

# R2R

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We Affirm, resolved: the United Nations should grant India permanent membership on the Security Council.

Our sole contention is preventing reckless interventions.

In the last 20 years, the United Nations peacekeeping has shifted from stopping interstate wars to intrastate wars. This includes civil wars and combating insurgents.

The UN Security Council has relied more and more on violent interventions to solve global issues since the Cold War. Joelle Hageboutros of Swarthmore University writes in 2017:

During the Cold War, the use of the veto was predictable given the massive ideological gulf between the US and the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, member states have become more autonomous and cautious in wielding their vote. From 1946-1995, the veto was used a total of 244 times, but only 31 times from 1996-2014. On 90% of the Council's agenda, the council has no trouble agreeing.

The current Security Council favors a one size fits all solution to any problem; sending in troops or dropping bombs. However, this strategy has failed and a new approach is needed. India's accession to the UNSC would force a shift in the UN's strategy. Neelam Deo writes in the Diplomat magazine in 2014: If the UNSC includes India, it will infuse the council with a deeper understanding and enable a wiser response to the world's cascading political crises, unlike the hasty and excessive militarism of the West.

This is because India stands at odds with the foundational assumption of interventions; that the UN has the right to violate the sovereignty of other states in certain instances, known as the responsibility to protect doctrine.

India believes that this doctrine is used recklessly. Kartik Bommakanti of the Strategic Studies Program writes in 2017: the R2P represents a shift at the extreme end of Humanitarian Interventions to the extent it is doctrinaire and coercive, and mandates expeditious action against mass atrocities without adequately considering outcomes. Consequently, it grates against India's preferred deliberative and consent-based approach to Humanitarian Interventions.

Peacekeeping is harmful for two reasons

First, they instigate more conflictspire future conflicts.

Alan Kuperman at the University of Texas explains in 2008: genocidal violence often represents state retaliation against a substate group for rebellion (such as an armed secession) by some of its members. The responsibility to protect, by raising expectations of diplomatic and military intervention to protect these groups, unintentionally fosters rebellion by lowering its expected cost and increasing its likelihood of success, intervention does sometimes help rebels attain their political goals, but usually it is too late or inadequate to avert retaliation against civilians. It creates moral hazard that encourages the excessively risky or fraudulent behavior of rebellion by members of groups that are vulnerable to genocidal retaliation, but it cannot fully protect against the backlash

In Libya, the UN Security Council sanctioned a NATO-led intervention that destabilized the country. Kuperman writes in 2013: The biggest misconception about NATO's intervention is that it saved lives and benefited Libya and its neighbors. when NATO intervened in mid-March 2011, Qaddafi already had regained control of most of Libya, but NATO ousted Qaddafi and enabled the rebels to resume their attack, increasing the duration of Libya's civil war by about six times and its death toll by at least seven times.

Second, they increase conflict length

When an actor believes that the international community will come to their aid, they drag out conflicts in the hop of this assistance coming. Kuperman writes:

In 2006, Sudan's government signed a US-brokered peace agreement, but two of the three main rebel factions refused to join because they demanded additional concessions and greater foreign intervention "like in Bosnia."<sup>20</sup> This recalcitrance triggered a further fractioning of the rebellion, a breakdown in the peace process, and anarchic violence. In light of the fact that the rebels have never had any chance of battlefield victory on their own, one can reasonably conclude that their repeated refusal to make peace is driven by the hope of larger international intervention under the Responsibility to Protect.

Thus, we affirm.

# CASE CARDS

**We Affirm, resolved: the United Nations should grant India permanent membership on the Security Council.**

**Our sole contention is preventing reckless interventions.**

**In the last 20 years, the United Nations peacekeeping has shifted from stopping interstate wars to intrastate wars. This includes civil wars and combating insurgents.**

**This strategic shift has been justified by the idea of responsibility to protect, which, political science professor Robert Murray explains in 2013:**

**Murray 13** Robert W. Murray [Robert W. Murray is an adjunct professor of Political Science at the University of Alberta, a blogger for e-International Relations and a Columnist for Troy Media], 8-28-2013, "R2P: More Harm Than Good?," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/r2p-more-harm-good-8970> //DF

What is R2P? Put simply, it **is a doctrine calling for fundamental alterations to our concepts of national sovereignty and security. Rather than the model of sovereignty that has dominated the international system for centuries, where states are granted legal sovereign status by virtue of being able to exercise power and authority over their people and territory, R2P sees sovereignty as conditional upon a state's' willingness to protect its own people. In cases where a state or regime fails to live up to its duty, other states have a responsibility to intervene on behalf of those affected.** There have been various iterations of R2P, starting with the original report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001, carrying through the much-eroded version endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2005, and the numerous interpretations proposed by scholars and advocates since. The doctrine is predicated on three pillars—first, the responsibility to prevent human insecurity; second, the responsibility to protect (read here intervention); and third, the responsibility to rebuild (read here regime change). Throughout the life of R2P, the number of prominent thinkers and decision-makers backing it has grown significantly. R2P is also now a very powerful and effective political lobby group. Various think-tanks, research institutes, offices within national governments, and international organizations have all been formed since 2001 with the express purpose of advocating the growth and adoption of R2P principles. Often, these institutions have recruited well-known proponents of the doctrine and have played prominently in debates surrounding instances of human insecurity and atrocity. The development of the R2P lobby is surely seen by most as a positive influence in efforts to protect human populations suffering horrendous abuses, yet one cannot help but also ponder that they may also be serving to negatively impact state decision-making in cases of humanitarian crisis. Prior to 2001 and the advent of R2P, humanitarian interventions did occur, and so did missions aimed at halting violence within states or between them. The notion of protecting civilians did not originate with R2P, and arguably, previous forms of intervention, though sporadic, achieved many of the same purposes desired by R2P proponents. What has changed most markedly with R2P is the linkage between sovereignty and legitimacy, and humanitarian intervention. Under the provisions of the doctrine, and according to many of its advocates, it is not enough to end violence. **There is typically a desired response that sees full-scale military intervention followed by regime change** (hence the reference to a responsibility to rebuild). In some ways, this makes perfect sense, in that it is extremely difficult to end violence or human suffering without putting external forces in place to protect them and overthrow the regime responsible for using the tools of violence in the first place—once a war criminal, always a war criminal. Yet, since 2001, we have also witnessed a variety of intervention missions, some R2P-endorsed, others not, that have demonstrated the enormous risks and costs involved with long-term military deployments and nation building experiments. **These missions are vast departures from traditional**

**military missions, in that the enemy is very difficult to find and identify, foreign forces are rarely welcomed with a red carpet** (and if they are, it is a short-lived celebration), **and insurgent forces are more familiar with the terrain and local intricacies than external forces could ever be.** **Experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have been effective in scaring states away from wanting to embark on regime change and counterinsurgency missions, and the 2011 mission in Libya is a good example of what happens when interventionism is only taken half way without a long-term commitment.** None of this is to say that the R2P lobby is responsible for the debacles seen in recent military deployments, but rather, it is to say that continually calling for intervention and regime change in the wake of these experiences panics states more than it mobilizes them. Invoking morality has never been a compelling argument for states to act consistently in the cause of human security, and in a practical sense, the thought of committing to intervention missions with no clear end game other than realizing human security is irrational. Ultimately, **R2P can be seen as a good idea but bad policy.** The situation in Syria is worthy of action not because of any false sense of responsibility, but because of international law that existed long before R2P came around. The Chemical Weapons Convention, conventions prohibiting genocide and war crimes, and historical experiences with peacekeeping missions all serve effectively enough as justification for action in Syria. By continually attaching responsibility, regime change and long-term action, states are deterred from making decisions that might set a precedent interpreted as endorsing or enacting R2P in national foreign and defense policy.

**The UN Security Council has relied more and more on violent interventions to solve global issues since the Cold War.**

**The current Security Council favors a one size fits all solution to any problem; sending in troops or dropping bombs. However, this strategy has failed and a new approach is needed. This is because India stands at odds with the foundational assumption of interventions; that the UN has the right to violate the sovereignty of other states in certain instances, known as the responsibility to protect doctrine.**

**India is skeptical of this doctrine. Kartik Bommakanti at the Strategic Studies Program explains in 2017: the responsibility to protect represents a shift at the extreme end of humanitarian interventions to the extent it is doctrinaire and coercive, and mandates expeditious action against mass atrocities without adequately considering outcomes. Consequently, it grates against India's preferred deliberative and consent-based approach.**

Bommakanti, 2017, Strategic Studies Program, "India's evolving views on responsibility to protect (R2P) and humanitarian interventions: The significance of legitimacy"

<https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-evolving-views-responsibility-protect-r2p-humanitarian-interventions-the-significance-of-legitimacy/> (NK)

Why and how India's views on the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Humanitarian Interventions (HIs) are a function of Global Institutional Legitimacy (GIL) and Domestic Normative Legitimacy (DNL), are the subject of enquiry for this article. This conceptual distinction is important in that it helps clarify why both concepts have underpinned India's approach to humanitarian interventions. HIs come in different guises. The most well-known form of HIs are UNPKOs. India's most consequential contributions, even as an emerging power to global governance, have been through UNPKOs. On the other hand, **the R2P represents a shift at the extreme end of HIs to the extent it is doctrinaire and coercive, and mandates expeditious action against mass atrocities without adequately considering outcomes. Consequently, it grates against India's preferred deliberative and consent-based approach to HIs through UNPKOs authorised by the UNSC.** This paper will show by way of argument and analysis that legitimacy plays an important role, if not exclusively, and broadly defines India's approach to R2P and humanitarian interventions. The different strands of thought among Indian foreign policy elites reflects the values inherent in Indian society.

## India is wary of interventions given their politicized nature, but favors them in the most extreme cases like genocide

**Jaganathan 17** Madhan Mohan Jaganathan [Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharal Nehru University], 12-11-2017, "It Is More than What It Seems: Understanding India's Perspective on 'Responsibility to Protect,'" in *Southern Democracies and the Responsibility to Protect: Perspectives from India, Brazil and South Africa* by Dan Krause and Daniel Peters, Nomos Verlag,

[https://books.google.com/books/about/Southern\\_Democracies\\_and\\_the\\_Responsibil.html?id=bRB4DwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp\\_read\\_button#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.com/books/about/Southern_Democracies_and_the_Responsibil.html?id=bRB4DwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button#v=onepage&q&f=false) //DF

The point is to probe the salience of sovereignty in India's world view. This paper sets out to do precisely this. Contrary to the interpretation that India clings on to sovereignty and abandons the same depending on the interests at stake, the attachment to the principle of sovereignty echoes a fundamental value "preference in favour of order" and reflects a world view that provides wide latitude to the sovereign state. For India, sovereignty is not just a convenient platform or a symbolic rhetoric; it signifies a substantive moral position. **At the core of this moral position is the firm belief that the autonomy of the sovereign state should be left unaltered and unfettered. The only exception to this principled position is the outbreak of horrendous events such as genocide or mass killings.** Short of such events, the sovereign state remains as the prime "arbiter" on all matters within its territorial space.<sup>8</sup> In India's view, this is as much a morally defensible position as the insistence, say, on fundamental human rights. It is not difficult to trace the genesis of India's position on sovereignty. **As a post-colonial state with bitter memories, India has developed a considerable degree of aversion to anything that is tantamount to external in-terference.** In this line of thinking, intervention, howsoever, benign it may be, seems unpalatable and unacceptable. In fact, intervention by definition is bereft of noble intentions. It is an act of manipulation driven by vested political interests. It is for this reason that India has always been a first rate sceptic of the pursuit of humanitarian intervention. Critics point out the case of India's intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 to demonstrate the glaring inconsistency: the reservations about intervention and yet undertaking the role of an intervening actor in certain circumstances.<sup>9</sup> It needs to be noted that the case of East Pakistan is an exceptional case and constitutes an exception to India's general emphasis on the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity. The extremely high rate of violence in terms of atrocities committed on the population in East Pakistan renders the case as exceptional. The exact rationale for India's intervention in East Pakistan is not clear-cut. However, India's involvement in the region has been characterised and judged differently by various scholars;" they range from "humanitarian intervention"<sup>21</sup> to "strategic game plan of dismembering and partitioning Pakistan"<sup>22</sup> to "mixed motives".<sup>23</sup> **Nevertheless, it is clear that India is moved into action whenever there is an outbreak of genocide. It is this line of reasoning that helps to explain India's intervention in East Pakistan which resulted in the eventual creation of Bangladesh.** Again, it is this reasoning that enables an understanding of India's position on Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia. **India did not mince words and strongly criticised the spectre of genocide which was perpetrated by the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia.** The then prime minister of India, Indira Gandhi, remarked: "Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea cannot be isolated from the context of the barbarous dictatorship of Pol Pot and the external interest in sustaining it".<sup>24</sup> **In 1987, India intervened in Sri Lanka; it considered the actions of Sri Lanka as "almost genocidal in their objective".**<sup>25</sup> By and large, the intervention was undertaken with the consent of the Sri Lankan state. The exception to this modus operandi was the initial Operation Poomalai on 4 June 1987 which involved the delivery of food and medicine through air and entailed "humanitarian action violating the airspace of Sri Lanka"<sup>26</sup> Subsequently, the conclusion of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement on 29 July 1987 resulted in the deployment of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka.<sup>27</sup> However, India's intervention in Sri Lanka turned out to be an utter failure.<sup>28</sup> As a result, India ended its intervention and

the IPKF was withdrawn in March 1990.<sup>29</sup> During the 1970s and the 1980s, India had undertaken several interventions in its neighbourhood. Such a high frequency of intervention is not to be seen thereafter. As the paper demonstrates in subsequent sections, India's proclivity for intervention has to do with a pro-interventionist preference of leaders such as Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi." Individual leaders have played and continue to play a significant role in India's decision-making on matters of humanitarian intervention and R2P.<sup>31</sup> An analysis of India's stance on humanitarian intervention in the 1990s seems to indicate a pattern. It is that India is extremely wary of any intervention that violates the sovereignty of the target state. The sole exception to this principle is the occurrence of extremely high levels of violence which is almost tantamount to genocide. Barring this exception, India favours an intervention only if it satisfies certain core criteria: these include amongst others, the consent of the target state and the mandate and authorisation of the United Nations.<sup>32</sup> By and large, India seems to have adhered to these principles and caveats. In the case of the first Gulf War which occurred in the early 1990s, India voted in favour of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 678 but abstained from UNSC resolution 688. India had no qualms in supporting UNSC resolution 678" as it condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. By rendering support to that resolution, India acted in defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kuwait. However, it was not forthcoming in its support to UNSC resolution 688 and chose to abstain.<sup>34</sup> UNSC resolution 688 was more coercive and expansive than UNSC resolution 678 and hence India's abstention."

