

We negate.

Our sole contention is disaster in Asia

Pei '19 of the Nikkei Asian Review finds that China is being forced to let the initiative die because of drained foreign exchange reserves, rising pensions, dwindling tax revenue, and declining growth combined with domestic criticism.

However, affirming would save the initiative. Garcia-Herrero '17 of the Bruegel Institute writes that EU banks are in position to finance the BRI to promote Eurasian growth. Xiang '19 of the IPIS confirms that the BRI is doomed without external financing, something Germany and France can provide. Ciurtin '17 of the EIR continues that without European cash, the BRI will fall.

However, Casarini '15 of the Wilson Center explains that policymakers in the EU and China have already discussed co-financing the BRI project through the EU's Juncker Plan.

Unfortunately, saving the Belt and Road has two devastating implications for Asia.

Subpoint A is Uighur Silencing

Devi '17 of the ERA Institute writes that China has waged a war on the Uigher muslims within the Xinjiang region, using economic strategies that keep 50% of the region in poverty and employing "counter terrorism" policies as a ploy to raid the homes of Uighers, tear them from their families, and intern them. Ketto '18 of the Times of India furthers that China uses these strategies to intern and kill millions of Uighurs.

The Chinese Pakistan Economic Corridor, a subset of the Belt and Road, perpetuates this abuse in two ways

First is location control

Kirby '18 of Vox writes that the Xinjiang province is a major strategic location within CPEC and the Belt and Road at large. Since the inception of the first Belt and Road route through this area, China has begun to crackdown, suppressing beliefs and rights to secure this location for certain. Riots in 2009 have determined this location to be at-risk, so Beijing polices and surveils at beyond authoritarian levels to ensure its success. Ma '19 of Business Insider furthers that the incentive for terror crackdowns comes from it's need for CPEC to succeed. The continuation of CPEC ensures the continuation of the internment of Uighur muslims.

Second is coordination

Calabrese '17 of the AEJ explains that Chinese influence from CPEC has forced Pakistan to cooperate on counter terror efforts, leading Pakistan to ban Uigher muslims from schools and shelters, and extradite these Uighurs to China for internment. However, removal of CPEC solves, as Kugelman '19 of Foreign Policy explains that CPEC is the only thing stopping Pakistan's religious leader from speaking out against Chinese oppression of Uighurs. Ma '19 of Business Insider writes that the Chinese Pakistan Economic Corridor buys the silence of Pakistan, as they refrain from speaking out in fear of economic punishment, Ma finds that “[there is an] explicit link between Pakistan's increasingly tepid response [to Uighur crackdown] and its reliance on Chinese investment.” Eliminating CPEC solves, as Pakistan loses it's incentive to extradite Uighur muslims and act as a puppet for Chinese oppression.

Ultimately, CPEC justifies provincial repression and silencing, and the mass interment of Uigher muslims

Subpoint B is an indo pak war

Morin '18 of The Foreign Analyst explains that Chinese investment in Pakistan through the BRI and Chinese Pakistan Economic Corridor has struck fear in Indian leaders and militants alike, as investments infringe on the disputed Kashmir territory, with China backing Pakistan.

There are two scenarios where war begins because of CPEC.

First is Emboldening Pakistan.

Markey '18 of War on the Rocks finds that Pakistan is a revisionist state, prioritizing changing the status quo which favors India rather than promoting stable growth and tensions in the region. Markey continues that CPEC provides a unique opportunity for Pakistan to hide behind bolstered Chinese forces and poke India through proxy attacks until engaging in all-out war.

But even if the Pakistani government chooses not to go to war with India, it does not mean Pakistan won't strike first. Hiro '19 of National Interest explains that weapons are in the hands of nationalist commanders. This gives rogue actors opportunities to attack without concern for international backlash or governmental pressure.

Second is Indian Lashout.

Baruah '18 of Carnegie India explains that the Indian government is incredibly suspicious over Chinese investments in the south Asian region. He continues that the Indian government believes that the Chinese Pakistan Economic Corridor will shift the power balance in the region, leading India to cling to its relevance in the region through aggressive action.

Hendrix '16 of PIIE explains that CPEC threatens Indian interest by granting Pakistan de facto control over disputed territory, causing militant groups on both sides to engage in conflict that eventually pulls national militaries in as tensions flare.

