A2 AFF

A2 AFF Yemen

A2 Capacity Link

1: Delink: Local Groups: Johnsen ’18 of the Lawfare Magazine writes that even if Saudi Arabia stopped intervening, local actors fighting for ideological reasons will continue to fight,

2: Delink: Stockpiles: Myre ’18 of NPR writes that the Saudi’s bought $112 billion-worth of U.S. weapons during Obama’s administration, but have only spent $5 billion under Trump. This is reflective of a Saudi stockpile. Knights ’18 of the Washington Institute writes that even if the U.S. cut all arm sales now, Saudi Arabia could continue bombing for several years. Indeed, the Aman Times ’18 writes that Saudi Arabia has purchased 60% of its needed armaments for the next 10 years from the U.S.

3: Delink: Clayton ’19 of Progress Magazine writes that Saudi Arabia’s military relies almost entirely on private military contractors for training, logistics support, and intelligence gathering, indicating that ending arm sales wouldn’t prevent Saudi Arabia from continuing operations. And these subsidiaries are exploiting loopholes to continue selling to Saudi Arabia; Paretzky of the Yale Journal of International Law writes that multinational corporations manipulate supply sources to avoid scrutiny and control of any one national government. For example, Borrelli ’18 of Politico writes that after Germany banned arms sales to Saudi Arabia, companies simply shifted to Italian subsidiaries and continued selling. Moreover, Cameron ’18 of the Wall Street Journal writes that American companies have set up subsidiaries in Saudi Arabia to domestically produce weapons.

4: Nuclearization DA: Jerome ’10 of the Council on Foreign Relations writes that if Iran obtains a nuclear capacity, Saudi Arabia will be quick to consider nuclearizing. However, he furthers that arms sales serve as an American commitment to Saudi’s security, thereby removing the need for them to pursue their own arsenal. Kroenig ’15 of the Journal of Strategic Studies writes that nuclearization of new states make nuclear conflict significantly more likely because new nuclear states don’t have second-strike capabilities and are thus incentivized to use a first strike if they anticipate an impending conflict.

Johnsen, Gregory. “Yemen’s Three Wars.” Lawfare. September 2018. https://www.lawfareblog.com/yemens-three-wars //RJ

The most intractable of Yemen’s three conflicts is the increasingly ugly and increasingly fragmented civil war. This war existed before Saudi Arabia and the UAE intervened in Yemen and it will continue long after they leave. Sadly, this means that **the worst of the fighting in Yemen**

may still be ahead of us. The rickety anti-Houthi alliance, which has been mostly held together by the coalition, is likely to break apart when Saudi Arabia and the UAE withdraw. Much of **the south**, regardless of economic feasibility, **is going to want to secede**. President Hadi has little military support he can depend on outside of five presidential protection brigades. Vice President Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, a former Saleh loyalist, has already been defeated by the Houthis once, and his support within the military is unsteady at best. What's left of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh's military network, around 3,000 men, will continue to fight. As will a handful of well-trained UAE proxy forces, multiple Salafi groups, and several different local militias. For their part, **the Houthis are likely to lose territory following the withdrawal of Saudi and UAE forces. The Houthis have made a lot of enemies during their time in power, but have largely been given a pass by many under their control due to the Saudi-led coalition's bombing campaign. When that ends, so too will some of their support.** There is, simply put, no longer a single Yemen. **There are multiple Yemens and no single individual or group capable of re-uniting them into a coherent whole. Yemen has too many groups with too many guns to ever be a unified state again**. **The civil war, which has taken a back seat to the regional conflict over the past three years, will eventually resume at full force. And when it does, the fighting it produces will be bloody and protracted.**

Myre '18, NPR

https://www.npr.org/2018/10/15/657588534/fact-check-how-much-does-saudi-arabia-spend-on-arms-deals-with-the-u-s

MYRE: No, it is not. The president seems to be mixing some old contracts, some current contracts and some hoped-for contracts. We spoke to some people who study this, including Bruce Riedel at the Brookings Institution. **He noted that, during the Obama administration, the Saudis bought about $112-billion-worth of U.S. weapons. So they - that was in the - that ballpark. But those contracts are mostly completed by now.** And here's what Riedel said when I asked him about the state of sales with the current administration. BRUCE RIEDEL: **Since Donald Trump has been president, the United States and Saudi Arabia have concluded less than $4-billion-worth of arms agreements. KELLY: Less than $4 billion, so that is a big gap.** Do we know how much the Saudis actually do spend, are currently spending on weapons from the U.S.? MYRE: Well, they do spend a lot. And they've really ramped up their defense spending in recent years, particularly because of this protracted war they're fighting in Yemen. In fact, their defense budget is now considered to be the third-largest in the world, trailing only the United States and China.

(Aman Times) "Saudi Arabia: will pay nothing' to USA for its security: Prince Salman" October 7, 2018

https://amantimes.com/2018/10/07/saudi-arabia-will-pay-nothing-to-usa-for-its-security-prince-salman/

Pressed on how he would regard Trump's humiliating rhetoric against Saudi Arabia, the crown prince described the controversial remarks as a "bad issue" offset by "99 percent of good things."there since 1744, I believe more than 30 years before the United States of America, And I believe, and I'm sorry if anyone misunderstands that, but I believe President (Barack) Obama, in his eight years, he worked against many of our agenda – not (only) in Saudi Arabia, but also in the Middle East. And even though the USA worked against our agenda we were able to protect our interests. And the end result is that we succeeded, and the United States of America under the leadership of President Obama failed, for example in Egypt. So Saudi Arabia needs something like around 2,000 years to maybe face some dangers." "Actually, we will pay nothing for our security," the prince said, explaining that what Riyadh pays the USA for is weapons purchases, which have increased since Trump's election. **Ever since the relationship started between Saudi Arabia and the United States of America, we've bought everything with money, he further said, adding that since Trump came to power, the kingdom decided to purchase over 60 percent of its needed armament from the USA for the next 10 years.** The 33-year-old crown prince went on to say that Saudi Arabia had agreed to buy $110 billion worth of USA weapons and signed investment deals

worth billions more, some $400 billion in total, since Trump took office in early 2017, and described the deals as a good achievement" for Trump.

Michael Knights, November 5, 2018, a senior fellow with The Washington Institute, visited Yemen and the Gulf coalition states four times this year to observe military operations on multiple fronts, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-saudi-security-cooperation-part-1-conditioning-arms-sales-to-build-lev U.S.-Saudi Security Cooperation (Part 1): Conditioning Arms Sales to Build Leverage

Sales of air-delivered precision-guided munitions (PGMs) are another lightning rod issue in the bilateral security relationship. Following the 2009-2010 round of hostilities with the Houthis, the kingdom sought to refresh its stock of antipersonnel bombs with a large order of 1,300 U.S.-built CBU-105 sensor-fused weapons (a higher-reliability submunition that manufacturers say does not qualify as a cluster bomb due to its low malfunction rate). Yet by November 2015, eight months into the current war, the Saudis had used up nearly 2,600 PGMs, according to strike metrics compiled by The Washington Institute. In response, the Saudis requested a $1.29 billion package comprising around 19,000 air-delivered PGMs, an order that began delivery in July 2017. In addition to that package, the Senate narrowly approved a new $500 million commercial sale of PGMs to Riyadh in June 2017—the first installment in a mammoth $4.46 billion series of air-launched munition deals that would provide the Saudis with 104,000 U.S. PGMs in the next half decade. Riyadh may be accelerating its purchases in anticipation of a prolonged war in Yemen and the potential loss of U.S. sales down the road. According to Washington Institute data collected in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, the kingdom's forces have used around 14,500 munitions since March 2015, almost all PGMs, with the average rate gradually declining from 333 PGMs per month in 2015 to 270 per month this year. **The U.S. munitions currently arriving in Saudi Arabia were ordered in November 2015, when Riyadh recognized it might need new PGMs by 2019, but the intervening years have seen few signs of a PGM shortfall.** Based on a rough sense of prewar stocks and a constant dribble of replacements, ***Riyadh could probably keep bombing at its current rate for several years even if all new U.S. PGM deals were rejected***. Thus, while **cutting off** such **sales** may be a good way to signal U.S. displeasure or publicly distance Washington from the war, the data indicates that it **would not meaningfully slow the air campaign anytime soon.**

Clayton '19, Progress, http://www.progressonline.org.uk/2019/01/24/saudi-arabia-answer/

Unlike mercenary armies, **PMCs are legal businesses, providing military services including training, logistics support, equipment procurement and intelligence gathering.** American political scientist and PMC expert Peter Singer estimates they operate in 50 countries. Clients claim PMCs are not used as frontline combatants and are not mercenaries. Even so, PMCs are serious international security threats. **PMCs allow governments to resort quickly to militarism since they are affordable and discourage diplomacy. In 2002 a Foreign Office report encouraged the United Nations to hire PMCs because they are cheaper than using soldiers.** The UN dismissed this approach, but others did not. **Saudi Arabia initially strengthened its military largely by investing in PMCs. According to Singer, Saudi Arabia's military now relies almost entirely on PMCs providing a variety of services – developing its air defence system while training and advising its land, sea, and air forces.** This sets a worrying precedent for wealthy nations, showing that investment in **PMCs make a military powerful within weeks, effectively encouraging arms races. PMCs frequently undermine peace-building, especially in the Middle East. Although they consist of trained soldiers, they do not focus on the political and ethnic complexities of foreign war zones, exemplified during the Iraq War by the PMC Blackwater.** Blackwater were not prepared to stay in Iraq long-term, and had little understanding of the sectarian tensions between the Sunnis and Shias. They were also unfamiliar with guerrilla warfare and vulnerable to car bombs and non-uniformed enemy ambushes. The goal of abolishing PMCs is ambitious, but unless this issue is urgently addressed, **countries like Saudi Arabia will continue to buy military power with devastating consequences.**