India has voted against such missions in the past and would do so as a member of the Security Council. When India held a non permanent seat on the council in 2011, it opposed the disastrous UN-sponsored intervention into Libya.

Checking the Security Council's militaristic and reactionary impulses is good for two reasons.

First, it would allow for autonomous recovery.

Professor Jeremy Weinstein of Stanford University writes in 2005:  
War has the potential to actually resolve political conflict and lead to peace. In particular, the absence of international intervention allows conflict to run its "natural course." War comes to an end when one group is strong enough to win decisively, or when both groups are sufficiently exhausted that they become willing to accommodate one another. Cease-fires and negotiated settlements, on the other hand, allow belligerents to reconstitute their forces. In effect, intervention serves to freeze unstable distributions of power and to provide a respite from hostilities for groups that are intent on continuing the conflict when the international community departs.

In fact, Weinstein compares the effect of autonomous recovery directly to UN conflict intervention, finding:

the hazard for another war drops by over 80% when there is a decisive military outcome. <sup>29</sup> This is a larger effect than the 32% drop in the risk of war recorded for the presence of UN peacekeepers.

Second, it would prevent moral hazards.

Alan Kuperman at the University of Texas explains in 2008:  
genocidal violence often represents state retaliation against a substate group for rebellion (such as an armed secession) by some of its members. The perception of frequent interventions, by raising expectations of intervention to protect these groups, unintentionally fosters rebellion by lowering its expected cost and increasing its likelihood of success. Intervention does sometimes help rebels attain their political goals, but usually it is too late or inadequate to avert retaliation against civilians. It creates

moral hazard that encourages the excessively risky or fraudulent behavior of rebellion by members of groups that are vulnerable to genocidal retaliation, but it cannot fully protect against the backlash.

**Kuperman 08** Alan J. Kuperman [University of Texas], 2008, "The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans," *International Studies Quarterly*,

<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.322.1966&rep=rep1&type=pdf> //DF

This article explores a perverse consequence of the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention, or "Responsibility to Protect," contrary to its intent of protecting civilians from genocide and ethnic cleansing. The root of the problem is that such **genocidal violence often represents state retaliation against a substate group for rebellion (such as an armed secession) by some of its members. [The responsibility to protect]** The emerging norm, **by raising expectations of diplomatic and military intervention to protect these groups, unintentionally fosters rebellion by lowering its expected cost and increasing its likelihood of success.** In practice, **intervention does sometimes help rebels attain their political goals, but usually it is too late or inadequate to avert retaliation against civilians.** Thus, the emerging norm resembles an imperfect insurance policy against genocidal violence. **It creates moral hazard that encourages the excessively risky or fraudulent behavior of rebellion by members of groups that are vulnerable to genocidal retaliation, but it cannot fully protect against the backlash.** The emerging norm thereby causes some genocidal violence that otherwise would not occur. Bosnia and Kosovo illustrate that in at least two recent cases the moral-hazard hypothesis explains why members of a vulnerable group rebelled and thereby triggered genocidal retaliation. The article concludes by exploring whether potential interveners could mitigate genocidal violence by modifying their intervention policies to reduce moral hazard.

**Kuperman 13** Alan Kuperman, 9-2013, "Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,

<https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/lessons-libya-how-not-intervene> //DF

A Model Intervention? Many commentators have praised NATO's 2011 intervention in Libya as a humanitarian success for averting a bloodbath in that country's second largest city, Benghazi, and helping eliminate the dictatorial regime of Muammar al-Qaddafi. These proponents accordingly claim that the intervention demonstrates how to successfully implement a humanitarian principle known as the responsibility to protect (R2P). Indeed, the top U.S. representatives to the transatlantic alliance declared that "NATO's operation in Libya has rightly been hailed as a model intervention." A more rigorous assessment, however, reveals that **NATO's intervention backfired: it increased the duration of Libya's civil war by about six times and its death toll by at least seven times, while also exacerbating human rights abuses, humanitarian suffering, Islamic radicalism, and weapons proliferation in Libya and its neighbors.** If this is a "model intervention," then it is a model of failure. Flawed Narrative The conventional account of Libya's conflict and NATO's intervention is misleading in several key aspects. First, contrary to Western media reports, Qaddafi did not initiate Libya's violence by targeting peaceful protesters. The United Nations and Amnesty International have documented that in all four Libyan cities initially consumed by civil conflict in mid-February 2011—Benghazi, Al Bayda, Tripoli, and Misurata—violence was actually initiated by the protesters. The government responded to the rebels militarily but never intentionally targeted civilians or resorted to "indiscriminate" force, as Western media claimed. Early press accounts exaggerated the death toll by a factor of ten, citing "more than 2,000 deaths" in Benghazi during the initial days of the uprising, whereas Human Rights Watch (HRW) later documented only 233 deaths across all of Libya in that period. Further evidence that Qaddafi avoided targeting civilians comes from the Libyan city that was most consumed by the early fighting, Misurata. HRW reports that of the 949 people wounded there in the rebellion's initial seven weeks, only 30 were women or children, meaning that Qaddafi's forces focused narrowly on combatants. During that same period, only 257 people were killed among the city's population of 400,000—a fraction less than 0.0006—providing additional proof that the government avoided using force indiscriminately. Moreover, Qaddafi did not perpetrate a "bloodbath" in any of the cities that his forces recaptured from rebels prior to NATO intervention—including Ajdabiya, Bani Walid, Brega, Ras Lanuf, Zawiyah, and much of Misurata—so there was virtually no risk of such an outcome if he had been permitted to recapture the last rebel stronghold of Benghazi. The conventional wisdom is also wrong in asserting that NATO's main goal in Libya was to protect civilians. Evidence reveals that NATO's primary aim was to overthrow Qaddafi's regime, even at the expense of increasing the harm to Libyans. NATO attacked Libyan forces indiscriminately, including some in retreat and others in Qaddafi's hometown of Sirte, where they posed no threat to civilians. Moreover, NATO continued to aid the rebels even when they repeatedly rejected government cease-fire offers that could have ended the violence and spared civilians. Such military assistance included weapons, training, and covert deployment of hundreds of troops

from Qatar, eventually enabling the rebels to capture and summarily execute Qaddafi and seize power in October 2011. The Intervention Backfired **The biggest misconception about NATO's intervention is that it saved lives and benefited Libya and its neighbors.** In reality, **when NATO intervened in mid-March 2011, Qaddafi already had regained control of most of Libya,** while the rebels were retreating rapidly toward Egypt. Thus, the conflict was about to end, barely six weeks after it started, at a toll of about 1,000 dead, including soldiers, rebels, and civilians caught in the crossfire. **By intervening, NATO enabled the rebels to resume their attack, which prolonged the war for another seven months and caused at least 7,000 more deaths.** The best development in postwar Libya was the democratic election of July 2012, which brought to office a moderate, secular coalition government—a stark change from Qaddafi's four-decade dictatorship. Other developments, however, have been less encouraging. The victorious rebels perpetrated scores of reprisal killings and expelled 30,000 mostly black residents of Tawerga on grounds that some had been "mercenaries" for Qaddafi. HRW reported in 2012 that such abuses "appear to be so widespread and systematic that they may amount to crimes against humanity." Ironically, such racial or ethnic violence had never occurred in Qaddafi's Libya. Radical Islamist groups, suppressed under Qaddafi, emerged as the fiercest rebels during the war and refused to disarm or submit to government authority afterward. Their persistent threat was highlighted by the September 2012 attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi that killed Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three of his colleagues. Even more recently, in April 2013, a vehicle bomb destroyed half of the French embassy in the capital, Tripoli. In light of such insecurity, it is understandable that most Libyans responding to a postwar poll expressed nostalgia for a strong leader such as Qaddafi. Among neighboring countries, Mali, which previously had been the region's exceptional example of peace and democracy, has suffered the worst consequences from the intervention. After Qaddafi's defeat, his ethnic Tuareg soldiers of Malian descent fled home and launched a rebellion in their country's north, prompting the Malian army to overthrow the president. The rebellion soon was hijacked by local Islamist forces and al-Qaida, which together imposed sharia and declared the vast north an independent country. By December 2012, the northern half of Mali had become "the largest territory controlled by Islamic extremists in the world," according to the chairman of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Africa. This chaos also spurred massive displacement of hundreds of thousands of Malian civilians, which Amnesty International characterized as "Mali's worst human rights situation in 50 years." Sophisticated weapons from Qaddafi's arsenal—including up to 15,000 man-portable, surface-to-air missiles unaccounted for as of 2012—leaked to radical Islamists throughout the region. NATO's intervention on behalf of Libya's rebels also encouraged Syria's formerly peaceful protesters to switch to violence in mid-2011, in hopes of attracting a similar intervention. The resulting escalation in Syria magnified that country's killing rate by tenfold. Lessons NATO's intervention in Libya offers at least three important lessons for implementing the responsibility to protect. First, potential interveners should beware both misinformation and rebel propaganda. If Western countries had accurately perceived Libya's initial civil conflict—as Qaddafi using discriminate force against violent tribal, regional, and radical Islamist rebels—NATO would have been much less likely to launch its counterproductive intervention. The second lesson is that humanitarian intervention can backfire by escalating rebellion. This is because some substate groups believe that by violently provoking state retaliation, they can attract such intervention to help achieve their political objectives, including regime change. The resulting escalation, however, magnifies the threat to noncombatants before any potential intervention can protect them. Thus, the prospect of humanitarian intervention, which is intended to protect civilians, may instead imperil them via a moral hazard dynamic. To mitigate this pathology, it is essential to avoid intervening on humanitarian grounds in ways that reward rebels, unless the state is targeting noncombatants. A final lesson is that intervention initially motivated by the desire to protect civilians is prone to expanding its objective to include regime change, even if doing so magnifies the danger to civilians, contrary to the interveners' original intent. That is partly because intervening states, when justifying their use of force to domestic and international audiences, demonize the regime of the country they are targeting. This demonization later inhibits the interveners from considering a negotiated settlement that would permit the regime or its leaders to retain some power, which typically would be the quickest way to end the violence and protect noncombatants. **Such lessons from NATO's use of force in Libya suggest the need for considerable caution and a comprehensive exploration of alternatives when contemplating if and how to conduct humanitarian military intervention.**

### **Intervention forces are bad because they just pause the conflict, allowing belligerents to regroup, and continue fighting for longer after they leave (Weinstein - Stanford)**

Jeremy Weinstein, Stanford University, 2005, "AUTONOMOUS RECOVERY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE" [https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/2731\\_file\\_WP57.pdf](https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/2731_file_WP57.pdf) (NK)

The logic behind the first intuition was famously laid out in a controversial article in Foreign Affairs. 26 On the heels of UN peacekeeping disasters in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, Luttwak reminded readers of an "unpleasant truth." **War has the potential to actually resolve political conflict and lead to peace. In particular, the absence of international intervention allows conflict to run its "natural course."** By this logic, **war comes to an end when one group is strong enough to win decisively, or when both groups are sufficiently exhausted that they become willing to accommodate one another. Cease-fires and negotiated settlements, on the other hand, allow**



**belligerents to reconstitute their force**s, especially if there is uncertainty about the durability of the agreement (because of the unobservable intentions of either party or uncertainty about the commitment of external actors to guarantee the peace). **in effect, intervention serves to freeze unstable distributions of power and to provide a respite from hostilities for groups that are intent on continuing the conflict when the international community departs.** This is a particular problem because intervention forces tend to attempt to intervene impartially, neither providing sufficient force to help one side win, nor committing to stay long enough to allow antipathies that exist between fighting groups to be overcome.

### **Autonomous recovery more than 2x more effective than peacekeepers (Weinstein - Stanford)**

Jeremy Weinstein, Stanford University, 2005, "AUTONOMOUS RECOVERY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE" [https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/2731\\_file\\_WP57.pdf](https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/2731_file_WP57.pdf) (NK)

It turns out that the claim of war producing peace is supported by much of the quantitative evidence on the determinants of successful peacebuilding. In an influential article on the effectiveness of negotiated settlements – the first major statistical work on the determinants of civil war resolution – Licklider reported a strong statistical correlation between military victories and a stable peace.<sup>28</sup> **Civil wars did not recur in 85% of the countries that experienced a military victory, while war resumed in 50% of the conflicts settled by means of negotiation.** He took this as confirmation of what he called the "Wagner hypothesis." Subsequent statistical work confirms Licklider's early findings. **Fortna records a significant impact of military victory on the durability of peace; the hazard for another war drops by over 80% when there is a decisive military outcome. 29 This is a larger effect than the 32% drop in the risk of war recorded for the presence of UN peacekeepers.** Toft reports that wars ended by military victory are twice as likely to remain settled than those ended by negotiated settlement or ceasefire. In particular, rebel victories exhibit the highest degree of stability.<sup>30</sup> These results again fit with the logic provided earlier—namely, that decisive victories have a transformative effect, weakening the capacity or will of opposing parties to reignite conflict.

