transition into manufacturing and industrial production. Agriculture, primarily a rural occupation, is critical to Africa’s effective fight against poverty and its eventual industrialization and modernization efforts. However, “[t]he majority of Africa’s rural populations do not live within reach of all season roads. As a result, they are not capable of participating in any meaningful entrepreneurial activities,” (Juma, 2012). More importantly, the lack of infrastructure may not only be depriving those living in rural areas from participating gainfully in economic activities, but it may also be denying them access to life-saving public services (e.g., health care, including prenatal care for women). Most of these services are located in urban centers.

Ronald Chipaike, Department of Peace and Governance at Bindura University of Science Education. “China and the United States of America in Africa: A new scramble or a new cold war?”. International Journal of Humanities and Socia Science. September 2012.<http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_2_No_17_September_2012/35.pdf>

While neocolonialism is mainly attributed to the invisible western hand in most of SSA economies, the Chinese have not hidden their desire for African resources. Though their Africa policy has benefited most SSA countries through infrastructure development, the basic fact remains that they want a bigger share in Africa’s resource cake. Whether one views Chinese and USA activities in SSA as a kind of a cold war or a new scramble, the two processes can not be viewed exclusive of each other. The various economic initiatives undertaken by the two countries in Africa can be viewed as a way of influencing SSA governments to behave in ways that do not endanger their resource exploitation activities. **AGOA and related programmes ensure the serene exploitation of oil resources in the eligible countries and China’s infrastructural development and related activities have the same effect.**

Paul Collier, Oxford University. “Africa and Globalization”. Center for the Studies of African Economies. 2003.<http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/activities/files/Collier11-24-03>

**“In Africa there have been evident links between natural resources and violent conflict**. Partly**, the natural resources act as a lure as recently in the coup attempt in Sao Tome and the routine extortion rackets in the Delta region of Nigeria, partly they encourage secessionist movements** as in Biafra and Katanga, and partly **they provide easy finance for rebel military expenditures as with UNITA in Angola and the RUF in Sierra Leone.** Africa has had a rising incidence of violent conflict, and its continued and even increasing dependence upon primary commodity extraction is part of the explanation for this trend, so different from that in other regions.”

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Phuong Tran. April 12, 2010. AID POLICY: Does Health Aid let Governments Off the Hook?

<http://www.irinnews.org/report/88785/aid-policy-does-health-aid-let-governments-off-the-hook>

“Given a lack of transparency and incomplete data, it is unclear where governments receiving donor health aid are channeling national funds that would have gone to that sector, but analysts say states could be putting the funds toward other priority sectors. **Every US$1 of health sector aid to Sub-Saharan African governments means ministries reduce health funding from domestic resources by $0.43 to $1.14**, according to a just-published [Lancet study](http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(10)60233-4/fulltext). **When donor aid is a substitute for government health spending the result is generally a weaker national health system**, say the report’s authors. The study notes that health aid given to NGOs in the respective countries has no impact on government health spending. “

Larry Krotz. Maclean’s Magazine. January 22, 2007. So Much for Foreign Aid.

<http://www.macleans.ca/world/global/article.jsp?content=20070122_139599_139599>

But they do point out that **over the past 60 years, rich countries have paid, in Easterly's estimation, US$2.3 trillion for development in poor countries--only to see children in Africa and parts of Asia still dying from entirely preventable diseases, and women still walking miles to collect water or firewood**. No one seems to know where all the money went. Its disappearance has led to the current skepticism over aid's effectiveness. **The old idea that something will eventually trickle down to the truly needful once local elites have lined their pockets no longer does the trick.** Tough-minded executives like Paul Wolfowitz at the World Bank are exercising zero tolerance on corruption, with no hesitation to freeze loans in the face of it. **Meanwhile, the bureaucracy that accompanies a lot of aid is just as crippling.** The African country of Tanzania is reportedly burdened with preparing 2,400 reports each quarter and hosting 1,000 meetings with donors annually--no doubt at great cost. According to a Brookings Institution task force, called Transforming Foreign Assistance in the 21st Century, Tanzanians have concluded that the cost of accepting aid is quite equal to its benefit. **Robert Calderisi cites a US$300-million malaria project in which one cent of each dollar spent went to medicine, one cent to insecticides, six cents to mosquito nets, and 92 cents to training, research, administration and evaluation, most of which returned to Western donor countries in the pockets of consultants.**

### AT: Chinese Retaliation

1. **Delink:** **China Daily ’05** writes that China actually does support India’s bid for the Security Council, so they would have no reason to retaliate. **Pillalamarri ’15 of the Diplomat** confirms that China views India on the UNSC as a benefit, because they vote similarly in international decisions. In addition, China views India as an unbiased counterweight to usher in a multipolar world.