Markey '18 of War on the Rocks finds that Modi's nationalism and over excited risk analysis from Pakistan and Chinese encroachment means that any minimal perception of threat from Pakistan means that Modi is likely to attack and start a series of responses that will inevitably lead to war.

For these two reasons, Hiro '19 of National Interest writes that an IndoPak war would kill millions, with a potential to bring a global nuclear war because of the aggressive military doctrines of both nations, and lack of rational, influenceable actors.

Uighur genocide outweighs

1. Time frame. Cuomo '96 finds that small instances of violence should be prioritized because major crises are preferred over these violence, leading to an infinite time frame of repression and human rights violations.
2. Severity. Poverty and war are bad, but no violence is as totalizing and heinous as ethnic repression and genocide.
3. Reversibility. Their impacts are reversible. Uighur killing is not reversible in so far as China wants to exterminate the entire culture, leading to the irreversible impact of the loss of entire cultures their subsequent generations.
4. Probability. There is always a chance that hypothetical impacts can be resolved by intervening actors. Because of this, prefer ongoing violence because you know for 100% certainty that you vote for an argument that has an impact.

Cards:

Ketto '18 <https://www.vox.com/2018/8/15/17684226/uighur-china-camps-united-nations?fbclid=IwAR2EMQ685e6gebciDM-Xkm8I1kHvohUmvI-aTbCzexZ8yx3UcjJrPqSeUo>

China has detained as many as 1 million Uighurs in so-called “reeducation centers” and forced them to undergo psychological indoctrination programs — like studying communist propaganda and giving thanks to Chinese President Xi Jinping. Chinese authorities have also reportedly used waterboarding and other forms of torture on the ethnic minority.

Kirby '18 https://www.vox.com/2018/8/15/17684226/uighur-china-camps-united-nations?fbclid=IwAR3Skywx2Kz5FXMmyeBOD2bRC7tWBeiv67zSbdarUOaT4WgXa3_-GEfbiMY

Xinjiang is also a major logistics hub of Beijing's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, a trillion-dollar infrastructure project along the old Silk Road meant to boost China's economic and political influence around the world. **Xinjiang's increasing importance to China's global aspirations is likely a major reason Beijing is tightening its grip. All of which means China has increasingly tried to draw Xinjiang into its orbit, starting with a crackdown in 2009 following riots in the region and leading up to the implementation of repressive policies in 2016 and 2017 that have curbed religious freedom and increased surveillance of the minority population, often under the guise of combating terrorism and extremism. The Chinese government justifies its clampdown on the Uighurs and Muslim minorities by saying it's trying to eradicate extremism and separatist groups.** But while attacks, some violent, by Uighur separatists have occurred in recent years, there's little evidence of any cohesive separatist movement — with jihadist roots or otherwise — that could challenge the Chinese government, experts tell me.

Ma '19

<https://www.businessinsider.com/pakistan-wont-call-out-china-uighur-oppression-shows-power-of-money-2019-1>

Experts have made an explicit link between Pakistan's increasingly tepid response and its reliance on Chinese investment. Many Muslim countries have refrained from criticizing China over its treatment of Uighurs in the past, likely to keep Chinese investments coming, or to avoid charges of hypocrisy over their own human rights record. Pakistan is a major part of the Belt and Road Initiative, a major Chinese project that aims to link the country to more than 70 countries via infrastructure. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) — a massive, \$62 billion partnership between the two countries consisting of transport and energy projects — passes directly through Xinjiang.

Kugelman '19-

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/21/masood-azhar-is-chinas-favorite-terrorist/>

In reality, Pakistan shouldn't need reminding that China is still on its side. The India-China rivalry remains strong and fraught, and it's destined to deepen in the coming years as the two Asian giants ramp up competition for markets, mineral resources, and influence. And a bitter territorial dispute—the cause of a 1962 war—remains unresolved. Still, signaling is important in international relations, and Beijing's obstructionism at the U.N. sent a strong message. To be sure, other factors may have prompted China's move as well. **With Pakistan facing mounting debt to Beijing from CPEC, and with several Belt and Road countries having backed out of projects over the past year due to financing concerns, Beijing**

may have wanted to make a gesture of goodwill to get Islamabad to shake off any emerging discontent over CPEC. Additionally, Beijing may have wanted to offer a sop to Pakistan to preclude any chance of Islamabad calling China out for its Uighur policy. While Pakistan, like every other government of a Muslim-majority country (except Turkey), has maintained a deafening silence on the matter, one can't rule out the possibility, however remote, of Prime Minister Imran Khan—a bold leader with a populist streak—speaking out at some point. If Khan doesn't take it up, the opposition may.