**the R2P represents a shift at the extreme end of HIs to the extent it is doctrinaire and coercive, and mandates expeditious action against mass atrocities without adequately considering outcomes. Consequently, it grates against India's preferred deliberative and consent-based approach to HIs through UNPKOs authorised by the UNSC**

Bommakanti, 2017, Strategic Studies Program, "India's evolving views on responsibility to protect (R2P) and humanitarian interventions: The significance of legitimacy" <https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-evolving-views-responsibility-protect-r2p-humanitarian-interventions-the-significance-of-legitimacy/> (NK)

Why and how India's views on the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Humanitarian Interventions (HIs) are a function of Global Institutional Legitimacy (GIL) and Domestic Normative Legitimacy (DNL), are the subject of enquiry for this article. This conceptual distinction is important in that it helps clarify why both concepts have underpinned India's approach to humanitarian interventions. HIs come in different guises. The most well-known form of HIs are UNPKOs. India's most consequential contributions, even as an emerging power to global governance, have been through UNPKOs. On the other hand, **the R2P represents a shift at the extreme end of HIs to the extent it is doctrinaire and coercive, and mandates expeditious action against mass atrocities without adequately considering outcomes. Consequently, it grates against India's preferred deliberative and consent-based approach to HIs through UNPKOs authorised by the UNSC.** This paper will show by way of argument and analysis that legitimacy plays an important role, if not exclusively, and broadly defines India's approach to R2P and humanitarian interventions. The different strands of thought among Indian foreign policy elites reflects the values inherent in Indian society.

**India believes that interventions should be the last option after all others have been exhausted and only after deliberation**

**Puri 12** H.E. Ambassador H.S. Puri [Permanent representative of India to the UN], 9-5-2012, "An Informal Dialogue on the Report of the Secretary General on Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Action," Statement by H.E. Ambassador H.S. Puri to the UN at the 66th Session of the UN General Assembly, <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/India.pdf> //DF

Mr. President, in my view, the R2P should start with an early political engagement with the parties concerned. Any specific needs of the state concerned should be given due consideration and support. **Sufficient time should be allowed to see that the non-coercive measures employed are bringing desired results. It is only when an honest and serious**

attempt at peaceful settlement fails that the international community, acting under the United Nations, should respond with coercive measures. And the response should again be calibrated and gradual, rather than immediate recourse to Article 42. Armed intervention should be a measure of last resort when everything else has failed. Selectivity must be avoided at all cost and the principle must be applied uniformly to all parties to a conflict. Most importantly, whenever the use of all necessary means is authorized, there must be provisions in the resolution for monitoring and reporting mechanisms so that the principles of neutrality, impartiality and proportionality is ensured. In this context, responsibility while protecting (RwP), as proposed by Brazil, is equally important. If R2P is to regain the respect of the international community, it has to be anchored in the concept of RwP.

## **India on UNSC would make them take better decisions**

**Deo and Pradhan 14** Neelam Deo [Co-founder and Director of Gateway House. She has been the Indian Ambassador to Denmark and Ivory Coast with concurrent accreditation to several West African countries] and Karan Pradhan [Senior Researcher at Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations], The Diplomat, 11-9-2014, "Should India Give Up on the UN Security Council?," Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/should-india-give-up-on-the-un-security-council/> //DF

Meanwhile, even as the reform remains in abeyance, global geopolitics have changed. Today, there are three major conglomerations of problems: the turmoil in West Asia, encapsulated by the brutal Islamic State, which is quickly redrawing the map of the region; the rise of an increasingly expansionist and assertive China; and the renewed standoff between the West and Russia. It is worth noting that although matters of war and peace are the core function of the UNSC, it has not been consulted on any of these issues. The most blatant instance was Obama's address to the UN General Assembly on September 24, where he defended airstrikes on Syria and Iraq. The U.S did not deem it necessary, once again, to seek the approval of the UNSC. Sadly, UN secretary general Ban Ki Moon was pressured to support the U.S.'s unilateral actions, though he expressed the vain hope that the UNSC will lead the effort against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. In the east, China has completely rejected international arbitration on territorial disputes with its maritime neighbours, despite the Philippines taking the issue to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea. And amid steadily deteriorating Russia-West ties, U.S.-led NATO has not taken the issue to the UNSC, though it has accused Moscow of breaching international law and compromising Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity by annexing Crimea. With these disagreements—as well as the opposing perspectives on Syria—the equation between the West and Russia has deteriorated to a point reminiscent of the hostilities between the two during the Cold War. The new standoff over Ukraine has completely paralysed the UNSC. However, such disregard was already evident when the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 without the Security Council's authorisation, distorted the sense of UNSC Resolution 1973 on Libya in 2011 by justifying the invasion of that country, and recently ordered airstrikes on Syria. These repeated unilateral actions raise questions about the UNSC's relevance. It then becomes necessary to ask if India should persist in its efforts to be part of an organisation that lacks weight and sway. In fact, whether India should seek membership is a matter of debate within the country. Former colonial powers are not going to allow a change, nor will China allow other Asian countries, particularly Japan, to enter. But there is also the view that though India may not gain much from becoming a part of an archaic organisation, the world needs an expanded UNSC that includes countries like India to influence the very ethos of the council. At a time when faster growing economies, more youthful populations, and the concentration of natural resources are mainly in the developing world, as are problems like the dispersion of capacity to build weapons of mass destruction, a reform of global political management systems to respond to crises and violence—such as the chaos in West Asia—is even more imperative. If the UNSC includes India and Brazil, and also represents Africa and West Asia, it will infuse the council with a deeper understanding and enable a wiser response to the world's cascading political crises, unlike the hasty and excessive militarism of the West.

## 65 R2P Resolution in the last 13 years

Global center for responsibility, "About R2P", [http://www.globalr2p.org/about\\_r2p](http://www.globalr2p.org/about_r2p) (NK)

In January 2009, the UN Secretary-General released a report on implementing the Responsibility to Protect. Following this, the first General Assembly Debate on the Responsibility to Protect was held in July 2009. **At this debate UN Member States overwhelmingly reaffirmed the 2005 commitment and the General Assembly passed a consensus resolution (A/RES/63/308)** taking note of the Secretary-General's report. The Secretary-General has since released annual reports in advance of the UN General Assembly Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect. During June 2018 the General Assembly held its first debate on the Responsibility to Protect since 2009. For more detailed information refer to the Dialogue and Debate Summary pages on the right. **The Security Council has invoked R2P in more than 65 resolutions since 2006.** The Human Rights Council has also invoked R2P in 30 resolutions.

## Moral Hazard Examples

### In both Bosnia and Kosovo, groups rose up because they thought they were gonna get support

**Kuperman 08** Alan J. Kuperman [University of Texas], 2008, "The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans," International Studies Quarterly, <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.322.1966&rep=rep1&type=pdf> //DF

This study utilizes the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo to illustrate the explanatory power of the moral-hazard hypothesis.<sup>16</sup> (Future research will utilize a larger universe of cases to enable rigorous assessment of bounding conditions for this hypothesis.)<sup>17</sup> **In both cases, substate actors initially did not launch armed secession from the former Yugoslavia when it began to splinter in 1991. Over the next year, however, Bosnia's Muslims (supported by its Croats) established a militia and seceded, provoking genocidal retaliation by Serb and Yugoslav forces. Kosovo's Albanians remained quiescent for most of the decade, despite suffering much greater discrimination and oppression. But in 1998 the province's Albanian militants launched a full-blown rebellion that by the following year spurred genocidal retaliation by Serb and Yugoslav forces.** As detailed below, **only the hypothesis of moral hazard explains the initial restraint and the timing of rebellion in each case.** The hypotheses of rational deterrence theory are tested by process tracing (George 1979; Van Evera 1997) the actions of the vulnerable groups, relying heavily on interviews with at least a dozen leaders of each. These officials include the eventual presidents of Bosnia and Kosovo, leaders of political parties, senior rebel officers, clandestine weapons procurers, and diplomats in charge of external relations. A major concern in retrospective interview research is that officials may misrepresent history in their own interest (Lebow and Stein 1989).<sup>18</sup> To mitigate this risk, testimonies were cross-checked against contemporaneous journalistic accounts and interviews with political opponents. In each case a coherent and consistent account emerged.

### Longer periods of violence (Kuperman)

Kuperman, 2009, Journal of Diplomacy,

<http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/files/archives/Kuperman%20-%20Rethinking%20the%20Responsibility%20to%20Protect.pdf> (NK)

rebels to continue fighting, with the hope of soliciting greater intervention. The tragic consequence was to exacerbate and prolong the suffering of civilians. **In 2006, Sudan's government signed a US-brokered peace agreement, but two of the three main rebel factions refused to join because they demanded additional concessions and greater foreign intervention "like in Bosnia."**<sup>20</sup> This recalcitrance triggered a further fractioning of the

**rebellion, a breakdown in the peace process, and anarchic violence. In light of the fact that the rebels have never had any chance of battlefield victory on their own, one can reasonably conclude that their repeated refusal to make peace is driven by the hope of larger international intervention under the Responsibility to Protect.**<sup>21</sup> Once again, the emerging norm, which was intended to reduce genocidal violence, has produced the opposite effect.

## FRONTLINES

### R/T Less Terrorism

1. The way pakistani military gains legitimacy is by appearing strong versus India; an increase in terror would create a rally around the flag while more terror helps them ---> Bangladesh succession showed military was weak and lost power
2. India being in the spotlight makes India look worse by showing their military failures to the outside world

### R/T Defensive PK sucks

**Traditional peacekeeping uses the consent of both sides and enforces the peace process - (our analysis) this is better than offensive PK bc it ensure ending fighting when both sides are ready, as opposed to ending it prematurely which only lets both sides re - arm and eventually fight for longer (Sandler - UT Dallas)**

Todd Sandler, 2017, "International Peacekeeping Operations: Burden Sharing and Effectiveness," UT Dallas, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5603976/> (NK)

UN PKOs may be grouped into four categories of increasing complexity: (i) monitoring and observer missions, (ii) traditional peacekeeping, (iii) peacebuilding, and (iv) peace enforcement. **Monitoring and observer missions are at the consent of belligerents and consist of peacekeepers that observe and report any cease-fire violations. Traditional peacekeeping is also at the consent of adversaries and includes actions by lightly armed troops and police to end hostilities and to maintain peace in a conflict area.** It generally consists of actions to interpose UN peacekeepers between adversaries to bring about a cease-fire. At times, **traditional peacekeeping may include disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of rebel forces**. Some studies group these first two categories together (Diehl, Druckman, and Wall 1998).

### **Defensive PK's 2x more effective than offensive missions**

Fortna, Columbia, 2004, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War", <http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/pkISQ%20offprint.PDF> (NK)

In Table 8, four dummy variables indicate the effects of different types of peacekeeping missions relative to cases with no peacekeeping (the omitted category). Over the 50-year period, consent-based peacekeeping is associated with a drop in the risk of war and these effects are

jointly significant, but only at the 0.10 level (hence the single asterisk after the “js” notation).<sup>46</sup> Observer missions appear to have the largest effect on the durability of peace, reducing the hazard of peace failing by 80%. Notice, however, the hazard ratio for enforcement missions (1.88). This means that in the post-WWII period, the risk of war was almost 90% higher when an enforcement mission was in place. If anything, enforcement missions are associated with unstable peace, though this finding is not statistically significant. In the post-Cold War era, all four types of missions have decreased the risk of another war, all else equal. **Traditional peacekeeping missions and observer missions have been the most successful, reducing the risk of war by about 86% and 81%**, respectively.

Multidimensional peacekeeping appears to cut the risk of war by more than half, and **enforcement missions by just under half**. Taken individually, only one of the peacekeeping hazard ratios is statistically significant, but jointly they pass the significance test with flying colors (in a joint test,  $\Pr(w_2) \approx 0.015$ ).

## UQ – R/T vetos now

**Hageboutros 17** Joelle Hageboutros [Swarthmore College], 7-31-2017, "The Evolving Role of the Security Council in the Post-Cold War Period," Swarthmore International Relations Journal, <https://works.swarthmore.edu/swarthmoreirjournal/vol1/iss1/6/> //DF

In the Security Council, the Cold War ended not in 1989 but in 1986 when the powers first found common ground regarding the renewal of Secretary General Cu'ellar's term. Soon after, the UK representative invited the P5 to informal negotiations outside of the UNHQ in hopes of discussing a solution to the Iran-Iraq War. (Malone, 2004, 4) Freed from formalities, the delegates found a frank discussion amongst themselves to be very productive, and were able to authorize an observer force and propose a ceasefire. USSR leader Gorbachev's 1988 address to the General Assembly (GA) introduced new faith in the council when he announced the Soviet Union would use the UN as the primary means of handling international conflicts. This implied that the USSR would retract from its overextended commitments throughout the world, thus marking the end of the Cold War global rivalry. This strategy was reciprocated with US cooperation in peace initiatives in Angola, Namibia, Cambodia, and Central America, which were sites of major Cold War proxy conflicts. (Wallensteen & Johansson, 2004, 19) The Security Council was thus the stage for the end of the Cold War before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. **One major trend following the increase in cooperation among the members includes the sharp decline of veto use among the P5. During the Cold War, the use of the veto was predictable. One camp would propose a draft resolution that was expected to be rejected by the opposing side. (Wallensteen & Johansson, 2004, 20) The veto thus gained a propagandist nature as each side accumulated political points for its position on the resolution. After the Cold War, however, forcing fellow council members to vote for or against a specific resolution was viewed as "irresponsible."** (Wallensteen & Johansson, 2004, 20) While voting blocks still exist among the P5 along certain issues (e.g. Syria, Ukraine, Libya) member states have become more autonomous and cautious in wielding their vote. From 1946-1995, the veto was used a total of 244 times (approximately 29% by the U.S. and 50% by the USSR). (Global Policy Forum, 2015) **The majority of vetoes that have been used since the Cold War (31 from 1996-2014) relate to issues concerning one member (e.g. Israel/Palestine for the US and Taiwan for China) who will predictably wield its veto alone. The recent deadlocks among the P5 over Syria, Libya and Ukraine obscure the overall trend of a high rate of cooperation among the P5.** Current Under-Secretary General David Malone argues that too often one forgets **"on 90% of the Council's agenda which are even more murderous conflicts [than Syria, Libya, Ukraine] often in Africa, places like the Congo, the council has no trouble agreeing."** (Malone, March 9) In 2014 alone, the SC passed 60 out of 63 resolutions unanimously. (United Nations Security Council, January 2015, 8) The three aforementioned cases are nevertheless important signifiers of new trends emerging in the Council where Russia and China have become more vocal opponents.<sup>1</sup> Cooperation among the P5 members of the SC since the late 1980s has resulted in a redistribution of tasks and prestige once accorded to the General Assembly and the Secretariat, that now favor the Council. During the Cold War, the GA overshadowed the deadlocked SC and even involved itself in security affairs, a duty normally reserved for the Council. In 1950, it passed Resolution 337A: "Uniting for Peace" which allowed the GA to consider a resolution that was blocked by the SC due to a lack of unanimity among the P5, and thus act accordingly.<sup>2</sup> (Tomuschat, 2008) The GA has since lost influence and attention as the SC has been able to effectively resume its duties.