Paretzky, Raymond. "The United States Arms Embargo Against South Africa: An Analysis of the Laws, Regulations, and Loopholes." Yale Journal of International Law. 1987. https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F&httpsredir=1&article=1498&context=yjil&fbclid=IwAR2rY8ZRK2R-ZCLkkBJg0w-e427GHNQPauup2WmDJxxCtuCh6upOpBYkXWs //RJ

According to a recent report, "[**m]ultinational corporations have globalized their production to such an extent that it is easy to manipulate supply sources to avoid the scrutiny and control of any one national government**."1 56 Presently, **U.S. multinationals can legally evade the embargo export restrictions by producing abroad items for export** to South Africa that could not legally be exported from the United States. Therefore, all restrictions that apply to exports of U.S.-origin commodities and technical data should also apply to exports by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations outside of South Africa and to sales by subsidiaries located in South Africa.157

Borrelli, Silvia. "Italian stalemate lets German firm profit from Saudi arms sales." Politico. December 2018. https://www.politico.eu/article/italian-stalemate-lets-german-firm-profit-from-saudi-arms-sales/ //RJ

Germany has imposed a ban on arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the larger partner in Italy's coalition government has for years opposed exporting weapons to Riyadh. **So you might imagine a German-owned Italian arms manufacturer wouldn't have much chance of continuing to ship bombs to Saudi Arabia** under a €400-million-plus deal. **But you'd be wrong.** Italian political divisions mean **a Sardinia-based arms manufacturer is still selling bombs to Saudi Arabia — even though its German parent company is banned from doing so.** The company, RWM Italia, is 100 percent owned by Germany's biggest arms firm, Rheinmetall. **The German company is not allowed to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia due to a ban imposed by Berlin** in October after the killing of Saudi dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi. **Even though it is wholly owned by Rheinmetall, RWM Italia is not subject to the German ban because it is an Italian-registered company and Italy has no such embargo.** The 5Star Movement, the larger party in Italy's government, has for years called for a ban on arms exports to Saudi Arabia. But it has been unable to get its coalition partner, the far-right League, to support the policy — despite Italy already having a law that could be used to justify a ban. The League has cited economic reasons for opposing an embargo. That has allowed RWM Italia to keep shipping arms to Saudi Arabia in the face of calls for an international ban from the European Parliament and human rights groups due to Khashoggi's death and the killing of civilians by Saudi-backed forces in Yemen. The Italian firm has sent three shipments to Saudi Arabia since the German ban came into force, according to classified port authority documents seen by POLITICO and other sources.

Cameron, Doug. "U.S.-Saudi Defense Ties on Track to Weather Controversy." Wall Street Journal. October 2018. https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-saudi-defense-ties-on-track-to-weather-controversy-1539887144?fbclid=IwAR1t78hHtLTd95bjgaK8IO6WPuGRsx0RhvPQiEbBDWBLGLNAHT_Sph202Rg //RJ

Saudi Arabia's huge arms bill has led the country to push for a greater share of the economic benefits, especially jobs. The kingdom has said it wants to become less reliant on imports and spend half its weapons budget in domestic facilities—compared to just 2% at present—part of a plan to diversify its economy beyond the oil industry by 2030. **That has led U.S. companies to open Saudi subsidiaries and to agree to shift assembly and other production processes to the kingdom. Boeing announced a joint venture in March that would place more than half the repair work for Saudi helicopters in the country, creating 6,000 jobs.** BAE Systems plc, Europe's largest weapons maker with deep ties to Saudi Arabia, is expected to have representatives at the business conclave in Saudi next week, a person familiar with the company's plans said. Saudi Arabia this year agreed to buy 48 more Eurofighter Typhoons from BAE Systems, though the contract still has to be finalized. It could see assembly of the planes in Saudi Arabia.

Jerome, Deborah, "Is Big Saudi Arms Sale a Good Idea?" Council on Foreign Relations, 1 Jan. 2010, https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/big-saudi-arms-sale-good-idea.

Also, there are two positive foreign policy consequences that could come from the sale. Its psychological effect could give the Saudis more credibility with regional elites in their contest for influence with Iran, making potential Saudi allies in places like Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Yemen more confident in throwing in their lot with Riyadh. And **if**

Iran obtains a nuclear weapons capability, the Saudis would undoubtedly consider the option of proliferating themselves. If they are confident of their American security guarantee--and these big arms sales are warrants of the American commitment to their security--American advice not to obtain nuclear weapons will carry more weight.

Kroenig, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair at Georgetown, **2015** (Matthew Kroenig, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, "The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?", The Journal of Strategic Studies, 2015 Vol. 38, Nos. 1–2, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273960071_The_History_of_Proliferation_Optimism_Does_It_Have_a_Future] //CJC

The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plusyear tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dotcom bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.48 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. **Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability**. In this context, one or both **states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first**. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, **the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability**. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran's nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel's aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, **the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal**, in this case Iran, **might feel use them or lose them pressures**. That is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, **nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack**.49 **If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second**. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran's theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.50 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO's conventional inferiority.51 As Russia's conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan's military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, leaders

can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’. 52 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.53 When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.

A2 Negotiations Link

1: Uniqueness: Negotiations are succeeding in the status quo. The Fassihi evidence in our case says that despite limited violations, the ceasefires have dramatically reduced violence and have allowed aid to flow into Yemen, reaching half of the Yemeni population. This indicates that both sides are already committing to negotiations. There is no risk of improving negotiations with an affirmative ballot.

A2 Impact Level

Gordon, Evelyn. "Backing the Saudis in Yemen is right, strategically and morally." JNS News. 30 Jan. 2019. https://www.jns.org/opinion/backing-the-saudis-in-yemen-is-right-strategically-and-morally/ //RJ

On the strategic side, let's start with the fact that **an organization whose official slogan is "God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, Victory to Islam" isn't one Americans should want ruling anything**, **much less a country whose location enables it to dominate a strategic waterway vital to the global oil industry**. And **without the Saudi-led coalition, the Houthis would long since have taken over Yemen. In** other countries, like **Syria and Lebanon**, **Iranian military** and financial **aid has repeatedly enabled its proxies to overwhelm the opposition**; that **this hasn't yet happened in Yemen is only because** there, unlike in Syria and Lebanon, **the Saudi coalition has provided its local allies with substantial assistance**, including airstrikes. Second, empowering allies is always better than empowering enemies. Granted, Saudi Arabia a highly imperfect ally, but it is at least nominally in America's camp. Iran, in contrast, has been America's avowed enemy since 1979, and its proxies have been responsible for hundreds, if not thousands, of American deaths in Lebanon and Iraq. Thus for the Senate to weaken Riyadh and strengthen Tehran, which targeting the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen does, would be foolish at any time.

Fatima Alasrar (The National Interest) "Yemen Is Bad but It Would Be Worse Without U.S. Involvement" July 25, 2018
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/yemen-bad-it-would-be-worse-without-us-involvement-26801
For example, congressional narratives depict the Saudi-led coalition as the instigators of the Yemen conflict. In fact, the war in Yemen did not begin with Saudi Arabia's March 2015 military intervention in the country but with the Houthi militias' violent overthrow of Yemen's internationally recognized government, which happened in September 2014. Following their takeover of Yemen's capital, Sana'a, the Houthis, backed by Iran, imposed a fundamentalist, sectarian, brutal, and repressive regime that dashed any hope for political pluralism and democratic governance in the wake of Yemen's Arab Spring. The government-in-exile then requested external military intervention, and the Saudi-led coalition responded. That Saudis also got involved because they feared that Iranian military and financial support for the Houthis would create a new and deadly proxy force for Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps within the Arabian Peninsula. There is no question that Yemen is confronting a humanitarian crisis that has been exacerbated by the entry of the Saudi-led coalition into the war. **However, much of this crisis has been manufactured by the Houthis themselves. The Houthi government's total neglect of sanitation services, and its failure to maintain and repair sewer and water infrastructure, has contributed to the deepening of the cholera epidemic. Additionally, the Houthi have confiscated food, medicine, and critical life-saving medical equipment to give to militia members or to sell on the black market at wildly inflated prices. Also, they have widely used landmines and the forced recruitment of child soldiers, many of whom are under fifteen years of age, all of which further compounds Yemen's humanitarian crisis. In contrast, areas that the Saudi-led coalition have restored to Yemeni government control do not suffer the same disastrous conditions that civilians in Houthi-controlled regions are experiencing.** Furthermore, vital U.S. interests are at stake. The Houthis have repeatedly threatened to disrupt international shipping. Earlier this year, they made good on this promise by firing on a Saudi oil tanker and a Turkish freighter carrying wheat. The Houthi militias are a sworn enemy of the United States and a tool for expanding Tehran's destabilizing influence throughout the Middle East. The Iranians have supplied ballistic missiles to the Houthis that have been launched against America's Saudi, Emirati, and Yemeni allies. For the United States to withdraw its support now would be tantamount to conceding Yemen to Iran, which would deal a serious blow to Washington's regional credibility.

[Cut Iran Takeover DA]

A2 AFF Weapons Leakage

A2 NEG

A2 Leverage

1: Nonunique: [insert NYT evidence about economic leverage]

2: Delink: Failed Reform: Walsh '18 of the New York Times writes that American pressure for reform in 2017 did not lead to a change in Saudi strategy, as they simply bombed another school-bus of children after promising stricter rules of engagement.

3: Delink: Trump Dooms: Bazzi '18 of the Atlantic writes that the Trump administration has shown little interest in using arms deals as leverage for a political settlement, and they haven't forced Saudi Arabia to take concerns about civilian deaths seriously at all.

4: Turn: Sending Signal: Bazzi '18 of the Atlantic writes that it is much more likely that Saudi Arabia accepts a peace process if it is clear that the United States won't provide Saudi Arabia the weapons to keep bombing Yemen. Prefer this analysis over their link; leverage is only useful if Saudi Arabia sees that America will actually follow throw. The status quo is a failure; Riegg '17 of Newsweek writes that currently, Saudi Arabia is willing to intervene because they think that America's politicians lack backbone because there haven't been any serious reactions to Saudi action in Yemen.

