

Pro Blocks

Memmi OV

1. Racism impacts are a priori. Sociology professor Albert Memmi explains in 2000 “To accept... [racism] to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence... racism signifies the exclusion of the other, and... [their] subjection to violence and domination....the refusal of racism is the [pre]condition for all...morality because... the ethical choice commands the political choice, [and] a just society must be... accepted by all.”

Try or die OV

1. The Johnson evidence from the bottom of our case frames the round — there is no political will to pass reforms to get rid of racist policy in the status quo which means the neg never solves our impacts — it's try or die for the Aff, any risk of offense is sufficient to Affirm especially in the context of our Memmi evidence which says racism is the most important impact.

Racism impact OV

General

1. It's a prior ethical question — Memmi says you must first reject racism before you can make moral decisions about what the US ought to do because failing to reject racism condones the violence and exclusion that racism necessitates.
2. Magnitude and scope — Johnson says giving minorities political power solves mass incarceration which ruins the lives affects millions of minorities by taking away access to education and employment.
3. Timeframe – racism is a long-term intergenerational impact.

Turns/specific args:

O/W small states/rural neglect

1. Magnitude, rural whites have tons of other institutional mechanisms to protect their interests them but minorities don't which is why we should prioritize ending systemic discrimination
 2. Timeframe, racist policies like mass incarceration have intergenerational impacts and create things like cyclic poverty.
 3. Scope, we help minorities nationwide and create national policy shifts but you only help the subset of white voters.
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1. Turns extremism — when minorities have more political power and politicians are forced to compete for their vote no one will vote for racist xenophobic extremists.
 2. Outweighs extremists on probability — empowering minorities happens in every election, but extremists are unlikely to be elected.
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1. Outweighs recounts on probability — empowering minorities happens in every election, recounts don't.
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1. Turns “representation” — racism in the electoral system is the most fundamental violation of political equality and ensures an entire group never has adequate representation.
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1. Turns civic engagement — political engagement is bad when it only benefits racist white voters because minorities have no political power.
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1. Turns voting restrictions — racist voting restrictions are high in the squo, the Aff solves by empowering the large diverse states and urban centers to create a nationwide policy shift against voting restrictions.

AT: EC protects small states

1. No impact - They never explain what policies the president specifically can take away to hurt rural voters.
2. Other institutions will protect rural voters. Emily Badger of the New York Times furthers in 2016 that most other political institutions have pro-rural biases including state governments and congress, and empirical data has shown that pro-urban bills are more likely to be rejected. Since urban centers are discriminated against in other forms of politics it's always better to at least have one electoral system that helps them.
3. The electoral college always creates on net more neglect. Computer science professor John Koza writes in 2013 that the electoral college causes candidates to neglect the 80% of states that aren't swing states and this outweighs their argument
 - a. On scope - the electoral college ignores 80% of the country while the link to their argument concedes that rural interests are a minority of the country.
 - b. On strength of link - rural votes would at least matter somewhat under the popular vote but 80% of states literally don't matter at all under the electoral college.
4. Racism outweighs and is an impact turn; Templon says giving small rural states extra voting power harms minorities because small states are disproportionately white whereas minorities live in large states, which outweighs A, on magnitude, whites in small states have tons of other institutional mechanisms to protect their interests them but minorities don't which is why we should prioritize ending systemic discrimination, B, on scope, we help minorities nationwide and create national policy shifts but you only help the subset of small state white voters, and C, on timeframe, racist policies like mass incarceration trap entire families in intergenerational cyclic poverty.

AT: Rural Poverty

1. No solvency — they don't explain how presidents affect rural poverty — the bigger cause is state and local governments passing bad economic policy by trying to boost jobs in coal and agriculture which are unsustainable for long term economic growth.
2. We solve better - the fact that poverty rates are lower in urban areas proves those voters prefer policy that is more effective at reducing poverty, so increasing urban power will elect leaders who pass policy that's actually effective at poverty reduction.
3. Alt causes galore - rural poverty exists because it's harder to access resources in rural areas, less infrastructure, lower access to higher paying jobs, different economic policy within the state, worse healthcare systems, low food access, low education access, the list goes on — none of their evidence says the presidential election system is uniquely key.
4. Our Goodman evidence disproves the thesis of this argument — small rural states have extra power under the electoral college, which means the fact that poverty is high in the status quo despite this boost and the boost from being overrepresented in the Senate just proves the alt cause argument.

Delinks/Non-uniques

1. Non-unique, the electoral college protects swing state, not small state. Koza from case says only one of the 13 smallest states get any attention under the electoral college because their electoral votes are forgone conclusions, for example Wyoming is always going to vote Republican so candidates don't have to campaign. Timothy Noah of Slate corroborates in 2004, "it is difficult to imagine how presidential candidates could be less attentive to small states."
2. No impact. Noah continues that "the states with the smallest populations ought to have the least clout in our political system, precisely because they represent the interests of the fewest number of people."
3. Rural neglect is non-unique. Robert Speel of Time Magazine writes in 2016 that within each state, "candidates focus on urban areas where most voters live. In Pennsylvania, for example, 72 percent of Pennsylvania 2016 campaign visits to large cities, meaning rural interests still aren't represented even if candidates campaign in small states."

AT: Cities will take control

1. This argument is racist and should be rejected on face as per our Memmi evidence— our Dreyfuss evidence says urban centers are majority non-white and their argument is literally that giving minority dense areas more power is bad because it would harm the white people.
2. The case is an impact turn, giving cities all the power is good and solves racism — Beckwith says the popular vote gives power to cities which forces politicians to pay attention to the racial minorities living in cities, Johnson says giving minorities more political power creates a policy shift that solves all forms of systemic discrimination, which outweighs A, on magnitude, whites in small states have tons of other institutional mechanisms to protect their interests them but minorities don't which is why we should prioritize ending systemic discrimination, B, on scope, we help minorities nationwide and create national policy shifts but you only help the subset of small state white voters, and C, on timeframe, racist policies like mass incarceration have intergenerational impacts and create things like cyclic poverty.

Delinks (incompatible with race – responds to cities)

1. No link, computer science professor John Koza explains in 2013 that cities wouldn't control the result of a popular vote election because 85% of the nation's population live small cities or rural areas.
2. Turn, Koza continues that under the popular vote where every vote is equal, candidates would have to appeal to their entire constituency, both rural and urban, to win the election.
3. No link - small states would get attention under the popular vote. Professor John Koza finds empirically in 2013 that in popular vote races for governor and within swing states, candidates campaign in every region because every vote matters.

AT: Agriculture Policy

1. Turn it, Timothy Noah of Slate writes in 2004 that most farmers live in big states like Texas and California, so they would only get more attention under the popular vote.

AT: Cross-regional appeal

1. Non-unique – coalitions aren't diverse in the status quo, Republican's win all the rural ones in the middle and the democrats win all the big coastal states. Political science professor George Edwards confirms in 2005 that the notion that the electoral college produces candidates that appeal to a variety of regions is pure fantasy, and that nothing like that happens in the real world.
2. Non-unique, the popular vote also ensures cross-regional appeal is necessary. Andrew Prokop at Vox explains in December 2016 that the country is big and broad enough that even under a popular vote, regional candidates would need to get support outside their region to win the election.
3. Non-unique, most regions get ignored by the electoral college. Koza explains in 2013 that 4 of 5 states under the electoral college are entirely ignored by campaigns because the results in those states is a forgone conclusion. The Congressional Research Service furthers in 2014 that because the electoral college, 38 states didn't even get visits in 2012.
4. Turn, Northwestern University professor Brett Gordon explains in 2016 that because the popular vote forces candidates to win the entire nation instead of just swing states, candidates would have to adopt policy positions with more popular support since traditional campaigning like rallies and local ads only increase turnout in single areas whereas new policy positions increase turnout everywhere. Thus, Gordon finds the popular vote would force candidates to appeal to a broader voter base.
5. Racism outweighs and is an impact turn; trying to ensure cross-regional appeal requires giving power to small white states, Templon says giving small rural states extra voting power harms minorities because small states are disproportionately white whereas minorities live in urban centers, which outweighs A, on magnitude, whites have tons of other institutional mechanisms to protect their interests them but minorities don't which is why we should prioritize ending systemic discrimination, B, on scope, we help minorities nationwide and create national policy shifts but you only help the subset of the population in certain states, and C, on timeframe, racist policies like mass incarceration trap entire families in intergenerational cyclic poverty.

AT: Mandate to govern

1. No impact, there's no reason someone needs cross-regional appeal to govern, once they win, they can just pass XOs and work with Congress, Obama was super unpopular in certain regions but still passed policies like the ACA and got reelected.

AT: PV is racist

1. It's try or die for the Aff, Johnson says there isn't any political will to reform racist policy in the status quo which means the Neg never solves, Trump proves that racial progress isn't coming any time soon, so any risk that we improve conditions for racial minorities is enough to vote Aff.
2. Turn, Kathy Griffin at the University of Georgia finds in 2012 that empirically, studies that find that the electoral college helps minorities don't take into account turnout rates and use faulty premises and incomplete data, but when turnout is accounted for, black Americans are actually disadvantaged by the system.

AT: Swing states help minorities

1. If this was true Trump would have lost, but he won practically every swing state despite spewing racism and only pandering to white voters.
2. No link, Pitner says vital swing states have implemented voter ID laws to target minority voters and stop them from voting, which means none of their evidence about demographic change materializes in the real world.
3. Turn, giving power to cities is better. Ronald Brownstein at the Atlantic finds in 2015 that the most racially diverse battleground state is 80% white and each state has only gotten slightly less white since 1980. Compare this with Dreyfuss from case, who says that most urban centers are 50% non-white and that minority population growth is fastest in cities, which means it's always preferable to turn urban centers into the new swing states under the popular vote.
4. This is false, Bradford Plumer of Mother Jones writes in 2004 that the idea that the electoral college helps racial minorities in swing states is "wholly untrue" because they are not concentrated in swing states, with the only swing state with high minority concentration being Cuban Americans in Florida.
5. This is false, swing states are disproportionately white. Gelman in case says holistically, swing states are on average whiter than the national average so giving them extra voting power disempowers minorities.

AT: Tyranny of the majority/Pander to whites

1. Non-unique. Politicians already primarily focus on white people in the status-quo, Trump proves.
2. No impact, political scientist Simon Geissbuhler finds in 2015 that empirically, there are no monolithic majorities with identical opinions to enforce their will on the minority. Even if whites make up the majority, they'll split their vote between the two parties just like they always do.
3. Turn, Johnson from case says that when minorities have more political power it creates a stronger voting block that forces politicians to actually account for the concerns of minorities.
4. Winner takes all in the electoral college is tyranny of the majority, Wing says 50% of the black vote in southern states disappears because they're overwhelmed by the white voters within their state.

AT: EC favors cities which helps minorities

1. Turn, Goodman says the large states with the least voting power per person under the electoral college have high minority populations, whereas the states with the most voting power per person are the most white.
2. Empirically denied, Kathy Griffin at the University of Georgia finds in 2012 that empirically, the electoral college doesn't favor large states with large urban populations, and therefore doesn't help minorities.

AT: Swing states have lots of African Americans

1. This is false, African American studies professor Marie Campbell explains in 2016 that African Americans are concentrated in red southern states, not swing states.

AT: Swing states have lots of Latinos/Asians

1. This is false, Dave Wasserman at the Cook Political Report finds in 2015 that Latino and Asian voters are concentrated in non-competitive blue states where their votes don't matter, not swing states.

AT: More Voting restrictions

1. Status-quo solves. Law professor Anthony Gaughan writes in 2016 that “the judicial tide is moving sharply against strict voter ID laws,” with restrictions being struck down in multiple circuits and district courts.
1. Turn, status quo voter ID is worse. Christopher Keelty explains in 2016 that because swing state victory margins are small, existing voter ID laws are able to swing the result of elections, whereas under the popular vote, margins of victory would be too large for the result to be changed with voting restrictions. This means, A, the incentive to restrict voting decreases under the popular vote, and B, the impact on election results of any restrictions also decreases.
2. Turn, the incentive to pass voter ID is super high for swing states because they have low margins of victory, but under the popular vote, no individual state can determine the result of the election, so the incentive to restrict voting is comparatively lower.

States Link:

1. Non-unique. Republicans in red states already implement voter ID laws because they want to protect their jobs at all costs, minimize the amount of Democrats they send to the house, and if they have a majority, they want a super majority. William Kimberling of the FEC confirms in 1992 that because presidential elections don't occur in a vacuum there will always be incentives for some states to discourage voting.
2. Turn - the Pitner evidence from case says that since Republicans already control most swing state legislatures they are already passing voting restrictions there. Since swing states control the election, the aff is always preferable because there will at least be some states that don't have strict voting laws that start to matter under the popular vote like California and New York.
3. Turn, if you believe this argument then Democrats in blue states will now expand the vote and reduce voting restrictions. Law professor Derek Muller writes in 2012 the popular vote would cause democrats to expand voting rights to felons and noncitizens.

National Link:

1. This is short term and zero sum - when democrats control congress this will just be reversed.
2. No link - law professor Derek Muller writes in 2012 under all current proposals to implement the popular vote, states would continue to run elections and determine voter eligibility themselves, retaining power to pass their own voting restrictions.
3. No link — law professor Anthony Gaughan explains in 2016 that because Congress wants to avoid states using voting restrictions to gain a partisan advantage, nationwide voting standards under a popular vote would reject strict voter ID.
4. No link — The Congressional Research Service reports in 2005 that of the 5 proposals to reform the electoral college in one Congressional term, only ONE gave Congress the authority to determine voter eligibility.

Impact defense

1. No impact. Jason Mycoff explains in 2009 that voting restrictions such as voter-ID have “no systematic effect on turnout” as less than 0.2 percent of respondents cited restrictions as the reason for not voting and other factors are more prevalent in the decision of voters to vote. Linda Qiu of Politifact corroborates in 2014 that empirically black turnout is just as high in states with strict voter ID laws.
2. Turn, voter ID sparks backlash which increases minority turnout. German Lopez of Vox finds in 2016 that despite Republican’s best attempt to suppress minorities, study after study has found that voter ID laws have either no effect on minority turnout or cause a small increase in black voter turnout.