## Link – R/T no veto

**1. The resolution says that India would become a permanent member, which by definition have vetoes. It is impossible to know whether they will get one or not, so it most education to go by the current definition and debate on whether that veto is good or bad.**

**Foreign minister Swaraj says they want to be treated equally, and get a veto. Prefer this analysis because the entire reason India wants to be on the council is for power and fairness; no veto would destroy these things.**

**2. Abusive because members without a veto have no power. Gillman 17 writes that members with vetoes are 10-100x more powerful than those without; no veto, no intervention prevention or need to be listened too.**

**3. Not an educational debate because there are so many different reform possibilities. When the UN secretary general asked for members to submit reforms to the Security Council they had 101 different ideas. We shouldn't be speculating about what any number of those reforms should look like.**

"The Veto : UN Security Council Working Methods : Security Council Report," Security Council Report, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php> //DF

**Beyond permanency itself, the veto power is probably the UN Charter's most significant distinction between permanent and non-permanent members. Article 27 (3) of the Charter establishes that all substantive decisions of the Council must be made with "the concurring votes of the permanent members"**. The veto has been addressed regularly during the annual working methods debates and is among the topics most frequently raised in the context of almost all discussions of Council working methods. Permanent members use the veto to defend their national interests, to uphold a tenet of their foreign policy or, in some cases, to promote a single issue of particular importance to a state. Since 16 February 1946—when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) cast the first veto on a draft resolution regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Syria (S/PV.23)—the veto has been recorded 290 times. In the early years, the USSR cast most of the vetoes, with a considerable number of these used to block the admission of a new member state. Over the years, the USSR/Russia has cast a total of 141 vetoes, or close to half of all vetoes. The US cast the first of its 83 vetoes to date on 17 March 1970 (S/9696 and Corr. 1 and 2). The USSR had by that point cast 107 vetoes. Since 1970, the US has used the veto far more than any other permanent member, most frequently to block decisions that it regards as detrimental to the interests of Israel. The UK has used the veto 32 times, the first such instance taking place on 30 October 1956 (S/3710) during the Suez crisis. France applied the veto for the first time on 26 June 1946 with respect to the Spanish Question (S/PV.49) and has cast a total of 18 vetoes. China has used the veto 14 times, with the first one, on 13 December 1955 (S/3502), cast by the Republic of China (ROC) and the remaining 13 by the People's Republic of China after it succeeded ROC as a permanent member on 25 October 1971.

Press Trust of India, 4-6-2017, "India Will Become Permanent Member Of UN Security Council: Sushma Swaraj," NDTV,

<https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-will-become-permanent-member-of-un-security-council-sushma-swaraj-1678206>

NEW DELHI: Expressing confidence that India would become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj today said the country expected that the new members would have the same rights, including the veto power, as the existing permanent members. During the Question Hour in Rajya Sabha, Ms Swaraj said India has all the credentials to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council and four permanent members, US, UK, France and Russia have all extended support. The fifth member, China, has also "not publicly opposed it", the External Affairs minister said. "I am confident that if not this time, then next time, India would become a permanent member of the UN Security Council," she said. **To a question whether India would also get the 'veto' power [India's External Affairs Minister], Ms Swaraj said the country wants the same responsibilities, prerogatives as well as obligations as the current permanent members.** "We don't want any discrimination between old and new members. **We don't want two classes - that there is a first class and a second class of permanent members. This should make it clear that India wants the same responsibilities, prerogatives and obligations as the current permanent members,**" she said. She also said India has been making diplomatic efforts to ensure not only expansion, but also reform in the Security Council. She said India wanted expansion of its permanent as well as non-permanent membership of the council. In her reply tabled in the House, Ms Swaraj said on the issue of extending veto powers to new permanent members in their submission during the inter-governmental negotiation process of the 69th General Assembly, USA and UK opposed extension of veto to new members. France supported the extension while Russia and China did not make any submission on the issue, she said.

**Blum 05** Yehuda Z. Blum [Hersch Lauterpacht Professor of International Law (Emeritus), The Hebrew University], June 2005, "Proposals for UN Security Council Reform," Cambridge University Press, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1602295.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A4c99e9c2fcb3f4ef41cddb280ff2cb64> //DF

**On December 2, 2004, United Nations secretary-general Kofi Annan** circulated the report submitted to him by a sixteen-member high-level panel that he had appointed to address "threats, challenges and change" confronting the United Nations in the coming years.<sup>1</sup> The secretary-general **had requested that the panel, inter alia, "make recommendations for strengthening the United Nations so that it can provide collective security for all in the twenty-first century."**<sup>2</sup> A list of 101 recommendations are summarized in Annex I of the panel's report<sup>3</sup> and deal with a wide range of problems facing the international community. Of them all, the recommendation **concerning the enlargement of the Security Council** (with two alternative models envisaging such enlargement)<sup>4</sup> **has attracted the greatest attention internationally,** despite the caveat contained in the transmittal letter of the panel's report that "it would be a major error to allow the discussions needed to move towards a decision between the two options [concerning the enlargement of the Security Council] to divert attention from decisions on the many other necessary proposals for change

**Now even China - the historic naysayer of India UNSC membership - supports their entrance so there's no need to sacrifice the veto to be on the council (Guruswamy - National Herald)**

Mohan Guruswamy, 8-1-2018, "A second class seat on the Security Council; Is this what India wants?," National Herald, <https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/international/a-second-class-seat-on-the-security-council-is-this-what-india-wants> (NK)

To that extent, it is not a reform of the UN system but a little tweak to it. This idea has so infatuated us that we now insist that support for India's membership is a part of every joint communiqué with any foreign government. Except for an obvious handful, most governments oblige.

**Even China, which probably most resists the expansion of the P-5, says it would like to see India on the UNSC.**

Even President Donald Trump with his many pre-occupations supports a seat in a reformed UNSC and in other multilateral institutions like the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Following Trump's support, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the White House to thank him. Inevitably the India-US joint statement reflected this. "President Trump reaffirmed the support of the United States for India's permanent membership on a reformed UN Security Council." How this support translates in real life is something else. When former US President Barack Obama last visited India, he said that he supported a reformed UNSC with India as a permanent member.



## The US opposes any changes to the veto

**Nastranis 18** J Nastranis, 12-29-2018, "UN Security Council Reform Back On The Table Again," UN Insider,

<https://www.indepthnews.net/index.php/global-governance/un-insider/2398-un-security-council-reform-back-on-the-table-again> //DF

"Attempts to set artificial timelines and arbitrarily launch text-based negotiations will undermine unity and have a negative impact on the contributions of small States," he warned. Member States must pursue frank and in-depth negotiations to better understand each other's positions, he said, calling for intergovernmental negotiations to remain a State-driven endeavour. U.S. representative Rodney M. Hunter said Washington supports a "modest expansion" of the Council in the permanent and non-permanent categories. "Consideration of new permanent membership must consider candidates' ability and willingness to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security," he said, noting that the United States opposes any change to the veto. He affirmed his Government's openness to any form of intergovernmental negotiations — whether text-based or otherwise — as long as the format allows for broad consensus. The United States seeks an effective and efficient Council and only supports reforms that work towards that end. Reform efforts must advance the Council's core mandate of addressing challenges to international peace and security.

## Moral Haz – R/T Works for dictators

**Kuperman says that dictators will always oppress their people**

## Moral Haz – R/T Why would rebels kill themselves

**They obviously don't expect to be slaughtered; they could a) overestimate their strength, b) expect the interveners to take out the hostile regime, c) expect any outcome with intervention to be better than now (Kuperman - Penn State)**

Kuperman, University of Texas, 2008, "Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention"

<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.322.1966&rep=rep1&type=pdf> (NK)

But none of these theories provides a satisfactory account of why a group vulnerable to genocidal retaliation would risk provoking that outcome by launching a rebellion. Suicide does not satisfy greed, rectify grievance, or mitigate insecurity. **There are several plausible explanations for seemingly suicidal rebellions. Rebels may miscalculate their relative strength and expect to prevail on their own. Or they may expect intervention by third parties motivated by strategic considerations, such as replacing a hostile regime or gaining access to resources.** But in some cases, substate actors may be driven by the expectation **that humanitarian intervention can enable them to prevail at a cost in state retaliation that they deem acceptable.** This does not imply that they accurately assess the prospect of humanitarian intervention. Moreover, depending on tolerance for cost and risk, their expectation of such intervention need not approach certainty to tip the balance in favor of launching or perpetuating rebellion. But so long as nonstate actors are not immune to information about the likely cost and benefit of their actions, the likelihood of rebellion will increase with the expectation of humanitarian intervention.



## Moral Haz – R/T India won't intervene in genocide

### **India is wary of interventions given their politicized nature, but favors them in the most extreme cases like genocide**

**Jaganathan 17** Madhan Mohan Jaganathan [Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharal Nehru University], 12-11-2017, "It Is More than What It Seems: Understanding India's Perspective on 'Responsibility to Protect,'" in *Southern Democracies and the Responsibility to Protect: Perspectives from India, Brazil and South Africa* by Dan Krause and Daniel Peters, Nomos Verlag,

[https://books.google.com/books/about/Southern\\_Democracies\\_and\\_the\\_Responsibil.html?id=bRB4DwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp\\_read\\_button#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.com/books/about/Southern_Democracies_and_the_Responsibil.html?id=bRB4DwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button#v=onepage&q&f=false) //DF

The point is to probe the salience of sovereignty in India's world view. This paper sets out to do precisely this. Contrary to the interpretation that India clings to sovereignty and abandons the same depending on the interests at stake, the attachment to the principle of sovereignty echoes a fundamental value "preference in favour of order" and reflects a world view that provides wide latitude to the sovereign state. For India, sovereignty is not just a convenient platform or a symbolic rhetoric; it signifies a substantive moral position. At the core of this moral position is the firm belief that the autonomy of the sovereign state should be left unaltered and unfettered. The only exception to this principled position is the outbreak of horrendous events such as genocide or mass killings. Short of such events, the sovereign state remains as the prime "arbiter" on all matters within its territorial space.<sup>8</sup> In India's view, this is as much a morally defensible position as the insistence, say, on fundamental human rights. It is not difficult to trace the genesis of India's position on sovereignty. As a post-colonial state with bitter memories, India has developed a considerable degree of aversion to anything that is tantamount to external interference. In this line of thinking, intervention, howsoever, benign it may be, seems unpalatable and unacceptable. In fact, intervention by definition is bereft of noble intentions. It is an act of manipulation driven by vested political interests. It is for this reason that India has always been a first rate sceptic of the pursuit of humanitarian intervention. Critics point out the case of India's intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 to demonstrate the glaring inconsistency: the reservations about intervention and yet undertaking the role of an intervening actor in certain circumstances.<sup>9</sup> It needs to be noted that the case of East Pakistan is an exceptional case and constitutes an exception to India's general emphasis on the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity. The extremely high rate of violence in terms of atrocities committed on the population in East Pakistan renders the case as exceptional. The exact rationale for India's intervention in East Pakistan is not clear-cut. However, India's involvement in the region has been characterised and judged differently by various scholars;" they range from "humanitarian intervention"<sup>2</sup> to "strategic game plan of dismembering and partitioning Pakistan"<sup>22</sup> to "mixed motives".<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, it is clear that India is moved into action whenever there is an outbreak of genocide. It is this line of reasoning that helps to explain India's intervention in East Pakistan which resulted in the eventual creation of Bangladesh. Again, it is this reasoning that enables an understanding of India's position on Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia. India did not mince words and strongly criticised the spectre of genocide which was perpetrated by the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia. The then prime minister of India, Indira Gandhi, remarked: "Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea cannot be isolated from the context of the barbarous dictatorship of Pol Pot and the external interest in sustaining it".<sup>24</sup> In 1987, India intervened in Sri Lanka; it considered the actions of Sri Lanka as "almost genocidal in their objective".<sup>25</sup> By and large, the intervention was undertaken with the consent of the Sri Lankan state. The exception to this modus operandi was the initial Operation Poomalai on 4 June 1987 which involved the delivery of food and medicine through air and entailed "humanitarian action violating the airspace of Sri Lanka"<sup>26</sup> Subsequently, the conclusion of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement on 29 July 1987 resulted in the deployment of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka.<sup>27</sup> However, India's intervention in Sri Lanka turned out to be an utter failure.<sup>28</sup> As a result, India ended its intervention and the IPKF was withdrawn in March 1990.<sup>29</sup> During the 1970s and the 1980s, India had undertaken several interventions in its neighbourhood. Such a high frequency of intervention is not to be seen thereafter. As the paper demonstrates in subsequent sections, India's proclivity for intervention has to do with a pro-interventionist preference of leaders such as Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi." Individual leaders have played and continue to play a

significant role in India's decision-making on matters of humanitarian intervention and R2P.<sup>31</sup> An analysis of India's stance on humanitarian intervention in the 1990s seems to indicate a pattern. It is that India is extremely wary of any intervention that violates the sovereignty of the target state. The sole exception to this principle is the occurrence of extremely high levels of violence which is almost tantamount to genocide. Barring this exception, India favours an intervention only if it satisfies certain core criteria: these include amongst others, the consent of the target state and the mandate and authorisation of the United Nations.<sup>32</sup> By and large, India seems to have adhered to these principles and caveats. In the case of the first Gulf War which occurred in the early 1990s, India voted in favour of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 678 but abstained from UNSC resolution 688. India had no qualms in supporting UNSC resolution 678" as it condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. By rendering support to that resolution, India acted in defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kuwait. However, it was not forthcoming in its support to UNSC resolution 688 and chose to abstain.<sup>34</sup> UNSC resolution 688 was more coercive and expansive than UNSC resolution 678 and hence India's abstention."

