

Donations push candidates to the middle

Zillante 2011 [Arthur, "An Experimental Study of Alternative Campaign Finance Systems: Donations, Elections and Policy Choices," *NBER Working Paper* No. 17384. Accessed at: <http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/~hfang/WorkingPaper/campaignfinance/w17384.pdf>.] //DNP

We experimentally study the effect of alternative campaign finance systems – as characterized by different information structure about donors – on donations, election outcomes, political candidates' policy choices, and welfare. Three alternative campaign finance systems are considered: a full anonymity (FA) system in which neither the politicians nor the voters are informed about the donors' ideal policies or levels of donations; a partial anonymity (PA) system in which only the politicians, but not the voters, are informed about the donors' ideal policies and donations; and finally a no anonymity (NA) system in which both the politicians and the voters are informed about the donors' ideal policies and donations. We find that donors contribute less in the FA system than in the PA and NA system, and candidates are less likely to deviate from their ideal policies under FA than under the PA and NA systems. The effect of donations on the candidate's policy deviations differs in FA from that in PA and NA. Specifically, in the FA system larger donations lead to smaller deviations from the candidate's ideal policy; but in the NA and PA systems, larger donations lead to larger deviations. As a result **we observe that the donations lead to a centrist bias in the candidate's policy choices, i.e., donations are more likely to make extreme candidate move to the center than to make centrist candidate move to the right.** This centrist bias is present more robustly in FA treatments. Finally, we find that donors greatly benefit from the possibility of donations regardless of the finance system. Voter welfare remains virtually unchanged under the PA and NA systems, especially when there is competition among the donors. Our findings provide the first experimental evidence supportive of Ayres and Ackerman's (2002) campaign finance reform proposal.

[...]

The estimated coefficients on the candidate's ideal location π_1 are negative and significant in all three treatments. Recall that a larger π_1 means that the human candidate has a larger initial probability of being elected. Thus this result means that, holding the donation amount and other factors constant, candidates who are more likely to be elected to start with are less likely to deviate from their preferred policy. Furthermore, it means that extreme candidates' deviations are larger than those of centrist candidates. This together with our observation from Table 4 implies that **donations are more likely to make extreme candidate more moderate and less likely to make centrist candidate less centrist.** The intuition behind the result is straightforward. **When the candidate has a relatively high chance to win elections without the donations** (in our model it's centrist candidates) **then they value donations less and are less inclined to reciprocate.** On the other hand, candidates with a lower election chance may desire campaign contributions more and may be more willing to reward donors. The coefficient estimates indicate that the effect of this centrist bias varies across treatments: it is strongest under FA and is approximately the same in NA and PA with PA being the weakest. This finding that candidate's policy deviations, when influenced by donations, are biased towards the center is beneficial for voters' welfare, an issue discussed more in Section 5.4.

Democrats are pro free trade unless it doesn't have good regulations

Democrats.org, 2016 [, "2016 Party Platform," <https://www.democrats.org/party-platform>] MJS
4-30-2017

While we believe that openness to the world economy is an important source of American leadership and dynamism, we will oppose trade agreements that do not support good American jobs, raise wages, and improve our national security. **We believe any new trade agreements must include strong and enforceable labor and environmental standards in their core text with streamlined and effective enforcement mechanisms.** Trade agreements should crack down on the unfair and illegal subsidies other countries grant their businesses at the expense of ours. **It should promote innovation of and access to lifesaving medicines. And it should protect a free and open internet.** We should never enter into a trade agreement that prevents our government, or other governments, from putting in place rules that protect the environment, food safety, or the health of American citizens or others around the world. **These are the standards Democrats believe must be applied to all trade agreements, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).**

A2: Steel initiative - Ben Goodrich furthers, the steel initiative would have harmed Florida, a swing state, therefore the Electoral College couldn't be the reason for its implementation.

Steel Policy: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly/ Gary Clyde Hufbauer and **Ben Goodrich/ International Economics Policy Briefs/** January 2003/ <http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb03-1.pdf>
As soon as President Bush announced the steel tariffs, domestic steel consumers and foreign steel exporters complained that they were being forced to pay for Bush's gift to the steel industry. Leading the charge, the European Union and Japan publicly threatened to retaliate against hallmark US exports from politically sensitive congressional districts—such as textiles from Southeast states and citrus products from Florida—in advance of the November 2002 mid-term elections.

New swing states coming - and they are super diverse

David F. Damore, 1-26-2012 ["The Impact of Density and Diversity on Reapportionment and Redistricting in the Mountain West," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-impact-of-density-and-diversity-on-reapportionment-and-redistricting-in-the-mountain-west/>] MJS 4-30-2017

During the first decade of the 21st century the six states of the Mountain West — Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah — experienced unprecedented political and demographic changes. Population growth in all six states exceeded the national average and the region is home to the four states that underwent the largest population gains between 2000 and 2010. As a consequence, **the region is now home to some of the most demographically diverse** and geographically concentrated states in the country— **factors that helped to transform the Mountain West from a Republican stronghold into America's new swing region.** This paper examines the impact that **increased diversity** and density are exerting on reapportionment and redistricting in each Mountain West state and assesses the implications that redistricting outcomes will exert both nationally and within each state in the coming decade. Nationally, the region's clout will

increase due to the addition of three seats in the House of Representatives (one each in Arizona, Nevada, and Utah) and **electoral contexts in Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico that will result in competitive presidential and senate elections throughout the decade**. At the state level, the combination of term limits, demographic change, and the reapportionment of state legislative seats from rural to urban areas will alter the composition of these states' legislatures and should facilitate the realignment of policy outcomes that traditionally benefitted rural interests at the expense of urban needs.

[...]

In addition to further urbanizing the region, **the prior decade's growth continued to transform the region's demographics as all six Mountain West states are now more ethnically diverse as compared to a decade ago**.^[iii] The largest changes occurred **in Nevada** where **the minority population increased by over 11 percent and now better than 45 percent of Nevadans are classified as non-white**. While the bulk of this growth was among Hispanics, whose share of the population increased by 7 percent and are now 26.5 percent of all Nevadans, the Silver State also recorded large increases among Asian and Pacific Islanders. **Arizona experienced similar increases as that state's minority population mushroomed from 36.2 percent to 42.2 percent** with Hispanics now constituting 30 percent of the population. **In Colorado, the minority population increased by 3.5 percent to 30 percent**. Nearly all of this change was caused by an increase in Hispanics, who now constitute 20.7 percent of the state's population. **New Mexico continues to be the Mountain West's most diverse state as nearly three out of five New Mexicans are minorities** and the state contains the region's largest Hispanic population (46 percent). And while Idaho and Utah remain overwhelmingly white, both states' non-white populations grew at levels similar to Colorado. Idaho is now 16 percent non-white (including a Hispanic population of 11.2 percent) and nearly one in five Utahans is a minority. Between 2000 and 2010, Hispanics increased by 4 percent to constitute 13 percent of Utah's population. Politically, **these changes helped to create competitive electoral contexts across the region**. Indeed, with the obvious exceptions of Idaho and Utah, **the Mountain West is now more hospitable to the Democratic Party** than it was in 2000. In particular, Democrats were able to make significant gains in Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico and effectively flipped those states from Republican leaning in 2000 to Democratic leaning in 2010. In Arizona, the Democratic performance was highly variable and moved in near perfect tandem with the broader national political environment. At the same time, the downturn in Democratic support in 2010 indicates that the party has not yet consolidated its gains. Riding a favorable 2010 macro-environment, Mountain West Republicans gained one governorship (New Mexico), seats in ten of the region's 12 state legislative chambers, and seven House seats (out of a total of 26 in the region).^[iv] Thus, heading into the 2011 redistricting cycle, Republicans control the executive and legislative branches in Arizona, Idaho, and Utah and there are no Mountain West states where the Democrats have unified control as the partisan composition of the Colorado legislature is divided and Nevada and New Mexico have Republican governors and Democratic legislatures.

Non-unique – all people think free trade is dangerous and protectionism is good, not just swing voters

Harvard School of Public Health, 2016, "Americans' Views on Current Trade and Health Policies", Politico, <http://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000157-58ef-d502-ad5f-dbef0b4f0000>

Many Americans also believe that trade policies with other countries have lost American jobs (65% lost U.S. jobs, 13% created U.S. jobs, 15% no effect on U.S. jobs), and nearly half (49%) think these policies have lowered wages for American workers. Only 14% think these policies have raised American wages. While *89% of Americans favor the federal government creating policies to encourage companies to bring jobs back to the U.S.*, only 25% think these policies would be very effective, with another 48% saying they would be somewhat effective.²

Swing state voters broadly support free trade (2016 evidence means we probably post-date)

Vicki Needham, 6-22-2016, "Poll: Trade is popular in swing states, among Democrats", TheHill, <http://thehill.com/policy/finance/trade/284539-poll-trade-is-popular-in-swing-states-among-democrats>

Trade is more popular with voters in swing states than the presumptive Democratic and Republican presidential nominees might think, especially among Democrats, according to a new poll. Voters in four battleground states — Colorado, Florida, Nevada and Ohio — expressed positive views about the U.S. expanding trade, even while Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump call for major changes to the nation's global commercial outreach. A new Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) poll on Wednesday shows that by a 55 to 32 percent margin swing-state voters say that new high-standard trade deals can help the U.S. economy and support good-paying jobs. Democrats are particularly supportive, 66 to 25 percent. "Our poll's findings suggest that to prevail with swing voters [candidates] and in swing states, Democrats, in particular, will need to craft messages and support policies that transcend protectionism — that recognize trade's role in supporting American prosperity, acknowledge the complexity of global competition and highlight the benefits of high-standard trade agreements," Marshall and Gerwin wrote.

The root cause is a lack of social expenditure – they can't solve

Cullen Hendrix, 2016, "Protectionism in the 2016 Election: Causes and Consequences, Truths and Fictions", Peterson Institute for International Economics, <https://piie.com/system/files/documents/pb16-20.pdf>

How did we wind up here? Two prominent explanations—that free trade is popular with elites but unpopular with the masses and that younger generations are more protectionist than older ones—can be rejected. Another three—the "China shock" sinking in, the current US electoral map privileging protectionist sentiment, and modern free trade agreements' growing complexity—are more compelling. At root, the turn toward protectionism is the result of a disconnect between the United States' rising trade exposure and a failure to adopt the social expenditure policies that have accompanied open markets in other advanced economies.

Even if you buy the arg, the squo prevents harms to candidates

Cullen Hendrix, 2016, "Protectionism in the 2016 Election: Causes and Consequences, Truths and Fictions", Peterson Institute for International Economics, <https://piie.com/system/files/documents/pb16-20.pdf>

In the 11 battleground states in the 2016 election (Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin), the pattern is striking. In only one (Colorado, with 9 electoral votes) did the majority of respondents report that free trade had definitely or probably helped them or their families. In the remaining 10 (which together hold 137 electoral votes), the proportions agreeing with the statement ranged from 25 percent in Michigan (where Bernie Sanders won the Democratic primary) to 27 percent in Ohio and 48 percent in Virginia. Since 1944 Ohio has gone for the losing candidate at the national level only once (in 1960, when Richard Nixon carried the state over John Kennedy, with 53.3 percent of the vote).

Moreover, voters in swing states are more apt to punish incumbents as trade exposure increases, creating a built-in disincentive to engage in further trade liberalization (Jensen, Quinn, and Weymouth 2016). This tendency can be offset, however, by government programs like Trade Adjustment Assistance, which help cushion the anti-incumbent effects of trade-related job loss (Margalit 2011).

A. free trade benefits Rust Belt where there are swing states B. Ohio's Representatives champion free trade

Jason Noble [University of Missouri-Columbia]. July 27, 2016. "Growing anger on trade makes Midwest key battleground in Trump-Clinton race." USA Today. <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/07/27/growing-anger-trade-makes-midwest-key-battleground-trump-clinton-race/87637980/> // AA

Indeed, Dennis Kucinich, a former congressman from [Ohio] Cleveland and Democratic candidate for president, pointed to international trade and free-trade agreements as the primary factor putting the Rust Belt in play this year. "Trade has stripped this area not just of the financial power of major industries but also thousands of small manufacturing and companies..." he said. "NAFTA, the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, China trade and now the Trans-Pacific Partnership all are part of a disaffection that working people have with both political parties." Kucinich, known as a liberal during his time in office, said he was not comfortable with Trump's political style, but credited him with recognizing the political potency of trade and addressing it more clearly on the trade issue than any other candidate in the race.

Iowans, a swing state, fear protectionism because it is detrimental to their economy.

Kevin Hardy and Donnelle Eller. 2017. „Why Iowans are so nervous about Trump's proposed imports tax." Des Moines Register.

<http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/money/business/2017/01/26/iowa-uneasy-over-trumps-proposed-imports-tax-mexico/97082370/> // AA

Iowans' fears [protectionism] that President Donald Trump could incite an international trade war were heightened Thursday when he floated a plan to pay for a proposed wall along the Mexican border with a 20 percent tax on imports. Experts warn such a move could ripple through Iowa's economy, prompting Mexico and other countries hit with the tax to retaliate against local firms that export products internationally — a prospect that is particularly daunting for Iowa ag producers and

manufacturers. Next to Canada, Mexico is Iowa's second largest export market. " *There will be a tit-for-tat*

reaction, " said Iowa State University Economist Peter Orazem. "Mexico is our second biggest customer, so I don't think that's good." The news was particularly alarming coming just two days after Trump announced he was jettisoning the Trans-Pacific Partnership Deal and renegotiate U.S. trade with Canada and Mexico. State leaders, including Republicans and Democrats, said that could lead to a trade war that could put Iowa in the cross-hairs.

Wages fell by 5.5%

Josh Bivens, 3-22-2013, "Using standard models to benchmark the costs of globalization for American workers without a college degree", Economic Policy Institute, <http://www.epi.org/publication/standard-models-benchmark-costs-globalization/>

A standard model estimating the impact of trade on American wages indicates that **growing trade** with less-developed countries **lowered [annual] wages** in 2011 **by 5.5 percent**—or by roughly \$1,800—for a full-time, full-year worker earning the average wage for workers without a four-year college degree. One-third of this total effect is due to growing trade with just China.

A study by the Economic Policy Institute looking at American income finds that wage losses because of trade flows have increased 7% in one year which would essentially erase all wage gains in the past 38 years if the trend continues.

Josh Bivens, 2007, "Globalization and American Wages", Economic Policy Institute, <http://www.epi.org/publication/bp196/>

In 2006, the impact of trade flows increased the inequality of earnings by roughly 7%, with the resulting loss to a representative household (two earners making the median wage and working the average amount of (household) hours each year) reaching more than \$2,000. This amount rivals the entire annual federal income tax bill paid by this household. Over the next 10-20 years, if some prominent forecasts of the reach of service-sector offshoring hold true, and, *if current patterns of trade roughly characterize this offshoring, then globalization could essentially erase all wage gains made since 1979 by workers without a four-year college degree.*

Income Inequality

Trade with low-wage countries makes up 90% of the reason that wage premium for 4 year degree workers has risen in comparison to those without one [warrant later in card]

Josh Bivens, 3-22-2013, "Using standard models to benchmark the costs of globalization for American workers without a college degree", Economic Policy Institute, <http://www.epi.org/publication/standard-models-benchmark-costs-globalization/>

Trade with low-wage countries can explain roughly a third of the overall rise since 1979 in the wage premium earned by workers with at least a four-year college degree relative to those without one. However, *trade with low-wage countries explains more than 90 percent of the rise in this premium since 1995.*

Importantly, the wage effects of global integration reach beyond those workers exposed directly to foreign competition. **AS** imports displace non-college-educated workers from tradeable sectors (such as manufacturing), these laid-off workers need to accept lower wages to obtain work in other sectors (such as landscaping or construction). Further, the competition provided by these workers helps to lower the wages of similar workers already employed in these sectors.

Trade caused 25% of the growth in wage inequality

Robert Scott, 11-17-2003, "The high price of 'free' trade: NAFTA's failure has cost the United States jobs across the nation", Economic Policy Institute, http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp147/

When trying to identify the causes behind trends such as the disappearance of manufacturing jobs, the rise in income inequality, and the decline in wages in the United States, NAFTA and growing trade deficits only provide part of the picture. Other major contributors include deregulation and privatization, declining rates of unionization, sustained high levels of unemployment, and technological change. While each of these factors has played some role, **a large body of economic research has concluded that trade is responsible for at least 15% to 25% of the growth in wage inequality in the United States** (U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission 2000, 110-18). In addition, trade also has indirect effects on wage inequality by contributing to many of these other causes. For example, the decline of the manufacturing sector attributable to increased globalization has resulted in a reduction in unionization rates, since unions represent a larger share of the workforce in this sector than in other sectors of the economy.

Income inequality causes long-term economic harm

Daniel Lederman [Economics Research Group; World Bank] 07 July 2015. "Effects of income inequality on economic growth." Center for Evaluating Research. <http://voxeu.org/article/effects-income-inequality-economic-growth> // AA

Our empirical analysis shows that for the average country in the sample during 1970-2010, increases in income inequality reduce GDP per capita. Specifically, we find that, on average, a 1 percentage point increase in the Gini coefficient reduces GDP per capita by around 1.1% over a five-year period; the long-run (cumulative) effect is larger and amounts to about -4.5%. To be clear, this finding implies that, on average, increases in the level of income inequality lead to lower transitional GDP per capita growth. Increases in the level of income inequality have a negative long-run effect on the level of GDP per capita. We document the robustness of this result to alternative measures of income inequality, alternative income inequality data sources, splitting the sample between pre- and post-1990 period (end of the Cold War), and restricting the sample to countries located in Latin America and the Caribbean or Asia.

Job Loss Impact Magnifier

Most lost jobs are high-wage positions – caused higher income inequality

Robert Scott, 11-17-2003, "The high price of 'free' trade: NAFTA's failure has cost the United States jobs across the nation", Economic Policy Institute, http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp147/

Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed in 1993, the rise in the U.S. trade deficit with Canada and Mexico through 2002 has caused the displacement of production that supported 879,280 U.S. jobs. Most of those lost jobs were high-wage positions in manufacturing industries. The loss of these jobs is just the most visible tip of NAFTA's impact on the U.S.

economy. In fact, *NAFTA has also contributed to rising income inequality, suppressed real wages for production workers, weakened workers' collective bargaining powers and ability to organize unions, and reduced fringe benefits.*

Net Loss in every state

Robert Scott, 11-17-2003, "The high price of 'free' trade: NAFTA's failure has cost the United States jobs across the nation", Economic Policy Institute, http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp147/

All 50 states and the District of Columbia have experienced a net loss of jobs under NAFTA (see Table 2). Exports from every state have been offset by faster rising imports. Table 2 provides detailed estimates of job gains due to the growth in exports, job losses due to changes in imports, and the trade balance for each state. In every case, many more jobs are lost due to growing imports than are gained by increasing exports.

Hurts working families

Globalexchange.org. "Top Ten Reasons to Oppose the Free Trade Area of the Americas."

Global Exchange. <http://www.globalexchange.org/resources/ftaa/oppose> // AA

The FTAA is essentially an expansion of NAFTA. But NAFTA has proven to be a nightmare for working families and the environment. A look at NAFTA's legacy shows why these kinds of "free trade" agreements should be opposed. Working families suffer: In the

US, more than 765,000 jobs have disappeared as a result of NAFTA. When these laid off workers find new jobs, they earn 23 percent less on average than at their previous employment. In Mexico, manufacturing wages fell 21 percent from 1995 to 1999, and have only started to

recover. The percentage of Mexicans living in poverty has also grown since NAFTA went into effect. The environment suffers: In the maquiladora zones along the US-Mexico border, the increased pollution and the improper disposal of chemical wastes have dramatically raised rates of hepatitis and birth defects. NAFTA should be repealed, not expanded.

Free Trade Leads to A LOT OF Offshoring

Globalexchange.org. "Top Ten Reasons to Oppose the Free Trade Area of the Americas."
Global Exchange. <http://www.globalexchange.org/resources/ftaa/oppose//AA>

The NAFTA experience demonstrates how basic labor rights and the interests of working families are eroded by "free trade" agreements that lack enforceable labor protections. Corporations move high-paying jobs to countries with lower wages and bust unionization drives with threats to transfer production abroad. According to a Cornell University study, since NAFTA two-thirds of manufacturing and communications companies faced with union organizing campaigns threatened workers with moving their jobs abroad. This "race-to-the-bottom" will accelerate under the FTAA as corporations pit exploited workers in Mexico against even more desperate workers in countries such as Haiti and Guatemala. Already, Mexico is losing maquiladora jobs to countries with cheaper wages. In the last two years, some 280,000 jobs have vanished with the closure of more than 350 maquiladoras.

Free trade harmed America — outsourcing, wages, etc

Madrick 2014 [Jeff Madrick is senior fellow at the Century Foundation, "Our Misplaced Faith in Free Trade", *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/04/opinion/sunday/our-misplaced-faith-in-free-trade.html?_r=0>] //CJC

The skeptics are on to something. **Free trade creates winners and losers — and American workers have been among the losers. Free trade has been a major (but not the only) factor behind the erosion in wages and job security among American workers. It has created tremendous prosperity — but mostly for those at the top.**

Little wonder, then, that Americans, in another Pew survey, last winter, ranked protecting jobs as the second-most-important goal for foreign policy, barely below protecting us from terrorism. Many economists dismiss these attitudes as the griping of people on the losing end of globalization, but they would do better to look inward, at the flaws in their models and theories. Since the 1970s, economic orthodoxy has argued for low tariffs, free capital flows, elimination of industrial subsidies, deregulation of labor markets, balanced budgets and low inflation. This philosophy — later known as the Washington Consensus — was the basis of advice the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank gave to developing countries in return for financial help. The irony is that during the Industrial Revolution, today's rich countries — Britain, France and the United States — pursued the very opposite policies: high tariffs, government investment in industry, financial regulations and fixed values for currencies. Trade expanded, and capital flowed anyway. World War II changed everything. Tariffs were seen as having exacerbated the Depression, and inadequate globalization as one cause of the two world wars. So, through the late 1970s, the United States and Europe cut tariffs, though currencies were fixed and capital was still highly controlled. Astonishing American prosperity in the three decades after 1945 led economists to overestimate the impact of free trade. In reality, high growth in those years resulted from many factors: pent-up demand from the war; the Marshall Plan; Cold War military spending; investments in universities, highways and scientific research; and falling oil prices. Starting in the 1970s, however, under the influence of free-market enthusiasts like Milton Friedman, economists urged further removal of barriers to trade and capital flows, hoping to turn the world into one highly efficient market, unobstructed by government. The results were often disastrous. The lowering of protective tariffs did not lead to rapid growth in Latin America, which stagnated in the 1980s. Mr. Friedman's acolytes also urged the reduction or elimination of capital controls — starting in the 1970s in the United States, and in the 1980s in Europe — along with lower tariffs. This, too, was ruinous. An exodus of short-term investments contributed to financial crises in East Asia, Russia, Argentina and Turkey in the mid-1990s, and to the collapse of the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund in 1998 (a prelude to the 2008 crisis). Though these mistakes were recognized, the World Trade Organization continued to push one-size-fits-all rules, premised more on ideology than experience, that hurt developing countries. In 1995, it demanded that members substantially reduce subsidies for export industries. Imagine what would have happened if South Korea, Japan and Taiwan had had to follow this guidance; they became economic powerhouses in the 1960s and 1970s by nurturing their export sectors. (To join the W.T.O., in 2001, China was forced to slash industrial subsidies, but it resorted to currency manipulation to boost its export sector.) Also that year, the W.T.O. adopted a rule obliging members to abide by rich nations' patent laws. (Never mind that Americans stole technologies from Europe throughout the 1800s.) These laws typically enabled investors in rich countries to reap substantial rewards, while poor nations like India were forced to pay the same price for patented drugs as the rich West, because they were not allowed to make generic substitutes. **But the consensus was flawed. Even free-trade advocates**

now admit that American wages have been reduced as a result of outsourcing, the erosion of manufacturing and an ever-increasing reliance on imports. Middle-income countries, meanwhile, have been blocked from adopting policies that might make them world-class competitors. Nations that have ignored the nostrums of the Washington Consensus — China, India and Brazil — have grown rapidly and raised their standards of living. Improvements in poverty and inequality occurred in Latin America only in the 2000s, after the I.M.F. and the World Bank reduced their grip on those nations.

Free trade bad for America—jobs, wages, econ

Raedle 2016 [Joe Raedle at Newsweek, “ARE FREE TRADE DEALS BAD FOR AMERICA?”, *Newsweek*, <<http://www.newsweek.com/2016/06/24/free-trade-trans-pacific-partnership-469693.html>>] //CJC

The question then is: Who is right? Are the trade deals that Trump has turned into epithets bad for the country? Critics of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the 1993 trade and investment pact ratified by the U.S., Canada and Mexico, or of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, which the U.S. championed, argue that allowing **unfettered imports from low-wage countries (like China or Mexico) puts the U.S. and its manufacturing workers in a “race to the bottom.”** Trade critic Alan Tonelson says **it’s a race that we can’t win, given how much more a U.S. industrial worker earns than his or her counterpart in, say, China’s Yangtze River Delta.** From this, critics contend that **bad trade agreements have led to the decline of U.S. manufacturing employment—down 30 percent since 2000—as well as stagnation in manufacturing wages and,** because of persistently large merchandise trade deficits (which decrease gross domestic product), the overall **sluggish pace of U.S. economic growth.**

Congress has the same protectionism effect - Non-Unique

Facchini 2012 [Giovanni, “Policymakers’ Horizon and Trade Reforms: The Protectionist Effect of Elections,” *Center for Economic Policy and Research*. Accessed at: <https://www.k-state.edu/economics/seminars/Facchini%20--%20Trade%20reforms.pdf>. Giovanni is a professor of economics] //DNP

This paper shows that the political horizon of legislators plays an important role in shaping their support for trade liberalization reforms. Our analysis exploits the institutional features of the U.S. Congress — in which House and Senate members serve respectively two- and six-year terms, and one third of senators face elections every two years — to examine the impact on term length and election proximity on congressmen voting behavior on all major trade liberalization bills introduced since the early 1970’s. We show that **House representatives are more protectionist than members of the Senate.** However, this difference disappears for senators in the last two years of their mandate, who face elections at the same time as House members, indicating that inter-cameral differences in voting behavior are driven by differences in term length. When restricting our attention to the upper house, we find that the last generation is more protectionist than the previous two: **senators who are in the last two years of their terms are less likely to support trade liberalization than senators who are further away from re-election.** This result holds when comparing the behavior of different legislators voting on the same bill, and the behavior of the same legislator over time. It is also robust to the inclusion of a large set of controls for congressmen and their constituencies, and the use of different econometric methodologies. We also show that calendar effects are pervasive: **all senators, even those representing export-oriented constituencies, in which a majority of voters should benefit from trade liberalization, take a more protectionist stance as they approach re-election.** Inter-generational differences disappear only for senators who hold very

safe seats or are retiring, suggesting that the protectionist effect of election proximity is driven by the fear of losing office.

Mandate to govern is rhetoric vague and useless

Strating 2016 [Bec Strating at La Trobe University, "What A 'Mandate To Govern' Actually Means", *Huffington Post*, <<http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/bec-strating/what-a-mandate-to-govern-actually-means/>>] //CJC

One of the central debates which has emerged following the tight Federal election race on 2 July revolves around whether a Turnbull-led government will possess a 'mandate'. The national primary vote swing against the Coalition of around 3.4 percent has been used by some in the opposition to claim that the agenda of the Coalition has been rejected. Even before election night was over, Labor leader Bill Shorten declared that the Coalition had "lost their mandate".

Mandate, though, is a slippery and ambiguous rhetorical term and its usefulness and meaning is contested among political scientists. Given its re-emergence after the federal election, it is worth considering what is meant by possessing a mandate.

Social Media only targets milenials, milenials don't turn out

Kiefer, 2015 [Brittaney, "Can social media really win elections?", *US Campaign*, <http://www.campaignlive.com/article/social-media-really-win-elections/1366623>] //AKC

Candidates may be tapping into social media to reach the ever-elusive Millennial generation, but that strategy does not always translate to political success.

"Generally, [Millennials] don't show up to vote. That's the real problem we have," said John Fugelsang, comedian and host of "Tell Me Everything" on SiriusXM Insight Satellite Radio. "The focus should be on getting people involved in democracy rather than winning the election battle.

Negative ads decrease trust in government

Richard R. Lau (Rutgers University), **2007** [Lee Sigelman The George Washington University Ivy Brown Rovner Rutgers University, "The Effects of Negative Political Campaigns: A Meta-Analytic Reassessment,"

<https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/65d7/b9ee4773cb9afd5f3315910779860580d5a1.pdf>] MJS

The conventional wisdom about negative political campaigning holds that it works, i.e., it has the consequences its practitioners intend. **Many observers also fear that negative campaigning has unintended but detrimental effects on the political system itself.**

An earlier meta-analytic assessment of the relevant literature found no reliable evidence for these claims, but since then the research literature has more than doubled in size and has greatly improved in

quality. We reexamine this literature and find that the major conclusions from the earlier meta-analysis still hold. All told, the research literature does not bear out the idea that negative campaigning is an effective means of winning votes, even though it tends to be more memorable and stimulate knowledge about the campaign. Nor is there any reliable evidence that **negative campaigning** depresses voter turnout, though it **does slightly lower feelings of political efficacy, trust in government, and possibly overall public mood.**

Ads negative over 80% of the time

Albert R. Hunt, 10-14-2012 [, "Media Share Blame for Negative Ads," International Herald Tribune, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/us/15iht-letter15.html>] MJS 4-29-2017

The hundreds of thousands of television commercials broadcast by the presidential candidates are lopsidedly negative; this is the case with **80 percent of** those put out by President Barack **Obama and 84 percent of** those by **Mitt Romney**. It is all the more true of spending by **outside groups**; the “super PACs” on both sides, along with business, conservative and labor organizations, **are running negative ads more than 90 percent of the time,** according to CMAG, an advertising tracking unit at the analysis firm Kantar Media.

Attack ads are more prevalent than positive ads

Denise-Marie Ordway, Sept 2016 [, "Negative political ads and their effect on voters: Updated collection of research," Journalist's Resource, <https://journalistsresource.org/studies/politics/ads-public-opinion/negative-political-ads-effects-voters-research-roundup>] MJS 4-29-2017

Many people have a visceral reaction to political attack ads on TV: Not much will prompt a faster change of the channel. But they are difficult to escape during election season and the 2016 presidential election season won't be much different. Political ads became much more negative over the course of the 2012 presidential campaign. Erika Franklin Fowler, an assistant professor of government, has noted that 2012 may be remembered for its record-setting negativity. Fowler directs the Wesleyan Media Project, which monitors and analyzes televised campaign ads and found that three-quarters of ads aired during the last presidential race “appealed to anger.” The 2016 presidential election already has become a nasty one, however. A September 2016 report from the Wesleyan Media Project shows that 53 percent of ads that aired over the previous month were negative — compared to 48 percent of ads that ran during a comparable period of the 2012 campaign. The report notes that Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump have taken different approaches with their advertising: **“Just over 60 percent of Clinton’s ads have attacked Trump while 31 percent have been positive, focusing on Clinton. Trump, on the other hand, has** by and large used contrast ads, which both promote himself and attack Clinton. He has **aired no positive ads.**” Journalists writing about the 2016 race can find a searchable and shareable archive of 2016 primary election ads through the Political TV Ad Archive, an initiative funded by a Knight News Challenge grant. The Wesleyan Media Project compiled the following chart to show how political advertising has become distinctly more negative over the past few election cycles: In a May 2013 post for “The Monkey Cage,” a leading political science blog, John Sides of George Washington and Lynn Vavreck of UCLA summarize their research on the 2012 campaign. With regard to advertising, they conclude that ads mattered but only in “very circumscribed ways” and the “effect of ads appeared to decay quickly.” Further, they assert that “back-loading — airing ads close to the election — was actually more effective than front-loading — airing ads early in the campaign — if the goal was to influence voters on Election Day.” Of course, **the apparent rising volume and intensity of negative ads may reflect legal changes in how campaigns are funded in a post-Citizens United landscape.**

A related 2013 study in The Forum by Michael Franz of Bowdoin, “Interest Groups in Electoral Politics: 2012 in Context,” provides additional analysis and data relating to the role of outside groups in the most recent ad wars. In

another May 2013 post for "The Monkey Cage," Franz examines data suggesting that the type and potentially lower quality of ads by outside groups may have played a role in the election. The Romney campaign's "reliance on outside spending put a significant burden on those groups to produce and air ads that could resonate with voters. They may have done so — we need more research on this — but they may have also produced ads that were far less effective at mobilizing or persuading voters." From a historical perspective, it is worth considering, too, that **increased news media focus on negative advertising itself has helped accelerate this trend**, creating a vicious cycle of attack politics driven by political consultants and journalists. With its FlackCheck.org site, the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania aims to help the public recognize flaws in arguments, including those made in political ads.

85% of 3rd party campaign ads contained false information

MEGHAN KIESEL, 6-22-2012 [, "Majority of Attack Ads Include False Claims," ABC News, <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/06/vast-majority-of-attack-ads-include-false-claims/>] MJS 4-29-2017

Campaign ads want viewers to think they're just exposing the truth that voters need to hear, but a new study finds campaign attack ads from outside groups are about 85 percent false. Analysis conducted by the Annenberg Public Policy Center on behalf of the Center for Responsive **Politics indicates that four of the biggest third-party spenders in political advertising have not only been shelling out the big bucks on attack ads that contain false claims over the past six months.** The **vast majority of spending - 85 percent** - by these groups, referred to as 501(c)(4)s because of their place in the tax code, **was on ad spots that included at least one false assertion.** The ads were fact-checked by the groups like FactCheck.org, PolitiFact.org, the Washington Post's Fact Checker and the Associated Press.