AT: Ingraham/UCSD-Michigan-Bucknell impact card

1. No impact — German Lopez at Vox reports in March 2017 that a follow up study found that the UCSD voter ID study was deeply flawed because it used a notoriously unreliable dataset, didn't control for important variables, and misinterpreted and miscalculated data. The follow up study found that correct analysis of the data found that voter ID had no impact on turnout.

AT: PV → Polarization

1. Non-unique, polarization is high and increasing the status-quo. Stanford researcher Didi Kuo finds in 2015 that the level of polarization in America is unprecedented and will only continue to grow in future years.
2. Racism takes out the link on two levels— A, Johnson says higher minority political power forces candidates to compete for minority votes to win the election, which means the Aff depolarizes race issues, and B, Beckwith says the popular vote forces both parties to focus on winning urban centers that are disproportionately made up of racial minorities which means Republicans get forced to the left.
3. Alt cause — the two party system causes polarization. Attorney Michael Coblenz explains in 2016 that the two party system ensures that every issue is framed in a Republican vs Democrat oppositional duality, which puts Congressional Republicans and Democrats in a death match, causing mass gridlock.
[KIMBERLING regionalists w/ PV if want to use as turn]

AT: Base Turnout

1. No link, candidates wouldn't only play to the base. Computer science professor John Koza explains in 2013 that because every vote has equal weight under the popular vote, candidates would need to solicit votes throughout their entire constituency to win instead of just focusing on their base. This is because A, democrats know people on the far left will always vote for them and vice versa, so they have an incentive to go to the middle instead of the base, and B, both parties know that they can't guarantee victory if they only focus on their base because the other campaign is doing the same thing, so they both have an incentive to try to win over voters in the middle.
4. No link - Beckwith from case says both parties would be forced to campaign in and around urban centers under the popular vote because candidates would have to focus on the densest population areas, but the Republican base is primarily in rural small states, not urban centers. Prefer this evidence — Beckwith cites Republican campaign advisors discussing what they would tell candidates to do under the popular vote, your authors are just hypothesizing about what might happen.
2. No link - the way to get people to turnout isn't to shift to a further extreme, it's to sponsor get out the vote efforts and advertise. There's no reason their actual policy positions would change. Moreover, even if candidates push to the extremes to get elected, if they don't actually believe those positions they won't be as extreme when in office.

Link turn

1. Turn, Northwestern University professor Brett Gordon explains in 2016 that because the popular vote forces candidates to win the entire nation instead of just swing states, candidates would have to adopt policy positions with more popular support since traditional campaigning like rallies and local ads only increase turnout in single areas whereas new policy positions increase turnout everywhere. Thus, Gordon finds the popular vote would force candidates to appeal to a broader group of voters, countering polarization.
2. Turn, [KOZA 11% don't matter if flow case] our turnout contention proves the popular vote would increase turnout, which solves polarization, as Paul Steenkiste of United States Common Sense writes in 2014 that with low turnout, only the most extreme and committed voters show up, so increasing turnout has a moderating effect and reduces gridlock.

IMPACT TURNS:

1. Polarization causes turnout. Political science professor Alan Abramowitz writes in 2010 that polarized candidates make it easier to choose who to vote for and make the public more enthusiastic, increasing the level of turnout.
2. Polarization reduces gridlock. Abramowitz writes that polarization increases party unity, making it easier for the majority party to pass its agenda - empirically shown with the Affordable Care Act.
3. Polarization reduces militarism. Gene Healy of Cato writes in 2011 that national unity leads to “unhealthy levels of trust in government, which in turn [enable] costly foreign adventurism.” This outweighs on scope and magnitude, as James Lucas of Global Research in 2016 finds that US international military actions have been responsible for the death of 20-30 million people.

AT: Campaign Spending / Special Interests

1. Non-unique - candidates are already raising as much money as possible in the status-quo. Government professor Ryan Enos finds in 2015 that there are no diminishing returns to campaigning because campaigns never get close to reaching every voter, meaning there always an incentive to raise more money to campaign more in swing states.
2. Non-unique - campaign spending is growing in the status-quo. Larry Shoemaker of Pew Research writes in 2015 that there is “more money in the U.S. political system now than at any time since the 1970s, with spending growing each year.
3. Non-unique — special interest influence is growing. The U Chicago Stigler Center reports in 2016 that the amount of donations from big donors is rapidly growing in the status quo, which means their impact is inevitable.
4. No link, available money is limited. Computer science professor John Koza explains in 2013 that total campaign spending is controlled by how much money political donors have available, which doesn’t change under the popular vote.
5. No link - Koza continues that since so much money is already spent in swing states candidates would just spread it more evenly instead of increasing spending.
6. No impact, their evidence is a sampling bias — white male donors give money to white conservative candidates. James Synder of MIT finds in 2002 that campaign spending has no effect on policy preferences when controlling for candidate’s initial policy positions, and if donations actually influenced policy, they would be a lot higher.
7. No link and turn, Northwestern University professor Brett Gordon explains in 2016 that because the popular vote forces candidates to win the entire nation instead of just swing states, candidates would have to adopt policy positions with more public support. Since spending only increases turnout one area at a time but new policy positions increase turnout in multiple geographical areas and thus have a larger effect on a candidate’s ability to win the election, candidates will always default to adopting better policy over allowing donors to corrupt their policy positions to get more money.

AT: Ad costs increase

1. Turn, Northwestern University professor Brett Gordon finds in 2016 that campaigns decrease spending elections that aren't close only increase spending when elections are very close because close elections can be swung by a marginal increase in spending. Critically, Gordon finds that under the popular vote, margins of victory would be much larger than margins of victory in the determinate swing states under the electoral college, so lower spending would be the norm under the popular vote.
2. Mitigate, Gordon continues that under the popular vote, candidates would pursue more free publicity in the media and thus wouldn't need to spend money on advertising.

AT: Campaign spending is racist

1. XA Wright — more political power empirically makes minorities more wealthy and helps living conditions independent of policy results — also turns their arg, minorities richer means they can be donors and shit the demographics of donors.
2. Racism outweighs A, on strength of link —none of their evidence speaks to whether more campaign money increases the chance of victory, so candidates will default to the safer option and focus on the more powerful minority voters instead of donors, and B, it short circuits their link, the truly anti-racist politicians that compete for minorities under the popular vote don't suddenly become racist when a white person donates to them and racist donors probably won't donate to the pro-minority candidate in the first place, so only the losing candidates will be corrupt, and C, changing the election system is the only way to give minorities more political power, but there are a ton of policy solutions to fix campaign spending.

Stupid Responses

1. Status-quo is solving. Amber Phillips of the Washington Post writes in 2015 that recent bills passed in Maine, San Francisco, and Seattle have turned the tide in favor of campaign finance reform across the country.
2. Alt cause — Super PACs. Shoemaker continues that Super PACs, which are legally barred from funding campaign costs, have rapidly become a major force in U.S. politics” and can raise unlimited funds to sway political outcomes.
3. No link, economist Steven Levitt finds in 2012 that doubling campaign spending only gains one percent of the vote, so big spending doesn’t cause presidential candidates to win. This means that they won’t clamor for more money because that’s not the best way to win elections.
4. Turn, Harry Enten of Fivethirtyeight explains in 2016 that in the status quo the media uses horse race coverage of the election. However, we’d argue that under the popular vote where there’s only one nationwide vote instead of individual state votes, that horserace coverage would cease and the media would start talking about candidate policy more, which decreases the need for advertising and campaigning, reducing spending.

AT: Direct democracy bad / tyranny of the majority

1. Non-unique, other elections use direct democracy. Law professor Akhil Amar explains in 2016 that US gubernatorial and Congressional elections are examples of direct democracy, which means their impact should have already happened.
2. No-link, citizens are still voting directly for their leaders under the electoral college, it just skews vote power in weird ways — there's no reason the resolution causes a complete transition to direct democracy.
3. No link – direct democracy isn't possible Law professor Richard Posner writes that “no form of representative democracy... aspires to be perfectly democratic. Certainly not our[s]. In the entire executive and judicial branches, only two officials are elected—the president and vice president.”
4. All their studies about direct democracy are talking about ballot initiatives like props in each state, not the popular vote.

Impact turns:

1. Turn, political science professor Caroline Tolbert finds in 2003 that empirically, direct democracy makes citizens feel empowered, increasing political engagement and voter knowledge.
2. Turn, direct democracy increases accountability. Political science professor Matthias Fatke explains in 2012 that because citizens have more control, direct democracy incentivises politicians to act more honestly, which is why Voigt in case finds that direct reduces corruption and helps the economy.
3. Turn, direct democracy is the only equal system. Law professor Lawrence Lessig writes in 2016 that “one person, one vote” is one of the most important democratic principles, and is key to equal citizenship.

AT: Tyranny of Majority

1. Civic engagement turns this, when voters are more informed they don't become some tyrannical oppressive mob.
2. No impact, political scientist Simon Geissbuhler finds in 2015 that empirically, direct democracy is not an instrument of the majority against the minority because there are no monolithic majorities with identical opinions to enforce their will on the minority. White people might make up 60% of the population but they split votes between Republicans and Democrats.
3. Non-unique, the electoral college is an example of tyranny of the majority. Computer science professor John Koza explains in 2013 that the electoral college's state-by-state winner-takes-all system enables 51% of voters in each state to control 100% of a state's electoral vote, thereby extinguishing the voice of the remainder of the state's voters.
4. No link, other restrictions prevent tyranny of the majority. Koza continues that tyranny of the majority is prevented by the bill of rights, governmental checks and balances, the independent judiciary, and the division of power between federal and state governments.

AT: Political instability

1. Turn, political scientist Simon Geissbuhler finds in 2015 that empirically, direct democracy has increased political stability and improved governmental legitimacy by increasing citizen trust in the government.

AT: People are stupid/make bad decisions

1. Non-unique, political scientist Simon Geissbuhler explains in 2015 that the logical conclusion of saying citizens aren't informed enough to participate in direct democracy is that they shouldn't participate in representative democracy either.
2. Turn, Geissbuhler continues that empirically, citizens that vote are well informed and direct democracy incentivizes citizens to inform themselves and participate in politics because they think they have more of an impact. Tolbert in case corroborates that direct democracy increases voter knowledge.

AT: Direct democracy helps rich people

1. Turn, political scientist Simon Geissbuhler finds in 2015 that empirically, because direct democracy is more inclusive and gives equal power to everyone, the popular vote decreases the bias toward the rich in elections.

AT: Money buys influence in direct democracies

1. Non-unique, political scientist Simon Geissbuhler finds in 2015 that empirically, the problem of money in politics is a problem that results from democracy and applies equally to representative democracies.

AT: Direct democracy causes policy failure

1. Turn, political scientist Simon Geissbuhler finds in 2015 that empirically, representative democracies have abrupt, ineffective policy shifts when a new group gains control of the government, whereas direct democracies encourage innovation that overcomes policy blockages.

AT: Swing States Good

1. Turn, Swing state voters are disproportionately agricultural or manufacturing workers who don't accurately represent the rest of the US population — there's no reason they should get more power to decide elections than others.
2. Cross apply case, swing states are disproportionately white and use harsh voter ID laws that destroy minority political power. Giving extra power to white interests ensures that systemic discrimination continues. Our racism argument outweighs A, on magnitude, whites have tons of other institutional mechanisms to protect their interests them but minorities don't which is why we should prioritize ending systemic discrimination, B, on scope, we help minorities nationwide and create national policy shifts but you only help the small subset of swing state voters, and C, on timeframe, racist policies like mass incarceration trap entire families in intergenerational cyclic poverty.
3. Turn, swing states are bad for democracy. Two reasons.
 1. Vote power. Andrew Prokop at Vox explains in 2016 that because the electoral college privileges swing states over other states, the system is fundamentally unfair and undemocratic.
 2. Policy skew. Becky Bergdahl at IPS News furthers in 2012 that unlike the popular vote, swing states under the electoral college draw unwarranted focus from candidates, undermining democracy. Because of this, computer science professor John Koza reports in 2016 that swing states receive 7% more presidential grants and exemptions.

AT: Agriculture Policy

2. Turn it, Timothy Noah of Slate writes in 2004 that most farmers live in big states like Texas and California, so they would only get more attention under the popular vote.

AT: Swing states help rural voters

1. This is false, Robert Speel at Time explains in 2016 that giving swing states priority doesn't help rural interests because when candidates campaign in swing states they focus heavily on winning the urban vote within swing states.

AT: Voter Enthusiasm

1. The difference is marginal at best — a 2012 Gallup poll found that 46% of swing state voters were enthusiastic about voting in the 2012 election, compared to 43% nationally.
2. Turn, Koza in case says swing state voters are more enthusiastic because they know their vote actually matters, under the popular vote, every state's voters matters so there's overall more enthusiasm.

AT: Informed Voters

1. Empirically, swing state voters make bad, uninformed decisions — Trump won most swing states in 2016.
2. Turn, Koza in case says swing state voters are more informed because they know their vote actually matters, but under the popular vote, every state's voters matters so there's far more informed voters.

AT: Swing states have high turnout

1. Turn — if voters with lots of campaign attention turnout more, then shifting the focus of campaigns to cities will increase turnout there — that's preferable because Dreyfuss says cities are 50% nonwhite, whereas Gelman says the average swing state is 80% white.
2. Turn — the aff increases nationwide turnout. Computer science professor John Koza writes in 2013 that under the electoral college, turnout is 11% lower in spectator states because those voters feel their votes don't matter, but under the popular vote, those 80% of Americans would become more involved.
3. No link – voters don't think they'll swing the election, they just want to express their preferences. Harvard professor Ryan Enos finds in a 2010 study that the likelihood of a voter determining the election has no impact on that individual's decision to turnout. Because of this, political science professor Scott Ashworth finds in 2006 that when controlling for demographics like gender age and race, there is no difference in turnout between swing states and spectator states.
4. No impact. Political Science Professor Robert Stein finds in 2002 that non-voters and voters have the same level of trust in government, are equally engaged in politics, and have identical policy preferences.

AT: Federalism

1. Tons of alt causes — literally every policy passed by the federal government has some effect on state power, this one change to state power doesn't reach the brightline of taking away all the states' power.
2. Non-unique, federalism is gone now which means your impacts should have triggered. Political science professor John Dinan explains in 2009 that because of the recession, power has become centralized in the federal government because people looked to them to solve the economic crisis.
3. No link, the popular vote doesn't affect state power. Computer science professor John Koza explains in 2013 that the popular vote doesn't affect the amount of power that state governments possess relative to the federal government because state power is not determined based on boundary lines for tallying presidential votes.
4. No link, federalism isn't about state power. Environmental law professor Bradley Bobertz explains in 2003 that federalism is simply a concept where power is shared between one central power and several subunits. He continues that federalist systems can give the central government far more power than the subunits or vice versa without an impact on whether the system is federalist.