2. **Delink:** This argument doesn’t make any sense. **Schaefer ’97 of the Heritage Foundation** writes that, in order to add India to the Security Council, an amendment would have to be approved by all of the P5 members. In a world where India has permanent membership, China had to have approved it.

Brett Schaefer, Heritage Foundation, 9-22-1997, "The United States Should Oppose Expansion of the U.N. Security Council", https://www.heritage.org/report/the-united-states-should-oppose-expansion-the-un-securitycouncil-0 // JJ  
Expanding the Security Council requires an amendment to the U.N. Charter. It must be approved by two-thirds of the General Assembly, including all permanent members of the Security Council, and be ratified by their legislatures. In the case of the United States, the amended charter must be passed by two-thirds of the Senate, some members of which have been highly critical of the Clinton Administration's plan. Senate leaders should put President Clinton on notice that they will reject any amendment to the U.N. Charter that includes an enlarged Security Council. Pressure to Expand the Security Council During the drafting of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council was described as the first among six equal bodies in the U.N. system, including the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice. The Security Council, however, indisputably is the U.N.'s premier political body, both because it is charged with maintaining international peace and because the General Assembly must abide by its resolutions. Nearly every important U.N. decision must originate in or be approved by the Security Council. For example, the Council nominates candidates for Secretary General as well as new members of the General Assembly. It also is the only body that can initiate U.N. peacekeeping missions and impose economic sanctions.

China Daily, April 12, 2005, "China tells Japan: Face up to history", No Publication, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/12/content\_433525.htm // JJ  
"Japan must adopt an earnest attitude and appropriate ways to deal with major principled issues concerning the feelings of the Chinese people," he said, "The Japanese have to do more things conducive to enhancing mutual trust and maintaining the relations between the two countries, rather than doing the reverse." China supports India's bid for UNSC seat Wen said China supports India's bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. "We fully understand and support the Indian aspiration to play an even bigger role in international affairs and in the UN," Premier Wen said while addressing a question at a press conference before winding up his four-day visit to India. He said he had conveyed the support to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during their talks here. China attaches "great importance" to India's role in both international and regional affairs, Wen said, adding "India is a very populous developing country and also a very important developing country".

Akhilesh Pillalamarri, The Diplomat,2-13-2015, China Should Back India for a Permanent UN Security Council Seat, Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-should-back-india-for-a-permanent-un-security-council-seat/, //CJ

On Thursday, multiple Indian media outlets were abuzz with the ‘story’ that the Chinese government had stated that it had no objections to India and Brazil joining the United Nations Security Council as permanent members. **While this story was, in fact, not true, and an exaggeration, the recent Chinese position is that India should play a greater role at the United Nations.** **This position was articulated at a recent meeting between the Chinese, Russian, and Indian foreign ministers in China. Despite the lack of explicit Chinese support for an Indian bid to join the UNSC as a permanent member, India should make the most of China’s favorable position to press China to support its bid. India and China often vote together at international forums despite their bilateral differences and border disputes. Moreover, an India on the UNSC would provide a neutral and independent counterweight to other powers, and would help usher in a more multipolar world**, as many Chinese analysts wish for. Despite being a liberal democracy, India has supported Russia and China on issues of non-interference in the affairs of other states and would help balance the UNSC away from the Western bloc. China would be more favorable towards an Indian bid or a larger Indian and Brazilian role at the U.N. than the bids of Japan and Germany. Japan and Germany, along with Brazil and India form the G4 nations grouping, an informal agreement among the four nations to support each other’s bids to join the Security Council. However, their bids are all opposed by regional rivals, such as Pakistan for India’s bid, and Argentina for Brazil’s bid.

### AT: China FDI

1. **delink:** India won’t get much aid from China. **Ma & Teng 18** of **The World Economy** writes that countries that are not a part of China’s Belt and Road initiative receive significantly more than countries who are on the BRI, because China is already heavily investing in the latter.

2. **nuq:** China always has an incentive to use FDI as political influence. According to the **China Power Team 18** for the **Center for Strategic and International Studies** explains that China invests in foreign countries to help its own economic and to increase its influence abroad. As a part of their “Going Global” strategy, firms in China have been increasingly investing overseas. Insofar as China always wants to have influence in other countries, there is no reason why India’s vote on the UNSC is any more important than its vote in the UN or the World Bank or any other international body. **D’Cunha 18** of **Forbes** confirms this is the case: in order to build international influence and stabilize the relationship, China has been scaling up both FDI and trade to India, tripling FDI from China to India from 2016-2017.