4x more likely to vote for low quality candidate with misinformation

Daniel Houser (George Mason University), Sandra Ludwig and Thomas Stratmann Aug. 2009 ["Does deceptive advertising reduce political participation? Theory and evidence," Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, <http://www.gmu.edu/schools/chss/economics/icesworkingpapers.gmu.edu/pdf/1011.pdf>] MJS 4-29-2017

The population consists of N (potential) voters. Voting is voluntary and costless. All voters are swing voters, with half leaning toward the Circle party, and the other half leaning toward the Triangle party. **With respect to candidate quality, all voters' preferences are homogenous. They all prefer a high-quality candidate to a low-quality candidate, irrespective of the candidate's party affiliation.** As shown in Table 1, voters' payoffs are x_H or x_L if their own party high- or low-quality candidate is elected, respectively, and those same respective amounts, less ϵ , if the other party's high- or low-quality candidate is elected, where $x_H - x_L > \epsilon > 0.8$. A voter can cast her ballot for her own party's candidate, the other party's candidate, or abstain. At the beginning of each campaign, voters are unaware of the true quality of a specific candidate. They do know, however, that each election will have exactly one high-quality candidate and one low-quality candidate, and that each party is equally likely to have the low-quality candidate. We consider a first-past-the-post voting system where ties are broken randomly. Voters are rational, in the sense that they are motivated by the possibility that their

ballot will be pivotal. A pivotal vote occurs if, absent that ballot, either candidate leads by exactly one vote or the election is tied. 7

[...]

To assess the effect of information on efficiency of electoral outcomes, we begin by investigating the effect of information between treatments. Table 8 shows that informed voters cast their ballot for the high-quality candidate when advertising is truthful, but fail to do so when advertising is deceptive. A reason, as discussed with Table 4, is that informed voters in the deception treatment appear to abstain rather than vote for the high-quality candidate. In particular, we find that 91% of informed voters vote for the high-quality candidate in the true advertising environment, and only 59% of informed voters vote for the high-quality candidate in the deception treatment. This is despite the greater than 4:1 odds that the information is accurate, and that the theoretically optimal decision is to vote for the candidate who sent the 24 advertisement. **Comparing both treatments, we also find that in the deception treatment, when information is received, there is a four-fold increase in the likelihood of an informed voter casting a ballot for a low-quality candidate** (Table 8). These observations suggest deceptive advertising affects electoral outcome efficiency. As discussed above, our theoretical model predicts that efficiency under true advertising is about 0.95 to 0.99, while predicted efficiency is slightly lower, 0.87 to 0.94, when ads are deceptive. To measure efficiency empirically, we assign an efficiency value of 1 to an election where the Striped candidate wins, a value of 0.5 if there is a tie, and zero if the Solid candidate wins. So measured, mean efficiencies are 0.89 for Treatment T and 0.49 for Treatment D, and this difference is statistically significant (t-test, $p = 0.00$, two-tailed).¹⁹ Thus, campaigns with deceptive advertising are much more likely than truthful campaigns to result in the election of a low-quality candidate. In particular, there would be an average efficiency of 0.5 (as we observe for Treatment D) if voters cast their votes randomly

FTAs Non-u

Export.gov 1/24/17 [Export.gov, "U.S. Free Trade Agreements", *Export.gov*, <<http://2016.export.gov/fta/>>] //CJC

With which countries does the United States have an FTA? **The United States has 14 FTAs in force with 20 countries, and is currently in the process of negotiating regional FTAs with several others.** U.S. FTA Partner Countries: [Australia](#); [Bahrain](#); [Chile](#); [Colombia](#); [DR-CAFTA](#): Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, & Nicaragua; [Israel](#); [Jordan](#); [Korea](#); [Morocco](#); [NAFTA](#): Canada & Mexico; [Oman](#); [Panama](#); [Peru](#); and [Singapore](#).

Platforms won't change - nationwide Dems support free trade and Repubs don't

Bruce **Stokes**, March 2016 [, "Republicans, especially Trump supporters, see free trade deals as bad for U.S.," Pew Research Center, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/03/31/republicans-especially-trump-supporters-see-free-trade-deals-as-bad-for-u-s/>] MJS 4-29-2017

Trade and free trade agreements have had rough goings in both the Republican and Democratic 2016 presidential campaign debates. All of the remaining candidates from both

parties have criticized the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a recently negotiated trade deal between the U.S. and 11 Asia-Pacific nations. **A new Pew Research Center survey finds that criticism of trade deals in general is particularly strong among Republican and Republican-leaning supporters of GOP presidential contender Donald Trump who are registered voters.** Americans ages 65 and older and men, especially white men, stand out among this group. Although **Democratic candidates** Hillary Clinton and Sen. Bernie Sanders have both come out against TPP, **majorities of their supporters believe trade agreements have been good for the country.** Americans' positive view of free trade deals has ebbed in recent years: 51% say such trade agreements between the U.S. and other countries have been a good thing for the country, while 39% believe they have been a bad thing. Favorable views of free trade accords peaked in 2014 (59%), and current positive assessments are similar to those measured in March 2011. Views of U.S. **free trade agreements are more positive among Democratic and Democratic-leaning respondents (60% good thing vs. 30% bad thing) than Republican and Republican-leaning (40% good thing vs. 52% bad thing).**

Free Trade Increases Democracy by 3x and Reduces Political Tyranny by 9x

CATO Institute, January 9, 2004, "How Free Trade Promotes Democracy" Dan **Griswold** [Former Director of Center for Trade Policy Studies]

<https://www.cato.org/events/how-free-trade-promotes-democracy> MRS

"A new Cato study finds strong evidence that **free trade promotes democracy and respect for human rights** in countries that open their borders to the global economy. Specifically, the research finds that **countries that are the most open to trade are three times more likely to enjoy full civil and political liberties than those that are closed, and are nine times less likely to suffer under political tyranny.** Cato scholar Dan Griswold will discuss the findings of his study and their implications for U.S. trade policy toward China, the Middle East, Central America, and Cuba."

Trade Helps Fight Income Inequality (Warrant List)

Flanigan, 2014 [Maggie, associate, "Can International Trade Help Decrease Economic Inequality?", *BusinessForward*, <http://www.businessfwd.org/blog/can-international-trade-help-decrease-economic-inequality>] //AKC

A new report by Progressive Economy Executive Director Edward Gresser finds that trade agreements can help to decrease economic inequality. Overall, the gains from trade would outweigh the risks.

Here is a summary of the report's key findings:

Many Trade Barriers Hurt Low-Income Americans

International trade policy is especially influential on the lives of lower-income consumers. Tariffs for necessary consumer goods such as shoes, clothes, and blankets make up a greater proportion of the final price than those on higher-end counterparts.

New trade agreements have the potential to correct this regressive taxation and increase the purchasing power of lower-income individuals.

....

Trade Can Increase Economic Growth

International trade helps to increase economic growth, which counteracts income inequality.

The Progressive Economy report argues that though international trade is a secondary factor in affecting inequality, it does expand the pool of consumers to which businesses can export. Last year, every \$1 billion of exports supported nearly 6,000 jobs. Increasing exports would lead U.S. businesses to expand and hire. Even if the income gap between the richest and the poorest is not directly decreased because of international trade, the overall standard of living for the least affluent is improved.

Democracy Impacts

Lynn-Jones, 1998. ["Why the United States Should Spread Democracy." Author: Sean M. Lynn-Jones | March 1998. *Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School*

<https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/why-united-states-should-spread-democracy>] GST

2. Liberal Democracies are Less Likely to Use Violence Against Their Own People.

Second, America should spread liberal democracy because the citizens of liberal democracies are less likely to suffer violent death in civil unrest or at the hands of their governments.²⁷

These two findings are supported by many studies, but particularly by the work of R.J. Rummel. Rummel finds that **democracies-by** which he means liberal democracies-between 1900 and 1987 **saw only 0.14% of their populations (on average) die annually in internal violence.**

The corresponding figure for authoritarian regimes was 0.59% and for totalitarian regimes 1.48%.²⁸ Rummel also finds that citizens of liberal democracies are far less likely to die at the hands of their governments. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have been responsible for the overwhelming majority of genocides and mass murders of civilians in the twentieth century. **The states that have killed millions of their citizens all have been authoritarian or totalitarian: the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Nazi Germany, Nationalist China, Imperial Japan, and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge.** **Democracies have virtually never massacred their own citizens on a large scale,** although they have killed foreign civilians during wartime. The American and British bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan, U.S. atrocities in Vietnam, massacres of Filipinos during the guerrilla war that followed U.S. colonization of the Philippines after 1898, and French killings of Algerians during the Algerian War are some prominent examples.²⁹

[...]

Why do democracies perform better than autocracies over the long run? Two reasons are particularly persuasive explanations. First, **democracies-especially liberal democracies-are more likely to have market economies, and market economies tend to produce economic growth over the long run.** Most of the world's leading economies thus tend to be market

economies, including the United States, Japan, the "tiger" economies of Southeast Asia, and the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Two recent studies suggest that there is a direct connection between economic liberalization and economic performance. Freedom House conducted a World Survey of Economic Freedom for 1995-96, which evaluated 80 countries that account for 90% of the world's population and 99% of the world's wealth on the basis of criteria such as the right to own property, operate a business, or belong to a trade union. **It found that the countries rated "free" generated 81% of the world's output even though they had only 17% of the world's population.**³⁷ A second recent study confirms the connection between economic freedom and economic growth. The Heritage Foundation has constructed an Index of Economic Freedom that looks at 10 key areas: trade policy, taxation, government intervention, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking policy, wage and price controls, property rights, regulation, and black market activity. It has found that countries classified as **"free" had annual 1980-1993 real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (expressed in terms of purchasing power parities) growth rates of 2.88%. In "mostly free" countries the rate was 0.97%, in "mostly not free" ones -0.32%, and in "repressed" countries -1.44%.**³⁸ Of course, some democracies do not adopt market economies and some autocracies do, but liberal democracies generally are more likely to pursue liberal economic policies.

[....]

Democracies do not experience famines for two reasons. First, in **democracies governments are accountable to their populations and their leaders** have electoral incentives to prevent mass starvation. The need to be reelected impels politicians to ensure that their people do not starve. As Sen points out, "the plight of famine victims is easy to politicize" and "the effectiveness of democracy in the prevention of famine has tended to depend on the politicization of the plight of famine victims, through the process of public discussion, which generates political solidarity."⁴⁵ On the other hand, **authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are not accountable to the public; they are less likely to pay a political price for failing to prevent famines.** Moreover, authoritarian and totalitarian rulers often have political incentives to use famine as a means of exterminating their domestic opponents. Second, the existence of a **free press and the free flow of information in democracies prevents famine by serving as an early warning system on the effects of natural catastrophes such as floods and droughts that may cause food scarcities.** A free press that criticizes government policies also can publicize the true level of food stocks and reveal problems of distribution that might cause famines even when food is plentiful.⁴⁶ Inadequate information has contributed to several famines. During the 1958-61 famine in China that killed 20-30 million people, the Chinese authorities overestimated the country's grain reserves by 100 million metric tons. This disaster later led Mao Zedong to concede that "Without democracy, you have no understanding of what is happening down below."⁴⁷ The 1974 Bangladesh famine also could have been avoided if the government had had better information. The food supply was high, but floods, unemployment, and panic made it harder for those in need to obtain food.⁴⁸

Globalization empirically bad in weak/unstable countries as shown in Africa (also has all the warrants)

Ibrahim, 13 [Alhaji Ahmadu Ibrahim, Professor of Sociology at Yobe State University, 'The Impact of Globalization on Africa',

http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_3_No_15_August_2013/11.pdf] PP

The negative impacts of globalization on Africa:

1. Tendon (1998) states that the cold war which was born out of the process for globalization has had significant consequences for Africa. During its height in the 1960's and 1970's, the cold war witnessed the emergence of authoritarian regimes in the form of one-party or military regimes. This was largely a result of the support of the two blocks to keep African countries in their respective camps. This has in turn, substantially reduced Africa's international negotiating power and its ability to maneuver in the international system. In sum then, the cold war and its demise has worked against democracy and economic development in Africa.
2. Specific impact of globalization on Africa were identified according to Oyejide (1998) in the political sphere, the most important consequence is **the erosion of sovereignty, especially on economic and financial matters**, as a result of the imposition of models, strategies and policies of development on African countries by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization.
3. **More important is the fact that globalization for most part does not facilitate the establishment of the economic conditions necessary for genuine democracy and good governance to take solid roots and thrives.**
4. Economically, globalization has, on the whole, **reinforced the economic marginalization of African economies and their dependence on a few primary goods for which demand and prices are externally determined**. This has, in turn **accentuated poverty and economic inequality** as well as the ability of the vast number of Africans to participate meaningfully in the social and political life of their countries.
5. As a result of the cultural domination from outside that goes with globalization, African countries are rapidly **losing their cultural identity and therefore their ability to interact with other cultures on an equal and autonomous basis**, borrowing from other cultures only those aspects that meet its requirements and needs.
6. The scientific and technological forces unleashed by globalization have facilitated the **extinction of the indigenous development of technology and distorting patterns of production in Africa.**
7. Globalization on the whole impacts **negatively on the development and consolidation of democratic governance**. One form of this is the **reduction of the capacity of governments to determine and control events in their countries, and thus their accountability and responsiveness to their people**, given the fact that the context, institutions and processes by which these decisions are taken are far from democratic.
8. **Globalization introduces anti-developmentalism by declaring the state irrelevant or marginal to the developmental effort.** Development strategies and policies that focus on stabilization and privatization, rather than growth, **development and poverty eradication, are pushed by external donors, leading to greater poverty and inequality and undermining the ability of the people to participate effectively in the political and social processes in their countries.** Welfare and other programs intended to meet the **basic needs of the majority of the population are transferred from governments to non-governmental organizations**

that begin to replace governments making them to lose the little authority and legitimacy they have.

9. By imposing economic specialization based on the needs and interests of external forces and transforming the economies of African countries into series of enslaved economies linked to the outside but with very little linkages among them, **Democracy, with its emphasis on tolerance and compromise, can hardly thrive in such an environment** (Rodrik 1994).

10. Further, Mule (2000) views that the **economic specialization** imposed on African countries **makes rapid and sustainable growth and development impossible**, conflicts over the distribution of the limited gains realized from globalization becomes more acute and politicized. **Vulnerable groups, such as women, the youth, and rural inhabitants, fare very badly in this contest and are discriminated against.** This further erodes the national ethos of **solidarity and reciprocity that are essential to successful democracies.**

11. Globalization, by **insisting** on African countries **opening their economies to foreign goods and entrepreneurs, limits the ability of African governments to take proactive and conscious measures to facilitate the emergence of an indigenous entrepreneurial class.** (Mowlana 1998).

12. **Globalization has encouraged illicit trade in drugs, prostitution, pornography, human smuggling, dumping of dangerous waste and depletion of the environment by unscrupulous entrepreneurs.**

13. Globalization has freed labour across boundaries and **facilitated brain drain.** It facilitated “brain drain” in developing countries, thus reducing further their human capacity.

The current world, where resources and benefits are concentrated in the hands of very few, is not a comfortable world for anybody. And to sustain it is to breed future insecurity as the mass of the poor strives to get a share of the riches concentrated in the hands of the few. It is clear that **globalization benefits those who have the capacity to harness it but can be very detrimental to those whom it finds not prepared.** Most African States are not prepared, especially in terms of having the requisite capacity.

Competition is not a link to turnout -- other studies are wrong.

Fowler, Anthony George. 2013. Five Studies on the Causes and Consequences of Voter Turnout. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University.

https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/11156810/Fowler_gsas.harvard_0084L_10773.pdf?sequence=1

Many democratic citizens habitually abstain from the political process, and the reasons for this abstention are of great interest to scholars, campaigns, activists, and policymakers. **Most social scientists and political pundits assume that greater electoral competition and the increased chance of pivotality will motivate citizens to turn out to the polls. First, analyzing observational and survey evidence, we find little support for this claim.** Then exploiting the rare opportunity of a tied election for major political office, we conduct a large-scale field experiment. Informing citizens that an upcoming election will be close has little mobilizing effect. To the extent that we do detect an effect of electoral competition on turnout, it is concentrated among a small set of frequent voters. **Our evidence suggests that increased**

electoral competition is not a solution to low turnout, and the predominant models of turnout which focus on pivotality are of little practical use.

Electoral Turnout widens participation gap between minorities and whites.

Fowler, Anthony George. 2013. Five Studies on the Causes and Consequences of Voter Turnout. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University.

https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/11156810/Fowler_gsas.harvard_0084L_10773.pdf?sequence=1

Numerous get-out-the-vote (GOTV) interventions are successful in raising voter turnout. However, these increases may not be evenly distributed across the electorate and may actually increase the differences between voters and non-voters. This phenomenon is particularly notable given the many GOTV strategies that explicitly aim to reduce inequalities in representation. By analyzing individual level-data, we reassess previous GOTV experiments to determine which interventions mobilize under-represented versus well-represented citizens. We develop a generalized and exportable test which indicates whether a particular intervention reduces or exacerbates disparities in political participation and apply it to 26 previous experimental interventions. Despite raising mean levels of voter turnout, more than two-thirds of the interventions in our sample widened disparities in participation. **On average, voter mobilization strategies tend to increase the participation gap, thereby exacerbating representational inequality.** We conclude by discussing substantive implications for political representation and methodological implications for experimenters.

26% of Americans are less likely to vote because of donor influence

Brennan Center, 4-24-2012 [, "National Survey: Super PACs, Corruption, and Democracy," NYU, <https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/national-survey-super-pacs-corruption-and-democracy>] MJS 4-29-2017

An alarming number of Americans report that their concerns about the influence of donors to outside political groups make them less likely to engage in democracy. **Communities of color, those with lower incomes, and individuals with less formal education are more likely to disengage due to concerns about how much influence is wielded by Super PAC donors.**

Two in three Americans — 65% — say that they trust government less because big donors to Super PACs have more influence than regular voters. Republicans (67%) and Democrats (69%) uniformly agree. **One in four Americans — 26% — say that they are less likely to vote because big donors to Super PACs have so much more influence over elected officials than average Americans.** Less wealthy and less educated Americans were significantly more likely to say they would be less likely to vote because of Super PAC influence: 34% of respondents with no more than a high school education, and 34% of those in households with an annual income less than \$35,000, said they would be less likely to vote.[4] A higher number of African-American and Hispanic voters also stated that the disproportionate influence of Super PAC donors will discourage them from voting: 29% of African Americans and 34% of Hispanics said they were less likely to vote because of Super PAC influence.[5] 41% of respondents — including 49% of those who have no more than a high school education

and 48% of those with household incomes under \$35,000 – believe that their votes don't matter very much because big donors to Super PACs have so much more influence.[6]

No threats to Heg in the squo

Salvatore **Babones**, June 11th, 2015, [an associate professor of sociology and social policy at the University of Sydney. He is a comparative sociologist who writes on comparative international development and on quantitative methods for the social sciences, "American Hegemony Is Here to Stay", <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-hegemony-here-stay-13089>] MJS

Ultimately, **it is inevitable that in the long run** American power will weaken and **American hegemony** over the rest of the world **will fade. But how long is the long run? There are few factual indications that American decline has begun—or that it will begin anytime** soon. Short-term fluctuations should not be extrapolated into long-term trends. Without a doubt, 1991 was a moment of supreme U.S. superiority. But so was 1946, after which came the Soviet bomb, Korea and Vietnam. **American hegemony has waxed and waned** over the last seventy years, **but** it has **never** been **eclipsed. And it is unlikely that the eclipse is nigh.**

Double bind — either Social movements get coopted by electoral politics or they're too radical to do anything — AND electoral movements are different from social movements

Trudeau 2014 [Michael Trudeau is a writer for TruthOut, "Social Movement and Electoral Movements, Not One or the Other", *TruthOut*, <<http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/23029-social-movement-and-electoral-movements-not-one-or-the-other>>] //CJC

On the left, it has long been argued whether electoral politics can have any lasting effect on positive societal change or whether activists should instead focus solely on building **social movements**. In the latter camp, commentators such as Patrick Barrett, writing in Truthout, argue that a run for president by Bernie Sanders, for example, would be a huge waste of time and resources, and some even call for boycotts of elections. Why? **The "social-movement-only" proponents argue that electoral politics is counterproductive because it undercuts social movements by diverting too much energy to elections.** The argument goes that even electoral movements independent of the two-party system, such as the Green Party, weaken popular movements by pacifying them and quickly devolve into duopoly politics as usual. The boycott argument goes that US elections are completely undemocratic, that voters are invited to choose between various representatives of the same corporatocracy. Boycott proponents have forgotten, though, that some parties exist to challenge that very corporatocracy. Boycotters are welcome to try to convince Democrat and Republican lawmakers that they have no need to worry about alternative parties threatening their rule. Maybe then these politicians would stop routinely passing bipartisan legislation meant to thwart the advancement of alternative parties - just as Obama did in concert with Republicans on April 3 by eliminating public funding of party primaries and conventions, a ban that disproportionately affects minor parties that do not rely on wealthy donors and corporate funding. The fact is, the duopoly sees the threat of alternative parties and works hard to curb it. **What are these **social-movement-only activists** - who sometimes scorn independent parties such as the Greens - picturing when they pose the argument that electoral politics are a nuisance and counterproductive? What is their vision for social change? Do social-movement-only proponents still believe that people such as Rahm Emanuel, George Bush, Scott Walker, Chris Christie, Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, John Kerry, etc., give a damn about their movements and issues? Do they still believe that the more progressive Democratic politicians will be able to deliver on these issues even if they do agree? **Why do these activists think these politicians will enact policies their movement advocates? If the politicians do enact****

such policies, what makes these activists think the legislation would be anything but meager, incremental and placating? Remember to whom you're appealing for change. When, in recent times, has lobbying these politicians resulted in the kinds of foundational changes fought for by committed activists and desired by most of the American public? Isn't that exactly the problem that nearly all Americans recognize to be true, that politicians do not act in service to people? **Social-movement-only activists who disdain electoral movements must be envisioning a kind of utopian revolution in which all these bad guys in government simply step down, and all the noble and peaceful revolutionaries take their places or, more utopian yet, these altruistic revolutionaries democratically decide to abolish the entire idea of governance.**

What else could they be envisioning for revolutionary change? Don't revolutionary movements with no electoral option almost always devolve into chaos and violence, especially when confronted with hostile police resistance, as has happened and will surely continue to happen in the United States? Don't revolutionary movements with no electoral option end up getting one of various corporate, oligarchic spokespersons, as has occurred in Ukraine?

Civic Engagement is high now — Trump

Liu 3/8/17 [Eric Liu is a writer for the Atlantic, "How Donald Trump Is Reviving American Democracy", *The Atlantic*, <<https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/how-donald-trump-is-reviving-our-democracy/518928/>>] //CJC

There are two ways to look at the effect of Donald **Trump's** presidency on American democracy. One is that he is a menace to the republic: that his attacks on journalists, federal judges, and constitutional norms undermine the rule of law. The other is that **he is the greatest thing to happen to America's civic and political ecosystem in decades.**

These views are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they are causally related. **The president's attacks on established institutions have triggered a systemic immune response in the body politic, producing a surge in engagement** among his opponents (and also his fans). **Since the early 1970s, the nation's civic health—from membership in civic groups to attendance at public meetings to newspaper reading—has been in steady, severe decline.** Economic inequality has fed political inequality in a viciously self-reinforcing loop of disenfranchisement and concentration of clout. But **now millions of people, once cynical bystanders, are participating earnestly.** **In mass marches and packed congressional town meetings, Americans have taken vocal stands for inclusion. At airports and campuses and street corners they have swarmed in defense of Muslim and undocumented neighbors. Membership in the ACLU and the League of Women Voters has swelled, as have subscriptions to leading newspapers.**

Census data is broken — hispanic switching

Cohn 2014 [Nate Cohn is a writer for the New York Times, "More Hispanics Declaring Themselves White", *New York Times*, <<https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/22/upshot/more-hispanics-declaring-themselves-white.html>>] //CJC

Hispanics are often described as driving up the nonwhite share of the population. But a new study of census forms finds that **more Hispanics are identifying as white. An estimated net**

1.2 million Americans of the 35 million Americans identified in 2000 as of “Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin,” as the census form puts it, changed their race from “some other race” to “white” between the 2000 and 2010 censuses, according to research presented at an annual meeting of the Population Association of America and reported by Pew Research. The researchers, who have not yet published their findings, compared individual census forms from the 2000 and 2010 censuses. They found that **millions of Americans answered the census questions about race and ethnicity differently in 2000 and 2010.** The largest shifts were among Americans of Hispanic origin, who are the nation’s fastest growing ethnic group by total numbers. Race is an immutable characteristic for many white, black and Asian-Americans. It is less clear for Americans of Hispanic origin. The census form asks two questions about race and ethnicity: one about whether individuals are of Hispanic or Latino origin, and another about race. “Hispanics” do not constitute a race, according to the census, and so **37 percent of Hispanics, presumably dissatisfied with options like “white” or “black,” selected “some other race.”** The researchers found that **2.5 million Americans of Hispanic origin, or approximately 7 percent of the 35 million Americans of Hispanic origin in 2000, changed their race from “some other race” in 2000 to “white” in 2010.**

Census data is broken — bad categories ensure the stats are all bogus

Prewitt 2013 [Kenneth Prewitt, the director of the United States Census Bureau from 1998 to 2000, is a professor of public affairs at Columbia University, “Fix the Census’ Archaic Racial Categories”, *New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/opinion/fix-the-census-archaic-racial-categories.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1>] //CJC

STARTING in 1790, and every 10 years since, the census has sorted the American population into distinct racial groups. Remarkably, a discredited relic of 18th-century science, the “five races of mankind,” lives on in the 21st century. Today, the census calls these five races white; black; American Indian or Alaska Native; Asian; and Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander. The nation’s founders put a hierarchical racial classification to political use: its premise of white supremacy justified, among other things, enslaving Africans, violent removal of Native Americans from their land, the colonization of Caribbean and Pacific islands, Jim Crow subjugation and the importation of cheap labor from China and Mexico. Of course, officially sanctioned discrimination was finally outlawed by civil rights legislation in 1964. The underlying demographic categories, however, were kept. **Securing civil rights required statistics.** Thus resulted an uneasy marriage of preposterous 18th-century racial classifications to legitimate 20th-century policy goals like fair electoral representation, anti-discrimination programs, school desegregation, bilingual education and affirmative action. But the demographic revolution since the immigration overhaul of 1965 has pushed the outdated (and politically constructed) notion of race to the breaking point. In June the Supreme Court struck down a core provision of the Voting Rights Act, taking note of changing demographics. I disagree with the court’s ruling, but agree that society is changing. And our statistics must reflect those changes. **Fast-growing population groups — mixed-race Americans, those with “hyphenated” identities, immigrants and their children, anyone under 30 — increasingly complain that the choices offered by the census are too limited, even ludicrous.** Particularly tortured is the Census Bureau’s designation, since 1970, of “Hispanic” as an ethnicity or origin, thereby **compelling Hispanics to also choose a “race.”** In 2010, Hispanics were offered the option to select more than one race, but **37 percent opted for “some other race”** — a telling indicator that the term itself is the problem. Indeed, anyone who filled in “some other race” that year was allocated to one or more of the five main groupings. **Many absurdities have resulted.** America has about 1.5 million immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa — some 3 percent of the nation’s black population. Like President Obama’s father, who was Kenyan, their experience differs vastly from that of African-Americans whose ancestors were enslaved, yet they are subsumed into the same category — one that, until this very year, continued to include the outdated term “Negro.” **The census considers Arabs white, along with non-Arabs like Turks and Kurds** because they have origins in the Middle East or North Africa. **Migrants from the former Soviet nations in Central Asia are lumped in as white along with descendants of New England pilgrims.** An indigenous person from Peru, Bolivia or Guatemala is Hispanic, but if she “maintains tribal affiliation or community attachment,” she might also be counted as part of a racial group that includes the Inupiat and Yupik peoples of Alaska. **Are Australian immigrants whites or Pacific Islanders?** (The Census Bureau’s own documents are unclear on this.) **The census has no second-generation**

question, leaving Congress to debate immigration reform with inadequate statistics about which new Americans are learning English, finishing school, living in segregated neighborhoods or staying out of jail. Social scientists closely track intermarriage as an indicator of assimilation, but the census reports intermarriage only among whites, blacks, Hispanics and others — overlooking unions between, say, Japanese and Chinese, Cubans and Mexicans, Nigerians and native-born blacks. These marriages may have as much to tell us about where the nation is headed as the rate at which whites intermarry.

Census data is broken — people change their race

Cohn 2014 [Devra Cohn is a writer for Pew Research Center, “Millions of Americans changed their racial or ethnic identity from one census to the next”, *Pew Research Center*, <<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/05/05/millions-of-americans-changed-their-racial-or-ethnic-identity-from-one-census-to-the-next/>>] //CJC

Millions of Americans counted in the 2000 census changed their race or Hispanic-origin categories when they filled out their 2010 census forms, according to new research presented at the annual Population Association of America meeting last week. Hispanics, Americans of mixed race, American Indians and Pacific Islanders were among those most likely to check different boxes from one census to the next. The researchers, who included university and government population scientists, analyzed census forms for 168 million Americans, and found that more than 10 million of them checked different race or Hispanic-origin boxes in the 2010 census than they had in the 2000 count. Smaller-scale studies have shown that people sometimes change the way they describe their race or Hispanic identity, but the new research is the first to use data from the census of all Americans to look at how these selections may vary on a wide scale. **“Do Americans change their race? Yes, millions do,”** said study co-author Carolyn A. Liebler, a University of Minnesota sociologist who worked with Census Bureau researchers. “And this varies by group.”

Monolithic minorities united against the common single enemy of “racism” ignores the complexity of modern racism — dooms policy to failure and causes the most disadvantaged to lose out

Ford 2012 [Richard Ford, Professor at Stanford Law School, “Black and White No Longer”, *American Interest*, <<https://www.the-american-interest.com/2012/08/10/black-and-white-no-longer/>>] //CJC

American society is neither post-racial nor stuck fast in a racist past, but **fantasies of monolithic racial communities are distorting our national conversation on race and public policy.** **African Americans were once united and to some extent even defined by the experiences of slavery, Jim Crow and the quotidian humiliations dealt out by an overtly and habitually racist society.** But **today overt racism is almost universally condemned, and Americans grow more racially tolerant with each generation.** African Americans now occupy some of the nation’s most coveted and prestigious positions. Black culture, once treated with contempt, now produces much of the nation’s most celebrated popular music and many of its most emulated celebrities. **Although racism is an enduring feature of American society, for a growing cadre of successful and well-positioned blacks it is more an annoyance than a serious threat to personal well-being.** By contrast, **today’s poor blacks endure social conditions that are arguably worse than those of the era of Jim Crow-style racism. For members of the black underclass, broken families, malnutrition,**

joblessness, crime and entanglement with the criminal justice system are endemic and devastating problems; opportunities for upward social mobility are arguably more limited today than at any time since Reconstruction. But is this because of racism, or other institutional deficiencies? This divergence in experiences and life chances now divides the black community as sharply as the color line once divided Americans. **The fracturing of the black community is a challenge to conventional ways of thinking about race, identity and social justice,** even as it opens some new possibilities for human flourishing and for a more just society. Although **we still typically think in terms of a single black experience, a unified black community and a common black identity,** these assumptions ever more starkly spite the facts of daily life. **Our failure to come to grips with the new realities of race in America has distorted our analysis of social problems and undermined our efforts to find viable solutions.** **Increasingly desperate attempts to cling to outdated ideas of racial identity and solidarity have bred a fundamentally dishonest racial conversation that warps individual psychological development and confounds cross-racial understanding.**

[...]

Race still matters in casual encounters, long-term relationships, job opportunities and run-ins with the law. But **increasingly the way race matters differs depending on one's wealth, social standing, education and acculturation.** The once iron law of racism is now a mesh of flexible guidelines, full of loopholes and exceptions. Yet **almost everyone**—from politicians to civil rights advocates to academic commentators—**continues to think of race as a simple trait and racism as a unified phenomenon.** **Instead of looking with fresh eyes on the new and more complex racial problems of today, we analyze today's problems using the ideas, diagnoses and prescriptions of the past.** So racial disparities in criminal sentencing and incarceration are a "New Jim Crow" and voter ID laws are like "poll taxes." Not only do we reflexively think of new racial problems as nothing other than subtler versions of old ones, **we also think that all racial problems flow from a singular cause: racism.** That's how a police officer responding to a report of a break-in becomes a case of racial profiling.

[...]

In order to confront today's racial injustices, we need to move beyond the much-too- neat and false equivalences we have inherited from earlier times. We have to confront the fracturing of the black community and question the idea that race in and of itself explains much of what ails our inner cities and the black and brown people who live in them.

[...]

This new complexity not only has made race relations more fluid; it **has also made racial identity much less certain and thereby weakened the boundaries that defined the black community and the bonds that kept it together.** It has given rise to the persistent, nagging suspicion that, stripped of its biological foundation, race is simply a pernicious fiction that we should reject outright; but would that make racial solidarity a holdover from an unfortunate chapter of the past that has outlived its usefulness? It is easy to see the benefits of debunking race as a biological fact—much easier, in fact, than to jettison the psychological stability of racial affinities. **In response to these threats to identity and solidarity, many people settled on the idea that racial identity is a question of culture.** The black community is defined not by its common blood but by its common norms, practices and beliefs. But increasingly the idea of a "black culture" looks questionable, too: Given the difference between rich and poor, well-educated and culturally deprived, long-suffering descendants of American slaves and recent immigrants from the West Indies and the African continent, there are, as Professor Gates himself once put it, at least "1,000 ways to be black."