AT: Conflict impacts

1. Tons of alt causes — Ben Friedman at George Washington University explains in 2014 that mutually assured destruction and globalization have reduced international conflict because MAD makes conflict suicidal, while globalization reduces the economic incentive for war.
2. No impact, John McGarry of the Federal Election Commission explains in 1994 that federalism has a poor track record of regulating conflict because minority groups don't get enough governmental representation, which incentivizes things like secession.
3. Turn, Willy Mutunga at The Nation explains in 2001 that because federalism subjects local governments to taxation by state and national governments, it fuels secessionist conflicts.

AT: Modeling

1. US federalism has existed for 200 years, which means other countries should have modeled by now and the ones that haven't probably won't in the future.
2. Modeling won't happen, government professor Alfred Stepan explains in 1999 that developing countries won't model US federalism in their transition to democracy because they are multinational multilingual regions that aren't as unified as the US was.

Impact turn:

1. Turn, federalism makes disasters more destructive. Law professor Stephen Griffin explains in 2007 that because federalism divides power between the state and federal government, it prevents long term planning and coordination to deal with the effects of natural disasters, pandemics, and terrorist attacks. The WHO finds in 2006 that natural disasters produce chaos that independently increase the spread of disease and kills millions. Ultimately, Victoria Yu at Dartmouth University finds in 2009 that new, uncureable viral strains that can undergo antigenic shifts threaten pandemic-level human extinction if disease spreads.

AT: Recounts

1. The probability of recounts is crazy low. Carl Bialik of 538 finds in 2016 that in the past 15 years, only 0.5% of statewide general elections, which use the popular vote already, had recounts. Computer science professor John Koza quantifies in 2013 that a presidential election recount would only happen once every 740 years under the popular vote.
2. Turn it, Timothy Noah of Slate writes in 2004 that the cost and logistical challenges of a recount increases as the number of votes being recounted increases, meaning there is a significantly lower incentive to do a nationwide recount under the popular vote.
3. Turn it, John Koza explains in 2013 that the electoral college splits the presidential election into 51 different state elections each with their own probability of a recount, so there is a 16 times higher chance of a recount under the current system than a national popular vote.
4. Turn it, Bradford Plumer of Mother Jones writes in 2004 that popular vote margins tend to be much wider than the total vote margin in the electoral college. For example, Clinton won the popular vote by almost 3 million, while Trump won in the deciding swing states by just 80,000 total, so recounts in swing states are far more likely than recounts under the popular vote.
5. Turn it, the popular vote would streamline the recounting process. Timothy Noah of Slate writes in 2004 that the popular vote would “necessitate imposing a uniform set of rules” about recounts, sparing us from all the controversy. This functions:
 1. As impact defense: recounts won't be problematic if we streamline the process.
 2. As offense for us: since some recounts happen in both worlds, prefer the affirmative world where they go much smoother

AT: Legitimacy impact

1. No terminal impact to legitimacy — 2000 Florida recount proves, there was massive public uproar and a Supreme Court case but nothing actually happened.
2. The Noah card takes out this impact - it indicates that under a streamlined, agreed upon recount system there would be no controversy and therefore no crisis of legitimacy.

AT: Changes the Outcome of the Election

1. Reversals are unlikely. Carl Bialik of 538 finds in 2016 that in the last 15 years there were only 3 outcome altering recounts on the state level - just over 10% over total recounts.
2. Reversals are a good thing - Timothy Noah of Slate writes in 2004 that recounts would not be catastrophic, and at least we'd actually be giving the presidency to the person that won the most votes!

AT: Court Clog impact

1. Mitigate. At worst, recounts in all 50 states means 50 court cases, one for each state, which definitely isn't enough to overload the whole judicial system.
2. No internal link. The courts that rule on legal challenges to elections are civil courts, not criminal courts, which is what their econ and enforcement impact cards are talking about.
3. Courts are already clogged, which means either the impact should have triggered or the link isn't true. Gary Fields at the Wall Street Journal explains in 2014 that judges decide cases within 4 minutes and time is in short supply because of massive caseloads from years of tough on crime legislation.

AT: Voter suppression impact

1. It's inevitable — Republicans are already trying to restrict the vote as much as possible. William Kimberling of the FEC writes in 1992 that since states host a variety of other elections for Congress and state legislature there will always be incentives for certain states to restrict the vote.

AT: Two Party System Good

1. Empirically denied. House, senate, state legislature, and gubernatorial elections are all done with a popular vote and we still have two parties in those races. Computer science professor John Koza writes in 2013 that worldwide studies of 5,000 elections show that the popular vote doesn't cause a proliferation of candidates.
2. No link. Economist Marcus Drometer explains in 2013 that major parties empirically implement higher barriers to entering the race as a candidate in response to greater electoral competition to protect the two-party system. These ballot access restrictions act as a deterrent as Thomas Stratmann finds in 2003 that a \$1,000 increase in filing fees results in a 43 percent decrease in minor party candidates.
3. No link - Political science professor George Edwards writes in 2004 that a medley of other factors such as American political culture, state ballot restrictions, federal funding statutes have created a permanent institutional duopoly that the electoral college could never overcome.
4. No link - Aaron Hamlin of The Center for Election Science writes in 2016 that the since media doesn't give any coverage to third parties they still wouldn't win under the popular vote.

AT: Runoffs link

5. No link - Political science professor Steven Rosenstone writes in 1984 that most serious proposals for the popular vote only include a runoff if no one gets 40% of the vote. He continues that because Republican voters are scared of a vote for a third party turning into a vote for the democrat and vice versa, the major parties always poll above 40% of the vote.
6. No link – Computer science professor John Koza finds in 2013 that just as individual states don't have runoffs when one presidential candidate doesn't win more than 50% of the vote in that state, a presidential popular vote wouldn't have recounts either.

AT: Regionalist candidates link / Cross national appeal

1. Voters won't vote for extremist regionalist candidates under the popular vote for the same reason they don't in the status quo — Republican voters are scared of a vote for a third party turning into a vote for the democrat and vice versa, which means regionalists won't ever gain enough support to win.
2. No link, Andrew Prokop at Vox explains in December 2016 that the country is big and broad enough that even under a popular vote, regional candidates would need to get support outside their region to win the election, which means regionalist candidates are screwed under the popular vote too.

AT: Extremist parties impact

1. Racism turns this, when minorities have more political power it means racist extremists lose the election and Johnson says minority political power forces politicians to compete for minority votes.
2. Turn, excluding extremist parties with the two party system makes them stronger. Political science professor William Downs explains in 2013 that excluding extremist parties causes them to further radicalize because they become victims of the political elite, whereas inclusion exposes extremist parties as ineffective at governance and causes them to self destruct.
3. Impact is non-unique. Trump is an extremist and he's the empirical proof of the Downs argument — his voters felt like their voices had been silenced by the political system and that propelled him to victory.
4. Turn, the two party system is more extremist. The Economist explains in 2014 that the two party system causes both parties to become more extremist as they ramp up their opposition to the other party. Stanford researcher Didi Kuo explains in 2015 surveys show that the US is more polarized than in the multiparty systems of Europe.
5. No link, Computer science professor John Koza explains in 2013 that the popular vote hasn't caused extremism in gubernatorial races, and even if it did, the extremists wouldn't win.
6. No link - Darrell Francis at The Observer explains in 2016 that empirically, extremist parties are not a threat in multiparty systems, and "countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland all have eight or more parties represented in their legislature and all are considered to be stable, well-governed democracies."

AT: Coalitions unstable impact

1. Empirically denied, Francis Darrell at The Observer explains in 2016 that coalition governments in multi-party democracies like Switzerland are very stable, and in cases of instability, that instability is due to other problems in the society, not the governing structure.

IMPACT TURNS:

1. The two party system causes the mass incarceration of minorities. Political science professor Salomon Orellana finds in 2014 that empirically, two party systems cause countries like the US to have higher incarceration rates because it encourages pandering and quick fix “solutions” by politicians who compete for who can be more “tough on crime” to gain support. Orellana continues that multiparty systems allow for the creation of niche dissenter parties that break the vicious cycle of incarceration.
2. The two party system causes political gridlock which precludes their impacts. Attorney Michael Coblenz explains in 2016 that the two party system ensures that every issue is framed in a Republican vs Democrat oppositional duality, which puts Congressional Republicans and Democrats in a death match, causing mass gridlock. For this reason, The Economist explains in 2014 that the two party system causes both parties to become more extremist as they ramp up their opposition to the other party.

AT: Closer Elections → Less Legitimacy

1. No impact to legitimacy, it's vague and intangible. Make them outline what will happen in the real world when people doubt the results of the election. Many people protested the 2000 and 2016 elections and nothing tangible happened from those legitimacy crises.
2. If anything, turn it, there's a greater legitimacy crisis when the popular vote outcome is different from the electoral college because people think their candidate's victory was stolen.
3. The probability of a close election is crazy low. David Strömberg of Stockholm University in 2008 finds using 50 years of empirical data that the chance of an election closer than 1000 votes under the popular vote is around 0.02%, or one every 20,000 years.
4. Turn it. Closer elections cause more political engagement. Political science professor Philip Jones finds in 2012 that citizens in districts with more competitive elections are statistically more likely to thoroughly research candidates voting history and therefore make better political decisions. Political science professor Patrick Flavin furthers in 2014 that closer elections also empirically lead to higher turnout, increasing the likelihood candidates actually represent popular opinion.

AT: Republican Backlash (Politics DA)

1. Non-unique, Republicans already control a large majority of state legislatures, Congress, and the Presidency, which means they're already able to pass whatever bad policy they want.
2. Republican politicians actually support the national popular vote system, so there's no reason for them to backlash. Political reporter Matthew Holloway of the Blaze reports in 2016 that legislatures in conservative states such as Oklahoma and Arizona have passed National Popular Vote Bills, and that they've been sponsored by conservative authorities such as the Arizona House majority leader.
3. Republican voters support the aff as well. Professor John Koza explains in 2013 that 66% of republican voters support a National Popular Vote.
4. Turn, the popular vote saves the democrats. Alex Seitz-Wald at NBC explains in 2017 that liberals are rapidly becoming more and more densely packed into deep blue urban areas that don't net them many electoral votes, so republicans could continue to win the electoral college for many cycles despite losing the popular vote.
5. Racism turns this, Johnson says that when racial minorities get more political power it forces politicians to focus on winning the minority vote, which means Republicans would be forced to change their policy positions to the left AND when urban centers control the result of the election it means Republicans are probably going to lose elections.

AT: Republicans turnout more

1. The people who would turn out more from a change to the electoral system are probably already turning out because they're politically engaged.
2. Turn, Bob Fredericks at the New York Post explains in 2016 that turnout is 10 to 20% lower in solidly democratic states because they know their votes won't affect the outcome, and, because deep blue states are blue by larger margins than deep red states, instituting the popular vote would increase democrats vote total.

AT: Runoffs

1. There's no reason the popular vote would require winning more than 50% of the vote — it could just as easily be implemented where whoever gets the most votes wins the election, which would preclude runoffs from ever happening.
2. No link - Computer science professor John Koza writes in 2013 that just as each individual state doesn't have runoffs when one presidential candidate doesn't receive more than 50% of the votes, there wouldn't be runoffs for the popular vote.
3. No link - Political science professor Steven Rosenstone writes in 1984 that most serious proposals for the popular vote only include a runoff if no one gets 40% of the vote. He continues that because Republican voters are scared of a vote for a third party turning into a vote for the democrat and vice versa, the major parties always poll above 40% of the vote.
4. No impact — other countries have runoffs and nothing tangible has happened.
5. Racism turns this, when minorities have more political power it makes a democrat landslide much more likely because the popular vote shifts power to democratic urban centers and Republicans can't win minorities while keeping their base, which precludes a runoff.

AT: Fraud

1. Fraud is non-existent, and there's at least some incentive for fraud in the status-quo. The Brennan Center at NYU reports in 2017 that the rate of voter fraud is .0025%, or 31 in 1 billion votes.
2. No link, there are tons of legal restrictions and election monitoring systems that prevent significant fraud.
3. No link. Computer science professor John Koza explains in 2013 that under the electoral college, there's a huge incentive to commit fraud in swing states that could control the election result but no fraud exists. Koza explains that this incentive is comparatively larger than the fraud incentive that exists under the popular vote because it's very unlikely that one vote will swing the national popular vote, each individual state has a much higher chance of being swung by one vote.
4. Turn, it's easier to swing an election using fraud under the electoral college. Koza continues that in the 2004 and 2008 elections, it would have taken 60,000 and 214,000 fraudulent votes in specific swing states to swing the electoral college, whereas it would have taken 3 million and 5 million fraudulent votes to swing the popular vote.

AT: Hard to predict link

1. This is false, computer science professor John Koza explains in 2013 that it's extremely easy to predict which states will matter under the electoral college because of the existence of battleground swing states.

AT: Constitutionality

1. No link, Amy Sherman at Politifact confirms in 2016 that the NPV compact would not abolish or eliminate the electoral college. Because the resolution requires replacing the electoral college with a direct popular vote, the NPV compact isn't how the resolution is implemented because the electoral college would still exist and the election would still be indirect instead of direct.
2. No link, Joseph Stern at Slate reports in 2016 that there is a legal consensus that the NPV compact isn't unconstitutional; the NPV doesn't violate the Compact Clause because it doesn't privilege certain states over the government or other states, it just makes state assign their electoral college delegates to vote a certain way, which they are granted permission to do by the Constitution.
3. The most probable way of passing the resolution is a constitutional amendment, as Hans Von Spakovsky at the Heritage Foundation explains in 2011 that changing or eliminating the electoral college is only possible through a constitutional amendment. He furthers that 700 bills have been proposed to Congress to amend the constitution to change the electoral college, proving this option is feasible.
4. No impact. The fact that the Supreme Court regularly overturns a ton of legislation as unconstitutional proves that A, constitutional violations are inevitable, and B, violating the constitution doesn't have tangible harms because if it did, they would have already manifested.

