

Resolved: The United Nations should grant India permanent membership on the Security Council.

## OVERVIEWS

### Legitimacy

We control legitimacy because it is a function of effectiveness. If peacekeeping becomes less effective and the UNSC becomes more choked up and we don't intervene in major crises, their legitimacy will decrease.

## BLOCKS

### R/T Taliban

Even if they do some nego - the always re-nege.

Haqqani, Foreign Policy, December 2018, "Afghanistan's Taliban Is in It to Win It"  
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/05/afghanistans-taliban-is-in-it-to-win-it/> (NK)

Much of the discussion about Afghanistan in Washington since 2009 has focused on how America's longest war can be brought to an early end. In addition to initiating the peace process, Obama even set a timeline for withdrawal of U.S. troops—something Trump has thankfully avoided. But lost in the perennial discussion of the 17-year war is the point that military missions must be tied to the attainment of objectives, not to their length of time. If defeating the Taliban militarily has proved difficult, negotiating with them has not been particularly easy either. The Taliban's view of the conflict is fundamentally different—and far more long-term—than Washington's. In their worldview, shaped by their ideology, Americans are unbelievers occupying an Islamic country, and their Afghan allies are also legitimate targets of jihad. The Taliban have been playing the long game, hoping to wait the Americans out before defeating the inadequately trained Afghan forces. **The Taliban have a long pattern of following up peace overtures with highly visible attacks, such as the assassination in October of Kandahar's police chief, Gen. Abdul Raziq, in an attack that narrowly missed the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan.** The purpose of such attacks, soon after secret talks with U.S. interlocutors, is to demonstrate to true believers that the American eagerness to negotiate is the result of weakness, whereas the jihadis are willing to talk only to ease the withdrawal of infidels without giving up on their ideology.

# R/T SCS

## Generic

### **1. No link: India is behind China on every metric of military and economic power and cannot challenge China in Asia**

**Hawskley 18** Humphrey Hawksley [BBC Correspondent and Author], 2018, "Asian Waters: The Struggle Over the South China Sea & the Strategy of Chinese Expansion, The Overlook Press //DF

India refuses to join the Belt and Road Initiative, of which almost all this infrastructure building is part. Instead, as Xi Jinping was hosting the May 2017 summit in Beijing, the Indian Foreign Ministry released a fractious announcement: "No country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity." But if that were the case, most countries around the world would still be in the same

hostile state as India and Pakistan, and they are not. **Delhi tried to match China's ambitions by referring to**

**little-known projects** such as the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal Initiative and the Trilateral Highway Project between India,

Myanmar, and Thailand without explaining what these programs actually did or making any effort to capture the public imagination. **The**

**Belt and Road Initiative is now absorbing the precursor of Indian Ocean port construction known as**

**the String of Pearls, giving China an abundant presence in South Asia. India is dwarfed economically**

**and encircled in a way that even now is beginning to make Delhi a subordinate of Beijing.** Crucially, while

China has single-mindedly committed to military expansion, India has muddled along and, as with its overall development, has been left behind.

Its defense industry operates like much else in government with parliamentary blockages, protected vested interests, executive indecision, and

high levels of corruption. Over the past thirty years, scandals involving bribes and corrupt procurement include German submarines, Israeli

missiles, Italian helicopters, Singaporean small arms, and Swedish artillery. The bigger contracts with America and Russia go more smoothly.

The United States has strict anti bribery laws, and most defense contracts are carried out under its Foreign Military Sales programs whereby the

buyer does not deal directly with a defense contractor. The system for buying from Russia is well oiled and less prone to revelations of scandal.

The upshot is that **China outmatches India in just about every area of conventional warfare.** As of mid-2016, India

had nineteen attack helicopters against China's two hundred; fourteen submarines against China's sixty-eight; fourteen frigates against

forty-eight; 1,448 fighter aircraft against 2,615; and so on. Defense analysts argue that **Indian spending needs to double to at**

**least 3 percent of gross domestic product for the country to even start to catch up. Even then, that**

**would not be enough because in any all out conflict, India would probably face simultaneous assaults**

**from both China and Pakistan. India may have fared better in its economic relationship with China, but**

**not enough yet to give it political leverage.** Delhi has joined the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the

Shanghai-based New Development Bank led by Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, collectively known as BRICS. An Indian banker holds the

presidency. Trade between China and India has been on a rapid increase but is still much in China's favor. In 2000, trade was worth just \$2

billion. By 2016, it measure more than \$100 billion, but with a \$46 billion surplus to China, which is India's biggest export market. Even now,

there are few direct flights between Beijing and Delhi, the capital cities of these Asian powers. John Elliot describes China as playing India,

alternately confronting and befriending it. One stark example came in September 2013, when chinese troops entered and set up position in

Indian-occupied Ladakh just as President Xi Jinping was visiting Delhi, ostensibly to drum up business. Less than three years later, in July 2017,

China and India were challenging each other again on the Doklam Plateau claimed both by China and the tiny kingdom of Bhutan which

traditionally fell under India's arc of control. Like the submarine visits to Sri Lanka, these were public reminders as to who was ultimately the big

power in Asia: China. Delhi's indecision and lack of initiative has left it with impossible choices. **Either it [India] does nothing and**

**watches as influence continues to melt away, or it tries to compete with China, which it cannot**

**realistically do alone, either economically or militarily.** Or it supports China's aspirations, but to do that it would have to

concede that it is a junior partner on its own patch, and China would have succeeded in creating a string of vassal states beholden to its power,

and India would be by far its biggest prize.

## India's military is much weaker than China's

**Abi-Habib 19** Maria Abi-Habib, 3-3-2019, "After India Loses Dogfight to Pakistan, Questions Arise About Its 'Vintage' Military," NYT,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/03/world/asia/india-military-united-states-china.html> //DF

The aerial clash, the first by the South Asian rivals in nearly five decades, was a rare test for the Indian military — and it left observers a bit dumbfounded. While the challenges faced by the India's armed forces are no secret, its loss of a plane last week to a country whose military is about half the size and receives a quarter of the funding was still telling. **India's armed forces are in alarming shape. If**

**intense warfare broke out tomorrow, India could supply its troops with only 10 days of ammunition,**

according to government estimates. **And 68 percent of the army's equipment is so old, it is officially considered**

**"vintage."** "Our troops lack modern equipment, but they have to conduct 21st-century military operations," said Gaurav Gogoi, a lawmaker and member of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense. American officials tasked with strengthening the alliance talk about their mission with frustration: a swollen bureaucracy makes arms sales and joint training exercises cumbersome; Indian forces are vastly underfunded; and the country's navy, army and air force tend to compete rather than work together. Whatever the problems, the United States is determined to make the country a key ally in the coming years to hedge against China's growing regional ambition. Last year, when Defense Secretary Jim Mattis announced that the Pentagon was renaming its Pacific Command — to Indo-Pacific — he emphasized India's importance in a shifting world order. "It is our primary combatant command," said Mr. Mattis, who left the Pentagon at the end of the year. "It's standing watch and intimately engaged with over half of the earth's surface and its diverse populations, from Hollywood to Bollywood."

The American military began prioritizing its alliance with India as its close relationship with Pakistan soured over the last two decades. United States officials are concerned that Pakistan is not doing enough to fight terrorism, a charge the country denies. In just a decade, United States arms sales to India have gone from nearly zero to \$15 billion. But Pakistan can still draw on a powerful American-supplied arsenal. Indian officials say Pakistan used one of its F-16 fighter jets to down its MiG-21 last week. Islamabad rejected the claim, but on Sunday the American Embassy in Islamabad said the United States was looking into the report. The offensive use of an F-16 warplane against its neighbor might have been a violation of the sales agreement. "We are aware of these reports and are seeking more information," the embassy said in a statement. "We take all allegations of misuse of defense articles very seriously." However troubled its military, India holds an obvious strategic appeal to the United States by virtue of both its location and its size. India will soon become the world's most populous country, on track to surpass China by 2024. It shares a long border with southern and western China and controls important territorial waters Beijing needs for its maritime trade routes. All that can help the United States try to box in its rival. "India's sheer demographics, its long-term military potential, its geographic expanse — it makes India worth waiting for," said Jeff Smith, a research fellow for South Asia at the Heritage Foundation in Washington and the author of "Cold Peace: China-India Rivalry in the 21st Century." "As China rises and the United States fights to keep its dominance, it will need a swing state to tip the balance of power in the 21st century," Mr. Smith said. "And that swing state is India. The United States knows this and is willing to be patient." **For India's military, funding remains the biggest challenge.** In 2018,

India announced a military budget of some \$45 billion. By comparison, China's military budget that year was \$175 billion. Last month, Delhi announced another \$45 billion budget. It is not just a question of how much India spends on its military, but how it spends it. **The majority of the money goes to salaries for its 1.2 million active duty troops, as well as pensions. Only \$14 billion will be used to buy new hardware.** "At a time when modern armies are investing hugely on upgrading their intelligence and technical capabilities, we need to be doing the same," said Mr. Gogoi, the Parliament member. Unlike China, where an authoritarian government is free to set military policy as it wishes, India is a democracy, with all the messiness that can entail. Cutting troop levels so that the military can spend the money on buying modern equipment is not so simple. India's military has long been a source of jobs for a country struggling with chronic underemployment. That is likely to be a big issue in elections scheduled for later this spring. Prime Minister Narendra Modi won elections in 2014 promising to reform the economy and provide the one million jobs needed each month to satisfy its growing work force. But with elections around the corner, Mr. Modi has shelved promises of economic reform and embraced the usual populist measures.

**The thrust of this government is to focus more on economic development, which has to precede military strength,** said Amit Cowshish, a former defense ministry financial adviser for military acquisitions. "That was what China did — they focused on developing their economy and then focused on acquiring their current military stature. The difference is that China started 20 or 30 years ahead of us in terms of economic liberalization." **Government officials** in New Delhi say they **are struggling to**

**improve the lives of their citizens in the most basic of ways** — dealing with high illiteracy rates and poor sanitation

infrastructure, as just two examples — **making it hard to funnel more money toward the military at a time when**

**China is making incursions into India's backyard by land and sea. China has significantly outpaced its**

**rival, creating a robust and taxable middle class. China's economic boom has allowed it to invest**

**aggressively in buying top military hardware and producing it at home. As the world's conflicts are increasingly fought with state-of-the-art weaponry rather than the large invading armies of the past, India is falling behind.**

Despite being the fifth-largest military spender, only about a quarter of its military budget this year will purchase new equipment. Although the purchase of military hardware is a slow-moving process in most countries, in India it moves even more sluggishly amid a swollen bureaucracy. There are also concerns about corruption. Mr. Modi is currently being grilled by the opposition over a murky \$8.9 billion deal to buy 36 Rafale fighter planes from France. His political opponents have cast the agreement as corrupt in an effort to discredit him ahead of elections.

**India needs to bolster its military capabilities to combat both China and Pakistan; its recent embarrassment against Pakistan in Kashmir demonstrated to China that the country is vulnerable**

**Ganguly and Menon** 19 Sumit Ganguly [Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Indiana University and also holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Culture and Civilization] and Rajan Menon [Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of International Relations at the Powell School, City College of New York/City University of New York, and Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University], 3-7-2019, "What the India-Pakistan Crisis Taught China," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-india-pakistan-crisis-taught-china-46377> //DF

India has more capable and modern aircraft and yet oddly chose to include an anachronistic one in the Balakot operation. Nuclear deterrence may have averted disaster even had the MiG pilot been killed, but India's choice of aircraft in effect put deterrence to a needlessly stringent test. Had the Indian pilot died in combat, India would have been forced to strike back in greater force. The Pakistan brass would surely have responded. The result would have been what works call a crisis spiral. Assessments of the crisis have focused almost exclusively on its implications for the India-Pakistan relationship. In fact, it has wider ramifications, certainly for India. The People's Republic of China (PRC), Pakistan's "all weather" friend and India's long-term adversary, was doubtless watching closely—and assessing India's military capabilities—even as it, to Pakistan's disappointment, called for restraint by both sides. Even after twenty-one rounds of bilateral talks, the India-China border dispute remains unresolved. Nor is the frontier quiet. In the summer of 2017, a flare-up occurred at Doklam near the India-Bhutan-PRC tri-junction. The catalyst was an attempt by China's People Liberation Army (PLA) to construct a road on the Doklam plateau, through disputed territory. Bhutan, which has a security pact with India, turned to New Delhi for assistance. India responded by deploying a contingent of forces to block the road building. That decision did not stem from altruism toward a weak neighbor but rather from the awareness that China, had it completed the road, would have been in a position to launch a pincer movement to cut India's ground links to its northeastern states in the event of a war. After an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation for some weeks, the Doklam crisis dissipated. Both sides withdrew their forces from the region. Yet the PRC has not relinquished its territorial claims there. Anticipating another crisis, Indian military planners have made fitful efforts to bolster security in the neighborhood by building new airfields and moving strike aircraft, including its Sukhoi-30s, and deploying mechanized forces into the area. Yet India still lacks the wherewithal to deter the PRC in the event of another crisis. For its part, the PRC has been improving its military capabilities along the border for well over a decade, its eyes cocked on India. Which brings us back to the recent India-Pakistan confrontation. China's brass has carefully watched the latest India's military performance. The important question is whether, in light of Pakistan's downing of the MiG, Beijing's perception of India's military strength has been influenced in ways that could embolden China's leaders down the line. If it has indeed had that effect, deterrence, while it held recently on the India-Pakistan border, may have been weakened along the India-China border. For India that's no small matter: **China, not Pakistan, remains its most formidable foe.** The Pulwama crisis demonstrated that India needs to improve its intelligence, surveillance, and other defense capabilities if it is to successfully implement a strategy of "deterrence by denial" along the Line of Control. Without appropriate investments in fencing, sensors, and drones India will face similar attacks from Pakistan-based terrorist organizations. And alongside these military measures, India must find ways to reduce the political discontent among the Kashmiris it governs: it won't do attribute the turbulence in Kashmir to "cross-border terrorism,"

real though it is. India needs to do all this for reasons that go beyond Pakistan. Because military clashes between India and Pakistan offer free lessons to China's leaders, India's national security planners have every interest in ensuring that the lessons Beijing learns are, from the standpoint of Indian security, the right ones. The wrong ones could lay the groundwork for another, more dangerous, crisis—and not along the Line of Control in Kashmir.

## 2. Link turn: India trying to check China would make them fearful and increase tensions

**India's membership would exacerbate tensions between the US and China.**

**Carpenter '10** Carpenter, Ted G. (Vice President for Defense and Foreign-Policy Studies at the Cato Institute,). "Long Overdue: Adding Permanent Members to the UN Security Council." *Cato Institute*, 8 November 2010,

<https://www.cato.org/commentary/long-overdue-adding-permanent-members-un-security-council>. [Premier]

There are, however, some major questions that remain following Obama's speech. Most notably, if India is added to the roster of permanent Security Council members, how many others — if any — should be added? And if so, which countries? **It's a little hard to advocate adding India without simultaneously adding Japan, since Japan has both a larger economy and (on balance) a more potent conventional military.** The one major difference, of course, is that Japan would be the only permanent member that is not a nuclear-weapons state. But should that be enough to disqualify Tokyo? **There is also the matter of China's probable opposition. Beijing has been noticeably unenthusiastic about India's bid, and has been downright hostile to Japan's. And the desire to block Tokyo's UN ambitions existed long before the nasty spat erupted between the two countries this autumn over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islets. A threatened Chinese veto may stymie Obama's proposal before it can advance very far. Moreover, by making such a splashy endorsement of India's bid, President Obama may have further exacerbated tensions in the U.S. relationship with China.**

**India's permanent membership causes regional instability with Pakistan and conflict with China, and other members would face opposition.**

**Quarterman '10** Quarterman, Mark (Director of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies). "Security Council Reform and the G-20." *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 9 November 2010, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/security-council-reform-and-g-20>. [Premier]

The path to permanent membership for each is tortuous and opens a virtual Pandora's Box of difficulties. Amending the UN Charter, which would be necessary for changing the Security Council membership, is not an easy process. Such a change would come into force when it has been adopted and ratified by two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly, including all of the permanent members of the council. **Pakistan has already spoken out against permanent membership for India, citing the effect of such a change in status on "regional stability," and China is not likely to greet one of its Asian rivals with open arms. Brazil's membership would likely be opposed by Argentina and other Spanish-speaking Latin American countries, which would object to a Portuguese-speaking country "representing" them on the Security Council. Germany, which would be the third EU permanent member of the council, would likely fail because of the overrepresentation of Europe and the unwillingness of either France or the United Kingdom to give up a permanent seat. Japan, which has a complicated and not always positive relationship with China, would probably not receive China's support for its candidacy. South Africa is considered to be a candidate for a permanent African seat on the council, but it would likely face opposition from Nigeria and Egypt, which also covet the seat.**

Guest Author, xx-xx-xxxx, "India and the South China Sea," Center for International Maritime Security, <http://cimsec.org/india-south-china-sea/35520> //DF

Engagement also served to counter China's growing influence in the region. **India's relationship with its giant neighbor has been difficult and tenuous. Both sides have been embroiled in a long, ongoing border dispute that resulted in a war in 1962 and till today remains a source of tension that has resulted in occasional crises. This has perpetuated the sense of suspicion and mistrust between the two.** As the Doklam standoff in 2017 shows, conflict between the two sides remains a very real prospect. Hence, from New Delhi's perspective, it is imperative that the SCS does not turn into a 'Chinese lake.' Managing the region's competing territorial disputes has required shrewd diplomatic awareness and delicate balancing from India. On one hand, the South Asian state wants to maintain friendly relations with the various SCS claimants; on the

other, it **[India] has to avoid excessively provoking its Chinese neighbor**. In New Delhi's view, while activities such as energy exploration and weapon sales to the region would incur Beijing's disapproval, such ventures are unlikely to instigate anything more than a verbal response from the Chinese. **Taking a stand on the territorial disputes is another matter. China has repeatedly described the SCS as a "core interest", indicating its willingness to use force to protect its claims. Thus, India's stand on the issue has been one of deliberate ambiguity – not favoring any one side, but instead advocating freedom of navigation and peaceful resolution of disputes** in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). On the South China Sea Arbitration ruling in 2016, India, which had not taken sides in the dispute, urged all parties to respect and uphold the verdict of the UNCLOS-based tribunal.