Walsh, Declan, New York Times, December 25, 2018, "Arms Sales to Saudis Leave American Fingerprints on Yemen's Carnage"
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/25/world/middleeast/yemen-us-saudi-civilian-war.html
In June 2017, American officials extracted new promises of safeguards, including stricter rules of engagement and an expansion of the no-strike list to about 33,000 targets — provisions that allowed the secretary of state, then Rex W. Tillerson, to win support in Congress for the sale of more than $510 million in precision-guided munitions to the kingdom**. But those measures seemed to make little difference. Just over a year later, in August 2018, a coalition airstrike killed at least 40 boys on a packed school bus in northern Yemen.** Still, American leaders insisted they need to keep helping the Saudi coalition. America's role in the war was "absolutely essential" to safeguard civilians, the general in charge of Central Command, Gen. Joseph L. Votel, told a charged Senate hearing in March.

Bazzi, Mohamad. "U.S. Support For Saudi Arabia's War in Yemen Will Prevent a Political Settlement." The Atlantic, The Atlantic, 30 Sept. 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/iran-yemen-saudi-arabia/571465/. // RH

The Saudis and Emiratis have largely ignored international criticism of civilian deaths and appeals for a political settlement—and the Trump administration's latest signal of support shows that strategy is working. Investigations by the UN and other bodies have found both the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition responsible for potential war crimes. But air strikes by the Saudis and their allies "have caused most of the documented civilian casualties," the UN concluded in a report last month. On August 9, the Saudi coalition bombed a school bus in the northern town of Dahyan, killing 54 people, 44 of them children, and wounding dozens, according to Yemeni health officials. For weeks, the coalition defended the airstrike, but on September 1—with the deadline looming for the Trump administration to certify Saudi and UAE efforts to reduce civilian casualties—the coalition admitted that the bombing was a mistake and that it would "hold those who committed mistakes"

accountable. **U.S. officials seized on that statement as evidence that the Saudi coalition is willing to change its behavior**. But for three and a half years now, there has been "little evidence of any attempt by parties to the conflict to minimize civilian casualties," said Kamel Jendoubi, the chair of the UN investigation team that documented war crimes. **The Trump administration has shown little interest in using arms deals as leverage for a political settlement, or to force the Saudis to take concerns about civilian deaths more seriously**. In March 2017, Trump reversed a decision by the Obama administration to suspend the sale of more than $500 million in laser-guided bombs and other munitions to the Saudi military. As more members of Congress expressed criticism of Saudi actions in Yemen, the Senate narrowly approved that sale. After the Houthis fired ballistic missiles at several Saudi cities in late 2017, the Trump administration again escalated U.S. involvement in the war. The New York Times broke the news that the Pentagon had secretly dispatched U.S. special forces to the Saudi-Yemen border to help the Saudi military locate and destroy Houthi missile sites. Frustrated by the deepening U.S. role, two dozen members of the House introduced a resolution this week invoking the 1973 War Powers Act, arguing that Congress never authorized American support for the Saudi coalition and instructing Trump to withdraw U.S. forces. **Saudi and Emirati leaders want a clear-cut victory in their regional rivalry with Iran, and they have been emboldened by the Trump administration's unconditional support to stall negotiations**. A recent UN effort to hold peace talks between the Houthis, Hadi's government, and the Saudi-led coalition collapsed in early September, after the Houthi delegation did not show up in Geneva. Houthi leaders said the Saudis, who control Yemen's airspace, would not guarantee their safe travel. Days later, **Yemeni forces loyal to the Saudi-UAE alliance launched a new offensive aimed at forcing the Houthis out of Hodeidah port, which is the major conduit for humanitarian aid in Yemen**. UN officials warn that a prolonged battle for the port and its surroundings **could lead to the death of 250,000 people, mainly from mass starvation. After the Trump administration's endorsement this month, the Saudi-UAE alliance has even less incentive to prevent civilian casualties and new humanitarian disasters. Saudi Arabia and its allies are more likely to accept a peace process if it is clear that the United States won't support an open-ended war in Yemen and won't provide the military assistance required to keep the war apparatus going**. But Trump has shown little sign of pressuring his Saudi and Emirati allies, least of all over Yemen. The only realistic check left is in Congress, where more voices are asking why the world's most powerful country is helping to perpetuate the world's worst humanitarian crisis.

Riegg, Ryan. "What is Saudi Arabia Going to Do With Its Arms Buildup?" Newsweek. March 2017. https://www.newsweek.com/what-saudi-arabia-going-do-its-arms-buildup-569277 //RJ

However, **Saudi Arabia's massive expansion of its military**—which has continued unabated for six years and involves increasing naval capabilities; troop movements in Aden, Yemen; and plans to train submarine crews in Malaysia—**indicates that hawks within Saudi Arabia may choose to use military action, particularly in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as a hedge against domestic instability caused by the kingdom's economic decline. If Saudi Arabia's economic reforms**, which include the initial public offering of its oil company (Aramco), Vision 2030 reforms and OPEC's production cuts, **all fail, which is likely, then hawks may push the kingdom toward actions that could spark a new regional war. To raise the standard of living of their citizens, all countries face a choice on whether to grow internally through production of new goods and services, or externally, through the conquest of other countries and territories.** The takfiri and theocratic form of Islam promoted by the conservative portions of Saudi Arabia's religious and political establishment is expansionist by nature. It glorifies conversion by violence and portrays all non-Muslims as inherently inferior. While not all members of the Saudi government support this form of Islam (and many actively fight against it), it is not an overstatement to say that those who wish for a more modern or tolerant form of Islam face an uphill battle in the kingdom. Many Saudi educational organizations still use textbooks that instruct Muslim students not to take Christians or Jews as friends and promote conspiracy theories that accuse Western charitable organizations (Rotary, Lions Club, etc.) of plotting to undermine Muslims. Meanwhile, the kingdom's religious establishment continues to command Muslims to "hate" Christians, Jews, "polytheists" and other "nonbelievers." More problematic than Saudi Arabia's religious glorification of violence is **the theocratic nature of the kingdom's government**, which **makes economic growth nearly impossible without violent external expansion**. Saudi Arabia is a theocracy. Religion and state are combined. Power is centralized. No other forms of faith are allowed. No other political parties are allowed. Individual choice in terms of what you can say, what you can watch and whom you can talk to (e.g., women and men cannot speak to each other without the presence of a guardian) is severely limited. Meanwhile, critical thinking in regards to religion is actively discouraged. **Because theocracy severely limits individual choice, it tends to be inhospitable to both creativity and science, both of which are crucial ingredients to economic growth. New products and services tend to be created only when you have a workforce that is free to explore ideas in a society that encourages science and creativity. Saudi Arabia**, like much of the Arab world,

is unable to retain scientists or educated workers. Thus, **despite spending billions of dollars more on education than any other country in the Middle East and North Africa, the country's potential for long-term internal growth is severely hampered by a persistent brain drain alongside a chronic failure of performance in science and math.** Additionally, as written about more extensively elsewhere, **religious restrictions within Saudi Arabia make it nearly impossible for the kingdom to diversify or grow its non-oil economy. It is very difficult to grow an economy if women cannot drive to work or speak to men and half the labor force is stuck at home due to gender segregation rules.** Meanwhile, mandatory salat (prayer time) rules close all businesses between two and four times every workday for between 15 minutes to an hour each time. During the average Saudi workday, most businesses are closed roughly 10 to 45 percent of the time for either prayer or lunch. It is nearly impossible to have an efficient economy when businesses are closed so often. The result is that, **despite its many reform efforts over the years, nearly 90 percent of Saudi's export economy remains based on oil.** Thus, as discussed in "Why the Saudis May Be Preparing for a Real War," **due to Saudi Arabia's increasing consumption of energy, as well as a steady decline in the relative importance of oil in the world economy, it is unlikely that the economy will experience sustained growth in the near term. Consequently, hawks within Saudi Arabia's political establishment may have decided to grow their economy not internally but externally, through conquest and violent expansion. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia has dedicated 13 percent of its gross domestic product to its military for six years and has become the largest per capita purchaser of weapons in the world.** At first glance, despite Saudi Arabia's military buildup over the past six years, the threat of the Saudis directly attacking one of theirs neighbors may seem most unlikely. The U.S. maintains a substantial naval presence in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, supplemented by U.S. (and Japanese) military bases in Bahrain, etc. **Ostensibly, if Saudi Arabia invaded a neighbor, the U.S. military would insist that the kingdom desist. However, if the economic situation in the kingdom gets bad enough, hawks within the Saudi establishment may be able to convince their more moderate counterparts to attack one of the kingdom's neighbors to stave off domestic discontent, especially if they can promote the idea across government that the U.S. would be unlikely to retaliate against the kingdom.** As discussed in "Why the Saudis May be Preparing for War," **it is likely that the kingdom's economic decline will continue**. Especially if its IPO of Aramco, Vision 2030 reforms and OPEC production cuts fail to live up to expectations. Thus, the probability of Saudi Arabia attacking a neighbor largely depends on four beliefs about the U.S. within the Saudi establishment: That the American people are too exhausted by 15 years of near-endless involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan to engage in another war in a country (Saudi Arabia) filled with adherents to the same form of Islam that inspired the Islamic State militant group (ISIS). That the U.S. military is too dispersed around the world and/or involved with containing Russia to engage in another war in the Middle East, making it especially unlikely that the U.S. would be willing to prosecute a successful war against Saudi Arabia since doing so would likely affect the Muslim holy sites of Mecca and Medina. Should the U.S. go to war with Saudi Arabia, the entire Muslim world might react violently in the event U.S. soldiers enter the Hijaz region, which would significantly bind the U.S. in terms of strategy and is not something the U.S. military leadership would wish to manage after four years of historically high tensions with Russia. That **the U.S. political elite lack backbone**. **For the past several years, the Saudis have funneled guns and weapons to ISIS and bombed the near-defenseless country of Yemen with impunity**. Therefore, **the Saudis may believe that they can do whatever they want and the U.S. will not react**, **especially given** Barack Obama's failure to enforce his "red line" in Syria and **speeches by Donald Trump indicating an isolationist worldview that would keep the U.S. out of the Middle East.** That the U.S. is becoming a net energy exporter. Any event that raises oil and gas prices is partially in America's interest. If Saudi Arabia starts a war in the Middle East by invading a neighbor (Yemen, Qatar, Iraq, etc.), the biggest loser outside of the region will be Europe, which will have a significant quantity of its energy supply cut off. And, unless Europe wishes to increase its already substantial dependence on Russian oil and gas, it will have few options but to import more energy from the U.S. Thus, it is not entirely within America's interest to go to war with Saudi Arabia, regardless of the kingdom's actions. Even though the European Union is a historic ally of the U.S., it is not completely within America's interest to protect European energy supplies coming from the Middle East. Especially since Trump has indicated a dissatisfaction with, as he has put, Europe not paying its "part of the bill" on its defense. It is unclear to what extent the Saudi military and political establishment holds these four beliefs. If the Saudis do not believe the U.S. will crack down on the kingdom for invading a neighbor, **there may be little that would hold the kingdom back from doing so. The political, economic and religious history of the kingdom all push for external expansion through conquest and war over internal expansion** through the production of goods and services. **Yemen is the likeliest target for invasion. The country has been bombarded by Saudi Arabia for two years now, and the Saudi propaganda machine has been mostly focused on Yemen's Houthi rebels since the beginning of the Yemeni civil war.** However, **invading Yemen is unlikely to provide Saudi Arabia a significant economic boost, unless Saudi Arabia disrupts the Bab el-Mandeb Strait**, which the U.S. Energy Information Administration refers to as