All this said, one gets the impression that Beijing didn't block Azhar's listing with glee, and that it did so somewhat grudgingly. The official Chinese justification for its technical hold—it needed more time to think the matter through—suggests a level of indecision. Also, on March 17, Luo Zhaohui, China's ambassador to India, struck a conciliatory tone, [saying](#), "We understand India's concerns and are optimistic this matter will be resolved." At the very least, Beijing appears to be trying to soften the blow of the move for Indian audiences, indicating a desire not to antagonize New Delhi.

Calabrese '17-

<http://sci-hub.tw/http://www.jstor.org/stable/43857989>

From time to time, local Chinese officials have alleged that the perpetrators of terrorist attacks had trained in Pakistan, a charge then repeated in the China Daily.²⁹ For the most part, however, Chinese authorities have avoided depicting Pakistan as a terrorist 'haven' or 'enabler' and have instead lauded Pakistani contributions in combating terrorism²⁹ whilst **reaffirming their commitment to pursue joint counterterrorism efforts.**³⁰ **To be sure, China and Pakistan have cooperated closely on counterterrorism, including by conducting joint military exercises to address non-traditional security threats.**³¹ Furthermore, **Pakistan has responded to China's concerns by arresting and extraditing terrorist suspects, exerting pressure on religious leaders not to accept Uighurs into madrasas, and even going so far as shuttering community centres for Uighur immigrants.**³² Meanwhile, Beijing has used the Pakistani military as channels to dissuade Afghan groups from targeting China³³ and has also reached out directly to Pakistani religious parties.³

Devi '17 <https://uyghuramerican.org/article/how-will-cpec-affect-xinjiang-conflict-and-terrorism-china.html>

China's obsession with the economic development of the region may also have been spurred by its strategic interest in the abundant natural resources and minerals of the XUAR and its proximity to Central and South Asian commerce and trade. Therefore, Beijing has been investing heavily in developing infrastructure in the XUAR since the 1990s, and the CPEC is yet another project in the same vein. The original documents of the CPEC project also reportedly reveal that the underlying purpose of the project is to integrate Pakistan's economy and supply chain with the "**Kashgar Prefecture in the**

XUAR, which suffers from a poverty incidence of 50 per cent, and large distances that make it difficult to connect to larger markets in order to promote development.”⁸

But, the fundamental question is whether economic development in a silo is sufficient to dispel ethnic tensions and work as a counter-terrorism strategy in the XUAR. On both counts, this isolated approach of the Chinese government fails. While Beijing claims that economic benefits have trickled down to the Uyghurs and stabilized the region in recent times, Uyghur activists and conflict analysts claim that economic inequalities persist in the region. For instance, even today, it is estimated that of the 2.6 million people employed in the XPCC, almost all are Han Chinese. **Further, the counter-terrorism and security strategy adopted by the Chinese government (dubbed the “strike-hard policy”) in response to extremist violence that began in the 1990s has drawn much ire for its lack of regard for human rights.** Over the years, the Communist Party of China reportedly **censored mosques, banned fasting during Ramadan, and banned veils and beards. The “strike hard” policy triggered an unprecedented rise in incidents of police violence and arrests. Apart from encouraging regular raids of the homes of Uyghurs, Beijing also seems to maintain a system of mass surveillance and profiling, daily patrols in villages, cultural standardization, and verification of the identity of worshipers at mosques in the XUAR.** These policies have only sustained Uyghur resentment, despite improvements in the Uyghurs’ economic status, if any. This has created a terrorist threat of greater proportions, with at least 3000 Uyghurs fighting in the ranks of jihadi organizations in the war in Syria.¹⁰ Since the conflict has deflected from its ethno-economic leanings to take on a fundamentalist character, mere emphasis on economic benefits through the CPEC project is an inadequate solution.