## **Increases fear of encirclement that Chinese leaders will act on**

**Chang 16** Felix K. Chang [senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is also the Chief Strategy Officer of DecisionQ, a predictive analytics company in the national security and healthcare industries], 6-24-2016, "China's Encirclement Concerns," Foreign Policy Research Institute, <https://www.fpri.org/2016/06/chinas-encirclement-concerns/> //DF

But even if China's fear was to manifest itself, Beijing is already developing the means to break out of it. In late 2013, China turned heads across Asia with its "One Belt, One Road" initiative. Among the many infrastructure projects it has financed in Southeast Asia are a special economic zone in Cambodia, hydroelectric dams in Laos, and energy and railway projects in Malaysia. While China's "yuan diplomacy" has not always been successful, it has had an impact. Cambodia and Laos have become reliable advocates for China within ASEAN. Malaysia largely remains on the sidelines of the South China Sea dispute, despite a rising number of Chinese infringements of its exclusive economic zone. China's initiative may prove useful even in the Philippines, which has been a thorn in Beijing's side. The Philippines' new president, Rodrigo Duterte, has indicated that he would undertake the bilateral dialogue that China has long sought in exchange for Chinese economic development assistance. Benefit of the Encirclement Still, Beijing may have reason to play up its fears of encirclement. Despite its remarkable economic achievements, China faces a host of problems. Today, **Chinese leaders must manage their country's difficult transition from investment-led growth to expansion by private consumption, while dealing with its various debt-fueled bubbles. Even under the best conditions, those challenges are bound to be volatile. So some may see fears of encirclement as a way to rally public sentiment and maintain the "social stability" needed to ensure the longevity of communist rule**. In any case, whether the "encirclement of China" is imagined or real, effective or not, one can expect the phrase to remain in Beijing's lexicon for years to come.

## **Intense nationalist sentiments fueled by Chinese leaders make war possible**

**Holmes 18** James Holmes, 5-30-2018, "China Could Win a War Against America in the South China Sea," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-could-win-war-against-america-the-south-china-sea-26033> //DF

That's the first point about a people's war at sea. **A clash of arms is possible**. Statesmen and commanders in places like Manila, Hanoi, and Washington must not discount Chang's words as mere bluster. Indeed, **it's doubtful China could comply with the UNCLOS tribunal's ruling at this stage, even if the Chinese Communist Party leadership wished to**. Think about the image compliance would project at home. **For two decades now, Beijing has invested lavishly in a great navy, and backed that navy up with shore-based firepower in the form of combat aircraft, anti-ship missile batteries, and short-range warships such as fast patrol craft and diesel submarines. (This first appeared last year.) Party leaders have regaled the populace with how they will use seagoing forces to right historical wrongs and win the nation nautical renown. They must now follow through**. (This first appeared in 2016.) It was foolish to tie China's national dignity and sovereignty to patently absurd claims to islands and seas. But party leaders did so. And they did so repeatedly, publicly, and in the most unyielding terms imaginable. By their words they stoked nationalist sentiment while making themselves accountable to it. **They set in motion a toxic cycle of rising**

popular expectations. Breaking that cycle could verge on impossible. If Beijing relented from its maritime claims now, ordinary Chinese would—rightly—judge the leadership by the standard it set. Party leaders would stand condemned as weaklings who surrendered sacred territory, failed to avenge China’s century of humiliation despite China’s rise to great power, and let jurists and lesser neighbors backed by a certain superpower flout big, bad China’s will. No leader relishes being seen as a weakling. It’s positively dangerous in China. As the greats of diplomacy teach, it’s tough for negotiators or political leaders to climb down from public commitments. Make a promise and you bind yourself to keep it. Fail to keep it and you discredit yourself—and court disaster in the bargain.

**The fear of encirclement by hostile forces presents a real threat to nations that they are not afraid to respond to. Mearsheimer 14 writes in Foreign Affairs that in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West.**

**Mearsheimer 14** John J. Mearsheimer, 8-20-2014, "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault>  
According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, annexed Crimea out of a long-standing desire to resuscitate the Soviet empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine, as well as other countries in eastern Europe. In this view, the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich in February 2014 merely provided a pretext for Putin’s decision to order Russian forces to seize part of Ukraine. But this account is wrong: **the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West.** At the same time, the EU’s expansion eastward and the West’s backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine—beginning with the Orange Revolution in 2004—were critical elements, too. Since the mid-1990s, **Russian leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically important neighbor turned into a Western bastion.** For Putin, the illegal overthrow of Ukraine’s democratically elected and pro-Russian president—which he rightly labeled a “coup”—was the final straw. He responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a NATO naval base, and working to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join the West. Putin’s pushback should have come as no surprise. After all, the West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threatening its core strategic interests, a point Putin made emphatically and repeatedly. Elites in the United States and Europe have been blindsided by events only because they subscribe to a flawed view of international politics. They tend to believe that the logic of realism holds little relevance in the twenty-first century and that Europe can be kept whole and free on the basis of such liberal principles as the rule of law, economic interdependence, and democracy

## **UQ – R/T CN aggression**

**Friedman 17** George Friedman [Hungarian-born U.S. geopolitical forecaster, and strategist on international affairs. He is the founder and chairman of Geopolitical Futures, a new online publication that analyzes and forecasts the course of global events], Xander Snyder and Cheyenne Ligon, 4-3-2017, "Chinese Military Installations in the South China Sea," Geopolitical Futures, <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/chinese-military-installations-south-china-sea/> //DF

The next day, the Chinese Foreign Ministry denied that China had intentions of building anything—including an environmental facility—on Scarborough Shoal, and a correction was issued to remove Xiao’s comments regarding Scarborough Shoal construction from the Hanan Daily, a state-backed newspaper. Duterte responded to China’s revised position by claiming that he doesn’t believe China would build on the shoal “out of respect for our friendship.” Conclusion Diplomatic spats between China and the other claimants in the South China Sea are, for now, just that—spats. China is building up military capabilities on the contested reefs, but the installations are primarily for defensive purposes. The SAMs [surface-to-air missiles] China installed on the reefs are mainly air area denial tools with a limited range of 124 miles, meant to shoot down incoming enemy planes. China’s planes spotted at these South China Sea installations have also been largely defensive (such as the J-11 fighter jet, which is used to maintain air superiority over the islands). The position of the reefs is also defensive: The location of the Paracel Islands gives China the ability to block Taiwanese or Philippine access to its Hainan submarine base. However, it is possible that Chinese involvement on these reefs could progress from a defensive nature to a more offensive one. The occasional presence of Xian JH-7 fighter bombers and the construction of large harbors that can accommodate the largest ships in the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s fleet indicate China’s interest in demonstrating that it could, if provoked, carry out future attacks from these islands. Additionally, if Scarborough Shoal becomes another base of Chinese operations, it sits close enough to the Philippines to pose an offensive threat, regardless of whether China considers it a defensive position. For now, like all Chinese moves in the South China Sea, it is just a bluff meant to make China look bigger and scarier than it actually is.

## UQ – R/T CN vs Philippines

**Duterte always talks a big game before elections to rally up public sentiment, but he was never serious about stepping on China’s toes because he know he’d get stomped on**

**Economist 19 4-13-2019, "The Philippines changes tack on China—again," Economist,**

<https://www.economist.com/asia/2019/04/13/the-philippines-changes-tack-on-china-again> //DF

For more than three months a flotilla of fishing vessels from China’s maritime militia has been swarming around Philippine-occupied Thitu, an island in the Spratly archipelago which is home both to a small military base and 200-odd civilians (see map). The manoeuvres appear to be a response to Philippine construction work on the island, to repair the airstrip and build a beaching ramp for small craft. Mr Duterte has responded with characteristic bluster. “I have soldiers there,” he warned the Chinese. “If you make a move there, that’s another story. I will tell my soldiers: ‘Prepare for suicide missions.’” The Chinese foreign ministry responded, slightly more stodgily, by noting that the Philippines and China had only recently “reiterated our commitments to further cooperation and talked about measures to enhance mutual trust”. Since the 1990s China has been occupying reefs and rocks in the South China Sea claimed by the Philippines and other littoral countries, and building on them. In 2012, after the Philippine navy tried to arrest some Chinese fishermen near Scarborough Shoal, which both China and the Philippines claim, Chinese vessels have patrolled the surrounding waters and at times turned away Philippine fishermen. The Philippines asked an international tribunal to adjudicate. In 2016, just after Mr Duterte became president, the tribunal ruled in the Philippines’ favour, saying China’s claim to the shoal was baseless. Jingoism sells well in the Philippines (as it does in China), and in the run-up to his [2016] election Mr Duterte threatened to jump on a jet ski and defend the Philippines’ claim to Scarborough Shoal single-handedly. But once in office, he opted instead to cosy up to China. He has kept quiet about the tribunal’s ruling, which Chinese leaders had rejected. China, in turn, has pledged big investments in roads, ports and railways around the Philippines. And although it still turns away some Philippine vessels, it has not built any military installations on Scarborough Shoal. But mid-term elections are nearing. The opposition has been cudgelling Mr Duterte for selling out to China. Not much of the promised investment has materialised. And now the Chinese are testing boundaries around Thitu. Small wonder, then, that Mr Duterte, who is as mercurial as he is expressive, appears to have had a change of heart. But as even he acknowledges, the Philippines would lose a war with China, so it would be foolish to start one.

## Duterte's just shit-talking for the election

Genalyn Kabilig, 4-16-2019, "PH seeking 'mutually satisfactory solution' to conflict with China on WPS," Manila Bulletin News, <https://news.mb.com.ph/2019/04/15/ph-seeking-mutually-satisfactory-solution-to-conflict-with-china-on-wps/> //BW

### **The Philippine government is seeking "a mutually satisfactory solution" to the conflict in the West Philippine Sea through a dialogue with China next week, Malacañang said Monday.**

Presidential Spokesman Salvador Panelo (OPS / MANILA BULLETIN) After the government protested the presence of Chinese ships near Pag-asa Island, **Presidential Spokesman Salvador Panelo said they hope to settle the issue by holding bilateral negotiation with China.** The West Philippine issue may be raised when President Duterte meets Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on the sidelines of a summit next week, according to Panelo. **"We are supposed to be friends so, let's be friendly first** – pag-usapan natin [let's talk]," **Panelo said during a Palace press briefing.** "We have to forge a mutually satisfactory solution to the conflict in that area based on the directives of each constitution, as well as the aspirations of these two countries. ADVERTISING inRead invented by Teads so depende, tingnan natin. Since we will be meeting next week, hopefully that will be taken either by them or by us or by both," he added. Duterte is scheduled to visit China next week to attend the second Belt and Road forum, where Beijing seeks to gain more support for its massive infrastructure and investment plan. **His forthcoming visit to China comes after Duterte asked China to lay off Pag-asa Island amid reports that hundreds of vessels were swarming the Philippine-occupied area. He said he would deploy government troops to "suicide mission" if Beijing touches Pag-asa Island.** The Palace, meantime, also welcomed China's willingness to thresh out the dispute through peaceful negotiations and consultation between the two countries. But Panelo urged China anew to avoid any hostile actions in the area to prevent an escalation of the conflict. He acknowledged that it was crucial to keep peace and order in the disputed waters.

## **Link – R/T Multilat**

**Turn: multilateral coalitions that are formed specifically to contain China are the kinds of things that it fears most. Tanner in 2015 explains: China was subject to what they perceive to be numerous "humiliations" at the hands of western powers, specifically with regard to invasions of its sovereign territories. This has led to the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. The CCP have looked to protect their perceived sovereign borders in response to a fear of history repeating itself via a strategic encirclement from the USA and ASEAN.**

**Tanner 15** Anthony Tanner, 7-15-2015, "Multilateralism in the South China Sea Dispute," Future Foreign Policy,

<http://www.futureforeignpolicy.com/multilateralism-south-china-sea-dispute-misunderstandings-opportunities/> //DF

Regarding the first issue, **a major sticking point in dispute resolution has been the USA's continued support for a multilateral solution in stark contrast to China's favoured bilateral approach.** This leads one to question the root of China's disdain for external interference especially given the demonstrable support for multilateralism via, for example, the founding of the Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB). The answer is quite simple. From the First Opium War in 1839 until Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China in 1949, **China was subject to what they perceive to be numerous "humiliations" at the**

hands of western powers, specifically with regard to invasions of its sovereign territories. This has led to the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, as stated in a white paper released on September 6th 2011 named "China's Peaceful Development", to be two of China's non-negotiable "core interests". These principles are premised on the declaration that China will "not interfere in another countries' internal affairs" and subsequently expects the same courtesy. Thus, it is no wonder that, given the Obama administration's widely held "Pivot to Asia", the CCP have looked to protect their perceived sovereign borders in response to a fear of history repeating itself via a strategic encirclement from the USA and ASEAN. The notable actualization of this fear can be seen through China's rigorous protection of Hainan Island's borders which has required control of the contested Parcel Islands in order to provide air cover and sea protection for Chinese vessels leaving and entering the Yulin Naval Base. This is a feasible explanation for the March 2009 USS Impeccable incident when the vessel was confronted by the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 121 kilometres off the coast of Hainan or the more recent interception of the USN P-8 Poseidon Maritime Control Aircraft (MPA) while it was performing a routine reconnaissance in the same vicinity.

## Impact – R/T US entanglement

**US won't get pulled in by allies because they haven't made formal commitments; we're not going to war over a couple of islands**

**Mastro 18** Oriana Skylar Mastro [Georgetown University], 11-28-2018, "In the Shadow of the Thucydides Trap: International Relations Theory and the Prospects for Peace in U.S.-China Relations," Journal of Chinese Political Science, <https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11366-018-9581-4.pdf>  
//DF

Nature of Alliances The U.S. alliance system in Asia is characterized as a hub and spokes system<sup>^</sup> composed of a series of bilateral alliances between the United States and individual Asian countries, specifically Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia with New Zealand.<sup>35</sup> Without a formal alliance, the United States has also made a series of commitments to the defense of Taiwan. The risk of entanglement is much lower for China, as Beijing has no such alliance commitments and most Chinese strategists and scholars oppose the formation of such relationships [100–102].<sup>36</sup> While these commitments could bring the United States into conflict with China, for the most part Washington has been careful not to issue a blank check to its allies that could embolden them in their confrontations with China. The United States has not stated, for example, that the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty signed with the Philippines would apply if China attacked or occupied islands in the South China Sea over which Manila and Beijing have overlapping claims, even as the U.S. reiterates that its commitment to defend the Philippines is ironclad.<sup>^</sup> [104] The United States also maintains strategic ambiguity about the conditions under which it would defend Taiwan to simultaneously deter Beijing and restrain Taipei [105]. Unlike the treaties between the U.S. and Japan and between the U.S. and the ROK, the Taiwan Relations Act does not guarantee military protection; it states only that BThe President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.<sup>^37</sup> The U.S. treaty with Japan has the broadest mission to counter potential regional threats and maritime aggression from China and North Korea and therefore the most potential to entangle the United States in a conflict with China. As described in Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan security treaty, Japan enjoys extended deterrence provided by the U.S. across all territories under its administration. U.S. Presidents have clearly stated that this includes the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands currently disputed by Japan and China [106–108]. The new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation articulate that when an armed attack against Japan and/or its surrounding water and airspace occurs Bdespite diplomatic efforts and deterrence...Japan and the United States will cooperate to repel promptly the attack and deter any further attacks to return peace and security to Japan.<sup>^</sup> [109] There is less risk of entang

## Impact– R/T SCS Miscalc

### **No risk of miscalc because of extensive wargaming; CN and the US aren't gonna sleepwalk into WWII**

**Rosencrance and Miller 15** Richard N. Rosencrance and Steven E. Miller, 2015, "The Next Great War? The Roots of World War I and the Risk of US-China Conflict," The Belfer Center Studies in International Security, MIT Press //DF

Is it possible to sketch a scenario in which the major players sleepwalk into war? Fortunately, not with any ease. There could of course be a situation in or over the South or East China Seas in which the US and Chinese warships or aircraft collide. Recall the 2001 incident in which a hot-rodding Chinese pilot collided with a US spy plane, forcing it to make an emergency landing on Hainan Island. Tense moment ensued, but both governments contained themselves and the crisis was resolved. Recently a Chinese ship in the South China Sea cut one hundred yards in front of a US cruises. Had the US ship not stopped, the two would have collided.

**Although playing Chicken with military ships and aircraft is foolish, both the United States and China have examined these possibilities so thoroughly in war games that is reasonable to expect cool heads to prevail before matters take a dangerous turn.** Another scenario that could spark a war in the coming years resembles China's recent unilateral declaration of an "air identification zone" over disputed islands in the East China Sea. Imagine a similar move triggering an escalatory response from Japan, leading to the downing of a plane or sinking of a ship with scores of casualties. A process of retaliatory risk taking could eventually result in a small conflict between Japan and China at sea in which dozens of ships and planes are destroyed. Expecting the US Navy and Air Force to stand with it, Japan could adopt a tit-for-tat strategy with the expectation that China would ultimately back down, certain that with assistance from the US military Japan would have a decisive advantage.

### **Routine operations in SCS won't spark a war because the militaries train to avoid that** **Hawksley 18** Humphrey Hawksley [BBC Correspondent and Author], 2018, "Asian Waters: The Struggle Over the South China Sea & the Strategy of Chinese Expansion, The Overlook Press //DF

The United States directly challenges China's South China Sea sovereignty claim by deploying warplanes or naval vessels close to its new outpost in the Spratly Islands in what is known as a "freedom of navigation" operation. If China's sovereignty was recognized under international law, the united states would not be allowed within twelve nautical miles of the islands without seeking permission. By sending its military into Chinese-claimed waters and airspace and refusing to leave when ordered, the United States is testing China's military resolve. The administration of President Barack Obama was fraught with disagreement as to how these missions should be used. Harris wanted more, Obama less; and Trump ordered several in the first months of his presidency. **China constantly warns that these operations could spark something more serious, but for the time being they are carefully choreographed.** In 2015 CNN recorded a radio exchange on board a Us Navy P8A Poseidon surveillance plane patrolling the South China Sea. The Chinese radioed, "Foreign military aircraft, this is the Chinese navy. You are approaching our military alert zone. Leave immediately in order to avoid misjudgement." The Poseidon crew replied, "I am a United States military aircraft conducting lawful military activities outside national airspace with due regard to international law." **Because of the risk of miscalculation, crews are careful not to say anything that could be misinterpreted as being provocative. "The actual transits are heavily scripted,"** Mark E. Rosen, an international maritime lawyer at the US Center for Naval Analyses, told me. "The crews are given talking points for when they are challenged or queried. Basically, they say, 'We are operating innocent passage in accordance with the 1983 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention.'"

