

Pranav and I affirm. Resolved: The United Nations should grant India permanent membership on the Security Council.

### **C1: Responsibility to Protect**

Since India's independence, it has viewed intervention with skepticism. Using its position inside the UN, India has been a strong opponent of UN resolutions and protocols that degrade state sovereignty and interfere in other countries' domestic issues. A hallmark of the UN's interventionist policies has been the responsibility to protect, or R2P. According to **Murray 13** at The National Interest, R2P asserts that nations in conflict should cede control to the UN to unilaterally intervene in a state's affairs. **Gifkins '16** of Manchester University finds that the Security Council has increasingly invoked the harmful principle of R2P since the 2011 Libya intervention. Fortunately, **Jaganathan '14** of the CSD Journal writes that India objects to the principles of R2P because it infringes on its values concerning state's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thus, **Hall '13** of the Australian National University furthers that Indian government's diametrically opposing stance to R2P is unlikely to shift in the future. Furthermore, **Bershidsky 15** of Bloomberg finds that India has been classified as a state that is likely to oppose R2P in an expanded security council, which is especially critical considering that the current dynamic of the UNSC, which is in majority terms dominated by states favorable to R2P. Thus, if granted a permanent seat, India could use permanent membership in the security council to build a coalition of opposition to the expansion of R2P, ultimately preserving security and safety across the globe.

In fact, R2P intervention has empirically backfired. **Kuperman 13** at JHU SAIS reports that R2P intervention in Libya killed 1000 civilians and increased violence and humanitarian abuse several fold. **Bramlett 18**, researcher at the Borgen Project finds that R2P operations reignited the Libyan slave trade and displaced hundreds of thousands of war ravaged native peoples.

Overall, intervention leads to cycles of humanitarian abuse and kills civilians. Intervention allows worse regimes to fill in the gap. **Kuperman 13** continues that in R2P case studies rebel groups benefit from intervention and increases risk to civilians. For example, **Harvey 16**, a non for profit journalist finds that intervention led to the creation of ISIS in Iraq It creates worse instability. **Ahmar 17**, at the University of Karachi corroborates that intervention creates worse humanitarian problems and creates unstable institutions. **Fettweis 11** at Tulane University concludes in a study spanning 13 years that the data suggests that intervention leads to more global instability. Overall, **Daalder 15 for the AC Voice** finds that recent US intervention has taking upwards of 300,000 lives.

### **C2: Foreign Aid**

In the United Nations security council, larger developed nations often trade foreign aid and economic support to developing nations in exchange for their support on key issues.

Historically, when a new developing country joins the Security Council, the United States steps up in humanitarian contributions in response. In fact, **Dreher 06** of the Karls University writes that when a country gets a permanent Security Council seat, average US aid increases by 54 percent. The incentive to contribute aid exists to a higher degree when India is a permanent member of the security council, as **Werker 05** of the Journal of Political Economy finds that the incentive to leverage aid with permanent security council members is even higher than for non-permanent members, as they have a higher concentration of power due to their respective vetoes.

Although some forms of aid can hurt the economy and corrupt local officials, US aid to India specifically helps the Indian people because the aid increases Indian access to healthcare and simply supplements the local economy. **Ayres 17** for CFR writes that the Trump administration has focused its aid initiatives in India around healthcare, streamlining US aid flows towards health related reasons. Healthcare aid is critical to preventing loss of life. A report from [USAID](#) found in **2018** reports that by combatting the effects of malnutrition, TB, and maternal and child mortality, US AID to India is directly responsible for saving the lives of 2.1 million children in India since the 90's, and an additional 2 million total lives every year.