3. **alt causal:** According to **Busvine 19** of **Reuters**, Chinese investment into North America and Europe – home to 3(/4 – Russia?) of the Security Council permanent members – fell 73% in 2018. This, he elaborates, can be attributed to things like regulatory changes and tensions between countries. At best, the argument has a really low strength of link and at worst it’s just entirely untrue. The implication of this is also that even if statistics have proven this trend true for temporary members, it is clearly not for the current permanent members, so make them prove why India would be different.

**Ma**, **H**., & **Teng**, Y. (**2018**). How political incentives affect Chinese outward foreign direct investment: A UN Security Council membership perspective. The World Economy.doi:10.1111/twec.12677 [sci-hub.tw/10.1111/twec.12677](https://sci-hub.tw/10.1111/twec.12677) //RM

**The result in Table 7 indicates that if a country is not included in the Belt and Road initiative (with which China has close corporation in economy and trade), China will invest in it more when it rotates onto the UN Security Council. The investment value and average value per project will increase by 265% and 243%, respectively. On average, 0.96 more projects will be invested in and the probability of being invested will raise by 0.89.**

**China Power Team**. "Does China dominate global investment?" China Power. September 26, 2016. Updated July 19, **2018**. Accessed April 26, 2019. <https://chinapower.csis.org/china-foreign-direct-investment/> // RM

**Overseas investment offers China an opportunity to not just bolster its own economy, but also leverage its economic strength to increase its influence abroad.** Driven in part by **Beijing’s “Going Global” strategy that encourages investment in foreign markets, Chinese firms have actively expanded their overseas footprint in recent years and explored investment opportunities in a range of sectors.**

Suparna Dutt **D'Cunha**, 5-1-**2018**, "How China Is Positioning Itself Among India's Top 10 Investors Despite Bilateral Differences," Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/suparnadutt/2018/05/01/how-china-is-positioning-itself-among-the-top-10-investors-in-india-despite-bilateral-differences/> // RM

Interestingly, despite bilateral and geopolitical differences, **economic ties have been steadily growing over the years between the two countries. China ranks among the fastest-growing sources of foreign direct investment in India. “**[**In 2017, China invested an estimated $2 billion, compared to $700 million in 2016,**](https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.forbes.com%2Fsites%2Fsuparnadutt%2F2018%2F05%2F01%2Fhow-china-is-positioning-itself-among-the-top-10-investors-in-india-despite-bilateral-differences%2F&text=In%202017%2C%20China%20invested%20an%20estimated%20%242%20billion%2C%20compared%20to%20%24700%20million%20in%202016%2C)**tripling the funding in a single year,”**says Mohammed Saqib, secretary-general of India-China Economic and Cultural (ICEC) Council. [Mauritius](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/mauritius-largest-source-of-fdi-in-india-says-rbi/articleshow/62571261.cms) was the largest source of foreign investment in India, followed by the U.S. and the U.K. in 2016-17.

**…**

Seemingly, **there’s a shared belief in both countries that a position of hostility undermines their interests, and stabilizing relations at a time of global uncertainty will yield economic dividends**. India's competitive edge in information technology, software and medicines, and China's strengths in manufacturing and infrastructure development make the two sides natural partners. “**China and India are seeking a mutually beneficial reset in their bilateral relations now, and their trade links should strengthen this**,” says Saqib. “**In the Asian neighborhood, India is the only country that has the market and the strength to absorb China’s excess capacity and investment. India's GDP of nearly $2.5 trillion is equal to all the**[**ASEAN**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_of_Southeast_Asian_Nations)**countries combined, and is rapidly growing.”**

Douglas **Busvine**, Reuters Editorial, 1-14-**2019**, "Chinese FDI into North America, Europe falls 73 percent in 2018:...," U.S., [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-fdi/chinese-fdi-into-north-america-europe-falls-73-percent-in-2018-report-idUSKCN1P800H //](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-fdi/chinese-fdi-into-north-america-europe-falls-73-percent-in-2018-report-idUSKCN1P800H%20//) RM

FRANKFURT (Reuters) **- Chinese foreign direct investment into North America and Europe fell by 73 percent to a six-year low last year as the United States tightened scrutiny of deals and Chinese restrictions on outbound investment bit,** law firm Baker & McKenzie said.

