

**We Negate Resolved:**The United States should accede to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea without reservations

**Contention 1 is Minesweeper**

[The NOAA explains](#)  
AUV stands for autonomous underwater vehicle and is commonly known as unmanned underwater vehicle.

A greater emphasis is being placed on AUVs, as , [Schmitt 2017](#) writes  
between 2011 and 2015, funding allocated to <sup>UMSS</sup> [underwater marine systems] increased over 300%.

Furthermore  
Near East AUV programs lag behind those of the United States

**Second Line of Defense concludes in 2016**  
The greatest threat to warships and commercial shipping is not anti-ship missiles or torpedoes, but rather mines.

[According to The Drive in 2017, this is because](#)

Although missile and drone boat attacks garner big news, a threat just as deadly quietly looms in the form of sea mines that have been persistently deployed  
by Houthi rebels. These weapons have already struck local ships with devastating effects.

On March 11th a Yemeni Coastguard vessel struck one of these mines, killing two and wounding eight of its crew. The strike resulted in Yemeni forces executing a rudimentary anti-mine warfare operation in the area, in which multiple mines were found and disarmed. But more mines can easily be dumped into the water, and those already floating in the waterway can travel great distances via ocean currents.

Now more mines—which the Yemeni government claims, as with other advanced weapons, are of Iranian origin

**According to the [Center for International Maritime Security in 2015](#)**  
A covert, in-mission, full kill chain, integrated, Mine Warfare Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) is described. It will significantly compress the kill chain beyond today's overt detect to engage methods. It also eliminates or reduces costs associated with today's multi-system approach. Over time, the MCM practice will inevitably evolve from overt to covert: this natural transition is discussed. The Navy asserts that time line improvements are urgently needed, but equally important is improved affordability. Cost savings for the integrated AUV are expected to be less than \$5K per mine kill. The paper describes significant potential to reduce system costs using <sup>An</sup> in-mission full kill chain integrated AUV would dramatically compress the kill chain from traditional Navy detect to engage approaches. It will also eliminate and reduce costs compared to their multi-system approach. Over time, the MCM practice will transition from overt to covert. The time line savings still need to be modeled and validated, but early estimates calculate 3000% improvement. or several orders of magnitude savings in operational time lines. Cost savings are similar because the mine kill per engagement with a 30 mm device are estimated to be less than \$5K per mine kill. The reduction in system cost is potentially huge by scaling to one system that replaces the multi-system of RMMV, AQS-20 and MH-60S Archerfish neutralization placement.

Unfortunately, UNCLOS inhibits our ability to utilize AUVs.

[Showalter](#) from the University of Mississippi argues that under UNCLOS,

In the territorial sea, which extends to twelve nautical miles (nm) offshore, coastal nations have complete sovereignty over the [territorial] waters subject only to the right of innocent passage. According to UNCLOS Art. 19, "passage is innocent so long as it [unless passage of a vessel is not] not "prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State." UMV operations could potentially be undertaken in a foreign nations' territorial sea, as long as the UMV was traveling on the surface and its activities were not prejudicial to that state's "peace, good order, or security." However, it is likely that most UMV [AUV] operations would be considered prejudicial. Article 19 provides several examples of prejudicial activities including weapons exercises, fishing activities, interference with communications, and the carrying out of research or survey activities. Except for a small subset of UMV operations involving the delivery of payloads, most UMMVs are engaged in research or military activities.

Which is why [Ridenour 2006](#) concludes that If the U.S. ratifies the Law of the Sea Treaty, the use of AUVs and ROVs for these and other purposes could be reduced.

The first impact is political instability

[Chatham House 2017](#) finds

Crucially, chokepoint disruptions may also add to political instability. Governments rely on the functioning of chokepoints to ensure sufficient supplies of affordable food for their populations. A poor wheat harvest in the Black Sea region, for example, contributed to protests across North Africa in late 2010 and early 2011; these protests became the Arab Spring.