## Still support for R2P

Gifkins, Jesse. "R2P in the UN Security Council: Darfur, Libya, and Beyond." Manchester. 2016//SK

[https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/files/60023708/R2P\\_in\\_the\\_UN\\_Security\\_Council\\_Darfur\\_Libya\\_and\\_Beyond\\_prepublication\\_version.pdf](https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/files/60023708/R2P_in_the_UN_Security_Council_Darfur_Libya_and_Beyond_prepublication_version.pdf)

**Many have argued that there has been a backlash against R2P after the Libyan intervention.** For example, Gareth Evans argued that 'consensus fell away' after Libya (2012). Likewise, Ramesh Thakur has said that the international consensus on R2P has been damaged by the Libyan intervention (2013: 72). Graham Cronogue took this a step further and argued 'The legacy of NATO's overreach in Libya will make Russia and China extremely hesitant to approve the Responsibility to Protect in the future' (2012: 151). While NATO's actions in Libya, particularly on regime change, have been contentious these arguments assume that there was more consensus on R2P in the Security Council before the Arab Spring than there was afterwards. **Some have challenged this argument by showing that the Security Council used R2P in resolutions more often in the two years after Libya than it had used it prior to 2011** (Bellamy, 2014: 26; Weiss, 2014: 10). Frequent use of R2P language is part of the change, but the ease and speed with which R2P language has been included in Council resolutions since Libya also represents a significant shift. To demonstrate the depth of this change, this article draws on the case of Darfur. Libyan Resolution 1970 was the second country-specific resolution to include language on R2P, while Darfur Resolution 1706 was the first. It took six months to negotiate Resolution 1706 on Darfur in 2006, and language on R2P proved to be one of the most difficult aspects. The following year, there was insufficient agreement to refer to R2P again in a resolution on Darfur, and this language was removed from an early draft. This contrasts strongly with the period from 2011 onwards, beginning with Libya, where the Council has routinely included language on R2P in resolutions. These negotiations have been quick and language on R2P has not been a major obstacle in the negotiations. **Language on R2P has become more acceptable to Security Council members over time, and the Libyan resolutions in 2011 mark the turning point.** This article focuses on the way language on R2P has been used in Security Council resolutions and how it has changed over time. Resolutions are the strongest form of decision the Security Council makes, and can be legally binding, but this article analyses the politics of drafting resolutions rather than their legal effects.<sup>ii</sup> While there is literature which discusses the language of specific Council resolutions, there have been few sustained studies on the language in Security Council resolutions more broadly.<sup>iii</sup> To analyse the politics of language in Security Council negotiations – and R2P language more specifically – this article proceeds in two parts. The first section discusses the significance of language within the Security Council, which can be resistant to innovation, but new language can become routinized over time. The second section takes a chronological approach to the Security Council's use of language on R2P in resolutions, divided into three phases of the Council's engagement with R2P: from the early stages of R2P in 2001 to 2006; 2007–2010 when R2P was rarely cited; and 2011–2014 with regular language on R2P from the Libyan resolutions onwards. In doing so I show that language on R2P was highly divisive and rarely used by the Council until 2011, and it has been used more frequently since and negotiations have been easier and quicker.

## Fire don't like R2P card

Jaganathan, Madhan. "Singing the tune of sovereignty? India and the responsibility to protect." CSD Journal. 6/30/14

What explains India's perspective and position on R2P? The existing literature on the subject is useful but only to a limited extent. The first strand of explanation interprets India's stance on R2P in particular and its behaviour in general as characterised by 'ambiguity' or 'ambivalence'.

India's perspective on R2P is clearly unambiguous. **The central tendency of India's stance is revealing: a clear privileging of the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity and its corollary, non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Where sovereign states are seen as culpable of mass atrocities or gross human rights abuses—such as the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka or Syria—India's tilt has been towards the side of caution, which implies that, above all, it favours the principle of sovereignty.** It is worth emphasising that India's