AT: NPV Solves the Aff

1. This non-uniqueness your whole case too — if the NPV gets passed in enough states, the election is now decided by popular vote which means all your links trigger.
2. The NPV won't get enough support to go into effect. Aaron Blake at the Washington Post reports in November 2016 that only blue states have joined the NPV, which suggests that the effort won't get enough support from red states to succeed. Nate Silver at FiveThirtyEight furthers in 2014 that the states that have signed the compact are the most democratic-leaning states in the US, which means the initiative probably won't succeed. Joseph Stern at Slate furthers in 2016 that the compact can only be passed by state legislatures, which are disproportionately stacked with Republicans in every swing state.
3. The NPV is unconstitutional, which means the Aff always has a higher chance of staying enacted instead of being rolled back by the Supreme Court. Hans Von Spakovsky at the Heritage Foundation explains in 2011 that the NPV violates the Constitution's Compact Clause in the context of a previous Supreme Court decision because A, it gives some states far more power to determine elections than others, B, it makes electors not accountable to voters, and C, it limits the conditions by which states can withdraw from the compact. Amy Sherman at the Miami Herald confirms in 2016 that if the NPV ever went into effect, it would be challenged in the Supreme Court and require Congressional approval.

AT: Reform the EC instead

1. This isn't offense. It's not a reason the electoral college is better than the popular vote, the resolution requires that the neg defend the electoral college over the popular vote in the status quo.
2. This is basically a counterplan. They don't choose to reform some specific part of the electoral college when there are zero reform efforts that will succeed in the status quo because Republicans control Congress, the Presidency, and state legislatures and are opposed to changing the electoral college.
3. Reform doesn't solve. Kathy Griffin at the University of Georgia finds in 2012 that empirically, "attempts to simply reform the Electoral College still result in the popular vote winner losing the election" when simulating the 2000 election. Griffin finds that the only way to ensure the winner of the popular vote wins the election is to use a direct popular vote.

AT: Citizens want the EC

1. This isn't a reason the electoral college is better than the popular vote for the American people. There's no impact to following the public opinion or any reason following public opinion is good.
2. Non-unique, there are tons of other policies where politicians don't follow the public, which means the Neg isn't sufficient to solve any tangible impact.
3. This is horribly ironic, they're saying we should follow public opinion for the election system we use but not follow public opinion when actually electing the president by using the popular vote.
4. Turn, popular vote is more popular. Sarah Dutton at CBS News finds in December 2016 that 54% of Americans support a constitutional amendment to implement the popular vote, whereas 41% favor the electoral college, and that this view has been consistent since 1987.

AT: Aff Must Advocate for NPV Interstate Compact

1. The most probable way of passing the resolution is a constitutional amendment, as Hans Von Spakovsky at the Heritage Foundation explains in 2011 that changing or eliminating the electoral college is only possible through a constitutional amendment. He furthers that 700 bills have been proposed to Congress to amend the constitution to change the electoral college, proving this option is feasible.
2. No link, Amy Sherman at Politifact confirms in 2016 that the NPV compact would not abolish or eliminate the electoral college. Because the resolution requires replacing the electoral college with a direct popular vote, the NPV compact isn't how the resolution is implemented because the electoral college would still exist and the election would still be indirect instead of direct.

AT: Con Con (Constitutional Convention)

1. Uniqueness overwhelms the link — all their case evidence proves that a convention is basically inevitable in the status quo, Republicans only need a tiny bit more control to make it happen.
2. We fiat that the resolution passes through a constitutional amendment in Congress. Three reasons this interpretation is preferable:
 1. Topic education. Endless bickering over the process through which the resolution is implemented trades off with debate about whether the resolution is good or bad.
 2. Real world. Policymakers don't choose the worst actor to implement a new policy, debaters shouldn't either.
 3. Predictability. A convention hasn't happened for 200 years, whereas Hans Spakovsky at the FEC explains in 2011 that the most popular proposed constitutional amendment in Congress involves electoral college reform.
 4. Aff ground. Allowing us to choose how the resolution is implemented is the only way we have stable ground, otherwise they can choose an actor or process that takes out all our links.
3. The impact is extra topical — the impact doesn't come from implementing the popular vote, it comes from the process of doing the resolution creating some external harm. Extra topicality is a voting issue — it explodes the topic and makes prep and substantive clash impossible, which ruins fairness and education.
4. No Link — A congressional amendment is more likely. Jake Novak of CNBC in 2016 specifically analyzes the two mechanisms for replacing the Electoral College and finds that a constitutional convention is less likely than a congressional amendment as it would require small states would never agree to the convention.
5. No link — Congress checks. Because a convention poses a massive threat to Congress's authority, Congress will just pass the popular vote as a constitutional amendment to stop a convention from occurring. Former federal judge Bruce Van Sickle empirically finds in 1990 that the mere threat posed by constitutional conventions was the "direct cause" of Congress proposing and passing the 17th, 18th, 22nd, and 25th amendment. Sickle concludes that congress naturally preempts the threat of conventions using constitutional amendments.

AT: Runaway convention impact

1. Bruce Van Sickle explains that the fear of a runaway convention is entirely unfounded because A, a convention can only propose amendments, it can't unilaterally pass them, and B, it would only take 13 states to oppose the changes made by a runaway convention for those changes to be nullified.
2. Republicans control all the state legislatures — they'll just control the convention agenda to stop it from becoming runaway because the state legislatures elect the convention representatives.

AT: Balanced Budget impact

1. It's inevitable — gerrymandering means Republicans will easily win another state legislature or two so that they can start a budget convention.
2. Republicans aren't stupid — only a few crazy Republicans seriously want a balanced budget because most of them are smart enough to realize that a budget amendment would tank the economy.

AT: Cuba Embargo

1. Be skeptical — None of their evidence makes the reverse causal claim that the popular vote would cause the embargo to be lifted.
2. Congress supports the embargo which proves that it isn't just Florida being a swing state in the presidential election that determines our Cuba policy. Moreover, David Francis at Foreign Policy explains in 2016 that the Helms Burton Act prevents more parts of the embargo from being lifted without Congressional approval, which means they don't have a link unless they prove Congress would change its tune under the popular vote.
3. Multiple alt causes to embargo support mean it will still exist under the popular vote
 1. Terrorism and authoritarianism. Republicans label Cuba as a sponsor of terrorism and demonize the Castro regime to justify the embargo because it feeds the broader narrative that we need a hardline foreign policy to stop terrorist threats and authoritarianism — they'll still do that under the popular vote.
 2. Helms Burton. Reggie Thompson of Stratfor explains in 2016 that the Helms Burton Act legally prevents the embargo from being lifted unless Cuba disbands multiple institutions and holds elections, which is not something Cuba will do anytime in the near future.
4. The link is false — Democratic strategist Giancarlo Sopo analyzes the 2016 electoral breakdown of Florida voting and finds that republicans aren't deterred from lifting the embargo due to Cuban-American voters for three reasons:
 1. 55% of Cuban-American voters support Obama's policies and 58% support lifting the embargo.
 2. An overwhelming majority of pro-embargo Cuban-American voters are republican for other reasons and would support a republican candidate regardless, and
 3. Due to an influx of Puerto-Rican hispanics and changing political trends, Cuban American voters no longer determine Floridan elections
 - d. Thus, Sopo finds that there was no increased support for Trump after he shifted to a more hardline agenda and concludes that pro-engagement candidates are no longer harmed in Florida for their beliefs
5. [INSERT TURNS FROM CUBA BLOCKFILE – Katz, Ashby, Barnes+CATO]

AT: Alternatives better

1. This is a counterplan. The Neg has to defend the status-quo, which is the electoral college, not some alternative voting system to the popular vote.
2. The most probable alternative to the electoral college is the popular vote because it has the most public support. Sarah Dutton at CBS News finds in December 2016 that 54% of Americans support a constitutional amendment to implement the popular vote, whereas 41% favor the electoral college. This means at best, 5% of the public favors some third voting system.

AT: Proportional Voting

1. Proportional voting is bad, as Neal Suidan at FairVote explains in 2010 that proportional voting would require rounding votes, marginalizing a large number of voters. He furthers that proportional voting would do nothing to alleviate the massive inequality in voting power between states with small and large populations.

AT: Congressional District Allocation

1. Congressional district voting is bad, as Neal Suidan FairVote explains in 2010 that congressional district voting would replace swing states with swing districts, causing candidates to focus all their attention on tiny parts of certain states and ignore the rest of the country. He furthers that because congressional district lines can be changed, district voting would encourage gerrymandering so that one party's candidate would stay in power.

AT: Ought=best option (CPs)

1. This is obviously ridiculous — if we prove that the popular vote is net beneficial to the status quo then we should win.
2. Even if the popular vote precludes other alternatives, there's no evidence that those alternatives will actually happen in the status-quo, which is what the neg has to defend, which means there's no tradeoff.
3. Turn, this framework causes policy paralysis. If we reject good policy because "there might be a better policy", literally every policy would fail because no policy is completely perfect so there's always going to be some theoretically superior policy.

AT: Need for Media Attention

1. Non-unique. Candidates always want as much media attention as possible, meaning this is still a viable strategy in the status-quo. Trump's proves this true - he used exactly this strategy under the electoral college.
2. Non-unique, it's growing the in the status-quo. Josh Nass of The Hill writes in 2016 that the free media earned by both Clinton and Trump was far greater than the free media received by Obama and Romney.
3. No tangible impact - if they are just doing it to get media they won't change their policy stance.
4. Extremists won't win just because they spread extreme discourse — there are tons of other factors that influence whether someone wins, none of their evidence says media discourse is the sole determinant of who wins.
5. Backlash to Trump means the media has changed its coverage practices — a bunch of networks have changed their policy so that they aren't giving free coverage to extremists like Trump.

NPV IS Aff Ground

1. It's topical. According to lawyer Tara Ross in 2012, "The practical effect of [the NPV] is to abolish the Electoral College," and that "With NPV in place... As a practical matter, the election would be a direct national election."
2. It's the most probable implementation of the resolution. Ross furthers that whereas a constitutional amendment would require $\frac{3}{4}$ of State Legislatures to pass, the NPV would require far fewer states—only needing to meet an Electoral Majority. Campaign Director Chris Bowers furthers in 2016 that the NPV has already reached over 60% of the requisite votes with just 10 states.

Con Blocks

ID impact OV

Voter ID outweighs.

1. Scope. Their impacts are only about presidential politics, but voter ID legally bars people from participating in local, state, and Congressional elections, thus skewing every level of government against racial minorities as per Ingraham and McElwee. AND, state and local politics are the strongest internal link to policy — law professor Heather Gerken explains in 2014 that political polarization and legislative obstacles make national policymaking virtually impossible, so the most effective way to pass policy is to use the states.
2. It's cyclic. Once voter ID passes, it ensures one party gains even more control of a state legislature and thus has more leeway to make ID laws even stricter.

Turns case:

3. Turns representation — voting restrictions specifically target racial minorities which is comparatively larger distortion of representation than geographic factors because people with lower relative voting power under the electoral college still get to vote, whereas voter ID ensures entire groups can't vote at all. That's why Erin Lee at Project Vote concludes in 2016 that strict voter ID is fundamentally undemocratic.
4. Turns racism — Ingraham says voting restrictions target and disenfranchise minorities, obviously it doesn't matter if minorities have more theoretical political power if nationwide voting restrictions legally bar minorities from voting.
5. Impact turns turnout — voting restrictions reduce minority turnout which means even if overall turnout goes up, that turnout is bad because it skews policy towards white people and harms racial minorities.

Campaign spending impact OV

Donor influence outweighs.

1. Magnitude. McElwee says donors are white males who corrupt the agenda and stop all types of equalizing policy to help women and minorities, Lioz says donors created mass incarceration which ruins the lives of millions of people of color and traps them in cyclic poverty and crime.

Turns case:

1. Turns representation — even if the voting pool is more representative it doesn't matter because the Drutman evidence says that presidents are only accountable to their donors and the preferences of most voters has no effect, campaign promises never get actualized into policy
 2. The terminal impact to representation is good policy, but the McElwee evidence indicates that donor influence causes bad policy so it doesn't matter how representative it is.
-
1. Turns racism — even if minorities political power goes up it doesn't matter because the Drutman evidence says that presidents are only accountable to their donors and the preferences of most voters has no effect, campaign promises never get actualized into policy, and the McElwee evidence says that donors are mostly white and promote racist policy.
 2. Outweighs racism on scope – the McElwee evidence says donor influence harms not only minorities but also women and the poor, so we affect more people.
 3. Turns turnout — even if more people vote it doesn't have any effect because the Drutman evidence says that presidents will only be accountable to their donors and the preferences of most voters has no effect, campaign promises never get actualized into policy.

Convention impact OV

General

1. Magnitude and scope. Super says a balanced budget amendment would tip the economy into recession and make it virtually impossible to end recessions, Caploe says the US is interconnected so domestic recessions go global and can't be ended by anyone other than the US; all your impacts are intangible and US specific whereas a convention thrusts the entire world into an unending economic disaster.
2. Reversibility. The convention would create a new constitution that would set the guidelines for our country in perpetuity – all their policy impacts are reversible.

Turns case

1. Turns representation — under a constitutional convention there is no way to guarantee we even have elections, or that every vote counts equally. Moreover, the Super evidence indicates that the wealthy would have all the power at the convention, which means our constitution would be rewritten in a way that fundamentally discriminates against the lower and middle class.
2. Turns racism — Paul Taylor at Pew Research finds in 2011 that the previous recession disproportionately harmed minorities, reducing median latino wealth by 66% and median black wealth by 53%.

DAs

Ethanol

6. Turn, getting rid of swing states stops ethanol subsidies. Eric Black at the Minnesota Post explains in 2012 that the electoral college forces candidates to use ethanol subsidies to win voters in agricultural swing states like Iowa. Ethanol reduces emissions, as Chris Prentice at Reuters reports in 2017 that a new USDA study found that corn ethanol reduces greenhouse gas emissions by 43% relative to gasoline. This solves climate change, as Patrick Bedard explains in 2006 that federal ethanol mandates can jump-start innovation to cause a switch to carbon neutral ethanol and save the earth from climate change.

Special Interests

1. Turn, the popular vote will increase the influence of special interests. USA Today reports in 2016 that because nationwide campaigns are much more expensive, the popular vote will “set off a scramble for even more campaign money, leaving candidates more beholden to special interests.” Economics professor Gene Grossman writes in 2000 that special interest groups distort the 1 person 1 vote mantra by influencing the result of the election.