Mizokami ‘19- last time it was close to nuke war

<https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/millions-could-perish-5-weapons-india-would-use-war-against-pakistan-44907>

The nuclear arsenals of both sides—and the red lines that would trigger their use—have made conventional war much more risky to conduct. **The 1999 Kargil War is considered the closest the world has come to a nuclear war since the Cuban Missile Crisis.** If India were to use its superiority in ground forces to seize a sizable amount of Pakistani territory, Pakistan could respond with nuclear weapons. It’s distinctly possible that any future war between India and Pakistan would involve limited action on the ground and full-scale fighting at sea and in the air. India has the upper hand in both, particularly at sea where it would have the ability to blockade Pakistani ports. Pakistan imports 83% of its gasoline consumption, and without sizable reserves the economy would feel the effects of war very quickly. An economic victory, not a purely military one might be the best way to decisively end a war without the use of nuclear weapons.

China willing to give up BRI control

Dasgupta, Saibai. "Xi Signals Change in Belt and Road Initiative." VOA News. Apr. 2019.

<https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/xi-signals-change-belt-and-road-initiative-amid-criticism> //RJ

Officials from Germany, France, Australia and Japan have also said they would like to see more opportunities for foreign companies in BRI projects.

The Chinese president has now given a clear indication that he is ready to recalibrate the project parameters even if it means losing control over many aspects of the program. There are signs China had talks with several institutions before Xi spelled out the changes he wanted to make in the Belt and Road program. International Monetary Fund Managing Director Christine Lagarde said at the forum that the BRI could "benefit from increased transparency, open procurement with competitive bidding and better risk assessment in project selection." Said Cabestan, "Xi will make sure that his signature project remains both welcomed and sustainable." Supporters of the Belt and Road program often point to China's huge foreign exchange reserves exceeding \$3 trillion as proof that it can support massive infrastructure projects in 60 countries, which have been included in Beijing's BRI map; but analysts point out that China did not originally plan to use the reserve currency for that purpose. It had intended not to use foreign exchange reserves, but to make investments with renminbi, which would allow for the outward transfer of China's excess capacity, labor and construction facilities, and so on said John Olin Palmetto, chair professor in business at the University of South Carolina Aiken, in an interview with VOA's Mandarin service.

Ciurtin '17 - China cannot build the BRI without financing from the EU

http://ier.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/publicatii/Final_Policy-Brief-5_Horia-Ciurtin-A-Pivot-to-Europe_web.pdf //TP

Therefore, a simple notion must be kept in mind at all times: China seeks not only to build a corridor through Asia, but to rebuild Asia itself. For this purpose, it operates a "creeping displacement" of existing economic dependencies. It has successfully tested this tactic in Central Asia and it is on the verge of implementing it large-scale. The Belt-and-Road Initiative truly is a globalizing project, facilitating the export of a distinct international business model. A model that Europe is not well-equipped to address (and compete with) in troublesome areas of the Middle East and the Caucasus. **However, as shown before, China cannot financially and logistically manage such an ambitious project on its own. And, this time, prominent regional actors such as Russia, Iran and Turkey (who are unable) or India and Japan (who are unwilling) cannot be counted upon to build the Belt and Road. The only possible – and the truly necessary – partner is the European Union. The path to Europe can open up only with Europe's support and financial participation. For this reason, the EU is in the position to exercise its considerable leverage and make limited (but strong) demands on China, before getting to the actual build-up.** However impressive the sums might appear at a first glance, they fall short of the needed amount. The first stages of developing the Belt-and-Road require no less than \$3 trillion (according to some accounts, even more). **And this is a task that China – despite its constant growth and increasing economic power – cannot accomplish alone.**³⁶ It

really needs co-interested parties. And that is where the European Union (with its unbearable economic force) comes into the spotlight: it is not supposed to be just a “passive” destination at the end of the road, but also a co-owner in this joint venture. Without European cash – from public and private sources – it is highly improbable that other actors could feasibly join China in funding the initiative. Russia, Iran, Turkey or Kazakhstan (or even Japan and India³⁷) are in an entirely different economic league than what is needed for such a massive project. For a path to Europe to emerge, Europe itself is needed along the way. In reality, EU-based institutions already are the largest lenders in the region (see Figure 3 below). And Europe is highly interested in developing infrastructure and connectivity with its marginal areas. The Chinese dilemma is – in such conditions – how to attract the European cash within its own framework, while maintaining control of the initiative, but also convincingly advocating that it is an open project among “equal partners”. It is supposed to be a win-win situation for everyone, but – in case of failure – it might amount to a disaster for China. To put it metaphorically, Beijing does not bet all its cards on Europe, but it certainly lays down its jokers here. With more than \$3 trillion to be invested in its flagship initiative, this is projected to devour all of China’s cash surplus over the next decades, rising to an investment intensity that is higher than the Marshall Plan.³⁸ Leadership and great power status comes with great costs. And with great risks.