behaviour has generally defied a priori theoretical postulates. **India's position on R2P is grounded in its social and cultural roots, shaped by its historical experiences and influenced by domestic and individual-level factors. An identity-based understanding may be useful in shedding light on India's perspective.** To a certain extent, India is overwhelmed by how other actors (i.e. states) perceive it currently; a rising or an emerging power is the term in vogue. Accordingly, India is conscious of its fluid identity in international society. The dilemma is whether to act 'responsibly' so as to satisfy the expectations or to carve out its own niche and become a major power on its own terms. Unlike Brazil, which has promoted the idea of RWP, India is merely responding to the discourse rather than fleshing out its own proposal. For an Indian critique of this, see Khilnani et al. An attitude of cautious support towards R2P amidst acute concerns such as the infringement of sovereignty and the legitimacy of such enterprises probably echoes this tension. **India's behaviour defies the description of the state as a unitary and rational actor. It would be futile to understand India's perspective on R2P without recognising its internal dynamics.** The deliberation over R2P has been initiated and shaped during the coalition era. India's stance on Sri Lanka is a case in point. The pressure exerted by the DMK—a political party in Tamil Nadu with whom the INC, the prime constituent of the UPA coalition government was keen to sustain the electoral alliance—was influential. India shifted the scale and voted in favour of resolutions that were mildly critical of Sri Lanka at the UNHRC in 2012 and 2013. India's turnaround yet again at the UNHRC in 2014 by deciding in favour of abstention demonstrates that domestic considerations are not just influential but tied to electoral calculations and swing considerably, thereby vacillating India's foreign policy, especially on the issue areas of humanitarian intervention and R2P.

### Adding India = No 1973

Hall, Ian. "Tilting at Windmills? The Indian Debate over the Responsibility to Protect after UNSC Resolution 1973" Australian National University. 2013//AG  
[sci-hub.tw/10.1163/1875984X-00501005](http://sci-hub.tw/10.1163/1875984X-00501005)

India voted for United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, but abstained from Resolution 1973 authorizing a no-fly zone over Libya, subsequently criticizing the NATO campaign. This stance provoked much comment within India and among foreign commentators on Indian foreign policy. Some praised it as morally superior to approving military action, which was portrayed by some as Western 'neo-colonialism'. Others, however, were critical of India's unwillingness to back intervention in Libya and the principle of the Responsibility to Protect. For the critics, **India's objections to UNSC 1973 merely demonstrated the continued weakness of the foreign policy establishment and its inability to balance power politics and ethical values.** This article evaluates these various positions, but argues that while the Libyan episode stimulated an unprecedented amount of comment in India about R2P, **it is unlikely that the Indian government or leading Indian commentators will soon shift their positions.**

Bershidsky 15 (Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 9-30-2015 "Russia's Syria move confirms UN's irrelevance", chicagotribune,  
<https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-wp-blm-nations-russia-comment-d035f168-678d-11e5-bdb6-6861f4521205-20150930-story.html>) //PSR 4-24-2019

In sheer numbers there appears to be a relative advantage on states opposing R2P in a reformed UNSC. States likely to favor action under R2P's third pillar are France, U.K., USA, Japan, and Nigeria while **states likely to oppose it and be more reluctant towards R2P as a whole are** Russia, China, **India**, South Africa, Brazil, and Egypt. A possible swing state that may favor or oppose R2P on a more ad hoc basis is Germany. This set is substantially different

to the current dynamic of the UNSC, which in its permanent seating is in majority terms dominated by states favorable to R2P.

**Murray 13** (Robert W., 8-28-2013 "R2P: More Harm Than Good?", National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/r2p-more-harm-good-8970>) //PSR 4-27-2019  
What is R2P? Put simply, **it is a doctrine calling for fundamental alterations to our concepts of national sovereignty and security.** Rather than the model of sovereignty that has dominated the international system for centuries, where states are granted legal sovereign status by virtue of being able to exercise power and authority over their people and territory, **R2P sees sovereignty as conditional upon a state's' willingness to protect its own people.**

**Jaganathan M M and Kurtz G.** Singing the Tune of Sovereignty? India and the Responsibility to Protect. 14 Conflict Security and Development (2014) 14 Pg 466.  
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14678802.2014.930591>

Throughout the 1990s, **India remained unconvinced of the rationale for humanitarian intervention.** There are several reasons for this circumspection. Primarily, **India perceived humanitarian intervention as an infringement of sovereignty and viewed the utility of the use of force in international affairs as very limited.** Also, **India continued to be sceptical of Western intervention in the light of failed promises** and high selectivity in Somalia, the Balkans and Rwanda. Lastly, India wanted to avoid becoming the target of international criticism, owing to human rights violations in its own territory, especially in Jammu and Kashmir.