## Impact – R/T US starts war

No impact: the US has no interests in SCS that are substantial enough to go to war over

**Farley 18** Robert Farley, 6-5-2018, "The South China Sea Conundrum for the United States," The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/the-south-china-sea-conundrum-for-the-united-states/> //DF

U.S. commitment to the South China Sea is also a proxy for its commitment to regional allies. Unfortunately, it performs this role altogether inadequately. Few, if any, countries in the region believe that the United States would go to war in order to forcibly eliminate China's installations; indeed, we already know that the United States will not do so. Unlike the Fulda Gap or the DMZ, the South China Sea does not offer convenient spaces for the United States to declare red lines, and to make expensive commitments to them. No American property is endangered by Chinese encroachment; unlike in Germany or Korea, U.S. soldiers do not bring families or marry and have children in the South China Sea. Apart from perhaps the Baltic or the Black Sea, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force fight at greater disadvantage in the South China Sea than anywhere else on earth. Chinese aircraft and missile can take advantage of land bases in order to project power across the region. China can multiply the numbers of these systems as it sees fit. While U.S. military technologies remain more sophisticated than Chinese, the trendlines for regional military capabilities are not positive for the United States.

## Impact – R/T US-CN War

### **1. Nuclear deterrence checks: they enormously raise the risk and potential cost of war and introduce the specter of truly disastrous outcomes for all concerned**

**Allison 17** Graham Allison [professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard], 2017, "Destined for War: Can America and China Escape the Thucydides Trap?" Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Books //DF

Nonetheless, in one decisive respect, the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries are different from anything that preceded them: nuclear weapons have no precedent. Einstein observed after the US dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki that nuclear weapons have "changed everything except our way of thinking." Yet over time the thinking of those who have shouldered responsibility for nuclear weapons has been changing. Statesmen know that today's arsenals include single nuclear bombs with more explosive power than all of the bombs that have been dropped in all the wars in history. They know that a full-scale nuclear Armageddon could actually extinguish life on earth. Thus **nuclear weapons have** what students of international relations call a "**crystal ball effect.**"<sup>58</sup> **Any leader contemplating a nuclear attack on a state with a nuclear arsenal capable of retaliation must confront the specter of killing tens or even hundreds of millions of his own people.** Understandably and repeatedly, this has led them to think again.<sup>59</sup>

Clue 7: MAD really does make all-out war madness. After exploding its first bomb in 1949, the Soviet Union rapidly developed a nuclear arsenal so substantial and sophisticated that it created what nuclear strategists recognized as mutual assured destruction: MAD. This described a condition in which neither the US nor the USSR could be sure of destroying its opponent's arsenal with a nuclear first strike before the enemy could launch a fatal nuclear response. Under such conditions, one state's decision to kill another is simultaneously a choice to commit national suicide. Technology, in effect, made the US and USSR (and now Russia) inseparable Siamese twins. While each still had a head and brain and will to act, their backbones have been fused to become one. In their united breast beats a single heart. On the day that heart stops beating, both unquestionably die. As awkward and uncomfortable as this metaphor is, it captures the defining fact about the US relationship with the Soviet Union in the Cold War. And it remains the defining truth many twenty-first-century Americans imagine somehow vanished when the Cold War ended. Both the US and Russia retain superpower nuclear arsenals. Thus, however evil, however demonic, however dangerous, however deserving to be strangled Russia is, the US must struggle to find some way to live with it—or face dying together. In Ronald Reagan's oft-quoted one-liner: "A nuclear war cannot be won and must therefore never be fought."<sup>60</sup> **Today, China has also developed a nuclear arsenal so robust that it creates a twenty-first-century version of MAD with the United States.** The US recognizes this reality in its deployments of ballistic missile defenses, which exclude Russia and China from the threat matrix they are required to meet (since under current conditions, it is not feasible to mount a credible defense against them).<sup>61</sup> Thus in a second case, as Churchill noted about the Soviet Union, a "sublime irony" has made "safety the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation."<sup>62</sup> Clue 8: Hot war between nuclear superpowers is thus no longer a justifiable option. The constraints imposed by MAD on the contest between the Soviet Union and the United States are relevant for American strategists thinking about China today. From the 1950s through the 1980s, the rise of the Soviet Union to superpower status created what came to be recognized as a "bipolar world." Both nations believed that their survival required that they bury or convert the other. But if President Ronald Reagan was right, this had to be achieved without war. The central implication for US strategy toward China from the US-Soviet competition is therefore as

uncomfortable to accept as it is impossible to deny: once two states have invulnerable nuclear arsenals, hot war is no longer a justifiable option. Both nations must integrate this brute fact in their foreign policies. To repeat: we are inseparable Siamese twins. This means both must compromise in ways they would otherwise find intolerable and restrain themselves and their allies from taking actions that could escalate to all-out war.

## **2. Economic interdependence creates its own MAD: the economies of China and the US rely on each other at every level; they literally could not make goods without each other**

**Allison 17** Graham Allison [professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard], 2017, "Destined for War: Can America and China Escape the Thucydides Trap?" Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Books //DF

Clue 10: Thick economic interdependence raises the cost—and thus lowers the likelihood—of war. In the decades before World War I, the UK and German economies became so thickly interwoven that one party could not impose economic pain on the other without harming itself. Many hoped that this entangling web of trade and investments would prevent war. They were wrong. But when war did break out, the economic consequences for Berlin and London were extraordinary. Similarly, current US-Chinese economic relations are so interdependent that they create an analogue of MAD that has been labeled MAED: mutual assured economic destruction.<sup>67</sup> The United States is the largest market for Chinese exports, and China is America's largest creditor. **If war prevented the US from buying Chinese goods, and China from buying American dollars, the economic and social impact on each would almost certainly outweigh any benefits that war could achieve.** Recognizing that Angell made a similar argument before World War I, proponents of MAED have offered two further considerations. Some argue that Angell was right. The costs of war to all parties in World War I did far exceed the benefits the victors reaped. If given the chance to repeat their choices, none would. Since that is now clear, the next time statesmen will be smarter. Others emphasize differences between the earlier case and US-Chinese economic relations today. Levels of trade and investment are similar to those prior to World War I. But **supply chains connecting the indispensable producer to the irreplaceable consumer have become so integrated that virtually everything sold in the US, from iPhones to Boeing aircraft, is made with components from China.** "Furthermore, **the Chinese government has made a "cosmic bet" on an open global marketplace to which it can sell its products** and on daily arrivals of tankers delivering oil to power its factories, cars, and planes. **All are essential for sustaining the extraordinary rate of economic growth on which the Communist Party's claim to political legitimacy—indeed, its "mandate of heaven"—depends.** Both are vulnerable to interruption by the United States. America is not only the major market for Chinese products. **Two-thirds of China's oil imports travel across oceans where the US Navy is the guardian and ultimate arbiter**—a position it will retain long into the future. **War between the US and China, therefore, would certainly mean the end of both economies as we now know them.** Even those who find MAED an exaggeration would agree that thickening economic entanglement is creating within both societies influential actors who have big stakes in a productive relationship, which encourages them to become lobbies for peace.

## **The massive economic consequences that China would disproportionately feel deter any chance of a war**

**Gompert 16** David C. Gompert, 2016, "Exploring the Course and Consequences of a Sino-U.S. War," RAND Corporation, [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR1140.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1140.html) //DF

Economic Costs **Owing to the size, interdependence, and global integration of the U.S. and Chinese economies, a Sino-U.S. war could be immensely costly for the belligerents**, East Asia, and the world. **These vulnerabilities are a major reason why war, at least a premeditated one, is so unlikely, even though the two states are and likely will remain at odds over a number of regional disputes.** Should a war nevertheless occur

(perhaps from a mismanaged crisis), the scale of economic costs would depend on its severity and duration. In contrast to military losses, even a mild level of hostilities, if prolonged, could inflict serious economic harm. But the focus here is on the economic effects of severe hostilities. Estimating economic costs of a Sino-U.S. war is, if anything, more difficult than estimating military losses, for such costs depend not only on military developments but also on the response of sundry economic actors and markets with limited degrees of state control: government policy responses, possible economic warfare, the fate of industrial enterprises, the effect on and reactions of consumers and workers, international financial institutions, debt and equity markets, and third parties (i.e., trading partners). Accordingly, the analysis that follows is meant not to be definitive but instead illustrative of the sorts and scale of costs in the different cases.

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The Importance of Nonmilitary Factors The prospect of a military standoff means that war could eventually be decided by nonmilitary factors. These should favor the United States now and in the future. **Although war would harm both economies, damage to China's could be catastrophic and lasting: on the order of a 25–35 percent reduction in Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) in a yearlong war, compared with a reduction in U.S. GDP on the order of 5–10 percent.** Even a mild conflict, unless ended promptly, could weaken China's economy. A long and severe war could ravage China's economy, stall its hard-earned development, and cause widespread hardship and dislocation. Such economic damage could in turn aggravate political turmoil and embolden separatists in China. Although the regime and its security forces presumably could withstand such challenges, doing so might necessitate increased oppressiveness, tax the capacity, and undermine the legitimacy of the Chinese regime in the midst of a very difficult war. In contrast, U.S. domestic partisan skirmishing could handicap the war effort but not endanger societal stability, much less the survival of the state, no matter how long and harsh the conflict, so long as it remains conventional. Escalating cyberwarfare, while injurious to both sides, could worsen China's economic problems and impede the government's ability to control a restive population.

### **3. China has a number of strategic disadvantages that make it suicidal to engage in a war with the US**

**Hawskley 18** Humphrey Hawksley [BBC Correspondent and Author], 2018, "Asian Waters: The Struggle Over the South China Sea & the Strategy of Chinese Expansion, The Overlook Press //DF

"The US still sits in the driver's seat," Liu Baocheng of the Center for International Business Ethics told me. **[1, China is heavily dependent on the US for food] We import more than eighty million metric tonnes of soybeans from the US, not to mention wheat and many agricultural products.** One-fifth of the arable land of the US is there to grow food for China. The US is stronger. Its domestic economy and industrial and energy base would remain intact if there were a war. **[2] China is not prepared. Chinese troops are not properly trained. The US has strong allies, while China maintains a non allied diplomatic policy. If you count how many countries are China's friends, you don't really have a large list.** The US has us encircled and could still impose strategic containment over China in terms of trade embargo and world financial market manipulation. Cyberspace is still heavily dependent on the US architecture, encryption codes, the Internet, the banking industry, the financial world—all that is in the hands of the US. **[3, giving up all of the gains China would have without a war] We are getting close to being equal to the US, even overtaking it in ten to fifteen years. Therefore, it is unthinkable that China would initiate a war. Why would we?** Yet disagreement between China and the United States can very quickly dissolve into talk of missiles and conflict. In the first months of Donald Trump's presidency, the specter of war involving China was raised in North Korea, the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait. During the Korean standoff in the summer of 2017, China made clear that should the United States carry out a preemptive strike against North Korea it would ally itself with the regime.

## **R/T Pakistan War**

### **No risk of India-Pakistan war**

James **Mutti 09** – over a decade of expertise covering on South Asia geopolitics, Contributing Editor to Democracy journal, 1/5/09, "Mumbai Misperceptions: War is Not Imminent", <http://democracy.com/four-reasons-why-the-mumbai-attacks-wont-result-in-a-nuclear-war/>

Writer Amitav Ghosh divined a crucial connection between the two messages. “When commentators repeat the metaphor of 9/11, they are in effect pushing the Indian government to mount a comparable response.” Indeed, India’s opposition Hindu nationalist BJP has blustered, “Our response must be close to what the American response was.” Fearful of imminent war, the media has indulged in frantic hand wringing about Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals and renewed fears about the Indian subcontinent being “the most dangerous place on earth.” As an observer of the subcontinent for over a decade, I am optimistic that war will not be the end result of this event. As horrifying as the Mumbai attacks were, they are not likely to drive India and Pakistan into an armed international conflict. The media frenzy over an imminent nuclear war seems the result of the media being superficially knowledgeable about the history of Indian-Pakistani relations, of feeling compelled to follow the most sensationalistic story, and being recently brainwashed into thinking that the only way to respond to a major terrorist attack was the American way – a war. Here are four reasons why the Mumbai attacks will not result in a war: 1. **For both countries, a war would be a disaster. India has been successfully building stronger relations with the rest of the world** over the last decade. It has occasionally engaged in military muscle-flexing (abetted by a Bush administration eager to promote India as a counterweight to China and Pakistan), but it has much more aggressively promoted itself as an emerging economic powerhouse and a moral, democratic alternative to less savory authoritarian regimes. **Attacking a fledgling democratic Pakistan would not improve India’s reputation in anybody’s eyes.** The restraint Manmohan Singh’s government has exercised following the attacks indicates a desire to avoid rash and potentially regrettable actions. It is also perhaps a recognition that military attacks will never end terrorism. **Pakistan, on the other hand, couldn’t possibly win a war against India, and Pakistan’s military defeat would surely lead to the downfall of the new democratic government.** The military would regain control, and Islamic militants would surely make a grab for power – an outcome neither India nor Pakistan want. Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari has shown that this is not the path he wants his country to go down. He has forcefully spoken out against terrorist groups operating in Pakistan and has ordered military attacks against LeT camps. Key members of LeT and other terrorist groups have been arrested. One can hope that this is only the beginning, despite the unenviable military and political difficulties in doing so. 2. **Since the last major India-Pakistan clash in 1999, both countries have made concrete efforts to create people-to-people connections and to improve economic relations.** Bus and train services between the countries have resumed for the first time in decades along with an easing of the issuing of visas to cross the border. India-Pakistan cricket matches have resumed, and **India has granted Pakistan “most favored nation” trading status.** The Mumbai attacks will undoubtedly strain relations, yet it is hard to believe that both sides would throw away this recent progress. With the removal of Pervez Musharraf and the election of a democratic government (though a shaky, relatively weak one), both the Indian government and the Pakistani government have political motivations to ease tensions and to proceed with efforts to improve relations. There are also growing efforts to recognize and build upon the many cultural ties between the populations of India and Pakistan and a decreasing sense of animosity between the countries. 3. **Both countries also face difficult internal problems that present more of a threat to their stability and security than does the opposite country.** If they are wise, the **governments** of both countries **will work more towards addressing these internal threats than the less dangerous external ones.** The most significant problems facing Pakistan today do not revolve around the **unresolved situation in Kashmir or a military threat posed by India.** The more significant threat to **Pakistan comes from within.** While LeT has focused its firepower on India instead of the Pakistani state, other militant Islamic outfits have not. Groups based in the tribal regions bordering Afghanistan have orchestrated frequent deadly suicide bombings and clashes with the Pakistani military, including the attack that killed ex-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007. The battle that the Pakistani government faces now is not against its traditional enemy India, but against militants bent on destroying the Pakistani state and creating a Taliban-style regime in Pakistan. In order to deal with this threat, it must strengthen the structures of a democratic, inclusive political system that can also address domestic problems and inequalities. On the other hand, the threat of Pakistani based terrorists to India is significant. However, suicide bombings and attacks are also carried out by Indian Islamic militants, and vast swaths of rural India are under the de facto control of the Maoist guerrillas known as the Naxalites. Hindu fundamentalists pose a serious threat to the safety of many Muslim and Christian Indians and to the idea of India as a diverse, secular, democratic society. Separatist insurgencies in Kashmir and in parts of the northeast have dragged on for years. And like Pakistan, India faces significant challenges in addressing sharp social and economic inequalities. Additionally, Indian political parties, especially the ruling Congress Party and others that rely on the support of India’s massive Muslim population to win elections, are certainly wary about inflaming public opinion against Pakistan (and Muslims). This fear could lead the investigation into the Mumbai attacks to fizzle out with no resolution, as many other such inquiries have. 4. **The international attention** to this attack – somewhat difficult to explain in my opinion given the general complacency and utter apathy in much of the western world about previous terrorist attacks in places like India, Pakistan, and Indonesia – **is a final obstacle to an armed conflict. Not only does it put both countries under a microscope** in terms of

how they respond to the terrible events, **it also means that they will feel international pressure to resolve the situation without** resorting to **war**. India and Pakistan have been warned by the US, Russia, and others not to let the situation end in war. India has been actively recruiting Pakistan's closest allies – China and Saudi Arabia – to pressure Pakistan to act against militants, and the US has been in the forefront of pressing Pakistan for action. Iran too has expressed solidarity with India in the face of the attacks and is using its regional influence to bring more diplomatic pressure on Pakistan.

## **Nuclear weapons deter a hot war between India & Pakistan**

Michael Kugelman, 9/24/2016, (senior program associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), THE DIPLOMAT, Sept 24, 2016. Retrieved Apr. 11, 2018 from <https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/could-india-and-pakistan-go-to-war/>, kdd The good news is that the terrifying prospect of an India-Pakistan shooting war—two nuclear-armed nemeses locked in conflict—is highly unlikely. The bad news is that a more shadowy war, marked by covert activities, is quite possible, if not inevitable. The main deterrent to a hot war on the subcontinent is nuclear weapons. Pakistan refuses to adopt a no-first use policy, meaning that it could conceivably respond to India's use of conventional military force with a nuclear strike. This means that for India, any substantive military action against Pakistan—and even modest uses of force such as targeted airstrikes—would be dangerously risky. To avoid crossing any nuclear red lines, Indian military actions would need to be very modest and targeted—thereby hampering efforts to degrade and destroy terrorist compounds, Pakistani military facilities, or whatever India's desired target may be.