Rajeev ‘18 - Nukes in hands of local commanders in Pakistan, and retaliation could be misinterpreted as escalation

Rajeev 2018 (Nishant Rajeev is an independent commentator on foreign policy and national security based in New Delhi, “Massive Retaliation is Still India's Best Bet”, *National Interest*, October 20th 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/massive-retaliation-still-indias-best-bet-33792?page=0%2C1>. DOA: April 11th 2019) TG

Furthermore, there is a fair chance that most Pakistani military units will be located close to population centers due to the urbanized nature of some of the theatres along the India-Pakistan border—potentially causing massive collateral damage and inciting an escalatory response. Selecting civilian population centers for proportionate retaliation will likely be all the more difficult for India considering the asymmetries in population, economies and geographical size of the two countries. Moreover, tight civilian control over nuclear weapons in India means that target selection will take more time as damage assessments will need to be conducted before targets for retaliation are selected. *Across the border, however, tactical nuclear weapons will likely be delegated to Pakistani field commanders who may have the discretion to choose their own targets without properly assessing the damage incurred.* Owing to these asymmetries in military strength, population, economy and geographical size, retaliation

against each selected target can easily be misinterpreted by the opponent and lead to further inadvertent or accidental escalation.

Rajeev '18 - Escalation always easier to de-escalation, and thresholds usually kept until end of war

Rajeev 2018 (Nishant Rajeev is an independent commentator on foreign policy and national security based in New Delhi, "Massive Retaliation is Still India's Best Bet", *National Interest*, October 20th 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/massive-retaliation-still-indias-best-bet-33792?page=0%2C1>. DOA: April 11th 2019) TG

Past conflicts have also shown how it is always easier to escalate rather than de-escalate a conflict. In war, once a threshold has been traversed, rarely has a conscious decision been taken to scale down from this level. Instead, the conflict usually reaches a new level which continues on until the end of the war. The strategic bombing of civilian population centers during World War II began accidentally, but continued until the very end of the war with Germany launching V2 missile attacks against British cities even after it had lost much of Europe to the Allies. Other prominent examples include the use of chemical weapons during World War I and the Iran-Iraq War and unrestricted submarine warfare again in World War I. These difficulties in intra-conflict de-escalation coupled with the high probability for inadvertent or accidental escalation make nuclear conflict termination very difficult. This entire problem gets exacerbated when one considers that the missile flight times between India and Pakistan are quite short given their geographical proximity, which leads to shorter time-frames for decision making.

Rajeev '18 - India would switch to defense during a war, and could wage a conventional war due to massive retaliation doctrine

Rajeev 2018 (Nishant Rajeev is an independent commentator on foreign policy and national security based in New Delhi, "Massive Retaliation is Still India's Best Bet", *National Interest*, October 20th 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/massive-retaliation-still-indias-best-bet-33792?page=0%2C1>. DOA: April 11th 2019) TG

Once hostilities break out between India and Pakistan, the priority of India's posture will shift from that of general deterrence to that of intra-war deterrence and defense. In Pakistan, there is still a debate in the role tactical nuclear weapons play in its national security objectives. Some analysts argue that the Nasr—Pakistan's most publicized tactical nuclear weapon—is still a "force in being" while others argue that these weapons have battlefield utility and can be used successfully to stymie an Indian conventional advance. The latter group's belief is that escalation can be controlled, and that Pakistan can "get away" with a limited nuclear exchange (as it can be safely assumed that group of advocates will also expect that there will some form of Indian retaliation). **A massive retaliatory posture looks to trump this very assumption and is likely to push the nuclear threshold higher in a conflict. It seeks to impose costs on Pakistan that are beyond what Islamabad is likely to be able to accept. This will also give further credence to any limited conventional war doctrine India looks to profess and to create space for the use of force in general.**

Hendrix '16 - initiative solidifies Pakistan control and gives them asymmetric economic gains