[Clements worldwide](#) reports in 2015

political unrest is the number one concern among top global managers at multinational corporations and global aid and development organizations. For corporations and developing nations – it means less investment for those countries that have greater political instability and more reported problems.

[Edoun of the University of Johannesburg 2016](#)

Political instability is literally related to maladministration and corruption that are severely affect<sup>ing</sup> citizen's wellbeing as well as socio-economic development.

The second impact is disrupting food supply

[Chatham House 2017](#) outlines that

Over a third of <sup>GCC</sup> [Gulf Cooperation Council] food imports pass through at least one chokepoint for which no alternative route exists. Historical links between food insecurity and political and social instability make the region's high dependence on chokepoints a cause for concern.

concluding

Currently, four out of five people live in countries that depend on imports to feed their populations.

## Contention 2 is A Very Cold War

Newsweek in 2015 writes that

Russia has renewed its claim on 436,000 square miles of Arctic territory in an application to the United Nations, [the Russian Foreign Ministry said Tuesday.](#) Russia's previous claim was rejected in 2002 by a U.N. commission on the grounds of insufficient evidence. This time, the ministry says it has "ample scientific

data collected in years of scientific research,” [The Associated Press](#) reported. The area of Russia’s claim **extend[ing] 350 nautical miles from beyond its shoreline.**

However if the U.S. joined UNCLOS it would be able to dispute Russian claims

Colonel [Riley](#) in 2014 explains

Russia has been extremely focused on securing its Arctic interests and, under the provisions of Article 76 within UNCLOS, has made claims (as yet unrecognized) to extend its Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) to encompass nearly half of the Arctic region. 7 UNCLOS Article 76 allows a coastal state benefits from an extended continental shelf and exclusive rights to seabed resources and Russia has sought to claim these rights under UNCLOS.8 Russia has also been the most aggressive Arctic nation in enhancing its naval capacity within the region. Russia maintains a fleet of 37 icebreaking vessels, dwarfing the next closest Arctic state of Sweden who possess 7, 9 and have also indicated they will grow a deployable Arctic combined arms capability by 2020.10 Russia is not the only state to make Arctic claims under Article 76. Iceland, Norway, Denmark, and Canada have all either submitted, or are in the process of submitting, claims to extend their EEZ. **The U.S.**, however, is restricted from taking similar action. It **has no international legal authority to make seabed claims beyond 200 nm because it is not a party to UNCLOS.** Lack of membership also constrains U.S. ability to formally dispute the resource claims made by other Arctic nations.

[Frolov global Research Institute](#)

The latest findings are likely to prompt Russia to lodge another bid at the UN to secure its rights over the Arctic sea shelf. If no other power challenges Russia’s claim, it will likely go through unchallenged. **But Washington seems to have a different view and is seeking to block the anticipated Russian bid.** On May 16, 2007, Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, made a statement encouraging the Senate to ratify the Law of the Sea Convention, as the Bush Administration wants. The Reagan administration negotiated the Convention, but the Senate refused to ratify it for fear that it would unduly limit the U.S. freedom of action on the high seas. Lugar used the following justification in his plea for the United States to ratify the convention: “Russia has used its rights under the convention to claim large parts of the Arctic Ocean in the hope of claiming potential oil and gas deposits that might become available as the polar ice cap recedes due to global warming. If the United States did not ratify the convention, Russia would be able to press its claims without the United States at the negotiating table. This would be directly damaging to U.S. national interests.” President Bush urged the Senate to ratify the convention during its current session, which ends in 2008. **The United States** has been jealous of Russia’s attempts to project its dominance in the energy sector and **has sought to [use UNCLOS] to limit opportunities for Russia to control export routes and energy deposits outside Russia’s territory.** But the Arctic shelf is something that Russia has traditionally regarded as its own. For decades, other countries have pressed no claims to Russia’s Arctic sector for obvious reasons of remoteness and inhospitability, but no longer. Now, as the world’s major economic powers brace for the battle for the last barrel of oil, it is not surprising that the United States would seek to intrude on Russia’s home turf. **It is obvious that Moscow would** try to resist this U.S. intrusion and **would view any U.S. efforts to block Russia’s claim to its Arctic sector as unfriendly and overtly provocative.** Furthermore, such a policy would actually help the Kremlin justify its hardline position. **It would certainly prove right Moscow’s assertion that [while proving to Russia that] the U.S. policy towards Russia is really driven by the desire to get access to Russia’s energy resources.**