Swing states turnout

1. Turn, popular vote decreases swing state turnout. Richard Posner of U Chicago writes in 2012 voters in swing states are more engaged under the electoral college than they would be under the popular vote because their influence over the election would go down. Since swing states determine the election, this helps the poor and minorities because Sean McElwee of the Atlantic writes in 2016 that minorities and the poor are the first ones to stop voting when turnout is low.

Fraud

2. Turn, the popular vote will increase fraud, undermining democracy. Hans Spakovsky of the FEC writes in 2011 that under the popular vote, fraud increases because A, fraudulent ballots can now spillover past just one state, and B, fraud is easier to commit in highly partisan areas with no opposition party poll watchers, but those areas don't matter under the electoral college. Pete Du Pont of the Wall Street Journal agrees in 2006, pointing to the popular vote in Washington state's 2004 governor's race which was swung by voter fraud.

Polarization

1. Turn it, the popular vote causes polarization. Jason Willick of the American Interest writes in 2016 that without the electoral college, there would be no incentive to try to swing middle ground voters and parties would just try to get as much base turnout as possible, greatly accelerating political polarization.

X-National Appeal

2. Turn it, cross-national appeal key to effective leadership. Law professor Michael Herz writes in 2004 that the electoral college forces candidates to gain the geographic appeal necessary to have widespread legitimacy and effectively govern. Because the popular vote doesn't account for how much people desire each candidate, it is much more important to appeal to a variety of types of people than the majority of people.

Tyranny of majority

3. Turn - the popular vote causes tyranny of the majority. Lawyer Tara Ross writes in 2004 that electoral college is designed to prevent the tyranny of the majority by forcing candidates to win a majority within individual states, but the popular vote causes mob rule.
 1. Less welfare. Because of majority rules, economics professor Lars Feld therefore finds in 2006 that institutions of direct democracy are associated with lower spending on welfare programs to help the poor.
 2. Ethnic conflict. Barry Fagin of the Independence Institute corroborates in 2016 that “ethnically concentrated regions of countries all across the globe have seen brutal violence and outright war because their political interests were ignored by far-away majorities who ruled over them. The electoral college helps mitigate that risk.”
 3. Link turns the aff’s argument – Tyranny of the majority is anti-democratic because it only represents the interest of 51% of the population whereas every group has some representation under the electoral college.

Federalism

4. Turn it, having the electoral college is key to preserving federalism. Gettysburg professor Allen Guelzo writes in 2016 that “the electoral college is at the core of our system of federalism” and replacing it would mean “dismantling federalism.” There are two implications.
 1. This turns aff’s arguments about democracy. Law professor Neil Siegel writes in 2008 that distributing power throughout the states bring government closer to the people and therefore increases civic engagement and holds representatives accountable.
 2. Federalism promotes democracy globally. David Broder of the Washington Post in 2001 explains that federalism is vital to answering other countries’ concerns about mob rule in democracy - only with federalism can the US support democratic movements.

AT: EC is Racist

1. All their demographic data is flawed, public affairs professor Kenneth Prewitt explains in 2013 that the census overlimits options for races and produces inadequate data, classifying people from the Middle East, Soviet Union, and Central Asia as white and causing 37% of Hispanics to identify as “some other race”. Moreover, Devra Cohn at Pew Research finds in 2014 that over 10 million Americans changed their race on the census from 2000 to 2010.
2. No impact. Because politicians pander to minorities to get votes without actually intending to pass pro-minority policies, law professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos finds in 2015 that empirically, when black voters gain more political power, it doesn't affect policy outcomes.
3. Voter ID turns this— Ingraham says voter ID doubles the election participation gap between whites and minorities, and if we win that the Aff causes nationwide voting restrictions it obviously precludes any increases in theoretical minority political power from materializing into actual results.
4. Wealthy donors turns this, McElwee says the donor class is mostly white males, which means even if politicians will compete for minority votes, once they get elected, they'll still be beholden to racist special interests that will stop them from reforming. Drutman says once presidents get elected, campaign promises to the voters become irrelevant and they begin to represent the donors.

AT: Winner Takes All link

1. Non-unique. This effect goes both ways, which means Republicans in previously Democratic strongholds are also now enfranchised and more likely to vote because their individual vote also has the potential to change the outcome of the election.
2. Non-unique. The popular vote is just a nationwide winner takes all, by their logic almost 50% of the population gets disenfranchised under the popular vote.
3. Wasted votes is non-unique, lawyer Tara Ross explains in 2004 that votes for the losing side in the electoral college are not wasted, "They were simply cast on the losing side of a popular vote within the state. If you take the wasted vote mindset, if any candidate wins under the popular vote almost 50 percent of the population is disenfranchised.

AT: Swing states link

1. Turn, swing states force candidates to pay attention to minorities because white voters are split between two parties. Mike Hudak at the Brookings Institute explain in 2016 that because every swing state is becoming more racially diverse, the Republican strategy of winning by only appealing to white voters is a sure path to defeat in future elections.
2. Even if they win that swing states in general are white, as long as a few swing states like Florida have high concentrations of minorities, it will still force a policy shift because candidates will want to win those states and will change policy accordingly. Political science professor Kyle Kreider explains in 2016 that high concentrations of Latinos and African Americans in a key swing states like Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia states determine the result of those states, and ultimately the result of the election.
3. Turn, Richard Posner of U Chicago writes in 2012 voters in swing states are more engaged under the electoral college than they would be under the popular vote because their influence over the election would go down. Since swing states determine the election, this helps minorities because Sean McElwee of the Atlantic writes in 2016 that minorities are the first ones to stop voting when turnout is low.

AT: Gerrymandering link

1. No uniqueness — District plan bills aren't going to pass in the status quo. David Weigel at the Washington Post explains in 2017 that in Virginia and Minnesota, the only states where district reallocation bills have been introduced, democrat governors will be able to veto the bills. Stephen Wolf at Daily Kos furthers in 2017 that Virginia already pulled their version of the bill, and the newly introduced New Hampshire district plan bill would only swing one electoral vote.
2. Status quo solves. Mark Stern at Slate reports in January the Supreme Court will soon hear a partisan gerrymandering case, and that Kennedy will cast the deciding vote against partisan gerrymandering due to a new algorithm that can accurately determine if a gerrymander was highly partisan.
3. This won't happen - it's not in Republicans interest. Nate Silver of 538 in writes 2011 that
 1. The swing states that adopt this would no longer get preferential treatment, hurting their economies, AND
 2. The backlash would cost Republican office-holders their jobs.

AT: Geographical Distribution (Large vs small) link

1. Status-quo solves. Mike Maciag at Governing Magazine furthers in 2015 that since 2010, every state except Hawaii and DC has become more racially diverse. This is especially the case in small rural states, as sociology professor Kenneth Johnson finds in 2013 that minority populations in non-metropolitan areas have grown by 21% and accounted for 83% of overall non-metropolitan population growth.
2. Turn, the electoral college helps minorities in large states Kathy Griffin at the University of Georgia finds in 2012 that the minority population in large states is growing, ensuring that electoral votes are reallocated to disproportionately favor large states. Moreover, Griffin finds that because large states have lower turnout rates, each voter in large states actually has more voting power than votes in small states.
3. Swing states control the result of the election — the small vs big state disparity in voting power doesn't matter if we win that swing states help minorities.

AT: Urban Centers link

1. Non-unique and turn - Jason Willick of the American Interest writes in 2016 that the Electoral College's requirement to win close states and not just rack up the votes in red ones has caused Republicans to increasingly compete with Democrats in cities. However, Trent England of US News in 2012 finds that a popular vote would eliminate this incentive, causing Candidates to "simply go where they are already popular and fan the flames of political radicalism, meaning Republicans will stop going to cities and go to their base in rural areas.
1. No link - urban centers won't be the focus. Computer science professor John Koza explains in 2013 that cities wouldn't control the election, as 85% of the population lives in small cities or rural areas.
2. Non-unique — Robert Speel of Time Magazine writes in 2016 that within each state, "candidates focus on urban areas where most voters live. In Pennsylvania, for example, 72 percent of Pennsylvania 2016 campaign visits to large cities
3. No impact, campaigns will visit because urban centers it's more efficient, but that doesn't mean policy will shift toward urban interests or that urban voters gain voting power.

AT: Less Voting Restrictions

7. No link - states don't care how much they influence the election, they only care about partisanship.
8. Voter ID turns this.
9. Republicans are already trying to restrict the vote as much as possible on the state level, so any risk that it becomes a federal nationwide law is a reason to negate. William Kimberling of the FEC writes in 1992 that since states host a variety of other elections for Congress and state legislature there will always be incentives for certain states to restrict the vote.

AT: Direct Democracy Good / 1 Person 1 Vote

1. There is no tangible real world impact to this argument.
2. This is just a pretty slogan – Law professor Richard Posner writes that “no form of representative democracy... aspires to be perfectly democratic. Certainly not our[s]. In the entire executive and judicial branches, only two officials are elected—the president and vice president.” This means
 - a. We won’t have perfect democratic equality even under the popular vote, AND
 - b. There is no impact to not having one person one vote because having all these undemocratic institutions has not caused any bad effects.
3. Turn it, cross-national appeal promotes more effective policy. Law professor Michael Herz writes in 2004 that the electoral college forces candidates to gain widespread geographic appeal among a variety of groups. One person one vote doesn’t account for how much people desire each candidate, it is much more important to appeal to a variety of types of people than the majority of people
4. Voting restrictions turns the link. ID laws target racial minorities, which is a comparatively worse distortion of democracy because it targets race as opposed to a neutral factor like geography.
5. Campaign finance turns the link, Economics professor Gene Grossman writes in 2000 that special interest groups distort the 1 person 1 vote mantra by influencing the result of the election.
6. Two party system turns this, Mendelberg says extremist campaigns pollute the discourse and make the populous more resistant to progressive democratic change even if the extremists don’t win, which means minorities never get representation.

AT: Direct democracy cards

2. No link, citizens still vote for representatives under the popular vote, which means the Aff is representative, not direct democracy.
3. Their evidence is talking about direct democracy in the context of ballot initiative like props within states, not the popular vote.

AT: Increases Low Income Turnout

1. Political science professor Matthias Fatke finds in 2013 that the level of direct democracy had no impact on the relationship between socioeconomic status and turnout.

AT: Increases Faith in Politics / Participation

1. Political science professor Joshua Dyck finds in a 2008 study of three national datasets that there is no relationship between direct democracy and political efficacy.

AT: Turnout increases

1. If you believe that voters are more likely to turn out when they have a bigger impact on the election, than this will just be compensated by decreased turnout in swing states. Von Spakovsky of Heritage finds in 2011 corroborates that under the popular vote, more states will lose influence than gain it.
1. No link — Voters don't turnout because they think they'll swing the election. Harvard professor Ryan Enos finds in a 2010 study that the likelihood of a voter determining the election has no impact on that individual's decision to turnout. Because of this, political science professor Scott Ashworth finds in 2006 that when controlling for demographics like gender age and race, there is no difference in turnout between swing states and spectator states.
3. No link — even if the chance of swinging the election has an impact on turnout, political science professor Andrew Gelman finds in 2004 that the chance of a voter casting the pivotal vote is the same under the popular vote and the electoral college.
4. Alternate causality. Government professor Michael McDonald finds in 2015 that policies that make voting easier such as mail-in ballots and early voting are disproportionality implemented in battleground states, which is actually what causes the higher turnout.
5. No impact. Political Science Professor Robert Stein finds in 2002 that non-voters and voters have the same level of trust in government, are equally engaged in politics, and have identical policy preferences.
6. Voter ID turns this and outweighs A, on scope — you only impact to turnout in states that are currently ignored, whereas voter ID becomes nationwide and B, on probability — people still sometimes vote if they think their vote doesn't matter much but a legal mechanism that prevents them from voting will stop turnout in 100% of cases.

Link turn

1. Turn, Leslie Francis at the DNC explains in 2012 that the popular vote would redistribute resources toward national media campaigns, sapping funding from grassroots activities, which ultimately reduces voter turnout.

Impact turns

1. Turn it, higher turnout only helps white people. Empirically, Ryan Enos at Harvard finds in 2014 that because it's always easier for campaigns to try to "get out the vote" for privileged groups, higher turnout only helps overrepresented dominant groups.
2. Turn, Will Wilkinson of the Cato Institute writes in 2008 that low turnout is actually better for democracy because higher turnout tends to include flakier voters who know less about politics and therefore vote for worse candidates.
3. Turn it, voter knowledge will go down. Judge Richard Posner explains that voters in swing states are more politically informed, and therefore are more reliable for deciding the election. Under the popular vote, campaign attention would be spread out instead of focused on a few states, so voters overall would be less informed.

AT: Spreading the Money / Advertising

1. Government professor Ryan Enos finds in 2015 that there are no diminishing returns to campaigning because campaigns never get close to reaching every voter, meaning spreading out the money can't possibly help.
2. No link - Political science professor Scott Ashworth finds in 2006 that when controlling for demographics, exposure to campaign ads do not increase turnout.

AT: Trust impacts

1. Turn, trust in government destroys accountability. Award winning political author James Bovard writes in 2010 that trust in government breeds attention deficits and decreases resistance, enabling governmental atrocity. He continues that empirically, high trust after 9/11 gave the “U.S. government carte blanche to attack anywhere in the world” and enabled crackdowns on domestic rights.

AT: Spillovers over to other elections

1. The people who only turnout in presidential elections won't fill out the other boxes - if they cared and did their research they would have voted in the other elections. David Axelrod of U Chicago confirms in 2016 that most voters just leave down ballot races blank, or guess randomly.
2. This only happens once every four years, which means it has a very small impact.