## **No risk of India-Pakistan war**

Bharat Karnad, Research Professor in National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, April 2005, India Review, "South Asia: The Irrelevance of Classical Nuclear Deterrence Theory," p. 173-174

Deterrence theory can, perhaps, make clear how and why the Cold War between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and their respective military blocs, did not turn hot. But it **cannot** adequately **explain the face-off between** a nuclearized **India and Pakistan**. Very little theorizing has been done about the workings of deterrence between two manifestly unequal states, and what little there is has grave weaknesses. Despite the marked inequalities between India and Pakistan, Western governments, with US nonproliferation- minded analysts giving the lead, insist on seeing the subcontinental reality through the dark lens of US–Soviet nuclear rivalry, pronouncing it a "nuclear flash-point."<sup>1</sup> By hitching the limited explanatory power of classical deterrence theory to the cause of conflict resolution in South Asia, more alarm is generated than useful insights. This unfortunate analogy only aggravates the situation and begets inappropriate solutions. This essay will examine the deficiencies in deterrence theory pertaining to conflictual dyads involving states differing vastly in size, resources, and power. It will give particular focus to the theoretical constructs spawned by the strategic side-shows of the Cold War featuring France and the United Kingdom separately prepared to fight the Soviet Union. It will discuss why such and other deterrence- derived concepts, such as the stability–instability paradox, are irrelevant to the South Asian context. Further, it will argue that **the possibility of nuclear war between India and Pakistan is**, realistically-speaking, **infinitesimally small due to** a number of factors, including: the **close social and cultural linkages** between the two countries and **India's fear of the consequences of prosecuting a war of annihilation against Pakistan**; the conventional military near-parity and **the controlled nature of the conventional India–Pakistan military conflicts** that have accrued as a result; **military reasons, such as a completely unbalanced "exchange ratio" that will obtain in a nuclear war, which renders all Pakistani threats to use nuclear weapons not credible**; Pakistan's deterrent posture relies on India's sufferance for its success and that India can challenge or undermine it through a combination of targeted intelligence operations and conventional military initiatives, including the use of Special Forces; **and, finally, the United States' military entrenchment in Pakistan post-9/11 that all but eliminates the possibility of nuclear war between the two South Asian states.**

## **The last thing Pakistan wants is a war because it needs international backing to help fix its economy; it simply can't afford to be seen as an aggressor**

**Gettleman 19** Jeffrey Gettleman, 4-10-2019 "Economy in Tatters, Pakistan's Premier Calls for End to Armed Militias," NYT, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/09/world/asia/imran-khan-pakistan.html> //DF

Mr. Khan promised that this new crackdown would go far deeper than previous ones criticized as cosmetic. The government, for instance, plans to send 200,000 teachers to religious schools across the country to teach secular subjects like English and math. The intention, Mr. Khan's aides

said, was to deradicalize students. His government sees the stakes as high. An international watchdog group, the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force, is on the brink of blacklisting and sanctioning Pakistan. If that happened, Pakistan would face greater difficulties in obtaining the financial bailouts and loans it has sought. “We can’t afford to be blacklisted,” he said on Tuesday. But Mr. Khan has also won praise for his seemingly coolheaded and statesmanlike behavior during the recent crisis with India, which he helped de-escalate by releasing a captured Indian pilot and emphasizing peace. He seemed quite cognizant that the last thing Pakistan needed was a war. On Feb. 26, around 3:30 a.m., Mr. Khan said he was awakened by a phone call. A top military official told him that Indian warplanes had just crossed the border and conducted airstrikes on Pakistani soil. Pakistan and India have been bitter enemies since 1947 when Britain decolonized the Indian subcontinent and created two nations: the mostly Hindu India, and the mostly Muslim Pakistan. The two have warred several times. This time, the spark was a suicide bombing in the disputed territory of Kashmir that killed dozens of Indian soldiers. India blamed Pakistan for supporting the militant group behind the attack and vowed revenge. After learning that the Indian bombs had fallen into an empty ravine around Balakot (India said the bombs had struck a terrorist training camp), Mr. Khan said Pakistan opted for a measured response and bombed an empty area just across the Indian border. “They hit our trees, so we thought we’d hit their stones,” he said. When asked whether he or the country’s military establishment controls Pakistan, Mr. Khan said that they work closely. Independent analysts don’t disagree, but many Pakistanis still see Mr. Khan as the army’s puppet. Even some of Mr. Khan’s own ministers have said that they worry the relationship could sour if Mr. Khan, famous for self-confidence and unpredictability, crosses the army bosses. But in this case, after Pakistani forces shot down an Indian fighter jet and captured the pilot, Mr. Khan and the military seemed to agree the best response was to release the pilot, which eased tensions. “I’ve played down the whole thing,” he said. Now Mr. Khan is back to wrestling with the economy. Pakistan has struggled for years with high unemployment, extremely low rates of tax collection, runaway corruption, and sluggish exports. The country’s trade deficit had swelled to \$33 billion when Mr. Khan took office in August. He blames Pakistan’s economic problems on his predecessors, especially the Sharif family, his political rivals. “You can’t have the ruling elite siphoning off money and taking it abroad,” he said. “If you don’t hold them accountable, the country has no future.” With barely enough foreign reserves to cover the country’s monthly import bills, Mr. Khan’s government knows it needs a large bailout from the International Monetary Fund, but those often come with painful austerity conditions. His finance team has been reluctant to turn to the I.M.F. but now promises that a deal will be announced in the coming weeks. On the streets, discontent is rising. People grumble about rising prices. Mr. Khan’s government is trying to slow down demand to keep the trade deficit from growing even bigger. But his government’s decisions to raise levies on fuel and collect more taxes from ordinary Pakistanis, even if necessary for the economy’s long-term health, have made people even angrier. Economic growth is forecast to slow further, leading to even more joblessness. Nonetheless, Mr. Khan said, “my first priority is to take 100 million people out of poverty.” Pakistani analysts say his priority is genuine but question how Mr. Khan can possibly pay for it.

## R/T Election Advantage

### R/T UQ: Modi won’t win

**Since the strikes on Pakistan, Modi’s base has been rallied and is now very likely to win (Naqvi - Gulf News)**

<https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/india/india-elections-2019-will-the-opposition-thwart-the-modi-juggernaut-1.1552796366480> (NK)

In the last one week, I have interacted with a cross section of people in Uttar Pradesh -- journalists, workers, party leaders and academics.

**Most agree that the strikes on Pakistan’s Balakot has changed the narrative decisively in favour of Modi and his support base, which had shrunk in the last four years and ten months, is recovering fast.**

"An agrarian expert who recently toured several districts of UP said that Modi has earned back the support of rural population after Balakot," a leader of Samajwadi Party told me. They are praising Modi for two things -- hitting Pakistan and rallying diplomatic support to force Pakistan

to return the Indian pilot. I can’t be sure that this is the dominant view among all sections of the society but **Modi’s decision to hit Pakistan has definitely given a collective adrenaline rush to his supporters who love aggressive**

**nationalism. They are willing to endure unemployment, farm distress and even willing to close an eye on corruption as long as Pakistan is taught a lesson.** The Modi edge Till a weeks ago, it was widely believed that BJP will suffer in states where the Congress performed well in state elections late last year. Today, in Rajsthan, Madhya Pradesh and Chattisgarh, the BJP has a clear edge and the recent electoral gains by the Congress party are unlikely to dent Modi's support base in these heartland states, senior editors based in Bhopal and Jaipur told me over the phone

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But the state that will decide if Modi gets a second term is Uttar Pradesh where his party got 71 out of the 274 seats it won from all over the country. Therefore, winning most seats from here is critical for Modi's re-election. Two arch rivals, Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party, have joined hands to mount a formidable challenge against Modi. While both the parties have strong support base among backward and Dalit voters in addition to an impressive army of committed cadres, their regional character is a big handicap. Today's politically aware vote is conscious that only a party with pan-India presence has the ability to govern India and thwart external challenges. The Samajwadi Party and Bahujan Samaj Party have kept Congress out of their alliance, a failure all the three parties blame on each other. Meanwhile, the electorates, who are looking for an alternative to Modi, are confused and demoralised due to the opposition's failure to unitedly fight the BJP. **As things stand today in Uttar Pradesh, Modi's BJP appears to be making a comeback with a reduced majority. The opposition parties will gain ground here and other states but they are unlikely to be in a position to stop the Modi juggernaut.**

## R/T Link

### **1. Modi won't win because he's lost the support of minority groups who have faced attacks during his tenure**

**Gettleman 19** Jeffrey Gettleman, Vinu Goel and Maria Abi-Habib, 3-11-2019, "In India's Election Season, a Bombing Interrupts Modi's Slump," NYT,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/world/asia/modi-india-election.html> //DF

Another problem for Mr. Modi is dissatisfaction among Dalits. India's centuries-old caste hierarchy — with Dalits at the bottom, Brahmins at the top and many groups layered in between — still dominates life in many areas, especially rural ones. Lower castes still face horrendous abuse, and Dalits — who represent close to 100 million votes — have long distrusted Mr. Modi and his party, which is rooted in a Hindu nationalist worldview that favors upper castes and emphasizes India's Hinduness. But in the last election, in 2014, Mr. Modi played up his humble origins — the son of a tea seller from a relatively low caste. Analysts said that 24 percent of Dalits voted for his party, double the percentage from the previous election. This time around might still be very different, even with a bump from the showdown with Pakistan. **Under Mr. Modi, hate crimes against Dalits and Muslims, who make up a sizable minority in India, have exploded.** Dalits have been killed for such things as riding a horse or skinning a cow. Mr. **Modi** himself has not made disparaging remarks about minorities, but **in the wake of this kind of violence, he is often silent. Many officials in his party, including ministers, have taken what are widely considered extremist positions when it comes to protecting cows, a sacred animal in Hinduism, or siding with vigilantes who target Muslim or low-caste butchers. Hate crimes against Dalits and Muslims have exploded during Mr. Modi's tenure.** While many conservative Hindus see Mr. Modi as an unwavering defender of some of their most deeply felt values, **many Dalits and Muslims are frightened of their own government.** Despite Mr. Modi's pledges to unify India — he often repeats his slogan, "Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas," or "All together, development for all" — many observers say India has become more polarized along caste and religious lines during his time in power. Chandra Bhan Prasad, a well-known political commentator and a Dalit, said **few Dalits would change their mind on Mr. Modi because of the action on Pakistan. "He's totally lost the Dalit vote,"** Mr. Prasad said. **"Dalits will still vote for any party that can defeat the B.J.P." If true, that could mean the loss of millions of votes.** Farmers were another concern for Mr. Modi, but here, the action on Pakistan could make a difference.

## 2. Affirming won't tip the scales in favor of Modi because Indian voters care the most about the economy, not the UNSC.

Hindu Editorial, December 12 2018 "Northern comfort: on Congress's win in Hindi heartland," The Hindu, <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/northern-comfort/article25720333.ece> (NK)

As for the BJP, the results are an opportunity to introspect. Not just on the performance of its governments in the State, but also the performance of the Narendra Modi government at the Centre. To reduce the results of the Hindi-speaking States to the intangible anti-incumbency sentiment would be a mistake. After all, both Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh and Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister Shivraj Singh Chouhan survived two elections as incumbents. **A potent mix of rural distress and urban angst seem to have contributed to the erosion in the BJP's support base. Farmers suffered disproportionately and for longer following demonetisation, and small traders in urban areas have felt handicapped by the straitjacket of the Goods and Services Tax.** It may be tempting to think that aggressive cow vigilantism and the Ram temple will influence voter behavior, but **these elections underline it is livelihood concerns that really influence voter behaviour.** The BJP will need to tackle issues of employment and development with better intent if it is to arrest the slide. The first term of a Prime Minister is won on a promise, but the second term will have to be won on performance. Not even Narendra Modi is an exception to this

## R/T Economy Impact

**Modi has failed to raise prices for agricultural goods (which more than half of the population rely on), pursued misguided trade policy, and has overseen growing unemployment - he is no economic savior. (Basit - National Interest)**

<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/2019-elections-india-modi-wont-have-it-easy-40507> (NK)

The anti-incumbency factor has cost the BJP big time in state elections. The party could not live up to the hype and over-expectations of its voters. The grandiose promises of job creation for the youth, increasing farmers' income and development for all have begun to bite. **For instance, the farmers are angry for not getting the prices they wanted for their produce. Almost 55 percent of India's 1.25 billion population is affiliated with the agricultural sector,** directly or indirectly, and forms an important voting bloc. In recent weeks, there have been large-scale protests by the farmers in India over falling prices and natural disasters. Similarly, **traders are unhappy with the BJP for slow economic progress, controversial demonetization policy, and the institutionalization of the Goods and Services Tax (GST).** **Likewise, the lack of jobs and growing unemployment has left the youth disillusioned.** Meanwhile, the moderate voters feel alienated because of party's heavy reliance on the Hindutva rhetoric that has pushed the religious polarization in India to dangerous levels. The minorities, particularly Muslims, are full of resentment due to growing Islamophobia in India. The emergence of cow-vigilante groups that have tortured Muslims on allegations of eating and trading beef, the so-called "love-jihad" narratives which peddles conspiracy theories that Muslims are dating Hindu women to convert them to Islam have disenfranchised the Muslim electorate

**Modi's economic policy in reality is actually very similar to what the Congress party's would have been had they won in 2014; GDP growth rates were no greater, no great reform of the labor market (Economist)**

Economist, February 2019, "Narendra Modi's most distinctive economic policies were his worst "

<https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2019/02/28/narendra-modis-most-distinctive-economic-policies-were-his-worst> (NK)

The upa never, of course, got this third bite of the cherry. It lost instead to Mr Modi, who promised a radical alternative to this steady-as-she-goes approach. But **despite these bold pledges, Mr Modi's first term in charge of the economy has proved to be rather similar to the hypothetical third upat term described above. Much of what probably would have happened if Mr Modi had somehow lost also happened after he won.** The parallels loom large. **gdp growth has averaged about 7%, quicker than any other big economy but little different from the average for the five years before Mr Modi entered office. There have been no big reforms of land or labour markets; no junking of the employment guarantee or the identity scheme; and a costly delay in tackling banks' bad loans. The government's proudest economic feat was to implement a nationwide value-added tax that Congress had**

**previously proposed.** This continuity should not be a surprise. Although Mr Modi's party won a rare majority in parliament, India's political system still imposes checks on his power through the upper house, the courts, public auditors and the states, which have sole or joint responsibility for many of the reforms India needs. And **although the Modi vote was a plea for more jobs and fewer scams, it was not a vote for liberal economics per se. Capitalism in India remains "stigmatised"**, notes Arvind Subramanian, a former economic adviser to the government, in his new book, "Of Counsel".

### **Poverty reduction not from Modi, but actually policies that were put in place by the INC in the decade earlier (INC) - uses World Bank data**

Indian National Congress, July 2018, "Poverty Alleviation Under UPA," <https://www.inc.in/en/in-focus/poverty-alleviation-under-upa> (NK)

**While the PM likes to believe he has changed the story of India in four years, the truth paints a different picture.** Read this story in Hindi **According to the World Bank, between 2004 & 2011 poverty in India declined from 38.9% of the population to 21.2%.** The report finds that rapid economic growth during this period helped alleviate poverty & improve the livelihoods of millions of people. **The report also refers to the economic reforms of 1991 under former PM, P.V. Narasimha Rao & former FM, Dr. Manmohan Singh. Hence, the BJP is merely reaping the benefits of the thoughtful policies put in place by previous Congress governments.** It would be prudent for the Modi govt. to remember that the credit they are so gleefully accepting really belongs to the judgement & economic acumen of Dr. Manmohan Singh. According to the Brookings report, poverty is reducing in India at the rate of 44 people per minute. While PM Modi may believe his economic policies have contributed to this, the fact still remains that his govt. lumbered from one ill-advised & poorly thought out decision to another. From demonetisation - which wiped out 25 lakh jobs - to GST - which stalled entrepreneurship - the economy has been in free fall & the poorest sections of society have been affected.

### **TURN; Modi has not been a champion of liberalisation - his policies have been actually been regressive, as he has put tariffs on a wide variety of products including medical devices (Subramanya - WP)**

Rupa Subramanya, January 15, "Modi has failed to reform India's economy. Populist tricks are all he has left.," Washington Post, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/01/15/modi-has-failed-reform-indias-economy-populist-tricks-are-all-he-has-left/?utm\\_term=.27f615e0ad88](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/01/15/modi-has-failed-reform-indias-economy-populist-tricks-are-all-he-has-left/?utm_term=.27f615e0ad88) (NK)

Far from jettisoning the remnants of central planning, **Modi imposed price controls on medical devices to benefit a handful of manufacturers in his home state of Gujarat and hiked import tariffs across a range of products, reversing a quarter century of trade liberalization** — thus marking a return to India's failed import substitution and command-and-control era. In 2014, Modi spoke to the aspirations of young Indians with the promise of plentiful good jobs. Four years later, when challenged on his poor job creation record, his cavalier response was that even selling Indian street food — a highly precarious, low-productivity and low-wage occupation — was also employment. **Despite the promise of minimum government, Modi all but abandoned the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and, if anything, the government is more bloated and intrusive than ever, making for a virtual alphabet soup of government schemes, and with no diminution in routine corruption that average Indians face everyday.** Not surprisingly, Modi has not managed to lift the Indian economy above its 7 percent growth rate, the minimum it would grow given the economy's fundamentals, no matter who was in power.

### **Unemployment increasing under Modi - highest it has been in 45 years (Kalbag - Asian Review)**

Chaitanya Kalbag,, 2-5-2019, "Modi's huge handouts could win votes but won't end poverty," Nikkei Asian Review, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Modi-s-huge-handouts-could-win-votes-but-won-t-end-poverty> (NK)

"The poor have the first right on the resources of the nation," Goyal told parliament, while also reporting success in offering free cooking-gas connections for poor households, an ambitious campaign to build millions of toilets to eradicate the practice of open defecation, a free health insurance program for the poor launched last autumn, and an aggressive expansion of rural road construction. The leak last week of a National Sample Survey Office report that said **unemployment had risen to 6.1% in 2018, the highest in 45 years,** added to opposition allegations that the Modi government has overseen the growth of joblessness. The government said in defense that the NSSO report was a draft. **But figures released by the private Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, which surveyed a larger sample of 172,365 households, showed that the unemployment rate was actually even worse -- at 7.1% this week.** Two members of the National Statistical Commission resigned, alleging that the government had withheld the NSSO report. CMIE CEO Mahesh Vyas wrote last month that 11 million jobs were lost in 2018, and the size of the labor force had shrunk to 397 million by end-2018.