### AT: FOIP

1. **turn: Swaine 18** of the **Carnegie Endowment for International Peace** finds FOIP is a combative policy by the allied nations to check China’s power and it only increases the risk of war in the region. It presents China as hostiles and rejects China as a partner.

2. On the Rural/Urban Tradeoff: **The Washington Post ’18** finds that the BRI operates in rural areas, and **Hemmings ’19** finds that FOIP is engaging in rural areas as well.

3. **Jay ’19** finds that the US supports it – also its lead by japan – india disappearing wouldn’t change much likely

4. **Rossiter 18** writes that FOIP is super ambiguous and there are really no clear plans laid out yet.

5. It’s only an official thing from Japan and the US, not India – also why didn’t they stop the US …

Michael D. Swaine, 3-2-2018, "Creating an Unstable Asia: the U.S. “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” Strategy," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, [https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/02/creating-unstable-asia-u.s.-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy-pub-75720 //](https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/02/creating-unstable-asia-u.s.-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy-pub-75720%20//) RM

THE CORE OF **FOIP: A ZERO-SUM, ANTAGONISTIC POSTURE TOWARD CHINA**

Unfortunately, FOIP possesses none of the Rebalance’s positive features toward China. First and foremost, despite occasional brief nods toward cooperation with Beijing (for example, in dealing with a nuclear-armed North Korea), **FOIP proponents essentially view China as a hostile existential threat to regional (and global) order, prosperity, and Western interests. No longer is Beijing seen as both a competitor and potential partner to be selectively deterred and yet integrated into an evolving global and regional order.**These negative views of China are evident in the Trump administration’s most authoritative descriptions of **FOIP** and overall U.S. strategy, including Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s October 2017 speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, pertinent sections of the December 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), and relevant parts of the January 2018 unclassified summary of the U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS). Comparing the latest NSS and NDS summary to earlier versions highlights the **administration’s unprecedentedly confrontational, zero-sum view of China. Like Abe, Tillerson presented FOIP as a single strategic region stretching between the two anchors of Japan (in the east) and India (in the west). While focusing many of his remarks on India, he nonetheless portrayed both nations as like-minded democratic, market-oriented partners, in contrast to an authoritarian, rule-breaking, adversarial China. For example, Tillerson depicted Beijing as “. . . at times undermining the international rules-based order, even as countries like India operate within a framework that protects other nation’s [sic] sovereignty.”** In economic terms, Tillerson painted China as a clear threat engaged in unqualified “predatory” lending and other destructive practices that undermine the freedom and sovereignty of developing nations. Moreover, in responding to such evils, he suggested that the United States, under **FOIP, must offer “alternative financing mechanisms.” This cartoonish depiction ignores the significant scholarly literature and previous U.S government statements about how Chinese economic assistance actually benefits developing countries in some important ways, or about how Chinese-organized financial institutions—such as the Asian Infrastructure** **Investment Bank (AIIB)**—might augment, rather than undermine, similar Western-oriented institutions. And, of course, Tillerson made no mention of the fact that the Trump administration has rejected the TPP while offering no alternative policy that could expect to have the same transformational regional effects.Tillerson’s zero-sum characterization of Chinese practices is tame, however, compared with excerpts from the 2017 NSS and the 2018 NDS summary. For the first time since at least the early 2000s, these documents make no attempt to convey the more complex reality of a cooperative and competitive China, instead conflating Beijing with Moscow as a full-fledged adversarial “revisionist” state. The 2017 NSS baldly states:“China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence.”This hostile, one-dimensional depiction of China’s policies and intentions toward the United States is woven throughout the NSS. For example, at various points, it states: “China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests. China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor. . .”“China expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty of others. China gathers and exploits data on an unrivaled scale and spreads features of its authoritarian system, including corruption and the use of surveillance. . .” “China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda.” “China presents its ambitions as mutually beneficial, but Chinese dominance risks diminishing the sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific.” No other recent NSS has used such categorical, confrontational language to describe Beijing’s behavior around the globe and toward the United States. Instead, as one representative excerpt from 2015 stated: “The United States welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China. We seek to develop a constructive relationship with China that delivers benefits for our two peoples and promotes security and prosperity in Asia and around the world. . . . While there will be competition, we reject the inevitability of confrontation. At the same time, we will manage competition from a position of strength while insisting that China uphold international rules and norms . . .” Since the 2017 NSS depicts China’s behavior in such unqualifiedly negative and threatening terms, it naturally also describes future U.S