Peterson Institute for International Economics. Cullen Hendrix. March 2016.

https://www.piie.com/system/files/documents/piieb16-2_1.pdf //TP

The initiative potentially threatens Indian interests in at least three ways (two direct and one indirect), by increasing Chinese and Pakistani activity in the disputed Jammu-Kashmir region, increasing the Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and raising concerns about asymmetric gains from Belt and Road-related economic development. Jammu-Kashmir is one of the last powder kegs in global geopolitics. Most of Asia's land-based claims have been resolved or lay dormant. The competing claims of India and Pakistan to Jammu-Kashmir are a live issue, pitting nuclear armed rivals against one another in the shadow of a third larger nuclear power (China) with its own ambitions in the region. The creation of the CPEC, slated to run through the disputed territory, will solidify Pakistan's de facto control of the area. Although it is unlikely to lead to direct military confrontation between the Indian and Pakistani governments—which deescalated a series of border skirmishes in 2014 and 2015—the region is home to a variety of armed nonstate groups. Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Pakistan-based militant group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and its successors, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Al-Badr, are just some of the militant groups seeking to establish Islamic rule in Indian-held parts of the region. On the Indian side, armed Hindu civil defense forces and Bajrang Dal, the youth wing of the Hindu nationalist Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) party, have engaged in agitation in the region. **If development spurs an uptick in cross border clashes between nonstate armed groups, it may be a matter of time before national militaries once again become involved.** Setting aside the Jammu-Kashmir and Indian Ocean issues, **there is the more general concern that the Belt and Road Initiative will be a larger economic boon to India's rivals than to India, engendering concerns about relative gains with respect to perceived military competitors.** Security scholars have long debated whether states are concerned primarily with absolute gains or gains relative to potential adversaries (Waltz 1979, Grieco 1988, Powell 1991). If relative gains are of greater concern, states may forgo international cooperation in the economic and security realms if they believe the distribution of benefits tilts the balance of power between them and their potential adversaries in an undesirable manner. This question has obvious relevance for India. **Although it will be involved in some Belt and Road projects, the greatest gains from the initiative may accrue to countries it perceives as real or potential security threats.** There is little doubt that India perceives China as a competitor in South Asia and the Indian Ocean (whether China perceives India as a competitor is less certain). **India clearly perceives Pakistan—set to be a major beneficiary of Belt and Road largess—as a rival. To the extent the Belt and Road Initiative increases China's already considerable economic lead over India and contributes to more rapid development in Pakistan, the Indian government can be expected to perceive these developments as unsettling, if not outright threatening.** Of course, this source of tension may be mitigated by India's ability to make use of Chinese-funded infrastructure. To the extent these investments are truly public (albeit congestible) goods, India may gain as much as or more than its potential competitors.

Markey '18 - 1) threat of Chinese encroachment 2) threat of Pakistan emboldenment + Modi nationalism → high chance of conflict, conventional military likely Pakistan counter-attack

“Why The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Will Worsen Tensions in Southern Asia.” *War on the Rocks*, 28 Sept. 2017, warontherocks.com/2017/09/why-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-will-worsen-tensions-in-south-asia/. Accessed 17 July 2019. //tp

This takes us to the third debate, centered on the question of how India will respond to CPEC. Thus far, India’s official reaction to the corridor has been [negative](#) in a narrowly diplomatic sense, with New Delhi’s criticism [focused](#) on Beijing’s direct involvement in the disputed territories of Gilgit-Baltistan. More broadly, however, India sees the tightening China-Pakistan axis as a twofold problem: **First, the threat of Chinese encroachment in what New Delhi considers its traditional sphere of influence, and second, the threat that a China-backed Pakistan could be emboldened to pursue even more aggressive anti-Indian tactics, both by cross-border attacks by militant proxies and by ratcheting up tensions in the heat of a crisis. Combine these threat perceptions with the Indian government’s increasingly muscular approach to international politics under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and you have a recipe for heightened regional competition and a greater chance of violent conflict. India’s new and apparently effective tactics may add up to a broader strategy for countering the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Sino-Pakistani cooperation writ large.** At the very least, India has shown that it will up the ante with both Pakistan and China. Precisely how far New Delhi is prepared to go in response to the emergent China-Pakistan axis is not clear. Pakistanis already claim — [on rather flimsy evidence](#) — that India is engaged in covert operations to undermine CPEC. These claims are [easily brushed aside](#), but **it would hardly be surprising if New Delhi were to explore all options, from covert tactics to conventional military and diplomatic initiatives, in response to what it interprets as a defining — and expanding — strategic threat. In short, as in the case of Pakistan, we reach the gloomy prognosis that China’s deeper involvement in Southern Asia is stirring competitive Indian tendencies rather than cooperative ones. If China and Pakistan both perceive the need to check Indian tactics by escalating their own competitive initiatives, the scene is undoubtedly set for an increasingly dangerous spiral of moves and counter-moves. In short, the further we press our analysis, the gloomier the conclusions we reach.**