# R/T Peacekeepers

## R/T General

### **UN Missions failed in the 90's because of weak mandates (inability to use force), exactly what the R2P was introduced to counteract (Butler - Clark University)**

Butler, Clark University, 2016, "IS R2P FAILING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION? NORM STAGNATION AND THE (DE) CONSTRUCTION OF R2P"  
<http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/CEEISA-ISA-LBJ2016/Archive/37936886-e38c-4777-a11e-7cf43262c7c5.pdf> (NK)

The most immediate challenges to implementing the novel concept of peace enforcement following its introduction in the Agenda for Peace were hardly novel at all: namely, constraints on available and appropriate resources within the UN organization, and a lack of political will on the part of key member-states. **These problems, themselves rooted in a perpetual statism mitigating against an activist UN, were exposed by a series of high-profile security and humanitarian crises in the early to mid-1990s in which the UN as well as key member-states proved unable and/or unwilling to effectively deliver on the promise of peace enforcement.** For their part, while operations in **Somalia** (UNOSOM I and II), **Bosnia and Herzegovina** (UNPROFOR), and **Rwanda** (UNAMIR) **all revealed different facets of the problematic nature of peace enforcement, each resided on a common continuum.** Having received a peace enforcement mandate in Somalia, UNOSOM II failed to significantly alter the lawlessness and chaos of a stateless society. Subsequently, **when authorization for peace enforcement was needed in Bosnia, it was never fully granted, resulting in the disastrous safe areas policy.** Twice bitten, **the UN Security Council refused to commit a meaningful military presence to Rwanda, thereby indirectly facilitating genocide.**

**This is problematic, as Indian ambassador to the UN HS Puri explains that India supports peacekeeping operations with "non coercive measure" → not the use of force. Meaning, India on the security council, as they could veto any offensive mandate, a return to the even more disasterous peacekeeping tactics of the 90's.**

**Offensive PK's are crucial in resolving conflict for two reasons:**

**First, is the Security Guarantee:**

Hultman, 2014, American Political Science Review, "Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting"  
<http://sci-hub.tw/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/beyond-keeping-peace-united-nations-effectiveness-in-the-midst-of-fighting/46CFE142449D67731DF1E9FC37B46143> (NK)

First, **UN peacekeeping mitigates commitment problems, or conditions where one or both sides believe that gains from fighting outweigh the benefits of a possible settlement** (Powell 1999, 2012). Such problems loom large in ongoing civil wars, where rebel groups face a security dilemma. **For civil war hostilities to end, both factions must pull back from the battlefield, and rebels must disarm and demobilize. But by disarming, rebels sacrifice their only means of protecting themselves from a government that may renege on its commitments. Under these commitment problems, third parties such as the UN can provide security guarantees to improve the willingness of the parties to move toward peaceful resolution** (Walter 1997, 2002). The success of third party intervention depends upon the credibility of the third party's commitment to the conflict (Kathman and Wood 2011; Thyne 2009). **Having a credible security guarantee from UN peacekeepers in the form of troops on the ground allows belligerents to refrain from continued battlefield violence and initiate the process of demobilization.** By signaling to the combatants that the UN mission has the capacity to protect the parties against attacks from their adversary, peacekeepers can reduce tensions and battlefield hostilities.

## **Second, is increasing the cost of conflict**

Hultman, 2014, American Political Science Review, "Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting"  
<http://sci-hub.tw/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/beyond-keeping-peace-united-nations-effectiveness-in-the-midst-of-fighting/46CFE142449D67731DF1E9FC37B46143> (NK)

Next, **peacekeeping operations deployed in the midst of conflict make violence more costly relative to other forms of resolution.** Security guarantees may not always be enough, as some armed actors do not consent to the deployment of peacekeepers if they see potential gains to be made in combat. Thus, **PKOs also often pursue strategies that limit the opportunities warring actors have for advancing militarily on one another. Doing so affects each faction's cost calculus of combat as a means of achieving political goals. Research has shown that the expected cost of continued fighting is central to an actor's decision to use force or agree to a settlement** (e.g. Powell 2004). **Limiting opportunities for battlefield engagement increases the costs of continued hostilities, causing the utility of continued violence to decline.** In attempting to increase the cost of combat, the UN seeks to turn belligerents away from battle as a means by which to resolve the dispute. Both of these mechanisms work through two main operational activities that UN peacekeepers typically use during ongoing conflict. Separating the combatants is an important method by which UN peacekeeping reduces security concerns and makes it more difficult for combatants to engage militarily. **The UN frequently positions armed personnel on the frontlines of civil conflict to create a buffer zone between belligerents** (Fortna 2008), even when it intervenes short of a ceasefire (Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2012) or without the combatants' consent. **By interceding between factions and monitoring combat behavior on the frontlines, UN PKOs reduce battlefield violence by increasing the cost of fighting.** The barrier provided by large numbers of blue helmets increases the costs that factions incur in any effort to make battlefield advances. International audience costs of circumventing UN barriers are severe, and combatants pay direct military costs for thwarting the UN's interposition.

## **Thus Hovard Hegre finds pk's reduce conflict length, severity, the risk of conflict reoccurring**

**Hegre 18** Håvard Hegre [Dag Hammarskjöld Professor of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and research professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo], Lisa Hultman [senior lecturer in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University], and Håvard Mokleiv Nygård

[research director at the Peace Research Institute Oslo] 6-28-2018 "U.N. peacekeeping really can be effective. Here's how we tabulated this," Washington Post, [//DF](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/28/u-n-peacekeeping-really-can-be-effective-heres-how-we-tabulated-this/?utm_term=.445344906241)

Would a PKO have been able to resolve this conflict? Despite popular conceptions to the contrary (see also here and here), **a large body of research has shown that PKOs are surprisingly effective at keeping the peace.** How PKOs contribute to peace Here are four ways PKOs contribute to peace. This **intervention reduces the amount of violence during conflict, reduces the duration of conflict, increases the duration of peace following conflict — and limits the risk that conflict in one country spreads to neighboring countries.** "What you want to do is match up your sources and uses of capital as much as possible. Our job is to figure out what that mix of sources should be." In a new article in the Journal of Politics, we conducted the first comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping along all these proposed pathways. We found that **past studies have significantly underestimated the positive impact of U.N. peacekeeping.** A brief history of U.N. peacekeeping The number of PKOs deployed globally remained low and stable throughout the Cold War. Over the past three decades, both the funds spent and troops sent on U.N. peacekeeping operations have increased dramatically. Traditionally, U.N. PKOs took on limited tasks, often constrained to monitoring ceasefires and peace agreements. **An important shift occurred in the late 1990s when the U.N. started issuing increasingly more extensive PKO mandates.** These include "Multidimensional missions," such as the UNMIT in Timor-Leste, with activities intended to address the roots of the conflict, such as economic reconstruction and institutional transformation of police, army, and judicial systems, as well as holding elections. **In the early 2000s, the U.N. also scaled up the deployment of "Enforcement missions,"** exemplified by UNMIS in Sudan and the earlier UNPROFOR in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Our study shows that **it is mainly these more ambitious PKOs with a mandate to change the situation that are "winning the war on war"** — not the missions that aim merely to maintain the status quo. Toward a more peaceful world **Existing studies tend to evaluate PKO effectiveness by looking at individual pathways separately. This approach is likely to severely underestimate the overall effectiveness of PKOs,** we found. Instead, we developed a methodology that allows us to rigorously evaluate the effectiveness of PKOs along all of these pathways simultaneously. Based on a model trained on the period 1960-2013, we run a set of simulations to assess the impact of alternative U.N. peacekeeping policies for the period 2001-2013. We believe this approach allows our study to be one of the first to offer a comprehensive assessment of PKO effectiveness. We find that peacekeeping is even more effective than previous studies suggest. **In the short run, peacekeeping missions limit the amount of violence. But we also find clear evidence that the de-escalated conflicts are easier to end conclusively a few years down the road. Sierra Leone fits these patterns. The country experienced prolonged conflict until the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers, UNAMSIL, in 1999. The level of violence dropped precipitously after the deployment of the PKO and three years after the PKOs deployed the conflict ended.** In a given year, our results imply that for each conflict that the U.N. manages to transform from a major conflict to a minor one, another conflict ends. In a hypothetical historical scenario where the U.N. completely shuts down its peacekeeping practice from 2001 onward, we estimate that three to four more countries would had been in major conflict in 2013 relative to what the world saw, given the actual level of peacekeeping activity.

## R/T autonomous recovery

**UNSC has increasingly guided peace process post civil wars, meaning there is time to rebuild institution so that conflict does not just restart**

No Author, xx-xx-xxxx, ", " No Publication, [https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi\\_rpt\\_unsc\\_and\\_civil\\_war\\_epub.pdf](https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_rpt_unsc_and_civil_war_epub.pdf)

In the early 1990s, the vast majority of all Security Council resolutions were adopted in response to active civil wars, and aimed at ending mass violence. In more recent years, **the Security Council has increasingly spoken to postconflict situations,** while continuing to remain involved in attempting to resolve active wars. **21 Between 1989 and 1991, less than 5 percent of all demands the Security Council addressed to civil-war parties in its resolutions were issued after the end of fighting. Between 2004 and 2006, however, almost 48 percent of all Security Council demands**

**on warring factions were adopted in the aftermath of civil war.** During this three-year period, the Security Council specified more demands on conflict parties in post-conflict situations than in the first nine years of the postCold War era taken together. This suggests that **after the end of the Cold War the Security Council has gradually become much more active in guiding and sustaining peace processes after the end of fighting.** This trend is evident in Figure 5, which depicts the number of demands to civil-war parties in Security Council resolutions adopted during

### **Thus more recently, Forna of Princeton finds Peacekeeping reduces the risk of a conflict restarting 75-85% of the time**

Forna, 2008, "Does Peacekeeping Work?," Princeton University Press, <https://press.princeton.edu/titles/8705.html> (NK)

Chapter 4 lays out a causal argument of peacekeeping. It draws on the existing literature on peacekeeping, moving beyond descriptions of peacekeepers' functions to hypothesize specific causal mechanisms through which their presence may make peace more stable. It suggests that peacekeepers can disrupt potential pathways back to war (1) by changing the incentives for war and peace of the peacekept; (2) by reducing their uncertainty about each other's intentions; (3) by preventing and controlling accidents or skirmishes that might otherwise escalate to war; and (4) by preventing either side from permanently excluding others from the political process. Through these causal mechanisms, peacekeepers can shape belligerents' decisions about whether to maintain peace or return to war. Chapter 5 assesses the overall effects of peacekeeping, asking whether peace lasts longer when peacekeepers deploy than when they are absent. It employs primarily quantitative evidence to demonstrate that, all else equal, peacekeeping has a significant positive impact on the stability of peace. **Conservative**

**estimates indicate that peacekeeping reduces the risk of another war by more than half.** Less conservative, but probably **more accurate, estimates show that peacekeeping cuts the risk of renewed war by 10 CHA**

**PTER ONE 75%–85%.** A brief qualitative comparison of the cases supports this conclusion. In short, peacekeeping works. Chapter 6 addresses the question of how peacekeeping works. It draws on the case studies, and especially evidence from interviews, to assess the causal mechanisms of peacekeeping. It pays particular attention to the perspective of the peacekept in evaluating the causal impact of the presence or absence of peacekeepers. Chapter 7 summarizes conclusions and implications of this study, emphasizing lessons for policymakers.

## R/T India will give more peacekeepers

### **1. India is against intervention because they think that sovereignty rights come before all other concerns, even mass atrocities**

**Mukherjee 13** Rohan Mukherjee [doctoral candidate at Princeton University] and David M Malone [Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, is at the United Nations University and author of several books on the Security Council], 2013, "India and the UN security council an ambiguous tale," Economics & Political Weekly,

[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291916111\\_India\\_and\\_the\\_UN\\_security\\_council\\_an\\_ambiguous\\_tale](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291916111_India_and_the_UN_security_council_an_ambiguous_tale) //DF

Perhaps the most urgent goal for India at the UNSC since the cold war has been to act as "a voice of reason, calm and moderation" in the face of the western powers' increasing enthusiasm for humanitarian intervention and (subsequently) the responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocities within their states,<sup>8</sup> **India's stance on military and humanitarian intervention**, though somewhat flexible during the cold war, **has since the early 1990s steadily hardened into one that generally places state sovereignty and territorial integrity above considerations of human rights and state-sponsored atrocities. At the same time, the UN itself** - freed from the shackles of cold war gridlock - **has become a far more interventionist**

organisation than before, and has sought to redefine and expand its role in the security sphere to include a host of non-traditional situations such as coups, humanitarian crises, internally and externally displaced populations, and terrorism (Malone 2003). Consequently, **India has become a frequent naysayer on the merits of humanitarian intervention**, and at most a very reluctant supporter of specific missions. Its positions have become harder to defend as the global consensus on sovereignty – barring Russia and China – shifts from an absolute to a contingent view. The frequent association of India with China and Russia in western discourse on humanitarian intervention and R2P (the responsibility to protect) is telling of both, India's reflexive abstention on these issues and the West's lack of disposition to understand the constraints of a democratic state with multiple internal challenges to its authority such as India, which hosts a number of insurgencies (Mukherjee 2013). It is no surprise therefore that humanitarian intervention and R2P were the biggest bones of contention between India and the western powers on the UNSC in 2011-12. India abstained on two crucial votes – on Libya in March 2011 and Syria in October 2011 – while repeatedly sounding alarm bells on sovereignty and the need for domestic resolution of domestic conflicts even when voting in favour of taking action. In February 2011, while supporting a resolution calling for an arms embargo, travel ban, asset-freeze and referral of Libyan leaders to the International Criminal Court, India indicated that it would have preferred “a calibrated and gradual approach” (PMUN 2011a). During the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire in March 2011, India voted for a resolution implementing targeted sanctions and civilian protection but warned that UN peacekeepers “cannot be made instruments of regime change” (PMUN 2011b), which they did eventually become. In reference to the air strikes on Libya, India's ambassador to the UN alleged that the western powers did not pursue the same tactics in the humanitarian crises in Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s because these countries lacked oil resources (Dikshit 2012). During thematic debates on intervention, the Indian delegation frequently reiterated that “force is not the only way of protecting civilians” (PMUN 2011c). On the whole, India's statements and stances on issues of intervention and protection in 2011-12 – though widely criticised in the West – presented a coherent picture of conscientious objection, though one that resulted in it falling somewhat between the two stools of western pro-interventionism and eastern anti-interventionism. Consequently, India was not fully a member of either camp and at times found itself essentially isolated on the council, as in the case of its initial abstention on Syria in late 2011 that was followed by a change of course that some argue was largely provoked by representations from Delhi's Saudi interlocutors (Aneja 2012). That India was neither able to sway the council on specific cases nor able to emerge from debates with widely well-received positions is indicative of the international pressures and domestic constraints it faced during this time.

## These interventions are critical to stopping conflict by raising its cost

Hultman, 2014, American Political Science Review, “Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting”  
<http://sci-hub.tw/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/beyond-keeping-peace-united-nations-effectiveness-in-the-midst-of-fighting/46CFE142449D67731DF1E9FC37B46143> (NK)

Next, **peacekeeping operations deployed in the midst of conflict make violence more costly relative to other forms of resolution**. Security guarantees may not always be enough, as some armed actors do not consent to the deployment of peacekeepers if they see potential gains to be made in combat. Thus, **PKOs also often pursue strategies that limit the opportunities warring actors have for advancing militarily on one another. Doing so affects each faction's cost calculus of combat as a means of achieving political goals. Research has shown that the expected cost of continued fighting is central to an actor's decision to use force or agree to a settlement** (e.g. Powell 2004). **Limiting opportunities for battlefield engagement increases the costs of continued hostilities, causing the utility of continued violence to decline**. In attempting to increase the cost of combat, the UN seeks to turn belligerents away from battle as a means by which to resolve the dispute. Both of these mechanisms work through two main operational activities that UN peacekeepers typically use during ongoing conflict. Separating the combatants is an important method by which UN peacekeeping reduces security concerns and makes it more difficult for combatants to engage militarily. **The UN frequently positions armed personnel on the frontlines of civil conflict to create a buffer zone between belligerents** (Fortna 2008), even when it intervenes short of a ceasefire (Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2012) or without the combatants' consent. **By interceding between factions and monitoring combat behavior on the frontlines, UN PKOs reduce battlefield violence by increasing the cost of fighting**. The barrier provided by large numbers of blue helmets increases the costs that factions incur in any effort to make battlefield advances. International audience costs of circumventing UN barriers are severe, and combatants pay direct military costs for thwarting the UN's interposition.

**If India does approve peacekeeping, it will only be for defensive missions which are ineffective and result in civilian deaths**

**This is problematic, as Indian ambassador to the UN HS Puri explains that India supports peacekeeping operations with “non coercive measure” → not the use of force. Meaning, India on the security council, as they could veto any offensive mandate, a return to the even more disastrous peacekeeping tactics of the 90’s.**

**UN Missions failed in the 90’s because of weak mandates (inability to use force), exactly what the R2P was introduced to counteract (Butler - Clark University)**

Butler, Clark University, 2016, “IS R2P FAILING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION? NORM STAGNATION AND THE (DE) CONSTRUCTION OF R2P” <http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/CEEISA-ISA-LBJ2016/Archive/37936886-e38c-4777-a11e-7cf43262c7c5.pdf> (NK)

The most immediate challenges to implementing the novel concept of peace enforcement following its introduction in the Agenda for Peace were hardly novel at all: namely, constraints on available and appropriate resources within the UN organization, and a lack of political will on the part of key member-states. **These problems, themselves rooted in a perpetual statism mitigating against an activist UN, were exposed by a series of high-profile security and humanitarian crises in the early to mid-1990s in which the UN as well as key member-states proved unable and/or unwilling to effectively deliver on the promise of peace enforcement.** For their part, while operations in **Somalia** (UNOSOM I and II), **Bosnia and Herzegovina** (UNPROFOR), and **Rwanda** (UNAMIR) **all revealed different facets of the problematic nature of peace enforcement, each resided on a common continuum.** Having received a peace enforcement mandate in Somalia, UNOSOM II failed to significantly alter the lawlessness and chaos of a stateless society. Subsequently, **when authorization for peace enforcement was needed in Bosnia, it was never fully granted, resulting in the disastrous safe areas policy.** Twice bitten, **the UN Security Council refused to commit a meaningful military presence to Rwanda, thereby indirectly facilitating genocide.**

## **2. Link-in:**

**Not only would India oppose interventions, but it would likely instigate conflicts and then prevent the UN from intervening in them.**

**Khan 2015** Aamir Hussain Khan [Lieutenant Colonel, Pakistan Army M.A., University of Baluchistan], 12-2015, "UNSC'S EXPANSION: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIONS AND THE WORLD," Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf>. //DF

India is a big country and has remained relatively democratic since its independence in 1947. It has contributed a large troop commitment toward the U.N. peace efforts in the world. India has provided leaders for both civilian and military leadership to the U.N. India has the third-largest military and is bracing to become a rising economic power in the world. India, along with the other G4 countries, is striving for permanent membership in the UNSC, which will further increase its influence in the world and South Asian region. India, however, has a number of disputes with its small regional countries, especially Pakistan. Interestingly, all South Asian countries border India, but do not have contiguous borders with each other. Therefore, most of the South Asian countries, being India's neighbor, depend on India's support for their security and economic assistance. For instance, Nepal and Bhutan are landlocked countries and depend on Indian seaports for their trade. Additionally, Bangladesh has unresolved border and water dispute with India. Similarly, Sri Lanka has suffered from Tamil's insurgency that was

supported by India. Both India and Pakistan have failed to resolve their disputes peacefully and have fought four major wars over these disputes since 1947. As an influential regional state, India has failed to play the required leadership role to amicably solve its problems with its small neighbors. India, however, considers that its neighbours are its enemies and regards them as subordinate states. Thus, India's permanent membership of the UNSC will have serious implications for the South Asian region. **India will pursue its own interest and objectives and will not pay any heed to regional issues, involving smaller regional states. In the past, India has violated UNSC's resolution and is not likely to respect these resolutions in the future as well. India can isolate and intimidate smaller regional states through economic strangulation and by involving them in political problems and disputes. India can politically and militarily interfere in the internal affairs of smaller regional countries on various pretexts, and at the same time can prevent U.N. intervention through India's influence as a permanent member. Giving a permanent seat to India at this stage would likely raise the chances of serious armed conflicts in the region.**

### **3. India's motivation for peacekeeping is to get a seat on the UNSC.**

#### **(Krishnasamy 10 at the University of Western Australia)**

Kabilan Krishnasamy, 2010, "A Case for India's 'Leadership' in United Nations Peacekeeping," University of Western Australia, <https://sci-hub.tw/https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/002088171104700410> //AM

**What then explains India's proactive commitment to UN peacekeeping operations?** Generally, there is a tendency among Indian observers to argue that India is inspired by an idealism rooted in the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence and the vision of a peaceful world. Here, it is argued that **India's idealism is far outweighed by its aspirations for 'great power' recognition and the need to increase its presence within the UN, with the long-term aim of being considered favourably as a candidate for a permanent seat on the Security Council.** One of the fundamental structural shifts in Indian foreign policy in recent years has been India's transition from being a leader of the 'Third World' to a growing perception that it is on the cusp of achieving 'great power' status (Mohan 2006). India's aspiration for 'great power' recognition in world affairs is no secret. Indian leaders at the outset have always sought to corner a leading role for India in the international arena.