## Moral Haz – R/T Other actors intervene

1. Sliding scale
2. Many conflicts where the UN is the only body who will intervene (ex. The AU will intervene when there's regional destabilization, but they won't intervene when governments are killing their own people, like Sudan)

### **Regional organizations are the first line of defense, so that's not a response**

CFR 12 5-11-2012, "The Global Human Rights Regime," Council on Foreign Relations,  
<https://www.cfr.org/report/global-human-rights-regime> //DF

The UN Security Council (UNSC) has more power to take action against human rights abusers. It can impose sanctions, mandate peacekeeping operations, and authorize use of force in extreme cases. Furthermore, UNSC deliberations are higher profile than UNHRC meetings and thus substantially elevate international attention to and pressure on rights violators. The UNSC deliberates on countries' abuses when they threaten international peace and security—but only when UNSC politics permit it. The five permanent UNSC members can all veto resolutions. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States tend to be the most vocal advocates for promoting human rights, though they routinely subordinate such concerns to strategic interests. China and Russia, however, often veto human rights interventions. Recently, major powers elected to the UNSC have been ambivalent on human rights, and none of the three seeking permanent membership (Germany, Brazil, and India) voted to authorize the mission in Libya. Increasingly, the locus of activity on human rights is moving to the regional level, but at markedly different paces from place to place. Regional organizations and powers contribute to advancing human rights protections in their neighborhoods by bolstering norms, providing mechanisms for peer review, and helping countries codify human rights stipulations within domestic institutions. **Regional organizations are often considered the first lines of defense, and better able to address rights issues unique to a given area. This principle is explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter, which calls on member states to "make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies" before approaching the UNSC.** Major regional organizations in the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and Africa—such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU)—have integrated human rights into their mandate and established courts to which citizens can appeal if a nation violates their rights. This has led to important rulings on slavery in Niger and spousal abuse in Brazil, for example, but corruption continues to hamper implementation throughout Latin America and Africa, and a dearth of leadership in African nations has slowed institutionalization.

## Haz – R/T India didn't intervene Libya and Syria

### **India supported action against Libya but worried (correctly) that the intervention was premature and would destabilize the country**

**Hall 18** Ian Hall [Professor in the School of Government and International Relations, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia. He is currently working on an Australian Research Council-funded Discovery project (2015-17) on the evolution of Indian thinking about world politics since 1964], 11-2018, "India and the Responsibility to Protect," In *New Directions in India's Foreign Policy*, Cambridge University Press, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329182562\\_India\\_and\\_the\\_Responsibility\\_to\\_Protect//DF](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329182562_India_and_the_Responsibility_to_Protect//DF) India remained in this sceptical position when it took up a non-permanent seat on the UNSC on 1 January 2011 – the first time it had occupied a seat since 1984–85 and thus it was a significant moment for 'rising' India.<sup>50</sup> It faced difficult decisions concerning R2P almost at once. In February 2011, Libyans rose up against Muammar Gaddafi, and civil war soon followed. India's immediate concern was the fate of 18,000 or so Indian citizens working in Libya and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) began the difficult process of making arrangements for an evacuation. At the end of the month, the growing conflict was referred to the UNSC. On 26 February, UNSCR 1970 was passed. The Resolution reminded the Libyan government of its responsibility to protect its people, referred the regime's conduct to the International Criminal Court's (ICC) prosecutor, and imposed both an arms embargo and specific sanctions on Gaddafi's family and associates.<sup>51</sup> Somewhat reluctantly, expressing concerns that the ICC referral might push Gaddafi into a corner and lead to reprisals against its citizens and others, India voted for the resolution.<sup>52</sup> India balked, however, when it came to the follow-up resolution in UNSCR 1973, which authorized European-led military action against the Libyan government. In the Security Council, Puri argued that India could not support the resolution on the grounds that the facts of the matter were unclear and that military action would likely have unintended consequences, probably escalating the violence.<sup>53</sup> A few days later, External Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna expressed his 'regret' over the bombing authorized by UNSCR 1973 and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued a statement to call for peoples in the region to make their own decisions 'free from outside interference'.<sup>54</sup> Singh reiterated this message in his address to the UNGA in September 2011, arguing that 'actions taken under the authority of the United Nations must respect the unity, territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of individual states'.<sup>55</sup> Thereafter, India's official position on R2P with reference to both Libya and then Syria, as that civil war escalated through 2011 and beyond, was generally unsympathetic. In October 2011, it abstained in the vote on a resolution – vetoed by China and Russia – that framed the Syrian crisis in terms of R2P. Puri argued that India agreed with the underlying principles of R2P, but maintained that states also have a responsibility to 'protect their citizens from armed groups and militias'.<sup>56</sup> Although India indicated its support for a second draft resolution, championed by the Arab League, in early February 2012, Puri argued that it did so only because it was backed by that regional organization and because it did not authorize the use of force.<sup>57</sup> The resolution was in any case vetoed by China and Russia, as was a third draft in July 2012.

## R/T Length most important

Not necessarily - think of Rwanda; 800k in 100 days (prob don't read @ last line)

Krain, 2005, *International Studies Quarterly*, "International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides"

[http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/AboutGen\\_International\\_Intervention\\_and\\_the\\_Severity\\_of\\_Genocides\\_and\\_Politicides.pdf](http://www.genocidewatch.org/images/AboutGen_International_Intervention_and_the_Severity_of_Genocides_and_Politicides.pdf) (NK)

Moreover, much of the recent literature on intervention has focused on its effects on civil war duration. Empirical findings seem to indicate that external interventions tend to result in civil wars of longer duration, but that under particular circumstances, they can shorten the duration of the conflict (Regan, 1996, 2000, 2002; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000). There is a belief among some policy makers that

**shortening an internal conflict's duration reduces the severity of that conflict** (Holbrooke, 1998). **Yet, this may not hold true for all types of internal conflicts. An examination of a few high-profile cases of statesponsored mass murder reveals the reason why the duration and severity of genocides or politicides are not always related. In a matter of 100 days, almost 800,000 people were slaughtered in Rwanda, a rate of approximately 8,000 per day. Here, the duration of the slaughter was one of the shortest on record; yet, the rate of the killings was nearly unprecedented.** Another example is the short but astonishingly brutal killings of somewhere between 1,250,000 and 3,000,000 Bengalis by the Pakistani military in 1971 (Harff and Gurr, 1988). Indeed, duration is not strongly correlated with severity, although it has been found to be a significant factor increasing it (Krain, 1997).

## EXTRAS

### R2P

#### R2P Politically Motivated

##### **The interests of countries are too heterogeneous to reach a consensus on R2P**

**Menon 13** Rajan Menon [the Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of Political Science at the City College of New York/City University of New York, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and the author, most recently, of *The End of Alliances*], 6-20-2013, "The Fatal Flaws of R2P," Atlantic Council, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-fatal-flaws-of-r2p//DF>

It is now a commonplace belief that a worldwide diffusion of human rights norms occurred following the Cold War, creating a consensus favoring humanitarian intervention. The cachet acquired by the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) is proffered as proof of this proposition. This is wishful thinking. Armed humanitarian interventions since the aftermath of the Cold War have been selective, poorly executed, strategically naive, morally incoherent and even dangerous. Far from reflecting, let alone having contributed to, a global consensus, they have been divisive. This is so not because the world has just done it wrong at this early stage of R2P awareness; it is so because of flaws in the concept itself.

**States seldom take military action in support of abstract principles except when important interests are also at issue, the risks small, and the cost tolerable.** The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, advanced by the

international community in the wake of the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo and non-intervention in Rwanda, attempts to reconcile the perspectives of two different constituencies. The first comprises states and organizations that aver that human beings have certain inalienable rights, above all not to be killed or harmed without just cause, and that the "international community" has an obligation to protect them when these rights are violated. The second consists of states that see sovereignty as fundamental both to international law and to international order. They fear that norms and formulas that facilitate armed intervention within countries will only produce more war and instability. States have long favored the principle of human rights, so long as it is restricted to words and documents. It is also true that the idea that sovereignty involves duties as well as rights has gained wide support, and not just in the West. But when it comes to common criteria for permitting military action to save lives, the consensus invariably breaks down on both theoretical and practical grounds. Brazil and India abstained in the Security Council on the no-fly zone resolution aimed at Libya (as did Germany). That decision reflected a wider suspicion that humanitarian intervention, no matter its paeans to justice, will be applied inconsistently, and inevitably by the strong against the weak. This underscores the ultimate problem facing humanitarian intervention.

**Countries differ on too many dimensions** (power and wealth, historical experience, culture and religion, political ideology and national identity) **and are too numerous to allow a common standard for authorizing military coercion in support of human rights.** As was apparent in the General Assembly debates on R2P at the "World Summit", **what is agreed upon will be general, qualified, non-binding and susceptible to self-interested interpretation.** That is because many weaker states cannot get good answers as to who exactly gets to decide

whether and when a state has failed to meet its responsibilities, and how the decision would be taken. What would prevent the definition of "responsibility" from expanding and eroding sovereignty? How would people in "rescued" countries hold accountable a UN that, via R2P, acquires power over their lives? There simply are no good answers to these questions, and there cannot be.

## **The responsibility to protect doctrine isn't strong because nations can decide to violate it based on their national interests**

**Holmes 14** Kim R. Holmes [Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation. He was Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations under President George W. Bush], 1-7-2014, "The Weakness of the Responsibility to Protect as an International Norm," Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/the-weakness-the-responsibility-protect-international-norm> //DF

The resolutions on R2P ratified by the U.N. General Assembly in 2005 tried to overcome these tensions, but it still recognized the ultimate authority of the Security Council. Each state had a responsibility to protect its population, the resolution said, but collective action was to be taken "through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis...." In other words, only the Security Council could decide whether an intervention of the international community should be undertaken, which implied not only the rights of the veto of the Permanent Five (P-5) members (including the United States), but also that the universal humanitarian legal principles supposedly established by the R2P resolution were still subordinate to the principles of national sovereignty—to rights of the P-5 members in particular. Why does this matter? Because it points to the fact that R2P is a mere aspiration, as opposed to a real principle of international norms or even law. R2P sometimes not only runs against the practices of Realpolitik (where national sovereignty still reigns supreme), but more importantly, it is at odds with a fundamental principle of the United Nations itself—namely, the ultimate legal deference to national sovereignty as decided by the national members of the Security Council. The Council may approve of the concept with respect to Libya but does not do so in Syria because certain members of the P-5 (namely Russia) object. In that difference is the ultimate weakness of R2P as a principle. **The opposition of Russia to a Syria intervention, for example, reveals that no matter what Moscow may think about R2P as a principle, it will not adhere to it if it violates its national interests.** Frankly, as a matter of principle, the United States as a P-5 member more or less does the same thing. Regardless of what the General Assembly may say, it is the actions of the Security Council that count in international peace and stability. If there is no consensus among the P-5 on how R2P should be followed, or subsequent observance of any agreement on it in practice, then it will never survive as a viable legal or normative principle of international order. Now to the second question regarding whether the principle is consistent with the purposes of warfare. Civilians may be ultimately protected from further harm if a nation intervenes to overthrow a genocidal regime. But throughout history the purposes of war have always been mainly political—namely, as understood in just war theory, to counter an aggressor who is inflicting lasting, grave, and certain damage on a nation or community of nations, as a last resort that has serious prospects of success and won't inflict more grave damage than the aggressor. Woodward and Morrison argue that the R2P sanction of Libyan operation was "not taking sides"—a frankly preposterous notion. Clearly the sanction was aimed at Gaddafi's regime, and that leader ultimately paid the price with his life, even if he was killed by his own people. Thus, the political purpose of R2P remains one of changing policy or even overthrowing a regime, even if we pretend we are not taking sides and only protecting civilians.

## **Impact – Autonomous Recovery**

First, it would allow for autonomous recovery.

Professor Jeremy Weinstein of Stanford University writes in 2005:

War has the potential to actually resolve political conflict and lead to peace. In particular, the absence of international intervention allows conflict to run its "natural course." War comes to an end when one group is strong enough to win decisively, or when both groups are sufficiently exhausted that they become willing to accommodate one another. Cease-fires and negotiated settlements, on the other hand, allow belligerents to reconstitute their forces.

Political Science Professor Edward Luttwak further explains this failure in UN PKO's in his famous essay "give war a chance", arguing:

Since no side is threatened by defeat and loss, none has a sufficient incentive to negotiate a lasting settlement; because no path to peace is visible, the dominant priority is to prepare for future war rather than to reconstruct devastated economies and ravaged societies.

In fact, Weinstein compares the effect of autonomous revery directly to UN conflict intervention, finding:

the hazard for another war drops by over 80% when there is a decisive military outcome. 29 This is a larger effect than the 32% drop in the risk of war recorded for the presence of UN peacekeepers.

## India-Pakistan

### **Wanna start with a little poetry?**

**Rao 19** Nirupama Rao, 3-11-19, "How India and Pakistan can step back from the brink of war," Washington Post,

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/11/how-india-pakistan-can-step-back-brink-war/?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.671d0a078b86](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/11/how-india-pakistan-can-step-back-brink-war/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.671d0a078b86) //DF

More than five decades ago, the Indian poet Sahir Ludhianvi wrote about India and Pakistan:

Delay the war, it is better

Your yard or mine,

If the lights stay on, it is better

The blood be your own or foreign

It is the blood of Adam, after all

The war, it may be in the west or east

It is the murder of world peace, after all.