The new consensus seems to be that what joins these discrete and increasingly divergent black communities is the struggle against racism. For instance, the cultural critic Touré insists that, "There is no consensus on what it means to be black and never has been." But a few sentences later he assumes just such a consensus, writing that "just because someone gets expelled from the race the way, say, Clarence Thomas has doesn't mean they don't continue to battle racism on a daily basis, so what does expulsion really mean?"⁴

Battling racism, then, is the defining and unifying black experience (even if there is no such factual thing as race). But is it? **As late as the 1980s it would have been reasonable to insist that all black people—even the wealthiest and most powerful, suffered from racism “on a daily basis.”** But frankly, **it’s hard to imagine that in 2012 most wealthy and socially privileged black people—much less an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court—find much in the way of overt racism to battle.** When they do encounter racism, it is typically of the subtle, ambiguous and relatively inconsequential variety—mild slights, snubs or concealed contempt. We can be certain that no bigoted potential employer will deny Clarence Thomas a job, no bigot will call him a nigger, no power-hungry police officer will rough him up for sport, no paranoid vigilante will shoot him as he walks home from the convenience store. **These kinds of injustices and indignities, once the defining features of the black experience, are now familiar only to a portion of African Americans.** Today’s race relations are a good news, bad news story. The good news is really pretty good: **Since the civil rights legislation of the 1960s, life has gotten much better for blacks with the resources,** skills and socialization necessary to enter the American mainstream. **Racism has consistently and steadily declined,** and **opportunities** for well-educated blacks **have expanded** even more quickly than a rapidly expanding economy. **American racism is in steady decline** as the aging white supremacists influenced by Birth of a Nation or Father Coughlin are replaced by a generation raised on The Cosby Show and Oprah Winfrey. Legally enforced segregation is a thing of the past: Today the law prohibits race discrimination by government, employers and landlords. Wall Street banks, white-shoe law firms and ivy-league universities aggressively seek out minority race applicants. For well-educated blacks, acculturated to the norms of the prosperous American mainstream, racism is rarely a serious impediment to success, esteem and well-being. Yes, there are still the vexations caused by petty insults and slights, but for many blacks the once ubiquitous iron law of white supremacy is now an occasional and petty hindrance; the once arrogant and terrifying bigot is little more than a pathetic annoyance; the menacing Jim Crow has been reduced to an irritating mosquito. The bad news, as already suggested, is that **things have actually gotten worse for those blacks without such advantages**—just as, by the way, they have gotten worse for whites without the resources, skills, socialization and education to stick to the mainstream. But **it has been worse for poor blacks in large part because the exodus of the more successful blacks left poor blacks without economic capital and positive role models.** A changing economy shed many of the once plentiful, well-paid, blue-collar jobs. The War on Poverty morphed into a war on the poor: social welfare programs yielded to a “tough love” that slashed benefits and pushed millions into homelessness and abjection, and a zero-tolerance approach to law enforcement led to the incarceration of unprecedented numbers of black men. Many of America’s cities are as racially divided as they were during the era of southern Jim Crow segregation, racial discrimination in employment and housing stubbornly persists, racial stereotypes are a staple of popular culture, and hardly a month goes by without a new race scandal to occupy the intense if fleeting attention of the mass media. Racist cops, prejudiced employers and bigoted landlords seem to have little trouble knowing whom to discriminate against. In these and many other respects racism and race seem as blatant and implacable as ever. Yet **today “racism” does not describe a single attitude or phenomenon but a number of distinct and often unrelated social problems. The joblessness, isolation and despair that afflicts poor blacks in inner-city ghettos is different in kind, not simply degree, from the subtle bigotry, ambiguous slights and “soft” exclusion encountered by black people lucky enough to write books, teach at elite universities** or serve as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. The success of the blacks who can tell the good news story does not suggest any improvement in the dire circumstances of the blacks who must live out the bad news story. **Nor are the benefits of policy reforms designed to help the former group likely to trickle down to the latter group. The idea of a single American black community is an anachronism.** Today there are at least two black communities that are joined by a shared history—no small thing—but increasingly divided by lifestyle, values, norms of behavior and life prospects. **Most middle-class blacks of my generation were taught that all blacks are joined in unavoidable struggle against a common enemy and that we had both a personal interest and a moral obligation to keep faith and solidarity with other blacks,** especially the less fortunate. “There but for the grace of God go I”, we said whenever a black person suffered an injustice that we had been spared. This ethos had the considerable virtue of encouraging emotional empathy and political solidarity with the less fortunate. But **it also encouraged a distorted image of the contemporary racial landscape. It suggested that it is wise and virtuous to emphasize potential racial threats** and, conversely, naive and blameworthy to downplay them. And the imperative of solidarity requires us not only to sympathize with other blacks but also to see our social situation as continuous with theirs, to see their plight as our plight and their injuries and deprivations as our own. This keeps our attention relentlessly focused on the perils of life in a racist society and on the victims of that racism. So **we effectively define the black experience as one of constant peril**

and in terms of the suffering of the most disadvantaged, victimized and unfortunate blacks: poor blacks living in violent inner-city neighborhoods, victims of police harassment and brutality, gang members, criminal recidivists. At best, this is a useful fiction that encourages us to work to improve the plight of the disadvantaged. But at worst it's a way of staking a claim to sympathy for injuries suffered by other people. Consequently, **public policy too often addresses only the problems faced by the most vocal and influential members of minority groups.** For instance, preferences for minority-owned businesses and affirmative action in higher education are thought to help "disadvantaged minorities", but few of the benefits of these policies trickle down to poorly educated and low-skilled minorities. If such policies are to be defended (and I believe many should be), they must be justified in terms of their true effects and their true beneficiaries—not in terms of "the disadvantaged" or "racial justice" generally. Meanwhile, **the truly disadvantaged are in desperate need of policies closely tailored to the unique problems they face.**

[...]


The opportunity: For the first time in American history, it's plausible that a solid majority of Americans actually wants a racially just society. Of course there are many serious disagreements about what that would mean and how to achieve it. But the hard-core racists—those who will fight to defend a social hierarchy based on race—are a rapidly dwindling minority. Many have overestimated the significance of Barack Obama's election as a barometer of race relations, but just as many have underestimated it. Obama's election does not suggest that racism is a relic of the past, but it does prove that racists no longer have a stranglehold on American politics as they did during the long ascendancy of the Republican Party's "Southern strategy", which successfully undermined Democrats by associating them with civil rights and racially tinged social welfare policies. The challenge: **The fracturing of the black community means that simple analyses, policies and prescriptions focused on a monolithic evil called "racism" will not do.** A black kid stopped and frisked by aggressive police in Queens is facing a largely different problem than a black professor confronting an overzealous cop near Harvard Square. The success and esteem enjoyed by black rappers tells us very little about the reception that the black high school student who mimics them is likely to receive. The typically subtle and ambiguous racism that well educated and acculturated blacks confront is not of a piece with the racial injustices that keep poor blacks caught in a cycle of poverty, isolation and crime. **We need new ideas based on the more complex and varied nature of racial injustice today. These ideas need to confront the specifics of varied forms of racial inequality rather than painting them all with the same broad brush as simple racism** and proposing the familiar but often unworkable civil rights solution of prohibiting "discrimination." For example, if employers shun and police target young black and Latino men who adopt gang-banger fashions and affectations, there are at least two potential solutions. One is to prohibit the predictable reactions of employers and police as forms of racial discrimination. The other is to try to change the social pressures that lead young men to make self-defeating decisions. So far we have only tried the first approach, with limited enthusiasm and even more limited success. Fryer's analysis suggests that the latter approach, while more arduous, is much more likely to succeed. But of course looking at the problem in terms of the complex social dynamics of an underprivileged group would undercut the simple solidarity narrative that insists all blacks are united by a struggle against a common enemy, and it would pull the rug out from under the comfortable moral story that blames mean-spirited racists for all racial inequality. It's harder than ever before to say what it means to be black in America today. Or more precisely, there are many different answers, which have less and less in common with each passing day. For a black community that has long defined itself in terms of the injustices it has suffered collectively, this threatens an identity crisis, even as it promises new freedoms and broadened horizons.

Only three swing states have strict ID

NCSL 3/28/17 [National Conference of State Legislatures, "VOTER IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS | VOTER ID LAWS", NCSL, <<http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx>>] //CJC

Voter Identification Laws in Effect in 2017

Strict Photo ID	Strict Non-Photo ID	Photo ID requested	ID requested; photo not required	No document required to vote
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AT: Terry card

Terry 2016 [William C. Terry (2016): Yes, structurally low turnout favors the right, Politics, Groups, and Identities, DOI: 10.1080/21565503.2015.1124789

http://pages.uoregon.edu/wterry/Research/Terry_PGI_2016.pdf] //WGC

ABSTRACT It is well known that socioeconomically disadvantaged citizens tend to vote less than other citizens. Does this cause democratic politics to systematically favor conservative causes? Surprisingly, the conventional wisdom in a very large scholarly literature says “no.” Whether turnout is high or low, according to numerous studies, makes no substantive difference on political outcomes. This article refutes the scholarly conventional wisdom on theoretical and empirical grounds. It points out that the evidence marshaled in the mainstream turnout debate focuses almost exclusively on partisan vote shares as the dependent variable and “nonstructural” variation in turnout. Unfortunately, many studies do not consider the policy consequences of turnout, a more substantively interesting variable for studying patterns of disadvantage that may result from unequal voting rates. Moreover, conventional research designs do not distinguish between structural changes in turnout caused by legal changes to the voting regime and nonstructural changes precipitated by partisan mobilization, candidate valence, or other election-specific factors. This distinction has substantial implications for understanding turnout’s impact. The article employs nonparametric meta-analytic methods to synthesize a large

number of empirical studies and demonstrates that low structural turnout does indeed favor the right in theoretically predictable ways.”

“The paper’s central claims are these: (1) Nonstructural increases in turnout should not systematically boost the Left’s vote share. (2) Nonstructural increases in turnout should not systematically move policy leftward. (3) Structural increases in turnout should not theoretically, nor do they empirically, boost the Left’s vote share. (4) Structural increases in turnout should theoretically, and do empirically, move policy leftward.”

BUSTOS Sergio Bustos (Associated Press). The Christian Science Monitor. 4 September 2015. “Puerto Ricans in 2016: they can’t vote but they still matter.”
<http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2015/0904/Puerto-Ricans-in-2016-they-can-t-vote-but-they-still-matter>
MIAMI — Residents of Puerto Rico are U.S. citizens but can’t vote for president. Yet Republican Marco Rubio and Democrat Hillary Rodham Clinton are campaigning there, following two other 2016 White House hopefuls. Why the journey? Despite its crimped political clout, Puerto Rico is seen as one path to presidential victory. Five million Puerto Ricans live on the U.S. mainland, including nearly 1 million in the key swing state of Florida, and they care about what happens back on the island.

Gerken 2014 [Heather Gerken is a law professor at Yale, “States Get Things Done, Affecting National Policy”, *New York Times*, <<https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/07/16/state-politics-vs-the-federal-government/states-get-things-done-affecting-national-policy>>] //CJC

The federalist camp has the advantage right now of advocating for the one form of politics that is actually active. **Political polarization has paralyzed the national government, but it has catalyzed state policy making. When policy is implemented, rather than just debated, Congress is forced to take action.** But one segment of government is not more important than the other. National politics fuels state politics, and state politics helps ensure that national politics function properly. The question isn’t which matters more; the question is when and how each matters in the first place. Those offering starry-eyed odes to the value of local participation underestimate how closely state politics are tied to national politics. As the important work of David Schleicher and others has shown, elections for state offices are as much referendums on the national politics as they are about anything else. Most people don’t pay much attention to state politics. When they vote for a state legislator, they are voting based on something they know about: national politics. That’s why we see a remarkably close connection between votes in most state races and votes in national ones. The close ties between state and federal parties can lead to all kinds of problems by keeping poor-performing state and local officials from getting voted out of office. But oddly enough, the connection can mitigate what ails national politics. **National politics are locked up. Our legislative process has too many obstacles when politics are highly polarized.** As a result, **issues that matter quite a bit to the American people – gay rights, abortion, immigration, guns -- don’t get any traction in Congress. Ambitious members of both parties may not be able to get anything passed in Washington, but they can in the states.** That means **state officials can challenge national policy – or protest its absence – by passing laws at home. By making policy rather than merely debating it, groups on both sides of the aisle can seize the national agenda and shift the burden of inertia in Congress.** Usually all opponents of a policy need to do is kill the bill. **When a state passes the policy, however, that strategy doesn’t work anymore. Opponents and proponents, then, suddenly agree on one thing – Congress should do something – and they will unite in pushing Congress to act. When national politics are the problem, then, state politics can be the solution.**

There are limits for direct donations — no limits for super PACs, which can’t work with campaigns

Yeager 2016 [Melissa Yeager is a writer for the Sunlight Foundation “Aren't there limits on campaign contributions?’ and other questions you're too embarrassed to ask”, *Sunlight Foundation*, <<https://sunlightfoundation.com/2016/04/21/arent-there-limits-on-campaign-contributions-and-other-questions-youre-too-embarrassed-to-ask/>>] //CJC

There are limits to how much you can contribute to a candidate's campaign. That's the committee directly run and managed by the candidate. You'll know these committees because they'll include the candidate's name in them. This is also how you can identify who is behind an ad. If it is paid for by the candidate, they will say, "I'm candidate X and I approved this message." Every candidate committee has to include that on their ads. If you're a small donor, you're probably giving to the candidate committee, so **there is a limit to how much you can give. In 2016, that amount is \$2,700 per election,** but the amounts increase periodically based on factors like inflation. **The Federal Election Commission (FEC) considers the primary election and the general election two different races, so you could contribute \$2,700 in the primary and \$2,700 in the general election for a total of \$5,400 per election cycle.** So how do people give more than that? I won't confuse you with some of the inside baseball of giving to state parties or to the political parties in general. For the purpose of this post, I'm just going to focus on the main two ways we see people channel unlimited amounts of money into a campaign: super PACs and dark money groups. What's a super PAC? **A super PAC** is technically “a PAC that makes independent expenditures for the express election or defeat of a candidate.” What the heck does that mean? It means this is a group established to get someone elected or attack their opponents, but **they are doing so independent of the candidate's committee – meaning they are not working with them.** (Though there is a lot of debate about whether that actually happens and the FEC seldom disciplines groups for “coordination.”) Since these groups are not supposed to work with the candidate in any way, **there are no caps on the amount someone can give a super PAC;** however, these groups do have to disclose all of its donors. A super PAC cannot use a candidate's name in its own identification, so if you see a political ad and it is sponsored by a group that does not have the candidate's name in it, it's likely a super PAC (or another outside group) putting out the advertisement.

Calexit fails — withdrew petition

Myers 4/17/17 [John Myers, “The author of the 'Calexit' initiative calls it quits on his proposal for a 2018 ballot measure”, *Los Angeles Times*, <<http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-the-author-of-the-calexit-initiative-1492463654-htmstory.html>>] //CJC

Less than three months after being given the green light to start gathering voter signatures, the author of a closely watched effort to split California from the United States has decided to withdraw his proposal. Marcus Ruiz Evans, the initiative's official proponent, sent an email Monday to the secretary of state's office asking to **cancel his initiative.** State election law allows a proposed ballot measure to be recalled for any reason, as long as it happens prior to 131 days before the election. But to do so, **Evans must submit a signed letter — which has yet to be received.**

Popular vote decreases turnout and faith in politics

Francis 2012 [Leslie Francis is former executive director of the Democratic National Committee and Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, “Why National Popular Vote Is a Bad Idea”, *Huffington Post*, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/curtis-gans/national-popular-vote_b_1189390.html>] //CJC

By its very size and scope, **a national direct election will lead to nothing more than a national media campaign,** which would propel the parties' media consultants to inflict upon the entire nation what has been heretofore limited to the so-called battleground states: **an ever-escalating, distorted arms race of tit-for-tat unanswerable attack advertising** polluting the

airwaves, **denigrating every candidate and eroding citizen faith in** their leaders and **the political process as a whole**. **Because a direct election would be, by definition, national and resource allocation would be overwhelmingly dominated by paid television advertising, there would be little impetus for grass-roots activity. That, in turn, would likely diminish voter turnout.** Similarly, because a national campaign mandates a national message, there would also be a smaller incentive for coalition-building or taking into account the characteristics, needs and desires of citizens in differing states and regions.

Courts are ruling against racial gerrymandering now

Ollstein 1/20/17 [Alice Ollstein is a writer for ThinkProgress, "Alabama found guilty of racial gerrymandering", *ThinkProgress*, <<https://thinkprogress.org/alabama-found-guilty-of-racial-gerrymandering-e42f48e19c40>>] //CJC

A federal appeals court ruled Friday that the state of Alabama engaged in

unconstitutional racial gerrymandering in at least 12 districts in order to preserve a Republican supermajority. The ruling is a victory for the state's Legislative Black Caucus, which has been fighting in court for years against voting maps that intentionally limit the voting power of African Americans by packing them into as few oddly-shaped districts as possible. The decision, which came down on the day Donald Trump took the presidential oath of office, calls on Alabama to re-draw 12 districts that were drawn "predominantly" based on race. These districts are all currently represented by Democrats, and 10 out of 12 by Black Democrats. Unless Alabama appeals, the state will have to redraw its voting maps to comply with the Voting Rights Act and the Constitution before the next election in 2018. The leader of the statehouse Democrats, Craig Ford (D-Gadsden) said the state should take the opportunity to transition to an independent system that doesn't allow the majority party to draw maps that help them hold onto power. "Today's ruling highlights the need to take the politics out of drawing legislative districts and instead, rely on an independent, non-partisan commission," he said. Republicans now control 68 out of 99 state legislative chambers and control both chambers in 33 states, riding a wave that began in 2010. Since then, they have come under fire in several states for engaging in illegal gerrymandering. In November, **a federal court ordered the state of North Carolina to redraw its unconstitutionally and racially gerrymandered voting maps**. That same month, **Wisconsin's maps were struck down for intentionally drawing Republicans into safe, non-competitive districts. A major case on the issue is likely to come before the U.S. Supreme Court later this year, with one of the most successful lawyers in the country leading the fight against partisan gerrymandering**. Another one of the most influential legal minds in the nation—former Attorney General Eric Holder —will also join the fight, seeking to pressure states to adopt non-partisan systems before the next census in 2020. If they prevail, **it will mean a national shakeup of the political landscape that could break Republican dominance of state legislatures and the House of Representatives.**

Racial gerrymandering is unconstitutional — SCOTUS ruling

Fairvote 2005 [Fairvote, "LEGALITY OF GERRYMANDERING", *Fairvote*, <<http://archive.fairvote.org/redistricting/legality.htm>>] //CJC

Political Gerrymandering. **Political gerrymandering is the drawing of electoral district lines in a manner that discriminates against a political party**. When used to insure party success, **political gerrymandering is usually legal** but can be contested. At this time it is legal to draw district lines to protect incumbents of both parties. Racial Gerrymandering | **Racial gerrymandering** originally referred to manipulating legislative district lines to under-represent racial minorities. **Tactics such as "packing" black voters into a given district or "cracking" them to make black voters a minority in all districts can be illegal**. This sort of gerrymandering was first used in the South after the Civil War to dilute the black vote. Racial

Gerrymandering II In 1982, the Voting Rights Act was amended to require many political jurisdictions to create **"majority-minority" districts in order to allow more racial minorities to elect candidates of their choice**. After the 1990 census, **the Supreme Court invalidated several such redistricting plans as unconstitutionally** race-conscious.

Squo will kill partisan gerrymandering — new formula will flip Kennedy

Stern 1/9/17 [Mark Stern is a writer for Slate, "Death to the Gerrymander", *Slate*, <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/01/death_to_the_gerrymander_paul_smith_might_defeat_unconstitutional_redistricting.html>] //CJC

It has become painfully clear in recent years that **partisan gerrymandering** is one of American democracy's worst illnesses. Although the Supreme Court held decades ago that the purpose of redistricting was to ensure "fair and effective representation for all citizens," legislators often use the process to lock the minority party out of power. Both Democrats and Republicans deploy partisan gerrymandering to dilute votes for their opponents, creating one-party rule and, arguably, greater polarization. That's bad for the body politic and a clear contravention of the Constitution. But as long as the courts refuse to step in, gerrymandering will continue to plague the country. **Now Paul Smith, one of the greatest legal minds in the country, is asking the Supreme Court to finally put a stop to it. And here's the exciting part: He might actually succeed.** Smith, a renowned Supreme Court litigator, recently joined the Campaign Legal Center's battle **against Wisconsin's egregious partisan gerrymander**. The CLC believes **it has finally developed a winning strategy to combat partisan redistricting, developing a mathematical formula to help courts decide which gerrymanders violate the Constitution. It triumphed in district court, where a three-judge panel agreed that Wisconsin's redistricting scheme was unconstitutional, citing the CLC's formula in striking down the map.** A peculiarity in federal law ensures that **Wisconsin can appeal the decision directly to the Supreme Court, which must hear the case.** Smith and the CLC are now preparing for the greatest showdown over political redistricting in a generation. **The difficulty in curbing partisan gerrymandering has not been in convincing judges that the practice is unconstitutional—the Supreme Court has found that it is—it's convincing judges that they can fix it.** Most gerrymanders involve a blatantly unconstitutional practice called "packing and cracking": packing some supporters of the opposing party into a few "safe" districts and distributing others throughout a bunch of districts to dilute their votes. This form of gerrymandering runs afoul of two constitutional guarantees: The First Amendment, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of a person's viewpoint, and the Equal Protection Clause, which bars the government from disfavoring individuals on the basis of an illegitimate classification like political affiliation. **In 2004's Vieth v. Jubelirer, which Smith argued, five justices agreed that partisan gerrymandering likely violated the Constitution. But one of these justices, Anthony Kennedy, wasn't sure quite how to fix the problem, and so he voted with the conservative justices to toss out a challenge to a Pennsylvania gerrymander—** without closing the door to future lawsuits. In a concurring opinion, Kennedy wrote that partisan gerrymandering seems to unconstitutionally "burden representational rights" by "penalizing citizens" because of their "association with a political party" or their "expression of political views." Still, **Kennedy insisted, courts should not intervene until they could articulate "principles of fairness in districting"—specifically, a formula to decide when the burden placed on representational rights crosses the line into unconstitutionality.** Otherwise, he argued, "the results from one gerrymandering case to the next would likely be disparate and inconsistent.

Gorsuch will turn the tide pt 2

Michaels 4/13/17 [Cash Michaels is an award-winning reporter for the WS Chronicle. “Justice Gorsuch expected to oppose N.C. voting rights,” *WS Chronicle*, <<http://www.wschronicle.com/2017/04/justice-gorsuch-expected-oppose-n-c-voting-rights/>>] //WGC

“Last Monday morning, Judge Neil Gorsuch, nominated by Pres. Donald Trump, was sworn-in as the nation’s 113th associate justice to the United States Supreme Court.

After a bruising Senate confirmation process that saw Senate Democrats oppose Gorsuch for his strict conservative record of rulings from the federal bench, the Republican majority changed the rules so that Gorsuch could win appointment by a simple 51-vote majority, instead of the standard 60-vote threshold. He took his seat Monday, replacing the late conservative Justice Antonin Scalia, who died 14 months ago. Several progressive groups opposed Justice Gorsuch during his nomination process. **Here in**

North Carolina, several legal experts are now also alarmed that the U.S. Supreme Court – which is soon scheduled to rule on at least two North Carolina **voting rights** and redistricting issues – **is right-leaning again with Gorsuch’s addition.** “Justice Gorsuch’s prior record demonstrates

that he will likely be hostile to traditional civil rights issues as a Supreme Court justice,” said Kami Chavis, a professor of law and director of the Criminal Justice Program at Wake Forest University in Winston-Salem. “Many civil rights organizations, including NAACP LDF (Legal Defense Fund) have opposed him, stating his restrictive access justice approach. He has consistently ruled against those requesting relief in capital punishment cases and employment discrimination cases.” A veteran legal veteran of civil rights agrees. “Judge Gorsuch was nominated by Donald Trump and presented for that position solely because he is expected to vote to support the established right-wing political agenda,” **Professor Irving Joyner of the North Carolina**

Central University School of Law in Durham, says. “He may be qualified in a professional sense, but the paramount basis for his support from the Republican Party is that he is right-wing and is expected to oppose a progressive view of the protection of individual rights, which are embedded in the U.S. Constitution.”

“Gorsuch is advertised and touted as a judicial re-incarnation of the arch-conservative Antonin Scalia, who regularly voted against the interests of African-Americans and people of color,” Professor Joyner continued. “As such, he **is expected to vote in support of legislative efforts to suppress the rights of people to register and vote,** against the rights of people to protest and assemble to voice objections to governmental policies **and against efforts to expand protections for the powerless and disfranchised portions of our society.** “It is

because of Gorsuch’s past judicial opinions, which are supportive of this right-wing political agenda, that he is presented now as the “new darling” of the Republican Party,” Professor Joyner concluded. But another professor of Law at Wake Forest University suggests based on his own review, Justice Gorsuch may not be so predictable. “My sense of Judge Gorsuch is formed only by those of his circuit court opinions I have read,” says Shannon Gilreath, professor of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies. “Basically, I feel he is not as bad of a choice as could have been made. He certainly isn’t the best, either, from a progressive perspective. He is a soundly conservative vote on most questions.” “In some areas, as in the rights of criminal defendants, he may be even more reactionary than Justice Scalia, who tended to be fairly protective of defendants’ rights. My assumption is that

Gorsuch will be a vote in favor of the further disenfranchisement of African-Americans at the polls. Gorsuch also has a disturbing record when it comes to women’s rights, particularly reproductive rights, which are in my view African-American rights.”

Gorsuch will turn the tide — this card is fantastic

Sneed 4/13/17 [Tierney Sneed is a reporter for Talking Points Memo. She previously worked for U.S. News and World Report. “Gorsuch Arrives At The Supreme Court At A Crucial Moment For Voting Rights”, *Talking Points Memo*, <<http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/gorsuch-voting-rights-supreme-court>>] //CJC

Less than a week into the job, Supreme Court Justice Neil **Gorsuch will** have his first chance, behind closed doors at least, to **weigh in on voting rights**. When the justices meet Friday for their private conference, the first since Gorsuch's confirmation, among the cases that they will be considering whether to take up is an appeal of a landmark ruling striking down North Carolina's mammoth restrictive voting law. **The moment is an anxious one for voting rights advocates**, who had seen a number of lower court victories on key cases in the months since the death of Justice Antonin Scalia and **were cautiously optimistic that the Supreme Court was about to flip their way** in time for them to cement that progress at the highest court. While it is unclear how **Gorsuch** is likely to rule on the major questions bubbling up in voting rights litigation, if he **does represent the second coming of Scalia, as he has been billed by his supporters, then some of those intermediary wins are now at risk**. **"There was some hope in the voting rights community**, especially with a sympathetic Supreme Court, **that courts would increasingly provide the role of being a back stop of more egregious limitations on voting rights**," Richard Hasen, a professor at UC-Irvine School of Law who also runs the Election Law Blog, told TPM. **"Now all of that is off the table. " The mood was quite different a year or even six months ago, after President Obama had chosen Judge Merrick Garland—a moderate who nonetheless would have shifted the court left in replacing Scalia—and when Hillary Clinton was viewed as likely to win the election.** As Hasen himself wrote in a New York Times op-ed last August, "the changing composition of the Supreme Court" meant that were "no longer five justices willing to uphold restrictive voting laws." **But that ground shifted significantly with President Trump's surprise victory**, coupled with the Senate GOP's unprecedented blockade of Garland, which allowed Trump to choose Scalia's successor instead. **Gorsuch will likely return the court to the status quo**, but at a time when states are doubling down on passing restrictive laws and **the voting rights community can't depend on the Justice Department, under Attorney General Jeff Sessions, to fight them**. "The legislatures are in a position where if they are determined to suppress voting rights, there are not a lot of options but to go to the courts," Myrna Perez, deputy director of the Democracy Program at the Brennan Center, told TPM. "While in other periods in this country's history, there were other checks and balances and different pressure points that could be happening, the courts are going to become important to a highly politicized legislative system." As a judge on the Colorado-based 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Gorsuch didn't participate in any major voting cases, beyond a uncontroversial National Voter Registration Act decision. The comparisons of him to Scalia and the so-called "originalist" legal doctrine Scalia championed are perhaps the most worrying signs for voting rights advocates. But Caroline Fredrickson, president of the progressive legal organization the American Constitution Society, also pointed to his votes on cases concerning the 14th and 15th amendments. **"His voting record is extraordinarily unsympathetic to the types of claims that would be raised in a voting rights case,"** she said. "He hasn't shown himself to appreciate the Reconstruction amendments."

Texas was an exception — this ruling won't spill over, especially because DOJ doesn't care

Wines 4/10/17 [Michael Wines is a reporter for the NYT. "Federal Judge Says Texas Voter ID Law Intentionally Discriminates", *New York Times*, <<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/us/federal-judge-strikes-down-texas-voter-id-law.html>>] //CJC

Texas passed the most restrictive photo ID law in the country — a law the legislators knew would hurt minority voting rights, without any evidence justifying it, **and they broke all sorts of legislative rules and norms to do it**," Ms. Perez said. Judge Ramos acknowledged the difficulty of pinning down the Legislature's motives. She wrote of considering "all available direct and circumstantial evidence of intent" rather than trying to "discern the motivations of particular legislators."

The judge highlighted attempts by Democrats to blunt the racial impact of the law, known as Senate Bill 14, through amendments that were ultimately rejected, including

allowing additional types of photo identification. "Many categories of acceptable photo IDs permitted by other states were omitted from the Texas bill," she wrote. Kristen Clarke, the president and executive director of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, which represented some of the plaintiffs, said the ruling on Monday marked the fifth time that a court found that the law had a discriminatory purpose or effect. Judge Ramos's decision, she said, "should sound the death knell for burdensome voter ID requirements in Texas and across the country." For decades, Texas and several other mostly Southern states with a history of discrimination had been required to seek federal approval before making changes to their voting laws. But the states were freed from that requirement in 2013, after a Supreme Court decision that invalidated key provisions of the Voting Rights Act. The finding of intentional discrimination could once again put Texas under federal supervision. It would be the first state brought back into so-called preclearance since the Supreme Court's 2013 ruling. Judge Ramos did not address whether she would order Texas to undergo federal oversight, but will examine the issue during the next stage of the case. The law was passed by the Legislature and signed by then-Gov. Rick Perry in 2011, but took effect in 2013. It required voters to show a driver's license, passport or other government-issued photo ID before casting a ballot. It was previously found by the appellate court to have a discriminatory effect on black and Hispanic voters, many of whom lacked government-issued photo identification, and as a result was softened for the November 2016 election. Numerous Democratic lawmakers, voters, civil rights organizations and black and Hispanic groups sued, arguing that Republican legislators steamrolled the bill through the State House and Senate. They said legislators departed from procedural norms in passing the law, including classifying it as emergency legislation, cutting debate short and bypassing the ordinary committee process in both chambers. The plaintiffs told Judge Ramos in court documents and at various hearings that the law's true purpose was to help Republicans maintain their hold on power amid the fast-paced growth of Democratic-leaning black and Hispanic voters. Republican officials, including Gov. Greg Abbott, who defended the law in court when he served as the state's attorney general, have long disputed any suggestion that lawmakers intentionally discriminated. They said that the law was aimed at preventing voter fraud and that the departures from the normal legislative process were made to prevent Democratic lawmakers from manipulating procedural rules to thwart passage. They maintained that opponents had turned up no evidence that any legislator had intended to discriminate against blacks and Hispanics. Under the Obama administration, the Justice Department had joined the legal fight against Texas. But in a reversal that angered civil rights lawyers and Texas Democrats, the Trump administration's Justice Department withdrew from the part of the case that Judge Ramos decided on Monday: the agency's claim that Texas had enacted the law with discriminatory intent. Samuel Bagenstos, a law professor at the University of Michigan and a principal deputy assistant attorney general for civil rights in President Barack Obama's Justice Department, noted the timing of the ruling. "I think it's a very significant ruling in part because **the Department of Justice under the Trump administration decided to abandon arguing for a discriminatory-intent holding,**" Professor Bagenstos said. "This sort of makes the Department of Justice look bad for abandoning its previous position."

Bigger chance of swinging the election does not increase chance of turnout

Ryan D. Enos and Anthony Fowler, Mar 2014 ["Pivotality and Turnout: Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Aftermath of a Tied Election*", Cambridge Core, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-science-research-and-methods/article/pivotality-and-turnout-evidence-from-a-field-experiment-in-the-aftermath-of-a-tied-election/EFC53E5761492F1E766C81495782F74F>] MJS 4-3-2017

Many citizens abstain from the political process, and the reasons for this abstention are of great interest and importance. Most scholars and pundits assume that greater electoral competition and the increased chance of pivotality will motivate citizens to participate. **We test this hypothesis through a large-scale field experiment that exploits the rare opportunity of a tied election for major political office. Informing citizens that an upcoming election will be close has little mobilizing effect.** Any effect that we do detect is concentrated among a small set of frequent voters. **The evidence suggests that increased pivotality is not a solution to low turnout** and the predominant models of turnout focusing on pivotality are of little practical use.

PV forces candidates to appeal to cities and rural areas — cities wouldn't control the result

Koza 2013 [John Koza is PhD in computer science and Stanford professor of computer science, electrical engineering, and medicine, "Every Vote Equal: A State-Based Plan for Electing the President by National Popular Vote", NPV Press, <<http://www.every-vote-equal.com/sites/default/files/everyvoteequal-4th-ed-2013-02-21.pdf>>] //CJC

MYTH: Big cities, such as Los Angeles, would control a nationwide popular vote for President. QUICK ANSWER: • **Under a national popular vote, every vote would be equal**

throughout the United States. **A vote cast in a big city would be no more (or less) valuable or controlling than a vote cast anywhere else.** • Los Angeles does not control the outcome of statewide elections in California and therefore is hardly in a position to dominate a nationwide election. The fact that Los Angeles does not control the outcome of statewide elections in its own state is evidenced by the fact that Republicans such as Ronald Reagan, George Deukmejian, Pete Wilson, and Arnold Schwarzenegger were elected Governor in recent years without ever winning Los Angeles. • **The origins of the myth about big cities may stem from the misconceptions that big cities are bigger than they actually are, and that big cities account for a greater fraction of the nation's population than they actually do. In fact, 85% of the population of the United States lives in places with a population of fewer than 365,000** (the population of Arlington, Texas—the nation's 50th biggest city). MORE DETAILED ANSWER: In a nationwide vote for President, a vote cast in a big city would be no more (or less) valuable or important than a vote cast in a suburb, an exurb, a small town, or a rural area. **When every vote is equal, candidates know that they need to solicit voters throughout their entire constituency in order to win**

Turnout key to equality

McElwee, Sean. "WHY VOTING MATTERS: LARGE DISPARITIES IN TURNOUT BENEFIT THE DONOR CLASS." Demos. 16 Sep 2015. <<http://www.demos.org/publication/why-voting-matters-large-disparities-turnout-benefit-donor-class>>] //CJC

In America today, public policy is deeply biased towards affluent white people, as numerous scholars have discovered.¹⁴ In light of the income and race differences, and the differing views, of voters and nonvoters, **it seems logical and likely that voter turnout differences are a significant part of the problem of white-affluent bias in public policy.**¹⁵ While it is difficult to entirely disentangle how much of this policy bias can be explained by differences in turnout, in fact **there is strong evidence to suggest that more inclusive voting could help to shift public policy in a more inclusive and widely beneficial direction, particularly for working class and poor Americans and communities of color.**

[...]