one of the seven major energy choke points in the world (3.8 million barrels of oil head to the West pass through the strait each day, along with the equivalent of 0.5-1 million barrels of natural gas). Should Saudi Arabia succeed in creating chaos and confusion in the strait through rocket attacks, its significantly expanded naval capabilities or by provoking the Houthis to attack ships in the strait, Europe will be by far the biggest loser, being deprived of over $150 billion worth oil and natural gas per year, making the Europeans more dependent on Russia, Norway, the U.S. and Saudi for their energy needs. **If the strait is disrupted, oil and gas prices will spike and the Saudi economy will profit significantly, especially since the Saudis last year quietly started expanding their East-West pipeline**. Thus, **should the strait get cut off, the only practical method for nearly all of the Gulf states to export energy to the West will be across Saudi Arabia and/or through its newly expanded East-West pipeline. Saudi Arabia often claims it is the Houthis who are threatening the strait, but the facts suggest otherwise. The Houthis have occupied multiple locations in the strait over the past two years that would have allowed them to significantly disrupt shipping, but the strait has largely remained open**, mostly because shutting it down would severely affect the Houthis' ally, Iran, which ships millions of barrels of oil and natural gas to Europe through the strait each month. **By comparison, Iranian and Pakistani vessels have been attacked by Saudi Arabia and/or its allies in Yemen on at least two occasions.** Meanwhile, there is little to no evidence that the majority of attacks on non-Saudi coalition vessels during the past two years have been carried out by Houthis. **Beyond Yemen, Saudi Arabia could target southern and eastern portions of Iraq** (i.e., parts of Al Anbar and Al Muthana), **over which it maintained significant tribal influence before Iraq's government shifted control to Shiite hands.** In terms of specific locations in Iraq, it is doubtful that Saudi Arabia would invade Iraq all the way to Iran's border. Doing so would invite a direct war with Iran and would lead Saudi Arabia to having to absorb an even greater number of Shiites, which the Saudis would not want. Rather, in terms of costs and benefits, **it is likelier that Saudi Arabia could instead attempt to disrupt the Iraq Strategic Pipeline through a few well-targeted bombs or "terrorist" operations that would raise the value of Saudi oil at relatively low cost to the Saudis.** Having a militant organization blow up pumping stations in Al Muthana or Al Anbar may seem far-fetched, but **it would not be the first time such operations have been used in Iraq effectively**. The Mosul-Haifa pipeline was blown up both by Arab gangs and the Jewish Irgun several times during the 1930s and the 1940s. Moreover, **hawks in Saudi Arabia have spent the past five years funding the militant organization Nusra Front, which**, despite its claims of wanting to overthrow the Syrian regime, **has spent more time taking over portions of Al Anbar in Iraq** than trying to fight Assad. Meanwhile, **guns funneled to ISIS from Saudi Arabia have led to significant oil supply disruptions in northern Iraq that**, according to Forbes, **have substantially benefited the Saudi regime.** However, **in the event that Saudi Arabia did invade Iraq, it** would presumably take over portions of Al Muthana and Al Anbar, which are not predominantly Shiite, are sparsely populated and **would provide Saudi Arabia** two major benefits: **Control over the oil fields in Abu Khaima, Samawa, Salman and Diwan. Permanent disruption/control of the Iraq Strategic Pipeline. Should Saudi Arabia disrupt both the Iraq Strategic Pipeline and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Saudi Arabia will have a near monopoly on the transport of Arabian oil and gas to Europe. Most Arabian energy producers will be obliged to export energy either across Saudi Arabia or via far more limited and costly African and Iranian routes**. Beyond Iraq and Yemen, **should the Saudi economic situation get bad enough, the country could also attack Qatar. Qatar holds three times as much natural gas as Saudi Arabia, and, more important, the demand for natural gas** (which burns cleaner than oil) **is quickly increasing in Europe, where natural gas imports increased by 17 percent in 2015.** While the least likely of the three scenarios, an attack on Qatar is still a possibility. **The growth of natural gas from Qatar and Iran is the greatest threat to Saudi regional power today. Should Iranian relations with the West improve, should natural gas continue to displace oil and should Saudi Arabia's economy continue its decline, then the Saudis might attack Qatar as a last resort to stop Qatari natural gas from undermining Saudi oil.**

Wald, Ellen. "Opinion | Saudi Arabia Has No Leverage." Nytimes.com. N. p., 2019. Web. 30 Jan. 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/18/opinion/saudi-arabia-economy-united-states.html // RH

As the fallout continues over the disappearance of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the government in Riyadh is putting on a tough face. If there are sanctions over the alleged murder of Mr. Khashoggi, the Saudis want the world to know, they will fight back. On Sunday, the Saudi government released a recalcitrant statement: "The Kingdom also affirms that if it receives any action, it will respond with greater action, and that the Kingdom's economy has an influential and vital role in the global economy and that the Kingdom's economy is affected only by the impact of the global economy." These are empty threats. **Saudi Arabia is not in a position to harm the United States**. In fact, when it comes to relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia, Washington has all of the leverage. American policymakers shouldn't forget that. One of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's primary objectives is to diversify the Saudi economy and wean his country off its dependence on oil. **Unemployment in Saudi Arabia is at more than 12 percent, and some 70 percent of employed Saudis work for the government. The Saudi labor ministry estimates that the economy needs to create 1.2 million jobs by 2022 to lower unemployment to a still dismal 9 percent**. But because the country lacks business experience and special expertise outside of the oil and petrochemical industries, that **won't be possible without foreign — and particularly American — participation**. That's why the Saudis have been making so many deals recently: The Public Investment Fund has partnered with AMC to open and run movie theaters across the country because AMC knows how to manage cinemas. Saudi Arabia is pursuing deals for Snap and Amazon to open facilities in the kingdom because they can offer tech opportunities. It's not just the private sector. **The Saudi government bureaucracy also relies heavily on American management expertise. Riyadh has been hiring American consultants since the 1950s**, and in recent years American firms like McKinsey, Boston Consulting Group and Oliver Wyman have worked on hundreds of projects for the kingdom. In some cases, Saudi government bureaucrats work side by side with these consultants to implement government programs. **The Saudi Public Investment Fund — the kingdom's sovereign wealth fund, which is estimated to have more than $250 billion in assets — is also closely tied to the American economy.** To name just a few of its major investments: It put $3.5 billion into Uber in 2016 and almost half a billion dollars in the start-up Magic Leap this year; it invested $45 billion in SoftBank's Vision Fund, which invests heavily in American technology start-ups; and it made a $5 billion investment with a possible growth to $20 billion in a Blackstone fund for United States infrastructure. Much of the tens of billions of dollars cannot be pulled out on a whim. These start-ups are private companies without open markets for their shares**. Prince Mohammed is building a domestic reputation with this tech portfolio, so its success is politically important, too. All of this is at risk if the dispute worsens between Saudi Arabia and the United States over Mr. Khashoggi's disappearance. Not only could the Saudis not retaliate because their economy is so intertwined with that of the United States, but they will also be susceptible to pressure**. Targeted sanctions — if it comes to that — could force consultants to withdraw or cut off the Saudi Public Investment Fund's access to the profits of its investments. **More likely, though, is that a continuing dispute would force American businesses** like AMC **to seriously reconsider involvement in the country because of negative publicity. What about oil**? Whereas Saudi Arabia could once shock the world economy by cutting oil exports or production to raise prices, it no longer has that power. **The oil market today is significantly more diverse than it was in 1973**, when Saudi Arabia and other Arab petroleum exporters unilaterally raised the price of oil and unsettled the American economy**. In fact, the United States now produces more oil than Saudi Arabia, and imports make up a smaller percentage of domestically refined crude oil**. **Saudi Arabia cannot embargo or unilaterally raise oil prices for the United States without doing greater harm to its own industry and revenues**. If Riyadh directed the national oil company, Saudi Aramco, to halt exports to the United States today, it would primarily hurt Aramco itself. Aramco owns Motiva, the largest refinery in the United States, and Motiva is more reliant on Saudi oil than any other part of America's energy ecosystem. **If Aramco tried to raise prices by cutting oil production or exports, it would face irate customers in Asia and hurt its own refineries in China and Korea, too.** We do not yet know for certain what happened to Mr. Khashoggi, but President Trump has now said that he believes the Saudi journalist is dead and that there was high-level Saudi government involvement. If the United States determines that Saudi Arabia is at fault, the Trump administration will have a real opportunity. Of course, President Trump has so far indicated that he doesn't have much interest in holding Saudi Arabia accountable. But with calls for a response growing louder on Capitol Hill, the White House should see a strategic opportunity here. The Saudis are dependent on the United States, and public opinion is increasingly against them. Already, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin has backed out of a high profile finance conference in Riyadh next week. Mr. Trump could use this as a chance to pressure Riyadh to come around on some of his real priorities: the peace deal between the Israelis and the

Palestinians that Jared Kushner is trying to broker; a resolution to the dispute with Qatar, which hosts a critical American military base; billions of dollars more in purchases from American industries.