# Election Advantage

UQ

## **Many voters in Indian elections are undecided until election day, meaning that there's many factors that could swing their decisions**

**Gettleman 19** Jeffrey Gettleman, Vinu Goel and Maria Abi-Habib, 3-11-2019, "In India's Election Season, a Bombing Interrupts Modi's Slump," NYT,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/world/asia/modi-india-election.html> //DF

"I hear farmers saying he is more decisive," he said. According to Gilles Verniers, an assistant professor of political science at Ashoka University, near New Delhi, 40 percent of India's 900 million voters typically remain undecided until right before the election. Unlike with politics in the United States, where people tend to pick a party and stick with it, many voters in India tack back and forth between the major parties depending on the candidates and the issues of the day. Mr. Verniers said the crisis with Pakistan was certain to "tame the decline" Mr. Modi had been facing. Before the attack in Kashmir, a disputed territory that both India and Pakistan claim, Mr. Gandhi, the leader of the Congress party and the scion of a storied political dynasty, had gained a new spring in his step. He was speaking out forcefully about a murky jet fighter deal that Mr. Modi's government made with France, and he enlisted his popular younger sister, Priyanka, to join the campaign, delivering it a jolt of energy.

## Link – Mobilizing Nationalists

### **A "seat at the high table" is seen in India as a major achievement in its progress as a great power**

**Schaffer 16** Teresita C. Schaffer [expert on economic, political, security, and risk management trends in India and Pakistan, as well as on the region that extends from Afghanistan through Bangladesh, was a nonresident senior fellow with the India Project at Brookings. She also serves as a senior adviser to McLarty Associates, a Washington-based international strategic advisory firm], Howard B. Schaffer [(deceased) was a leading South Asia specialist who served as ambassador to Bangladesh in a 36-year career in the Foreign Service], 2016, "India at the Global High Table, The Quest for Regional Primacy and Strategic Autonomy," Brookings Institution Press //DF

Leadership roles in multilateral organizations are regarded by India's foreign policy establishment as an important indicator of India's global recognition. The one to which the Indian government has been for-mally committed for the longest time is a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The UN Charter makes this a difficult process. The five permanent members are specified by name in the charter. Amend-ing the charter requires a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of the UN membership, including all the cur-rent permanent members.<sup>9</sup> The last increase in the number of non-permanent Security Council seats from six to ten, implemented in 1965, was under discussion for ten years, which illustrates how slow the process is.<sup>10</sup> Since the early 1990s, India has sought the needed support from both permanent Security Council members and the full UN membership. The campaign was both persistent and oddly hesitant, consisting mainly of putting India's Security Council ambitions on the agenda for senior-level visits with leaders of other countries. Among the five permanent mem-bers of the Security Council, whose concurrence is essential, Russia, France, and Britain were the first to offer public support. The United States, long hesitant, came on board when President Obama, during his 2010 visit to New Delhi, pledged U.S. support for a permanent Indian seat in a "reformed" Security Council, a pledge reiterated during Prime Minister Modi's 2014 visit to



Washington. None of the four permanent council members that offered support was in any hurry to see the council expand, however, and none pushed to accelerate the slow reform process, described below.

## Link – Converting Moderates

Modi needs people to think that he's a moderate. Joining the UNSC shows he's more of an internationalist which reassures businesspeople and that he's not an isolationist.

## IL – National Security

### **Moves that secure India's security increase Modi's popularity and make him more likely to win, even if those actions don't have real effects**

**Zargar 19** Arshad R. Zargar, 3-11-2019, ""Potential for armed conflict" looms over India's upcoming elections," CBS News,

<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/india-narendra-modi-strongman-image-pakistan-tension-national-election-looms/> //DF

Last month, a suicide attack on an Indian military convoy in the disputed region of Kashmir, along India's border with Pakistan, killed more than 40 soldiers. Modi's India responded with airstrikes deep inside Pakistani territory, purportedly targeting a training camp of the banned terrorist group Jaish-e-Muhammad, which India blamed for the attack. The next day, Pakistan retaliated with airstrikes on Indian territory, prompting a dogfight in which one Indian fighter jet was shot down and its pilot captured by Pakistan. Pakistan released him the next day as a "peace gesture," bringing the nuclear-armed south Asian neighbors back from the brink of full scale war. The two countries have fought three wars since 1947 over Kashmir -- a mountainous region divided between them but claimed in its entirety by both. "The airstrikes on Pakistan will likely boost Modi's election prospects," Michael Kugelman, Deputy Director of the Asia Program and Senior Associate for South Asia at The Wilson Center, a Washington-based think-tank, told CBS News. Many believe that Modi, who seemed to be on the back foot after his party was dealt a series of state election losses, has shifted his campaign strategy from pushing for national development projects, to a platform focused on national security. "The airstrikes have had a rally-around-the-flag effect and reinforced a tough-on-Pakistan position that can only help Modi and the BJP at the polls," Kugelman told CBS News. Respected Indian news editor Raju Narisetti, now a professor at Columbia Journalism School in New York, said Modi's campaign would likely push "the overt and covert case that India simply needs a strong and decisive leader at the helm." Modi carries the image of a strong prime minister who has acted tough with the "enemy" next door. He has dismissed all offers of dialogue with Pakistan, "until it stops exporting terror to India." Narisetti said that while Modi's primary challenger Rahul Gandhi has been able to "shake off" his own devastating losses from elections last year, he and other challengers' opposition leaders -- of which there are few with a high profile -- will be at a "relative disadvantage" to the incumbent. Political analyst Yogendra Yadav told an Indian news channel that if it weren't for the airstrikes, Modi's party could have lost at least 100 seats in the upcoming election, but now, "the impression is things have improved for BJP." Potential for armed conflict" Modi's firm stance with Pakistan and the Kashmiri militants his government insists Pakistan allows to operate has come under criticism, but it has consolidated his nationalist, right-wing base. Before he became the prime minister, Modi would often taunt the government led by the rival party as "weak." After he assumed the nation's highest office, he had to live up to expectations.



## The Pakistan strike has increased support for Modi

**Gettleman 19** Jeffrey Gettleman, Vindu Goel and Maria Abi-Habib, 3-11-2019, "In India's Election Season, a Bombing Interrupts Modi's Slump," NYT,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/world/asia/modi-india-election.html> //DF

Only one month ago, Narendra Modi, India's once unstoppable prime minister, seemed surprisingly vulnerable going into his re-election campaign. Economic growth had been slowing, thousands of farmers were marching on the capital (some even dumped gallons of nearly worthless milk in the streets), and unemployment had hit its worst level in 45 years — an unpleasant fact that Mr. Modi's government tried to hide. In a recent batch of critical state elections, his party got trounced. And with the country's weekslong election process set to begin on April 11, the rejuvenated opposition was landing punch after punch with corruption allegations. But one bombing in Kashmir, and weeks of military brinkmanship with Pakistan afterward, appears to have interrupted Mr. Modi's slump. A young suicide bomber blew up a military bus in Kashmir on Feb. 14, killing more than 40 troops. The group Jaish-e-Muhammad, which operates from Pakistan and is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States, claimed responsibility. Mr. Modi ordered airstrikes on Pakistan, which he blamed for the attack, and Pakistan struck back. Never before, experts said, had two nuclear-armed nations bombed each other. From the outside, Mr. Modi was widely criticized as being willing to risk war for even the chance at a political boost. And when an Indian pilot was captured in Pakistani territory — and was then quickly returned in a good-optics moment for Pakistan — some international analysts thought Mr. Modi's military adventurism had backfired. But that's not how it has played out within India. Political analysts say that Indians are rallying behind Mr. Modi again, and that he seems to be making crucial gains among independent and undecided voters. The fact that India's airstrikes probably missed their targets, and that a fighter jet was shot down by Pakistan, doesn't seem to matter to most Indians. Their country was hit, and Mr. Modi hit back. "Even if they go below the seven seas, I will find them," Mr. Modi said in a speech this month, referring to terrorists. "To settle the score is my habit!" Some of his supporters in India see Mr. Modi's aggressive stance not as pandering for votes, but as a return to his old passion and focus. "Whatever our criticisms about him regarding the economy and jobs, at the end of the day he has done an incredible job of delivering justice for the martyrs," said Prapti Bhattacharya, a law student and first-time voter. "Before this, I would have voted for Congress," the leading opposition party, she said. "Now I'm voting for Modi." The Pakistan crisis "has provided him with a golden narrative," said Milan Vaishnav, the director of the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "The thing about a national security crisis is that it plays up decisiveness, leadership and nationalism. These are three characteristics he often touts." Still, a lot can happen over the next few weeks. India has a parliamentary system, and for Mr. Modi to return to power, his Bharatiya Janata Party must win a majority of the 543 elected seats in the lower house of Parliament or form a coalition with regional parties. The same goes for the Indian National Congress party, which ruled India for about 50 of the country's 71 years of independence. Congress's leader, Rahul Gandhi, is determined to swing the election discussion back to domestic issues. Mr. Modi's biggest vulnerability is the economy. Even though the country's economy grew 6.6 percent in the most recent quarter, still faster than most developed countries, it was India's slowest rate in five years. With a population of 1.3 billion and improving education, India produces nearly half a million new job seekers each month. This would be an overwhelming burden for any leader, and Mr. Modi raised expectations even higher by promising to create 10 million jobs, a wildly ambitious goal that, by most accounts, he has failed to achieve. "We haven't created jobs — we have actually lost jobs," said Mahesh Vyas, the chief executive of the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy. By his count, India now has about 400 million jobs, down slightly over the last three years. Another problem for Mr. Modi is dissatisfaction among Dalits. India's centuries-old caste hierarchy — with Dalits at the bottom, Brahmins at the top and many groups layered in between — still dominates life in many areas, especially rural ones. Lower castes still face horrendous abuse, and Dalits — who represent close to 100 million votes — have long distrusted Mr. Modi and his party, which is rooted in a Hindu nationalist worldview that favors upper castes and emphasizes India's Hinduness. But in the last election, in 2014, Mr. Modi played up his humble origins — the son of a tea seller from a relatively low caste. Analysts said that 24 percent of Dalits voted for his party, double the percentage from the previous election. This time around might still be very different, even with a bump from the showdown with Pakistan. Under Mr. Modi, hate crimes against Dalits and Muslims, who make up a sizable minority in India, have exploded. Dalits have been killed for such things as riding a horse or skinning a cow. Mr. Modi himself has not made disparaging remarks about minorities, but in the wake of this kind of violence, he is often silent. Many officials in his party, including ministers, have taken what are widely considered extremist positions when it comes to protecting cows, a sacred animal in Hinduism, or siding with vigilantes who target Muslim or low-caste butchers. While many conservative Hindus see Mr. Modi as an unswerving defender of some of their most deeply felt values, many Dalits and Muslims are frightened of their own government. Despite Mr. Modi's pledges to unify India — he often repeats his slogan, "Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas," or "All together, development for all" — many observers say India has become more polarized along caste and religious lines during his time in power. Chandra Bhan Prasad, a well-known political commentator and a Dalit, said few Dalits would change their mind on Mr. Modi because of the action on

Pakistan. "He's totally lost the Dalit vote," Mr. Prasad said. "Dalits will still vote for any party that can defeat the B.J.P." If true, that could mean the loss of millions of votes. Farmers were another concern for Mr. Modi, but here, the action on Pakistan could make a difference. At 260 million strong, farmers are the biggest single voting bloc in India, and many had been furious with Mr. Modi. He had promised to ensure that farmers received prices high enough to make a profit, but export controls and overproduction have cut deeply into prices for crops like onions and potatoes. Tens of thousands of farmers have descended on cities, pouring milk into the streets and dumping vegetables onto sidewalks. One farmer sent the paltry \$15 he had earned selling 1,600 pounds of onions to Mr. Modi. But after the crisis with Pakistan, the conversation on many farms has changed, said Vijay Jawandhia, a farmer and leader of a farmers' union from Maharashtra State. "I hear farmers saying he is more decisive," he said. According to Gilles Verniers, an assistant professor of political science at Ashoka University, near New Delhi, 40 percent of India's 900 million voters typically remain undecided until right before the election. Unlike with politics in the United States, where people tend to pick a party and stick with it, many voters in India tack back and forth between the major parties depending on the candidates and the issues of the day. Mr. Verniers said the crisis with Pakistan was certain to "tame the decline" Mr. Modi had been facing. Before the attack in Kashmir, a disputed territory that both India and Pakistan claim, Mr. Gandhi, the leader of the Congress party and the scion of a storied political dynasty, had gained a new spring in his step. He was speaking out forcefully about a murky jet fighter deal that Mr. Modi's government made with France, and he enlisted his popular younger sister, Priyanka, to join the campaign, delivering it a jolt of energy. Both Congress and the B.J.P. have struck alliances with regional parties in the hopes of forming a governing coalition. The biggest leftist parties, including communists and those dominated by lower castes, are likely to back Congress, while some of the largest parties in Punjab and Maharashtra, two populous states, are firmly on Mr. Modi's side. As of now, Mr. Modi is the "odds-on favorite," said Ashutosh Varshney, the director of the Center for Contemporary South Asia at Brown University. "But I think the narrative can change," he said. "There is still a great deal of anger at Mr. Modi."

## **Modi's bombings after the Pakistani attack have also increased his support among farmers**

**Gettleman 19** Jeffrey Gettleman, Vinu Goel and Maria Abi-Habib, 3-11-2019, "In India's Election Season, a Bombing Interrupts Modi's Slump," NYT, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/11/world/asia/modi-india-election.html> //DF

If true, that could mean the loss of millions of votes. Farmers were another concern for Mr. Modi, but here, the action on Pakistan could make a difference. At 260 million strong, farmers are the biggest single voting bloc in India, and many had been furious with Mr. Modi. He had promised to ensure that farmers received prices high enough to make a profit, but export controls and overproduction have cut deeply into prices for crops like onions and potatoes. Tens of thousands of farmers have descended on cities, pouring milk into the streets and dumping vegetables onto sidewalks. One farmer sent the paltry \$15 he had earned selling 1,600 pounds of onions to Mr. Modi. But after the crisis with Pakistan, the conversation on many farms has changed, said Vijay Jawandhia, a farmer and leader of a farmers' union from Maharashtra State. "I hear farmers saying he is more decisive," he said. According to Gilles Verniers, an assistant professor of political science at Ashoka University, near New Delhi, 40 percent of India's 900 million voters typically remain undecided until right before the election. Unlike with politics in the United States, where people tend to pick a party and stick with it, many voters in India tack back and forth between the major parties depending on the candidates and the issues of the day.