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Jess Gifkins, 2016 Manchester University

It has been argued that consensus on the responsibility to protect (R2P) was lost in the UN Security Council as a result of the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011. **This argument assumes that there was more agreement on R2P before the Libyan intervention than there was afterwards. Yet a close examination of the Security Council's use of language on R2P shows the opposite: R2P was highly contentious within the Security Council prior to the Libyan intervention, and less so afterwards. Not only has the Council used R2P language more frequently since 2011, but also negotiating this language has become quicker and easier.** To demonstrate this I compare negotiations on Darfur with deliberations during and after the Arab Spring. Resolution 1706 on Darfur was the first time the Security Council referred to R2P in a country-specific resolution – and indeed it was the only country-specific resolution to refer to R2P before 2011 – making it an apt point of comparison. Via focused analysis on how the language used in Security Council resolution evolves over time, this article demonstrates that the Council has found 'agreed language' on R2P that is acceptable to members, both for thematic resolutions and country-specific resolutions. Language on R2P in Security Council resolutions has shifted from contentious to commonplace.

## **US interventionism means conflict and humanitarian crises are inevitable**

**Harvey 16**(Ryan, "Will the US Own Up to Its Role in Europe's Refugee Crisis?", Truthout, <https://truthout.org/articles/will-the-us-own-up-to-its-role-in-europe-s-refugee-crisis/>) ALH

US Involvement in Creating the Crisis Until last summer, the refugee crisis in Europe was quietly and intentionally hidden from most Americans' view. It took 3,771 deaths in the Mediterranean last year – and a photograph of a lifeless, drowned Kurdish child named Aylan Kurdi – for coverage to hit the American press. By that time, 3,000 people were arriving every day to Lesbos, and many thousands more to the other Greek islands. The irony of our ignorance should be obvious: the United States stands at the center of the situations pushing these refugees out of their homes, over mountains, around border crossings, through Turkish prison cells and onto crowded, dangerous boats. From Libya to southern Afghanistan, US interventions and occupations have led to further destabilization, violence and, in almost all cases, civil wars. A longer trail of complicity stretches back to the four decades of economic and military support that the United States has given to the Arab dictatorships challenged in the 2011 Arab Spring, and to similar support given in that same time period to a number of insurgencies that dovetailed with US foreign policy objectives. One such group, the insurgency of the Afghan Mujahideen, fought a decade-long guerrilla war against Soviet occupation in the 1980s. From Libya to southern Afghanistan, US interventions and occupations have led to further destabilization and violence. Those who came to fight in Afghanistan from abroad, many of whom received US military and economic support either from Congress or the CIA, hatched a postwar strategy of insurgency across the Arab and Muslim world, which resulted in a civil war in Algeria that took 120,000 lives. Meanwhile, other smaller rebellions caused significant fighting across the Maghreb, in northern Pakistan, Yemen, Chechnya, Albania and beyond. The group now known to the world as ISIS was created in this period by a Jordanian Mujahideen veteran named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Originally launched in Jordan, the all-but-failed organization was given a second lease on life in post-invasion Iraq, where a destabilized and fractured society made fertile soil for the hyper-sectarian ideology of Zarqawi, who helped turn anger at the US occupation into a civil war against Shiites. The sectarian state originally put in power in