Carmichael in 2018 furthers

This “seat at the CLCS table” yields several gains for the U.S. beyond putting its own claims forward. It also allows the U.S. to better defend its interests against Non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) and other non-state or rogue actors (be they domestic or international) which are actually trying to usurp the U.S.’ claims in one fashion or another.329 CLCS membership would also provide the U.S. with added defenses against more traditional adversaries and their respective claims and programs – entities which obviously pose both more of a policy and a real-world threat than do most NGOs. Two prime examples of such potential U.S. adversaries are its classic ideological opponents Russia and China, both of which are becoming increasingly active in such disputes and preparations. 330 Further, a legitimized CLCS position **[Ratification] would give the U.S. the ability to oppose** not only directly **contrasting claims and submissions,** but those which are simply “ambiguous” as well.331 This would in turn **increas[ing]** the breadth of **U.S. oversight beyond** anything it is presently **[its present capabilities]** capable of **with its “sidelined” status as a non-party** that relies solely on customary international law.

If the US accedes to UNCLOS, the US will certainly try to combat Russia in the Arctic because the United States views the Arctic as key territory. Secretary of Defense James Mattis says the arctic **“A key strategic terrain” and** that is is **“not to our advantage to leave any part of the world” to others.**

The impact of disputing Russian claims is cyberattacks on U.S. energy infrastructure

Schmitt in 2014 warrants

Michael N. Schmitt, Fletcher Security Review, "Security Challenges a& Opportunities in the Next American Century: A Conversation with David H. Petraeus", 2014, [http://media.wix.com/ugd/c28a64\\_2fdf4e7945e9455cb8f8548c9d328ebe.pdf](http://media.wix.com/ugd/c28a64_2fdf4e7945e9455cb8f8548c9d328ebe.pdf)

That States will continue to work through non-state actors to achieve national security and foreign policy objectives is inevitable. In cyberspace, this tendency will certainly grow, for such operations afford states a degree of anonymity and detachment from the non-state operations that serve useful political and legal ends. In particular, the relatively high levels of support that are required before a state can be held responsible for the activities of non-state groups or individuals, as distinct from their own responsibility for being involved, creates a normative safe zone for them.

Curently, Perloth from the New York Times in 2018 writes

"We now have evidence they're sitting on the machines, connected to industrial control infrastructure, that allow them to effectively turn the power off or effect sabotage," said Eric Chien, a security technology director at Symantec, a digital security firm. "From what we can see, they were there. They [Russia has] have the ability to shut the power off. All that's missing is some political motivation." Mr. Chien said.

Combating Russia in the Arctic gives that motivation  
[Blank](#) from the Strategic Studies Institute in 2011 explains that

On May 12, 2009, President Medvedev approved the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020 (NSS).<sup>62</sup> This doctrine replaced the national security concepts of 1997 and 2000. The document posited that Russia's ability to defend its national security depended overall on the country's economic potential. Russia's natural resources are viewed as a base for this economic development and determine its geopolitical influence. On February 4, 2009, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was quoted as saying: "Russia enjoys vast energy and mineral resources which serve as a base to develop its economy; as an instrument to implement domestic and foreign policy. The role of the country in international energy markets determines, in many ways, its geopolitical influence."<sup>6</sup>

Continuing, that

Perhaps more telling is paragraph 11, which lays out the future battlegrounds where conflicts over energy will occur: "The attention of [Russia] international politics in the [Russia's] long term [attention] will be concentrated on controlling the sources of energy resources in the Middle East, on the shelf of the Barents Sea and other parts of the Arctic, in the Caspian Basin and in Central Asia." Ominously, the document posits that future competition for energy near Russian borders or its allies may be resolved with military force: "In [the] case of a competitive struggle for resources it is not impossible to discount that it might be resolved by a decision to use military might." The existing balance of forces on the borders of the Russian Federation and its allies can be changed."<sup>65</sup>