AT: Swing States Bad

1. No impact - swing states are representative of the national population. Financial analyst Richie Bernardo finds in 2016 that swing states Illinois, Florida, Michigan, Arizona, Pennsylvania, Ohio, North Carolina, and Colorado are all among the top 13 most representative states based on socio demographics, economics, education, religion, and public opinion.
2. No impact - even the least representative state is still fairly representative. Bernardo furthers that Vermont, the least representative state, is still 77% representative of the entire population.
3. Pro just trades one problem for another and turns large states into the new campaign focus. Hans Von Spakovsky of the Federal Election Commission explains in 2011 that the popular vote would just cause candidates to cater to urban centers instead, which is comparatively worse because it would be the same areas that received attention each year, while swing states are different in each and every election.
4. Turn it, swing state voters are more informed. Richard Posner of the University of Chicago writes in 2012 that since swing state voters know they will decide the election, they take more time to thoroughly research the campaigns, leading to better choices.
5. Turn, getting rid of swing states stops ethanol subsidies. Eric Black at the Minnesota Post explains in 2012 that the electoral college forces candidates to use ethanol subsidies to win voters in agricultural swing states like Iowa. Ethanol reduces emissions, as Chris Prentice at Reuters reports in 2017 that a new USDA study found that corn ethanol reduces greenhouse gas emissions by 43% relative to gasoline. This solves climate change, as Patrick Bedard explains in 2006 that federal ethanol mandates can jump-start innovation to cause a switch to carbon neutral ethanol and save the earth from climate change.

AT: Trust in Government

1. The Electoral College is increasingly popular.
 1. A 2016 Gallup poll found support for the Electoral College is trending upwards, and for the first time in history less than half of Americans disapprove of the Electoral College.
 2. The people most invested in the fate of the Electoral college right now are its supporters. The Pew Research Center found at the end of 2015 that the Electoral College is always supported by the incumbent party and criticized by the party that lost the last election, which means all their impacts are short term.
2. No tangible impact to trust — they can't give an example of where lack of trust impeded policy success.

Link turn

1. Turn, Leslie Francis at the DNC explains in 2012 that the popular vote would take vicious attack ad campaigns that are currently isolated to swing states and make them nationwide, eroding citizens' faith in their leaders and the political process on the whole.

AT: Low trust stops policy

3. Turn, Philippe Aghion of the London School of Economics finds in a 2010 global analysis that low trust increases support for regulations because individuals view the status-quo as more problematic.

TRUST BAD:

1. Turn, trust in government destroys accountability. Award winning political author James Bovard writes in 2010 that trust in government breeds attention deficits and decreases resistance, enabling governmental atrocity. He continues that empirically, high trust after 9/11 “U.S. government carte blanche to attack anywhere in the world” enabled crackdowns on domestic rights.
1. Turn, trust causes militarism. Gene Healy of Cato writes in 2011 that national unity leads to “unhealthy levels of trust in government, which in turn [enable] costly foreign adventurism.” Since WW2, according to James Lucas of Global Research in 2016, US military actions have been responsible for the death of 20-30 million people

AT: Helps the Democrats

1. Turn, Republicans are screwed, Mike Hudak at the Brookings Institute explains in 2016 that because every swing state is becoming more racially diverse, the Republican strategy of winning by only appealing to white voters is a sure path to defeat in future elections. Chris Cillizza of the Washington Post furthers in 2014 growing hispanic populations in swing states are shifting them towards democrats.
1. Non-unique - Trump is going to lose in 2020. Political science professor Paul Kengor writes in 2017 that historically, vote totals decrease when presidents run for a second term, but Trump actually will need to increase his vote total if he wants to have a shot at winning. Mallory Shelbourne of the Hill furthers in 2017 that in 2020, Trump would "lose in a race against an unnamed Democrat," with polls showing a 8 point advantage for the democrats.
2. All their evidence about how the electoral college disadvantages democrats is just reactionary - just a few years ago people were talking about the unbreakable blue wall. USA TODAY reports in 2016 that Trump's election proves the electoral map is inherently fluid.
3. Voter ID turns this, Ingraham says ID laws reduce democratic turnout by 8% so even if you shift the power to democratic urban centers they'll still lose because federal laws will stop democrats from voting.

AT: Demographic changes

1. If there is truly a long term demographic change then electoral points will be reallocated to the cities because they are based on house seats which are based on population.

AT: More Dem turnout

1. No impact - This goes both ways, Republicans in heavily blue states will also be more likely to turn out.

AT: Democrats solve climate change.

1. No way a democratic president solves climate change — first, Republicans in Congress will stop meaningful emissions reductions and veto any international agreement that actually requires reductions, and second, Obama empirically failed to reduce emissions which proves democrats can't solve.
2. Trump means it's too late. Public policy professor Matthew Nisbet explains in 2016 that Trump will deliver the fatal blow to the fight against climate change by pulling out of the Paris Accords and UN climate programs, rolling back regulations that cut emissions, and creating an international chilling effect on progress through his disgust for international cooperation.
3. Campaign spending turns the link - Sean McElwee at Mother Jones finds in 2015 that the influence of big donors is a major impediment to progress on climate change because they pressure Republican leaders to deny climate change despite only one-third of Republican supporters actually rejecting climate science.

AT: Democrats are anti-racist

1. This is true of most Republicans as well, only a small minority of Republicans are racist.
2. There's no evidence that a democratic president can singlehandedly push through anti-racist legislation, especially considering all of Congress is Republican.
3. Democrats don't solve, Arielle Newton at PBS explains in 2016 the democratic party only pays lip service to minority concerns without actually pursuing any anti-racist policies because they know minorities won't vote for more racist Republicans, ultimately preventing racial progress.

AT: Two Party System Bad

5. Empirically denied. House, senate, state legislature, and gubernatorial elections are all done with a popular vote and we still have two parties in those races. Computer science professor John Koza writes in 2013 that worldwide studies of 5,000 elections show that the popular vote doesn't cause a proliferation of candidates.
6. No link - third parties will fail in both worlds. Economist Marcus Drometer explains in 2013 that major parties empirically implement higher barriers to entering the race as a candidate in response to greater electoral competition to protect the two-party system. These ballot access restrictions act as a deterrent as Thomas Stratmann finds in 2003 that a \$1,000 increase in filing fees results in a 43 percent decrease in minor party candidates.

AT: Runoffs link

7. No link - Political science professor Steven Rosenstone writes in 1984 that most serious proposals for the popular vote only include a runoff if no one gets 40% of the vote. He continues that because Republican voters are scared of a vote for a third party turning into a vote for the democrat and vice versa, the major parties always poll above 40% of the vote.
8. No link – Computer science professor John Koza finds in 2013 that just as individual states don't have runoffs when one presidential candidate doesn't win more than 50% of the vote in that state, a presidential popular vote wouldn't have recounts either.

AT: Regionalist candidates link / Cross national appeal

3. Voters won't vote for extremist regionalist candidates under the popular vote for the same reason they don't in the status quo — Republican voters are scared of a vote for a third party turning into a vote for the democrat and vice versa, which means regionalists won't ever gain enough support to win.
4. No link, Andrew Prokop at Vox explains in December 2016 that the country is big and broad enough that even under a popular vote, regional candidates would need to get support outside their region to win the election, which means regionalist candidates are screwed under the popular vote too.

AT: Political competition impacts

1. Non-unique, political competition just means close elections, which exist in tons of districts right now and most presidential elections are already super competitive.

AT: Democrats ignore racial minorities impact

1. This is false, democrats have been continually stepping up efforts to increase the size of the minority vote by making the DNC platform more progressive. The reason they haven't managed to pass policies to help minorities is because Republicans are obstructionist.

AT: Mass incarceration impact

1. This is inevitable, their own evidence says politicians gain votes by supporting quick fix solutions to crime, which means even without the two party system, there's an incentive to support incarceration policies.
2. They don't solve, even if a multiparty system creates a new "anti-incarceration" party, there's no evidence that this fringe party would get enough candidates elected to push through criminal justice reform.

AT: Gridlock impact

1. Alternate cause — the reason we have gridlock is because Republicans like Newt Gingrich tried to create gridlock as a way to get votes in the 90s, not the electoral college.
2. Turn, even if gridlock is bad now, it gets worse without the two party system as Benjamin Zycher explains in 2004 that the two party system causes moderation and compromise because each party needs to work with the other to pass policy, whereas a multiparty system gives power to extremist parties that will refuse to compromise.

AT: Representation / Turnout impact

1. Turn it, representation is bad when those new candidates are extremists. Without the two party system, there are more extremist candidates gaining representation, and Downs in case says these extremist candidates are racist xenophobes that undermine democracy.

AT: Winner takes all bad

1. Non-unique. Under the popular vote, the election operates on a nationwide winner takes all system instead of a state by state winner takes all system – close to 50% of the population's votes would be "wasted".
2. Non-unique. Every other election held in the nation uses winner takes all, Congressional, state legislatures, gubernatorial, and local elections.
3. The idea of wasted votes is false. Lawyer Tara Ross explains in 2004 that votes for the losing side in the electoral college are not wasted, "They were simply cast on the losing side of a popular vote within the state. If the 2000 election had been conducted based on nationwide popular vote totals only," people wouldn't say that votes for George W. Bush were "wasted" because Al Gore won the popular vote, they were votes casted for Bush in an effort to win.

AT: PV reduces polarization

4. No tangible impact to polarization.
5. Alt cause — the two party system causes polarization. Attorney Michael Coblenz explains in 2016 that the two party system ensures that every issue is framed in a Republican vs Democrat oppositional duality, which puts Congressional Republicans and Democrats in a death match, causing mass gridlock.

AT: Electoral Map Link

1. This is clearly silly. There's no way one graphic shown once every four years is a significant cause of our polarization issue.
2. Non-unique - there would still be red and blue states based on the state legislators, governors, and congress, so the media would still find a way to show their dumb chart.

LINK TURNS:

1. Turn it, the popular vote increases polarization. Benjamin Zycher of the LA Times writes in 2004 that the electoral college pushes candidates to the political center in order to win politically diverse swing states. On the other hand, Trent England of US News in 2012 writes that under the popular vote, candidates can “simply go where they are already popular and fan the flames of political radicalism.”
2. Turn it, the popular vote causes polarization. Jason Willick of the American Interest writes in 2016 that without the electoral college, there would be no incentive to try to swing middle ground voters and parties would just try to get as much base turnout as possible, greatly accelerating political polarization.

IMPACT TURNS:

2. Polarization causes turnout. Political science professor Alan Abramowitz writes in 2010 that polarized candidates make it easier to choose who to vote for and make the public more enthusiastic, increasing the level of turnout.
3. Polarization reduces gridlock. Abramowitz writes that polarization increases party unity, making it easier for the majority party to pass its agenda - empirically shown with the Affordable Care Act.
4. Polarization reduces militarism. Gene Healy of Cato writes in 2011 that national unity leads to “unhealthy levels of trust in government, which in turn [enable] costly foreign adventurism.” Since WW2, according to James Lucas of Global Research in 2016, US military actions have been responsible for the death of 20-30 million people.

AT: PV outcome is different from EC

1. No impact - Law professor Michael Herz writes in 2005 that candidates would have run their campaigns differently under the popular vote, so there's no way to knowing that the person who won the popular vote was actually the superior or more popular candidate.
2. The probability is low. David Strömberg of Stockholm University finds in 2008 that the probability of the popular vote and electoral college disagreeing is about 4%, meaning it should only happen once every hundred years.

AT: Legitimacy

1. Impact should have happened already — Trump and Bush in 2000 had splits between the electoral college and popular vote but there was no tangible impact other than short term protests.
2. No impact - when the less popular candidate won in the past there was still a smooth transition of power. Thus, Michael Herz concludes that the electoral college does not cause crisis of legitimacy.

AT: Gerrymandering District plan

1. None of their evidence says district plan bills will succeed, just that they could theoretically happen.
2. The link makes no sense — gerrymandering swing states will just benefit minorities who will now guarantee some swing state electoral votes go blue, so there's no incentive for Republicans to do it.
3. No uniqueness — District plan bills aren't going to pass in the status quo. David Weigel at the Washington Post explains in 2017 that in Virginia and Minnesota, the only states where district reallocation bills have been introduced, democrat governors will be able to veto the bills. Stephen Wolf at Daily Kos furthers in 2017 that Virginia already pulled their version of the bill, and the newly introduced New Hampshire district plan bill would only swing one electoral vote.
4. No link — racial gerrymandering is illegal. Fairvote explains in 2005 that while partisan gerrymandering tends to be legal, gerrymandering to pack minorities into safe districts or spread them too thin has been ruled to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. That's why Alice Ollstein at ThinkProgress reports in January that courts have recently ruled against racial gerrymandering in Alabama and North Carolina, whereas partisan gerrymandering in Wisconsin was also struck down.
5. Status quo solves. Mark Stern at Slate reports in January the Supreme Court will soon hear a partisan gerrymandering case, and that Kennedy will cast the deciding vote against partisan gerrymandering due to a new algorithm that can accurately determine if a gerrymander was highly partisan.
6. This won't happen - it's not in Republicans interest. Nate Silver of 538 in writes 2011 that
 1. The swing states that adopt this would no longer get preferential treatment, hurting their economies, AND
 2. The backlash would cost Republican office-holders their jobs.

AT: Too much rural power / harms large states+cities

1. Aff just trades one problem for another, Hans Spakovsky of the Federal Election Commission explains in 2011 that the popular vote would just cause candidates to cater to urban centers and ignore everywhere else.
2. Non-unique. Gary Gregg of Politico writes in 2012 that political power is already centralized in urban centers - we should at least have one institution that protects rural voters.
3. The case is a turn, nationwide voting restrictions on minorities harm city dwellers because minorities are concentrated in cities and large states as opposed to rural areas, which outweighs on magnitude, cities have some voting power under the EC, whereas voting restrictions prevent them from voting at all.

LINK TURN:

4. Turn, all of your evidence just compares population to electoral votes, but Kathy Griffin at the University of Georgia finds in 2012 that empirically, because large states have low turnout rates, their voters actually have disproportionately higher power per vote than other states.

IMPACT TURNS:

1. Rural power distorts policy in a positive way. Emily Badger of the New York Times writes in 2016 that the electoral college's rural tilt incentivizes infrastructure investment that keep national commerce flowing and reduce poverty.
2. Rural interests would be ignored under the direct vote. Gary Gregg of Politico in 2012 writes that the popular vote will cause politicians to dismiss rural concerns and will "centralize all power — government, business, money, media and vote — in urban areas to the detriment of the rest of the nation."

AT: Faithless Electors

1. Heavily mitigate, faithless electors are extremely rare. Maya Parthasarathy at Bustle News reports in 2016 that less than 1% of electors in history have failed to follow their pledge, and of the faithless electors throughout history, almost half of them failed to follow their pledge because the candidate died before the election.
2. Status quo solves. Law professor Joy McAfee explains in 2002 that while there used to be no laws to prevent faithless electors, now, over half of states and DC legally bind their electors to vote for the candidate chosen by the vote. William Kimberling of the Federal Election Commission confirms in 1992 that solving the problem of faithless electors doesn't require eliminating the electoral college.
3. No impact. Kimberling continues that there have been 7 faithless electors in the last century, faithless electors have never changed the outcome of an election. There's no reason to think there will ever be enough faithless electors to actually change anything, just because it has the "potential" to happen doesn't mean it has any real chance of happening.