The research on democracy and policy suggests three broad lessons. First, those who vote have more representation than those who do not.⁴³ Second, those who do not vote tend to have views that are more economically progressive than those who do vote. And third, **voting plays a significant role in the distribution of government resources as well as the size of government and who benefits from public policies.** **Increasing and equalizing voter turnout is not a panacea for reducing inequality and achieving racial equity in public policy; it is one important factor among others,** including the role of money in politics. But, as Robert Franzese argues, **where turnout is low and unequal, politicians who already cater to big donors have an even stronger incentive to do so.**⁴⁴ He concludes that **whether or not democracies respond to rising inequality is conditioned by the political participation** of poorer people in the electorate.⁴⁵ After the wealth of a country, voter participation and income inequality are the most important determinants of tax and transfer progressivity.⁴⁶ As President Obama has argued, "It would be transformative if everybody voted. That would counteract money more than anything."⁴⁷ He is correct.

High turnout key to helping the poor

Sean McElwee, 2015 [, "Why Increasing Voter Turnout Affects Policy," Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/why-non-voters-matter/405250/>] MJS 3-24-2017

It's not just the demographics of voters and nonvoters that differ; so do their views. Four questions from the American National Elections Studies (ANES) data show a stark divide on issues related to economic inequality. **Nonvoters tend to support increasing government services and spending, guaranteeing jobs, and reducing inequality—all policies that voters, on the whole, oppose. Both groups support spending on the poor, but the margin among nonvoters is far larger. Across all four questions, nonvoters are more supportive of interventionist government policies by an average margin of 17 points.** Measuring these differences with other data sets produces similar results. I took numbers from Pew and YouGov comparing registered voters with the non-registered population. These polls were not taken close to elections, so registration can serve as a rough proxy for the voting and nonvoting population. The polls show the same dramatic differences. **In every instance, net support for greater government intervention in economic affairs was higher for the non-registered populations—sometimes dramatically so.** For instance, while net support for free community college was 7 points for the registered population, it was 46 points within the non-registered population. Since **nonvoters tend to be younger, less white, poorer and more mobile than voters,** this isn't entirely surprising. But one reason these findings are so striking is that voters and nonvoters hold broadly similar views on a range of other controversial issues. Christopher Ellis, an assistant professor of political science at Bucknell, tells me that gaps on issues like abortion, immigration, and gun control are comparatively modest (he is supported by Pew research). But economic issues are different. That's a remarkable finding, because there's a mass of evidence to suggest that the views of voters play a hugely significant role in changing policy. Brian Newman and John Griffin, **who have found that voters are "almost always more conservative" than nonvoters, have argued that, "increases in turnout may lead to greater policy liberalism."** While many scholars have focused on the rather pedestrian question of whether turnout would benefit Republicans or Democrats, Griffin and Newman argue that even beyond the party differences, "voter ideology substantially affects the way Senators cast votes." They note, for example, that, "in states where voters are more conservative than nonvoters, Senators tend to be more conservative." Other recent studies bear out the conclusion that, lobbyists and wealthy donors notwithstanding, **elected politicians really do tend to act in accordance with the views of their electorates.** One researcher, for example, found that higher turnout among the wealthy changes the legislative agenda: Policymakers spend less time on bills relating to housing, welfare and healthcare. They're also likely to pass anti-predatory lending statutes, expand children's health insurance, or increase the minimum wage. Conversely, **another study finds that higher turnout among the poor leads to higher spending on welfare programs.** Counties with higher turnout receive more funding from the federal government, while districts with lower turnout have less influence on the policy positions taken by their representatives.

[...]

Inequality creates a worrying double-bind: Low-income people become more supportive of interventionist policies, even as they drop out of the political system. The result is a

troubling divergence between the economic views of the population as a whole, and the policies that voters and the politicians that they elect tend to favor. The simplest way to reverse that is to mobilize the great mass of potential voters who don't currently head to the polls. Universal registration, Jan Leighley said, would lead to a "more serious conversation about economic inequality, and one that included a wider range of views."

[...]

Higher turnout may lead to policies that somewhat better reflect the views of poor and middle-class Americans, but other factors will continue to favor the affluent. Members of Congress tend to come from white-collar occupations, and may therefore be less likely to support policies that benefit blue-collar workers. They are also wealthier than the average citizen, and perhaps unsurprisingly, more favorably inclined to policies like eliminating the estate tax that yield disproportionate benefits for the wealthy. More affluent Americans remain more likely to contact members of Congress, to work on campaigns, to donate to funds, or to have social networks that include elected officials. If higher turnout cannot change all of these factors, though, then lower turnout certainly exacerbates them. **In low turnout elections, politicians are incentivized to cater to the interests of a small portion of the general public—in a system with near-universal voting, they might take into account a wider array of interests.** After all, for what shall it profit a politician, if she shall gain a Super PAC, and lose her own seat?

Most voters don't fill out down-ballot races

David **Axelrod** and Mike Murphy, 11-7-2016 [director of the Institute of Politics at the University of Chicago, "More than 30 percent of voters fail to complete their ballots. Don't be one of them.," Vox, <http://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/11/7/13553496/down-ballot-vote-local-elections-informed-voter>] MJS 4-6-2017

But once **voters** make an informed decision about the presidential election, they often **scan the rest of the ballot only to be confronted with a dizzying array of people they've never heard of, running for offices they didn't know existed** until that moment. Not only will voters be asked to render an informed judgment on presidential and congressional elections, but they will be expected to do so for their state representatives, their county commissioners, their secretary of state, and an intimidatingly long list of judges. In Chicago, the average ballot has 101 candidates. In Los Angeles, there are 17 statewide ballot measures. **The unspoken truth is that** faced with a long ballot, unfamiliar names, and strange offices, **most voters will simply guess — or leave portions of their ballot blank.** Studies have found that in the absence of information, voters make decisions based on candidates' names, gender, ethnicity, sometimes even ballot position. Researchers from the University of Virginia estimate that candidates listed first on the ballot can receive up to 5 percent more votes than candidates listed lower. **More than 30 percent of voters will fail to complete their ballot.** Political science professors have called this the SAT effect — when you don't know, leave it blank.

Voter ID laws can get worse — likely will under trump.

Jesse Huseman, Jan 20, 2017. ProPublica. With Trump in Office, Feds May Alter Course in Texas Voter ID Case.

<https://www.propublica.org/article/with-trump-in-office-feds-may-alter-course-in-texas-voter-id-case>

Hours after President Donald Trump was inaugurated, the Department of Justice filed to postpone a hearing on the Texas Voter ID law. The request was granted. The DOJ had previously argued that the law intentionally discriminated against minority voters, but told the court it needed additional time for the new administration to “brief the new leadership of the Department on this case and the issues to be addressed at that hearing before making any representations to the Court.”

Chad Dunn, attorney for the plaintiffs in the case, expects Trump’s Department of Justice to reverse course. **“I figure the government will spend the next 30 days figuring out how to change its mind,”** he said, adding that now **he expects the DOJ to argue on behalf of the state of Texas**, which has held that there was no intent to discriminate against minorities. **“The facts did not change — just the personnel.”**

More Trump inherency about Voter ID Laws increasing because of Pop Vote.

BY JESSE RHODES ON 2/5/17 Newsweek: CALL VOTER ID LAWS WHAT THEY ARE— ATTEMPTS TO SUPPRESS MINORITY VOICES

<http://www.newsweek.com/voter-id-laws-attempts-suppress-minority-voices-551956>

Reports suggest that Trump’s obsession with voter fraud is due to his outrage at losing the popular vote to Democratic opponent Hillary Clinton. As Trump himself alleged in a recent interview, “of those [illegal] votes cast, none of ‘em come to me. None of ‘em come to me. They would all be for the other side.”

If voter fraud is a myth, why has Trump called for measures to “strengthen up voting procedures”? **Sadly, the evidence strongly suggests that supporters of restrictive voting rules are attempting to obstruct nonwhite citizens from voting, in order to promote the election of Republican candidates.**

Research on public attitudes toward stringent election rules such as voter ID laws shows that support for these measures is strongest among those with uncharitable attitudes toward people of color. **Indeed, one experimental study found that simply exposing whites to an image of an African-American person at the polls made them more supportive of voter ID laws.**

Lower turnout leads to more informed voting

Will Wilkinson, 10-22-2008 [research fellow @ Cato, "Thank You For Not Voting," Cato Institute, <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/thank-you-not-voting>] MJS 4-2-2017

The virtue of opting out is especially clear once you grasp that **more voting isn't necessarily better voting.** Specialists in public opinion have exhaustively documented **the average voter's shocking ignorance about the main issues of the day, the names of their local candidates for office, or the policies the candidates support. The flakiest voters** — the ones least motivated to show up at the polls year in and year out — also **tend to be most poorly informed. So when turnout drops, it tends to leave the pool of remaining voters with an improved average level of political knowledge and policy know-how.** If well-informed voters have a better picture of the candidate or party most likely to promote the general welfare, then especially high turnout can actually tilt an election away from the better choice, leaving everyone a bit worse off. And that's not very civic-minded. At this point in the argument, some readers will have become pretty upset. The "best informed" voters tend to be the best-educated, and therefore tend to be relatively wealthy. Doesn't this line of thinking suggest that relatively disadvantaged citizens would do us all a favour — would do themselves a favour — by staying home on election day? But then who will stand up for them? Who will promote their interests? It's an excellent question, but it's based on one disproven and one unlikely assumption. The disproven assumption is that economic self-interest predicts voter behaviour. **The consensus finding of political scientists is that voters — lettered and unlettered, rich and poor — tend to vote in good faith to promote what they see as the public good.** That's good news. The unlikely assumption is that the voters who know least about politics and public policy have the means to make good decisions about which candidates and policies will best promote their interests. That doesn't compute. But everyone should have the means to make informed and effective democratic decisions. And that's really the issue, isn't it? It would be ideal were each and every citizen to have the income and education typical of well-informed, motivated voters. But to get there, **we need policies that will actually work to promote broader prosperity and a fuller realization of basic human capacities. A better-informed pool of voters is more likely to deliver those policies.** And so we are left with the Zen riddle of democracy: the closer a non-ideal democracy comes to maximum democratic participation, the less likely it is to adopt the means to ideal democratic participation. **Lower voter turnout sets the stage for better democracy.**

Ethanol solves warming — mandate is key

Bedard 2006 [Patrick Bedard, "Ethanol Promises", *Car And Driver*,

<http://www.caranddriver.com/features/ethanol-promises-ethanol-and-global-warming-page-4>] //CJC

Ethanol will save us from global warming. When fossil fuels are burned, they release carbon that was removed from the atmosphere billions of years ago by plants and stored in fossils ever since. This release, in the form of carbon dioxide, builds up greenhouse gases that are widely believed to be causing climate change. **Ethanol releases carbon dioxide, too, but some of it was removed from the air recently by the plants grown as feedstock for ethanol production. So ethanol recycles a share of its carbon,** and the size of that recycled share determines its greenhouse appeal.

[...]

But if the ethanol mandate jump-starts the processes for making ethanol from the various forms of cellulose, reducing the cost and improving the energy efficiency of the process, ethanol could become a more significant fuel in the decades to come.

FIVE REASONS FUTURE STATES WILL NEVER GERRYMANDER

Silver 2011 [Nate Silver, "Pennsylvania Electoral College Plan Could Backfire On G.O.P," *FiveThirtyEight*, *New York Times*, September 15, 2011 <https://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/pennsylvania-electoral-college-plan-could-backfire-on-g-o-p/>] /WGC

"Republicans in Pennsylvania are considering a proposal that would award 18 of the state's 20 electoral votes to the winner of each of its congressional districts,

leaving the remaining 2 to the winner of the state at large. Had the proposal been in place in 2008, when Pennsylvania had one more electoral vote prior to reapportionment, Barack Obama would have carried only 11 of the state's 21 electoral votes despite winning Pennsylvania by a 10-point margin. The plan would create the possibility, in fact, that the winner of the popular vote in Pennsylvania could come away with fewer electoral votes from the state. Pennsylvania's congressional districts are heavily gerrymandered and the Democratic vote is concentrated in the dense urban areas of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. Republicans have a 12-7 edge now in the state's congressional delegation, and are in charge of its redistricting process. With Pennsylvania needing to lose one seat because of slow population growth, they will try to consolidate Democratic voters into six districts while reinforcing their own. A couple of the Republican-held districts might still be in play. The one occupied by Representative Charles Dent, for instance, now designated as Pennsylvania's 15th Congressional District, has been slightly Democratic-leaning in its presidential voting and was carried by Mr. Obama in 2008. But if Mr. Obama were to carry Pennsylvania narrowly, its electoral votes could plausibly split 9-11 or even 8-12 against him. The Constitution provides broad latitude to states to determine how to allocate their electoral votes. In fact, Democrats have little recourse in Pennsylvania at all: Republicans control both branches of the state legislature as well as the governorship. And Pennsylvania has neither ballot initiatives nor recall elections. Democrats simply have to hope that Republicans will decide that the proposal is not in their overall best interest. Fortunately for Democrats, the proposal is already drawing

objections from some Republicans. And it's easy enough to see why: there are all sorts of downsides to this plan for Pennsylvania Republicans. Problem #1. The Electoral College split could work against Republicans and cost their candidate the election.

It's easy to draw maps where the Pennsylvania plan could cost Mr. Obama an election he otherwise would have won. One case is if Mr. Obama were to lose Ohio, Florida, Nevada, Indiana and North Carolina from among the states he carried in 2008, holding the rest including Pennsylvania. That would result in a 279-259 win for Mr. Obama in the Electoral College under the current rules. But, since he would probably lose between 10 and 12 of Pennsylvania's electoral votes because of the congressional district split, that would put him below the 270 votes required to win the Electoral College. But one can also come up with plausible maps that would work the other way. Take the map we just drew and make two small alterations: Mr. Obama holds onto Nevada, but loses Pennsylvania. (Seem unlikely? It isn't: Mr. Obama carried Nevada by a wider margin than Pennsylvania in 2008.) Under the old rules, this would be enough for the Republican candidate to become the next president, winning the Electoral College 273-265. If Pennsylvania's votes were split, however, Mr. Obama would be very likely to carry at least five of them in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. That would be enough for him to win the Electoral College 270-268. Overall, somewhat more of these scenarios are likely to work for rather than against Republicans. That's because of the way Pennsylvania's congressional districts are drawn, and because Pennsylvania has historically been slightly Democratic-leaning relative to the rest of the country. Still, the relative order of states shifts a little bit from election to election, and Pennsylvania is close enough to the razor's edge that it could flip from Democratic-leaning to Republican-leaning. As recently as 1996, Pennsylvania was what I call the "tipping-point state." Bill Clinton carried 21 states and the District of Columbia by wider margins than he did Pennsylvania, giving him 256 electoral votes. There were 28 states, meanwhile, totaling 259 electoral votes, that Bob Dole either won outright or lost by a smaller margin than Pennsylvania. Neither figure is sufficient for a majority of the Electoral College — so had the 1996 election been closer over all, Pennsylvania would have been the decisive state. Mr. Clinton could have won Pennsylvania but lost the Electoral College under the proposed rules. But the same is true for Mr. Dole. Problem #2.

The plan could undermine the integrity of the Electoral College, which is probably not in Republicans' long-term best interest. Two states, Maine and Nebraska, already award some of their electoral votes by congressional district, although their votes had never actually been split before 2008, when Mr. Obama won Nebraska's 2nd Congressional District in Omaha to take 1 of the state's 5 electoral votes. This quirk hasn't led to the collapse of the Republic, or the Electoral College. But there are some important differences between these states and Pennsylvania. First and most obviously, they are much smaller, having 9 electoral votes between them, versus the 20 that could be affected by Pennsylvania's plan. And Maine and Nebraska are not usually swing states whereas Pennsylvania very much is, so their rules are exceedingly unlikely to change the winner of the election. Second, the candidate winning the popular vote in Maine and Nebraska is guaranteed to also win a

majority of its electors. Nebraska awards 2 electoral votes to the overall winner of the state, as well as 1 in each of its 3 congressional districts. But since it is mathematically impossible to win a state without winning at least one of its congressional districts, the worst that the statewide winner could do is 3 out of 5 votes total.

In Maine, meanwhile, the winner of the state is guaranteed 3 of 4 electoral votes. As we mentioned, **that isn't the case in Pennsylvania.**

It's quite plausible that a candidate could win the popular vote there but lose most of its electoral votes. **Finally, the Pennsylvania plan is much more explicitly partisan.**

And because of the geography of the state, it would give redistricting and gerrymandering a much larger role in the outcome of presidential elections. (There isn't much worth gerrymandering in Maine or Nebraska.) **So for all practical purposes, this would represent a paradigm shift in the way that presidential elections are**

decided. There's no reason that Republicans couldn't adopt a similar proposal in Wisconsin or Michigan, where they also have control of the state government. There aren't any particularly good places for Democrats to retaliate this year. They control the state governments in places like Arkansas and West Virginia, but they are small states and might not allocate many electoral votes to Democrats no matter how they were split. But if they swept the statehouse in Texas one year, or in Georgia, or Missouri, what would stop them from adopting the Pennsylvania plan if this were the new normal? It would be one thing if all states adopted the same method, some of which could have

advantages to the current approach, and which are sometimes favored by political scientists and good-government advocates. **But what you'd probably wind up with** instead is **a patchwork of procedures for awarding electoral**

votes: some states would retain the current winner-take-all method, but some would use the congressional district split. Some might divide their votes proportionately, or use other hybrid approaches. And the method could change each time that the state government changed hands. It's perfectly Constitutional, for that matter, for states to award their electoral votes through the state legislature, as many states did in the early years of the Republic, without taking a popular vote at all. If Republicans want to all but guarantee that they win the presidency next year, there is nothing stopping them. They control the state governments in 21 states totaling 242 electoral votes. All they need to do is have their state legislatures pick Republican electors in those states, and then for their candidate to win by popular vote in Alaska, Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi and

West Virginia, which would get him to 270 electoral votes. That, of course, is an extreme and unlikely example. But **the Pennsylvania play**

would undermine the integrity the Electoral College, which is already fairly

unpopular. Eight states and the District of Columbia, totaling 132 electoral votes, have signed on to a plan called **the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact**, a proposal that would use a workaround to guarantee that the winner of the national popular vote would win the Electoral College once states totaling a majority of 270 electoral votes had committed to the plan. Such efforts **would presumably gain steam if the Pennsylvania plan were adopted, as would proposals for changes to the**

Constitution. And that's probably not in Republicans' best interest: the Electoral College will generally favor them. Take the 50 states and the District and Columbia and divide them into three roughly-equal sized piles:

In the red pile go all of the states that John McCain carried, which currently have a total of 170 electoral votes. Into the purple pile go states with 182 electoral votes: all states that voted for both parties at least once between 2000 and 2008, plus Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan and Minnesota, where the results are usually close. The remaining 186 votes are in Democratic base states and go into the blue pile. The blue states award a total of 4.1 electoral votes per million voters, based on turnout in 2008. The red states, by contrast, award 4.9 electors per million votes. So Republicans get about 20 percent more Electoral College mileage out of their base states than Democrats do, relative to the number of votes cast. This reflects the fact that Republican states tend to have smaller populations, and the Electoral College slightly favors low-population states. (California has 66 times as many people as Wyoming, but awards "only" 18 times as many electoral votes.) In any particular election, this advantage may flip. Our simulations in 2008 suggested that Barack Obama was more likely to lose the popular vote but win the Electoral College rather than the other way around, a reflection of the fact that his campaign [over-performed in swing states](#) because of its superior turnout operations. Over the medium-to-long term, though, the Electoral College should increase the number

of Republican presidents — an advantage they would presumably want to keep rather than undermining the system. **Problem #3. The plan could motivate Democrats and lead to higher Democratic turnout both in Pennsylvania**

and nationally. I don't entirely buy that President Obama has problems with his base — his numbers are still pretty decent with most Democratic core voters.

But [they have eroded some](#), even among African-Americans. And even if these voters still support Mr. Obama, they may not turn out, or they may turn out but decline to devote their time and money to his campaign. I can't think of many better ways to motivate these voters than to convince them that Republicans are trying to steal the election, and remind them of what happened in 2000, themes that will become prominent should the Pennsylvania plan come to pass. Is the possibility of winning 10 or 12 extra electoral votes a good trade if the price, say, is motivating \$100 million in additional donations to Mr. Obama and the D.N.C.? Or boosting Democratic turnout by 5 percent? These effects are tricky to quantify. But considering that the Pennsylvania plan will help Republicans only under a relatively specific set of circumstances — if the election is close over all, if Pennsylvania is close to the electoral tipping point, and if Mr. Obama rather than their candidate wins the state — it's hard to know who gets the better of the deal.

Problem #4. The plan would significantly reduce Pennsylvania's influence in the election campaign. The first three problems concerned the Republicans' broad self-

interest in electing Republicans to the White House both in 2012 and in future years.

But Republicans in Pennsylvania also have narrower and more parochial things

to worry about. If the Republican plan were adopted, its two statewide votes would still be worth going after, as might the electoral votes three or four of its congressional districts. The others would be foregone conclusions, heavily advantaging one or the other party, which would lose them only in the event of a national landslide. Thus, Pennsylvania would effectively demote itself to something like New Mexico in the electoral pecking order — a state with five or six swing votes rather than 20. **That means fewer favors from Washington, fewer visits from the candidates, less of a windfall for the state’s economy, and less face-time for its politicians. Problem #5. The plan would probably become unpopular in the state over time, potentially costing some Republican office-holders their jobs.** That reduction in influence could also make Pennsylvania voters unhappy. Consider what happened in Colorado in 2004, when there was an initiative on the ballot to allocate the state’s electoral votes proportionately. Initially, the initiative had **plurality support in the polls. Once opponents began to point out that it would vastly reduce Colorado’s influence, however** — essentially, only 1 of its 9 electoral votes would be in play — its support collapsed to the **point that it was resoundingly defeated, 66-34, on Election Day.** The Pennsylvania and Colorado cases are not identical: Colorado’s plan would have split its votes proportionately according to the popular vote rather than by congressional district. **The experience suggests, however, that opponents of the bill are likely to have the stronger case in the court of public opinion:** the argument that Pennsylvania has been made less influential in determining the next president will tend to carry the day. Since there is no ballot initiative to vote on in this case, voters might instead take their frustrations out on Republican politicians throughout the state. Republicans control 112 of the 203 seats in the Pennsylvania State Assembly, with 102 votes being required to pass the bill. Republicans hold a 30-20 majority in the Pennsylvania State Senate, meanwhile, so would need to hold 26 of their members to pass it there. My guess is that they will not be able to keep their coalition together: it’s not clear if this plan is in their best interests. **There are reasons why states have been loathe to tinker with the Electoral College despite having the latitude to do so.**

Candidates Pander to Ethanol to Get Re-elected

John D. Graham [Dean of the Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs], Paul Noe [Vice President of Public Policy at the American Forest & Paper Association], "Beyond Process Excellence: Toward Enhancing Societal Well Being," Discussion Paper for the Penn Program on Regulation’s International Expert Dialogue on "Defining and Measuring Regulatory Excellence," March 19-20, **2015**. Available at: <https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/4382-grahamnoediscussion-draftmarch-2015pdf1pdf>

A third distortion occurs because of the non-competitive nature of general presidential elections in many states. The president is elected not by the national popular vote but by Electoral College votes in a dwindling number of “battleground states”: Colorado (9), Florida (27), Iowa (7), New Hampshire (4), New Mexico (5), Nevada (5), Ohio (20), Virginia (13). As a gross rule of thumb, both parties have a good shot at 160- 180 Electoral College votes with any decent presidential candidate. Most of the contested campaign occurs in ten or fewer swing states with about 90 Electoral College votes. **The victor is encouraged, given a re-election mindset, to spend four years focusing on policies that might give him or her an edge in those battleground states. This distracts from a focus on societal wellbeing.** It is instructive that Congress, not the president, ultimately passed relief from some of the questionable burdens of ethanol policy, as **Obama (like his predecessor) was publicly committed to ethanol.**

Ethanol is good for emissions

Chris Prentice, 2017 ["USDA analysis says ethanol's environmental benefits better than forecast," Journalist using USDA information, Reuters <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-ethanol-usda-idUSKBN14W2SI>] CAP

The U.S. government on Thursday said that ethanol made from corn is better for the environment than previously expected in a report boosting the country's biggest biofuel a week ahead of a new administration that has some in the industry concerned. The report, the first of its kind from **the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to examine the actual impact of ethanol, said the biofuel reduces greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 43 percent relative to gasoline, significantly more than the 21 percent estimated by the Environmental Protection Agency in 2010.** That marks a potential blow to critics who have questioned whether ethanol, the foundation of the country's biofuels program, is better for the environment than petroleum-based fuels. A spokeswoman for the American Petroleum Institute, which represents companies including Royal Dutch Shell Plc's and BP Plc's U.S. units, noted that use of natural gas in production of fuels has helped reduced carbon emissions from power generation. **The analysis forecasts the emissions reductions to rise to 50 percent by 2022 if trends in corn yields, fuel switching and efficiency continue.**

Ethanol is not the cause for food price spikes

John **Block 2011** [March 26. Staff Writer for the Chicago Tribune "Rising food prices? Can't blame ethanol" http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-03-26/news/ct-oped-0328-biofuel-20110317_1_ethanol-production-ethanol-industry-corn-gluten]

But this theory of food-versus-fuel flies in the face of four facts: First, **U.S. ethanol production uses only about 3 percent of the world's grain supply.** Moreover, that **3 percent consists of feed grains, largely corn for livestock. The food grains that people actually eat — mostly rice and wheat — aren't affected by biofuels production.** Second, about a third of the corn used for ethanol becomes a co-product: livestock feed for cattle, poultry and hogs. Last year alone, the U.S. exported 9 million metric tons of these distillers grains, corn gluten feed and corn gluten meal to nations around the world, including Egypt. Third, **volatile energy costs are the real drivers of all consumer prices including for food. Energy impacts every facet of food production from growing the crops to processing the food to transporting it to market. These factors explained why food prices soared in 2008 and are rising right now.** Imagine where oil and gasoline prices might be were it not for ethanol comprising 10 percent of the gasoline market today. Fourth — and most important — American farmers are increasing their productivity. Ethanol's demand for corn has grown dramatically during the past decade. But so has the crop of corn produced by American farmers. Because of productivity improvements, American farmers are growing more corn than ever, with the highest average yield per acre anywhere in the world, at any time in human history. From 1977 through 2007, U.S. corn acreage increased slightly, to 93.6 million from 84.3 million.

No correlation between food price spikes and ethanol

David **Bennett 2011** [April 21, Associate Editor for Delta Farm Press "Vilsack: no correlation between food prices and ethanol" <http://deltafarmpress.com/government/vilsack-no-correlation-between-food-prices-and-ethanol>]
As food prices rise, Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack is not fond of claims that ethanol production is a major cause. He also says an uptick in grain prices will not have a big impact on conservation programs. **"Ethanol production (doesn't have) a significant impact and effect on food prices,"** said Vilsack after touring an Iowa biofuel facility on Tuesday. "There's a misconception in the public that ethanol is driving up food prices. That isn't the case. **In 2008, the last time we had an increase in food prices, we saw ethanol responsible for** about 10 percent of the overall increase – **a very small percentage.** "That's reflected in the fact that farmers get only 16 cents out of every food dollar." What's responsible for the other 84 cents? "Energy costs, oil costs," insisted Vilsack. **"We ought to be looking at ways we can reduce our reliance on oil," a commodity with extreme fluctuations in price.** Despite high corn prices, "we see interest in our CRP (Conservation Reserve Program) program. ... It's true we'll have more corn acres. But it might be at the sacrifice of another commodity – maybe fewer bean acres, fewer wheat acres. ... Overall, I don't think we necessarily see a significant reduction in the

amount of conservation activity. We'll continue to promote conservation and have a proper balance. "But, from my perspective, I don't see the correlation between high food prices and ethanol production."

Ethanol Production Increasing – Other Countries Booming

Truit 6-27 Gary Truitt, 6/27 [6/27/12, President at Hoosier Ag Today Past: Farm Director at AgriAmerica Network
Education: North Central College Summary: Farm broadcaster with more than 25 years experience. Started his own broadcast company in 2006, now the largest farm radio network in Indiana. "Ethanol Production Expected to Grow this Year",
<http://www.hoosieragtoday.com/index.php/2012/06/27/ethanol-production-expected-to-grow-this-year/>] //CJC

New numbers show that, **globally, ethanol production will be up just slightly this year**. In the Global Renewable Fuels Alliance's Global Annual Ethanol Production Forecast, **the group that represents about two-thirds of the world's ethanol production in 44 countries says production of the green fuel should hit 85.2 billion litres in 2012. This comes despite the worries about the world's economy**: "While the world's financial health continues to preoccupy policy makers and governments, the global ethanol industry continues to be a bright spot in the world economy. It continues to grow, supporting nearly 1.4 million jobs and contributing \$277.3 billion to the global economy in 2010," said Global Renewable Fuels Alliance spokesperson, Bliss Baker. "The GRFA's 2012 production forecast sees global ethanol production continuing to displace the need for hundreds of millions of barrels of imported crude oil, further reducing our crippling reliance on foreign oil," said Baker. "Policy makers and governments must recognize the significant contribution biofuels are making to the global economy while reducing the world's foreign oil consumption," added Mr. Baker. **The United States and Brazil continue to be the largest producers of ethanol with production continuing at a steady pace in 2012**. The report highlights that **Africa will see a 36 percent increase in ethanol production**, although the continent remains relatively low compared to the big producers of ethanol. **Europe is expected to see an 11 percent increase in ethanol production**.

Abolishing electoral college causes more voting rights restrictions

Derek T. Muller, 5-1-2012 [Pepperdine University - School of Law, "Invisible Federalism and the Electoral College," Arizona State Law Journal,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2049630] MJS 3-29-2017

What role do States have when the Electoral College disappears? With the enactment of the National Popular Vote on the horizon and an imminent presidential election in which a nationwide popular vote determines the winner, States would continue to do what they have done for hundreds of years — administer elections. The Constitution empowers States to decide who votes for president, and States choose who qualifies to vote based on factors like age or felon status. This power of States, a kind of "invisible federalism," is all but ignored in Electoral College reform efforts. In fact, the power of the States to distinguish between voters and non-voters precludes reform. Such barriers to reform are both theoretical and practical. Theoretical because the Constitution is committed to a government in which the president represents all citizens of the States, voters and non-voters alike — and the maxim "one person, one vote" reinforces the notion that the president represents voters and non-voters. And the United States is not a single constituency in which one ignores States borders, but a number of smaller constituencies administering elections and determining voter eligibility. Practical because **State decisions to enfranchise or disenfranchise a group of voters would no longer affect just that State, but would affect the national total — and States would have an incentive to manipulate voter eligibility laws to affect interstate vote totals. States would** lower the

voting age, **disenfranchise felons, or redefine mental illness in order to add or subtract votes from a national vote tally.** And any efforts to create a uniform federal standard for voting would stifle potential expansion of enfranchisement and inevitably disenfranchise some citizens who, today, have the right to vote. Presidential elections need States to continue to decide who votes, which precludes Electoral College reform.

[...]

States have widely divergent laws on whether felons are permitted to vote. Some permanently disenfranchise essentially all felons and exfelons,²²¹ while others disenfranchise only a subset of felons and ex-felons.²²² Some restore voting rights after completing parole and probation,²²³ some allow probationers to vote,²²⁴ and some allow all parolees and probationers to vote.²²⁵ Two states permit felons to vote without qualification.²²⁶ In total, about 5.85 million felons and ex-felons are disenfranchised.²²⁷

[...]

Of course, the razor-thin margin of the Florida election and its decisiveness in a narrow Electoral College victory for Mr. Bush make it a prime choice for post hoc close scrutiny and reexamination. But for present purposes, the significance of felon or ex-felon voting status should not be glossed over as a one-time element of a rare Electoral College event. Instead, it should serve as an example of how modest adjustments to felon voter laws can affect the outcome of an election. **Political candidates might benefit from the enfranchisement or disenfranchisement of felons or exfelons, and when such voting decisions can affect a national pool, it is very possible that states would engage in further gamesmanship.**

High turnout is because voters think they can be pivotal (less pivotality under the PV b/c larger absolute margins)

Gelman 2015 [Andrew Gelman is political science professor, "Modern campaigning has big effects on voter turnout", *Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/18/modern-campaigning-has-big-effects-on-voter-turnout/?utm_term=.f42cc6e79214>] //CJC

Drawing upon inside information from presidential campaigns and utilizing a geographic research design that exploits media markets spanning state boundaries, we estimate . . . that **the 2012 presidential campaigns increased turnout in highly targeted states by 7-8 percentage points, on average, indicating that modern campaigns can significantly alter the size and composition of the voting population.** Further evidence suggests that the predominant mechanism behind this effect is traditional ground campaigning, which has dramatically increased in scale in the last few presidential elections. This work was discussed earlier on the Monkey Cage (see here and here) in the context of comparisons of the Obama and Romney campaigns. But here I want to look at this all slightly differently, in the larger context of historical trends in voter turnout. Here are some numbers from Enos and Fowler: The Romney campaign placed 35.8 million phone calls, sent 3.4 million pieces of mail, and knocked on 2.8 million doors in the state of Ohio alone. The voting-eligible population of Ohio was approximately 8.6 million, so this means that the Romney campaign placed 4.2 phone calls, sent 0.4 pieces of mail, and knocked on 0.3 doors per person. These figures are similar for other heavily targeted states. . . . Qualitative reports suggest that the Obama campaign exerted similar mobilization efforts, focusing more on door knocks and less on phone calls. Therefore, we approximate that the average eligible voter in a heavily targeted state received 7-10 phone calls, 1-2 pieces of mail, and 1-2 door knocks from the presidential campaigns. Assuming that our estimated effects are driven solely by ground campaigning, we would conclude that a treatment including approximately 7-10 phone calls, 1-2 pieces of mail, and 1-2 door knocks increases turnout, on average, by 7-8 percentage points. . . . Another calculation yields a similar conclusion. We previously estimated that presidential campaigning mobilized 2.6 million voters who would not have turned out in the absence of campaigning. Our data from the Romney campaign indicates that they attempted 225 million voter contacts. If we assume that the Obama campaign attempted a similar number, then we could say that 550 million voter contacts produced approximately 2.6 million votes. Again, assuming that all of our estimated effects arise through voter contact, we would conclude that the average effect of a single voter contact on turnout was 0.6 percentage points. . . . Or, to put it another way: The average cost of generating a single vote is about 87 dollars. Higher turnout in battleground states Enos and Fowler form their estimates by comparing voter turnout in

battleground and non-battleground states. There is the possibility, though, that turnout would be higher in battleground states anyway, even without the intense efforts to contact voters. Enos and Fowler dismiss that alternative explanation: We [Enos and Fowler] have also discussed the possibility that residence in a battleground state influences turnout for reasons unrelated to campaigning. On one hand, **an individual's probability of casting a pivotal vote is higher in swing states, which could increase the direct returns to voting and make one more likely to turn out.**

No difference in probability of influencing election outcome

Gelman 2004 [Andrew Gelman is political science professor, "Empirically Evaluating the Electoral College", *Oxford University Press*, <<http://gking.harvard.edu/files/rethink.pdf>>] //CJC

Thus, a vote is pivotal both if it determines how the state's electoral votes are cast and if those electoral votes determine the winner in the Electoral College. Since states vary both in their sizes and in the likelihood of ties, voters in different states will, in general, have different voting power, and as a result the average voting power can be less than under plurality rule. In fact, this is the central critique raised by Banzhaf (1968). Again using the statistical model of presidential elections that we develop here, **we can examine the empirical probability that an average voter is pivotal under both popular vote and Electoral College systems.**

[...]