policies toward China as solely aimed at countering Beijing, rather than as seeking cooperation where possible while competing and deterring in some areas, as earlier NSS documents have stated. The latest iteration of the NSS states: “We will work with our partners to contest China’s unfair trade and economic practices and restrict its acquisition of sensitive technologies.” “We will help South Asian nations maintain their sovereignty as China increases its influence in the region.” “We will offer American goods and services, both because it is profitable for us and because it serves as an alternative to China’s often-extractive economic footprint on the continent.” In this way, the NSS presents FOIP as a vehicle for countering a “repressive vision of world order” associated in Asia primarily with China (and elsewhere with Russia) with an opposing “free” vision of world order involving democratic allies and partners, especially the Quad. Although the 2017 NSS claims “[o]ur vision for the Indo-Pacific excludes no nation,” **the document’s portrayal of China and the political, economic, and military/security “priority actions” FOIP would entail to combat it make clear that Beijing is certainly not viewed as a potential partner but as an unqualified adversary**. The 2018 NDS summary follows this same adversarial, zero-sum template toward China to an even more extreme degree. To justify a highly ambitious set of steps to strengthen U.S. military and political capabilities, (such as modernizing the nuclear triad, developing military capabilities relevant to space and cyberspace, and defeating aggression by a major power), the document again lumps in China with Russia as a revisionist power dedicated to destroying the existing global order and undermining the West. In breathtaking fashion, it states that Beijing seeks to dominate the globe: “It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions. . . . China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage. As China continues its economic and military ascendance, asserting power through an all-of-nation long-term strategy, it will continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future. The most far-reaching objective of this defense strategy [the NDS] is to set the military relationship between our two countries on a path of transparency and non-aggression.” It is impossible to see how depicting Beijing as an implacable adversary determined to coerce and dominate the globe militarily and economically can help create a transparent, non-aggressive military relationship between the United States and China. One must ask why China would be transparent and peaceful in response to such a starkly aggressive stance? The previous 2008 NDS had none of this unqualifiedly hostile language toward Beijing. It explicitly stated that the United States “. . . encourages China to participate as a responsible stakeholder by taking on a greater share of burden for the stability, resilience, and growth of the international system . . .” while continuing to “. . . hedge against other possibilities.” As suggested above, all NSS documents up to 2015 reflected this general approach to China. It is highly implausible that, in two scant years, Beijing has reversed course to become an unambiguous opponent of the international system and an intractable foe of the United States and its allies. This sudden shift in the U.S. strategic posture toward China more likely has resulted instead from the inauguration of a new U.S. administration intent on defining its policies primarily in opposition to those of its predecessors. Equally contradictory, like the NSS, the NDS summary inexplicably depicts FOIP as both an all-inclusive vision for regional prosperity and security, and as a networked security architecture of allies and partners directed at China. It states: A free and open Indo-Pacific region provides prosperity and security for all. We will strengthen our alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to a networked security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains. Again, how can such a structure both include and simultaneously target as its primary adversary one of the largest, most economically dynamic nations in the Asia-Pacific? Unlike past U.S. strategy statements, these Trump administration documents neglect to portray China as a potential contributor to regional or global stability and prosperity, or as a possible collaborator on common global and regional security problems. The benefits Washington and its allies have accrued by cooperating with Beijing over the past several decades are completely unacknowledged. **And rather than recognizing the need to adapt some global norms to better reflect the views and interests of China and other developing states, these U.S. strategy statements and the FOIP concept seek to pit the United States and other democracies against China in a zero-sum competition by accusing Beijing of deliberately striving to overturn the entire global order. This preposterous notion is belied by the historical record and the analysis of numerous scholars.**

“INFRASTRUCTURE, IDEAS, AND STRATEGY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC” DR JOHN **HEMMINGS**. Asia Studies Center. March 2019. <https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/HJS-Infrastructure-Ideas-and-Strategy-in-Indo-Pacific-web.pdf>

**In this case, there are some other projects; for example, Japan and India are also planning**

**to build Trincomalee port project. This Trincomalee port project has the potential to**

**counter Beijing’s influence in Sri Lanka. Economically, the Hambantota port project by**

**the fact that there is not a nearby urban centre or city.** As a result, commercial ships

have little reason to carry cargo to Hambantota port. Ship crews do not wish to use

Hambantota port as hub port. In the hub port, crews want to stay in the city as their

cargo is reloaded to other ships to go other destination. In Trincomalee, while there is

also no urban centre, the Japanese project would connect Trincomalee with the large city