AT: Citizens want the PV

1. This isn't a reason the popular vote is better than the electoral college for the American people. There's no impact to following the public opinion or any reason following public opinion is good.
2. Non-unique, there are tons of other policies where politicians don't follow the public, which means the Neg isn't sufficient to solve any tangible impact.
3. This won't be true for much longer. Gallup finds in December 2016 that public support for the Electoral college has sharply increased to 47% compared to 49% support for the popular vote, whereas in the past, there was a clear majority support for the popular vote. Terence Jeffrey at CNS News furthers in December that public support for the popular vote is at the lowest level it's ever been since the surveys started.

AT: Calexit

1. None of their evidence says the popular vote would appease enough Californians to make the ballot initiative fail.
2. The ballot initiative was withdrawn, John Myers at the LA Times explains in April that the leader of the Calexit movement has cancelled the initiative and has stopped gathering signatures to even get the proposal on the ballot.
3. Lots of alternate causes. Melia Robinson at Business Insider explains in 2016 that the sudden push for a California secession has been driven by Trump's victory. Edward Morrissey at The Week furthers in February that Calexit leadership wants to leave the US over issues of education, natural resource access, and having to disproportionately pay federal taxes.
4. None of their evidence says there there will be enough signatures to turn Calexit into a ballot initiative, and none of their evidence says this ballot initiative will succeed. Even if it does succeed, Morrissey explains that it would simply make a toothless and ineffective demand on Congress, meaning actual secession won't happen.
5. Secession won't happen. Ian Bandler at the Daily Wire in 2016 outlines three reasons for this:
 - a. A constitutional amendment would be required for secession to happen, which would require the approval of Congress and 38 states, an impossible hurdle.
 - b. The federal government stops secession attempts, which empirically happened when Texas flirted with secession after Obama's 2012 victory.
 - c. California won't allow itself to secede, as it wouldn't have enough access to cash or water for its population and would be devastated by massive natural disasters absent federal assistance.
6. Turn, Morrissey continues that California's electoral votes have more sway than any other state, which means the resolution would probably cause backlash from Californians and make Calexit more likely.

AT: Ethanol

1. Not reverse causal — even if swing states are the reason ethanol subsidies exist, there's no evidence that switching to the popular vote would cause a transition away from ethanol.
2. The president is not key — there are tons of other actors that determine how much ethanol is produced like state legislatures, Congressmen, and agriculture lobbyists. Even if the popular vote caused the end of presidential ethanol subsidies, it would still be profitable for state governments to subsidize ethanol so the impact is inevitable.
3. Special interest turns this, if candidates need more money it means they're more likely to get donations from the agricultural lobby, which will force them to increase ethanol subsidies.
4. The impact is inevitable, broadcaster Gary Truitt explains in 2012 that internationally, ethanol production in Brazil, Africa, and Europe is steadily increasing.

AT: Food price spikes

1. No link, John Block at the Chicago Tribune explains in 2011 that ethanol has no effect on food prices because it doesn't impact the production of rice, wheat, and grains, which is what people actually eat.
2. Mitigate. Block continues that US ethanol production only uses 3% of global grains, but those grains would have gone to feeding livestock, not people.
3. Alternate cause to price spikes. Block explains that the price of energy is what causes food price spikes because every aspect of food production requires energy. David Bennett at Delta Farm Press furthers in 2011 that empirically, oil prices, not ethanol, were the major cause of food price spikes.

AT: Climate change

1. Turn, Chris Prentice at Reuters reports in 2017 that a new USDA study found that corn ethanol reduces greenhouse gas emissions by 43% relative to gasoline. Prefer because our evidence is about all greenhouse gas emissions, not just CO₂.

AT: Electoral Tie → House Decides

1. This is incredibly rare, and has only really happened twice in history. All our arguments outweigh on probability.
2. No impact - John Quincy Adams and Thomas Jefferson were elected this way and nothing bad happened, they are both considered good presidents, and were probably better than the alternatives.

AT: Cuba Embargo

6. Be skeptical — None of their evidence makes the reverse causal claim that the popular vote would cause the embargo to be lifted.
7. Congress supports the embargo which proves that it isn't just Florida being a swing state in the presidential election that determines our Cuba policy. Moreover, David Francis at Foreign Policy explains in 2016 that the Helms Burton Act prevents more parts of the embargo from being lifted without Congressional approval, which means they don't have a link unless they prove Congress would change its tune under the popular vote.
8. Multiple alt causes to embargo support mean it will still exist under the popular vote
 1. Terrorism and authoritarianism. Republicans label Cuba as a sponsor of terrorism and demonize the Castro regime to justify the embargo because it feeds the broader narrative that we need a hardline foreign policy to stop terrorist threats and authoritarianism — they'll still do that under the popular vote.
 2. Helms Burton. Reggie Thompson of Stratfor explains in 2016 that the Helms Burton Act legally prevents the embargo from being lifted unless Cuba disbands multiple institutions and holds elections, which is not something Cuba will do anytime in the near future.
9. The link is false — Democratic strategist Giancarlo Sopo analyzes the 2016 electoral breakdown of Florida voting and finds that republicans aren't deterred from lifting the embargo due to Cuban-American voters for three reasons:
 - a. 55% of Cuban-American voters support Obama's policies and 58% support lifting the embargo.
 - b. An overwhelming majority of pro-embargo Cuban-American voters are republican for other reasons and would support a republican candidate regardless, and
 - c. Due to an influx of Puerto-Rican hispanics and changing political trends, Cuban American voters no longer determine Floridan elections
 - d. Thus, Sopo finds that there was no increased support for Trump after he shifted to a more hardline agenda and concludes that pro-engagement candidates are no longer harmed in Florida for their beliefs
10. Turn, lifting the embargo causes democratic backsliding. Arch Puddington at Freedom House explains in 2015 that Latin America has largely democratized over the last few decades, creating pressure for other global regions to follow suit, but that progress is unstable. Peter Brookes at the Davis Institute explains in 2009 that lifting the embargo would signal American defeat, emboldening Cuba to spread anti-Americanism and communism throughout Latin America. This has a global effect, as political science professor Richard Hillman explains in 2002 that democracy efforts in Latin America serve as a model for other developing countries.
 1. Turn, lifting the embargo causes worse human rights. Ron Radosh at the Hudson Institute explains in 2013 that over the last decade, Cuba has improved human

rights, and is finally on the verge of democratic change. Peter Brookes at the Davis Institute explains in 2009 that because the economy is nationalized, trade from a lifted embargo would pour money into the regime's coffers that would be used to suppress Cuban human rights and keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. Even without new money, Nancy Menges at the Center for Security Policy confirms in 2008 that if the US fully lifted the embargo, it would result in more domestic repression because the regime fears the potentially subversive effects of US influence on the Cuban people.

11. [INSERT IMPACT SPECIFIC TURNS FROM CUBA BLOCKFILE – Bustillo 90% govt seize, trade bad stuff etc]

AT: Summit's dumb as fuck SMO arg

1. ID turns the argument, if minorities and progressive democrats are legally barred from voting none of their activism is able to impact policy
2. Campaign spending turns the argument, Drutman says donors ensure politicians NEVER do what the people want and only pass policy to help their donors once they win.
3. Double bind — Michael Trudeau at TruthOut explains in 2014 that social movements that try to achieve change to electoral politics are inevitably pacified by existing political parties and only granted incremental tiny reform if they succeed, but if they try to break from politics, they become too radical to ever enact change.
4. Turn the argument, because legal reform de-motivates social movements and creates complacency. Law professor Orly Lobel writes in 2007 that when social movements push for reform, the “focus on legal reform narrows the causes, deradicalizes the agenda, legitimizes ongoing injustices, and diverts energies away from more effective and transformative alternatives.”
5. Turn, Leslie Francis at the DNC explains in 2012 that the popular vote would redistribute resources toward national media campaigns, sapping funding from grassroots activities, which are the social movements that they say are so important.
6. Turn it again. Sociology professor David Meyer finds in 1996 that in the past, when a social movement received a victory that suddenly breaks from established precedent, it created countermovements that opposed the decision. In this case, that counter movement would likely be a bunch of Republicans who hate the popular vote
7. If social movements in one area like elections actually spill over to other areas like inequality and health, their impacts should have already been triggered by literally any social movement victory in any area in the status-quo.

Case specifics

1. Overview — You can read as many vague non-specific cards you read about social movements being good but this argument will still be absurdly stupid — only one piece of evidence in the contention mentions the popular vote.
2. They say their first card outlines the specifics of what a social movement is but they don't say what those aspects are. Their Sam Sanders card — CALL FOR IT — It doesn't say the popular vote is a social movement – just because people want the popular vote doesn't mean it's a social movement — the only actual movement toward the popular vote in the status quo is a legislative movement by state governments to adopt the national popular vote interstate compact.

3. NO LINK — THE POPULAR VOTE IS NOT A SOCIAL MOVEMENT — Michael Trudeau at TruthOut explains in 2014 that there's a fundamental difference between social movements and movements for electoral reform.
4. They are missing a vital internal link — they have ZERO CARDS that say passing the popular vote would help the social movement or help other movements— hold the line here, they need a card for their ONLY LINK if they're going to claim one legal victory will spill over to a ton of other social movements.
5. They say people are disengaged with politics — false — Eric Liu at the Atlantic reports in March that Trump's attacks on American institutions have prompted massive backlash, resulting in millions rejoining the political process through mass marches, town halls, and huge numbers of people joining organizations like the ACLU.
6. Social movements don't cause other social movements when they have absolutely nothing to do with each other — the civil rights movement spawned other rights movements, but a movement about electoral reform has no connection to income inequality, health, or racism.
7. This is an infinite feedback loop. If reform strengthens social movements which lead to more reform and more social movements, by their logic, any policy change create infinite more change.
8. If historical social movements caused current movements to succeed, then why aren't current movements succeeding now.
9. They have ZERO cards that say social movements for their three impacts WOULD succeed if the popular vote social movement gained strength — there's no brightline, how much of a victory needs to happen to give other social movements the strength to succeed if they aren't succeeding in the status quo.
10. They have ZERO cards saying there are social movements to stop income inequality or health problems— they can't name what specific reform will solve those issues either or why the res causes that reform.
11. Civil rights is proof that racial equality social movements are insufficient to solve discrimination — they say discrimination still exists, there's no reason this vague intangible social movement that they can't even name will suddenly solve racism if a different movement gets legitimized.
12. Democracy impact to racism isn't unique, we live in a democracy and they don't have a card saying marginally more democracy has a tangible impact.

Pro Frontlines

Racism

AT: Turns - Top level framing

1. Trump proves that the electoral college is insufficient to solve anything; Johnson says there's no political will in the status quo to pass reform and Dreyfuss says the electoral college will only discriminate more in the future because of population demographics— this means it's try or die, only aff has a risk of solving.

AT: Swing states turn:

1. Pitner takes this out — the vital swing states have passed new voting restrictions that stop millions of minorities from voting, so minority population size and growth is irrelevant — empirically proven — Trump ran a racist campaign but won all the swing states; they can't name a policy that was passed because of swing state minorities.

IF Going for Goodman/Templon:

2. Even if swing states help minorities, the Aff is preferable — Gelman says swing states are on average 80% white, whereas Goodman says big states that get more power under the popular vote have much larger minority populations, so shifting the focus from swing states to big states is always comparatively better for minorities.

IF Going for urban centers:

3. Even if swing states help minorities, the Aff is preferable — Gelman says swing states are on average 80% white, whereas Dreyfuss says urban centers are majority non-white, so shifting the focus from swing states to urban centers is always comparatively better for minorities.

IF Going for Feingold:

4. Even if swing states help minorities, the Aff is preferable — Gelman says swing states are on average 80% white whereas the nation is 62% white, which means a nationwide election is always comparatively better for minorities, as Feingold says minorities would determine every popular vote election.

Extra:

1. Gerrymandering takes this out — it doesn't matter how many minorities are in swing states because those states are going to redistrict their EC votes to prevent minorities from having an impact unless we do the Aff and eliminate state borders.
2. Turn, Gelman from case says that on average swing states make the electorate whiter. Prefer this evidence because it studies all swing states and encompasses your evidence. Moreover, this problem will only get worse - Dreyfuss from case says that since urban centers are diversifying so quickly the electoral college is getting even more discriminatory.

AT: Demographic shift in swing states

1. The Aff is preferable — Dreyfuss says that even if swing states are diversifying, urban centers are diversifying faster which means A, the Aff helps minorities more, and B, overall minority representation is going down under the electoral college.
2. Demographics change too slowly, Ronald Brownstein at the Atlantic finds in 2015 that the most racially diverse battleground state is 80% white and each state has only gotten slightly less white since 1980.

AT: Pander to whites:

1. Feingold takes this out — since whites only make up around 60% of the population and are split between the two parties he finds that minorities would determine every election under the popular vote.
2. Pandering is unlikely in a world in which cities are the focus of the election because Dreyfuss says cities are majority non-white so if anything, pandering would be to minority groups.
3. Political scientist Simon Geissbuhler finds in 2015 that empirically, there are no monolithic majorities with identical opinions, which means even if whites make up the majority, they'll split their vote between the two parties so pandering won't work.

AT: Whites turnout more than minorities

1. False — Johnson from case says the black turnout rate has now surpassed the white turnout rate. Linda Qiu of Politifact corroborates in 2014 that this effect held true even in states with super strict voter ID laws.
2. Even if this is true, giving minorities more political power incentivizes them to turnout more because they can now have greater influence on the election result.

AT: Minorities would be ignored under PV

1. Non-unique, Mccann says minorities are already ignored under the electoral college — only the aff has a risk of solving
2. Turn, Feingold says because white people split their votes between the two parties, both parties would be forced to focus on minorities under the popular vote to win.

AT: More voting restrictions

1. Non-unique — Pitner says vital swing states already have racist voting restrictions, only way to solve is to give minorities in the large states that don't have voting restrictions more political power to change the policy nationwide.
1. Irrelevant — left leaning cities and large states oppose voting restrictions and they'd become the determinant of candidate policy under the popular vote.
2. Non-unique — Kimberling explains in 1992 that presidential elections don't occur in a vacuum, there's always the incentive to restrict voting because Republican governors want to win reelection.