However, given these caveats, there does not seem to be strong evidence from Figure 5.4 to argue for moving from the Electoral College to a popular vote system. **The average voter is not likely to affect the outcome of the presidential election under any of the proposed methods.** Even in close elections, such as in 2000, a voter is more likely to win his or her state's lottery-or be struck by lightning-than to cast the deciding ballot. Further, there is not even that much difference in the voting power across the systems, even if the magnitudes were substantial.

Whites turnout more than other minorities

Pew Research Center 2016 [Pew Research Center is a polling group, "Voting Turnout Rates, by Race and Ethnicity, 2014", *Pew*, <http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/01/19/millennials-make-up-almost-half-of-latino-eligible-voters-in-2016/ph_election-2016_appen-chart-07/>] //CJC

Voting Turnout Rates, by Race and Ethnicity, 2014

TABLE C4

Voting Turnout Rates, by Race and Ethnicity, 2014

% of eligible voters who say they voted in each subgroup, by race and ethnicity

	All	Hispanic	White	Black	Asian
Total	41.9	27.0	45.8	40.6	26.9
Gender					
Male	40.8	25.2	45.2	36.4	26.0
Female	43.0	28.7	46.3	44.1	27.7
Age					
18 to 29	19.9	13.8	21.3	24.0	12.2
30 to 39	34.0	23.6	36.9	34.5	20.4
40 to 64	47.6	35.0	50.5	47.3	31.1
65 and older	59.4	45.5	61.8	56.8	39.2
Marital Status					
Married	50.5	34.1	54.1	49.7	30.9
Widowed/Divorced/Separated	41.7	29.6	43.1	46.7	28.6
Never Married	25.9	17.2	27.4	30.8	17.1
Citizenship Status					
U.S.-born citizen	42.7	24.2	46.1	40.7	22.4
Naturalized U.S. citizen	34.1	35.2	35.0	40.1	29.6
Educational Attainment					
Less than high school graduate	22.2	20.5	20.8	29.5	21.7
High school graduate	33.9	22.1	36.9	34.0	20.8
Two-year degree/Some college	41.7	28.0	44.9	42.2	23.2
Bachelor's degree or more	56.3	42.1	59.6	56.8	32.1
Annual Family Income					
Less than \$20,000	28.5	21.1	29.2	33.1	20.2
\$20,000-\$49,999	37.7	23.7	40.9	39.5	26.4
\$50,000-\$99,999	45.9	29.1	49.4	47.0	27.7
\$100,000 or more	51.3	38.9	54.8	49.2	28.5
Employment Status					
In labor force	41.2	26.3	44.9	41.1	26.6
Employed	41.8	27.0	45.4	42.3	26.6
Unemployed	29.9	17.1	34.1	30.5	28.2
Not in labor force	43.3	28.5	47.2	39.9	27.5

Higher turnout helps advantaged groups

Enos 2014 [Ryan Enos is a political scientist at Harvard, "Increasing Inequality: The Effect of GOTV Mobilization on the Composition of the Electorate", *Journal of Politics*, <<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1017/S0022381613001308>>] //CJC

Numerous get-out-the-vote (GOTV) interventions are successful in raising voter turnout. However, these increases may not be evenly distributed across the electorate and could potentially increase the differences between voters and nonvoters. By analyzing individual level-data, we reassess previous GOTV experiments to determine which interventions mobilize

under-represented citizens versus those who regularly turn out. We develop a generalized and exportable test which indicates whether a particular intervention reduces or exacerbates disparities in political participation and apply it to 24 previous experimental interventions. **On average, current mobilization strategies significantly widen disparities in participation by mobilizing high-propensity individuals more than the under-represented, low-propensity citizens.** The results hold troubling implications for the study and improvement of political inequality, but the methodological procedures laid out in this study may assist the development and testing of future strategies which reverse this pattern.

EC support is increasing

Gallup 12/2/16 [Gallup is a reputable polling agency, "Americans' Support for Electoral College Rises Sharply", *Gallup*, <<http://www.gallup.com/poll/198917/americans-support-electoral-college-rises-sharply.aspx>>] //CJC + PP

Americans' support for keeping the Electoral College system for electing presidents **has increased sharply.** Weeks after the 2016 election, **47% of Americans say they want to keep the Electoral College, while 49% say they want to amend the Constitution to allow for a popular vote for president. In the past, a clear majority favored amending the U.S. Constitution to replace the Electoral College with a popular vote system.**

From 1967 through 1980, Gallup asked a slightly different question that also found majority support for an amendment to base the winner on the popular vote. **Support for an amendment peaked at 80%** in 1968, after Richard Nixon almost lost the popular vote while winning the Electoral College. Ultimately, he wound up winning both by a narrow margin, but this issue demonstrated the possibility of a candidate becoming president without winning the popular vote. In the 1976 election, Jimmy Carter faced a similar situation, though he also won the popular vote and Electoral College. **In a poll taken weeks after the election, 73%** were in favor of an amendment doing away with the Electoral College.

This year, for the first time in the 49 years Gallup has asked about it, less than half of Americans want to replace the Electoral College with a popular vote system.

The reason for this shift in opinion is clear: In the aftermath of this year's election, the percentage of Republicans wanting to replace the Electoral College with the popular vote has fallen significantly.

The people that actually care about EC rn are republicans, who support it

Pew Research Center, 2015 [Pew is a nonpartisan think tank, November 23, 2015, "1. Trust in government: 1958-2015," <http://www.people-press.org/2015/11/23/1-trust-in-government-1958-2015/>] PP

Since the 1970s, **trust in government has been consistently higher among members of the party that controls the White House than among the opposition party. However,**

Republicans are much more reactive than Democrats to changes in political power.

Republicans express much higher levels of trust during Republican than during Democratic presidencies, while **Democrats' attitudes tend to be more consistent, regardless of which party controls the White House.**

Trust in government removes checks and balances and engenders ignorance

James Bovard, 3-1-2010 [James Bovard serves as policy adviser to The Future of Freedom Foundation. He has written for the *New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Washington Post*, *New Republic*, *Reader's Digest*, *Playboy*, *American Spectator*, *Investors Business Daily*, and many other publications. His book *Lost Rights* received the Mencken Award as Book of the Year from the Free Press Association. His *Terrorism and Tyranny* won Laissez Faire Book's Lysander Spooner award for the Best Book on Liberty in 2003, "The Folly of Blindly Trusting the Government," Future of Freedom Foundation, <http://www.fff.org/explore-freedom/article/foolly-blindly-trusting-government/>] MJS 3-28-2017

Democracy breeds gullibility. Lord Bryce observed in 1921, "State action became less distrusted the more the State itself was seen to be passing under popular control." The rise of democracy made it much easier for politicians to convince people that government posed no threat, because they automatically controlled its actions. The result is that the brakes on government power become weakest at the exact time that politicians are most dangerous. **Blind trust becomes a substitute for informed consent. But mass trust in government compounds the political damage brought about by pervasive ignorance.** The bias in favor of trusting government brings out democracy's worst tendencies. The normal defenses that people would have against alien authority are undermined by a chorus of politicians and government officials continually reminding people that government is themselves, and they cannot distrust the government without distrusting themselves.

[...]

The precedents established by one political party are routinely exploited for totally different ends by their opponents. During the 1990s, liberals were in the vanguard, preaching the need to trust government. **After 9/11, it was George W. Bush who exploited boundless trust to expand government power in ways that mortified many liberals. The Bush administration could exploit 9/11 because Americans were predisposed to see credulity and obedience as paramount virtues. The number of Americans who trusted the federal government to do the right thing more than doubled in the weeks after the attack.** By the end of September 2001, almost two-thirds of Americans said they "trust the government in Washington to do what is right" either "just about always" or "most of the time." **The foreign-policy response to 9/11 would have been far more targeted if scores of millions of Americans had not written George Bush a blank check in the form of automatic trust. The adulation and deference that he received in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 encouraged federal officials to believe that they could do practically whatever they pleased.** Top administration officials were laying plans to attack Iraq within days after the Twin Towers collapsed, though there was no evidence linking Iraq to the attacks. Less than two weeks after 9/11, **senior Bush administration officials were already claiming that the attacks gave the U.S. government carte blanche to attack anywhere in the world.** Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo sent White

House Counsel Alberto Gonzales a memo on September 25, 2001, suggesting that “an American attack in South America or Southeast Asia might be a surprise to the terrorists,” since they were expecting the United States to target Afghanistan. Blind trust in government is often portrayed as a harmless error — as if it were of no more account than saying prayers to a pagan deity. However, the notion that rulers are entitled to trust is the most expensive entitlement program of them all. **“Follow the leader” has often been a recipe for national suicide.** Throughout history, people have tended to trust most governments more than rulers deserved. **Blind trust in government has resulted in far more carnage than distrust of government. The more trust, the less resistance.** It was people who believed and who followed orders who carried out the Nazi Holocaust, the Ukrainian terror-famine, the Khmer Rouge blood bath, and the war crimes that characterize conflicts around the globe. It is not just a question of acquiescence but of breeding a docile attitude toward political events and government actions. **Docility is a far greater danger than blind fanaticism,** at least **in Western societies. It is mass docility that permits fanatics to seize power and wreak havoc. The more people there are who unconditionally trust the government, the more atrocities there are that the government can commit.** All that the government needs to do afterward is to label and blame the victim. **Excessive trust in government breeds attention deficits. People assume they do not need to keep an eye on government and politicians because government is no threat to them** — because their government tells them so. Ignorance combined with blind trust produces citizens pliable for practically any purpose the ruler decrees. **When people blindly assume that their leaders are trustworthy, the biggest liars win.** To believe their lies almost guarantees submission. To accept a false statement from one’s rulers is to submit to a lie — to intellectually submit. And submission is habit-forming. Politicians do not need to promulgate a duty to submit because as long as people believe, most will submit to almost anything. After people lower their mental defenses, political perfidy is halfway home. If people are trained not to doubt — politicians need only to continue lying and denying until all barricades that guard individual rights have been smashed, one by one.

Minorities are growing in rural areas

Johnson 2013 [Kenneth Johnson is sociology professor at the University of New Hampshire, “DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN NONMETROPOLITAN AMERICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR LAND USE DEVELOPMENT AND CONSERVATION”, *VERMONT JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW*, <<http://vjel.vermontlaw.edu/files/2013/11/Johnson.pdf>>] //CJC

The Growing Minority Population is Contributing to Rural Demographic Change. Any analysis of recent **demographic trends in rural America must also be cognizant of the growing impact that minority populations are having on rural population change.** Between 2000 and 2010, **minorities accounted for 83% of the nonmetropolitan population gain**, though they represented just 21% of the rural population. Overall, **the nonmetropolitan minority population grew by 1.8 million (21.3%) compared to a gain of just 382,000 (.95%) among the much larger non-Hispanic white population** (Figure 13). Thus, while nonmetropolitan America remains less diverse than urban America (which is 36% minority), minority growth now accounts for most rural population increase, just as it does in urban areas.

No marginal decrease

Ryan D. **Enos** and Anthony **Fowler**, 2015 [both authors are assistant professors in government, "Aggregate Effects of Large-Scale Campaigns on Voter Turnout," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, <http://www.campaignfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Enos-Fowler-2015-Campaign-Spending-And-Turnout.pdf>] MJS 3-25-2017

To what extent do political campaigns mobilize voters? Despite the central role of campaigns in American politics and despite many experiments on campaigning, we know little about the aggregate effects of an entire campaign on voter participation. Drawing upon inside information from presidential campaigns and utilizing a geographic research design that exploits media markets spanning state boundaries, we estimate the aggregate effects of a large-scale campaign. We estimate that the 2012 presidential campaigns increased turnout in highly targeted states by 7-8 percentage points, on average, indicating that modern campaigns can significantly alter the size and composition of the voting population. **Further evidence suggests that the predominant mechanism behind this effect is traditional ground campaigning, which has dramatically increased in scale in the last few presidential elections. Additionally, we find no evidence of diminishing marginal returns to ground campaigning,** meaning that voter contacts, each likely exhibiting small individual effects, may aggregate to large effects over the course of a campaign.

Trust in government removes checks and balances and engenders ignorance

James **Bovard**, 3-1-2010 [James Bovard serves as policy adviser to The Future of Freedom Foundation. He has written for the *New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Washington Post*, *New Republic*, *Reader's Digest*, *Playboy*, *American Spectator*, *Investors Business Daily*, and many other publications. His book *Lost Rights* received the Mencken Award as Book of the Year from the Free Press Association. His *Terrorism and Tyranny* won Laissez Faire Book's Lysander Spooner award for the Best Book on Liberty in 2003, "The Folly of Blindly Trusting the Government," Future of Freedom Foundation, <http://www.fff.org/explore-freedom/article/foolly-blindly-trusting-government/>] MJS 3-28-2017

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Reforms that make voting easier tend to be in battleground states

McDonald 2004 [Michael McDonald is an Assistant Professor of Government and Politics at George Mason University, "THE 2004 ELECTION RESULTS: HOW WILL THEY AFFECT POLITICS AND POLICYMAKING?" *Brookings*, 5 November 2004, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/20041105.pdf>] //ES

Now, a couple of other interesting things. We'll skip over Florida and Ohio. If you look at the mail-in ballot, which a lot of people--that's Oregon, that does their entire ballot by mail--the turnout rate there was 70.1 percent, which was an increase of 5.2 percentage points over the 2000 election. So mail-in balloting. It was also a battleground state that also has a very high turnout rate to start with versus the other the other battleground states. But you can see that it does seem to promote higher turnout rates. And then if you look at the election day registration, you see that turnout rate in those states, which were also battleground states as well, they also saw a higher turnout rate than other states. They were at an average of 72.5 percent. So **these sorts of reforms** are out there. They **are conflated with the battleground status of the states**. But perhaps **one of the structural ways to change turnout or increase turnout in the United States is through these sorts of reforms that provide greater access to the ballot for voters.**

Bills only in Virginia and Minnesota - both will be vetoed, failed attempts in 2011 and 2015

David **Weigel** Jan 2017 [, "Republicans in Minnesota, Virginia propose changes to their electoral college rules," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/01/25/republicans-in-minnesota-virginia-propose-changes-to-their-electoral-college-rules/?utm_term=.4b77e7f284d2] MJS 3-24-2017

Republicans in two swing states lost by President Trump in 2016 have introduced legislation that would have benefited Trump in the 2016 election, by splitting up their electoral votes by congressional districts instead of awarding them statewide.

In Minnesota, Speaker of the House Kurt Daudt has introduced a bill that would assign one electoral vote to each of the state's districts, and two to the winner of the statewide popular vote. In Virginia, Rep. Mark Cole (R-Fredericksburg) has introduced identical legislation, and passed it through the Elections Subcommittee on a party-line vote. If active in 2016, the bills would have handed a total of 11 electoral votes from Hillary Clinton to Trump, in states won by Clinton. Trump won six of Virginia's 11 districts, and five of Minnesota's eight districts. In Minnesota, that would have meant a 5-5 electoral vote tie for Trump despite a statewide loss; nationwide, it would have bumped his electoral vote total to 317.

[...]

Before 2016, similarly pessimistic Republicans in Rust Belt swing states proposed mirror-image electoral vote bills. In 2011 and 2015, after midterm victories in states won by Barack Obama, legislators in Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin argued that the will of the voter was being distorted by winner-take-all electoral voting. At the time, thanks to gerrymandered maps — Wisconsin's is even being challenged in court — a vote-by-district system would have allowed Mitt Romney to net the majority of electors from the states without winning their popular vote. But had those systems been in place last year, Trump, who turned the states red for the first time since the 1980s, would have lost five electors in Michigan, six in

Pennsylvania, and two in Wisconsin, dragging his overall electoral vote total down to 293. **Republicans have not introduced new electoral college reform bills in Michigan, Pennsylvania or Wisconsin this year so far. Minnesota and Virginia have Democratic governors, making those states' versions of the idea ripe for vetoes if they pass.**

New Hampshire can only swing one vote, Virginia's bill was pulled, Democrats veto in Minnesota

Stephen Wolf, 1-27-2017 [,"Voting Rights Roundup: Republicans around the country plot to gerrymander the Electoral College," Daily Kos, <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2017/1/27/1625678/-Voting-Rights-Roundup-Republicans-around-the-country-plot-to-gerrymander-the-Electoral-College>] MJS 3-24-2017

However, the news isn't all bad—at least, not yet. **New Hampshire Republicans** could pass their proposed bill since they completely control the state government, but it **would only swing one electoral vote there, and fortunately, this legislation has yet to gain traction in the Granite State. And in Virginia,** a state House subcommittee approved a measure before **its chief proponent abandoned his bill this week amid public backlash**. But more worrisome is Minnesota, where the Republican state House speaker just threw his backing behind such a scheme. **For the moment, Minnesota and Virginia currently have Democratic governors who could veto such bills**, but that could change. Minnesota faces a critical open-seat gubernatorial election in 2018, while Virginia has one this year. If Republicans were to gain the governors' offices and hold the legislatures there, they could easily pass these Electoral College gerrymandering schemes in two key swing states. And even if they don't, they could still prevail: The Republican-controlled legislatures in both states could still put these changes up to a popular vote with just a simple majority vote. Democrats everywhere need be on guard.

AT: Third Party Candidates → Increased Turnout

Stein 2002 [Political Science Professor Robert M. Stein, *Rice University*, Political Science Professor Paul Johnson, *University of Kansas*, American Government and Elections Professor Daron Shaw, *University of Texas*, Political Science Professor Robert Weissberg, *University of Illinois*, "Citizen Participation and Electoral College Reform," *Choosing a President: The Electoral College and Beyond (Book)*, Edited by Paul D. Schumaker, 2002] /WGC

"Although we cannot test empirically the speculation that changing the method of electing the president will increase the number of contesting presidential candidates, we can assess the empirical relationship between the number of contesting presidential candidates and voter turnout. Specifically, **we can test the proposition that voter interest and participation in presidential elections will increase with more presidential candidates. To test this proposition we report** in figure 9.2 **the relationship between voter turnout** (i.e., the percentage of eligible voters who cast a ballot) **in each presidential election between 1872 and 1992 and the percentage of total presidential votes cast for third-party candidates**. If candidates from outside the Democratic and Republican parties attract new voters, we would expect total voter turnout to be higher in those presidential elections in which third-party candidates gained a greater share of total votes cast. Such a finding would mean that third-party candidates were attracting new voters to the polls rather than siphoning voters from the two major parties.

Figure 9.2 fails to demonstrate that a significant relationship exists between voter turnout and the presence of third-party candidates on the presidential ballot between 1872 and 1992.³¹ There is virtually no relationship between the percentage of votes cast for third-party candidates and the percentage of eligible voters balloting over the period studied. **If there is any discernible relationship it appears that turnout actually declines, albeit insignificantly, with a higher percentage of votes cast for third-party candidates.**

No difference between voters and non voters

Stein 2002 [Political Science Professor Robert M. Stein, *Rice University*, Political Science Professor Paul Johnson, *University of Kansas*, American Government and Elections Professor Daron Shaw, *University of Texas*, Political Science Professor Robert Weissberg, *University of Illinois*, "Citizen Participation and Electoral College Reform," *Choosing a President: The Electoral College and Beyond (Book)*, Edited by Paul D. Schumaker, 2002] //WGC

"The Case for Full Voter Participation

Normative democratic theorists have argued that, in a society with diverse preferences and interests, maximization of participation is both desirable and necessary for the maintenance of democratic institutions.³³ First, failure to achieve maximum participation leaves many preferences unrevealed and potentially unmet. Under majority rule it is expected that the median voter's position will be adopted. Failure of some to participate may skew the outcome of elections and government policies away from the median citizen's preference. **The consequences are less public support and compliance with government policies.** Chronic levels of nonparticipation erode support for the political system and its institutions **penultimate to serious challenges to the legitimacy of political institutions. Policies under a political system with nonparticipation from a majority of the electorate are likely to be inefficient and ineffectual.**

Several empirical conditions should be observable among the eligible electorate if these normative prescriptions and empirical **predictions about citizen participation are true.** We should observe **significantly higher levels of dissatisfaction, distrust, and alienation with government among nonvoters.** Furthermore, **policy preferences should be significantly at variance between those who participate and those who do not.** Moreover, there should be **a significant and positive correlation between the policy preferences of participants and the actions of government.** Conversely there should be **a weak or insignificant relationship between the policy preferences of nonparticipants and government policies.**

Comparing Voters and Nonvoters

There is little evidence in the literature **to support any of these hypotheses.** It appears that **there are no significant differences between voters and nonvoters on** several affective dimensions, including **trust in government, perceived responsiveness of government, and satisfaction with the actions and policies of government.**³⁴ Moreover, **the policy preferences of voters and nonvoters on a wide range of issues were virtually identical.**³⁵ **Also suggestive of the point that maximum voter turnout really doesn't matter is** the finding that **the outcomes of the 1980, 1984, and 1988 presidential elections would have been the same even if non voters had balloted.**³⁶ What makes these findings even more perplexing is that "the core group of people that participate in election after

election, time after time is remarkably small.”³⁷ Citizen participation in general and in voting specifically is episodic with different people voting in different elections.³⁸

In short, the very conditions necessary to justify maximum electoral participation for the maintenance of democratic institutions appear not to be operative. What explains this apparent disconnect between theory and reality? What do these findings suggest about the importance of citizen participation for the healthy operation of democratic political institutions? Moreover, how can so few voters (i.e., less than half the electorate) produce an electoral outcome identical to what would have occurred if all voters balloted?

An important study of nonvoters offers some answers to these questions.³⁹ **First, it rejects the stereotypic image of the nonvoter as “a decidedly downcast lot...insufficiently motivated to participate in politics.”**⁴⁰ Though some portion of the non voting electorate (approximately 18 percent) fits this image, **the overwhelming majority of nonvoters are engaged in and knowledgeable about politics, candidates, and the actions of government. Their choice not to vote is voluntary and conscious,** and not solely determined by limited resources and contextual obstacles to voting (e.g., restrictive registration laws for mobile voters). **Nonvoters** are often thought of as people who never enter the political arena, but they **are better understood as individuals who enter and exit the electorate with greater regularity (and reason) than core or habitual voters.** For such citizens the irregularity of voting is partially a function of candidate and party mobilization of voters, but we think another explanation may also be operative. This explanation centers on the marginal or intermittent voter. **For such voters, nonvoting is itself a form of political behavior.”**

AT: Turnout Impact—Turns Edition!

Stein 2002 [Political Science Professor Robert M. Stein, *Rice University*, Political Science Professor Paul Johnson, *University of Kansas*, American Government and Elections Professor Daron Shaw, *University of Texas*, Political Science Professor Robert Weissberg, *University of Illinois*, “Citizen Participation and Electoral College Reform,” *Choosing a President: The Electoral College and Beyond (Book)*, Edited by Paul D. Schumaker, 2002] /WGC

“Modest voter turnout in any election is not a problem for representative democracy. Voter participation is expected to be informed and rational; that is, voters possess the information necessary to match their preferences and needs with the available candidates and/or electoral choices that maximize their utility. **The decisions of these marginal voters are not at variance with the preferences of nonvoters.** In fact, the latter obtain a free ride from voters, who produce outcomes that are similar to what nonvoters would have produced had they voted.

Thus far, our discussion has focused on the consequences and meaning of low voter turnout. Another perspective on this question asks whether there are unintended and unexpected consequences of maximum voter turnout?⁴⁵ **Higher turnout brings to the ballot box peripheral voters, who are unlikely to have voted without significant help from the candidates and parties and who are “just as fickle inside the voting booth as they are about getting to it.”**⁴⁶ **The fickleness of peripheral voters leads them to defect from their weakly held preferences** (i.e., party identification) **at rates much greater than core voters. Peripheral voters are not sufficiently interested in the outcome of any election to invest in maximizing their preferences** (however weakly held) through candidate

selection. We expect **peripheral voters will ballot in the direction of the loudest and most recent campaign message.**⁴⁷ Moreover, **peripheral voters' weakly held preferences and insincere voting choices actually distort the outcome of elections for core and other non peripheral voters. Though the preferences of peripheral voters are not** expected to be **at variance with the core voters, it is their mobilization into the electorate that produces defections** from these weakly held preferences, **thus distorting electoral outcomes for those with sincere and informed preferences.** Under these conditions **maximization of voter turnout is both unnecessary and potentially harmful to democratic representation. Mobilized peripheral voters are making choices they would not otherwise have made had they voted sincerely."**

VOTERS DON'T DO THE ARITHMETIC AND FOLLOW SECOND CHANCE PSYCHOLOGY MEANING THEY'LL VOTE FOR THIRD PARTY

Best 1996 [Judith Best, Distinguished Teacher of Political Science at SUNY Cortland, *The choice of the people?: debating the electoral college*. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield

<https://books.google.com/books?id=XJmZl4RTBkC&pg=PR17&lpg=PR17&dq=anti-abortion+parties.+Black+Power+parties.+anti-busing+parties.+anti-gun+control+parties&source=bl&ots=UxFTD30IMq&sig=ZLvy9xURxkzC19RQvnQBb3oLVZIs&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiHzOmT-OvSAhWihFQKHs8BNMQ6AEIGIAA#v=onepage&q=anti-abortion%20parties%2C%20Black%20Power%20parties%2C%20anti-busing%20parties%2C%20anti-gun%20control%20parties&f=false>] //WGC

"The sad thing here is that their sacrifice is for naught. Even with their 40 percent plurality victory requirement, runoffs will be the rule and not the exception. This is because politics is not arithmetic, and a second-chance psychology will infect both candidates and voters. It is the very existence of a popular vote runoff, a second chance provision, that tempts more candidates to enter and voters to cast what they would otherwise consider to be a protest vote—a "send them a message" vote. The Perot candidacy, in 1992, created a panic that no candidate would win a majority of the electoral vote even though the current system has never triggered a contingency election because it magnifies the plurality winner's margin of victory in the electoral votes.

If the 40 percent runoff rule in an all-national election had been the law in 1992, a runoff would have been very likely. Perot would not have withdrawn temporarily because he could win something by triggering a popular vote runoff even if he himself wasn't in the runoff. He could offer his support to one of the two runoff candidates in return for a 50 cent increase in the gasoline tax to pay off the deficit, or for a protectionist trade treaty, or for a cabinet position. Now with Perot in, put yourself in the shoes of other potential candidates and consider what you would do if the law allowed a popular vote runoff. Jerry Brown fought for the Democratic nomination all the way to the national convention, and Pat Buchanan was just as adamant on the Republican side. **Without the federal principle and the magnifier effect of the state unit rule, every additional candidacy would put a 40 percent plurality in doubt.** Even without Brown and Buchanan, Clinton won just 43 percent of the popular vote. Brown and Buchanan are likely, and why not Jack Kemp and Mario Cuomo, and Jesse Jackson? **They could be followed by the feminist candidate, the Hispanic candidate, the moral majority candidate, the environmental candidate, the gay rights candidate, the military candidate. The general election could be turned into a multi-issue public policy opinion poll."**

Precedent Proves—Closest Aff Constitutional Amendment to Passing included Recount Provision

Crezo 2016 [Adrienne Crezo, "The First (And Last) Serious Challenge to the Electoral College System" *Mentalfloss.Com*, December 06, 2016. Accessed March 21 2017.

<http://mentalfloss.com/article/13012/first-and-last-serious-challenge-electoral-college-system.>] //WGC

“No election cycle would be complete without a debate over whether or not the Electoral College should be abolished. But **have we ever come close to actually replacing the system that everyone loves to hate? Almost, once.**

It all started when Nixon was elected. The 1968 presidential election season was messy and contentious. The Vietnam War, widespread race riots, the assassination of Robert Kennedy, and lame duck LBJ's dissolving popularity created a perfect political storm for a third-party candidate. In 1968, that candidate was former Alabama Governor George Wallace, who ran on the American Independent Party ticket against Republican Richard Nixon and Democrat Hubert Humphrey. Wallace's pro-segregation platform was popular in the South, and when the ballots were counted, he'd snagged 46 of the available 538 electoral votes. Though Nixon garnered 301 electoral votes and Humphrey went home with 191, the two were separated by less than 1 percent of the national total—just 510,314 votes. The disparity between the popular and electoral votes, as well as Wallace's success, led **New York State**

Representative Emanuel Celler to introduce House Joint Resolution 681, a proposed Amendment to abolish the Electoral College and replace it with a system that required a president-vice president pair of candidates to win 40 percent or more of the national vote. In the event of a tie, or **if no pair reached 40 percent, a runoff election would be held between the two tickets with the highest number of votes.** Proponents argued that this system was friendlier to third parties (while not being *too* friendly to third parties, as 50 percent was deemed to be), less complicated, and **would never result in contingent elections by the Senate and House for President and Vice President (which is a possibility with the Electoral College).** **The Amendment was passed easily by the House Judiciary Committee** in April 1969. **By September** of the same year, **Celler's Amendment passed with strong bipartisan support in the House of Representatives.** President Nixon endorsed the proposal and urged the Senate to **pass its version**, now called the Bayh-Celler Amendment after it was sponsored by Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana. **A Senate Judiciary Committee approved the proposal with a vote of 11-6 in August 1970.**

But things looked grim for the Bayh-Celler Amendment as the proposal prepared to move to the Senate floor. The measure was expected to fall short of the 67 votes needed to pass, so Bayh called Nixon for backup. While he never withdrew his support, the President didn't call for any more favors regarding the Amendment. On September 17, 1970, the Bayh-Celler Amendment was met with a hearty filibuster from both parties, mostly from Southern states. Senators from Mississippi, Arkansas, North Carolina, Nebraska, Hawaii, and South Carolina argued that they would lose influence in the national election, and even though the Electoral College is complicated and has some potentially messy loopholes, it had served the country well and there was no real reason to change it. But most explicit in his reasoning was Carl Curtis of Nebraska, **who said**, “My state of Nebraska has 92/100ths of 1 percent of the electoral vote. Based on the last election, we had 73/100ths of the popular vote. I am not authorized to reduce the voting power of my state by 20 percent.”

It was the beginning of the end for the best attempt in history to abolish the Electoral College. Eventually, the Senate voted to lay the Amendment aside to attend to other business. It officially died with the close of the 91st Congress on January 3, 1971.”

Runoff only at 40% means no incentive to vote for 3rd parties

Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, Edward H. Lazarus, 1984 [Rosenstone is a political science professor, "Third Parties in America" Princeton University Press, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Political_Reform/Third_Parties_America.html] MJS 3-22-2017

Contrary to popular belief, **most current proposals for eliminating the Electoral College would not benefit third parties.** The most widely supported plan calls for the direct popular election of the president with a runoff if no candidate receives 40 percent of the votes cast. But as long as a president can be elected with less than an absolute majority of the popular vote, the plan would, for all practical purposes, work like a single-member-district plurality system. **To prevent either the Democrats or Republicans from collecting 40 percent of the vote, minor parties would obviously have to poll at least 20 percent. This**

has happened only three times since 1840. Any direct vote system that allows a party to win with less than a full majority of the popular vote would hinder third parties, though the larger the plurality required to elect a president, the lower the barrier becomes.

Stronger Electoral Competition Leads to Tightening of Ballot Access Rules

Drometer 2013 [Marcus, "Electoral Competition and Endogenous Barriers to Entry," *Ifo Institute*. Accessed at: http://www.wirtschaftspolitik.rw.uni-erlangen.de/research/Drometer_Rincke_manuscript_elsevier.pdf.] //DNP

Regulations that restrict the access of potential candidates to the ballot exist in many countries. To reduce the impact of confounding factors typically present in cross-country studies, we concentrate on ballot access laws in the United States. Ballot access laws define the requirements minor party and independent candidates need to fulfill in order to participate in general elections and are particularly promising for empirical research for a number of reasons. First, in contrast to the prediction of Duverger (1972), third party and independent candidates are a widespread phenomenon of the political system of the United States. During the period considered in our study (1946-1976), 46% of the gubernatorial races saw three or more candidates. Although rarely elected into office, these candidates can be highly influential, as has become evident by the prominent examples of Ralph Nader in the 2000 and Ross Perot in the 1992 presidential elections.³ Second, because **ballot access restrictions have a strong deterrent effect on non-major party candidates,**⁴ **imposing such rules presents the (major) parties with the opportunity to limit the degree of electoral competition.** The **re-design of these regulations** should therefore be **attractive from the point of view of current political elites.**⁵ Third, ballot access rules are set by the states and vary considerably across states and over time, giving us the opportunity to investigate the determinants of institutional change in a broad panel of socially and economically relatively homogenous jurisdictions.⁶ Finally, the stringency of ballot access laws is easily measurable since the states' election laws commonly require that minor parties and independent candidates file a petition signed by a certain number of eligible voters.

[...]