Russia targeting our energy infrastructure would be devastating  
Dancy in 2017 from the University of Oklahoma Law writes

It is estimated that the U.S. currently has 182,000 miles of hazardous liquid pipelines,<sup>12</sup> 325,000 miles of natural gas transmission pipelines, and 2.15 million miles of natural gas distribution pipelines along with the associated metering, pumping, sensors, and valves that accompany each.<sup>13</sup> Over 3,000 private and public companies own and operate the nation's pipelines according to recent estimates.<sup>14</sup> Due to the ubiquitous nature of the energy delivery system a cyberattack on such energy infrastructure presents the risk of "unfathomable asymmetrical physical damage" to life and property according to some experts.<sup>15</sup> Those who study cybersecurity issues realize that it is potential cyberattacks on the energy space, not the consumer credit space, that could cripple the United States economy.<sup>16</sup> At the extreme end of the spectrum a large cyberattack on energy infrastructure could bring about a collapse of society that most of us associate with apocalyptic scenarios. The costs of such a pipeline system cybersecurity breach include the cost of business interruption, damage to third parties, and damage to the physical plant or equipment and control systems. For those companies that are publicly traded, the cost could include a large post-breach drop in the

**Negate**

(FL BELOW)

**FL No threat of mines in squo**

Larter [Navy times 17](#)

**In the Persian Gulf, sailors face an increasingly confrontational Iran along with the risk of cheap but catastrophic mines.**

**FI arctic council - can't resolve strategic disputes**

Usnews 17

Nor is the Arctic Council any help. **The [arctic council]** organization, while bringing together all eight Arctic nations, **is prohibited by its charter from weighing in on security or military-related matters.** Legally, pursuant to the Illusissat Declaration of 2008, UNCLOS is the only framework for rectifying

competing claims to the Arctic's natural resources. Militarily, meanwhile, the "Meeting of the Northern Defense Chiefs" is the only venue for discussing security or military matters for

the Arctic region – but that body has no powers and provides for no processes or mechanisms by which to resolve disputes, should they arise.

**Business Insider in 2016 finds that**

Today's infographic highlights the size of some of these resources in relation to global reserves to help create context around the potential significance of this untapped wealth. In terms of oil, it's estimated that **the Arctic has 90 billion barrels of oil that is yet to be discovered** That's equal to 5.9% of the world's known oil reserves - about 110% of Russia's current oil reserves, or 339% of U.S. reserves. For natural gas, the potential is even higher: the Arctic has an estimated 1,669 trillion cubic feet of gas, equal to 24.3% of the world's current known reserves. That's equal to 500% of U.S. reserves, 99% of Russia's reserves, or 2,736% of Canada's natural gas reserves

Cambridge: <https://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/political-instability-and-weak-governance-lead-to-loss-of-species-study-finds>

Political instability and weak governance lead to loss of species, study finds

Gurzu from Politico in 2016 writes

Under pressure from its troubled fossil fuel-driven economy, Russia is moving ahead with risky projects to drill for oil and gas in the ice-clogged Arctic Ocean.

Russia's onshore oil and gas fields "are depleting and are depleting fast," said Mikà Mered, managing partner at Polarisk, a consultancy specializing in polar issues. "If you are the Russian government today and if you want[s] to keep having your oil and gas, you [it] need[s] to start developing offshore Arctic oil and gas fast."

Schmitt in 2014 warrants

Michael N. Schmitt, Fletcher Security Review, "Security Challenges a& Opportunities in the Next American Century: A Conversation with David H. Petraeus", 2014, [http://media.wix.com/ugd/c28a64\\_2fdf4e7945e9455cb8f8548c9d328ebe.pdf](http://media.wix.com/ugd/c28a64_2fdf4e7945e9455cb8f8548c9d328ebe.pdf)

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Peak from the Independent in August

"The primary cyber threat to oil and gas infrastructure comes from hostile states who are developing disruptive [cyber] capabilities in order to deliver power projection for their own long-term geopolitical and politico-military ends."