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117 Chan, T.F., ‘China has forced a Pacific airline to close down because of diplomatic ties with Taiwan’, Business Insider,

18 July 2018, available at: <https://www.businessinsider.com/palau-airline-closes-over-anger-from-china-about-taiwanties-2018-7>, last visited: 4 October 2018.

of Colombo. As a result, if the Trincomalee port project would develop and Trincomalee

port would become more useful. In addition, there is the possibility that Japan-India-US

and UK might be able to use Trincomalee port as a naval port. Trincomalee is 25m depth

natural naval port used by the UK. A depth of 25m means that US aircraft carriers can

use this port. And it is well protected. In the 2004 Tsunami in the Indian Ocean, ships

in the Trincomalee port were not damaged because this place is protected by natural

walls. And the Trincomalee project has one more important benefit for Sri Lanka. It will

promote the economy of the eastern part of Sri Lanka, which was destroyed during the

civil war of 1983–2009. This Trincomalee port project could be the counter project to the

Hambantota port project.

#### [Jay 19] The U.S. supports it.

James Jay, 4-7-2019, "America’s Next 5 Moves in the Indo-Pacific Region," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/america%E2%80%99s-next-5-moves-indo-pacific-region-50767> // JJ  
For sure, the Trump team stumbled out of the blocks, making U.S. policy a question mark for most of Asia. Many read the White House rejection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as a signal of disengagement. To be fair to the administration, TPP was already dead on arrival. During the presidential campaign, Hillary Clinton had announced that said she wouldn’t endorse the trade agreement. And Congress had sent clear signals it wouldn’t pass enabling legislation. But while Trump simply buried a corpse, he failed to promise to replace it with a better deal. On the other hand, the administration was crystal clear on U.S. national security strategy. Washington had no intention of ceding space in Asia. Later, the United States joined liked-minded nations in endorsing the concept of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Any objective assessment had to conclude that America was in anything but withdrawal mode. In the first two years, three regional issues dominated Washington’s attention: Afghanistan, North Korea and China. In August 2017, the president announced the [strategy for Afghanistan](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-strategy-afghanistan-south-asia/). The United States would continue to support the Afghan people as it pursued two important self-interests: ensure the country did not again become a sanctuary and platform for transnational terrorism, and make certain the conflict did not become a source of regional instability in South Asia. That was a sound course of action. While the consequences of ongoing negotiations with the Taliban and adjusting the U.S. military footprint remain to be seen, these actions are being undertaken in the context of the existing strategy. That’s a wise course the United States will likely stay on.

September 11, 2018. **The Washington Post**. “Belt and Road projects direct Chinese investment to all corners of the globe. What are the local impacts?”

SEPTEMBER 11, 2018

<https://outline.com/YrKf4d>

**But will BRI also benefit the people living in host countries?**

In his keynote address at the 2017 Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, Chinese President Xi Jinping indicated that the [central objective of BRI](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm) is to build “land, maritime, air and cyberspace connectivity” and create “networks of highways, railways and sea ports.”

We recently [provided evidence](https://www.aiddata.org/publications/aid-china-and-growth-evidence-from-a-new-global-development-finance-dataset) that many of these types of Chinese development projects accelerate economic growth in host countries. But it is unclear who benefits the most from such projects. **By building**[**connective infrastructure**](http://aiddata.org/publications/connective-finance-chinese-infrastructure-projects)**that helps local residents and businesses reach more distant markets, these investments could spread economic activity to rural, remote and disadvantaged areas**

Ash **Rossiter**, xx-xx-2018, "The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” Strategy and Japan’s Emerging Security Posture," No Publication, http://risingpowersproject.com/quarterly/the-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy-and-japans-emerging-security-posture/

**This article explicates the aims and objectives of the Abe administration’s central policy initiative towards the Indo-Pacific region: its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) strategy, which was officially unveiled in 2016. It argues that whilst the FOIP is talked of as one of the most important organizing ideas in Japan’s contemporary foreign policy, there is actually little consensus as to what the FOIP really entails and what it may mean for the country’s emerging national security posture. Using a novel analytical framework to test for potential points of contact between the FOIP and three critical strands of Japan’s national security (key alliances, the role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces outside of territorial defense, and security cooperation with ASEAN nations) the article shows why extant constitutional constraints on the use of the force combined with limited resources given over to defense make it unlikely that Japan will play a more robust role in pursuit of the FOIP’s main goal: the maintenance of open seas.**