We have tested the hypothesis that adjustments of the procedures under which nonmajor party candidates in the U.S. gain access to state ballots are driven by changes in electoral competition. Using instrumental variables rooted in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to overcome the identification problem originating from the simultaneity of ballot access requirements and candidates' entry decisions, we estimated that between 1946 and 1976 an additional candidate on the gubernatorial ballot **triggered an increase in petition requirements of about 4,750 to 9,700 signatures.** These results suggest that the barriers to entry for non-major party candidates in gubernatorial elections are endogenously determined: **if competition by such candidates increases, the political system dominated by the major parties tends to respond by setting higher barriers to entry.** This finding is consistent with the view that the **major parties** (or state governments and legislatures dominated by them) **use ballot access provisions to protect their current position in a quasi-duopolistic system of political parties.**

Higher Restrictions Prevent Political Competition and Party Fragmentation

Stratmann 2003 [Thomas, "Ballot Access Restrictions and Candidate Entry in Elections," *University of Chicago*. Accessed at: <http://aceproject.org/ero-en/topics/parties-and-candidates/ballotaccess.pdf>.] //DNP

The mere existence of a filing fee significantly lowers the number of major party candidates by approximately two percent. Filing fees that are greater than \$100 further lower the number of major party candidates by another three percent. Having a filing fee that is based on the expected legislator salary reduces the number of candidates by three percent, and this finding is statistically significant. Using the dollar filing fee measure, the results show that a \$1,000 increase in the filing fee leads to a four percent decrease in the number of major party candidates. **Higher signature requirements also lead to a decrease in the number of major party candidates and this coefficient is statistically significant at the seven percent level.**

Table 2 column combines the monetary ballot access restriction indicators with the signature requirements and the previous results are strengthened. A fee over \$100 now reduces the number of candidates by seven percent. The regression in the last column includes the fee variable, measured in dollars, along with the signature requirement variable. In this specification, a \$1,000 increase in the fee reduces the number of candidates by over five percent.

Table 3 examines the effect of minor party ballot access restrictions on minor party candidates. Signature requirements have no statistically significant effect on a minor party candidate's decision to enter the race. However, fees reduce the number of minor party candidates. Table 3, column 1 and column 2 differ in that column 2 allows for a non-linear effect of filing fees. Evaluated at the sample mean, a \$1,000 increase in filing fees reduce the number of minor party candidates by forty-three percent. Thus, the entry decision of minor party candidates is much more sensitive to monetary barriers to entry than major party candidates.

[...]

Signature requirements also reduce candidate entry, but this effects is concentrated among major party candidates. The findings imply that a \$1,000 increase in the filing fee leads to a five percent decrease in major party candidates and a forty-three percent decrease in minor party candidates. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that incumbents set high barriers to entry in order to insulate them from competition.

Your EV is all focused on population compared to electoral votes which doesn't account for low turnout in large states which gives large state voters overall way more power

Griffin 2012 [KATHRYN GRIFFIN has a BA, ABJ, and masters from University of Georgia, "REASSESSING ADVANTAGES IN THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE: FRAMERS' INTENTIONS AND MINORITY INFLUENCE", *University of Georgia*, <https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/griffin_kathryn_g_201205_ma.pdf>] GST

In order to best utilize the data and analyze the impact of diversity on voting rates, **I use OLS regression with clustered standard errors.** I clustered the standard errors by state in order to Table 3. Socioeconomic Correlation Matrix Correlation Income High School Bachelors Income 1.000 High School 0.793 1.000 Bachelors 0.838 0.843 1.000 38 deal with issues of having aggregated the data at the state level. **The clustered errors eliminate heteroskedasticity** that may occur due to the variation in standard errors across different states. The results of the regression can be seen in Table 4. The results clearly show both higher levels of black residents and high level of foreignborn residents decrease state voting rates confirming hypothesis one. On average, holding all else constant, **a one unit increase in the black percentage of a state results in a -.1844 decrease in voting rates,** while an increase in foreign-born percentage displays a greater decrease in voting rates of -.5478. Though these are not overly large

changes, because the data is averaged decreasing the overall range of the dependent variable, these changes are still significant. Substantively, **the results provide evidence that higher levels of minority populations, both black and foreign-born, result in lower voting rates.**

[...]

Foreign-born residents, which consist largely of Hispanic and Asian ethnic groups, must not only overcome class disparities, but also language and culture barriers²⁰ before voting equal to whites, which explains why this demographic has a larger negative effect on voting rates. Foreign-born minorities are increasing in more populous states. Currently California, Texas, New York, and Florida are the four largest states in the country totaling 147 Electoral College votes. In addition, these four states have some of the highest percentages of foreign-born residents-- 26.8%, 16%, 21.7%, and 18.5%--respectively. **These states demonstrate lower levels of voting (with the mean voting rates never reaching above 75% in the eleven elections discussed). Increasing minority populations, particularly foreign-born, are adding to the population of these larger states thereby increasing their total Electoral College votes. However, at the same time, the overall voting rates of these states are decreasing.** In other words, **the results demonstrate that the growing minority populations are currently increasing voting biases of large states, with voters in these states having a disproportionate impact on the Electoral College vote.**

Two-Party System Breakdown, Multiple Candidates Empirically Denied. Plurality Voting strengthens two-party system.

Koza 2013 [John Koza is PhD in computer science and Stanford professor of computer science, electrical engineering, and medicine, "Every Vote Equal: A State-Based Plan for Electing the President by National Popular Vote", *NPV Press*, <<http://www.every-vote-equal.com/sites/default/files/everyvoteequal-4th-ed-2013-02-21.pdf>>] //DNP

If an Electoral College type of arrangement were essential for avoiding a proliferation of candidates and preventing candidates from winning office with as little as 15% of the vote, we should see evidence of these conjectured problems in elections that do not employ such an arrangement (such as elections for Governor). **Historical experience in over 5,000 elections** for state chief executive **shows no evidence of the conjectured proliferation of candidates or the conjectured 15% winners in elections in which the winner is the candidate who receives the most popular votes.** Duverger's law (which is based on worldwide studies of elections) asserts that plurality-vote elections do not result in a proliferation of candidates or candidates being elected with tiny percentages of the vote. Tara Ross, an opponent of the National Popular Vote plan, predicts that a national popular vote would lead to a proliferation of candidates and a fracturing of the electorate, and that Presidents would be elected with only 15% of the vote: "[The National Popular Vote plan] is not even looking for a minimum plurality. Thus, a candidate could win with only 15 percent of votes nationwide."²⁴⁰ We do not have to speculate as to whether Ross' prediction is likely to materialize because we can refer to the nation's actual experience in the numerous elections that have been conducted in which the winner was the candidate who received the most popular votes. If an Electoral College type of arrangement were essential for avoiding Ross' conjectured outcome, **we should see evidence of this outcome in elections that did not employ an Electoral College.** When elections are conducted in which the winner is the candidate who receives the most popular votes, candidates do not, in actual practice, win the office with low percentages of the vote (and certainly not percentages such as 15%). In the 975 general elections for Governor in the United States between 1948 and 2011:²⁴¹ **90% of the winning candidates received more than 50% of the vote, 98% of the winning candidates received more than 45% of the vote, 99% of the winning candidates received more than 40% of the vote, and 100% of the winning candidates received more than 35% of the vote.** There were **only 25 general elections (out of 975) for Governor between 1948 and 2011 in which the winning candidate received less than 45%** of the popular vote, as shown in table 9.11.

Over half of the elections in table 9.11 (13 of 25) were in small states (Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont). **Elections for U.S. Senate, other statewide offices,**

Congress, state legislature, and other of ces confirm this pattern. In the real world, there are never any 15% winners in general elections in which the winner is the candidate with the most votes. There is no proliferation of candidates. There is no fracturing of the electorate. Moreover, elections in other countries around the world show a similar pattern. Duverger's law asserts that a plurality-rule election system tends to favor a two-party system. Maurice Duverger, the French sociologist who observed this tendency in election systems around the world, suggests that **plurality voting favors a two-party system because political groups with broadly similar platforms tend to form alliances because it increases their chances of winning office.** Voters generally desert weak parties or candidates on the grounds that they have no chance of winning. In practice, ordinary **plurality voting discourages the formation of niche parties and candidacies by rewarding the formation of broad coalitions** in which various groups and interests join together in order to win the most votes (and thereby win of ce). The reason that ordinary plurality voting has this effect is that a vote cast for a splinter candidate frequently produces the politically counter-productive effect of helping the major-party candidate whose views are diametrically opposite of those of the voter. For example, votes cast for Bob Barr (the Libertarian Party candidate for President in 2008) enabled Barack Obama to win the electoral votes of North Carolina, and votes cast for Ralph Nader (the Green Party candidate) in 2000 enabled George W. Bush to win the electoral votes of Florida and New Hampshire.²⁴³ Ross' criticism of the National Popular Vote plan concerning third-party candidates is an example of a criticism that actually applies more to the current state-by-state winner-take-all system than the National Popular Vote plan. Under the current system of electing the President, **minor-party candidates have significantly affected the outcome in 38%** (six out of 17) **of the presidential elections since World War II.** Specifically, minor-party candidates affected the outcome by either shifting states from one candidate to another or winning electoral votes outright in the 1948, 1968, 1980, 1992, 1996, and 2000 presidential elections. Segregationists such as Strom Thurmond and George Wallace each won electoral votes in various Southern states. Thurmond won 39 electoral votes in 1948, and George Wallace won 46 electoral votes in 1968. Candidates such as John Anderson (1980), Ross Perot (1992 and 1996), and Ralph Nader (2000) each managed to affect the national outcome by switching electoral votes in numerous states. None of these third-party candidates had any reasonable expectation of winning the most popular votes nationwide. The reason that **the current system has encouraged so many minor-party candidacies is that a third-party candidate has 51 separate opportunities to find particular states that he might win outright or where he might be able to shift electoral votes** from one major party to another. Tara Ross writes: "The most likely consequence of a change to a direct popular vote is the breakdown of the two-party system."²⁴⁴ Ross' prediction can be tested against actual historical facts. In 1787, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island conducted popular elections for the office of Governor.²⁴⁵ Today, 100% of the states conduct a direct popular vote for Governor. Yet, **after over 5,000 direct popular elections for Governor since 1789, the two-party system has yet to collapse.** The two-party system in the United States (which dominates the electoral landscape for the vast majority of elective offices in the country) is not sustained by the existence of the state-by-state winner-take-all rule for filling the single office of the Presidency. About three-quarters of the elections for Governor occur in non-presidential years—that is, they stand entirely apart from the presidential election cycle. Returning to the history of presidential elections, only three states had winner-take-all statutes in the nation's first presidential election in 1789. Only three states used the winner-take-all rule in 1792 and 1796. Given that political parties first emerged in the 1796 presidential election, it can hardly be argued that the existence of the state-by-state winner-take-all rule in just three states was the force that created the two-party system in the United States. Instead, the two-party system is the consequence of the plurality voting system in which the candidate who receives the most popular votes wins the office. There is no reason to expect the emergence of some unique, new political dynamic that would promote multiple candidacies if the President were elected in the same manner as virtually every other elected official in the United States. What can be said about third-party candidacies in presidential elections is that the current system often perversely discriminates against third-party candidates who have a broad national base of support, while encouraging regional third-party candidates. In 1948, Henry Wallace (a leftist candidate for President) and Strom Thurmond (a pro-segregation candidate for President) each received 1.2 million popular votes. However, Strom Thurmond (whose support was concentrated in the South) won 39 electoral votes in 1948, whereas Henry Wallace (whose support was distributed more evenly throughout the country) received no electoral votes. Ross Perot's percentage of the national popular vote in 1992 was twice the percentage received in 1968 by George Wallace (a pro-segregation candidate). However, Perot won no electoral votes in 1992, whereas George Wallace won 46 electoral votes in 1968. Although Ross Perot received eight times Strom Thurmond's percentage of the popular vote in 1948, Perot won no electoral votes in 1992, while Thurmond won 39 electoral votes.²⁴⁶ The current state-by-state winner-take-all system certainly does not prevent the proliferation of candidates; however, it does perversely reward regional third-party candidacies while punishing broad-based third-party candidates. Some argue that third parties are inherently undesirable and that the election system should be skewed so as to strengthen and favor the two-party system. Even if one subscribes to this viewpoint, it is difficult to see what public purpose is served by the current system's perverse discrimination in favor of regionally divisive third parties and against broad-based third parties with nationwide support.

Swing State Voters Aren't Enthusiastic

Gallup 12 [Gallup Poll, "Swing-State Voters' Enthusiasm Matches Voters' Nationally", *Gallup*, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/155573/swing-state-voters-enthusiasm-matches-voters-nationally.aspx>] //BS

Voters in this year's key election battleground states are similar to registered voters nationally in the enthusiasm they express about voting in the 2012 presidential election. **Just under half of swing-state voters, 46%, as well as 43% of national voters, report feeling extremely or very enthusiastic about voting.**

The new results are from the USA Today/Gallup Swing States poll, conducted June 22-29 as part of Gallup Daily tracking with 1,200 registered voters in 12 states where the presidential race is expected to be closely contested: **Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin.**

Direct democracies violently collapse because of tyranny of the majority—electoral college solves

Ross 2004 [Tara Ross is a lawyer in Texas and fellow at the Heritage Foundation, "The Electoral College: Enlightened Democracy", *Heritage Foundation*, <<http://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/report/the-electoral-college-enlightened-democracy>>] //CJC

Contrary to modern perceptions, **the founding generation did not intend to create a direct democracy.** To the contrary, the Founders deliberately created a republic -- or, arguably, a republican democracy -- that would incorporate a spirit of compromise and deliberation into decision-making. **Such a form of government,** the Founders believed, would allow them to achieve two potentially conflicting objectives: **avoiding the "tyranny of the majority" inherent in pure democratic systems,** while allowing the "sense of the people" to be reflected in the new American government.²⁷ Moreover, a republican government, organized on federalist principles, would allow the delegates to achieve the most difficult of their tasks: enabling large and small sovereign states to live peacefully alongside each other. **The authors of the Constitution had studied the history of many failed democratic systems, and they strove to create a different form of government.** Indeed, James Madison, delegate from Virginia, argued that **unfettered majorities such as those found in pure democracies tend toward tyranny.** Madison stated it this way: **[In a pure democracy], [a] common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert results from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual.** Hence it is that **such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.**²⁸ Alexander Hamilton agreed that **"[t]he ancient democracies, in which the people themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of good government. Their very character was tyranny;** their figure, deformity."²⁹ Other early Americans concurred. John Adams, who signed the Declaration of Independence and later became President, declared, **"[D]emocracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts, and murders itself. There never was a democracy yet that did not commit suicide."**³⁰ Another signatory to the Declaration of Independence, Benjamin Rush, stated, **"A simple democracy . . . is one of the greatest of evils."**³¹ Despite these strong statements against democracy, the Founders were also strong advocates for self-government, and they often spoke of the need to allow the will of the people to operate in the new government that they were crafting. "Notwithstanding the oppressions & injustice experienced among us from democracy," Virginia delegate George Mason declared, "the genius of the people must be consulted."³² James Madison agreed, speaking of the "honorable determination which animates every votary of freedom to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government."³³ The delegates, then, faced a dilemma. Their fierce opposition to simple democracy ran headlong into their determination to allow the people to govern themselves -- and they knew that voters in small states would need to be free to govern themselves, just as would citizens in large states. The Founders reconciled these seemingly conflicting needs by creating a republican government, organized on federalist principles, in which minorities would be given many opportunities to make themselves heard. **The Electoral College was considered to fit perfectly within this republican, federalist government that had been created. The system would allow majorities to rule.**

but only while they were reasonable, broad-based, and not tyrannical. The election process was seen as a clever solution to the seemingly unsolvable problem facing the Convention -- finding **a fair method of selecting the Executive for a nation composed of both large and small states that have ceded some, but not all, of their sovereignty to a central government.** "[T]he genius of the present **[Electoral College] system,**" a 1970 Senate report concluded, "**is the genius of a popular democracy organized on the federal principle.**"

No run-offs under popular vote

Koza 2013 [John Koza is PhD in computer science and Stanford professor of computer science, electrical engineering, and medicine, "Every Vote Equal: A State-Based Plan for Electing the President by National Popular Vote", *NPV Press*, <<http://www.every-vote-equal.com/sites/default/files/everyvoteequal-4th-ed-2013-02-21.pdf>>] AKC

Tara Ross complains that the National Popular Vote plan does not require an absolute majority of the national popular vote to win.²³⁶ **Ross' criticism applies equally to the current system.** There is no provision in current law for a run-off when no presidential candidate receives an absolute majority of the national popular vote. Moreover, there is **no provision in any state today for a run-off when no presidential candidate receives an absolute majority of the state's popular vote.** In fact, it is common, under existing state laws, for a presidential candidate to win all of a state's electoral votes without receiving an absolute majority of the state's popular vote. **For example, in 2008, no candidate received an absolute majority of the popular vote in four states.** Tara Ross says: "States that have agreed to participate in NPV can't force the other states to take any particular action—including a runoff or other secondary election procedure."²³⁷ **After the 1992 election in which no candidate received an absolute majority of the popular vote in 49 states, we cannot recall any demand from legislators, the public, the media, or anyone else for a run-off presidential election.** The National Popular Vote compact operates in a manner consistent with the widely held view in the United States that the winner of an election should be the candidate who receives the most popular votes (that is, a plurality).

No multi-party candidates → gubernatorial races prove

Koza 2013 [John Koza is PhD in computer science and Stanford professor of computer science, electrical engineering, and medicine, "Every Vote Equal: A State-Based Plan for Electing the President by National Popular Vote", *NPV Press*, <<http://www.every-vote-equal.com/sites/default/files/everyvoteequal-4th-ed-2013-02-21.pdf>>] AKC

If an Electoral College type of arrangement were essential for avoiding a proliferation of candidates and preventing candidates from winning office with as little as 15% of the vote, **we should see evidence of these conjectured problems in elections that do not employ such an arrangement (such as elections for Governor). Historical experience in over 5,000 elections for state chief executive shows no evidence of the conjectured proliferation of candidates or the conjectured 15% winners in elections in which the winner is the candidate who receives the most popular votes.** Duverger's law (which is based on

worldwide studies of elections) asserts that plurality-vote elections do not result in a proliferation of candidates or candidates being elected with tiny percentages of the vote. **The two-party system is, in fact, sustained by the plurality-vote rule—not the state-by-state winner-take-all rule. We do not have to speculate as to whether Ross’ prediction is likely to materialize because we can refer to the nation’s actual experience in the numerous elections that have been conducted in which the winner was the candidate who received the most popular votes.** If an Electoral College type of arrangement were essential for avoiding Ross’ conjectured outcome, we should see evidence of this outcome in elections that did not employ an Electoral College. When elections are conducted in which the winner is the candidate who receives the most popular votes, candidates do not, in actual practice, win the office with low percentages of the vote (and certainly not percentages such as 15%). **In the 975 general elections for Governor in the United States between 1948 and 2011:** 90% of the winning candidates received more than 50% of the vote, 98% of the winning candidates received more than 45% of the vote, 99% of the winning candidates received more than 40% of the vote, and 100% of the winning candidates received more than 35% of the vote. **There were only 25 general elections (out of 975) for Governor between 1948 and 2011 in which the winning candidate received less than 45% of the popular vote,** as shown in table 9.11.

Extinction – climate change, global wars, and turns case

Nisbet 16 (Matthew, Associate Professor of Communication Studies and Affiliate Associate Professor of Public Policy and Urban Affairs at Northeastern University who studies the role of communication, media, and public opinion in debates over science, technology, and the environment, New Scientist, 5/27, "Trump would deliver fatal blow to fight against climate change," <http://www.northeastern.edu/camd/commstudies/people/matthew-nisbet/#sthash.Zoq2zrjr.dpuf>)

Trump would deliver fatal blow to fight against climate change A Donald Trump presidency would disrupt the fight against climate change in a way that threatens to snuff out all hope, warns Matthew Nisbet Trump on a podium, with his hilarious hair Bad for the environment Robyn Beck/AFP/Getty Images By Matthew Nisbet Donald Trump has just **promised to “cancel the Paris climate agreement”, end US funding for United Nations climate change programmes, and roll back** the “stupid” Obama administration **regulations to cut power plant emissions.** The Republican presidential candidate has often defied party orthodoxy on major issues, shocking conservatives with his off-the-cuff remarks. But his scripted speech yesterday to an oil industry meeting directly echoed the party’s line on climate change and energy. Trump trails Hillary Clinton, the likely Democratic rival for the White House, in fundraising, and his speech was a clear sign that he seeks to capitalise on financial support from the powerful fossil fuel industry. His call to roll back industry regulations also deepens his appeal to voters in oil, gas and coal-producing states. “Obama has done everything he can to get in the way of American energy, for whatever reason,” Trump said, in an attack sure to be a centrepiece of his campaign. “If ‘crooked’ Hillary Clinton is in charge, things will get much worse, believe me.” Climate incoherence Yet a ***Trump presidency poses an existential threat qualitatively different from past Republican candidates*** who have doubted climate change. ***It could set in motion a wave of political and economic crises, creating global turmoil*** that would **fatally disrupt efforts to tackle this issue** in the US and abroad. Alarmed by the possibility of a Trump victory in November, international negotiators are urgently working to finalise the UN Paris agreement, in the hope that it can become legally binding before President Obama leaves office. Yet even if the gambit is successful, a Trump victory could cripple international progress in other ways. To meet the aggressive targets set at Paris, **countries will have to substantially ratchet up efforts to end reliance on fossil fuels** over the next few years. At the very moment when the world needs American leadership on this, **Trump’s incoherence on climate and energy policy and his outright disgust for global collaboration would have a severe chilling**

effect on progress. In past comments, he has said he is “not a believer in man-made global warming“, declaring that climate change is a “total hoax” and “bullshit“, “created by and for the Chinese” to hurt US manufacturing. On energy policy, he has appeared befuddled when asked about specifics, even fumbling the name of the Environmental Protection Agency, which he has promised to abolish. Civil unrest The broader disruption of a Trump presidency would do even greater damage, weakening efforts to create a sense of urgency over climate change. Trump’s candidacy has brought public discourse in the US to its ugliest level, as he trades in trash talk and outrageous insults, spreading falsehood and innuendo, fomenting bigotry and prejudice. He has threatened the censure of critics in the media, even condoning violence against protesters, calling them “thugs” and “criminals”. His success emboldens far right and ultra-nationalist movements in the US and across Europe, risking further destabilisation. At home, Trump’s promise to ban Muslims from entering the US, to erect a wall at the Mexican border, and to deport millions of immigrants will provoke widespread protest and civil unrest. Abroad, Trump’s **bravado and reckless unpredictability**, his vow to renegotiate trade deals and to walk away from security alliances **will generate deep tensions with China, Russia and Europe, risking financial collapse and military conflict.** In the midst of such dysfunction and upheaval, the glimmer of hope offered by the historic climate change pact agreed to in Paris last year may forever fade. The **stakes riding on a US presidential election have never been higher.**

Swing states are getting more diverse — Republicans are screwed

Hudak 2016 [John Hudak is deputy director of the Center for Effective Public Management at the Brookings Institute, “How demographic changes are transforming U.S. elections”, *Brookings Institute*, <<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/09/13/how-demographic-changes-are-transforming-u-s-elections/>>] //CJC

Connected to **rises in political clout among communities of color** is the decrease in the size of white populations in the U.S. generally and **in key swing states.** For example, in Arizona, Georgia, and Nevada, since 2008, the white share of the population has dropped to a slim majority of the population. **In every swing state, the share of the white population has dropped since 2008** and in four states—Florida, Georgia, Nevada, and Virginia—**that drop has been larger than the national average.** In coverage of the 2016 presidential race, **much has been discussed about Republicans’ ability to win the White House by relying solely on white voters—in the face of increasing losses in voting support among minorities.** These data suggest how precarious of a gamble that is and one that **is likely to be a sure path to defeat in future elections—if it is not already a losing bet.**

EC ensures minorities have more power — they are the determining vote in swing states — PV ensures minority interests get drowned out

Kimberling 1992 [William Kimberling is Deputy Director of the FEC Office of Election Administration, “THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE”, *Federal Election Commission*, <<http://www.fec.gov/pdf/eleccoll.pdf>>] //CJC

Proponents also point out that, far from diminishing minority interests by depressing voter participation, **the Electoral College actually enhances the status of minority groups.** This is so because **the votes of even small minorities in a State may make the difference between winning all of that State’s electoral votes or none of that State’s electoral votes.** And **since ethnic minority groups in the United States happen to concentrate in those States with the most electoral votes, they assume an importance to presidential candidates well out**

of proportion to their number. The same principle applies to other special interest groups such as labor unions, farmers, environmentalists, and so forth. **It is because of this "leverage effect" that the presidency, as an institution, tends to be more sensitive to ethnic minority and other special interest groups than does the Congress as an institution.** **Changing to a direct election of the president would therefore actually damage minority interests since their votes would be overwhelmed by a national popular majority.**

Minorities in swing states determine the result of the election — proves they have tons of power under EC

PR Newswire 2016 [PR Newswire publishes press releases and News, citing two professors, "Wilkes University Professors Say Minority Voters In Swing States Hold Key to Presidential Election", *PR Newswire*, <<http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/wilkes-university-professors-say-minority-voters-in-swing-states-hold-key-to-presidential-election-300353775.html>>] //CJC

Two Wilkes University professors say that **high concentrations of minority voters in swing states – not the popular vote -- is the key to victory in the election** for Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. **Latino and African American voters**, who were critical constituencies in Barack Obama's election in 2008 and 2012, **continue to be key**. Kyle Kreider, associate professor of political science, and Thomas Baldino, professor of political science are co-editors of Minority Voting in the United States, published in 2015 by Praeger. Their two-volume, 33-chapter collection of essays traces the voting patterns and election history of minority voters. They say the role of minority voters – a factor in Barack Obama's 2008 and 2012 wins -- continues to evolve. "You see **minority groups having the potential to help a candidate carry states and deliver the electoral votes needed to win the election.**" Kreider says. He cited states such as Virginia, which has high concentrations of Asian Americans and African Americans and **North Carolina**, which has a high number of African Americans and a growing Latino population. "**Florida**, with a mixed Latino population, also will be key," Kreider adds. He notes that older Cuban-Americans have historically voted for more conservative candidates. They are giving way to a younger generation of Cuban voters who are less concerned with the anti-Communist and conservative values that were important to their parents and grandparents.

EC gives minorities a seat at the table - without it they would be ignored

Ahmed 2016 [Amel Ahmed is political science professor, 12-23-2016, "In Defense of the Electoral College," *American Prospect*, <http://prospect.org/article/defense-electoral-college>] MJS 3-16-2017

Those pushing to repeal the Electoral College seem to have concluded that without it, Clinton would have won. Maybe. But there is also a good chance she wouldn't have. That's because **without the Electoral College**, we might have had a different outcome, but **we would also have had a very different campaign**—and it likely would have been one that **heavily focused on a much smaller, much less diverse segment of the population**. It's widely recognized

that without the Electoral College, one could win the presidency with a few key states. Even more troubling, though, is that **without the Electoral College one could win by just appealing to white voters.** Since white voters constitute a majority of the electorate, at least for now, **that might actually be the easiest road to the presidency for some candidates.** **The Electoral College is designed to protect minority interests in a variety of forms, whether economic, ideological, or racial. Black and Latino voters draw considerable attention because, in several states, their votes are pivotal. That affords minorities a seat at the table that they might not otherwise enjoy.**

EC not racist—geography is not racism

Luis Fuentes-Rohwer and Guy-Uriel Charles, law professors, Florida State University Law Review, 2001, v. 2, The Law of Presidential Elections: Issues in the Wake of Florida 2000: The Electoral College, the Right to Vote, and Our Federalism: A Comment on a Lasting Institution, p. 905-6] //CJC

1. The Electoral College and Voters of Color.—Though the impact of the current system on third parties is quite clear-cut, the impact of the College on voters of color is not. In this section we examine the oft-stated assumption that the Electoral College is inherently biased against voters of color. We conclude that the Electoral College is not inherently biased against voters of color. In fact, the College favors some voters of color, particularly Latinos and Latinas, and disadvantages others, especially African Americans living in the South. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that the College invariably and directly disadvantages voters of color, even African-American voters who reside in the South, qua voters of color. Rather, the evidence suggests that where the College disadvantages voters of color, this is because they live in a state that is disadvantaged by the College. Many commentators have stated that the Electoral College reduces the voting potential of voters of color. For example, Abbott and Levine note that African Americans, particularly those residing in the South, “find themselves typically casting votes for president that have virtually no influence on the electoral votes of their states.” The proposition that the political preferences of voters of color, particularly African Americans, are disproportionately and negatively affected by the Electoral College has gained increasing and widespread acceptance in both scholarly and popular circles. Some scholars argue that the Electoral College disadvantages voters of color because of the predominance of the unit-vote or winner-take-all method of selecting electors employed by the overwhelming majority of states. As we noted earlier, a consequence of unit-voting is the submergence of the votes of political minorities where the political preferences of voting minorities diverge with those of political majorities. As a result of the unit rule, African Americans—specifically African-American voters in the South who vote over-whelmingly for the Democratic Party—are more often than not submerged because they are surrounded by White voters who vote over-whelmingly for the Republican Party. Unless the presidential electoral preferences of African Americans who reside in the South coincide with those of their Southern White neighbors, they will seldom select a presidential elector. Consequently, as described by one commentator, the vote of African Americans in the South is “virtually meaningless in the final selection of the President.” Taking this criticism on its merits, there are no empirical reasons to believe that unit-voting invariably minimizes the electoral prospects of voters of color. There is support for the proposition that unit-voting minimizes the votes of African Americans in the South. This is because African Americans, who are a political minority and a distinctively liberal minority on some issues, are surrounded by the most politically conservative voters in the country—White voters in the South. As long as African Americans in the South remain politically liberal and are numerical minorities, and Whites in the South remain politically conservative, African Americans will continue to cast “wasted” votes in presidential elections. As Longley and Peirce document, the Electoral College disproportionately affects the relative voting power of African-American voters compared to other groups and the electorate as a whole. Significantly, Peirce and Longley explain that African Americans are disadvantaged by the Electoral College not because they are African Americans, but on the basis of their geographic concentration and distribution throughout the United States. This is because African Americans are largely concentrated in the South, and Southern states are disadvantaged by the Electoral College. Thus, Black disadvantage is ancillary to the inherent geographic biases of the Electoral College and is due to the stochastic element that is geographic distribution. The criticism that the unit-vote system depresses the votes of political minorities masks a

more fundamental division. The unit-vote debate is really an argument about what should constitute a proper "unit" for presidential elections. On one level, the argument is whether the proper unit is a state or a congressional district. But on a more fundamental level, the argument is whether the proper unit is a state or the whole of the United States. Viewed from this perspective, the unit-vote debate clearly raises questions about our national commitment to a certain conception of federalism. To what extent are we fundamentally a collection of sovereign states? To what extent are the interests of the states subsumed to that of the national or federal government? We take up these questions in the last Part.

EC prevents tyranny of majority and protects minorities

William Sullivan, November 25, 2016, American Thinker, All This Silliness About Abolishing the Electoral College,

http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2016/11/all_this_silliness_about_abolishing_the_electoral_college.html] //CJC

This argument is, of course, painfully dim and tiresome. **The Electoral College is one of many safeguards against** what de Tocqueville would later describe as **the "tyranny of the majority"** that our Founders feared, or more specifically, the threat of a concentrated majority in a state that happened to be more populous than another. After all, it's doubtful that Rhode Island would have chosen to ratify the Constitution and join these United States if they believed that their state's unique desires at the federal level would be perpetually overruled by the much more populous New York, for instance. Two, I think it makes more sense to look at how the EC functions now. As noted above, **there are many reasons why the EC promotes diversity and protects minority rights. And there is no evidence that the EC system undermines the interests of minorities.**

No impact and impact turn — black political power doesn't impact policy and causes backlash that makes racist policy more likely

STEPHANOPOULOS 2015 [Nicholas Stephanopoulos is an assistant law professor at the University of Chicago Law School. "The False Promise of Black Political Representation", *The Atlantic*,

<<https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/black-political-representation-power/395594/>>]

//CJC

One answer is that **the appearance of black political clout is deceiving.** Despite their gains in participation and representation, **blacks continue to fare worse than whites in converting their policy preferences into law.** This poor performance is more revealing than statistics on turnout or black electoral success. And even though

its causes remain mysterious, it is very much a rationale for frustration with the status quo. In a recent study, I analyzed group political power at the federal and state levels. At the federal level, I relied on a remarkable database compiled by Princeton political scientist Martin Gilens. It includes responses to thousands of survey questions from the last few decades. Crucially, it also tracks whether each policy referred to by a question was adopted by the federal government over the next four years. At the state level, I measured people's ideologies using exit polls that asked whether they are liberal, moderate, or conservative. And I assessed state laws using an index of overall policy liberalism created by another pair of scholars. **At both levels, I found that blacks hold much less sway than whites.**

For example, **a federal policy with no white support has only a 10 percent chance of being enacted, while one with universal white support has a 60 percent shot of adoption. But while a proposal with no black support has a 40 percent chance of becoming law, one enjoying unanimous approval has only a 30 percent probability of enactment. In other words, as support for a policy rises within the black community, the odds of it being achieved actually decline.**

Squo solves geography — everywhere is becoming less white

Maciag 2015 [Mike Maciag is data editor at Governing Magazine, “A State-by-State Look at Growing Minority Populations”, *Governing Magazine*, <<http://www.governing.com/topics/urban/gov-majority-minority-populations-in-states.html>>] //CJC

Several demographic shifts underway for years now have led **the nation to become increasingly diverse**, with the most recent Census Bureau projections suggesting **the country will become majority-minority by 2044**. For many individual states, **the tipping point is slated to occur much sooner**. Updated data released by the Census Bureau Thursday depict population changes for various demographic groups in states and counties. California, Hawaii, New Mexico and Texas are the only states where minorities, or those not identifying themselves as non-Hispanic whites, already make up the majority of the population. The latest estimates suggest the next states in line to surpass this threshold are Nevada (48.5 percent minority), Maryland (47.4 percent minority) and Georgia (45.7 percent minority). **Since 2010, the minority share of the population has increased in every state** with the **exception** of Hawaii, along with the District of Columbia, which has seen its white population grow faster than blacks. Nowhere is the shift more evident than Nevada, where the minority share of the population has increased faster than any other state (+2.7 percentage points) and all major minority groups have expanded

Swing states are becoming less white

Brownstein 2015 [Ronald Brownstein is a writer for The Atlantic, “The States That Will Pick the President: The Rust Belt”, *The Atlantic*, <<https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/the-states-that-will-pick-the-president-the-rust-belt/431853/>>] //CJC

Ohio: Racial change has unfolded relatively slowly here. **In 1980, whites constituted 91 percent of Ohio's eligible voters; by 2012** that number had declined only to **84 percent**. The States of Change model forecasts the white share to tick down to 83 percent in 2016, and then continue on a relatively unhurried decline to 76 percent by 2040. The pace of change in the actual voting pool hasn't been much different: Whites represented 91 percent of voters on Election Day in 1980, and 83 percent in 2012. From 1980 through 2012, African-Americans edged up from 9 percent to 11 percent of eligible voters. With improved turnout efforts, blacks grew faster over that period as a share of actual voters, from 9 percent to 13 percent. Looking forward, the model projects them to increase only slightly to 14 percent of eligible voters through 2040. Hispanics and the category of Asian, mixed-race, and other adults, each constituted just 2 percent of eligible voters in 2012, but the model projects these groups to gradually rise to 5 percent each by 2040. Those changes could amount to a (very) slowly intensifying thumb on the scale for Democrats in the state. Since 1996, according to exit polls, the Democratic share of Ohio's white vote has varied only from a low of 41 percent (for Obama in 2012 and Al Gore in 2000) to a high of 46 percent for Obama during his first victory. As in other states, Democrats under Obama achieved overwhelming margins among African-Americans: In each of his campaigns he carried 96 percent of them in the state. In 2000 and 2004, when Bush carried the state, Democrats had won 89 percent and 83 percent of blacks respectively.