Contention 1 FL

FL No mines The Drive 17

The potential threat to international commerce posed by naval mines remains palpable. This is especially true when it comes to their deployment around known geographical bottlenecks. When those bottlenecks convey a large portion of the world's daily oil supply, destabilizing any one of them could have massive economic and even life-safety repercussions around the globe. This is why the growing threat of naval mines in the Strait of Mandeb, the narrow body of water that ties the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, is so concerning.

FL No threat of mines in squo

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In the Persian Gulf, sailors face an increasingly confrontational Iran along with the risk of cheap but catastrophic mines.

FL US doesn't have AUVs in the gulf now  
NOAA 08

The REMUS autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) helped clear the Iraqi port Umm Qasr in 2003. This was the first successful wartime deployment of an AUV. REMUS AUVs are still in operation throughout the world. Click image for larger view and image credit.

FL US isn't interested in AUVs anymore  
The Drive 17

The implication here would be that, at least for a period, the Navy planned for UUVRON 1 to reach its full operational capability at some point in 2020. It is possible that the service may be able to get the squadron fully up and running sooner, depending on how the state of the training pipeline to staff the necessary slots and what additional equipment it needs to acquire.

FL:US AUV doesn't do anything The Drive 17

The Saudi Navy has also been active in minesweeping operations on the southern stretch of the Red Sea. But these anti-mine warfare efforts don't seem to be sufficient for confronting the threat.

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The Defense Security Service reported in 2011 AUVs have a variety of military and commercial uses. The U.S. Navy identifies nine areas for its AUV programs [including]: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) ; mine counter measures (MCM); anti-submarine warfare (ASW); inspection and identification; oceanography; communication/navigation network node; payload delivery; information operation; and time-critical strike.1Commercial applications include underwater surveys, fisheries research, search and recovery, wreck and navigational hazard mapping, and water profile sampling

Commented [1]: can prob take this out too

Contention 2 FL

FL Arctic Council Waston 09 U of Maine Law School

Likewise, in 2005, Canada and Denmark reached an agreement for managing Hans Island, while the two States continue to pursue their claims of the small land mass.<sup>175</sup> They have also undertaken a joint surveying project of the Arctic area near their coasts.<sup>176</sup> In 1996, the eight Arctic States established the Arctic Council, which was designed to promote

cooperation among the Arctic States. While the Arctic **Council** is demonstrative of the States' ability to cooperate, it cannot serve the same function as an Arctic treaty since **it has been delegated negligible power and its laws have no binding effect on the Arctic States.**<sup>177</sup> To date, **"the most the Arctic Council has been able to do . . . has been to adopt guidelines and recommendations on how the Arctic [S]tates should apply their [individual State] regulations in [Arctic] areas."**<sup>178</sup>

**FL Russia doesn't care about oil in arctic**

[Highnorthnews](#)

**Russia desires increased control in the northern areas in order to prevent other actors from challenging Russian financial and military strategic interests in the region when the sea ice melts and easier access to the Arctic is available, the report states.**



The second way is through proxy wars.

Russia and the US would engage in a proxy war to prevent the other from accessing the Arctic.

**Mumford from the Strategy Bridge in 2017 warrants** The indirect approach, as envisaged by Liddell Hart, creates the conditions whereby an enemy is forced to realise that their own strategic objectives are unattainable without the need for direct or conventional use of force. As Freedman has noted, "the logic point[s] to deterrence."<sup>[23]</sup> **Proxy warfare is a form of conflict** predominantly **designed to deter competitor states from staking** significant strategic **resources** of their own. This is in large part based on acute calculations of political risk and a desire to maximise self-interest that is greater than the will of an adversary to aggressively respond. This in-built logic of deterrence is reinforced by other key components of proxy warfare, namely causal ambiguity (victim states might be deterred from retaliating in a conventional way because of the unclear lines of responsibility for the initial attack). The recourse to proxy war has been particularly prevalent since 1945 as the shadow of nuclear war ensured more acute selectivity in conflict engagement, given the consequences of a potential nuclear exchange.