AT: No impact to political power (Stepanopolous)

1. Empirically denied — Wright says giving blacks more representation caused a flood of positive policy that resulted in more equality
2. This argument makes no sense — their evidence just says political power in the status-quo doesn't result in any change, obviously the Aff solves that problem — it makes sense that if one group gets more power in elections, they'll elect leaders who pass policy to help them.

AT: Cities are 15% of the population

1. This is non-responsive — Beckwith says candidates would go to urban centers because it's most efficient to go to the places with the densest population, which will still be the largest cities, even if they don't make up more than 15% of the overall population.
2. Misconstrued — their evidence just says the 50 largest cities in the country are 15% of the population, not that cities on the whole are 15% of the population

AT: Rural areas are diversifying

1. None of your evidence is comparative — Dreyfuss says urban centers are diversifying the fastest so it's better to shift the focus there than wait for rural areas to diversify.
2. This might be but it'll take a long time to solve — none of their evidence says rural areas will be majority minority anywhere in the near future — we shouldn't sit back and wait a few decades to solve massive systemic discrimination if we can do it now.

AT: People only turnout the base so there's no link

1. No link — Beckwith says both parties would be forced to campaign in urban centers because it's most efficient to focus on the densest population areas, but the Republican base isn't in cities. Prefer this evidence — Beckwith cites Republican campaign advisors discussing what they would tell candidates to do under the popular vote, your authors are just hypothesizing about what might happen without citing empirics.

Con Frontlines

Campaign Spending

AT: Ads less effective → lower spending (Gordon card)

1. That card is misconstrued – Gordon concludes that sometimes ads would go up and sometimes they would go down depending on the election, but he concludes overall spending increases by 25%.
2. This doesn't make sense – ads will be equally effective under the popular vote you just need to buy more of them across the nation and in more expensive areas.

AT: Incentive non-unique

1. If this was true spending would always be increasing, but our Galka evidence says when accounting for inflation and income and population growth, campaign spending has remained constant.
2. The NYT evidence from case says swing states are already saturated with spending so there's no incentive to increase spending in the status quo.

AT: Incentive doesn't matter – they always pursue \$

1. The Enns evidence says that the way politicians attract donors is by corrupting their agenda, which they wouldn't do if they didn't have to. Specifically, Enns says that more demand for money leads to a worse policy skew which proves the incentive really matters.

AT: Money gets spread out

1. This is our link — spreading out to new states means there's more spending because it's a bigger market so candidates can spend more before the market is oversaturated and diminishing returns kick in.
2. Even if they want to campaign the same amount, the Beckwith evidence says that media markets and campaign offices are more expensive in urban areas so candidates will still have to spend more.

AT: Money doesn't win elections

1. Even if money doesn't win elections, it's is a necessary but insufficient prerequisite to running a campaign — a candidate without funding will always lose.
2. Their evidence is talking about money not helping in the status-quo, which just proves our NYT evidence that swing state markets are oversaturated, which just means each additional dollar of spending will super useful under the popular vote.
3. It doesn't matter — even if money doesn't help them win, candidates perceive it as important and seek it out in the status quo.

AT: No available money/donors maxed out

1. Wealthy people are deciding between whether to donate to a campaign or use their money elsewhere. Kevin Collins of Princeton University finds empirically in 2011 that when donors perceive a higher need for money, they are more likely to contribute to campaigns.

AT: Campaign Spending rising

1. Our Galka evidence is better — it accounts for inflation, income growth, and population growth and concludes real spending on presidential races has remained constant or decreased, their evidence just says that the nominal spending in politics has increased.
2. Data is not reliable - Derek Willis of the New York Times writes in 2014 that campaign spending data double-counts contributions and has only recently started to account for dark money and loopholes, which is the only reason we perceive a rise.

AT: Campaign Spending high now

1. The Enns evidence says it's linear - more reliance on donors leads to a more skewed agenda, which means higher spending is still worse.
2. Spending might be high right now but demand for money is low because swing state markets are already oversaturated and only higher demand forces candidates to change their positions and causes the policy skew.
3. Spending could always be higher - Douglas Roscoe at Social Studies Quarterly finds in 2005 that one-third of votes in Congress are motivated by campaign donations, which indicates that it's bad now but could always get worse.

AT: Donations increasing (even if spending is constant)

1. Even if this is true, donations only skew policy when candidates need more money due to higher campaign costs, which only happens with the popular vote — if candidates don't need more money, they don't need to change their policy to what new unnecessary donors want.
2. It can get worse - Douglas Roscoe at Social Studies Quarterly finds in 2005 that one-third of votes in Congress are motivated by campaign donations, which indicates that it's bad now but could always get worse.
3. Most of the increased donations are to super PACs, which doesn't skew policy since super PACs are legally barred from working with the campaign. Melissa Yeager at the Sunlight Foundation finds in 2016 that there are hard limits to the amount of money a donor can give directly to a campaign, but no limits on super PAC donations.

AT: No policy skew

1. Their studies just look at voting patterns, but Patrick Flavin of Baylor writes in 2015 that most studies completely ignore the agenda setting phase where the biggest distortion occurs, so prefer the Enns evidence which studies that specifically and finds that higher spending corrupts the agenda.
2. Empirics prove a policy skew – The Lioz evidence from case says that when Connecticut adopted campaign finance reform, bills that donors had blocked such as a higher minimum wage, expanded welfare, and paid sick leave all suddenly passed.
3. Their studies miss the forest for the trees – Political science professor Michael Barber finds in 2016 that politicians voting records align more closely with the average donor than their voters, which proves broadly that policy is being skewed.
4. Their studies are flawed – the U Chicago Stigler Center finds in 2016 that a major research flaw in studies that find there's no policy skew is that veto votes don't show up as corrupt because they merely defend the status-quo.

AT: Presidents can't be corrupted

1. The Drutman evidence studies presidents specifically and finds that the policies they promise initially fade in favor of their donors' agenda.
2. Empirics disprove - the McElwee evidence says that Obama's agenda was empirically watered down by donors.
3. The policy skew spills over past the president - both parties really want the presidency, which means they will tailor their entire platform more to the interests of wealthy donors to secure more general donations.

AT: Super PACs alt cause

1. Super PACs only make up a minority of funding. Anu Narayanswamy of the Washington Post reports in 2016 that for both parties super PACs accounted for less than 13% of campaign spending.
2. Super PACs don't skew policy because they're legally barred from contributing directly to the campaigns, so our impact is still unique.

AT: Small donors good

1. Small donors make up a tiny fraction – Nick Confessore of the New York Times in 2015 finds that just 158 ultra-wealthy families make up nearly half of campaign contributions.

AT: Less horse race → free media

1. It doesn't trade off - candidates can't guarantee media coverage is positive and they always want to maximize their influence, so they still have to increase spending.
2. Non-unique - the media profits from horserace coverage so they'll find a way to do just as much of it because it makes them money.
3. This is super marginal - opening the floodgates to nationwide campaigns will always increase the demand for spending more than a slight change to media coverage can decrease it.

AT: Turn to free media instead of increasing spending

1. This won't happen on a large scale – only Trump was widely effective at it and that was because he said tons of absurd and stupid things.
2. At best, this has a tiny impact – candidates might pursue some more free media but on net they will still have to spend more money.

AT: Zero sum (Trades off with Congress spending)

1. It still gives us offense — Congress is already corrupted by spending, if donors shift and corrupt the presidency too, then there's no veto check on the special interests that will always exist in Congress.
2. This makes no sense — donors aren't picking between where to donate, they always want to spend more to maximize their influence.

Voter ID

AT: Incentives non-unique

1. All our impacts are specific to strict voter ID, which Jones says only exists in 10 states, which means your evidence that thirty states have some voter ID is just proof that the incentive isn't terminally high — the Aff can still cause a transition from weak to strict voter ID.
2. Incentives aren't terminally high now — Rosenthal says the electoral college deters voting restrictions because swing state are too divided to pass ID laws whereas solid red and blue states already know who will win in their state and don't need ID laws.
3. It doesn't matter — even if the incentive is terminally high for red states the Aff causes voter ID to become nationwide and apply to *all* states.

AT: All the Republican states already have voter ID

1. 30 Republican states have voter ID but only 10 of them are strict voter ID according to Jones — Our Ingraham evidence says only strict voter ID is racist so we don't even need to win that new states will implement ID, just that it gets worse in states that currently have weak ID.

AT: Democrats will reverse

1. Voting restrictions stop democrats from winning, Ingraham says voting restrictions decrease democratic turnout by 7.7% and the win margin is almost never as big as 8% in key swing elections — moreover, applying nationwide restrictions to blue states means democrat turnout in those states will fall by way more than 7.7%
2. The impact magnifies over time — once democrats lose a few seats from restrictions, Republicans will be able to make voting restrictions even worse so that they can win even more seats.
3. No warrant or card for why democrats will inevitably take over Congress.

AT: Impact Defense

1. The Ingraham evidence is better than yours — it is the ONLY study TO DATE that looks at the *strict* voter ID laws that were implemented in 2008 and finds that they disproportionately target minorities.
2. Your evidence just talks about voter ID, but Weiser says empirically other voting restrictions stop millions of minorities from voting

AT: Courts Solve

1. Gorsuch will flip it back — Tierney Sneed at US News reports in April that lower court victories to strike down voter ID are at risk because of Gorsuch, who is extraordinarily unsympathetic to voting rights cases and puts all future progress off the table. [OPTIONAL] Reporter Cash Michaels furthers in April that Gorsuch will vote for the further disenfranchisement of African-Americans and support legislative efforts to suppress voting rights.
2. Court victories won't continue under Jeff Sessions — Michael Wines at the New York Times reports in April that the DOJ has stopped trying to legally challenge voter ID laws as discriminatory.
3. Doesn't account for our link — if a constitutional amendment grants Congress the authority to determine voter eligibility, state courts won't be able to invalidate that authority.

AT: Texas Court decision

1. Michael Wines at the New York Times reports in 2017 that the Texas ID law broke multiple legislative rules which is why it was struck down, there's no reason the Texas ruling will spill over and strike down other ID laws.

AT: It's zero-sum (dems will franchise felons etc)

1. Democratic states already have virtually no voting restrictions, which means it can't get any better but it could certainly get worse in red states.
2. Irrelevant — if we win that Congress would take control then it means blue states no longer can determine voter eligibility.

AT: Swing state voter ID in squo worse

1. It can get much worse — our impact evidence only says strict voter ID is discriminatory, and The National Conference of State Legislatures reports in March that only three swing states have strict voter ID laws.
2. Irrelevant — if we win that Congress would implement strict nationwide voter ID it's much worse than having voter ID in a few swing states because it and skews local and state elections towards white racists in areas that previously had no voter ID. At worst our presidential impacts are non-unique.

AT: Centralization won't happen (CRS/Muller saying it won't be included in the legislation)

1. This response misses the boat — our link isn't that Congress immediately takes control when they pass the amendment, but rather Bayh says as soon as states mess with their laws to create a partisan advantage, Congress will step in and retroactively take control.

Convention

AT: Not likely

1. A convention might not be likely but it's still more probable than all the alternatives because A, both parties have something to gain from a convention, whereas the GOP Congress will blockade a popular vote amendment, and B, only three more states need to sign onto a convention, whereas a normal amendment needs two thirds of Congress and three quarters of states.
2. Empirically denied — Thorner says past and current movements to abolish the electoral college advocate for a convention.

AT: Aff can choose how res is implemented (fiat congress)

Offense for why Aff fiat choice is bad

1. This interpretation screws Neg ground on a topic that's already heavily Aff biased — letting them “implement” the resolution through amendment instead of convention also justifies using “implementation” to squirrel out our links to arguments like voting restrictions, recounts, runoffs, and more.
2. No — if Aff chooses how the resolution is implemented it's a plan which is illegal, you have to make arguments about the most probable form of the resolution just like on last year's TOC topic.

Defense on their args for Aff fiat choice good

1. Turn real world - policymakers frequently don't pass policy using the best mechanisms, it's important to consider the probability of a specific implementation method being used.
2. No link to Aff ground - we aren't using this convention argument to screw you out of any ground - you can fiat the popular vote passes at a convention but you have to also consider the impacts of the convention itself.
3. Turn predictability - if we win that the most probable method of implementing the resolution is a convention that also proves the most predictable implementation method is a convention.

AT: Extra topical impact

1. Nowhere in the resolution does it say all impacts must be tied to the popular vote and electoral college - if we prove the way the resolution is implemented causes massive harms that's a reason to not do the resolution.

AT: Congress pre-emptively does amendment

1. Your evidence is outdated and doesn't account for modern politics — Cobb says Republicans *really* want a balanced budget to pass but attempts to do so through Congress have failed, so the GOP wants a convention instead, which means there's a huge incentive for Congress to allow a convention to start and not preempt it.
2. There's no threat to Congress's authority — Republicans know they can control a convention because they control 33 state legislatures, so there's no danger of a convention somehow screwing over Congressional Republicans.

AT: Democrats wouldn't do a convention

1. The Balcerzak evidence disproves this – it says that members of the left also want a convention to pass other reforms.
2. You only need 34 states to form a convention, and there are 33 Republican controlled states which means you only need to convince one democratic state. This is much more likely than convincing all the Republicans in congress and three-quarters of the states.

AT: Republicans wouldn't do a convention

2. No — Cobb says Republicans tried to pass the balanced budget amendment through Congress but failed so they're now pushing for a convention to achieve the be all end all of party goals, which is Cobb says 28 states have already approved legislation calling for a convention.

AT: Democrats / moderates will prevent bad reforms

1. There are no rules - the Eddlem card says hardliners would just reform the ratification process to a simple majority so they could pass anything they wanted.
2. Delegates will get bought out by special interests - the Super evidence says that no other government body has authority over the convention so it would be a free-for-all for well-funded interest groups.

AT: Ought does not include implementation

1. This framework is not educational – in the real world we have to consider the real world consequences of doing the resolution.
2. This framework is abusive – the aff can just squirrel out of any questions of feasibility or implementation by asserting the resolution is always done in its most perfect form.
3. Implementation is a key aspect of any cost-benefit analysis – you ought not go to the grocery store if your best way of getting their is driving drunk.