A2 Peace Talks

1: Delink: Houthis will never commit to the negotiating table as long as Saudi Arabia continues to bomb. [Insert Feltman evidence about Houthis and peace talks]. Thus, Fenton of the New Arab writes this week that the Houthis violated the current ceasefire 700 times during January.

2: There are three reasons Saudi Arabia will never commit to peace talks in the status quo.

A: Lack of Reactions: Fenton '18 of the New Arab explains that Saudi Arabia will never abide by a ceasefire because of a lack of international impunity. Fortunately, Bazzi '18 of the Atlantic writes that ending arms sales would incentivize Saudi Arabia to commit to talks because America would send a signal that it no longer tolerates the war.

B: Oil: Fenton '18 of the New Arab writes that Saudi Arabia has long-term oil ambitions that give them an incentive to exploit Yemen's crisis. Extend the Riegg evidence from our case which says that Saudi Arabia absolutely needs to intervene to control oil in the region to save their falling economy.

C: Diversion: Behravesh '17 of Lund University writes that Saudi Arabia needs the Yemen conflict to boost domestic nationalism at home to divert away from economic and high-level political problems, which is why they will never commit to end the war.

Overall, Fenton of the New Arab writes this week that Saudi Arabia violated the ceasefire with airstrikes and missiles 3,189 times during the month of January.

3: Fenton furthers that even if peace talks did succeed, Saudi Arabia chronically intervenes in Yemen ever since the founding of the kingdom, which is why short-term ceasefires will simply not end these conflicts.

Jeffrey Feltman, November 26, 2018, is a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He was United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs from July 2012 until April 2018 and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs from 2009 to 2012, Foreigh Affairs. The Only Way to End the War in Yemen, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/1123390

For three and a half years, Saudi Arabia has insisted, with diminishing credibility, that military victory was imminent; and for just as long, the United States and other powers have largely turned a blind eye to the intervention's consequences. But the murder of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October has focused the world's attention on the kingdom's reckless conduct—including its disastrous war in Yemen. However belatedly, in October 2018, Mike Pompeo, U.S. secretary of state, and James Mattis, U.S. secretary of defense, both called for an end to the fighting and publicly expressed support for peace talks

proposed by the United Nations. But to bring a complex war such as Yemen's to a cease-fire through talks will take time, during which the country's agony and the strategic crisis in the Gulf will only deepen. **There is only one expeditious way for Saudi Arabia to end this counterproductive war, and that is to stop its military campaign unilaterally** and challenge the Houthis to respond in kind. Doing so will not end all of the fighting inside Yemen. But i**t will create the conditions necessary for peace talks to gain traction and for Yemeni leaders, supported by regional and international partners, to address the country's domestic troubles and the growing influence of Iran**. The United States should lead an alliance of powers in pushing Saudi Arabia to move first, rather than letting it drag out talks as the war rages on. AW-JAW WON'T STOP WAR-WA Charged with the difficult task of getting meaningful peace talks off the ground, Martin Griffiths, the UN special envoy for Yemen since February 2018, has focused his efforts on several fronts at once. He seeks to secure humanitarian access to the Red Sea port of Hodeidah, through which more than 70 percent of Yemen's imports flow. At the same time, Griffiths is seeking to persuade the Saudi-led coalition to refrain from air strikes in response to Houthi restraint from cross-border missile and rocket attacks. The envoy is working to build confidence on both sides through steps such as prisoner exchanges, and he is leading political talks addressing transitional arrangements and the threat of southern secession. **Griffiths' approach seems sensible.** Leaders on both sides can more easily accept (and the UN can more easily monitor) a quid pro quo cessation of Houthi missile strikes and Saudi air strikes than a comprehensive cease-fire. Griffiths is wise to begin political discussions without waiting for a cessation of hostilities or an answer to the "who goes first" question. Further, he has set forward his agenda for Yemen at exactly the moment the United States was most receptive. He seems to have won support from Trump administration officials during his recent consultations in Washington, including one with Mattis just days before the secretary of defense announced his support for peace talks at the Manama Dialogue, an annual high-profile security forum in Bahrain, sponsored by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. **But the problem with Griffiths' step-by-step negotiation strategy is that it will take too long. In Yemen, a catastrophic war drags on, and nearly half the population faces a potential famine. This is no time for bickering, yet bickering is precisely what Griffiths' process is likely to invite. That is in part because any of the belligerents could hold the negotiations hostage to unreasonable demands; and attempts to negotiate a cease-fire could easily get tangled up with the question of transitional leadership.** Unpopular and in poor health, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, the president of Yemen, is widely considered dispensable. He knows that his patrons—Saudi Arabia and the United States—would happily trade him for a solution to the conflict, and this knowledge makes him a difficult and paranoid negotiator. But replacing Hadi will be complicated. His vice president, General Ali Mohsen, is hated by the Houthis for his role in the brutal wars against them from 2004 to 2009 and distrusted by the Emiratis for being a member of Islah, Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood party. Without an obvious candidate for transitional leadership who could win support of a broad spectrum of Yemenis and their outside patrons, conditioning a cease-fire on a succession agreement prolongs the fighting. THE ROAD TO PEACE RUNS THROUGH RIYAD**Unilaterally ending its military campaig**n would serve Riyadh's interests as much as it would everyone else's. Not only **would** such a **halt stanch the bloodshed in Yemen**, it could slow or stop the slide in Saudi Arabia's global reputation**.** ***If Saudi Arabia waits to end the conflict through talks aimed at a cease-fire, the Houthis may decide that the***

kingdom loses more in a continuation of hostilities than they do. The Houthis could gain the upper hand in negotiations and hold them hostage by making unreasonable demands on the Saudis. Yet the Saudis do not seem to be moving in this direction. They answered the calls for peace from Pompeo and Mattis with more air strikes. The Trump administration's November cessation of midair refueling of Saudi-coalition flights does not seem to have changed Saudi calculations. Clearly, the United States needs other means to persuade them. There have been frequent calls [3] to suspend arms sales to Riyadh. But **Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, has pointed out that suspending the sale of military spare parts to Saudi Arabia would quickly ground the Saudi air force and be more effective**.

Fenton-Harvey, Jonathan. "Yemen needs more than peace talks and ceasefires." The New Arab. 5 December 2018. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2018/12/5/yemen-needs-more-than-peace-talks-and-ceasefires //RJ

The Trump administration, Saudi Arabia's biggest arms supplier, is clearly not serious about peace-making in Yemen either. Not only did they veto the UK-backed ceasefire resolution last month, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently defended Saudi-US ties, calling a US Senate resolution to block weapons sales to Saudi Arabia "poorly timed". Even President Trump audaciously justified continued arms sales because Russia and China would apparently sell them to the Saudis anyway. Even if they did reduce some arms sales, the US is more concerned about favourable ties with Riyadh. **Even if a ceasefire were passed, or peace talks were completed, it is likely that Saudi Arabia and the UAE will not abide, as they enjoy so much international impunity. The coalition previously ignored severe UN warnings when launching its assault on Hodeida in June. Even with the prospect of peace talks and the ceasefire resolution, fighting inside Hodeida still rages on, showing that warring factions are determined to gain leverage over each other, therefore undermining peace talks.** Yemeni hospitals still receive injured civilians, with Hodeida hospitals unable to take new patients, as they are surrounded by fighting. The Houthis have previously rejected UN-led peace efforts, claiming they were too favourable towards the coalition, and are likely to approach these current talks with scepticism. Furthermore, **the international community, especially Western backers of the coalition, have not addressed the potential long-term influence of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Yemen - which could have detrimental effects in the country even if a peace deal is forged. Saudi Arabia is supposedly looking to exploit Yemen's crisis**, having looked to build an oil-port in the south-eastern Mahra province. Western officials have reportedly discussed in private that **Saudi Arabia is aiming to build a pipeline in Yemen, through the Hadramawt province towards the Aden port.** Even Yemen's Oil and Minerals Ministry has noticed this; in September they reportedly slammed Saudi Arabia's "looting" of Yemeni oil. **Saudi Arabia has deliberately bombed Yemen's food production and agriculture, seemingly to keep Yemen weak, dependent on Saudi Arabia's patronage, and to prevent it having independence.** Meanwhile, UAE-backed militias in the south, including southern separatists and Al-Qaeda-aligned militants, threaten any peace deal. Aiming to essentially colonise southern Yemen, Abu Dhabi desires a friendly southern-state to secure its own influence in the port of Aden, giving it improved access to international trade. **All this sets the foundations for further conflict, while potentially further depriving ordinary southern Yemenis. Future international interference in Yemen from both the coalition forces and their backers will push Yemen into an even more fragile position, regardless of any peace deal.** As the war has destroyed much of the country, civilians are often left in desperate circumstances with horrific humanitarian suffering, while the enabling of powerful militant factions such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) allow gunmen to exploit the chaos. While AQAP lost territory between 2016 and 2017 after a US-backed UAE crackdown, it still has an estimated 6,000-7,000 fighters , and could easily appeal to disenfranchised Yemenis in dire conditions. **Along with AQAP, the influential Southern Transitional Council (STC) and a wide range**

