

Because we will not be able to face the twenty-first century by remaining firmly rooted in the twentieth, we affirm; resolved: United Nations peacekeepers should have the power to engage in offensive operations.

Contention One: Decisive victories accelerate post-conflict reconstruction.

There are three reasons why indecisive warfare is ineffective for a resolution of conflict.

First, warring parties inherently distrust each other. **Alexander Downes of Duke University writes**

Uncertainty regarding the intentions of one's adversary in the particularly dangerous environment of an internal armed conflict **is responsible for the fact that military victories provide more stable endings to civil wars than do negotiated settlements.**⁴⁶ The most current research on civil war termination finds that 77 percent of such conflicts that reach a conclusion end in decisive victory, compared to 23 percent that end in negotiated settlements.⁴⁷ Of these two types of war termination, **decisive victories are more stable: [as] only 12 percent of wars (4 of 42) ended in this way reignited, whereas 23 percent of negotiated settlements (3 of 13) broke down into renewed warfare.**⁴⁸ Each of the three failures occurred in an ethnic civil war, however, and fully one-half (three of six) of the identity-based wars settled by negotiated agreements in Walter's dataset experienced further fighting.⁴⁹ This is similar to Licklider's earlier finding that half of all negotiated settlements to civil wars broke down as compared to 15 percent of military victories. Again, however, every instance of a civil war starting again after a settlement was negotiated occurred in an ethnic war: two-thirds of negotiated settlements in ethnic wars failed to endure, compared to a failure rate of only 21 percent for decisive victories.⁵⁰

Second, ceasefires allow factions to recoup. **Edward Luttwak from the Center for Strategic and International Studies furthers**

But **a cease-fire tends to arrest war-induced exhaustion and lets belligerents reconstitute and rearm their forces. It intensifies and prolongs the struggle once the cease-fire ends** -- and it does usually end. This was true of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49, which might have come to closure in a matter of weeks if two cease-fires ordained by the Security Council had not let the combatants recuperate. It has recently been true in the Balkans. Imposed cease-fires frequently interrupted the fighting between Serbs and Croats in Krajina, between the forces of the rump Yugoslav federation and the Croat army, and between the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia. Each time, the opponents used the pause to recruit, train, and equip additional forces for further combat, prolonging the war and widening the scope of its killing and destruction. **Imposed armistices** meanwhile -- again, unless followed by negotiated peace accords -- **artificially freeze conflict and perpetuate a state of war indefinitely by shielding the weaker side from the consequences of refusing to make concessions for peace.**

Third, peacekeepers tacitly consent to abuses when avoiding conflict. **Luttwak continues**

A variety of multilateral organizations now make it their business to intervene in other peoples' wars. The defining characteristic of these **entities** is that they **insert themselves in war situations while refusing to engage in combat.** In the long run this only adds to the damage. If the United Nations helped the strong defeat the weak faster and more decisively, it would actually enhance the peacemaking potential of war. But **the first priority of U.N. peacekeeping contingents is to avoid casualties among their own personnel. Unit commanders therefore habitually appease the locally stronger force,** accepting its dictates and tolerating its abuses. **This appeasement** is not strategically purposeful, as siding with the stronger power overall would be; rather, it merely reflects the determination of each U.N. unit to avoid confrontation. The final result is to **prevent[s] the emergence of a coherent outcome, which requires an imbalance of strength sufficient to end the fighting.**

When PKOs partake in offensive operations, they contribute to a more decisive victory and therefore do not prolong the conflict like they have in the past.

Contention Two: PKOs must overcome systemic failures of the past.

There are three challenges PKOs face in the status quo.