### **As a permanent member of the UNSC India will manipulate its peacekeeping contributions to prevent interventions**

**Mappilly 18** Zachariah Mampilly [Professor of Political Science at Vassar College], 2018, SHIFTS IN GLOBAL POWER AND UN PEACEKEEPING PERFORMANCE: INDIA'S RISE AND ITS IMPACT ON CIVILIAN PROTECTION IN AFRICA, Journal of African Affairs, doi: 10.1093/afraf/ady009 //DF

In the aftermath of the Kiwanja massacre, the reforms enacted by MONUC empowered commanders to determine their own distinct approach to community relations. At the micro/local level, commanders were able to garner a degree of influence over how the operation fulfills its mandate, thereby bringing about performance improvements. Yet, while empowering local commanders is increasingly recognized as a method for improving peacekeeping performance on the ground, peacekeeping remains an essentially political pursuit, one defined by the interests of states at the international level. In other words, national and international agendas will trump local initiatives.<sup>69</sup> **As India assumed its seat on the UNSC, it sought to assert its rising power status by manipulating its contributions to UN peacekeeping. In 2011, soon after India began its term, the Libyan intervention set the stage for a standoff that led the government to leverage its contributions to African peacekeeping missions** with consequences for the mission in North Kivu. After days of strained negotiations, ten members including the United Kingdom, France and the United States, the so-called P-3, voted in favor of a UN intervention, while five others, including India, Brazil, Germany and two permanent members, China and Russia, abstained. On 17 March 2011, the UNSC passed resolution 1973 establishing a no-fly zone in Libya and authorizing the use of force for the protection of civilians. The actual conduct of the Libya campaign incensed the abstaining council members. Once the campaign began, it became clear that the P-3 countries, which possess the power to draft UNSC resolutions (short of a veto by China or Russia), were pushing for regime change, a position the abstainers felt superseded the boundaries of the mandate itself. Though helpless to stop the intervention once it had begun, the Libyan war triggered a debate about one of the central questions driving peacekeeping missions in the contemporary period, the meaning and practice of the emerging international norm regarding a Responsibility to Protect (R2P).<sup>70</sup>

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Most importantly, despite agreeing to return its helicopters to North Kivu, the Indian government decided to replace the 8 Mi-25/35 attack helicopters and 9 Mi-17 transport helicopters deployed to the missions in Congo and Sudan with six light utility helicopters manufactured in India (Chetak and Cheetah). Beyond the net reduction in number, the Indian made helicopters have less military capacity than the Russian made Mis and can only undertake surveillance, observation, search and rescue, medical and reconnaissance missions.<sup>87</sup> By late 2011, the situation became so dire that Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon drafted a letter to the UNSC warning that the lack of helicopters made the situation 'critical' and calling for members to 'think outside the box' to cover the shortfall.<sup>88</sup> Ukraine offered four Mi-24 attack helicopters in March 2012 and South Africa provided some transport helicopters to cover the shortfall, but neither was willing to make the long-term commitment necessary to retain MONUSCO's aerial advantage. In March 2012, a group of ex-CNDP soldiers loyal to Bosco Ntaganda mutinied from the Congolese Army. Claiming that the government had failed to implement the 23 March 2009 peace agreement with the CNDP, the group adopted the moniker M23 for itself. Despite possessing significantly less military power than its predecessor, M23 quickly took control of large territories in North Kivu, including the towns of Bunagana on the Ugandan border and marching on to Rutshuru and Rugari despite the presence of an Indian contingent at the Kiwanja base.<sup>89</sup> M23's advance led to a massive humanitarian crisis. Both the rebels and government forces were accused of war crimes, including the summary executions of civilians, mass rapes, and forced recruitment including children, leading to the displacement of hundreds of thousands.<sup>90</sup> The above evidence suggests that in its confrontation with M23, MONUSCO was hindered by the Indian decision to pull its helicopters and equally importantly, to cancel the reforms that improved relations between the mission and civilians. As the International Crisis Group noted, the failure to prevent M23's rise was related to the 'militarily passive' behavior of MONUSCO and demonstrated the 'ineffectiveness' of the mission.<sup>91</sup> Relations with Congolese civilians also declined and both local and national political leaders criticized the mission's performance, a dramatic turnaround from the praise showered on it following the post-Kiwanja reforms.<sup>92</sup>

#### **4. This would also set a terrible precedent where members could cut their peacekeeping to force the UNSC to give them a seat (Brazil, Italy, Japan)**

### R/T India Will Pull out PK's

#### **India will never pull peacekeepers because they are a symbol of its foreign policy success**

**Williams** Audrey Williams [policy programming intern at the Stanley Foundation. She recently graduated from the University of Iowa with a B.A. in political science and French. She will start work in Washington, DC, as a Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow in the fall],, xx-xx-xxxx, "A Smarter Approach

The Future of Indian Peacekeeping, Stanley Foundation

, " <https://www.stanleyfoundation.org/articles.cfm?id=769&title=A%20Smarter%20Approach> //DF

Now half a century after India joined its first peacekeeping mission, the country's calculus has begun to change—the incentives that first held true for the country are no longer relevant. After decades of missions, the training benefits for India's soldiers have plateaued, and a Security Council seat may be too ambitious a dream. But a number of factors have kept India from pulling out—maybe the most important as a reaction to the resurgence of China as a world power. While Beijing was against any involvement in peacekeeping operations in the past, it has had a change of heart. The number of Chinese peacekeepers is nowhere near India's, but it is growing. Much like India in its early peacekeeping days, China was swayed by the opportunities that sending troops abroad provided such as training its soldiers and increasing its standing in the international community. Another issue that will likely keep Indian peacekeepers on UN missions in the future is New Delhi's

**continued goal to be a world power.** In many regards, **India's bureaucracy is slow to articulate—much less execute—the country's foreign policy strategies, making peacekeeping one of the South Asian giant's few foreign policy strategies that is both highly visible and well executed.** If a withdrawal is out of the question, then India's only recourse against the dangers of peacekeeping is a smarter approach to its present and future contributions. India will likely take more care in choosing new missions by instituting a reform process. Another key strategy, and challenge, will be encouraging other countries to step up their contributions. India does not want to see UN peacekeeping end, nor does it want to play any role in weakening the foundations of present or future missions. The South Sudan attack has not unleashed a wave of cynicism in India. Instead, it has highlighted the changing nature of peacekeeping as India seeks to start what will hopefully be a worldwide discussion about a smarter approach to using blue helmets.

## R/T Impacts: Prevents amelioration of underlying issues

<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.469.6894&rep=rep1&type=pdf> (NK)

Our study also shows that once the fighting has stopped, **third parties can play a positive role in stabilizing the peace by offering security assurances to parties as part of a negotiated settlement.** In addition, outside actors could also seek to play a positive role by encouraging opponents to include institutions such as territorial autonomy in their negotiated settlements. Yet another promising implication of this research is that **it does appear possible to create a more durable peace without explicitly solving the issues at stake in a conflict. Designing new institutional arrangements for the management of conflict may contribute significantly to stabilizing the peace. This is encouraging because designing solutions to the issues that initially gave rise to a conflict may be difficult indeed.** This is particularly likely to be the case where the conflict itself gives rise to new issues and concerns. It is for this reason that we think it worthwhile to focus on the security concerns of civil war adversaries; no matter what a civil war may initially have been about, **once antagonists have set about killing one another they are likely to be concerned about their future security.** Although challenging, devising institutional means to enhance the security of former opponents may prove a more productive means of stabilizing the peace than attempting to identify and address the often complex origins of disputes. Finally, we should emphasize that we have examined only the short-term implications of the settlement environment and settlement arrangements on the stability of negotiated settlements

## R/T Venezuela

### 1. No link: India supports Maduro and won't intervene in Venezuela because India is anti-intervention and has economic interests in Venezuela

Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, 1-25-2019, "India refuses to join efforts to recognise self-declared president of Venezuela," Economic Times,

<https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-refuses-to-join-efforts-to-recognise-self-declared-president-of-venezuela/articleshow/67685085.cms> //AM

**India** on Friday **refused to be part of any efforts to recognise self-declared president of Venezuela and asserted that it is for the people of that country to find political solution obliquely rejecting outside interference in a country's internal affairs.** In response to queries on the situation in Venezuela, MEA Official Spokesperson said, "We are closely following the emerging situation in Venezuela. We are of the view that it is for the people of Venezuela to find political solution to resolve their differences through constructive dialogue and discussion without resorting to violence." "We believe democracy, peace and security in Venezuela are of paramount importance for the progress and prosperity of the people of Venezuela. India and Venezuela

enjoy close and cordial relations," the spokesperson pointed out. Venezuela is a key supplier of crude oil to India and has also joined the International Solar Alliance.

Wire Staff, 2-5-2019, "India Supports Maduro Government: Venezuela Envoy," Wire,  
<https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-supports-maduro-government-venezuela-envoy> //AM

New Delhi: Venezuelan ambassador to India, Augusto Montiel, said on Tuesday that India's statement in lieu of Venezuela's latest presidential crisis – which erupted last month – demonstrated **New Delhi's backing of the government of Nicolas Maduro,** adding that his **country was securing India's energy security "even in these hard times."** On January 23, Juan Guaidó, president of the national assembly swore himself in as the president. On the same day, the United States, Canada and Latin American countries recognised Guaidó as the president of Venezuela, instead of Maduro. Two weeks later, 11 European nations also joined the US in recognising Guaidó after an ultimatum to declare fresh elections lapsed. On the other side, **Russia and China solidly backed Maduro,** raising fears of a geo-political showdown. India had not joined the chorus of voices in the west calling for recognising Guaidó. At the same time, however, New Delhi had not referred to the government of Venezuela, but mentioned that "people" in the Latin American country should find a political solution through dialogue. Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Raveesh Kumar said on January 25, 2019: "We are of the view that it is for the people of Venezuela to find political solutions to resolve their differences through constructive dialogue and discussion without resorting to violence. We believe democracy, peace and security in Venezuela are of paramount importance for the progress and prosperity of the people of Venezuela. India and Venezuela enjoy close and cordial relations" Two weeks later, Montiel claimed the Indian statement was in favour of Caracas. **"The Government of India does not support anybody else but the government of Venezuela,"** said Montiel at a press conference answering a question on Venezuela's response to the Indian statement. He noted that India had said the "people of Venezuela" will decide the fate of the country. "This means that the government of India is clearly stating that it will not accept intervention in internal affairs," asserted the envoy sitting before a Venezuelan flag pinned to the wall, Montiel said that the statement was a "guarantee that India will continue to have independence" in foreign policy matters. **India is Venezuela's third largest buyer of crude oil after the US and China. Venezuela is the fourth-largest oil supplier for the Indian market, after Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran. With the US now out of bounds, India and China are the biggest markets for Venezuelan crude,** even though oil production has gone down substantially. **Several big Indian refineries are specifically adapted to process Venezuela's heavy crude.** According to Bloomberg, Indian private refiners could benefit from the diversion of Venezuelan crude towards the subcontinent. Montiel said that Venezuela was currently supplying 400,000 barrels of oil per day to India. "India's energy security is being guaranteed by Venezuela even in these hard times," he added.

## 2. No internal link: the US won't intervene in Venezuela

Andres Oppenheimer, 2-10-19, "Of the three major scenarios for Venezuela, U.S. military intervention is the least likely," MiamiHerald,  
<https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/andres-oppenheimer/article226008405.html> //AM

**There are three main scenarios for Venezuela following the decision by the United States and dozens of major world democracies to recognize Juan Guaidó as legitimate president, and to demand free elections to end that country's humanitarian crisis.** First, one quick note on the latest developments: The so-called International Contact Group created by Mexico and Uruguay to seek a national dialogue in Venezuela will not go anywhere. As Guaidó told me in a recent interview, he will not accept another "false dialogue" with Nicolás Maduro. At least four times in recent years, Maduro has used dialogues with the opposition to win time, then later jailed his political rivals as soon as international attention shifted somewhere else. This time, Maduro must go before a transitional government convenes free elections, Guaidó said. Besides, Mexico and Uruguay are hardly neutral countries. Both — alongside Cuba, Russia and China — still recognize Maduro as Venezuela's legitimate president. Much of the rest of the world — including Canada, the 28-member European Union and Latin America's biggest countries — recognize Guaidó's government. Here's are three scenarios of what might happen in Venezuela: Maduro is forced to allow internationally supervised free elections. Facing a U.S. embargo that cripples Venezuela's oil exports — the country's biggest source of income — and growing unrest at home as Venezuelans demand that the regime allow hundreds of trucks full of foreign food aid into the country, **Maduro is forced by the Venezuelan military to accept free elections.** Much like the end of Sandinista regime in Nicaragua before the 1990 elections, Maduro negotiates a soft landing for himself and his military clique. He then loses the elections and moves to Cuba, where he begins a new life

anchoring a daily TV show on the Telesur regional network, in which he plays the drums, sings and rants about U.S. imperialism. I'd put the probability of this scenario at 50 percent. **Maduro stays in power indefinitely.** Venezuela's dictator manages to survive his current troubles with help from China and Russia, and international attention soon shifts elsewhere. As happened in Cuba, Venezuela's humanitarian crisis deepens as international sanctions take hold, and millions more of Venezuelans flee the country. That leaves Maduro with fewer mouths to feed and with a population of mostly docile public servants who can be easily controlled through government food subsidies. Problem is, neighboring countries will not put up with a regime-caused famine, triggering an even larger invasion of Venezuelans into their territories. And neither Russia nor China are likely to bankroll Venezuela forever, as they have done with Cuba. I'd put the probability of this scenario at 30 percent. **A U.S. or multinational military intervention topples Maduro.** Much like happened in Panama in the late 1980s, a U.S. court indicts Maduro and his cronies on drug trafficking charges, prompting escalating tensions that end with a U.S. military invasion. Or, similar to what happened on the Caribbean island of Grenada in the early 1980s, the United States invades Venezuela citing a Russian and Cuban takeover. But while Panama's military had 21,000 troops, Grenada about 2,000 troops — with no tanks or heavy weapons — Venezuela's armed forces have 351,000 troops, according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, a British think-tank. And Venezuela is a much bigger country than Panama or tiny Grenada. While an estimated 20,000 U.S. troops participated in the Panama invasion — most of whom were already in U.S. bases there — and 7,000 took part in the Grenada invasion, some U.S. analysts have estimated that **invading Venezuela would take more than 100,000 U.S. troops.** There could also be calls for an Organization of American States intervention, like that in the Dominican Republic in 1965, **or an intervention by the United Nations,** like that in Bosnia in 1992. **But** the OAS would hardly get a consensus from its largest members, and **Russia and China would veto any U.N. Security Council resolution to intervene in Venezuela.** I'd give this scenario a 20 percent probability. **The current escalation of nonviolent sanctions is the best — and most plausible — chance in many years to force Maduro's illegitimate regime out of power. If the pressure keeps growing, the odds are against Maduro.**

## **R/T R2P Bad**

### **1. Link-in: India would use its UNSC seat to prevent peacekeeping in Kashmir and enable them to attack**

**Stuenkel 10** Oliver Stuenkel [Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo], 2010, "Leading the disenfranchised or joining the establishment? India, Brazil, and the UN Security Council," Carta Internacional,

<https://ri.fgv.br/sites/default/files/publicacoes/10d7bc9faa.pdf> //DF

But permanent membership would also help India defend its ever more global interests. According to Kulwant Rai Gupta, there is a sense in India that with regards to security matters, the role of the UNSC is increasing while that of the UN General Assembly is diminishing. Development issues are more and more handled by the IMF and the World Bank, while the UN turns into an institution dealing mostly with security issues. \* is interpretation is thus yet another reason why India should seek to gain admission as a permanent member to an ever more important organ.<sup>84</sup> Finally, **India is said to eye a permanent seat to assure that the United Nations does not get involved in the conflict in Kashmir, which would, Indians fear, lead to a partition or independence of Kashmir.**<sup>85</sup> Specifically, India seeks to expand the UNSC by four permanent and six non-permanent members. \* e G4's proposal envisions the six new permanent seats to be occupied by two African nations, two for Asia (India and Japan), one for Latin America (Brazil) and the Caribbean and one for Western Europe and others (Germany); and four new non-permanent members (one from Africa, one from Asia, one from Eastern Europe, and one from Latin America and the Caribbean).<sup>86</sup>

**Khan 2015** Amir Hussain Khan [Lieutenant Colonel, Pakistan Army M.A., University of Baluchistan], 12-2015, "UNSC'S EXPANSION: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIONS AND THE WORLD," Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632266.pdf>. //DF

India is a big country and has remained relatively democratic since its independence in 1947. It has contributed a large troop commitment toward the U.N. peace efforts in the world. India has provided leaders for both civilian and military leadership to the U.N. India has the third-largest military and is bracing to become a rising economic power in the world. India, along with the other G4 countries, is striving for permanent membership in the UNSC, which will further increase its influence in the world and South Asian region. India, however, has a number of disputes

with its small regional countries, especially Pakistan. Interestingly, all South Asian countries border India, but do not have contiguous borders with each other. Therefore, most of the South Asian countries, being India's neighbor, depend on India's support for their security and economic assistance. For instance, Nepal and Bhutan are landlocked countries and depend on Indian seaports for their trade. Additionally, Bangladesh has unresolved border and water dispute with India. Similarly, Sri Lanka has suffered from Tamil's insurgency that was supported by India. Both India and Pakistan have failed to resolve their disputes peacefully and have fought four major wars over these disputes since 1947. As an influential regional state, India has failed to play the required leadership role to amicably solve its problems with its small neighbors. India, however, considers that its neighbours are its enemies and regards them as

subordinate states. Thus, India's permanent membership of the UNSC will have serious implications for the South Asian region. India will pursue its own interest and objectives and will not pay any heed to regional issues, involving smaller regional states. In the past, India has violated UNSC's resolution and is not likely to respect these resolutions in the future as well. India can isolate and intimidate smaller regional states through economic strangulation and by involving them in political problems and disputes. India can politically and militarily interfere in the internal affairs of smaller regional countries on various pretexts, and at the same time can prevent U.N. intervention through India's influence as a permanent member. Giving a permanent seat to India at this stage would likely raise the chances of serious armed conflicts in the region.