of tribal factions have not been included in any peace negotiations, showing the current talks are limited. Humanitarian suffering will undoubtedly continue. Countless Yemenis have been forced to go without salaries. Food is available - to an extent - yet the main problem lies in Yemenis being able to afford it. The collapse of vital state institutions, including hospitals - half of which are not functioning - and sanitation facilities, have allowed a wide range of diseases, including cholera, to spread. As Matthew Tueller, US ambassador to Yemen, correctly argues: "The real answer to the humanitarian crisis lies in bringing about an end to the conflict in a way that will restore the institutions of the state." A combined international effort to restore Yemen's state is essential to prevent future instability and humanitarian suffering. The international role in the conflict needs to be addressed harshly. Activists including Campaign Against the Arms Trade in the UK have a court case against British arms sales to the coalition set to be heard next April, while in the US, Senate and Congressional support for ending America's support for Saudi Arabia is evidently increasing, heralded by figures such as Bernie Sanders. **Even if the conflict were to be halted soon, Saudi Arabia and the UAE could in the future intervene in Yemen if Western impunity does not end. After all, Riyadh has tried to control Yemen since the kingdom's founding in 1932, and has tried numerous times to destabilise the country, including supporting a southern split in 1994 after Yemen's 1990 unification. A simple ceasefire or peace agreement in this conflict will not prevent any future Saudi expeditions in the country, which will only perpetuate Yemen's instability.**

Fenton-Harvey, Jonathan. “Hodeida civilians despair as Yemen’s ceasefire fails.” The New Arab. 11 Feb. 2019. https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2019/2/11/hodeida-civilians-despair-as-yemens-ceasefire-fails //RJ

Both sides have been accused by the other of consistently violating the ceasefire. A Houthi report claims that **throughout January the Saudi-led coalition violated the agreement 3,189 times, through a combination of missiles, artillery shells, open fire with heavy weapons, and Saudi airstrikes. Meanwhile, the coalition and the Hadi government accuse the Houthis of breaching the ceasefire more than 700 times in the same period.** "It seems **the fighting shows no sign of ending**, and this enables the Houthis, who still control most of the city, to target any citizen they suspect of collaborating with the Hadi government or the coalition," Abdullah, a Hodeida resident, told The New Arab. "**They are attacking on all fronts too and this makes it impossible to implement the truce.** They need to retreat from all of Hodeida," he added. **The coalition still looks set to continue violence too, with the UAE** Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anwar al-Gargash, **saying the coalition was "prepared to use more calibrated force to prod the Houthi compliance with the Stockholm agreement", despite claiming a commitment to the ceasefire after several months of military assault.**

Behravesh, Maysam. “Why Saudi Arabia can’t let Yemen go.” Lund University. July 2017. https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/why-saudi-arabia-cant-let-yemen-go //RJ

Given these formidable challenges, the continuation of the Saudi-led military campaign is puzzling. **Why, after all, do the Saudis refuse to end their intervention in Yemen? Why don’t they make a final effort to conquer Sanaa and declare victory? Or let go of Yemen altogether?** The fact is that **the Saudi war in Yemen is driven by much more than territorial security reasons or simply the aspiration to “contain” Iran. It is, to a considerable extent, an “affective”, emotionally driven campaign rooted in** at least three significant political-psychological factors: 1) **revival of nationalism at home,** 2) masculinism in foreign policy making, and 3) protection of regional status **The military action against the Houthis** – which subscribe to the Zaidi branch of Shia Islam almost unknown outside of Yemen - **has arguably sharpened the sense of nationalism in Saudi Arabia, enhancing the popularity of its leaders, in particular the defence minister, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), who has marshalled the campaign from the onset. Interestingly, MBS’s recent promotion from deputy crown prince to crown prince would not be so convenient without his military**

adventures in Yemen and their impact on the Saudi national perception of him as a patriotic war hero and a determined defender of the realm. Another pertinent advantage of the intervention was its diversionary effect. It redirected public attention from the economic problems and high-level political schisms that Saudi Arabia has been grappling with since King Salman acceded to the throne in January 2015. It is little wonder that the coalition campaign in Yemen started only around two months later. Saudi foreign policy represents one of the most masculinist and patriarchal in the international community. A masculinist foreign policy may be characterised by tendencies that are conventionally associated with masculinism and male dominance such as hawkishness, aggressiveness, coerciveness, proneness to violence, compromise aversion and so on. In her groundbreaking book A Most Masculine State, Madawi al-Rasheed, a visiting professor at the London School of Economics, probes the political, religious and historical roots of patriarchy in the Saudi society and demonstrates how it has affected the lives of women and their struggle for recognition, emancipation and equality. It is equally evident in Saudi Arabia's foreign policy which usually manifests itself in its aversion to diplomacy and diplomatic solutions to conflicts, hasty recourse to aggressive measures without exhausting all non-military options, and obstinate insistence on policies whose ineffectiveness has been proven. The sudden decision to intervene in Yemen encapsulates all these tendencies quite evidently. Other examples of Riyadh's rigid patriarchal foreign policy orientation are its denunciation of political negotiations with Iran over bilateral tensions and the abrupt diplomatic and transport boycott of Qatar, a Sunni sheikhdom and former Saudi ally in the Middle East. Along parallel lines, Saudi Arabia prompted a diplomatic row with Sweden in early 2015 over a speech the Swedish feminist foreign minister Margot Wallstrom's had been invited to give at an Arab League summit in Cairo on 9 March. Saudis blocked the speech and when Sweden announced the long-anticipated termination of an arms deal with the kingdom a day later, they recalled their ambassador to Stockholm, citing Sweden's "flagrant interference" in their internal affairs, and further on mobilised the 22-member Arab League and the 57-member Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in vocal condemnation of the Swedish government. I argued back then that the Saudi reaction would probably have been different, had the ultimately undelivered speech belonged to a male politician hailing from another country such as the United States. While obviously unrelated to the Yemen war, this episode is indicative of broad tendencies in the official Saudi worldview that make it extraordinarily prone to aggressive and coercive policies. The timing of Saudi's military campaign, launched right in the thick of nuclear negotiations between Iran and world powers, is critical to understand the kingdom's motives. Betraying Saudi perceptions of its regional decline in the face of a resurgent rival, the intervention was meant, among other things, to send the Obama administration a signal that Saudi Arabia would not accommodate US overtures to Iran, and more significantly, the shifting balance of power in the Middle East. In other words, the Yemen intervention was part of Saudi attempts, since the beginning of King Salman's reign, to preserve their regional status and claims to leadership in the Muslim world, a position that has been consistently challenged over the past few years by the failure of hardline Saudi policies. For one, Riyadh's export and dissemination of Wahhabism as a means to maximise its influence abroad has helped cultivate such terrorist groups as al-Qaeda and Islamic State, which have not spared Saudi interests in their terror campaign. The perniciousness of the Wahhabi ideology has also served to tarnish the Saudi image in the region and more widely in the international community. The Saudi-led campaign to isolate and ostracise Qatar seems to be the latest instance of this passive-aggressive approach to reclaiming status and securing recognition. **It seems reasonable to argue that the Saudi Arabia's continuation of the military campaign in Yemen - against all the odds and despite its degeneration into an attritional "frozen" conflict - is less driven by "hard" national security concerns as it is by "soft" psychological factors and emotional gains, such as the boost of nationalism, surge in leadership popularity, diversion of public opinion from domestic problems, and projection of a powerful image abroad. The implications of such an argument are grim for the future of the Yemeni civil war. It suggests that the Saudi intervention will persist unabated until and unless those inherently elusive and long-term objectives are fulfilled.**

A2 Iranian/Houthi Control in Yemen

1: Turn: Iran Deal: Al-Muslimi '18 of the Center for Strategic Studies writes that with soaring inflation, tanking currencies, and socioeconomic protests across the country, Iran is banking on the nuclear deal to save its economy and cannot afford to go back to complete isolation and sanctions. Thus, he concludes that Iran is seeking to forge closer ties with Europe to counterbalance its souring relationship with the U.S. At the same time, Al-Muslimi furthers that Iran views Yemen and the Houthis only as a peripheral interest, and has only capitalized on the crisis because it is a low-cost way to bleed out Saudi Arabia. That's why Johnsen '18 of Lawfare concludes that if Saudi Arabia withdrew, Iran would cut off support for the Houthis to increase European support for the nuclear deal. The link-level weighing is easy; Iran is currently able to intervene in the conflict with no reputational cost because Saudi Arabia is perceived as the antagonist. A Saudi withdrawal would shift blame onto Iran, which is something they cannot tolerate.

2: Turn: Militia Support: Horton '17 of the Jamestown Institute writes that the Houthi alliance would fracture if Saudi Arabia withdrew from the war because the Houthis' popularity derives entirely from local militia groups who view Saudi Arabia as the larger enemy. Thus, he finds that ending Saudi involvement would curtail Houthi power considerably. Indeed, the Saba News Agency writes this month that the Hajoor tribe have already beaten back the Houthis from the Cashir district.