The first is a massively undersupplied organization. **The Center for International Cooperation at New York University highlights**

Despite these drawbacks, **robust actions are increasingly demanded and mandated.** Durch and England note that by mid-2008, mandates for over 80% of both troops and police in UN operations were Chapter VII (the chapter mandating peace enforcement) (42). Johnstone's "Dilemma's in Robust Peacekeeping" begins with the understanding that **robust peacekeeping is already a given in today's post-conflict toolbox.** Member states and others demand it, and DPKO has responded with more robust peacekeeping. It explores four peacekeeping operations between 2000 and 2005 – Sierra Leone, East Timor, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Haiti – that illustrate this trend. In each, Johnstone highlights how the Security Council provided a Chapter VII mandate, but that missions each began with a less forceful response and grew to use a more forceful one as the crisis escalated. As this trend is likely to continue into the future, the challenge is to acknowledge the demand for robust peacekeeping more cohesively and strategically. CIC has argued, however, that demand is but one part of the equation, and that critical to answering questions of what robust peacekeeping should look like in the future, one must focus on the supply of resources for robust peacekeeping. All of CIC's writing on robust peacekeeping recognizes the serious constraints the UN faces in composing peacekeeping. Gowan and Tortolani note, **[However,] "In the short to medium-term, the UN will of necessity have to work with military resources broadly comparable to those it has at present – and in some cases, even less."** (50) As neither the demand nor the supply of robust peacekeeping is binary, however, finding equilibrium between the two requires a closer look at the measurement of degrees of robustness.

Second, the transition from mandate to deployment is too long. **The Journal of International Affairs writes**

In terms of peace operations, the organisation hopes to streamline its often slow and cumbersome responses to emerging crises. **In many cases, precious opportunities have been lost by the lapse of time between the decision of the Security Council to mandate an operation and the moment when the peacekeeping forces arrive in the area.**²⁰ Earlier deployment of peacekeeping forces might prove to be more efficient in stabilising a critical situation before it erupts into widespread violence.²¹

Third, as the conflict dynamic changes, PKOs must alter priorities and tenets. **The Journal of International Affairs continues**

Some of the challenges to effective peacekeeping are considered largely conceptual. In the past, peacekeepers were merely expected to separate hostile forces and observe cease-fires or truces. For the operation to be successful, it was essential that the parties to the conflict offered their collaboration and support. However, **in recent conflicts,** involving ethnic-based disputes, internal political struggle or the collapse of state institutions, **the UN has been acting without the clear consent of the parties to the conflict. The result is that the environment for peacekeeping is no longer benign.**¹⁶ Peacekeepers increasingly work in a climate of continuing armed conflict, sometimes in **[in] places where there are poorly defined borders or cease-fire lines and no guarantees of respect for their safety or role.** Petru Dimitriu argues that this new and complex environment, together with the ambitious objectives of the United Nations and ever-growing pressure on scarce resources, has made it more imperative than ever to think clearly about when and how the UN should become involved in peacekeeping operations.¹⁷

Ultimately, being able to respond in a timely manner is **emphasized by the Society and Business Review**

Overall, two major contributions about humanitarian and peacekeeping supply chains are discussed in this article. First, the frequent emphasis on an OR/MS – and therefore quantitative – approach does not take into consideration the political and economic conditions influencing decision-making; in fact, the many stakeholders develop their own rationale, which could conflict with the global sensible purpose of supply chain coordination. Second, **responsiveness is essential in a context where more speed makes it possible to save additional thousands of lives; this will be made possible only if decision-makers have prepared well for various scenarios,** supporting pre-positioning costs for months, if not for years. Therefore, instead of soliciting potential donors and manage the incoming funding when a catastrophe happens or is imminent, NGOs must make donors aware of the importance of pre-positioning in order to better manage humanitarian emergencies. Clearly, warehouses with survival kits attract less sympathy than the pictures of desperate refugees or hopeless survivors having lost everything (and, sometimes, everyone as well). In more strategic terms, the challenge of leading effective humanitarian actions usually resides in conflicting rationales by stakeholders, each group believing strongly doing what is required to save lives and for the common good. In addition, egotistical thoughts and actions can be as present in humanitarian and peacekeeping supply

chains, as it can be in commercial supply chains. This might be a sad observation for some observers, but the reality is what it is. Research in the organizational theory field could likely help learn more about this situation.