2. Implications for Pakistan India has a complex and troubled relationship with Pakistan. It began with the single dispute of Kashmir<sup>215</sup> in 1947, but after half a century and four wars, more disputes have emerged in the process, and there is a likelihood of further proliferation of these disputes. The entry of India into the UNSC as its permanent member would greatly upset Pakistan's economic and foreign policy objectives and would have the following implications for Pakistan. <sup>215</sup> Also see footnote 86. 67 a. Kashmir is the major dispute between Pakistan and India. Pakistan wants a just resolution of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the spirit of UNSC resolutions—the UNSC resolution maintained the issue of Jammu and Kashmir be determined through plebiscite as per the wishes of the people of Kashmir. The U.N. HLP report also refers to the Kashmir dispute as one of the "oldest and unresolved disputes on the UNSC agenda."<sup>216</sup> To silence the popular demand of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, India has deployed a huge military contingent, which is involved in the worst kind of human right violations. According to Noorani, "Indian Security Forces have systematically, and with impunity, perpetrated outrageous violations of human rights in the [Kashmir] valley."<sup>217</sup> Today, Pakistan and India are nuclear power; even small conflict may conflagrate to nuclear exchange which will devastate the entire South Asian region. Without settlement of the Kashmir dispute, use of force cannot be ruled out. Noorani contends that, "It is reasonable to conclude that relations between India and Pakistan will never be normal until the Kashmir dispute is settled."<sup>218</sup> Without resolution of the Kashmir dispute, India does not qualify to be a member of the UNSC. India has refused to implement the resolutions of the UNSC over settlement of the Kashmir dispute. It would be unjust to award membership of the council to a country that has violated its resolution. As a permanent member of the UNSC, India can influence favorable decisions at the UNSC over Kashmir. Furthermore, India, due to its strong conventional military, can resort to the use of force on the pretext of pre-emption or hot pursuit to coerce Pakistan to change its stance on Kashmir in favor of India. India has been able to draw out the issue of Kashmir for over 68 years, intending to wait for the opportune moment to accrue maximum benefit. The permanent seat at the Council is one such moment through which India can extract a favorable outcome. The UNSC Resolution 38219 is the oldest resolution of the UNSC, which is still waiting for its final and just disposal. India has rejected the role of the international community and considers the Kashmir dispute to be a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. Unfortunately, however, the bilateralism has failed because of India's brinkmanship and failure to accept Kashmir as a disputed territory.

## India's attempt to retake Kashmir would pass the Pakistani nuclear threshold

Joshi 19 Manoj Joshi [journalist and a fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, an Indian public policy think tank], 3-1-2019, "Neither India Nor Pakistan Is Really Prepared To Fight A Conventional War," [https://www.outlookindia,](https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/india-news-radioactive-blueprints/301249)

<https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/india-news-radioactive-blueprints/301249> //DF

The International Institute for Strategic Studies says Pakistan has a spatial threshold that will be triggered if Indians reach the Indus, or an economic threshold resulting from any Indian naval blockade or if Indian military action threatens the destruction of the Pakistani military. There's also a political threshold in the event of developments that could lead to the breakup of Pakistan, just as it happened in the case of Bangladesh. Clearly, a conventional war by itself is not a threshold, in other words, if there were skirmishes along the LoC or even the international border, it would not necessarily trigger a nuclear conflict. But the danger here is the escalation as the nations seek to gain the edge in what began as a

localised clash. Commanders seeking advantage in a particular tactical situation could lead to a competitive circumstance, resulting in a quick climb on the escalation ladder. Neither India nor Pakistan is really prepared to fight a conventional war. But, to paraphrase General V.P. Malik during the Kargil war, they will fight with whatever they have. Because they maintain large establishments, they suffer from obsolescence and thus, they are desperately seeking to modernise their forces. There is little point in retailing the size, numbers and equipment of the two opposing forces. Suffice to say, Pakistan maintains enough strength to counter any Indian incursion.

This article argues that India has narrowed the definition of R2P to exclude a lot of atrocities that it itself is afraid of being attacked for. That means that India is selfishly denying the ability to intervene in serious situations

<https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/56723/s1903160%20Master%20Thesis.pdf?sequence=1>

**2. Stuart Nagel explains in his 2001 book Resolving International disputes: One role of peacekeeping troops could be as a tripwire against attack from either disputant. Attacks from either disputant would have to pass through the peacekeeping, thereby sounding an alarm for the international community.**

### **Increasing the cost of conflict**

Hultman, 2014, American Political Science Review, "Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting"  
<http://sci-hub.tw/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/beyond-keeping-peace-united-nations-effectiveness-in-the-midst-of-fighting/46CFE142449D67731DF1E9FC37B46143> (NK)

Next, **peacekeeping operations deployed in the midst of conflict make violence more costly relative to other forms of resolution.** Security guarantees may not always be enough, as some armed actors do not consent to the deployment of peacekeepers if they see potential gains to be made in combat. Thus, **PKOs also often pursue strategies that limit the opportunities warring actors have for advancing militarily on one another. Doing so affects each faction's cost calculus of combat as a means of achieving political goals. Research has shown that the expected cost of continued fighting is central to an actor's decision to use force or agree to a settlement** (e.g. Powell 2004). **Limiting opportunities for battlefield engagement increases the costs of continued hostilities, causing the utility of continued violence to decline.** In attempting to increase the cost of combat, the UN seeks to turn belligerents away from battle as a means by which to resolve the dispute. Both of these mechanisms work through two main operational activities that UN peacekeepers typically use during ongoing conflict. Separating the combatants is an important method by which UN peacekeeping reduces security concerns and makes it more difficult for combatants to engage militarily. **The UN frequently positions armed personnel on the frontlines of civil conflict to create a buffer zone between belligerents** (Fortna 2008), even when it intervenes short of a ceasefire (Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2012) or without the combatants' consent. **By interceding between factions and monitoring combat behavior on the frontlines, UN PKOs reduce battlefield violence by increasing the cost of fighting.** The barrier provided by large numbers of blue helmets increases the costs that factions incur in any effort to make battlefield advances. International audience costs of circumventing UN barriers are severe, and combatants pay direct military costs for thwarting the UN's interposition.

## R/T Libya bad

**The UN intervention goal in Libya was only to protect civilians from being massacred by Gaddafi and it succeeded at that, preventing a Syria-like situation of escalating violence where hundreds of thousands would have been killed. We need *more* Libya's, not less**

**Hamid 16** Shadi Hamid [Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy, U.S. Relations with the Islamic World], 4-12-2016, "Everyone Says the Lybia Intervention was a Failure. They're Wrong," Brookings Institution,

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/04/12/everyone-says-the-libya-intervention-was-a-failure-theyre-wrong/> //DF

Libya and the 2011 NATO intervention there have become synonymous with failure, disaster, and the Middle East being a "shit show" (to use President Obama's colorful descriptor). It has perhaps never been more important to question this prevailing wisdom, because how we interpret Libya affects how we interpret Syria and, importantly, how we assess Obama's foreign policy legacy. Of course, Libya, as anyone can see, is a mess, and Americans are reasonably asking if the intervention was a mistake. But just because it's reasonable doesn't make it right.

Most criticisms of the intervention, even with the benefit of hindsight, fall short. It is certainly true that the intervention didn't produce something resembling a stable democracy. This, however, was never the goal. The goal was to protect civilians and prevent a massacre. Critics erroneously compare Libya today to any number of false ideals, but this is not the correct way to evaluate the success or failure of the intervention. To do that, we should compare Libya today to what Libya would have looked like if we hadn't intervened. By that standard, the Libya intervention was successful: **The country is better off today than it would have been had the international community allowed dictator Muammar Qaddafi to continue his rampage across the country.** Critics further assert that the intervention caused, created, or somehow led to civil war. In fact, the civil war had already started before the intervention began. As for today's chaos, violence, and general instability, these are more plausibly tied not to the original intervention but to the international community's failures after intervention. The very fact that the Libya intervention and its legacy have been either distorted or misunderstood is itself evidence of a warped foreign policy discourse in the U.S., where anything short of success—in this case, Libya quickly becoming a stable, relatively democratic country—is viewed as a failure. NATO INTERVENED TO PROTECT CIVILIANS, NOT TO SET UP A DEMOCRACY **As stated in the U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing force in Libya, the goal of intervention was "to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack." And this is what was achieved.** In February 2011, anti-Qaddafi demonstrations spread across the country. The regime responded to the nascent protest movement with lethal force, killing more than 100 people in the first few days, effectively sparking an armed rebellion. The rebels quickly lost momentum, however. I still remember how I felt in those last days and hours as Qaddafi's forces marched toward Benghazi. In a quite literal sense, every moment mattered, and the longer we waited, the greater the cost. It was frightening to watch. I didn't want to live in an America where we would stand by silently as a brutal dictator—using that distinct language of genocidaires—announced rather clearly his intentions to kill. In one speech, Qaddafi called protesters "cockroaches" and vowed to cleanse Libya "inch by inch, house by house, home by home, alleyway by alleyway." **Already, on the eve of intervention, the death toll was estimated at somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000.** (This was when the international community's tolerance for Arab Spring-related mass killings was still fairly low.) As Obama's advisers saw it, there were two options for military action: a no-fly zone (which, on its own, wouldn't do much to stop Qaddafi's tanks) or a broader resolution that would allow the U.S. and its allies to take further measures, including establishing what amounted to a floating no-drive zone around rebel forces. The president went with the latter option. The NATO operation lasted about seven months, with an estimated death toll of around 8,000, apparently most of them combatants on both sides (although there is some lack of clarity on this, since the Libyan government doesn't clearly define "revolutionaries" or "rebel supporters"). A Human Rights Watch investigation found that at least 72 civilians were killed as a result of the NATO air campaign, definitively contradicting speculative claims of mass casualties from the Qaddafi regime. Claims of "mission creep" have become commonplace, most forcefully articulated by the Micah Zenko of the Council on Foreign Relations. Zenko may be right, but he asserts rather than explains why mission creep is always a bad thing. It may be that in some circumstances, the scope of a mission should be defined more broadly, rather than narrowly. If anything, it was the Obama administration's insistence of minimizing the mission—including the absurd claim that it would take "days, not weeks"—that was the problem from the very start. Zenko and others never make clear how civilians could have been protected as long as Qaddafi was waging war on them. WHAT LIBYA WOULD LOOK LIKE TODAY IF NATO HADN'T INTERVENED It's helpful to engage in a bit of

counterfactual history here. As Niall Ferguson notes in his book *Virtual Alternatives*, “To understand how it actually was, we therefore need to understand how it actually wasn’t.” Applied to the Libyan context, this means that we’re not comparing Libya, during or after the intervention, with some imagined ideal of stable, functioning democracy. Rather, we would compare it with what we judge, to the best of our ability, the most likely alternative outcome would have been had the U.S. not intervened. Here’s what we know: By March 19, 2011, when the NATO operation began, the death toll in Libya had risen rapidly to more than 1,000 in a relatively short amount of time, confirming Qaddafi’s longstanding reputation as someone who was willing to kill his countrymen (as well as others) in large numbers if that’s what his survival required. There was no end in sight. After early rebel gains, Qaddafi had seized the advantage. Still, he was not in a position to deal a decisive blow to the opposition. (Nowhere in the Arab Spring era has one side in a military conflict been able to claim a clear victory, even with massive advantages in manpower, equipment, and regional backing.) Any Libyan who had opted to take up arms was liable to be captured, arrested, or killed if Qaddafi “won,” so the incentives to accept defeat were nonexistent, to say nothing of the understandable desire to not live under the rule of a brutal and maniacal strongman. The most likely outcome, then, was a Syria-like situation of indefinite, intensifying violence. Even President Obama, who today seems unsure about the decision to intervene, acknowledged in an August 2014 interview with Thomas Friedman that “had we not intervened, it’s likely that Libya would be Syria...And so there would be more death, more disruption, more destruction.” WHAT CAUSED THE CURRENT LIBYAN CIVIL WAR? Critics charge that the NATO intervention was responsible for or somehow caused Libya’s current state of chaos and instability. For instance, after leaving the Obama administration, Philip Gordon, the most senior U.S. official on the Middle East in 2013–15, wrote: “In Iraq, the U.S. intervened and occupied, and the result was a costly disaster. In Libya, the U.S. intervened and did not occupy, and the result was a costly disaster. In Syria, the U.S. neither intervened nor occupied, and the result is a costly disaster.” The problem here is that U.S. intervention did not, in fact, result in a costly disaster, unless we are using the word “result” to simply connote that one thing happened after a previous thing. The NATO operation ended in October 2011. The current civil war in Libya began in May 2014—a full two and a half years later. The intervention and today’s violence are of course related, but this does not necessarily mean there is a causal relationship. To argue that the current conflict in Libya is a result of the intervention, one would basically need to assume that the outbreak of civil war was inevitable, irrespective of anything that happened in the intervening 30 months. This makes it all the more important to distinguish between the intervention itself and the international community’s subsequent failure—a failure that nearly all the relevant actors acknowledge—to plan and act for the day after and help Libyans rebuild their shattered country. Such measures include sending training missions to help the Libyan army restructure itself (only in late 2013 did NATO provide a small team of advisers) or even sending multinational peacekeeping forces; expanding the United Nations Support Mission in Libya’s (UNSMIL) limited advisory role; and pressuring the Libyan government to consider alternatives to a dangerous and destabilizing political isolation law. While perhaps less sexy, the U.S. and its allies could have also weighed in on institutional design and pushed back against Libya’s adoption, backed by UNSMIL, of one of world’s most counterproductive electoral systems—single non-transferable vote—along with an institutional bias favoring independents. This combination exacerbated tribal and regional divisions while making power sharing even more difficult. Finally, the U.S. could have restrained its allies, particularly the Gulf States and Egypt, from excessive meddling in the lead-up to and early days of the 2014 civil war. Yet Libya quickly tumbled off the American agenda. That’s not surprising, given that the Obama administration has always been suspicious of not just military entanglements but any kind of prolonged involvement—diplomatic, financial, or otherwise—in Middle East trouble spots. Libya “was farmed out to the working level,” according to Dennis Ross, who served as a special assistant to President Obama until November 2011. There was also an assumption that the Europeans would do more. This was more than just a hope; it was an organizing principle of Obama administration engagement abroad. Analysts Nina Hachigian and David Shorr have called it the “Responsibility Doctrine”: a strategy of “prodding other influential nations...to help shoulder the burdens of fostering a stable, peaceful world order.” This may be the way the world should operate, but as a set of driving assumptions, this part of the Obama doctrine has proven to be wrong at best, and rather dangerous at worst. We may not like it—and Obama certainly doesn’t—but even when the U.S. itself is not particularly involved in a given conflict, at the very least it is expected to set the agenda, convene partners, and drive international attention toward an issue that would otherwise be neglected in the morass of Middle East conflicts. The U.S., when it came to Libya, did not meet this minimal standard. Even President Obama himself would eventually acknowledge the failure to stay engaged. As he put it to Friedman: “I think we [and] our European partners underestimated the need to come in full force if you’re going to do this.” Yet it is worth emphasizing that even with a civil war, ISIS’s capture of territory, and as many as three competing “governments,” the destruction in Libya still does not come close to the level of death and destruction witnessed in Syria in the absence of intervention. In other words, even this “worst-case scenario” falls well short of actual worst-case scenarios. According to the Libya Body Count, around 4,500 people have so far been killed over the course of 22 months of civil war. In Syria, the death toll is about 100 times that, with more than 400,000 killed, according to the Syrian Center for Policy Research.

## Côte d'Ivoire

### **UN action in Côte d'Ivoire (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 12)**

12-15-2012, "Côte d'Ivoire" Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect,

[http://www.globalr2p.org/regions/cote\\_divoire](http://www.globalr2p.org/regions/cote_divoire) //AM

The recent cross-border and refugee camp attacks highlight the gravity of ethnic tensions in the western regions of Côte d'Ivoire where crimes have been perpetrated for more than a decade. Disputes over land rights and political affiliation are intrinsically linked to ethnic affiliation and renewed violence could potentially ignite a wider conflict in which mass atrocity crimes might recur. The government of Côte d'Ivoire still requires international assistance to rebuild, end impunity and uphold its Responsibility to Protect. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE: **The UN Security Council (UNSC) has passed nine resolutions on Côte d'Ivoire since the crisis began in late 2010, with the key resolution being 1975 at the peak of the crisis in March 2011 when the Responsibility to Protect was invoked.** UNOCI was originally authorized under Resolution 1528 (2004) with a protection of civilians mandate. Resolution 2045, which was passed on 26 April 2012 to extend the mandate of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire, expressed the UNSC's concern that UNOCI and the mission in Liberia (UNMIL) assist both governments in halting cross-border raids. Gbagbo was indicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity committed between 16 December 2010 and 12 April 2011. On 22 November the ICC also unsealed an arrest warrant for Simone Gbagbo, the former president's wife. The UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights visited the IDP camp in Nahibly during the end of November, urging the government to continue security sector reform and to quickly bring perpetrators of crimes to justice.

### **(Caro 17 at the International Peace Institute)**

Hayat Larbi Caro, 4-11-2017, "Cote d'Ivoire: A Success Story for UN Peacekeeping Missions," IPI - International Peace Institute,

<https://www.ipinst.org/2017/04/cote-divoire-success-in-crisis-management> //AM

**The United Nations Operations in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) is widely being praised as a success story—after 13 years, the peacekeeping mission will be closing in June 2017 and leaving behind a**

**stable and prosperous country.** With the closing of the mission, and as Cote d'Ivoire launches its campaign for a non-permanent member seat on the United Nations Security Council for the 2018-2019 period, the Permanent Mission of Cote d'Ivoire to the UN and IPI co-organized a high-level panel event on April 11, 2017, "Côte d'Ivoire, a Successful Case of Crisis Management: a Look Back at the Experience and Lessons Learned." Marcel Amon-Tanoh, Cote d'Ivoire Minister of Foreign Affairs, briefed the audience on the political and social measures implemented by the government to address the root causes of the conflict and build social cohesion.