Iraq by the United States escalated divisions in the country, helping fuel the other side of the 2005-2006 civil war while pushing a large, disenfranchised Sunni population further toward the open arms of groups like ISIS. A focus of the US "surge" in 2007 was working with Sunni militias to turn against this tide, but that strategy only lasted until the Iraqi state took control of the Sahwa program (Awakening Councils, or Sons of Iraq) as US troops withdrew and quickly dismantled them. Against a backdrop of electricity shortages, water contamination and continued political destabilization, ISIS, which had by then entered into the north of Syria to take advantage of the civil war there, re-entered the picture with its dramatic capturing of Fallujah, Ramadi and other key points in Iraq's Anbar Province. ISIS may be the most menacing face of Syria's civil war, but the multifaceted war includes a range of other groups, most notable the Assad regime itself, but also groups like the al-Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra and the Free Syrian Army, a "moderate" group originally formed by deserters from the regime's military. And while a civil society-based revolutionary movement continues to defend the small spaces it has been able to hold, a pipeline of US, Gulf and European money providing various factions with weapons that have helped prolong the bloodshed has helped shatter the hopes and dreams of those who first took to the streets in 2011. Though the US Congress recently canceled the public program backing such rebels, the much larger CIA program remains in operation. Alongside the US funding, US allies like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have pumped weapons, logistical equipment and soldiers into Syria to support various factions fighting in the civil war, mainly those linked with the Supreme Military Council of Syria, which includes the Free Syrian Army and other anti-ISIS, anti-Assad groups. These groups, as well as the Kurdish peshmerga (from Iraq but often fighting in Syrian Kurdistan) and the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), are often supported by bombings by the US, France, the UK, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Canada and Turkey. On the other side of that war, Russia and Iran have sustained financial and political support to the four-decade-old Assad regime, helping defend its authoritarian police state from an array of forces fighting against it. In October 2015, Russian air support joined in the fight to secure Russia a seat at the negotiation table and to bolster Assad's position in power. Though Russia announced in mid-March that it would begin withdrawing forces as a long-needed cease-fire takes effect, fighting targeting Islamist groups unaffected by the cease-fire continues in Aleppo, Syria's largest city and its financial center. The Refugee Crisis Beyond the common narrative of Arab war and repression is the other Middle East: the one that occupied Tahrir Square and Pearl Roundabout and took to the streets of Sidi Bouzid, Daraa and Sanaa demanding social justice, freedom and the end of dictatorships largely supported economically, politically and militarily by the United States. That Middle East turned upside down the US demand for "regime change" that was made infamous in Iraq, initiating a wave of protest and revolution that swept Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali (in Tunisia), Hosni Mubarak (in Egypt) and Ali Abdullah Saleh (in Yemen) from power as it inspired the world to take action against injustice and poverty. Since then, popular protests have exploded in almost every corner of the world, drawing comparisons to the revolutionary period of 1968. It's hard to analyze this wave of uprisings and protest without crediting the revolutions in the Arab world as the first spark that caught. Those who inspired the world now face a severe wave of repression, with Syria as one of the most shocking examples. Over 11 percent of the population has been killed or injured since the start of the revolt, and over 20 percent have fled the country. Syria has become the single largest source of refugees in the world. The second largest? Afghanistan. Beyond the common narrative of Arab war and repression is the other Middle East: the one that occupied Tahrir Square. The Arab allies of the United States, fully involved in the war, have taken in an astoundingly small number of refugees from Syria,

with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in last place, with zero. The United States, with its massive economy and “huddled masses yearning to breathe free” rhetoric, pledged last year to take in a mere 10,000 refugees for fiscal year 2016 – that’s .015 percent. So far, that number has only reached 955. Considering the extent to which US money has been spent killing people and destroying infrastructure in these countries — for each of the 1,700 Syrian refugees accepted into the country last year, the United States spent an estimated \$375,000 financing and arming various factions in the civil war — it’s far beyond an oversight that the United States’ borders are almost impossible for refugees from the region to enter. Even those who worked as interpreters for US soldiers in Iraq regularly make the dangerous crossing to Greece, unsupported by the governments they risked their lives to assist. The reality is that the United States is politically unwilling to help. Its wars of political and economic self-interest have always centered on a US perception of success and have always utilized a rhetoric of liberation to achieve long-sought foreign policy objectives. It has left those whose lives have been turned upside down across the Middle East — the people it claimed to be liberating when it invaded their homes — to fend for themselves in Europe or drown in the picturesque waters of the Mediterranean Sea. The message is clear: “Your liberation only matters when we need to justify our wars.”

### **Sustained intervention in Afghanistan only results in more deaths, not peace – the past decade proves that there isn’t a chance of US stability, intervention only exacerbates problems**

**Ahmar 17** (Moonis, Meritorious Professor of International Relations at the University of Karachi, Daily Times, “Afghanistan: an unwinnable war?”, accessed via ProQuest, 9-1-2017, 7-24-2018) DG