Markey '18 - CPEC will embolden Pakistan

“Why The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Will Worsen Tensions in Southern Asia.” *War on the Rocks*, 28 Sept. 2017, warontherocks.com/2017/09/why-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-will-worsen-tensions-in-south-asia/. Accessed 17 July 2019. //TP

Understanding how China's actions will play into existing regional realities begins with Pakistan, the locus for most of Beijing's new initiatives. **A second major debate has centered on the question, "What is Pakistan attempting to achieve through CPEC?"** Once again, the poles of the debate can be identified as, on the one hand, an optimistic [economic agenda](#) of promoting growth and opportunity sparked by Chinese capital, and, on the other, a strategically-oriented agenda, seeking to use China as an [external balancer](#) in Pakistan's core strategic aim of resisting Indian domination. A corollary to this strategic argument is the observation that [Pakistan faces a particular need for additional external assistance because its ties with the once-generous United States are fraying](#). A more sophisticated read of Pakistan's intentions would see both logics at work, with Islamabad seizing a last, best opportunity to advance its economic and security agendas with Chinese assistance, but without submitting to the politically wrenching path of sweeping economic reforms or acquiescing to the even more painful reality of India's regional supremacy. In other words, whatever China's broader intentions might be, its involvement in **Pakistan is reinforcing some of the least healthy aspects of Pakistan's political culture at home and its relationship with neighboring India.** By most Indian estimates, however, **China's backing is more likely to embolden Pakistan than to restrain it. This conclusion is based on the widely held Indian assumption that Pakistan is a revisionist state, not a pure security seeker. Behind Chinese defensive security guarantees. Chinese-assisted enhancements to Pakistan's economic or security condition at home would, from this perspective, only free up resources for a more vigorous competition with India.**

Singh '19- India won't listen to international actors

For many Indian officials, this Friday's EU-India Summit looks about as appealing as a holiday with their grandparents. **European diplomats have a habit of lecturing their Indian counterparts on issues like human rights in Kashmir and relations with Myanmar. The Indians concluded long ago that these lectures could be disregarded.** The Europeans, they believe, are only interested in India as a trading partner. That's not an entirely bad thing – Delhi and Brussels have made progress towards signing a free-trade agreement.

Hiro '19 <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/india-vs-pakistan-two-nations-might-start-nuclear-war-62487> //TP

Alarming, the nuclear competition between India and Pakistan has now entered a spine-chilling phase. **That danger stems from Islamabad's decision to deploy low-yield tactical nuclear arms** at its forward operating military bases along its entire frontier with India to deter possible aggression by tank-led invading forces. **Most ominously, the decision to fire such a nuclear-armed missile with a range of 35 to 60 miles is to rest with local commanders.** This is a perilous departure from the universal practice of investing such authority in the highest official of the nation. Such a situation has no parallel in the Washington-Moscow nuclear arms race of the Cold War era. When it comes to Pakistan's strategic nuclear weapons, their parts are stored in different locations to be assembled only upon an order from the country's leader. By contrast, tactical nukes are pre-assembled at a nuclear facility and shipped to a forward base for instant use. In addition to the perils inherent in this policy, **such weapons would be**

vulnerable to misuse by a rogue base commander or theft by one of the many militant groups in the country.

Hiro '19 Impact

It's possible that a small spark from artillery and rocket exchanges across that border might — given the known military doctrines of the two nuclear-armed neighbors — lead inexorably to an all-out nuclear conflagration. In that case the result would be catastrophic. Besides **causing the deaths of millions of Indians and Pakistanis, such a war might bring on “nuclear winter” on a planetary scale, leading to levels of suffering and death that would be beyond our comprehension.**