## R/T UNSC Legitimacy

**Increasing UNSC membership would not increase legitimacy because different nations have different standards of legitimacy, and it would decrease its effectiveness because of more members**

**Hurd 08** Ian Hurd [assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University. He is the author of *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the UN Security Council*], 2008, "Myths of Membership: The Politics of Legitimation in UN Security Council Reform," *Journal of Global Governance*,

<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55bc2903e4b0b7e056744a52/t/5935850ac534a52e4e3d2c98/1496679692124/myths-of-membership.pdf> //DF

Assessing the Hypotheses Does formal reform of membership contribute to legitimacy in any of the five hypotheses? The five are based on different empirical claims, but at least three general patterns emerge when one examines them as a group. First, each claim ultimately rests on

a trade-off, and each trade-off involves a political decision regarding one's priorities about the Council that cannot be resolved except by each state according to its own values and interests. Several of the hypotheses—H1 [the membership of the Council is representative of the General Assembly membership], H2, and H3—set up a trade-off between increasing the Council's legitimacy for some states while necessarily reducing it for other states. We may not be able to predict which states will fall into each category, but we do know that the lack of consensus over metrics of representation and diversity means that privileging one interpretation over others will contribute to the delegitimation of an enlarged Council in the eyes of some states. This weakens H1 and H2. H3 can, at best, increase legitimacy in the eyes of the individual states that might be added to the Council while reducing it for those that are not. The deliberative models create a different kind of trade-off, one between increasing the range of voices and issues that can be raised in the Council (which is seen as the source of legitimation) and reducing the possibility of consensus in decisions. More interests on the table will necessarily mean that it will be harder to reach an agreement. Finally, all legitimation hypotheses involve a trade-off between increasing the Council's legitimacy and furthering other values, such as efficiency, effectiveness, or power.<sup>54</sup> It is generally accepted that the size of the Council is negatively correlated to its effectiveness, and some countries raise this frequently as a cost of larger membership.<sup>55</sup> A negative correlation here would mean that it was a fatal flaw for all legitimacy-through-enlargement arguments if, in fact, Council legitimacy was primarily a function of its substantive effectiveness rather than its membership. Second, each hypothesis can be undermined by the possibility of "informal membership" in the Council. As the Council increases the opportunities for participation available to nonmembers, it steals the foundation from many of the reform arguments. The deliberative hypotheses, in particular, are weakened to the extent that Council rules of procedure, and Charter requirements, allow nonmembers of the Council to contribute to deliberation. The justification for adding new formal members is defeated if states' presence and participation can be solicited on a case-by-case basis. What remains is the potential legitimating power of the pure membership argument, where formal presence is thought by itself to have a legitimating effect (as in H1, H2, and H3). In the end, it is not clear that the formal structure of Council membership is the most important constraint on deliberation, or that adding new members would necessarily add to its deliberative quality. Finally, the weakness of many of these arguments relative to empirical evidence makes it plausible to conclude that much of the "legitimacy talk" 212 Myths of Membership around which reform arguments are constructed is a false front, covering up the political interests of states. What aspirants to Council membership seem to be really seeking are the status and prestige that they believe go along with a seat.<sup>56</sup> These real motives behind the rhetoric are not affected by the lack of evidence for the rhetorical claims. They are not without effect, however, given the nature of rhetorical power. Two new issues then come to the fore, each worthy of further research. First, the ubiquity with which reform arguments are defended by reference to the alleged "legitimacy deficit" of the Council suggests that the international community expects that proposals be couched in universal rather than particularistic values. Second, these generalizable claims may subject their speakers to the possibility of rhetorical entrapment, so that public statements about a principle of legitimation might be turned around by others in ways the speaker never intended but from which they can't escape.<sup>57</sup> International talk may be cheap, but it is never free.

## **Turn: India joining the UNSC will make their actions towards Pakistan look less legitimate**

**Bosco 09** David Bosco [associate professor at Indiana University's School of Global and International Studies. He is the author of books on the U.N. Security Council and the International Criminal Court, and is at work on a new book about governance of the oceans], 9-23-2009, "Think Again: The U.N. Security Council," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/09/23/think-again-the-u-n-security-council/> //DF

"Expanding the Council Would Increase Its Legitimacy." Don't be so sure. It has become a constant refrain at U.N. headquarters that the Security Council is anachronistic. And in many ways, it is. Japan, the organization's second-largest financial contributor, deserves a permanent council seat, as do rising economic stars India and Brazil. In the near future, the British and French seats should be combined into a seat for the European Union, a change that would give a regular voice to Germany and boost the EU's aspiration for a common foreign policy. These reforms would help the council more accurately reflect the world's power distribution. But reorganization alone would not greatly increase respect for the body worldwide. Many of the crises and conflicts that the UNSC confronts spring from either rogue regimes or uncooperative non-state actors for whom the council's

composition is all but irrelevant. Tyrants in Burma, militias in eastern Congo, and Al Qaeda disciples won't be impressed by a revamped council. And in some cases, **an expanded council would even introduce new legitimacy problems. Imagine, for example, a council with India as a permanent member that passed resolutions condemning Pakistan. From Islamabad, the new council would certainly look less legitimate than it does today.** Moreover, expansion of the UNSC requires the support of two-thirds of the General Assembly. Since small and mid-sized states often pool their votes, any reform package would have to compensate those blocs of power somehow. Most viable proposals for council reform envision adding five to 10 additional elected seats to compensate the broader U.N. membership for new permanent seats. All told, council membership might balloon to 25 states or more. Such a dramatic expansion could easily undermine the council's value as an important talking shop for major powers. A 25-member UNSC would often prove too large for the kinds of quiet, behind-the-scenes exchanges that have been one of the body's principal values — and contributions to security.

## **Adding India won't increase the legitimacy of the UNSC, but lead other countries to argue more fiercely for their right to a spot**

**McDonald and Patrick 10** Kara C. McDonald [Foreign Service officer with the U.S. Department of State, and currently serves as the U.S. deputy special coordinator for Haiti] and Stewart M. Patrick [senior fellow and director of the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations], 12-2010, "UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests," Council on Foreign Relations, [https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2010/11/UNSC\\_CSR59.pdf](https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2010/11/UNSC_CSR59.pdf) //DF

Such talking points pack a political punch in the developing world. But these arguments confront two inconvenient truths. First, regional representation and parity were never the basis for designating the UNSC's permanent members, which were chosen primarily as guarantors of world peace. The same should be true, presumably, of any additional permanent seats. The charter suggests that the candidacies of emerging powers such as Brazil or India (as well as established ones like Germany and Japan) should be weighed not on their role as regional leaders, but on their ability to help safeguard international peace. The place to address regional balance is clearly in the UNSC's elected seats, since Article 23 of the UN Charter explicitly mentions "equitable geographic distribution" as a secondary consideration. Second, **designating new permanent members will not likely sate demands for greater regional representation.** Indeed, **opposition to the main aspirants (Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan) is strongest from their regional rivals (Argentina, Mexico, Italy, Pakistan, and South Korea).** Some propose that each regional bloc should determine its own permanent representative, but such decisions are more properly left to the entire world body. Regional selection could result in the seating of unexpected, possibly compromising candidates. Should the United States accept Cuba or Venezuela as a permanent UNSC member if, by some bizarre twist in backroom negotiations, Brazil or Mexico cannot secure Latin American support?

## **The UNSC remains highly relevant and esteemed; the only countries that scoff at it are ones targeted by it, and they wouldn't warm up even with more members**

**McDonald and Patrick 10** Kara C. McDonald [Foreign Service officer with the U.S. Department of State, and currently serves as the U.S. deputy special coordinator for Haiti] and Stewart M. Patrick [senior fellow and director of the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations], 12-2010, "UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests," Council on Foreign Relations, [https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2010/11/UNSC\\_CSR59.pdf](https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2010/11/UNSC_CSR59.pdf) //DF

Decreasing Relevance? **The UNSC's relevance is not declining; it remains the premier multilateral institution for matters of international security.** To be sure, UN member states exploit a range of frameworks—including regional organizations, ad hoc coalitions, and interest-based partnerships—to advance their national and collective security. Examples range from the African Union to the Six Party Talks on North Korea. But in the last five years, the UNSC has spent comparatively less time rubber-stamping diplomatic agreements made outside its chambers and more time forging agreements within its own ranks. UNSC Resolution 1701 to end the Lebanon war, the P5+ Germany negotiations on Iran, and the UNSC's sanctions against North Korea are all examples. **The UNSC's**

**continued relevance is also illustrated by states' desire to serve on it.** Every October, **the UNGA is filled to capacity when delegations elect the new rotating UNSC members amid an orgy of vote-buying. Even countries that make a profession of attacking the UNSC's credibility nonetheless spend millions trying to gain a seat**—suggesting that, at a minimum, it retains prestige.<sup>6</sup> Weakening Implementation? Some critics claim that the lack of geographic balance in the council's permanent membership and its failure to include regional leaders erode its perceived authority, complicating the implementation and enforcement of its resolutions, and causing states to turn to other frameworks to address security problems. With rare exceptions, however, **UN members continue to regard the UNSC as the most authoritative international institution in matters of global peace and security.** To be sure, states are sometimes slow to align national laws and practices with new UNSC resolutions, and bureaucratic inertia contributes to deficiencies in implementation. But **the resolutions most commonly flouted today are those imposing sanctions and other punitive measures, and the violators tend to be the targeted states and their sympathizers. These are cases less of weak implementation than of political defiance.** Examples include the arms embargoes on Sudan and Somalia, resolutions condemning violence in eastern Congo, and the sanctions resolutions against Iran and North Korea. **A change in UNSC composition would probably not address noncompliance by offending states, like North Korea, Iran, or Syria.**

## R/T IMF Good

### 1. Link-in: India would use its influence with the IMF to block Pakistan from getting a loan that their economy needs

**Gettleman 19** Jeffrey Gettleman, 4-10-2019 "Economy in Tatters, Pakistan's Premier Calls for End to Armed Militias," NYT, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/09/world/asia/imran-khan-pakistan.html> //DF

"You can't have the ruling elite siphoning off money and taking it abroad," he said. "If you don't hold them accountable, the country has no future." **With barely enough foreign reserves to cover the country's monthly import bills, Mr. Khan's government knows it needs a large bailout from the International Monetary Fund,** but those often come with painful austerity conditions. His finance team has been reluctant to turn to the I.M.F. but now promises that a deal will be announced in the coming weeks. **On the streets, discontent is rising.** People grumble about rising prices. Mr. Khan's government is trying to slow down demand to keep the trade deficit from growing even bigger. But **his government's decisions to raise levies on fuel and collect more taxes from ordinary Pakistanis,** even if necessary for the economy's long-term health, **have made people even angrier. Economic growth is forecast to slow further, leading to even more joblessness.** Nonetheless, Mr. Khan said, "my first priority is to take 100 million people out of poverty." Pakistani analysts say his priority is genuine but question how Mr. Khan can possibly pay for it. "I've been pretty consistent of my criticism of the P.M. going back a long time," said Mosharraf Zaidi, a newspaper columnist. "One thing that I cannot criticize him for is the core purpose of his being in public life, which is compassion." As far as India, Mr. Khan could not resist a few digs. He said that India's prime minister, Narendra Modi, had opted for airstrikes to please a domestic audience — India begins holding elections on Thursday.

**Dreher 06** Axel Dreher [ETH Zurich, KOF & Department of Management, Technology, and Economics, Weinbergstrasse], Jan-Egbert Sturm [ETH Zurich, KOF & Department of Management, Technology, and Economics, Weinbergstrasse], and James Raymond Vreeland [Yale University, Department of Political Science], 2006, "Does membership on the UN security council influence IMF Decisions? Evidence from

panel data," Swiss Institute for Business Cycle Research, <https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/bitstream/handle/20.500.11850/2694/eth-29082-01.pdf?sequence=1//DF>

Our results contribute to the growing literature showing that **the IMF is to a great extent employed as a tool of foreign policy by its major stakeholders. Whether used to bribe or reward, IMF loans are funneled** not just to developing countries facing economic crises, but also **to politically important developing countries, such as those serving a term on the UN Security Council.** We do not know whether the temporary UNSC members increase their request for financing – having increased confidence the IMF would approve the loan – or, alternatively, whether the Fund's major shareholders take initiative. In any case, **IMF loans are one mechanism by which the major stakeholders of the IMF – mainly the US, but also Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom – can win the favor of voting members of the UN Security Council.** This is not what the institution was intended to be used for. Originally, the IMF was set up to facilitate international trade and national prosperity by helping to manage <sup>43</sup> Note that this remains true when the fixed country effects are omitted. <sup>36</sup> balance of payments through loans. The failure of IMF programs, which involve both loans and policy conditions designed to address the balance of payments, is blamed by many on the design of programs and on the failure of countries to adopt IMF reforms.

## **2. Politicized loans are bad: non permanent members of the UNSC have 40 percent less growth than the average nation who is not on the security council.**

**Dreher 15** Axel Dreher [Alfred-Weber-Institute for Economics, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany], Jan-Egbert Sturm [E T H Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, Zürich, Switzerland], James Raymond Vreeland [Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department of Government, Mortara Center for International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA], 2015, "Politics and IMF Conditionality," Journal of Conflict Resolution, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/24546221.pdf//DF>

Our study tests this relationship by (1) directly analyzing a new data set of IMF conditionality and (2) employing UNSC membership as a measure of political importance. The results of our analysis confirm that strategically important countries do receive favorable treatment from the IMF when it comes to the conditions that are imposed in return for loans. The robust finding is statistically significant and substantive:

**UNSC members receive about 30 percent fewer conditions than other countries.** Specifically, **fewer prior actions are required of them to enter into an arrangement, and they face fewer performance criteria to receive continued loan disbursements.** We detect more limited evidence of an effect on the number of structural benchmarks. The scope of policy areas covered by prior actions appears unaffected, although there is evidence that the scope of policy areas covered by performance criteria is narrower. In particular, we find reduced conditionality in the policy areas of debt repayment, the balance of payments, credit to the government, and domestic pricing. During the first decade of the 2000s, when many governments avoided borrowing from the IMF for the first time in their histories, several studies emerged showing that participation in IMF programs during the twentieth century resulted in lower rates of economic growth.<sup>32</sup> The result found acceptance from across the political spectrum, although people disagreed over the mechanism. Some have argued that IMF programs hurt economic growth by imposing weak conditionality, thereby encouraging moral hazard.<sup>33</sup> As countries are now returning to the IMF—and the debate about conditionality has again taken center stage—addressing the question of moral hazard continues to be of importance. The problem with corroborating the moral hazard argument has been the historic lack of transparency of the IMF when it comes to providing systematic data on levels of conditionality. So, in a recent study showing economic growth suffers when countries are temporary UNSC members (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010), a crucial piece of evidence is missing: the level of conditionality. Indeed, a debate has ensued in the pages of the Journal of Conflict Resolution over whether the pernicious effects of Security Council membership come from increased access to finance, on one hand, or increased political leverage to avoid macroeconomic adjustment, on the other. Bashir and Lim (2012) highlight that some of the worst performing UNSC members did not receive obvious increases in foreign aid, and they suggest that the negative effects of membership may have been caused by an increased ability to avoid macroeconomic adjustment that would have been required along with similarly sized aid packages, even small ones. In their rejoinder, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2013) clarify that **the problem is not necessarily more money but rather "easy" money—finance that does not come with proper policy conditions attached.** Indeed, Dreher, Eichenauer, and Gehring (2013) find that aid committed while a country was a temporary member of the UNSC is less effective in raising the recipient country's

rate of economic growth. Presumably, then, **temporary UNSC members experience lower rates of economic growth because the augmented foreign aid that they receive has low levels of conditionality attached. Rather than encouraging important policy changes, the aid simply props up bad policies and maybe even corrupt governments.** To test this argument, however, data on levels of conditionality are required. Such data are notoriously unavailable from most sources. Our study provides the first extensive analysis of official IMF data, focusing on IMF policy conditionality, thanks to the continuing opening of the IMF and their providing us access to their M O N A database. To be clear, **our findings** certainly do not imply that the IMF imposes optimal conditions. They do **suggest that politically important countries can expect softer treatment from the IMF. If the governments of such countries can expect fewer conditions in return for access to loans of foreign exchange, these arrangements may indeed serve to promote moral hazard** for countries considered politically important to the major shareholders of the IMF. Still, better access to IMF loans with lighter conditionality can be considered for temporary members of the UNSC to be a short-run perk.

## R/T SAP's

**SAP's have exacerbated poverty, decreased wages, increased inequality almost everywhere (gives examples in India)**

Anibel Comelo, Columbia, 1996, "Global Domination of the World Bank STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS IN INDIA"  
[http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ipsg/la\\_news/la\\_news\\_art4.html](http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ipsg/la_news/la_news_art4.html) (NK)

SAP realities - Systematic Assault Prevails Today, **contrary to the claims that SAPs would generate economic growth, promote investment, create jobs, and alleviate poverty, people's lives tell a different story.** Literally thousands of examples of the disastrous results that SAPs have had in the last decade have been documented. **Almost all countries which implemented one or more SAPs have experienced: declines in real wages, increased income inequality, imports, rises in infant and maternal mortality, and increase in malnutrition.** Furthermore, high prices for imported resources makes medicines, medical equipment and other life-saving items inaccessible to those who need them most. User fees often attached to basic social services make them unaffordable to the majority of the population in developing countries. As in other countries, **massive conversion of prime agricultural lands into export- processing zones in India has decreased food production for domestic populations, displaced farmers, many of whom are women with families, and destroyed the environment.** For example, **the establishment of Cargill's salt plants in Gujarat, in the name of trade liberalization, resulted in the displacement of over 2,000 women from their source of livelihood.** Similarly, the Export Promotion Zones which reportedly provide job opportunities for young women, whose average age is 20 years, in practice lead to their dependence on companies which have no use for them once they are married or pregnant. Moreover, **economic policies promoted by SAPs at the macro level have in fact extended and intensified poverty at the micro level for millions of individuals by undermining food production and local industries.** Throughout Africa, where 40 countries underwent at least one adjustment program between 1980 and 1991, average incomes fell by 20%, unemployment quadrupled to 100 million and investments fell to levels lower than in the 70's. examples from other countries prove the disasters that SAPs spell.

## R/T to FDI