3: Turn: Cammack '18 of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace writes that arms sales

Al-Muslimi, Farea. "The Iran Nuclear Deal and Yemen's War: An Opportunity for EU Statecraft." Center for Strategic Studies. November 2018.
http://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/6665 //RJ

Despite this apparent reticence to engage in efforts to find a political solution, the parties to this seemingly intractable conflict are in fact all seeking a route out. They cannot do so however, without a means to save face. **The United States' exit from the Iran nuclear deal this year has offered the opportunity for exactly this.** With Washington's withdrawal and reimposition of economic sanctions, Saudi Arabia – desperate to walk away from a war that is proving increasingly costly in both reputation and treasure – can claim a victory over its archrival Iran, at a time when its forces also have an upper hand militarily in Yemen. On the other side, **Tehran is seeking to forge closer ties with Europe to counterbalance to its souring relationship with Washington. While their ties are often mischaracterized, Iran is the only state actor with the ear of Houthis and can be expected to calculate – given the peripheral importance of Yemen's war for its national interests – that collaboration with Europe to end the war could be an astute move.**

Johnsen, Gregory. “Yemen’s Three Wars.” Lawfare. September 2018. https://www.lawfareblog.com/yemens-three-wars //RJ

As devastating as this war has been, it is also—unlike the other two—**solvable**. Saudi Arabia wants to avoid the rise of a Hezbollah-like group on its southern border, and **Iran, for all its delight in Saudi missteps, is much less invested in Yemen than it is in Iraq or Syria**. When it comes to a possible Saudi-Iranian détente, **Yemen may very well be the region’s low-hanging fruit.** Such a scenario would have benefits for both sides. **Iran, which is looking to split the United States and Europe on the nuclear deal and sanctions, would demonstrate flexibility on Yemen by cutting off support for the Houthis in exchange for a Saudi withdrawal. This would be a considerable gesture toward the moderation that Europe would like to see in Iranian policy, while also bringing to an end a limited intervention that has served its purpose**. And it would provide the Saudis a face-saving end to an ugly and expensive war.

Al-Muslimi, Farea. “The Iran Nuclear Deal and Yemen’s War: An Opportunity for EU Statecraft.” Center for Strategic Studies. November 2018. http://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/6665 //RJ

With the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in May this year – and many multinational companies’ subsequently cancelling newly inked deals with Tehran – **Iran’s hopes for an economic lift fell to earth.** While hardliners in Tehran have since trumpetted that the US cannot be trusted and issued bellicose dictates directed at Washington, the government has signalled that it seeks to keep as much of the JCPOA alive as possible. **With inflation soaring, the currency tanking and socioeconomic protests rattling the country, Iran can hardly afford going back to complete isolation and sanctions. Leaders from** the UK, France, Germany and the **Europe**an Union — all signatories to the JCPOA — **have** in public and behind the scenes **shown their intent to try and uphold the deal** as well, in spite of US threats to sanction European businesses doing trade with Iran. Since the US re-imposed sanctions on Iran on November 5, Europe has stepped up efforts to establish a clearing house designed to circumvent the US-dominated banking system and enable firms to continue conducting business with Iran. While its details remain vague and feasibility dubious, such moves illustrate Europe’s calculation that the JCPOA must be somehow preserved and Tehran kept on side. At the same time, **while Iran has regularly offered public support for the Houthis in Yemen, it has actually invested little of its political, military or economic capital in the conflict. This is unlike Iraq, Syria and southern Lebanon, which Tehran views as crucial to its geopolitical positioning and security, and thus in which it has invested heavily to maintain its interests. The Houthis have been incredibly convenient for bleeding Saudi Arabia** of treasure and reputation and the Iranians have in return been happy to offer piecemeal support as the opportunities have presented themselves. **However, in the unlikely circumstance that Houthi forces folded tomorrow and the coalition “won,” Tehran would lose little.** Indeed, **Houthi officials make no secret of their viewpoint that**, given the right assurances, **they would be open to being long-term strategic partners with Saudi Arabia in Yemen.** This is where the opportunity arises to set the conditions for conflict resolution in Yemen: Riyadh’s ability to save face and Tehran’s desire to forge deeper ties with Europe open the door to effectively neutralizing the regional drivers of the Yemen conflict.

Horton, Michael. “No Exit for Saudi Arabia: The Kingdom's War in Yemen.” Jamestown, The Jamestown Foundation, 27 Nov. 2017

Despite frequent claims to the contrary, the Houthis are far from being Iranian proxies, yet Iran undoubtedly has a relationship with some in their leadership. There are almost certainly information exchanges between the Houthis and various divisions within Iranian intelligence on, among other subjects, the tactics and performance of the Saudi and Emirati militaries. Just as Israel learned about the Egyptian military’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities, Iran is learning as much as it can about Saudi Arabia’s vulnerabilities. At the same time, the Iranians are happy to sit back and watch the Saudis sink further into the abyss of an unwinnable war in Yemen, just as the Israelis were with the Egyptians. Creating What They Fear Most In a recent interview, Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman said that the war in Yemen would continue because Saudi Arabia would not allow a “Hezbollah” on its southern border

(Majalla, November 3). The irony of this is that **by continuing the war, the Saudis risk creating what they fear — an organization that evolves into a proto-state, like Hezbollah, with a formidable hybrid warfare capability**. For now, the Houthis are not Iranian proxies nor are they directed by Hezbollah. Instead, the Houthis are a distinctly Yemeni group that is narrowly focused on nationalist concerns, namely defending the country against the two pronged threat of Saudi aggression and a resurgent al-Qaeda in the south. Of course their leadership is also determined to protect and, if possible, expand their political influence and growing economic interests. By continuing the war in Yemen, the Saudis ensure that the unlikely but pragmatic alliance between the Houthis and loyalists aligned with former president Saleh remains in place. It should be noted that Saleh waged six brutal wars against the Houthis before he resigned as president in the wake of popular protests in 2011. **This alliance would likely fracture without the threat of Saudi aggression. At the very least, it would be reconfigured and the authority and influence of the Houthis, whose power base does not naturally extend beyond parts of three governorates in northwest Yemen, would be curtailed. [2] The Houthis' popularity in northwest Yemen, if one can call it that, derives mainly from their indubitable courage on the battlefield. Without a potent enemy, much of their raison d'etre would dissipate.** The Saudi war in Yemen is not only helping to keep this unlikely alliance together, it is providing the ideal training ground for an already capable organization to perfect its hybrid warfare capabilities. The alliance between the Houthis and what are the best-trained and equipped parts of the Yemeni military — most of which remained loyal to Saleh and his sons — has allowed for a fertile cross-pollination between conventional methods of warfare and guerrilla tactics. The Houthis were already masterful practitioners of guerrilla warfare, but now they have incorporated numerous field grade officers — many of whom have trained at Western and former Soviet staff colleges — into their ranks. These men bring with them an in-depth understanding of conventional tactics and heavy weapons systems.

Saba News Agency. "Agency: Hajoor Tribes take strategic areas from Houthis." February 2019. https://debriefer.net/en/news-6564.html //RJ

Hajoor Tribes have taken control over Houthi-held strategic areas in the northwestern governorate of Hajjah, said the Aden-based Saba News Agency loyal to the internationally recognized government of Yemen. The tribesmen have launched their first attack on sites where Houthi rebels had stationed themselves and shelled tribal communities in Cashir District, agency quoted a field leader as saying. "They have taken control over Mansoura Mont and Qara'a area" from Houthis. For two weeks now, armed clashes erupted between Hajoor Tribes of Cashir District bordering Amran Governorate and Houthi group, as the latter attempting to control the area. Scores have been killed and wounded from both sides.

Cammack, Perry. "Fueling Middle East Conflicts – or Dousing the Flames." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2018. https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/23/fueling-middle-east-conflicts-or-dousing-flames-pub-77548?fbclid=IwAR0GTs5ZFzj5yVS9Beb33zJb9EwcmbNItGX-pe7Hn_cQ_lDdPdV5Myqo8YU //RJ

But is there evidence that the increased provision of arms has helped to stabilize the Middle East, or even to provide victory for key allies? Unfortunately, the brutality of contemporary Middle Eastern wars suggests that **this flood of weapons has poured fuel on the fire and made conflicts lengthier as well as deadlier.** First, **arms sales to belligerents in a conflict** are seldom a decisive factor, but rather **invite a counterreaction by opposing states, thereby feeding civil wars rather than extinguishing them. U.S. and European supply to the Saudi-Emirati intervention in Yemen has coincided with Iran's increased support for its Houthi partners.**17 The provision of weapons by the United States and several Gulf states to Syrian rebels initially helped to tip the balance against the Syrian army. But **this same support also encouraged Iran to escalate its support**, and once it became clear that the Obama administration would not take direct military action against the Syrian armed forces, Russia seized an opening to intervene and defeat those same rebels, thereby decisively changing the contours of the conflict. Even worse, **arms provided to militaries in fragile or highly corrupt states can slip into the hands of terrorists, militias, and other nonstate actors. Although the Houthi rebels have reportedly received Iranian-supplied ballistic missiles, many of their ballistic missile stocks are composed of Russian and North Korean weapons originally provided to the Yemeni army and seized**

during Houthi advances in 2013 and 2014.18 A comprehensive survey by Conflict Armament Research of 40,000 combat items recovered from Islamic State fighters in Syria and Iraq suggests that more than 50 percent of their weapons were originally produced by Russia and China (many of them for the Syrian and Iraqi armies), and 30 percent originated from Warsaw Pact–era Eastern Europe. Three percent of weapons and 13 percent of ammunition were NATO caliber, presumably seized from the Iraqi armed forces during the Islamic State's advances in 2014.19

A2 Houthi Takeover

1: Turn: Asymmetric Warfare: Truitte ’18 of the Georgetown Security Studies Review writes that because the coalition has taken back territory from the Houthis, they have turned towards asymmetrical tactics like attacking maritime targets in the Red Sea. Problematically, Vaughan ’17 of the Washington Institute writes that attacks on civilian shipping in the strait would internationalize the conflict and spur other actors to intervene, thereby escalating the conflict.