# UNSC Legitimacy

## UQ

**The UNSC suffers from a severe legitimacy problem in the eyes of its members, as evidenced by the fact that 70% of selected statements about UNSC were negative**

**Binder and Heupel 15** Martin Binder is [research associate at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. He received his PhD in Political Science from the Free University Berlin. His current research focuses on the legitimacy of international institutions, the role of rising powers in international organizations, and UN intervention in humanitarian crises] and Monika Heupel [research associate at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. She received a MA in International Relations from the University of Warwick and a PhD in Political Science from the University of Bremen. Her current research focuses on the rule of law in global governance and the legitimacy of international institutions], 2015, “The Legitimacy of the UN Security Council: Evidence from Recent General Assembly Debates,” *International Studies Quarterly*, [https://research.reading.ac.uk/ungop/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/Binder\\_et\\_al-2015-International\\_Studies\\_Quarterly1.pdf](https://research.reading.ac.uk/ungop/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/Binder_et_al-2015-International_Studies_Quarterly1.pdf) //DF

We intend to answer two main questions. First, how legitimate is the Security Council in the eyes of UN member states? To this end, we examine the extent to which states make positive or negative evaluative statements about the Council and thus ascribe legitimacy to, or withhold legitimacy from, it. Second, on what grounds are these ascriptions based? To answer this question, we consider whether states refer, as different theories of legitimacy hold, to the Security Council’s compliance with its legal mandate (legal legitimacy), to the quality of its decision-making procedures (procedural legitimacy), or to its effectiveness (performance legitimacy). Regarding both questions, we also explore whether particular perceptions of Security Council legitimacy are linked to specific state characteristics. Our findings suggest that **the Security Council suffers from a legitimacy deficit in the eyes of UN member states. Negative evaluations of the Council far outweigh positive ones.** This holds for all three grounds for legitimacy. Yet, the Council does not find itself in an intractable legitimacy crisis because it still enjoys some rudimentary degree of legitimacy. **The legitimacy deficit results primarily from concerns regarding procedural shortcomings;** misgivings regarding performance shortcomings rank second. Whether or not the Council complies with its legal mandate has not attracted much attention. Our data also suggest that democracies, members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and states represented in the Security Council are less critical of the Council than states to which these features do not apply.

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**Procedural Legitimacy A second theory maintains that the quality of an institution’s decision-making procedures is the key to its legitimacy.**<sup>5</sup> In the international realm, scholars have stressed the role of “fair and accepted procedure” for the legitimacy of international norms (Chayes and Chayes 1995:127). With regard to IOs, **four procedural standards are seen to be particularly relevant.** First, the legitimacy of an IO is said to depend on the equal participation of all of its member states in formal decision making (Dingwerth 2007). Second, the legitimacy of an IO is considered to be a function of transparency that enables interested states and stakeholders to trace the decision-making process (Caney 2006:748–749). A third procedural standard is accountability, which means that states and other actors in whose name an IO takes decisions and who are affected by these decisions can hold the IO responsible (Grant and Keohane 2005). **Fourth, an IO’s [International Organization’s] legitimacy can be undermined if the organization is dominated by great powers and if weaker states are forced to bow to their interests and accede to their values** (Coicaud and Heiskanen 2001:525–527). Many scholars have pointed out that the Security Council does not meet these procedural standards. Their criticism is that **those states most affected by Council action are**

almost always excluded from the decision-making process, and that Council decision making is highly opaque and largely insulated from public scrutiny (Paul 2004:375). There is no judicial or quasi-judicial body entitled to determine whether the Council has overstepped its competences or violated international law, nor is the GA in a position to call the Council to account (Koskeniemi 1995).

Finally, **the dominance of the Security Council by a few powerful veto-holding states has been identified as the core challenge to the body's legitimacy** (Caron 1993:566). Since the early 1990s, the Security Council has taken some limited steps to improve its procedures. For example, the Council President has begun to brief non-Council members following closed meetings and the Arria Formula has provided non-governmental organizations with better opportunities to voice their opinions. Nonetheless, progress has not gone very far (Paul 2004).

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The central result of our analysis is that the Security Council suffers from a legitimacy deficit in the eyes of UN member states. States, like Argentina, deplore the Council's "loss of ... legitimacy" and perceive this to be "a growing trend in recent years that [they] hope will be reversed."<sup>15</sup> **That the Council's level of legitimacy is low is evident in our finding that the share of negative statements amounts to more than two-thirds of all coded statements**. The number of negative statements on the Security Council by far outweighs the number of positive statements as 73% (1123) of all 1531 statements relevant for the assessment of the legitimacy of the Council are negative, while only 27% (408) are positive (see Figure 1). We find a great deal of negative statements on all grounds for legitimacy as stressed according to the legitimacy theories introduced in our conceptual framework. For instance, Vietnam expresses concerns regarding the Council's loose interpretation of its legal mandate, stating that "the Security Council should not attempt to expand its purview beyond what is authorized under the Charter," and that the "general membership of the United Nations . . . will not accept the Council indulging in efforts to establish certain norms."<sup>16</sup> On numerous other occasions, states call for procedural reforms, like Peru's demanding that "in order to adapt the Council to new realities, it is essential to admit new members . . . . That would promote just and equitable regional representation, which would project a stronger image of Council legitimacy."<sup>17</sup> States also frequently criticize performance shortcomings, like Libya's stating that "the Council has been questioned for not being able to fully shoulder its responsibility in dealing successfully with some of the most pressing peace and security issues."<sup>18</sup>

## Link

### **India is a popular state in the UN, maybe meaning that it becoming a permanent member would also be popular**

**Dabhade 17** Manish S. Dabhade [Assistant Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Convener of the Indian Diplomacy Research Group. His teaching and research interests include diplomacy history, theory and practice, with a special reference to India], 12-2017, "India's Pursuit of United Nations Security Council Reforms," ORF Occasional Paper,

[https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ORF\\_Occasional\\_Paper\\_131\\_UNSC\\_Dabhade.pdf](https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ORF_Occasional_Paper_131_UNSC_Dabhade.pdf) //DF

India has been elected for seven terms for a two-year non-permanent member seat, the last being 2011-12, only behind Japan, Brazil and Argentina. Except for the first time, when India held the seat earmarked for the Commonwealth group, it has held the seat on every other occasion on behalf of the Asian group. India has been a member of the Council during 1950-51, 1967-68, 1972-73, 1977-78, 1984-85, 1991-92, and lastly, 2011-12 which was seen as a "rehearsal for permanent membership" (Srinivasan 2013) **During the last term, India won the non-permanent seat with the highest number of votes in the General Assembly showing its impressive electoral popularity**. It needs to be recalled that in 1996, India had lost the elections to Japan by a wide margin for a non-permanent seat. The typical Indian preference in the UNSC has always been to be a part of the democratic majority contributing to the adoption of broadly acceptable resolutions and decisions. Analysing all terms of India in the SC barring the last one, Murthy (2011, p.3) points out that India joined 59 percent of the resolutions adopted either unanimously or without a vote. With regard to

aggregate of 113 adopted resolutions (41 percent) that gave rise to a division, India cast an affirmative vote on 101 (89 percent) of them. Significantly, on not more than a dozen times did India stand aside without joining the concurrent majority, and has not voted against any resolution, and resorted to abstentions only to express its reservations. Remarkably, India was never a loner in abstaining as it always had the company of other Council members on many occasions. The Indian behaviour herein clearly points to a systematic effort to display a constructive, rule of law abiding and a democratic majority building state in a global, multilateral setting like the Security Council.

## **India is a popular state among the permanent members of UNSC and the General Assembly, only being blocked by opposition states in the so-called “coffee club”**

**Mukherjee 17** Bhaswati Mukherjee [former Permanent Representative to UNESCO, Paris and a former Ambassador of India to the Netherlands], 2017, “India and the UN: Reform and Role in a Globalised World,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal,

<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1940440519/fulltextPDF/3E86CB0F1DD84FF4PQ/1?accountid=40468> //DF

India's international identity has long been shaped by its role in UN peacekeeping, with more than 100,000 Indian troops having served in UN missions during the past 50 years. Today, India has over 8,500 peacekeepers in the field, more than twice as many as the UN's five big powers combined.<sup>6</sup> In supporting India's bid for a permanent seat in an enlarged Security Council, then US President Barack Obama cited "India's long history as a leading contributor to United Nations peacekeeping mission". There has been no official comment so far from President Trump, but it is expected that he will continue this policy. India's bid for permanent membership of UNSC is backed by 4

Permanent Members: France, Russia, the UK, and the USA. China maintains an ambivalent silence. It is understood that China is fundamentally opposed to Japan's candidature, and cannot support the G4 (India, Japan, Germany and Brazil) for that reason. In the General Assembly, it is widely recognised that India is the only country with the support of a very large number of members of the United Nations. There are some exceptions, including Pakistan - the only nation which specifically opposes India's candidacy. Pakistan is a member of the so called 'Coffee Club'. It is well known that the victors of World War II shaped the UN in their national interests, dividing the permanent seats, and associated veto-power, amongst themselves. Any reform to the Security Council would require an amendment to the Charter. According to Article 108 of the Charter: Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.<sup>7</sup> 1 The only significant reform of the Security Council came to pass in 1965. The reform included an increase of the non-permanent membership from six to 10 members. By 1992, Japan and Germany had become the second and third largest financial contributors to the UN, and started to demand a permanent seat. Brazil and India, along with Japan and Germany, formed the G4. Regional rivals opposed to the G4 becoming permanent members with a veto power favoured the expansion of the non-permanent category of seats, with members to be elected on a regional basis. Italy, Pakistan, Mexico, and Egypt started to form an interest group known as the "Coffee Club." It is a group of 'spoilers'. India's bid for permanent membership of UNSC is backed by four Permanent Members of the Security Council, France, Russia, the UK and the USA. Its candidature for the Permanent Membership of UN Security Council took a great leap forward when, on 14th September 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted Decision 69/560 on Security Council Reform. This historic decision was adopted without a vote, despite opposition by China, Pakistan, and others in the Group that now calls itself as "Uniting for Consensus"; however, it is actually the reinvented "Coffee Club". The negotiation process was further complicated by a change in the chief negotiator under US pressure. Moreover, every candidate state requires 129 positive votes: that is, a two-third majority of the 193 member states. The reform process appears to have hit a difficult road block.

# Peacekeepers

## UQ

### **India contributes more peacekeepers than any other country, by far**

**Dabhade 17** Manish S. Dabhade [Assistant Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Convener of the Indian Diplomacy Research Group. His teaching and research interests include diplomacy history, theory and practice, with a special reference to India], 12-2017, "India's Pursuit of United Nations Security Council Reforms," ORF Occasional Paper,

[https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ORF\\_Occasional\\_Paper\\_131\\_UNSC\\_Dabhade.pdf](https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ORF_Occasional_Paper_131_UNSC_Dabhade.pdf) //DF

India, since its independence and even before that, has been an active participant in all initiatives undertaken by the UN and the various UN organs including the various discussions on the Agenda for Peace and the Agenda for Development, the Millennium Development Goals, and various UN summits, including most importantly, on climate change. India also contributed by being instrumental in establishing the G77 of developing states at the UN, other than supporting the establishment of various bodies, such as the UNICEF on a permanent basis, the UNDP, the UNEP, and the restructuring of the economic and social fields of the UN and the UN Development Fund. India also makes a strong case by highlighting its regular, significant contributions to the UN. In the arena of peacekeeping, India has remained the largest cumulative contributor of UN peacekeeping troops with around 180,000 troops since the 1950s. Currently, around 7,700 Indian peacekeepers have been deployed in 13 missions (out of the total of 16) in 11 countries. (Permanent Mission of India to the UN, New York 2016) Today, most significantly, India has almost twice the number of peacekeepers deployed in the ground as do China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States combined – also known as the P5, the five countries that wield veto power at the Council. In terms of financial contributions to the UN, India with US\$ 20.46 million ranks 23rd in the list of contributors. India had emphasised on this back in 1993: "...not just the financial contribution in absolute terms, but also in relative terms. For a country with low per capita income, assessed contribution as per the United Nations scale may entail proportionately higher sacrifice. The record of timely payment also should be taken into account." Adding further, India asserted: "the financial contribution does not remain static forever, and the crucial issue is the readiness to fulfil the obligations and not the quantum of payment at a particular point in time. The point is India could emerge before long, if its economy performs well, as a sizeable contributor to UN budget." (Menon 1995, p.15)

## India as a Great Power/ Liberalism

### **A permanent seat on UNSC would help to elevate India to great power status and check China**

**Dabhade 17** Manish S. Dabhade [Assistant Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Convener of the Indian Diplomacy Research Group. His teaching and research interests include diplomacy history, theory and practice, with a special reference to India], 12-2017, "India's Pursuit of United Nations Security Council Reforms," ORF Occasional Paper,

[https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ORF\\_Occasional\\_Paper\\_131\\_UNSC\\_Dabhade.pdf](https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ORF_Occasional_Paper_131_UNSC_Dabhade.pdf) //DF

Foremost in Indian calculus, however, lies the Indian aspiration of the institutionalised big power status the permanent seat in the Security Council would confer on India right away. Being a “pen holder” as the permanent member of the Security Council, India would similarly assume the mantle of international peace and security decision-making. India sees itself carrying the necessary abilities, actual and potential, which entitles it to a permanent seat at the Council. Further, the seat on the high table, at the UN’s premier, powerful body would provide it the much needed leverage to expand its global geo-political and geoeconomic clout. It would serve as an equalizer to China, its rival and an emerging hegemon in Asia, and an ever increasing strategic and security concern in its immediate neighborhood and beyond. India has always seen itself as a democratic alternative to the authoritarian China. India’s millennia old civilizational existence also demands it to be at the top of the international hierarchy of states. As India’s international profile and capabilities rise due to its ever expanding global and regional footprint in diverse areas such as, politics, development, economics, and culture and science and technology, India wishes to shift its international position from a rule taker (a constrained role) to a rule maker (a system shaping role). The Indian attempts at joining various regimes like the MTCR and the ongoing, high-pitched campaign to join the NSG amply indicate that India is no more satisfied with being either the target or a mere follower of various international norms and rules, and now wants to shape and align them to suit Indian ideas and interests. In conclusion, and most significantly, Indian hopes significantly rest on an acknowledgement by the UN itself of the need to expand the UNSC. In an interview to The Guardian (2015), former UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan said that the Security Council must either reform or INDIA’S PURSUIT OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORMS 12 risk becoming increasingly irrelevant: “If we don’t change the council, we risk a situation where the primacy of the council may be challenged by some of the new emerging countries.”