US President Donald Trump's policy speech on Afghanistan delivered on August 21 caused uproar in Pakistan, but also raised serious questions about the American resolve to win war in the conflict-ridden country. On several occasions, Trump made it clear in his speech that regardless of his earlier 'instincts' to militarily withdraw from Afghanistan, he has now been convinced by his generals that winning the war should be the thrust of US policy and in order to achieve that objective, America will need to send more forces and revamp his country's Afghan strategy. Trump's assertive policy on Afghanistan reflects the frustration on the part of White House and Pentagon that despite spending more than \$1 trillion and sacrificing 3,000 lives, America has not been able to win the war. He made it clear in his new Afghan strategy that, 'from now on, victory will have a clear definition: attacking our enemies, obliterating ISIS, crushing Al-Qaeda, preventing the Taliban from taking over Afghanistan and stopping mass terror attacks against America before they emerge.' Few days after Trump's policy speech on Afghanistan, General John Nicholson, a top US military commander in Afghanistan stated that, 'The Taliban cannot win on the battlefield; it's time for them to join the peace process. We will not fail in Afghanistan; our national security depends on that as well.' Trump's assertive policy on Afghanistan reflects the frustration on the part of White House and Pentagon. Despite spending more than \$1 trillion and sacrificing 3,000 lives, America has not been able to win the war America's longest war has a question mark as far as victory is concerned. Four major realities must be taken into account while analysing Trump's new Afghan policy and strategy. First, Afghanistan is the only country in modern history which has experienced attack and occupation by three great powers- Britain, Soviet Union and United States. While the British and Soviet interventions resulted into their withdrawal from Afghanistan, the American case has turned out to be different. British and Soviet expulsions were the result of nationalistic drive

among Afghans who have a historical rejection of foreign occupation. To a large extent, Afghans were united in their wars against the British(1839-42, 1878-1880, 1919) and the Soviets(1979-88) which is not the case as far as their 'Jihad' against the US backed foreign forces is concerned. Second, Afghanistan is 200 years older than Pakistan as in 1747, Ahmed Shah Durrani laid the foundations of modern Afghanistan by unifying various tribes under his leadership. Despite such a historical heritage, the country has not been able to settle down as a nation state because of tribal feuds, absence of a strong central government and weak state institutions and is a major destabilising factor in Central, West and South Asia. Therefore, as a fragile and failing state, Afghanistan provides a fertile ground to forces fomenting instability, violence and terrorism. In the last 16 years of their hold over Afghanistan, US and foreign forces failed to help the Kabul regime build strong institutions namely Afghan army, judiciary, executive, legislature and political parties adhering to the rule of law, accountability and justice system. The failure of governance and the absence of the rule of law is a major reality which the US President cannot overlook because despite the surge in American forces and maximisation of military operations against the Taliban, American cannot ensure victory. Third, the reality of Taliban fighting what they call foreign forces in their country cannot be undermined. Reacting to the assertion of President Donald Trump on winning war in Afghanistan, Zahidullah Mujahid, spokesman for the Taliban in Afghanistan said in a statement on August 22 that, 'if America doesn't withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, soon Afghanistan will become another graveyard for the superpower in the 21st century. The historical reality is that in modern times no foreign intervention and occupation in Afghanistan has yielded positive results. But, Trump's new Afghan policy has challenged that historical narrative because of his detailed plan to sustain American military involvement in Afghanistan unless the US wins the war. Fourth, the reality that without Pakistan's support the US cannot win its war in Afghanistan has some merit. But, President Trump instead of acknowledging Pakistan's pivotal role in America's longest war launched a forceful tirade against its questionable ally of harboring and patronising Afghan Taliban groups. Despite the fact that strong segments of Afghan society, particularly non-Pashtuns, do not support Taliban because of their barbarity, Afghanistan cannot provide space to foreign forces. It is true that compared to the US military involvement in Vietnam (1965-75), where the US lost more than 50,000 of its forces and several thousand war planes, in Afghanistan its physical casualties are not more than 3,000. If more power is used by American forces against the Taliban its repercussions may be lethal for the US in the days to come. In 1982, Vietnam Veteran Memorial was built in Washington DC to honour the services of 58,318 US soldiers who gave their lives or were missing in action while serving in Vietnam. If more bodies of US forces reach America from Afghanistan as a result of infighting against resistance groups, can one expect several years from now the building of Afghan Veteran Memorial in the US capital? Is the Trump administration prepared to fall into the tragedy of the Vietnam War as the Taliban are determined to transform their country as a 'graveyard for the US?'