Which is why [Mumford](#) concludes in 2013 **Where** state or group survival is not at stake but the **augmentation of national interests** or ideological gains **can** still **be achieved, states** and sub-state groups **have historically proven to be conspicuous users of proxy methods** as a means of securing particular conflict outcomes

**Davies in 2018 outlines the harm writing that** Altogether, in the three parts of this report, I have estimated that America's **post-9/11,** wars have killed about 6 million people. Maybe the true number is only 5 million. Or maybe it is 7 million. But I am quite certain that it is **several millions [ have died in U.S. covert and proxy wars in Libya, Syria, Somalia and Yemen]**

It is not only hundreds of thousands, as many otherwise well-informed people believe, because compilations of "passive reporting" can never amount to more than a fraction of the actual numbers of people killed in countries living through the kind of violence and chaos that our country's aggression has unleashed on them since 2001.

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## We negate

## Our Sole Contention is A Very Cold War

Newsweek in 2015 writes that

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While Secretary of Defense James Mattis has said the arctic is a key strategic terrain.

Colonel Riley in 2014 explains

Colonel Matthew Riley, US Marine Corps, 2014, <http://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/222.pdf>

Russia has been extremely focused on securing its Arctic interests and, under the provisions of Article 76 within UNCLOS, has made claims (as yet unrecognized) to extend its Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) to encompass nearly half of the Arctic region.<sup>7</sup> UNCLOS Article 76 allows a coastal state benefits from an extended continental shelf and exclusive rights to seabed resources and Russia has sought to claim these rights under UNCLOS.<sup>8</sup> Russia has also been the most aggressive Arctic nation in enhancing its naval capacity within the region. Russia maintains a fleet of 37 icebreaking vessels, dwarfing the next closest Arctic state of Sweden who possess 7, 9 and have also indicated they will grow a deployable Arctic combined arms capability by 2020.<sup>10</sup> Russia is not the only state to make Arctic claims under Article 76. Iceland, Norway, Denmark, and Canada have all either submitted, or are in the process of submitting, claims to extend their EEZ. The U.S., however, is restricted from taking similar action. It has no international legal authority to make seabed claims beyond 200 nm because it is not a party to UNCLOS. Lack of membership also, constrains U.S. ability to formally dispute the resource claims made by other Arctic nations.

The US acceding to UNCLOS and claiming these lands causes conflict for two reasons.

Land disputes can easily escalate

Osborn from Reuters in 2017 writes that as a result,

Under President Vladimir Putin, Moscow is rushing to re-open abandoned Soviet military, air and radar bases on remote Arctic islands and to build new ones, as it pushes ahead with a claim to almost half a million square miles of the Arctic. It regularly releases pictures of its troops training in white fatigues, wielding assault rifles as they zip along on sleighs pulled by reindeer. The Arctic, the U.S. Geological Survey estimates, holds oil and gas reserves equivalent to 412 billion barrels of oil, about 22 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and gas. Low oil prices and Western sanctions imposed over Moscow's actions in Ukraine mean new offshore Arctic projects have for now been mothballed, but the Kremlin is playing a longer game. It is building three nuclear icebreakers, including the world's largest, to bolster its fleet of around 40 breakers, six of which are nuclear.<sup>No</sup> other country has a nuclear breaker fleet, used to clear channels for military and civilian ships. Russia's Northern Fleet, based near Murmansk in the Kola Bay's icy waters, is also due to get its own icebreaker, its first, and two ice-capable corvettes armed with cruise missiles. "Under (Soviet leader Mikhail) Gorbachev and (Russian President Boris) Yeltsin, our Arctic