Pennsylvania: Racial change has also proceeded slowly here. **From 1980 through 2012, whites declined as a share of eligible voters** from 92 percent to 83 percent. But in the actual voter pool, the change was even more modest: **from 91 percent in 1980 to 85 percent in 2012**. African-Americans were 9 percent of actual voters in 1980 and 10 percent in 2012. Hispanics, Asian-Americans, mixed race, and others have barely established a beachhead in the state: too small to measure in 1980, those groups accounted for 4 percent of the actual (and 7 percent of the eligible) vote by 2012. The States of Change model projects a comparable rate of change rolling forward. It forecasts the white share of eligible voters to drop only another percentage point in 2016 (to 82 percent) and to recede slowly to 72 percent by 2040. It projects African-Americans to remain steady at 10 percent of eligible voters for the next several years before rising again toward 12 percent by 2040. By then, the forecast expects bigger change for Hispanics (rising to 10 percent of eligible voters by 2040) and Asians and others (reaching 6 percent.) But in the near term, it expects only minimal growth for the two groups, from 7 percent of the combined eligible voter population in 2012 to 8 percent in 2016 and 2020. In presidential elections, the Democratic vote among Pennsylvania whites has been remarkably steady all the way back to 1988, according to exit polls. Al Gore won 48 percent of whites in 2000 and Obama won 47 percent in 2008, but in the other five elections, the Democratic share varied only between 42 percent and 45 percent. In his 2014 victory, Democratic Gov. Tom Wolf did better, reaching exactly 50 percent. As in other states, Obama twice pushed up the Democratic margins among African-Americans above 90 percent, exceeding the party's advantages over the previous two decades. **Michigan:** Demographic change has come slowly here too, but because the state started

with a larger minority population, it stands as the most racially diverse of the major Rust Belt battlegrounds. **The white share of Michigan's eligible voters dropped modestly from 87 percent in 1980** to 83 percent in 2000, before continuing to fall along a similar slope **to 80 percent in 2012**. (From 1980 through 2012, the white share of the actual voter pool likewise declined from 89 percent to 82 percent.) Over that same period, African-Americans have edged up from 12 percent to 14 percent of eligible voters (and 10-13 percent of the actual voting pool). Hispanics, Asians, and others (including a substantial Arab-American population) have moved from a minuscule presence in 1980 (2 percent of eligible voters) to a measurable beachhead in 2012 (6 percent of eligible and 5 percent of actual voters.) Looking forward, the model sees the contraction of the white vote somewhat accelerating in the near term—down to 77 percent by 2020 and then 70 percent by 2040. It sees no near-term increase for African-Americans, and even by 2040, a rise only from the current 14 percent of eligible voters to 16

percent. The model anticipates the biggest growth among Hispanics and the combined Asian and other category (with each group rising from 3 percent of the eligible population in 2012 to 4 percent by 2016 and 7 percent by 2040). As elsewhere, under Obama, Democrats have consolidated their support among African-Americans, from around 90 percent in 2000 and 2004 to 96 percent and 95 percent in the past two elections, exit polls found. Although figures for 2012 were not available, Democrats also carried about three-fifths or more of Michigan Hispanics in each election back to 1988. And in contrast to most other states, Democrats have somewhat improved their performance among whites here. The party's nominees carried 39 percent of whites in both the 1988 and 1992 elections. But in the five elections since, the Democratic nominee has won between 43 percent and 46 percent of Michigan whites, except in 2008 when Obama carried a plurality with 49 percent. In 2014, exit polls found that Democrat Gary Peters, who won the Senate election, ran exactly even among whites, making him one of the party's few Senate and gubernatorial candidates anywhere who did not lose this bloc. Wisconsin: The state's racial balance has long been defined by a preponderant white population qualified by only a small number of African-Americans. **In 1980, whites represented 96 percent of eligible**, and 97 **percent of actual, voters in Wisconsin. By 2012,** those numbers had declined only to **88 percent and 89 percent respectively.** African-Americans edged up only slightly over that period from 3 percent to 5 percent of eligible voters. But by 2012 signs of a new equation were emerging: Hispanics (at 4 percent of eligible voters) and Asian-Americans, mixed race, and others (at 3 percent) combined to exceed blacks in the eligible share (although they still trailed blacks in the pool of actual voters). Looking forward, the model projects those trends in eligibility to continue. It forecasts whites to shrink slowly to 87 percent of eligible voters in 2016 and 79 percent by 2040. It expects African-Americans to rise only from 5 percent to 7 percent of the eligible population over the next quarter century. But by 2040, it expects a doubling among both Hispanics (from 4 percent of the eligible population now to 8 percent then) and the Asian/other category (from 3 percent to 6 percent.) Democrats have competed as well here with whites as almost anywhere. Their presidential nominees carried Wisconsin whites in 1992, 1996, and 2008, and lost them by no more than 4 percentage points in the other four elections since 1988. Combined with their strong performance among African-Americans—which surged past the 90 percent mark under Obama—that's allowed the party to carry the state in all seven of those elections, albeit sometimes narrowly. Still, Wisconsin has not been entirely immune to the shifts among whites under Obama evident elsewhere: In his 2014 reelection, Republican Gov. Scott Walker held Mary Burke, his Democratic opponent, to just 42 percent among them. Iowa: With its caucuses that begin the presidential nominating process every four years in picturesque small towns and farm communities, Iowa often seems immune to racial change. Yet change is coming even here. In Des Moines, the state's largest city, a majority of the students in the public school K-12 system are now nonwhite. But it will take time for that diversity to be felt in the state's political balance. **In 2012, 92 percent of Iowa's eligible voters were white. That was down from the 99 percent in 1980,** but still higher than any other Rust Belt battleground. Looking forward, the model projects whites to recede only slowly to 91 percent of eligible voters in 2016 and 83 percent in 2040. The model projects that even by 2040 African-Americans will represent only 4 percent of eligible voters (up from 3 percent in 2012). The forecast expects more change among Hispanics (up from 3 percent of eligible voters in 2012 to 4 percent in 2016 and 8 percent by 2040), as well as the category of Asian-Americans, mixed-race, and others. That group is now 2 percent of the eligible population and is projected to reach 5 percent by 2040. The challenge for Democrats is to build the machinery to drive turnout in a state with no tradition of mobilizing minority communities. As in Wisconsin, Democrats have maintained their presidential-level competitiveness among whites as well here as almost anywhere. The party's presidential nominees have carried them in four of the past six elections, and reached 48 percent in each of the two they didn't (both against George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004). The small African-American population has provided a small boost that has helped Democrats carry the state in five of the past six presidential contests; over time, Hispanics, Asians, and others could extend that advantage, albeit very slowly. In the 2014 Senate race, Republican Joni Ernst held Democrat Bruce Braley to just 43 percent among whites en route to her decisive victory.

Voter-ID Laws Do Not Affect Voter Turnout 5

Mycoff 2009 [Jason, "The Empirical Effects of Voter-ID Laws: Present or Absent?," *Brennan Center*. Accessed at:

<https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Democracy/VRE/Mycoff%20et%20al.pdf> [.] //DNP

In the CCES, respondents answered questions about whether they were asked to show identification and if they were prevented from voting because of a problem with identification. Ansolabehere (2007) used this data to demonstrate that exclusions from voting are exceptionally rare. Twenty two respondents out of the 36,421 person sample said voter-ID requirements prevented them from voting. Ansolabehere reports **no more than 0.2% of potential voters claimed to have been excluded from voting due to ID requirements, and with no clear demographic pattern among them, there is very little empirical basis to raise the alarm over the implementation of identification requirements.**¹⁵ As Ansolabehere explains, "one would need a survey more than 10 times as large as this one to begin to gauge who was excluded and why. It is just that rare of a phenomenon" (2007, 8). Indeed, when non-voters in the Current Population Surveys (CPS) from 2000 to 2006 were asked why they did not vote, **a lack of interest in politics was given as a reason twice as often as registration problems** (which include a variety of issues, many of which are unrelated to having a photo ID at the polls on Election Day). Indeed, according to the CPS, even in states where photo IDs are required, 11.7% of non-voters claim that a lack of interest kept them home in 2006 while 6.3% cited general registration problems. General registration problems could include voters turned away due to a lack of identification but also includes voters who had moved without reregistering, felons, and a litany of other special cases. More telling was that one-third of 2006

CPS respondents from Indiana said they did not vote because they were “too busy,” which can arguably be interpreted to mean they were less interested in midterm voting; after all they did respond to the CPS. At **every level of analysis, and with multiple forms of data, we have consistently demonstrated that voter-identification laws appear to be a much smaller piece to the voting behavior puzzle than are factors such as the kinds of issues on a state ballot, the competitiveness of campaigns, the institutional structures of a particular election, socioeconomic factors, and individual-level motivational factors such as interest in politics**. This is not to say that the rules of voting are unimportant or that there is no potential for disenfranchisement; rather our findings **suggest that voter-ID laws have had no systematic effect on turnout** thus far, and that some rules (voter-ID laws) do not affect turnout as much as others (same-day registration in Minnesota, a state with historically high turnout).

Empirically denied — two party system is entrenched

NPV 2017 [“Myths about the proliferation of candidates.” National Popular Vote..

http://archive.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/answers/section.php?s=7#m7_3] //CJC

Historical experience in over **5,000 elections** for state chief executive shows **no evidence of the conjectured proliferation of candidates** or the conjectured 15% winners in elections in which the winner is the candidate who receives the most popular votes. Duverger’s law (which is based on **worldwide studies of elections**) **asserts that plurality-vote elections do not result in a proliferation of candidates or candidates being elected with tiny percentages of the vote. The two-party system is, in fact, sustained by the plurality- vote rule**—not the state-by-state winner-take-all rule.

Perceived lack of legitimacy due to elections controversies decreases trust in government and interest in political campaigns

McLean 2006 [Stephanie, “Election Legitimacy in the United States: Effects on Political Efficacy, Trust, and Participation.” *University of Pittsburgh*. Accessed at: http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/9146/1/McLean_Stephanie.C._082006.pdf.] //DNP

The purpose of this study was to discover, first, what determines citizens’ attitudes toward the fairness of the election administration in 2000, and then of subsequent elections in 2002 and 2004. That is, are attitudes driven by partisan outcomes alone, or do demographic variables and attitudes about the political system more generally play a part? Second, does the belief that the 2000 elections was unfair influence such key political attitudes as trust in government and political efficacy, and does it have an effect on political participation? Both of these questions were first examined using data from the nationally representative surveys conducted by the American National Election Studies (ANES). The external validity and longitudinal design of these surveys provided evidence that the 2000 election was – and still is – widely perceived as unfair, and although

partisan attitudes are partly responsible for driving this view, other influences are also relevant. Furthermore, **trust in government and interest in political campaigns have declined over time as a result of the election controversy.**

These two questions were then tested in an original experimental survey conducted at the University of Pittsburgh in 2005. Despite the limitations of these data in terms of sample, the analysis illustrated that different kinds of **election problems interact with the outcomes to determine attitudes about election fairness.**

Winner takes all is stupidly non-unique

Ross 2004 [Tara Ross is a lawyer in Texas and fellow at the Heritage Foundation, "The Electoral College: Enlightened Democracy", *Heritage Foundation*, <<http://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/report/the-electoral-college-enlightened-democracy>>] //CJC

Critics of the Electoral College allege that the country's presidential election process does more to trample the rights of individuals than to protect federalism. In this context, they often cite the "winner-take-all" method employed by most states, claiming that it causes the votes of some individuals to be "wasted." ³⁵ As this argument goes, a Texan who voted for Al Gore in the 2000 election wasted his vote because George W. Bush was awarded the state's entire slate of electors under the winner-take-all method. Gore did not win so much as one electoral vote from Texas, despite winning nearly 2.5 million of that state's popular votes during the election. ³⁶ In a direct popular election, critics note, these votes would not have been "wasted" -- they could have instead been included in the final national tally for Gore. Such arguments, however, are a bit disingenuous. **These votes were not wasted. They were simply cast on the losing side of a popular vote within the state. If the 2000 election had been conducted based on nationwide popular vote totals only, would people claim that any vote for George W. Bush was "wasted" because Al Gore won the popular vote? Of course not. The votes for Bush were cast in an effort to win.** In the event of a loss, they would simply have been votes for the losing candidate -- just as in any other election (such as an election for Governor or Senator).

Can't happen — 5 reasons

Bandler 11/14/16 [Aaron Bandler is a writer for the Daily Wire, "5 Reasons California Won't Be Seceding Anytime Soon", *Daily Wire*, <<http://www.dailywire.com/news/10776/5-reasons-california-wont-be-seceding-anytime-soon-aaron-bandler#>>] //CJC

There has been a lot of absurdity from the left following the election of Donald Trump to the presidency, and one of the more absurd ideas that has surfaced is the notion that California should secede from the union. The #Calexit movement—which oddly enough, is being led by a New York Republican who was in Moscow on election night—is calling for a referendum to be voted on in 2019 for California to secede. "It is about California taking its place in the world, standing as an equal among nations. We believe in two fundamental truths: (1) California exerts a positive influence on the rest of the world, and (2) California could do more good as an independent country than it is able to do as a just a U.S. state," the Yes California website states. "In 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the international community with their 'Brexit' vote. Our 'Calexit' referendum is about California joining the international community. You have a big decision to make." **Here are five reasons why**

California won't be seceding anytime soon. 1. There is no constitutional right to secede.

There is a pervading myth among fringe libertarians that the Constitution allows for secession.

While the Constitution is silent on the matter, there is evidence to indicate that the founders viewed such an action as antithetical to the Constitution, according to Jarrett Stepman at

Human Events: Madison said in Federalist no. 43, that "The express authority of the people alone could give validity to the Constitution. To have required the unanimous ratification of the thirteen States, would have subjected the essential interests of the whole to the caprice or corruption of a single member. It would have marked a want of foresight in the convention, which our own experience would have rendered inexcusable." Like a man living in the state of nature who surrenders a part of his individual sovereignty to the state in exchange for the guaranteed protection of his natural rights—life, liberty and property—the states gave up a part of their sovereignty to enter the union. A state can no more secede from the union than an individual can secede from a state because of a law he doesn't like or find "constitutional." George Washington, who served as president of the Constitutional Convention, blasted the idea of state sovereignty in a letter announcing the new Constitution to Congress: "It is obviously impracticable in the federal government of these states to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all." **In order for a**

state to secede, there is only one process that is constitutionally viable... 2. A constitutional amendment would be necessary. To pass an amendment, two-thirds of Congress would

have to approve of it as well as 38 states, or there could be a Convention of States. It

seems unlikely that California's secession would pass such arduous hurdles, unless this sentiment becomes prevalent in the country: 3. Previous attempts at secession have been

stymied. For instance, **Texas flirted with the notion of seceding after President Barack**

Obama won re-election in 2012, and that went nowhere. The Supreme Court has also ruled that "that when the states accepted the the Constitution, they also waived their right to leave the Union,"

according to CNN columnist Danny Cevallos. There's also the obvious fact that a Civil War was fought over secession. "The reality is that if California really wanted to, it could probably just leave the United States," writes Cevallos. "It would be an unconstitutional, illegal act. But what could Washington actually do about it? Post another announcement on the White House webpage saying it doesn't approve? No president would send in the military, would he?" Would Californians really risk that possibility?

4. If California were to secede, it would be taking an enormous risk with regard to natural disasters.

Julienne Davis points out in Heat Street that there are a number of natural disasters that could afflict California, including a massive earthquake and a tsunami that could take out nuclear facilities in places like Avila Beach and San Onofre.

If California were to secede, they wouldn't receive any federal assistance if these natural disasters occur. It seems unlikely that Californians would take such a risk.

5. California would also face the prospect of collapse if they secede.

According to Davis: But what happens when the money runs out? California is already strapped for cash. Even if California will no longer subsidize other states, will they really have that much money to care for so many? While it's true California is rich in agriculture, what they are very poor in the last number of years, and will be for the foreseeable future, is water.

Right now they take from the Colorado river and other states as well like Oregon and they don't have the the additional necessary desalinization plants built to deal with the demand even without the influx of the millions they dream of taking in.

Then you have the issue of all those government pensions. If they've seceded, what will California do when those pensions hit the wall?

"Sorry.... You'll just have to keep working till you drop. We can't go back to Washington now to get more money." There are simply too many hurdles and risks involved with California seceding. #Calexit won't be happening anytime soon, if at all.

Tons of alt causes, even if it succeeds it doesn't cause secession, and electoral college argument makes no sense

Morrissey 2/22/17 [Edward Morrissey is a writer for The Week, "California has lost its mind", *The Week*, <<http://theweek.com/articles/681350/california-lost-mind>>] //CJC

Officially called Yes California, **the secession effort** picked up the nickname "**Calexit**" on Twitter, an obvious reference to the "Brexit" referendum that ordered the U.K. to leave the European Union. That name also evokes a feature for which California is particularly well known — its freeways. Marinelli and his supporters want an off-ramp from the United States, and claim that "our Calexit referendum is about California joining the international community. ... California could do more good as an independent country than it is able to do as just a U.S. state."

Calexit organizers seem to forget that the United States fought a civil war over the issue of secession,

and the secessionists lost. Now, **the Calexit vote is entirely meaningless — even if successful, it would only make a toothless "demand" of Congress.**

Still, the movement's rationale for trying to secede are telling in their ludicrousness. **Organizers lament that they cannot keep California's "coal, oil, and natural gas" for the state's own use,**

only to later argue that California has to lead the way on climate change by vastly reducing the use of those carbon-based energy sources. **They complain about California schools being "among the worst in the nation" — as if the state government had nothing to do with that outcome.**

The petition also **complains that California subsidizes the rest of the nation** at the same time that the federal government has poured billions of dollars into a high-speed rail system that has barely progressed at all. The more political arguments are equally ludicrous. **They complain that**

California's Electoral College votes "haven't affected a presidential election since 1876." Actually, **Electoral College votes have an effect in every election, regardless of outcome, and California's have more sway than any other state.** Furthermore, the petition notes that **Congress consists of "382 representatives and 98 senators we can't vote for," which can be said for California's legislature by every one of its counties and cities, too.** Unless the Republic of California is to be governed by referendum or dictator, the petition is basically complaining about the very nature of representative government that it uses for itself.

Alt cause: Trump victory

Robinson 11/10/16 [Melia Robinson is a writer for Business Insider, "Life in California could be surprisingly normal if 'Calexit' happens and the state secedes from the US", *Business Insider*, <<http://www.businessinsider.com/what-would-happen-if-calexit-happens-2016-11>>] //CJC

"Calexit" is swiftly taking over social media. After Donald Trump won the race to the White House, people across California took to social media Tuesday night to call for "Calexit" (or California exit), recalling Brexit, Britain's push to leave the European Union. As the topic continues to trend on Twitter, Californians in favor of seceding from the US will gather November 9th on the steps of the capitol in Sacramento. **The group leading the charge, Yes California Independence Campaign, assembled long before Trump's surprising victory.** Its aim is to hold a referendum in 2018 that, if passed, would bring California one step closer to legally seceding from the union.

EC support is increasing

Gallup 12/2/16 [Gallup is a reputable polling agency, "Americans' Support for Electoral College Rises Sharply", *Gallup*, <<http://www.gallup.com/poll/198917/americans-support-electoral-college-rises-sharply.aspx>>] //CJC

Americans' support for keeping the Electoral College system for electing presidents **has increased sharply.** Weeks after the 2016 election, **47% of Americans say they want to keep the Electoral College, while 49% say they want to amend the Constitution to allow for a popular vote for president. In the past, a clear majority favored amending the U.S. Constitution to replace the Electoral College with a popular vote system.**

All time low support for PV

Jeffrey 12/6/16 [Terence Jeffrey is a writer for CNS News, "Support for Abolishing Electoral College Hits Historic Low in Gallup Poll", *CNS News*, <<http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/terence-p-jeffrey/support-abolishing-electoral-college-hits-historic-low-gallup-poll>>] //CJC

In the wake of an election in which Hillary Clinton won the popular vote but Donald Trump was elected president by winning the Electoral College, a survey showed **the lowest percentage of people ever** in a Gallup poll **saying they would support amending the Constitution to eliminate the Electoral College and decide presidential elections by the popular vote.** "This year, **for the first time in the 49 years Gallup has asked about it, less than half of**

Americans want to replace the Electoral College with a popular vote system,” Gallup said in an analysis of its poll results

Squo solves faithless electors

Joy McAfee, law professor, Cumberland Law Review, 2001 / 2002, SHOULD THE COLLEGE ELECTORS FINALLY GRADUATE?: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE: AN AMERICAN COMPROMISE FROM ITS INCEPTION TO ELECTION 2000, p. 653-4] //CJC

Perhaps the fear of the faithless elector arises from opinions such as the following given by a New York State Attorney General: The presidential electors for the respective candidates are voted for by the people and, by reason of the mandate given them by the people, the electors should vote in accordance with the people's desires as indicated by the majority vote. It is my understanding that there is not a rule of law which compels the electors to vote for a particular candidate for

President ... [A] particular presidential elector may cast his ballot legally for any candidate he might choose. However, now **over half the states and the**

District of Columbia under the power of Congress bind electors directly or indirectly to their political pledge using faithless elector laws. To the complaints of Electoral College

adversaries, **these states and the District of Columbia comprise over half of the Electoral**

College. Faithless elector laws were challenged in the Supreme Court on the ground that the Constitution places no limitation on how an elector must cast his or her vote in the Electoral College. Although the Supreme Court did not specifically address whether the punishment for faithless

electors is constitutional, **the Court did state that the Constitution and the Twelfth Amendment do not**

“forbid a party to require from candidates in its primary a pledge of political conformity

with the aims of the party.” If those in fear of the faithless elector are still unsatisfied with the current state legislation, efforts should be made to create these laws in all fifty states. Again, the blame is not the Electoral College.

Less than 1% of electors are faithless and 50% of historical faithless electors did it cuz the candidate died

PARTHASARATHY 2016 [Maya Parthasarathy is a writer at Bustle, “What Happens If Electors Change Their Minds? It Hasn't Happened Often Throughout History”, *Bustle*,

<<https://www.bustle.com/articles/192545-what-happens-if-electors-change-their-minds-it-hasnt-happened-often-throughout-history>>] //CJC

The United States' Electoral College system is largely based on electors voting for the candidate who won the popular vote in their state. But **what happens if electors change their minds** at the last minute? **Electors who don't vote for the candidate**

they've pledged to vote for are called "faithless electors." This designation only applies to pledged electors, not unpledged electors who have not pledged their support to a presidential or vice presidential candidate (however, there haven't been any unpledged electors since the 1964 election). **More than 99 percent of electors have followed their pledges while voting,**

according to the National Archives and Records Administration. While no federal law or constitutional provision exists to prevent electors from voting for a candidate other than the one chosen by popular vote in their **state, many states and the District of Columbia have their own requirements for electors.** The constitutionality of state laws surrounding pledged voting

was confirmed by the Supreme Court in the 1952 case of *Ray v. Blair*. Still, no faithless elector has actually ever been prosecuted. **There have only been 157 faithless electors in the**

Electoral College, and out of this number 71 changed their vote because the original candidate died before Election Day. The most recent incident was in 2004, when an anonymous Democratic elector in Minnesota voted for

John Kerry's running mate John Edwards, presumably by accident. In 1836, however, the entire Virginia electoral delegation voted faithlessly against vice presidential candidate Richard Johnson because of Johnson's public interracial relationship with his slave. Still, faithless electors have yet to impact the end result of any presidential election thus far.

Faithless electors never happen, never impact the result of the election, and can be solved without eliminating the electoral college

Kimberling 1992 [William Kimberling is Deputy Director of the FEC Office of Election Administration, "THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE", *Federal Election Commission*, <<http://www.fec.gov/pdf/eleccoll.pdf>>] //CJC

Opponents of the Electoral College system also point to the risk of so-called "faithless" Electors. A "faithless Elector" is one who is pledged to vote for his party's candidate for president but nevertheless votes for another candidate. **There have been 7 such Electors in this century** and as recently as 1988 when a Democrat Elector in the State of West Virginia cast his votes for Lloyd Bensen for president and Michael Dukakis for vice president instead of the other way around. **Faithless Electors have never changed the outcome of an election**, though, simply because most often their purpose is to make a statement rather than make a difference. That is to say, when the electoral vote outcome is so obviously going to be for one candidate or the other, an occasional Elector casts a vote for some personal favorite knowing full well that it will not make a difference in the result. Still, if the prospect of a faithless Elector is so fearsome as to warrant a Constitutional amendment, then **it is possible to solve the problem without abolishing the Electoral College** merely by eliminating the individual Electors in favor of a purely mathematical process (since the individual Electors are no longer essential to its operation).

It's inevitable — the same incentives apply to congressional and local elections which means the EC has no marginal effect

Kimberling 1992 [William Kimberling is Deputy Director of the FEC Office of Election Administration, "THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE", *Federal Election Commission*, <<http://www.fec.gov/pdf/eleccoll.pdf>>] //CJC

Opponents of the Electoral College are further concerned about its possible role in depressing voter turnout. Their argument is that, since each State is entitled to the same number of electoral votes regardless of its voter turnout, there is no incentive in the States to encourage voter participation. Indeed, there may even be an incentive to discourage participation (and they often cite the South here) so as to enable a minority of citizens to decide the electoral vote for the whole State. **While this argument has a certain surface plausibility, it fails to account for the fact that presidential elections do not occur in a vacuum. States also conduct other elections** (for U.S. Senators, U.S. Representatives, State Governors, State legislators, and a host of local officials) **in which these same incentives and disincentives are likely to operate, if at all, with an even greater force. It is hard to imagine what counter-incentive would be created by eliminating the Electoral College.**

Voters don't think they are the deciding vote - they are just expressing their preferences

Posner 2012 [Richard Posner is a judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, and a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. "In Defense of the Electoral College", *Slate*,

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2012/11/defending_the_electoral_college.html] MJS

It can be argued that the Electoral College method of selecting the president may turn off potential voters for a candidate who has no hope of carrying their state—Democrats in Texas, for example, or Republicans in California. Knowing their vote will have no effect, they have less incentive to pay attention to the campaign than they would have if the president were picked by popular vote, for then the state of a voter's residence would be irrelevant to the weight of his vote. But of course **no voter's vote swings a national election, and in spite of that, about one-half the eligible American population did vote in last week's election. Voters in presidential elections are people who want to express a political preference rather than people who think that a single vote may decide an election. Even in one-sided states, there are plenty of votes in favor of the candidate who is sure not to carry the state. So I doubt that the Electoral College has much of a turn-off effect.** And if it does, that is outweighed by the reasons for retaining this seemingly archaic institution.

It's balanced by the swing states anyways

Posner 2012 [Richard Posner is a judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, and a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. "In Defense of the Electoral College", *Slate*, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2012/11/defending_the_electoral_college.html] MJS

The winner-take-all method of awarding electoral votes induces the candidates—as we saw in last week's election—to focus their campaign efforts on the toss-up states; that follows directly from the candidates' lack of inducement to campaign in states they are sure to win. **Voters in toss-up states are more likely to pay close attention to the campaign—to really listen to the competing candidates—knowing that they are going to decide the election. They are likely to be the most thoughtful voters, on average** (and for the further reason that they will have received the most information and attention from the candidates), **and the most thoughtful voters should be the ones to decide the election.**

More voters can expect to lose influence than gain it

Von Spakovsky 2011 [Hans von Spakovsky Election Law Reform Initiative and Senior Legal Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, "Destroying the Electoral College: The Anti-Federalist National Popular Vote Scheme", *Heritage Foundation*, http://www.heritage.org/election-integrity/report/destroying-the-electoral-college-the-anti-federalist-national-popular?_ga=1.213754836.1522943971.1488386128#_ftn5] MJS

Although some legislators have embraced the NPV, such support appears to be rather shortsighted: Under the NPV, a majority of states will see their influence over the presidential election decrease. As John Samples of the Cato Institute has determined, the influence of a state under the Electoral College can be measured by dividing the state's electoral votes by the total electoral votes; the measure under the NPV is the number of a state's eligible voters divided by the total eligible voters in the country.

[...]

When these measurements are compared, states such as California, Hawaii, and Vermont, as well as the District of Columbia, lose influence by switching to the NPV. While California's loss is

relatively small (1 percent), Hawaii would lose 42 percent of its influence, Vermont 58 percent, and the District of Columbia a stunning 62 percent. Under Samples' analysis, 29 states and the District of Columbia would lose influence under the NPV.[41] Based on the 2006 elections, **"59 percent of voters...lived in states that would either lose influence under direct election or would be indifferent about moving away from the Electoral College."**

Trump's election proves the map is fluid

Editorial Board, 11-10-2016 ["Keep the Electoral College: Our view," USA TODAY, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/11/10/electoral-college-popular-vote-donald-trump-hillary-clinton-editorials-debates/93609562/>] MJS 3-1-2017

Electoral College opponents argue that the system pushes candidates to ignore states that Republicans or Democrats consider sure things and focus on a dozen battleground states during the campaigns. But **Tuesday's election showed that the Electoral College map is more fluid than many people believed. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, considered reliably Democratic, swung Republican.**

Demographic changes mean more swing states are trending blue than red

Chris **Cillizza, 6-10-2014** [writer for the Washington Post, "Democrats' stranglehold on the electoral college, in 1 GIF," https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/06/10/democrats-stranglehold-on-the-electoral-college-in-1-gif/?utm_term=.aae625f587d2] MJS 3-5-2017

Now, let's look at the 10 closest states -- by percentage -- in the race and subtract them from each man's electoral vote total. Those states -- Florida, Ohio, North Carolina, Virginia, Colorado, Pennsylvania, Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada and Wisconsin -- comprise 130 electoral votes. Obama won all of them except for North Carolina and its 15 electoral votes. So, take 115 votes from Obama's column and 15 votes from Romney's column. That brings Obama to 217 electoral votes and Romney to 191 -- a built-in 26 vote electoral vote edge. That edge is actually deceptively low because it excludes Pennsylvania and its 20 electoral votes from the Democratic side. And, while Pennsylvania was one of the 10 closest states in 2012 -- Obama won it by just over 5 percentage points -- the state hasn't voted for a Republican at the presidential level since 1988. Add Pennsylvania to Obama's total and he starts at a baseline of 237 electoral votes -- only 33 short of the 270 you need to get elected president. And, those electoral college advantages are not unique to Obama's 2012 map. Remember that in 2012 he didn't carry Indiana (as he did in 2008) or North Carolina, and the the 237 total above doesn't include swing states like Ohio, Virginia Florida, Colorado and Iowa -- all of which Obama won in 2012. In fact, there's an argument to be made that the electoral map in 2016 -- regardless of the two candidates -- will be even more challenging for Republicans than the 2012 map. **The growth of the Hispanic community in places like Arizona and Georgia means those states could teeter on being potentially competitive in 2016, and, if Republicans remain unable to win any significant swath of the Hispanic vote, will be prime battlegrounds in 2020 and**

beyond. Texas -- and its treasure trove of 38 electoral votes -- could follow suit in 2020 or 2024. While demographic changes are moving a number of traditionally Republican states closer to Democrats, there's little evidence that many states are heading in the opposite direction. You could make the case that Wisconsin is moving closer to Republicans' grasp (it was the 10th closest state in 2012), and Minnesota -- the 11th closest state -- might be shifting ever-so-slightly in Republicans' direction as well. The problem is that big states like New York, California, Michigan and Pennsylvania show no signs of becoming more friendly toward Republicans; in the case of New York and California, they are becoming far less friendly to the GOP. With those major electoral vote targets off the table -- or close to it -- **the math becomes increasingly difficult for Republicans.**

Swing states are fluid - this is better than just catering to urban centers which don't change year to year

Von Spakovsky 2011 [Hans von Spakovsky Election Law Reform Initiative and Senior Legal Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, "Destroying the Electoral College: The Anti-Federalist National Popular Vote Scheme", *Heritage Foundation*, <http://www.heritage.org/election-integrity/report/destroying-the-electoral-college-the-anti-federalist-national-popular?_ga=1.213754836.1522943971.1488386128#_ftn5>] MJS

Although the point has been argued that under the current system, swing states garner the majority of candidates' attention, **swing states can change from election to election**, and many states that are today considered to be reliably "blue" or "red" in the presidential race were recently unpredictable. **For example, "California was competitive for decades, only becoming a Democratic presidential bastion in the last 15 years. Florida was considered a safe Republican seat as late as 1996."**[39] With rare exceptions, **however, established urban centers like Houston, Chicago, New York City, and Los Angeles will always have high populations that vote in a predictable fashion.** While the Electoral College assures that minority interests in a variety of geographic regions are protected, **the NPV will help to protect only select urban interests.** The Electoral College "embodies the balance [the Founders] aimed to achieve through deference to states with smaller populations and by ensuring that the interests of these states be reflected in national decision-making."

Swing state voters are more informed

Posner 2012 [Richard Posner is a judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, and a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. "In Defense of the Electoral College", *Slate*, <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2012/11/defending_the_electoral_college.html>] MJS

The winner-take-all method of awarding electoral votes induces the candidates—as we saw in last week's election—to focus their campaign efforts on the toss-up states; that follows directly from the candidates' lack of inducement to campaign in states they are sure to win. **Voters in toss-up states are more likely to pay close attention to the campaign—to really listen to the competing candidates—knowing that they are going to decide the election. They are likely to be the most thoughtful voters, on average** (and for the further reason that they will

have received the most information and attention from the candidates), **and the most thoughtful voters should be the ones to decide the election.**

EC forces candidates to build cross national appeal—key to presidential power to govern

Michael Herz, law professor and Co-Director, Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy, Cardozo, Cardozo Law Review, May 2005, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION?: ROBERT DAHL'S HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION?: AN INTRODUCTION, WITH NOTES ON THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, p. 1208] //CJC

On this account, **the strength of the electoral college is that it forces presidential candidates to build broad cross-national political coalitions.** Thereby it produces presidents **who can govern because of their broad cross-national support.** In politics as well as in physics there is such a thing as a critical mass. In presidential elections numbers of votes are necessary but not sufficient. **To create the critical mass necessary for a president to govern, his votes must be properly distributed.** This means he must win states and win states in more than one region of the country.