### **Data disproves their interventionism impact**

**Fettweis 11** Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending \$100 billion less on defense in real terms than

it had in 1990.<sup>51</sup> To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”<sup>52</sup> On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, **even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends,** then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that **there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made** as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

## **American intervention in Afghanistan creates more violence and instability—turns case**

**Daalder 15-** writer at the AC Voice (Marc, "14 Years After the US Invasion, the War in Afghanistan is Impossible to Justify", In These Times, 10/7/15, [inthesetimes.com/article/18481/afghanistan-war-fourteen-years-later](http://inthesetimes.com/article/18481/afghanistan-war-fourteen-years-later))/NY

Fourteen years ago today, the United States and its allies launched a war in Afghanistan. Though it began with airstrikes that then-President Bush insisted were “carefully targeted,” he also emphasized that this was merely “phase one” of the War on Terror, and that “today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader.” But we never truly completed that first phase, let alone our operations elsewhere and the War on Terror as a whole. On October 3, the United States bombed a hospital in the Afghan town of Kunduz, killing 12 Doctors Without Borders staff and 10 patients, including three children. This was, presumably, just as “carefully targeted” as the thousands of coalition airstrikes and military actions that have left more than 7,260 Afghan civilians dead in the years since 2001. Looking back on the decisions that led us to invade Afghanistan, we must see that war as a failure. In our post-9/11 fear, we allowed ourselves to lash out at the world—and in so doing dealt much more harm than we had originally suffered while creating a whole new set of enemies for ourselves. Yet the war in Afghanistan still has the support of the vast majority of politicians in the United States. Across party lines and ideological differences, this war is seen as a justified conflict. Even Bernie Sanders, the leftmost candidate for the U.S. presidency, states on his website that “we entered [the Afghan] war with significant clarity of purpose and moral authority.” While the original purpose of the war may have been clear—to unseat the Taliban, but also to spread counterterror efforts throughout the world—we have since lost the way. Though the commonly cited date of the defeat of the Taliban is November 22, 2001, we still fight on. The invasion began with almost a month of airstrikes, of bombardments that alone killed hundreds of Afghan civilians. Following the ground invasion, U.S. forces were regularly cited for human rights abuses, including the torture and inhumane treatment of suspected insurgents—many of whom turned out to be innocent. The war also led to the establishment of the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, where the United States subjected Afghans to even more brutal methods of interrogation while sharply eroding whatever moral stature and post-9/11 sympathy we still held in the world. Of course, the various Afghan warlords (as well as the Northern Alliance) who received military and financial support from the United States in their fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda committed atrocities of their own, according to Human Rights Watch. Some of these warlords even went on to work with the Taliban against the new Afghan government. And according to a Brown University study, the war might be directly and indirectly responsible for as many as 360,000 deaths. Fourteen years on, the realization that we made a massive mistake may seem too little, too late. But understanding the U.S.’s failures in Afghanistan is integral to ensuring we don’t commit similar errors and atrocities in the future. When examining the sordid past of U.S. military endeavors, a pattern quickly becomes apparent: unwanted interventions result in unexpected consequences—and often new, bloody quagmires. The examples are legion. U.S. involvement in Iran helped to trigger the 1979 Revolution, turning the regional power into the fiercely anti-American authoritarian theocracy we are struggling to deal with. American arming of the mujahedeen against the Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of Afghanistan also backfired, as the insurgent group later splintered apart into a series of organizations, including the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Of course, these latter groups would attack the United States on 9/11—which would then, in