border areas were stripped bare," said Professor Pavel Makarevich, a member of the Russian Geographical Society. "Now they are being restored."... Mattis, in a separate written submission, described Moscow's Arctic moves as "aggressive steps" and pledged to prioritize developing a U.S. strategy, according to Senator Dan Sullivan. That poses a potential dilemma for President Donald Trump, who wants to repair U.S.-Russia ties and team up with Moscow in Syria rather than get sucked into an Arctic arms race. The build-up is causing jitters [in the United States] elsewhere. Some 300 U.S. Marines landed in Norway this month for a six-month deployment, the first time since World War Two that foreign troops have been allowed to be stationed there.

The negative solves in a clear way: If the US doesn't accede to UNCLOS conflict can't spark over nonexistent land disputes.

The second way conflict manifests is through resource competition for fossil fuels. Contrary to conventional thinking, the world is not entering an age of green technology, we are entering an age of unconventional fossil fuels.

Klare from the Nation in 2013 writes investment in unconventional fossil-fuel extraction and distribution is now expected to outpace spending on renewables by a ratio of at least three-to-one in the decades ahead.

The same is true for natural gas, the second most important source of world energy. The global supply of conventional gas, like conventional oil, is shrinking, and we are becoming increasingly dependent on unconventional sources of supply—especially from the Arctic the deep oceans, and shale rock via hydraulic fracturing.

This causes russia to go on the offensive to preserve their regime.

Jaffe from the Council on Foreign Relations warrants in 2017 The possible conflict over market share [of oil and gas] is existential to Russian power. Washington's energy dominance tack, which recently included an announced gas export deal for Alaska during the Trump visit to Beijing, sounds as threatening to Russian ears as NATO expansion did a decade or more ago. Not only does Russia rel[ies] heavily on its energy exports for its statist budget and as a diplomatic lever, but the commanding heights of Putin's inner circle and his grip on power is intimately inter-linked with Russia's oil and gas elite. Russian influence and economic health has suffered in the past from orchestrated alliances between the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar that targeted Russia's energy earnings. The threat of rising U.S. oil and gas exports could be one factor encouraging increasingly risky Russian adventurism since doing nothing about it could neutralize a major tool of Russian foreign policy.

Kolgan from the Belfer Center of Harvard outlines the potential for disaster, writing that Oil Is a Leading Cause of War. Between one-quarter and one-half of interstate wars since 1973 have been linked to oil.

Moreover, the probability of conflict between U.S. and Russia is exponentially higher given the nature of the Arctic. **Kolgan continues that**

Policymakers must also think systematically about oil-security linkages when monitoring emerging security threats as the global oil industry transforms itself. With sixteen additional countries potentially exporting oil in the near future, new international dynamics will materialize, especially in Africa. Furthermore, if oil prices remain high, incentives for resource grabs will grow. Resource wars are most likely to occur in unpopulated territories or naval zones, as oil can be extracted from these areas without the need to manage a populated, potentially hostile territory. Thus, policymakers should be most concerned about disputed territories in the East China and South China Seas and naval borders in the Caspian Sea. [In regions where] [t]here are already competing sovereignty claims to territory in those regions, and considerable uncertainty about the magnitude of the energy resources located there, creating conditions [are] ripe for miscalculation and mutual suspicion. Policymakers should be especially concerned about security threats that arise from unexpected sources, such as allies' energy needs or seemingly benign actions that prompt hostile responses from rivals.

Conflict could manifest itself in three ways.

First through direct conflict between U.S. and Russia **Clock from the National Interest in 2018** writes that a war between the U.S. and Russia would go nuclear and kill billions. .

The second way is through proxy wars.