The impact of underprepared forces is three-fold.

First, civilians are put in harm's way. **Edward Luttwak again notes**

The very presence of U.N. forces, meanwhile, inhibits the normal remedy of endangered civilians, which is to escape from the combat zone. **Deluded into thinking that they will be protected, civilians in danger remain in place until it is too late to flee.** During the 1992-94 siege of Sarajevo, appeasement interacted with the pretense of protection in an especially perverse manner: U.N. personnel inspected outgoing flights to prevent the escape of Sarajevo civilians in obedience to a cease-fire agreement negotiated with the locally dominant Bosnian Serbs -- who habitually violated that deal. The more sensible, realistic response to a raging war would have been for the Muslims to either flee the city or drive the Serbs out.

Second, it undermines proactive prevention of conflict. **Iain Guest from the U.S. Institute of Peace notes in the book *Soldiers for Peace***

This **lack of political will dooms any hope that emergencies can be nipped in the bud and prevented from exploding** -- one of the cherished assumptions of the *Agenda for Peace*. This is not to say that they cannot be spotted in advance. (UNDP presciently warned that conditions in the Mexican state of Chiapas were ripe for conflict before the indigenous revolt in 1994.) But **very few governments will admit that their repressive policies may be sowing the seeds of a future conflict, and even fewer will invite the United Nations** to come and set up an "early warning system." The U.N.'s Commission for Human Rights has over thirty individual "rapporteurs" and thematic inquiries monitoring consistent violations, which could certainly form the basis for intervention if their conclusions were reviewed by the U.N. Security Council. But this has resisted by developing countries who fear it could open the way to military intervention.

Third, inadequate resources undermine UN legitimacy and the mission at large. **James Sloan from the University of Glasgow School of Law elucidates**

On the same day that Ban Ki Moon was offering his assurances to Rwandans on behalf of the international community, Foreign Policy published the first of a three-part series of articles by correspondent Colum Lynch, offering a deeply disturbing analysis of the work of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in the Darfur region of Sudan (UNAMID). The titles of each of the three articles telegraph their contents: 'They Just Stood Watching', 'Now We Will Kill You', and 'A Mission That Was Set Up to Fail'. UNAMID, which was established in July 2007 and authorized to use 'the necessary action' to protect civilians, prevent disruption of the implementation of a peace agreement, and prevent armed attacks, is described in the articles as woefully inadequate—unable to protect civilians and, in many cases, unable to protect even its own forces. Moreover, the articles describe **UN peacekeeping officials that, unable to achieve the unrealistic tasks set for them by the Security Council, have resorted to cover-up and obfuscation.** In public statements and reports, UN officials are said to routinely downplay attacks by Sudanese government forces and their proxies against civilians and, in some cases, against the UNAMID peacekeepers themselves. UNAMID's non-confrontational approach is said to be borne of a desire to preserve good relations with the government in Khartoum. **Civilians, NGOs, and development agencies on the ground who expected protection from UNAMID have, in many cases, come to view the force as impotent and cowardly.**

As the UN has demonstrated in the DRC with the offensive operative Force Intervention Brigade, a rapid-response force, can streamline the process and address all three problems. **Anthony DeMartino impacts**

Throughout its history, the UN has employed peacekeeping forces hurriedly assembled from member nations to maintain global security and assist in assuring regional stability and global peace. The current method of conducting UN peacekeeping, on the cheap and on an ad hoc basis, is a recipe for failure in the current globalized, new war plagued, international environment. **The ability to conduct timely interventions and coordinated deployments in support of peace operations is paramount for the success of UN operations.** This requires a rapid reaction capability. **A rapid reaction force provides the international community a viable instrument to project military power quickly and effectively.** A rapid reaction force could be deployed for a multitude of purposes. **There are four main advantages to a standing rapid reaction force: responsiveness, cost efficiency, international credibility, and deterrence.** Each is addressed as well as the specific capabilities that are required in order to create an effective rapid reaction force. Issues concerning UN employment are addressed and none are found to be insurmountable.