Truitte, Kevin. “The Red Sea Insurgency: The Asymmetrical Houthi Threat to the Strategic Waterway.” Georgetown Security Studies Review. December 2018. http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2018/12/21/the-red-sea-insurgency-the-asymmetrical-houthi-threat-to-the-strategic-waterway/ //RJ

In March 2015, the Houthi movement and allied forces under the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh swept south from the Houthi stronghold in northern Yemen, seizing control over the capital Sanaa and much of the Red Sea coast. The Houthis and their allies drove forces loyal to Yemeni President Hadi all the way to the southern port city of Aden, where only timely intervention by a coalition of Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and supported by Egypt, Bahrain, Qatar and others managed to defend the city and reverse Houthi gains.ii **In the past three and a half years, Coalition forces have slowly clawed back territory from the Houthis and their allies**, using special forces and superior weapon systems to press their advantage. **Faced with superior forces, the Houthis have been forced to rely increasingly on asymmetrical insurgency tactics to pressure the coalition. The Houthi’s asymmetric strategy increasingly relies on attacks against maritime targets in the Red Sea from areas of the Yemeni coast they control.** The first major weapon the Houthis used effectively against warships in the Red Sea is the Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) and other anti-ship missiles and rockets. In 2016, the Houthis first used this type of missile to destroy a civilian vessel used by the Emirati military.iii Since then, the Houthis have targeted not only UAE and Saudi warships with missiles, but also American warships.iv In October 2016, Houthi missiles targeted the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Mason and the amphibious transport dock ship USS Ponce three times over the course of two weeks, prompting another U.S. Navy warship, the USS Nitze, to retaliate with cruise missiles to destroy Houthi-controlled surface surveillance radar stations on the Yemeni coast.v **Houthi missiles have also targeted civilian shipping, as indicated by a May 2018 attack that targeted a Turkish cargo ship carrying grain to a Yemeni port.**vi

Vaughan and Henderson 3/1 (Jeremy, US Navy Commander, and Simon, Director at the Washington Institute’s Gulf and Energy Policy Program, 3-1-2017, “Bab al-Mandab Shipping Chokepoint Under Threat”, The Washington Institute, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/bab-al-mandab-shipping-chokepoint-under-threat) *BS 11-19-2017*

On February 9, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence issued an alert warning commercial vessels about the risk of mines in the Bab al-Mandab Strait: "The U.S. Government has reason to believe in late January, mines were laid by Houthi rebels in Yemeni territorial waters in the Red Sea close to the mouth of Mocha harbor." The alert follows a number of other troubling incidents in the strategic waterway over the past few months. Saudi and Emirati naval vessels have been attacked while trying to enforce a blockade on the Iranian-supported Houthi rebels who control large parts of Yemen. And last October, patrolling U.S. Navy ships were targeted as well. Diplomatic efforts to end Yemen's civil war appear to be getting nowhere, and the fighting on land is largely deadlocked, though forces loyal to the internationally recognized government of President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi recently captured Mocha port near the Bab al-Mandab. Iran's motives for helping the Houthis are unclear but have the effect of challenging Saudi Arabia, which views the fighting as a proxy war. **More incidents at sea, especially involving civilian shipping, could further internationalize the conflict and spur other actors to intervene.** In terms of capability and

tradition, the leadership role in any such effort to safeguard freedom of passage would necessarily be taken by the U.S. Navy. A KEY CHOKEPOINT In a 2014 web post describing heavily transited oil chokepoints in the Middle East and elsewhere, the U.S. Energy Information Administration noted that **blocking such waterways, even temporarily, "can lead to substantial increases in total energy costs and world energy prices**." The Bab al-Mandab, which controls access to the Red Sea and the southern end of the Suez Canal, is particularly crucial at present because of Egypt's reliance on imported liquefied natural gas to maintain its electricity supplies. One LNG tanker destined for Egypt transits the strait each week. If passage were impeded, those shipments -- and all other vessels heading to Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea -- would have no alternative but to make the long voyage around the southern tip of Africa. The Bab al-Mandab is around ten miles wide at its narrowest point, where the Yemeni island of Perim protrudes into the waterway toward Eritrea and Djibouti. Under an international traffic separation scheme, northbound international shipping uses a two-mile-wide lane on the Arabian side just west of Perim, while southbound traffic uses a similar lane on the African side. Separated by just over a mile of water, the two lanes work well for international traffic but are ignored by smaller local ships and fishing vessels. More than sixty commercial ships transit the strait every day, and several passenger cruise liners use the route as well. THE THREATS **Houthi rebels have attacked warships in or near the strait on at least four occasions since last fall. On October 1, antishipping cruise missiles fired from the Houthi-controlled coastline severely damaged the Swift, an Emirati-operated troop landing and logistics ship**. In the following weeks, the destroyer USS Mason successfully defended itself against three similar attacks. The U.S. Navy launched a Tomahawk missile strike to knock out coastal radar sites that may have provided targeting information for the attacks. No further antishipping missile attacks have been reported since then, but radar sites can be rebuilt, and the Houthis' stores of such missiles have not been destroyed, so the threat remains. **Additional threats have emerged in the past few weeks and may already be affecting international shipping patterns**. The recent U.S. government warning about mines in the Bab al-Mandab advised ships to transit the strait only during daylight. **Moored mines have a notorious tendency to break free of their tethers and could ramp up the risk to all ships in the area**. Another new threat surfaced when **a Saudi frigate was attacked off the Houthi-controlled port of Hodeida on January 30**. Initially thought to be a suicide speedboat, the attacker is now assumed to have been a remote-controlled drone craft similar to the type Iranian smugglers employ to pick up contraband from Oman's Musandam Peninsula in the Strait of Hormuz, a Persian Gulf chokepoint. The UAE also has such craft (which it uses for target practice), so it is conceivable that the attack was conducted by a lost Emirati boat recovered by Iran. U.S. warships transiting the Strait of Hormuz are routinely harassed by small boats from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN), but weaponized speedboat drones, known in the military as unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), change the danger profile into a credible threat. An attacking USV must be disabled at distance from a warship's hull, a task that could prove exceptionally difficult during a swarming attack by multiple boats. Furthermore, Iran's familiarity with explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) means that such technology may soon be seen at sea. Fortunately, the difficulty in remotely placing such a narrowly focused explosive against a target's hull mitigates some of the risk; this could explain why the January 30 attack seemed to result in such minor damage, assuming an EFP was on board. Even so, an EFP-laden USV that gets through a ship's defenses could sink it.

A2 Nuclearization: Israel Scenario

1: The Middle East Monitor '18 writes that Israel is selling nuclear information to Saudi Arabia right now because they view Iran as a larger threat to the region. This postdates their evidence because Saudi Arabia and Israel's relations have normalized since 2008.

Middle East Monitor. "Israel 'is selling nuclear information' to Saudi Arabia." 31 May 2018. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180531-israel-is-selling-nuclear-information-to-saudi-arabia/ //RJ

Western security agencies believe that **Israel is selling nuclear information to Saudi Arabia**, Arabi21 has reported. According to Israeli writer Ami Dor-on, **such information will give the government in Riyadh nuclear weapons capabilities**. Writing on the News One website, Dor-on said that **the joint intention is to make sure that Iran will not be the only country in the region that possesses such weapons which threaten the security and safety of the Kingdom.** "This information should shock us," he said, "as we see the world is changing for the worse, following the race for the possession of nuclear weapons that pass right over our heads in the Middle East." Saudi Arabia no longer conceals its wish to develop nuclear weapons, the writer added. However, **General Amos Yadlin, former chief of Israel's Military Intelligence Directorate**, **has suggested that the Saudis would not wait to get nuclear capabilities**. "They will go to Pakistan, and take whatever they want," he claimed. Pakistan is a country with expertise in the nuclear field, Dor-on explained. "It has shown its willingness to transfer nuclear expertise and capabilities to Saudi Arabia within a month if the arms race in the Middle East intensifies." Apparently the former US President Barack Obama was told in 2012 about the strong possibility of the Saudis pursuing nuclear capabilities should Iran ever do so. "It can be assumed that **Israel may take the initiative to develop Saudi Arabia's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons**," Dor-on pointed out, "**and not leave it solely to Pakistan**, given the growing Saudi-Israeli relations."

A2 Offensive on Hodeidah

1: Turn: The United Nations '18 writes that an offensive on Hodeidah would kill 250,000 people.

United Nations. "A military assault on Hodeidah will almost certainly have catastrophic humanitarian impact." June 2018. http://ye.one.un.org/content/unct/yemen/en/home/news-centre/news/military-assault-hodeidah-will-almost-certainly-have-catastrophic-humanitarian-impact.html //RJ

Humanitarian agencies in Yemen are deeply worried by the likely impact of a possible military assault on the port city of Hodeidah. The UN and its partners estimate that **as many as 600,000 civilians are currently living in and around Hodeidah**. "**A military attack or siege on Hodeidah will impact hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians**," said Ms. Lise Grande, the Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen. "Humanitarian organisations have rushed to develop a contingency plan. **In a prolonged worst case, we fear that as many as 250,000 people may lose everything— even their lives**." In addition to being one of Yemen's most densely populated areas, Hodeidah is the single most important point of entry for the food and basic supplies needed to prevent famine and a recurrence of a cholera epidemic. **Close to 70 percent of Yemen's imports, including commercial and humanitarian goods, enter through the ports of Hodeidah and Saleef, just to the north of Hodeidah.**

Bachman, Jeff. "US complicity in the Saudi-led genocide in Yemen spans Obama, Trump administrations." The Conversation. November 2018. https://theconversation.com/us-complicity-in-the-saudi-led-genocide-in-yemen-spans-obama-trump-administrations-106896?fbclid=IwAR3DKyeX2xAU3Ov7A0YPRubeeSMbGG8xi6Vcx-167wc5HESmElKftrSXYNY //RJ

The attacks aren't the only way the coalition is creating a massive humanitarian crisis. **The air and naval blockade, in effect since March 2015, "is essentially using the threat of starvation as a bargaining tool and an instrument of war,**" according to the U.N. panel of experts on Yemen. **The blockade stops and inspects vessels seeking entry to Yemen's ports. That allows the coalition to regulate and restrict Yemenis' access to food, fuel, medical supplies and humanitarian aid.** In his analysis of the blockade's legality, Dutch military scholar Martin Fink writes that the blockade means "massive time delays and uncertainty on what products would be allowed to enter."