## **Enlarging the UNSC would fold India into the international order and make them a better partner for cooperation and ensure they build the international order**

**McDonald and Patrick 10** Kara C. McDonald [Foreign Service officer with the U.S. Department of State, and currently serves as the U.S. deputy special coordinator for Haiti] and Stewart M. Patrick [senior fellow and director of the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations], 12-2010, “UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests,” Council on Foreign Relations, [https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2010/11/UNSC\\_CSR59.pdf](https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2010/11/UNSC_CSR59.pdf) //DF

The UNSC, then, faces no immediate crisis of legitimacy, credibility, or relevance. At the same time, however, there is a powerful geopolitical argument for compositional reform. The primary consideration for permanent membership should be power—the ability and willingness to deploy it in service of global security. Openness to UNSC enlargement is justified by the changing nature of threats to international peace and by the need to harness the power of emerging and established states as pillars of an open, rule-bound global system. In 1945, permanent UNSC membership was primarily justified by political-military power, including a capacity to prevent—and, if necessary, conduct and win—interstate war.<sup>7</sup> But in today’s more diffuse security environment, national military power is no longer the sole or necessarily supreme qualification. Combating transnational threats, ranging from terrorism to nuclear proliferation to climate change, requires not only military but also diplomatic, economic, and technological capabilities.<sup>8</sup> Strategies to contain, manage, and solve global challenges depend as much on the cohesion of multilateral responses as on military might—and they require the contributions of all major emerging and established powers. In this new environment, the relevant question is: What composition does the UNSC need to fulfill its mandate to maintain international peace and security? The past six decades have witnessed significant shifts in the relative size of the world’s largest economies, alongside more modest shifts in relative defense spending (see Appendix 1). These trends suggest the emergence of new countries able to contribute to international peace and security. The hurdle to UNSC permanent membership must remain high, and aspirant countries should demonstrate an ability to broker and deliver global solutions to transnational threats. Skillfully accomplished, UNSC expansion could be an investment in global stability. While the UNSC is not presently in crisis, there are persuasive practical and geopolitical grounds for the United States to support a modest enlargement of its permanent membership. To fulfill its mandate the UNSC needs to draw on the collective authority and capabilities of many states. The Obama administration has an opportunity to shift the reform debate from one of entitlement to one of 10 UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests responsibility and action. Such an institutional bargain may appear at first magnanimous, but actually reflects enlightened self-interest.<sup>9</sup> **By spearheading reform that gives emerging nations (as well as important established powers) a stake in the current order, the United States can increase global political support for (or at least acquiescence to) existing**



**arrangements and leverage the contributions of capable states willing to provide a larger share of global public goods.** Historically, the task of accommodating rising powers has been among the most difficult challenges of world politics. **International relations tend to be particularly turbulent when the global distribution of power changes and international structures fail to keep pace.** The interwar years (1919–39) provide a case in point.<sup>10</sup> While it is impossible to predict the future, failure to adjust the UNSC's composition could well complicate multilateral security cooperation in the decades ahead. The most dire scenario—that dissatisfied states might launch a full-scale assault on the UNSC's legitimacy and seek to undermine its role—seems unlikely. **More plausible is that frustrated aspirants could reduce their investments in—and diplomatic support for—the institution, depriving the UNSC of needed capabilities and reducing its overall effectiveness.** Any effort to enlarge the UNSC will be difficult, but it will get harder with time as power diffuses around the world and calls for reform increase. By acting now, the United States can help harness the capabilities of new global actors and create incentives for their responsible behavior.

### **India's membership on the UNSC would make it accept R2P, making a more willing partner to intervene (this card isn't strong so something better would be needed)**

Amritar Narlikar [Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge], 2011, "Is India a Responsible Great Power?," *Third World Quarterly*, [//DF">https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41341187.pdf?casa\\_token=bbuxvruM0qQAAAAA:vb8PtAAqGqp0h\\_aPjigo3TDLZ3Hy8wgy\\_RBmlgLV\\_bkHK3H6s9NAlI-M7mASolr9bwXkwj35Afjf6BXINZo9Jc1jmgNilaNAfsxK5618ildHBU5FW32e">//DF](https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41341187.pdf?casa_token=bbuxvruM0qQAAAAA:vb8PtAAqGqp0h_aPjigo3TDLZ3Hy8wgy_RBmlgLV_bkHK3H6s9NAlI-M7mASolr9bwXkwj35Afjf6BXINZo9Jc1jmgNilaNAfsxK5618ildHBU5FW32e)

It could be argued (as a counter to the argument presented in this article) that responsible international behaviour need not necessarily entail the provision of the same public goods that the system has traditionally prioritised. It is possible to perhaps hypothesise that, even though India has been reluctant to contribute proactively to the provision of existing global public goods (such as freer trade, climate change mitigation, international security via non-proliferation, or the Responsibility to Protect), it might be willing to provide some alternative global public goods implied by differing visions of global order. At this point, however, it is difficult to find much evidence of this. Across regimes we find that India is reluctant to contribute significantly to the supply of existing global goods, nor does it offer alternative public goods in their place. Institutional differences do not seem to produce a huge variation on its behaviour on this, nor does the extent to which India acts as a veto-player or indeed agenda setter. **Its reluctance to take on new international responsibilities in certain areas of security, might not elicit surprise: why should India contribute to the Responsibility to Protect when it enjoys such little ownership of the UN Security Council?** But even in the case of the WTO, where every effort has been made to include India at the heart of negotiations, we still find few credible signals that the country is willing to take on a leadership role that involves a major contribution to the supply of public goods. The non-proliferation regime reconfirms and reinforces the argument made in this article. This is the one regime where India has actually emerged as an agenda-setter. But so far we have seen no sign from India that it is willing to provide, say, a system of rules to reinforce the regime that has been bent and twisted to accommodate it, nor do we see an alternative vision emergent. If anything, as has been argued in this article, a credible case could be made to say that India's integration into the regime provides not a public good but a public bad.

### **While India says it's against R2P, it actually supports humanitarian interventions and might be more willing to accept the doctrine were it on the security council**

**Møller 17** Bjørn Møller [Institute of Culture and Global Studies, Aalborg University Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark], 1-11-2017, "India and the responsibility to protect," *Third World Quarterly*, doi:10.1080/01436597.2017.1282312 //DF

India's attitude to R2P: a possible compromise? Even though India voted for the 2005 UN document and abstained from voting against UNSC Resolution 1973 in 2011, when it happened to be a 'rotating' member of the Council,<sup>22</sup> it has been adamantly opposed to humanitarian intervention on principled grounds, which has also made its attitude towards R2P ambivalent, to say the least.<sup>23</sup> However,



retrospectively **it is possible to view some of India's foreign policies and past military activities as quite R2P like, almost resembling humanitarian interventions.** When India intervened on the side of the present Bangladesh in 1971, it was not officially justified as a humanitarian intervention, but surely the Indian desire to assist the ethnic kin of its citizens in West Bengal across the border against the brutal Pakistani onslaught played a role.<sup>24</sup> India also intervened in Sri Lanka by deploying a 'peacekeeping' force, the activities of which included protecting civilians (ethnic kin of the inhabitants of Indian federal state of Tamil Nadu) against the Sri Lankan regime.<sup>25</sup> Even though especially the countries of the West/North have tended to interpret R2P as legitimising unilateral interventions by themselves and partners in 'coalitions of the willing', this was not in fact what was endorsed in the 2005 document, which reserved the right to authorise interventions to the UNSC. **Perhaps India would look more favourably at R2P if it was granted a permanent membership in the UNSC,** but this is not particularly likely in the near future. It seems unlikely that India (or the other BRICS countries, for that matter) would come around to supporting full-fledged humanitarian interventions, but equally unlikely that other states would press hard for anything like this in the foreseeable future – unless, of course, they could use this for moral grandstanding, protected from being forced to 'put their military might where their mouth is' by the predictable Russian and/or Chinese vetoes in the UNSC. However, it seems conceivable that India might support such UN interim or transitional administrations as have typically followed either an intervention or a negotiated peace agreement.<sup>26</sup>

## **UNSC Militarism**

### **India on UNSC would make them take better decisions**

**Deo and Pradhan 14** Neelam Deo [Co-founder and Director of Gateway House. She has been the Indian Ambassador to Denmark and Ivory Coast with concurrent accreditation to several West African countries] and Karan Pradhan [Senior Researcher at Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations], The Diplomat, 11-9-2014, "Should India Give Up on the UN Security Council?," Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/should-india-give-up-on-the-un-security-council/> //DF

Meanwhile, even as the reform remains in abeyance, global geopolitics have changed. Today, there are three major conglomerations of problems: the turmoil in West Asia, encapsulated by the brutal Islamic State, which is quickly redrawing the map of the region; the rise of an increasingly expansionist and assertive China; and the renewed standoff between the West and Russia. It is worth noting that **although matters of war and peace are the core function of the UNSC, it has not been consulted on any of these issues.** The most blatant instance was Obama's address to the UN General Assembly on September 24, where he defended airstrikes on Syria and Iraq. The U.S did not deem it necessary, once again, to seek the approval of the UNSC. Sadly, UN secretary general Ban Ki Moon was pressured to support the U.S.'s unilateral actions, though he expressed the vain hope that the UNSC will lead the effort against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. In the east, China has completely rejected international arbitration on territorial disputes with its maritime neighbours, despite the Philippines taking the issue to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea. And amid steadily deteriorating Russia-West ties, U.S.-led NATO has not taken the issue to the UNSC, though it has accused Moscow of breaching international law and compromising Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity by annexing Crimea. With these disagreements—as well as the opposing perspectives on Syria—the equation between the West and Russia has deteriorated to a point reminiscent of the hostilities between the two during the Cold War. The new standoff over Ukraine has completely paralysed the UNSC.

However, such disregard was already evident when the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 without the Security Council's authorisation, distorted the sense of UNSC Resolution 1973 on Libya in 2011 by justifying the invasion of that country, and recently ordered airstrikes on Syria. These repeated unilateral actions raise questions about the UNSC's relevance. It then becomes necessary to ask if India should persist in its efforts to be part of an organisation that lacks weight and sway. In fact, whether India should seek membership is a matter of debate within the country. **Former colonial powers are not going to allow a change, nor will China allow other Asian countries, particularly Japan, to enter. But there is also the view that though India may not gain much from becoming a part of an archaic organisation, the world needs an expanded UNSC that includes countries like India to influence the very ethos of the council.** At a time when faster growing economies, more youthful populations, and the concentration of natural resources are mainly in the developing world, as are problems like the dispersion of capacity to build weapons of mass destruction, a reform of global political management systems to respond to crises and violence—such as the chaos in West Asia—is even more imperative. If the UNSC includes India and Brazil, and also represents Africa and West Asia, it will infuse the council with a deeper understanding and enable a wiser response to the world's cascading political crises, unlike the hasty and excessive militarism of the West.

## **US-India Cooperation**

**India on UNSC is critical to enabling the US to combat numerous modern challenges**

Insider NJ 19 2-13-2019, "Pennacchio Calls for India to Have Permanent Seat on UN Security Council,"

Insider NJ

<https://www.insidernj.com/press-release/pennacchio-calls-india-permanent-seat-un-security-council/>

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The Trump Administration expressed its support of making India a permanent member of the UN SEC as recently as last September. Senator Pennacchio's resolution, SR-114, is also sponsored by fellow Senate Republican, Senator Sam Thompson (R-12), a longtime advocate for Indian-Americans in New Jersey. "The New York-New Jersey metro area is home to the largest concentration of Indians in the United States, making our State Legislature an appropriate advocate for granting India a seat on the UN Security Council," Senator Thompson noted. **"The nuclear challenges we are facing from abroad, and the tenuous circumstances in the Middle East, mandate that the United States maintain strong, strategic partnerships with allies that are loyal and committed to our cause. We cannot continue to address these challenges on a united, global scale without establishing India as a permanent member of the Security Council.** For the sake of our world and the health and welfare of future generations, I hope that the U.N. heeds our call to action immediately." The resolution has also received the support of the Consul General of India.

## Other Int'l Organizations

**When the UNSC became less active and effective in 2018, other organizations stepped up**

**UN 19** 1-10-2019, "Paralysis Constricts Security Council Action in 2018, as Divisions among Permanent Membership Fuel Escalation of Global Tensions," United Nations Press Releases, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13661.doc.htm> //DF

The Security Council remained largely paralysed by expanding rifts and mounting tensions involving its permanent members in 2018, a year characterized by the rise of nationalist movements and breaches of long-standing global norms that sparked questions about the very future of multilateralism. Over the course of the second-busiest year in its history, the 15-member Council convened a total of 275 public meetings, adopted 54 resolutions and issued 21 presidential statements. It also failed to adopt a total of seven draft resolutions, three of them due to a permanent member's exercise of its veto and four owing to a lack of sufficient votes in their favour. Meanwhile, a greater percentage of resolutions adopted in 2018 lacked the Council's unanimous support than in the previous year. The Council's five permanent members — China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States — remained gridlocked on several of the organ's oldest agenda items, with fresh divisions also emerging over newer issues. Against that backdrop, regional organizations such as the African Union took an increasingly prominent role in addressing their own challenges, raising new questions about the role and responsibilities of the United Nations in an evolving and more complex world. One of the Council's most intense divisions revolved around a worrying spike in the reported use of chemical weapons, from the battlefields of Syria to the tranquil United Kingdom town of Salisbury. Such allegations prompted many Council members to express grave concern over a perceived erosion of critical, long-held international norms governing warfare. More broadly, Council members, as well as the wider United Nations membership, repeatedly voiced alarm over indications that — seven decades into the world's grand experiment in multilateralism — deepening divisions and a rising tide of nationalism threaten to derail hard-won gains.