**Russia and the US would engage in a proxy war to prevent the other from accessing the Arctic.**

**Mumford from the Strategy Bridge in 2017 warrants** The indirect approach, as envisaged by Liddell Hart, creates the conditions whereby an enemy is forced to realise that their own strategic objectives are unattainable without the need for direct or conventional use of force. As Freedman has noted, "the logic point(s) to deterrence."<sup>[23]</sup> **Proxy warfare is a form of conflict** predominantly **designed to deter competitor states from staking** significant strategic **resources** of their own. This is in large part based on acute calculations of political risk and a desire to maximise self-interest that is greater than the will of an adversary to aggressively respond. This in-built logic of deterrence is reinforced by other key components of proxy warfare, namely causal ambiguity (victim states might be deterred from retaliating in a conventional way because of the unclear lines of responsibility for the initial attack). The recourse to proxy war has been particularly prevalent since 1945 as the shadow of nuclear war ensured more acute selectivity in conflict engagement, given the consequences of a potential nuclear exchange.

Which is why **Mumford** concludes in 2013 **Where** <sup>state or group</sup> survival is not at stake but the **augmentation of national interests** <sup>or</sup> ideological gains **can still be achieved. states** and sub-state groups **have historically proven to be conspicuous users of proxy methods** as a means of securing particular conflict outcomes

**Davies in 2018 outlines the harm writing that** Altogether, in the three parts of this report, I have estimated that America's **post-9/11** wars have killed about 6 million people. Maybe the true number is only 5 million. Or maybe it is 7 million. But I am quite certain that it is **several millions [ have died in U.S. covert and proxy wars in Libya, Syria, Somalia and Yemen]**

It is not only hundreds of thousands, as many otherwise well-informed people believe, because compilations of "passive reporting" can never amount to more than a fraction of the actual numbers of people killed in countries living through the kind of violence and chaos that our country's aggression has unleashed on them since 2001.

The third way is through cyberwarfare.

Russia and the US would engage in a cyberwar because they could not be held responsible.

**Schmitt in 2014 warrants**

Michael N. Schmitt, Fletcher Security Review, "Security Challenges a& Opportunities in the Next American Century: A Conversation with David H. Petraeus", 2014, [http://media.wix.com/ugd/c28a64\\_2fd4e7945e9455cb8f8548c9d328ebe.pdf](http://media.wix.com/ugd/c28a64_2fd4e7945e9455cb8f8548c9d328ebe.pdf)

<sup>These</sup> states will continue to work through non-state actors to achieve national security and foreign policy objectives <sup>is inevitable.</sup> In **cyberspace**, this tendency will <sup>certainly</sup> grow, for such **operations afford states a degree of anonymity** and detachment from the non-state operations **that serve useful political and legal ends.** In particular, **the** <sup>relatively</sup> **high levels of support that are required before a state can be held responsible** for the activities of non-state groups or individuals, <sup>as distinct</sup> from their own responsibility for being involved, **creates a normative safe zone for them.**

A cyberwar would devastating.

**Pizzi from AlJazeera identifies in 2014 that Cyberwarfare is the greatest threat facing the United States** – outstripping even terrorism – according to defense, military, and national security leaders in a Defense News poll, a sign that hawkish warnings about an imminent "cyber Pearl Harbor" have been absorbed in defense circles.

That warning, issued by then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta in Oct. 2012, struck many as a fear-mongering plug for defense and intelligence funding at a moment when many in the United States, including 32 percent of those polled by the same Defense News Leadership Poll, believe the government spends too much on defense.

Marquis-Boire said the most kinetic cyberattack to date was probably the Stuxnet worm that attacked Iran's Natanz nuclear enrichment facility in 2010, stoking fears of a cyber-triggered nuclear terror attack. In the U.S., the most prominent cyber attacks have targeted websites, including the Syrian Electronic Army's infamous White House bomb hoax that briefly caused a 140-point drop in the Dow Jones Industrial Average.

But the classic fear is that **enemy hackers** – from countries like Iran, China, wor Russia – **could infiltrate the U.S. power grid, shutting down government agencies, crashing planes into buildings, and grinding the economy to a halt.**

And though it has yet to happen, security experts say a large-scale attack on the U.S. power grid that could inflict mass casualties is within the realm of possibility. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation reported in 2009 that the U.S. grid remains susceptible to infiltration despite substantial government investment in securing it.