turn, provoke America's invasion of Afghanistan to root out the very same forces they once supported. For decades, the United States has sown the seeds for the new enemies again and again. This can also be seen in Syria today, where the power vacuum left in the region by the unseating of Saddam Hussein led to the rise of ISIS, a far graver threat than either al-Qaeda or the Taliban. But still, the US continues to arm and fund rebel groups and despotic regimes across the world, including in Syria. Just last month, Syrian rebels who had just graduated from American military training gave a quarter of their weapons to the al-Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. Rarely have U.S. interventions around the globe succeeded. But if you were to ask American politicians what our most recent success was, they would point to Afghanistan. On the campaign trail, Hillary Clinton—who supported the 30,000 troop surge to Afghanistan in 2009—praised the “gains that have been made there in the last 13 years.” President Obama himself said he has “always thought that we did the right thing in Afghanistan.” More recently, Obama argued that the Afghan war had succeeded. “Afghanistan has a chance to rebuild its own country,” he said. “We are safer [and Afghanistan is] not going to be a source of terrorist attacks again.” But even that promise, made in December 2014 when coalition forces officially ended the mission in Afghanistan, has not come to pass. Taliban activity is on the rise, as can be seen in the recent seizing of Kunduz that led to the Doctors Without Borders hospital strike. Even though only a few thousand U.S. troops remain in the country, it seems we are unable to avoid committing atrocities. Perhaps worse than the renewed violence is the likely American response to it: delaying the final extraction of U.S. soldiers. Originally, only 5,500 soldiers would remain in Afghanistan by the end of 2015, down from the current 9,800. By the time Obama leaves office, there were supposed to be only 1,000 U.S. troops in the country. Yet now, according to CNN, the president may leave at least one military base open, stocked with as many as 6,000 soldiers. Of course, this would be the second two-term president in a row to hand off the Afghan war to his successor—a war that officially ended on December 28, 2014. The longest war in American history just keeps growing longer, with no real end in sight.

After intervention in Libya left the state in shambles, hundreds of thousands remain displaced, slave trade reignited

Sam Bramble [researcher, Borgen Project], “Almost a Decade of Civil War in Libya Continues to Impact Civilians,” Borgen Project, April 2 2018. Available at: <https://borgenproject.org/decade-civil-war-in-libya/>

The direct humanitarian impact of the civil war in Libya is that hundreds of thousands of people across the country are now living in unsafe conditions with little access to healthcare, food, safe drinking water, shelter and education. An estimated 100,000 people are in need of international protection and 226,000 internally displaced people. A disturbing development of a slave trade has also become apparent in Libya. According to the U.N. Human Rights Council, Libyans and migrants are being detained and sold in open slave markets. Due to the split governments, no authority is able to stop the human rights abuses. Civilians in Libya continue to suffer as a result of the conflict. The desire for reform was well-intentioned, but the transfer of power following the death of Gadhafi did not go as planned. The resulting fracture of the country has thrown Libya into turmoil without any indication of ending.

Humanitarian intervention under R2P has empirically backfired

Alan J. Kuperman [assistant professor of international relations at John Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies], “Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene,” Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, September

2013. Available at: <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/lessons-libya-how-not-intervene>

The biggest misconception about NATO's intervention is that it saved lives and benefited Libya and its neighbors. In reality, when NATO intervened in mid-March 2011, Qaddafi already had regained control of most of Libya, while the rebels were retreating rapidly toward Egypt. Thus, the conflict was about to end, barely six weeks after it started, at a toll of about 1,000 dead, including soldiers, rebels, and civilians caught in the crossfire. By intervening, NATO enabled the rebels to resume their attack, which prolonged the war for another seven months and caused at least 7,000 more deaths. The best development in postwar Libya was the democratic election of July 2012, which brought to office a moderate, secular coalition government—a stark change from Qaddafi's four-decade dictatorship. Other developments, however, have been less encouraging. The victorious rebels perpetrated scores of reprisal killings and expelled 30,000 mostly black residents of Tawerga on grounds that some had been "mercenaries" for Qaddafi. HRW reported in 2012 that such abuses "appear to be so widespread and systematic that they may amount to crimes against humanity." Ironically, such racial or ethnic violence had never occurred in Qaddafi's Libya. Radical Islamist groups, suppressed under Qaddafi, emerged as the fiercest rebels during the war and refused to disarm or submit to government authority afterward. Their persistent threat was highlighted by the September 2012 attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi that killed Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three of his colleagues. Even more recently, in April 2013, a vehicle bomb destroyed half of the French embassy in the capital, Tripoli. In light of such insecurity, it is understandable that most Libyans responding to a postwar poll expressed nostalgia for a strong leader such as Qaddafi.