The need for a geographically diverse coalition counters polarization

Jason Willick, 11-12-2016 [, "Four Theses on the Electoral College," American Interest, <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/11/12/four-theses-on-the-electoral-college/>] MJS 3-9-2017

Partisan agendas don't exist in isolation; they are responses to political institutions, like the Electoral College, that set the rules for attaining political power. Going forward, **the Electoral College might moderate the violence of the nationalist-cosmopolitan clash by forcing the Democratic Party to court blue collar states more aggressively, instead of doubling down on their already-sizable advantage in metropolitan areas.** In other words, **it gives the Democrats an incentive to build a more geographically diffuse political coalition (and increased competition from Democrats in rural exurban areas might in turn force Republicans to think more about how to compete in cities).** In this election, Trump's America and Clinton's America were unrecognizable to one another. **In a popular vote system, there would be no obstacles against the parties engaging in an arms race to widen this chasm for political gain.** It's possible that because of **the Electoral College** verdict this time around, the next Democrat to run against Trump will work to build more appeal outside of metropolitan areas, **blunting the trend toward the mutual ghettoization of today's red and blue communities.**

Non-unique: Trump will lose in 2020 — Obama 2012 proves

Kengor 1/2/17 [Paul Kengor is professor of political science and executive director of the Center for Vision & Values at Grove City College, "THE NUMBERS DON'T LIE: TRUMP NEEDS TO DO BETTER BY 2020", *Conservative Review*,

<https://www.conservativereview.com/commentary/2017/01/the-numbers-dont-lie-trump-needs-to-do-better-by-2020>] //CJC

Looking again at the latest cumulative **popular-vote tabulation, Hillary's lead over Trump as I write is 2.865 million**. Her popular-vote lead still might hit three million, but will probably come in just under that. Still, those who (going forward) write about it or casually remark on it will probably tend to round it up to three million. How dreadful is this for Donald Trump? **The previous record popular-vote loss for a winning president was George W. Bush losing by only 543,000 votes to Gore in 2000. Trump's loss dwarfs that by over five-fold.** Even more alarming, **Trump's percentage loss is 46.1 percent vs. 48.2 percent for Hillary.** It has

continued to fall and still may slip under 46.0 percent. The 46.1 percent figure gives Trump a lower percentage than not only Hillary, but also Obama in 2012 (51.1 percent) and 2008 (52.9 percent), Romney in 2012 (47.2 percent), Bush in 2004 (51.0 percent) and 2000 (47.9 percent), Kerry in 2004 (48.5 percent), and Gore in 2000 (48.4 percent). For a while, I thought that Trump might get lower than who was 45.7 percent, but that probably will not happen. Of course, here as well, historians and pundits and others will round down Trump to 46 percent, just as they tend to round up McCain to 46 percent. It will then look like basically the same vote percentage for both. (By the way, Michael Dukakis in 1988 got 45.6 percent of the vote, which likewise is usually rounded up to 46 percent by historians. And amazingly, with that Trump-like popular-vote percentage, Dukakis was obliterated in the Electoral College, 426 to 111.) Some Trump enthusiasts will likely dismiss all of this shocking data by arguing that if we simply removed California, New York, and Illinois from Hillary's vote totals, Trump would have won the popular vote. That's just downright absurd. The same could have been said for Romney, for Bush in 2000, and maybe even for McCain, R-Ariz. (F, 32 percent) (I would need to do the math). It wouldn't be fair to do that to Hillary's vote total any more than it would be to remove Texas and the South from Trump's vote total. Trump also countered that he would have campaigned in places like California had the presidency depended not on the Electoral College but on the popular vote. Sure. But so would have Hillary. In fact, Hillary thus would have campaigned in Texas and the South as well. Trump almost achieved the impossible: becoming the only Republican who could've lost to Hillary Clinton. This is an asinine argument. If a student of mine made this argument on an exam, I'd give him an "F." Look, Trump admirers, your guy got crushed in the popular vote in historically unprecedented fashion for a winning president. So be it. Accept that and move on. You're far better off conceding your liabilities, so you can work to improve them next time around. Making false assumptions and excuses will be your political downfall. You were extremely fortunate you didn't get burned by them in November 2016. So, for Trump supporters who have been emailing me gloating about how brilliantly right they were, in defiance of the literal 90 percent-plus of polls that had him losing to Hillary (i.e., getting less votes), cut the nonsense. The polls were actually right. You were wrong. Be humble and be thankful, because you and your guy are extremely fortunate, even as (yes) his Electoral College triumph was a great achievement.

And here's where your gloating can come back to bite you: **If Trump gets 46.1 percent of the vote in 2020, he'll be the first one-term president in a while**, after three consecutive two-term presidents, and four of the last five. Keep this recent but crucial historical fact in mind: **Barack Obama in 2012 actually got fewer votes than he did in 2008. He got fewer popular votes, fewer Electoral College votes, fewer states, fewer counties, and a lower overall percentage vote.** He still won, yes, but his margin of victory over McCain in 2008 had been very significant. He had room for error his second time around. Donald Trump does not.

Non-unique: LITERALLY ANY democrat would beat Trump in 2020 except Warren

Shelbourne 2/15/17 [Mallory Shelbourne is a writer for The Hill, "Trump beats Warren, loses to unnamed Democrat in 2020 match-up: poll", *The Hill*, <http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/319600-trump-beats-warren-in-2020-match-up-poll>] //CJC

President Trump would beat Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) in a hypothetical 2020 election, though he would **lose in a race against an unnamed Democrat**, according to a Politico/Morning Consult poll released Wednesday. When asked to choose between Trump or Warren, 42 percent said they would vote for Trump, while 36 percent chose Warren. Twenty-two percent said they did not know or did not have an opinion. **When asked if they would vote for Trump or the unnamed Democrat, 35 percent said they would probably vote for Trump, while 43 percent said they would probably pick the Democrat.** Twenty-three percent said they did not know or have an opinion.

EC forces expansion toward middle because of swing states

Zycher, Benjamin. "The Electoral College Does It Better." Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, 27 Oct. 2004. <<http://articles.latimes.com/2004/oct/27/opinion/oe-zycher27>>] //CJC

Another goal is to **provide candidates with incentives to broaden their geographic and political bases and to steer toward the center rather than the extremes of the political spectrum.** This, the founders felt, would help reduce the sources of political strife and, in the extreme case, avoid civil war. They understood that passions and irrationalities can afflict mass decision-making under direct democracy. **The Electoral College** system as we know it today **further that goal.** The winner of a plurality in any given state (with two minor exceptions, Maine and Nebraska) gets all of that state's Electoral College votes; the candidate who wins a majority in the Electoral College (270 out of 538) is elected president. **Once a candidate determines that he will be able to win a plurality in a state, thus getting all the Electoral College votes, there is no point in campaigning further in that state. The candidate is then driven** (by the pressure of the market, so to speak) **to develop plurality support in additional states. Thus are candidates forced to broaden their geographic bases;** those whose support is heavily regionalized are penalized implicitly.

The need for a geographically diverse coalition counters polarization

Jason Willick, 11-12-2016 [, "Four Theses on the Electoral College," American Interest, <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/11/12/four-theses-on-the-electoral-college/>] MJS 3-9-2017

Partisan agendas don't exist in isolation; they are responses to political institutions, like the Electoral College, that set the rules for attaining political power. Going forward, **the Electoral College might moderate the violence of the nationalist-cosmopolitan clash by forcing the Democratic Party to court blue collar states more aggressively, instead of doubling down on their already-sizeable advantage in metropolitan areas.** In other words, **it gives the Democrats an incentive to build a more geographically diffuse political coalition (and increased competition from Democrats in rural exurban areas might in turn force Republicans to think more about how to compete in cities).** In this election, Trump's America and Clinton's America were unrecognizable to one another. **In a popular vote system, there would be no obstacles against the parties engaging in an arms race to widen this chasm for political gain.** It's possible that because of **the Electoral College** verdict this time around, the next Democrat to run against Trump will work to build more appeal outside of metropolitan areas, **blunting the trend toward the mutual ghettoization of today's red and blue communities.**

EC forces cross regional appeal which ensures no one group controls election outcomes and prevents polarizing regional differences

Kimberling 1992 [William Kimberling is Deputy Director of the FEC Office of Election Administration, "THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE", *Federal Election Commission*, <http://www.fec.gov/pdf/elec_coll.pdf>] //CJC

Recognizing the strong regional interests and loyalties which have played so great a role in American history, proponents argue that **the Electoral College system contributes to the**

cohesiveness of the country by requiring a distribution of popular support to be elected president. Without such a mechanism, they point out, **presidents would be selected either through the domination of one populous region over the others or through the domination of large metropolitan areas over the rural ones.** Indeed, it is principally because of the Electoral College that presidential nominees are inclined to select vice presidential running mates from a region other than their own. For as things stand now, **no one region contains the absolute majority (270) of electoral votes required to elect a president.** Thus, **there is an incentive for presidential candidates to pull together coalitions of States and regions rather than to exacerbate regional differences.** Such a unifying mechanism seems especially prudent in view of the severe regional problems that have typically plagued geographically large nations such as China, India, the Soviet Union, and even, in its time, the Roman Empire.

More radicalism under popular vote

Trent England, 10-1-2012 [, "Eliminating the Electoral College Would Corrupt Our Elections," US News & World Report, <https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2012/10/01/eliminating-the-electoral-college-would-corrupt-our-elections>] MJS 3-16-2017

Consider that both the Democratic and Republican parties have a presence in every state. Indeed the parties themselves are broad coalitions made up of millions of Americans. And each party enjoys strong support in a number of states. **With the Electoral College,** all this is essential. Presidential candidates have no choice but to reach out across the country. As the campaign wears on, attention focuses toward the most politically balanced "swing states." **Candidates cannot simply go where they are already popular and fan the flames of political radicalism.** Instead, they must make their case to voters in the most evenly divided states. **A national popular vote would eliminate any need for geographic balance. A candidate could win based on intense support from a narrow region.** It's happened before. In 1888, incumbent President Grover Cleveland won the most popular votes with huge margins in the Deep South, but lost the Electoral College and thus the presidency. Neither the nation nor the Democratic Party would have been better off with a **popular vote system that rewarded and encouraged radical, regional politics.**

National unity causes militarism internationally

Healy, Gene. "National unity is overrated" The Cato Institute. 11 May. 2011.

<<https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/national-unity-is-highly-overrated-ambitious-politicos>>] //CJC

For going on a decade now, politicians have called upon Americans to recapture our post- 9/11 "sense of **unity.**" But **that period of harmony-under-pressure also came with unhealthy levels of trust in government, which in turn enabled costly foreign adventurism abroad and a radical expansion of federal power at home. Maybe national unity isn't all it's cracked up to be.**

The US military has killed 20-30 million SINCE WW2

Lucas, 2016. "US Has Killed More Than 20 Million People in 37 "Victim Nations" Since World War II." By James A. Lucas. Global Research, March 07, 2016
<http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-has-killed-more-than-20-million-people-in-37-victim-nations-since-world-war-ii/5492051> GST.

The thesis of this is that more spending means that the **US government views military power as the only viable foreign policy strategy, which causes it to go to war, in turn creating new enemies. This study reveals that U.S. military forces were directly responsible** for about 10 to 15 million deaths during the Korean and Vietnam Wars and the two Iraq Wars. The Korean War also includes Chinese deaths while the Vietnam War also includes fatalities in Cambodia and Laos. The American public probably is not aware of these numbers and knows even less about the proxy wars for which the United States is also responsible. In the latter wars there were between nine and 14 million deaths in Afghanistan, Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Guatemala, Indonesia, Pakistan and Sudan. But the victims are not just from big nations or one part of the world. The remaining deaths were in smaller ones which constitute over half the total number of nations. Virtually all parts of the world have been the target of U.S. intervention. The overall conclusion reached is that **the United States most likely has been responsible since WWII for the deaths of between 20 and 30 million people in wars and conflicts scattered over the world.** To the families and friends of these victims it makes little difference whether the causes were U.S. military action, proxy military forces, the provision of U.S. military supplies or advisors, or other ways, such as economic pressures applied by our nation. They had to make decisions about other things such as finding lost loved ones, whether to become refugees, and how to survive. And the pain and anger is spread even further. Some authorities estimate that there are as many as 10 wounded for each person who dies in wars. Their visible, continued suffering is a continuing reminder to their fellow countrymen. It is essential that Americans learn more about this topic so that they can begin to understand the pain that others feel. Someone once observed that the Germans during WWII "chose not to know." We cannot allow history to say this about our country. The question posed above was "How many September 11ths has the United States caused in other nations since WWII?" The answer is: possibly 10,000.

Polarization increases turnout

Glenn Davis, 5-15-2014 [political commentator, "Are There Benefits to Polarization in Politics?," IVN.us, <https://ivn.us/2014/05/15/benefits-polarization-politics/>] MJS 3-16-2017

As the theory goes, **polarization is not inherently a bad thing. Political engagement is essential to the democratic process.** Abramowitz argues **that those most engaged are the most likely to be polarized.** He cites evidence that **during both the 2004 and 2008 elections, voters were energized by the polarized choices.** Higher voter turnout and involvement in campaign activities were the result. Popular opinion suggests that many voters have responded to gridlock and congressional ineffectiveness by becoming more disenfranchised. But Abramowitz maintains that the opposite has been true: **voters have become more engaged, more involved, more likely to be informed, and more apt to take a stand on policy issues.**

Polarization increases turnout and reduces gridlock

Alan I. Abramowitz, 8-1-2010 [professor of political science at Emory University, "Political Bookworm," No Publication, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/political-bookworm/2010/04/how_polarization_benefits_demo.html] MJS 3-16-2017

But are polarization and partisan conflict really bad for democracy? Certainly, they can go too far. It's not healthy when supporters of the minority party question the legitimacy of our country's elected leaders or when vigorous debate degenerates into name-calling and threats of violence. But a certain amount of **polarization and partisan conflict can actually be very beneficial in a democracy.** The fact that **the differences between Democrats and Republicans are much clearer today than they were 40 or 50 years ago makes it much easier to voters to choose candidates based on their policy preferences.** And the evidence from recent elections indicates that **far from turning off ordinary Americans, partisan polarization has led to increased levels of interest and participation** among the public. Voter turnout was the highest in 40 years in 2008 and early indications are that turnout will also be high in the 2010 midterm elections. And more Americans are also talking about politics, displaying yard signs and bumper stickers, and giving money to the parties and candidates.

[...]

Polarization can actually help to overcome gridlock in government by increasing party discipline so that after an election the majority party can enact its policy agenda. **Because of polarization, the Democratic majority in the current Congress was able to maintain enough unity to pass a strong economic stimulus bill and a major health care reform bill over near-unanimous Republican opposition.** And if you don't like those policies, because of polarization you know which party to hold responsible in the next election.

Direct democracy has no effect on SES's influence on turnout

Fatke 2013 [Matthias Fatke, political science professor, "Participation and Political Equality in Direct Democracy: Educative Effect or Social Bias", *University of Bern*, <ftp://ftp.repec.org/opt/ReDIF/RePEc/bss/files/wp3/fatke-2013-dd_and_social_equality.pdf>] //DNP + CJC

This paper juxtaposes two positions in the recently heated debate on **direct democracy**. On the one side, sceptics fear that due to the complexity of issues, citizens with high SES are more inclined to participate in direct democracies, thus increasing political inequality. On the other side, **proponents invoke the educative effect of participatory institutions, which should particularly stimulate citizens with low SES to participate, thus decreasing social bias of the electorate.** Thereby, this study constitutes the first systematical comparison between direct and representative democracy in terms of SES influence on participation. So does SES matter more or less in direct democracy? To test both arguments **empirically**, we computed crosslevel interactions of SES and direct democracy variables and estimated their marginal effect 21 on political participation. We used data from the Swiss cantons that provide a unique case for analysing direct democratic contexts. **Results of our series of analyses are unambiguous.** **There is no evidence that SES affects participation in direct democracies significantly more or less than in representative systems.** **This finding may serve** both as relieve for sceptics as well **as disappointment for enthusiasts of direct democracy.**

Direct democracy has no effect on political efficacy

Dyck 2008 [Joshua Dyck is a political science professor at the University of Buffalo, "Direct Democracy and Political Efficacy Reconsidered", *Political Behavior Journal*, <<http://www.csus.edu/uld/define/samplescholarship/dyck%20and%20lascher%20direct%20democ%20and%20political%20efficacy-%20published%20pb%20version.pdf>>] //DNP + CJC

Some studies have contended that **direct democracy** has secondary benefits unrelated to its impact on policy. In particular, recent scholarship **claims that the American ballot initiative process enhances political efficacy.** We began with concerns about the logic and empirical methods underlying this conclusion. We connect this research to the broader political psychology literature and in doing so find little reason to expect a positive relationship between direct democracy and efficacy. **Our other contribution is to subject the empirical claim to more extensive testing.** In contrast to prior research, we draw from multiple data sources and consider sampling methods. **The results consistently fail to indicate that direct democracy generally enhances political efficacy.** We find cause for skepticism about the secondary benefits of the ballot initiative process.

[...]

By presenting data from the **General Social Survey, American National Election Study, and PEW Trust in Government survey,** we have followed these principles and **consistently found no general relationship between direct democracy and political efficacy.**

We do find some sub-sample effects which support the notion that direct legislation has the capacity to increase efficacy among some respondents, but also has the potential to substantially decrease efficacy for others. Additionally, we hasten to note that we are unable to consider the effect of direct democracy on efficacy for those on the winning versus the losing side of specific ballot measure elections.

Americans Support the Electoral System, abolishing would be terrible

Gabbay, 2016 [Tiffany Gabbay, "Newsflash to Democrats: Americans Do Not Want to Abolish Electoral College," David Horowitz Freedom Center, 7 December 2016, <http://www.truthrevolt.org/news/newsflash-democrats-americans-do-not-want-abolish-electoral-college>] //ES

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While Democrats continue to rail against the Electoral College and push for its abolition, a new Gallup survey reveals that **the majority of Americans support the institution.** What's more, **the lowest percentage of Americans in history support a Constitutional amendment that would eliminate the Electoral College and replace it with the popular vote.**

[...]

Gallup posits that one possible reason for the decline in support for amending the Constitution to abolish the Electoral College lies in the fact that Republicans are "aware that President-elect Trump would not have won the presidency without [it]."

While this much may be true, the answer is more nuanced. Republicans -- and really any fair-minded person regardless of his or her political affiliation -- are aware that **the popular vote is an inherently flawed and unfair electoral system.** While it may seem counterintuitive, **basing political elections on the popular vote model would ensure that a small handful of states that boast highly populated urban centers like California, New York, and Illinois, would determine the outcome of each and every election ad infinitum.**

Without the Electoral College, the nation's elections would be a forgone conclusion, forever determined by the prevailing group-think of big city denizens. The Electoral College is an elegant system designed to give a single citizen in rural Montana the same chance of his or her voice being heard as the majority in San Francisco -- and that is about as American as it gets. Of course the Democratic Machine knows this, and it is why it continues to push the popular vote system.

No Removal w/o Congress

Francis 16 [David Francis, March 21 2016, Obama's Cuba Reset is now in the hands of congress. Too bad it won't budge", *Foreign Policy*, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/21/obamas-cuba-reset-is-now-in-the-hands-of-congress-too-bad-congress-wont-budge/>] //BS

For U.S. President Barack Obama, this week's trip to Cuba helps cement a foreign-policy legacy that now includes ending more than five decades of strife with a onetime Cold War rival. For Cuban President Raúl Castro, the visit represents a chance to welcome American tourists and businesses. **But without help from Congress, Obama will have done about all he can to normalize relations.** What the American president has done since the normalization process began in December 2014 is significant. He has made it easier for U.S. citizens to travel there, though tourism in the traditional sense is still prohibited. Obama has eased restrictions on U.S. businesses plying their trade in Cuba; as he visited, Starwood Hotels & Resorts became the [first](#) U.S. hotel chain to sign a deal with Cuba since the 1959 revolution. Obama is set to attend a Major League Baseball exhibition game in Havana on Tuesday. In December 2015, Washington and Havana announced the resumption of direct flights between the countries. **But Obama can't do much more unless Congress acts to repeal the 1996 Helms-Burton Act, which formalized the embargo** put in place by President John F. Kennedy in 1962 **and bars the executive branch from lifting it without congressional approval.** In other words, without the help of Congress, Obama can't fully lift all financial penalties against Havana, and proponents of the move have [acknowledged](#) that is unlikely to happen while Republicans control both the House and the Senate. Some Republicans, including Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.) and Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (R-Fla.), have vowed to fight it down the line.

Helms burton requires prior democratization, which isn't happening

Stratfor 16 [Reggie Thompson, September 2016, "Why Cuba's Half-Century Embargo Won't Be Lifted Overnight" <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/why-cubas-half-century-embargo-wont-be-lifted-overnight>] //WGC

"Analysis Whether Cuba will soon undergo an economic revolution depends more on politics in Washington than in Havana. After all, the only thing standing in the way of unrestricted trade between the world's largest economy and the island nation just 145 kilometers (90 miles) south of it is an embargo that rests on U.S. law. But after U.S. voters in November choose a new president, and perhaps change the makeup of the Senate and House of Representatives, the U.S. Congress could begin discussing the embargo's end. Lifting the long-standing sanctions against Cuba will be easier said than done, though, especially given the lingering controversy over [Havana's thawing relations with Washington](#). Even if the next U.S. president were willing to begin restoring trade ties between the two countries, there is little to suggest that a post-embargo Cuban government would look much different from the one in power today — a problem that will no doubt create headaches for whoever wins the U.S. election." "But even with Castro's departure, the structure of the Cuban government is unlikely to change enough to comply with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, one of the most important pieces of U.S.

law presently upholding the embargo. **The law, also known as the Helms-Burton Act, stipulates that U.S. recognition of the Cuban government would require the disbandment of several Cuban intelligence and security institutions, the establishment of an independent judiciary and competitive elections. Yet it is unlikely that any Cuban administration — even one in financial straits as dire as the Diaz-Canel government would be — would**

agree to such a massive overhaul in exchange for the embargo's end. Cuba's reluctance can largely be explained by the fact that many of the officials in its current government rose to power under Fidel Castro and will continue to serve after his brother is replaced in 2018. The government the Castro brothers erected during their five-decade rule is civilian in name only and is heavily underpinned by the political and economic backing of the Cuban armed forces.”

Nationwide campaign requires more private funding

Editorial Board, 11-10-2016 [, "Keep the Electoral College: Our view," USA TODAY, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/11/10/electoral-college-popular-vote-donald-trump-hillary-clinton-editorials-debates/93609562/>] MJS 3-1-2017

But those clamoring to dump the system cobbled together by the nation's Founders — which gives each state as many electoral votes as it has members of Congress — should be careful what they wish for. **Adopting a national popular vote would trade one set of problems for another.** Electoral College opponents argue that the system pushes candidates to ignore states that Republicans or Democrats consider sure things and focus on a dozen battleground states during the campaigns. But Tuesday's election showed that the Electoral College map is more fluid than many people believed. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, considered reliably Democratic, swung Republican. If the national popular vote were the ultimate decider, candidates would gravitate toward the voter-rich big cities and their suburbs and ignore everyone else. **If candidates felt obliged to blanket the entire country with visits and advertising, it would set off a scramble for even more campaign money, leaving candidates more beholden to special interests.**

Abolishing the EC would cause more desperation for big donors

Ryan Teague Beckwith, 11-17-2016 [, "How Campaigns Would Work If We Ended the Electoral College," <http://time.com/4573821/electoral-college-popular-vote-campaigns/>] MJS 3-5-2017

For the fifth time in history, the U.S. has elected a president who lost the popular vote, renewing calls to abolish the Electoral College and move to a simpler system. But strategists who have worked on presidential campaigns say that would change the way elections run dramatically, possibly exacerbating some of the complaints Americans have about their current system. They say that **under a national popular vote, they would push their candidates to** spend more time in TV interviews; hold more rallies in big cities like New York, Houston and Los Angeles; **raise vastly more money for nationwide advertising, direct mail and voter outreach;** and focus more on their party base than swing voters. In short, **if you were unhappy with the 2016 election because it featured a charismatic celebrity holding big rallies and doing cable TV interviews facing off against a longtime politician raising hundreds of millions of dollars**

from major donors, you might not like how campaigns under a popular vote would turn out.

[...]

That would exacerbate a trend that reached new heights this year, with Republican Donald Trump getting as much as \$5 billion in free publicity on TV, according to mediaQuant, which tracked media coverage of both candidates and came up with a dollar value based on advertising rates. **To compete, strategists say candidates would need to raise a lot more money to air ads in more expensive media markets in the country's top urban areas,** instead of just the handful of battleground states each cycle. **Fundraising would also have to increase to pay for more campaign offices across the country, especially in big cities with higher average rents, as well as direct mail and even online outreach for the entire country.** That, too, would **exacerbate a trend that accelerated this year, with the team backing Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton raising more than \$1 billion for her campaign, party and joint fundraising committees and super PACs supporting her.** Sarah Isgur Flores, who advised Republican Carly Fiorina this year, said that would mean **candidates would either be more beholden to fundraising or else they would need to be famous enough to kickstart a campaign on their own, as both Trump and Clinton did.** "Celebrities would become much more viable candidates," she said. "You'd really need everyone to know your name right off the bat, since you wouldn't have time to build name ID."

Spec interests distort 1P1V

Gene M. Grossman (econ professor), and Elhanan Helpman, Summer 2000 ["Special Interest Groups and Economic Policy," NBER, <http://www.nber.org/reporter/summer00/grosshelp.html>] MJS 3-16-2017

In the idealized democratic society, economic policy is determined by "one man, one vote." But in all real societies, special interest groups play an important role in the process that determines economic policy. Pressure groups represent relatively narrow interests, for example of peanut farmers, auto workers, or shareholders of firms that produce semiconductors. They also represent broader interests, such as those of retired workers, capital owners, and those with special concerns for the environment.

[...]

Our forthcoming book will discuss other ways that interest groups might use their knowledge of the issues to influence the policy process. (11) Among these are attempts at persuasion by lobbyists in one-on-one meetings with policymakers, public information campaigns aimed at the general voter, and resorting to costly displays such as those that took place in Seattle. Our book will also provide an integrated treatment of **campaign contributions as a means of policy influence** and will incorporate numerous examples of applications to specific policy questions.

Popular vote increases fraud, especially in highly partisan districts

Von Spakovsky 2011 [Hans von Spakovsky Election Law Reform Initiative and Senior Legal Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, "Destroying the Electoral College: The Anti-Federalist National Popular Vote Scheme", *Heritage Foundation*, <http://www.heritage.org/election-integrity/report/destroying-the-electoral-college-the-anti-federalist-national-popular?_ga=1.213754836.1522943971.1488386128#_ftn5>] MJS

Another unforeseen consequence of the NPV is that the plan would encourage vote fraud. **Currently, a fraudulent vote** is counted only in the district in which it was cast and therefore **can affect the electoral votes only in that particular state. Under the NPV, however, vote fraud in any state would affect the aggregate national vote. To a would-be wrongdoer, this is a drastic increase in the potential benefit obtained from casting fraudulent ballots.** Fraudsters would be encouraged to engage in fraud to obtain further votes for their national candidate or to deny votes for the opposition candidate. **Under the current system, there are some states where such fraud would make no difference, but with the NPV, every fraudulent vote obtained anywhere could make the difference in changing the outcome of the national race. This prospect is even more worrisome when one considers how much easier it is to cast fraudulent votes in strongly partisan neighborhoods** and one-party districts where there are no (or few) members of the opposition party to work as election officials or poll watchers. **There is little incentive to engage in such partisan fraud where it is most possible now, since the dominant party is likely to win anyway, but under the NPV scheme, there is an increased incentive to engage in fraud in such states that are the most corrupt** and one-sided even if others have relatively clean elections. Thus, this scheme makes all states—especially one-party states and those with a history of tolerating fraud—targets for fraud, likely increasing this type of misbehavior nationwide. It should be noted that “[t]he popular vote winner has triumphed in 42 of 45 elections.”[52] Supporters of NPV point to those elections (1876, 1888, and 2000) where the popular vote winner did not prevail. But Bradley Smith concludes that “the Electoral College clearly played a democratizing and equalizing role” in the 1876 and 1888 elections that “almost certainly better corresponded to true popular sentiment than did reported popular vote totals.” Why? Because in the 1876 election, for example, where Samuel Tilden defeated Rutherford B. Hayes in the popular vote, there was “rampant vote fraud and suppression in the southern states [that] make the actual vote totals from that election unknowable.” Similarly, in the 1888 election, Southern states voted overwhelmingly for Cleveland, the national popular vote winner, while Republican Benjamin Harrison carried the rest of the nation, winning 20 of 25 states. If blacks had not had their votes suppressed, there is little doubt that Harrison, as a Republican, would have received almost the entire black vote and would have won the national popular vote, which he lost by less than 100,000 votes.[53]

Empirical fraud in direct election in Washington State

Pete Du Pont, 2006 [former governor of Delaware, chairman of the Dallas-based National Center for Policy Analysis, "Outside the Box," WSJ

<https://web.archive.org/web/20091001064458/http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/pdupont/?id=110008855>] MJS 3-2-2017

Second, **in any direct national election there would be significant election-fraud concerns.** In the 2000 Bush-Gore race, Mr. **Gore's 540,000-vote margin amounted to 3.1 votes in each of the country's 175,000 precincts.** "Finding" three votes per precinct in urban areas is not a difficult thing, or as former presidential scholar and Kennedy advisor Theodore White testified before the Congress in 1970, **There is an almost unprecedented chaos that comes in the system where the change of one or two votes per precinct can switch the national election of the United States.** **Washington state's 2004 governor's race was decided by just 129 votes. A judge found 1,678 illegal votes were cast,** and it turned out that 1,200 more votes were counted in Seattle's King County than the number of people recorded as voting. This affected just Washington state, but **in a direct national election where everything hangs on a small number of urban districts, such manipulations could easily decide presidencies.**

Never meant to have one person one vote — Senate proves your arguments about favoring rural areas is non-unique

Kimberling 1992 [William Kimberling is Deputy Director of the FEC Office of Election Administration, "THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE", *Federal Election Commission*, <<http://www.fec.gov/pdf/eleccoll.pdf>>] //CJC

In response to these arguments, **proponents of the Electoral College point out that it was never intended to reflect the national popular will.** As for the first issue, that the Electoral College over-represents rural populations, proponents respond that **the United States Senate - with two seats per State regardless of its population -- over-represents rural populations far more dramatically.** But since **there have been no serious proposals to abolish the United States Senate on these grounds, why should such an argument be used to abolish the lesser case of the Electoral College?** Because the presidency represents the whole country? But so, as an institution, does the United States Senate.

No system is perfectly democratic - there is no impact

Posner 2012 [Richard Posner is a judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, and a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. "In Defense of the Electoral College", *Slate*, <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2012/11/defending_the_electoral_college.html>] MJS

Against these reasons to retain the Electoral College the argument that it is undemocratic falls flat. **No form of representative democracy,** as distinct from direct democracy, is or **aspires to be perfectly democratic.** Certainly not our federal government. **In the entire executive and judicial branches, only two officials are elected—the president and vice president.** All the rest are appointed—federal Article III judges for life.

Direct democracy causes less welfare spending

Feld 2006 [Lars Feld is professor of economic policy, "The Effect of Direct Democracy on Income Redistribution: Evidence for Switzerland", *London School of Economics and Political Science*, <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/19287/1/The_Effect_of_Direct_Democracy_on_Income_Redistribution_Evidence_for_Switzerland.pdf>] //DNP + CJC

There is an intensive dispute in political economics about the impact of institutions on income redistribution. While the main focus is on comparison between different forms of representative democracy, **the influence of direct democracy on redistribution** has attracted much less attention. According to theoretical arguments and previous empirical results, government policies of income redistribution are expected to be more in line with median voter preferences in direct than in representative democracies. In this paper, we find that **institutions of direct democracy are associated with lower public spending and revenue, particularly lower welfare spending and broad-based income and property (wealth) tax revenue.** Moreover, we estimate a model which explains the determinants of redistribution using panel data provided by the Swiss Federal Tax Office from 1981 to 1997 and a cross section of (representative) individual data from 1992. While our results indicate that less public funds are used to redistribute income and actual redistribution is lower, inequality is not reduced to a lesser extent in direct than in representative democracies for a given initial income distribution. This finding might well indicate the presence of efficiency gains in redistribution policies.

[...]

Table 2 contains the estimation results for the components of cantonal expenditure and revenue. **In all equations, direct democracy has the expected negative sign and is significant at least at the 5 percent level of significance.** The coefficient in the public revenue equation (2) is

of similar magnitude as the one in the public expenditure equation (1), and the one in the tax revenue equation (3) is slightly bigger in absolute terms. Thus, in cantons with **stronger direct democratic institutions less revenue is raised, and accordingly less money is spent**. The fact that the tax revenue-lowering impact is (slightly) stronger than the one on overall revenue supports previous findings that **direct democratic systems rely less on broad-based redistributive taxes for financing public goods than more representative democratic systems** (FELD and MATSUSAKA 2003a, MATSUSAKA 1995). **The coefficient of direct democracy in the welfare expenditure regression (4) is more than four times larger than those observed in the previous regressions.** Direct democracy thus reduces the log of sub-federal welfare spending much more strongly than expenditure or revenue. Moreover, **its impact is stronger than that of most of the other fiscal policy variables** (budgetary constraints and tax competition), as indicated by the magnitude of its estimated coefficients. These results again corroborate the earlier findings in the literature¹²) and are in line with the arguments presented above. We conclude that in a **direct democracy the government obtains considerably lower funds for redistribution.**

Direct democracy causes tyranny and regional ethnic conflict — empirics prove

Barry Fagin is senior fellow at the Independence Institute, a free market think tank in Denver, November 24, 2016, Greeley Tribune, Electoral College a Check on Majority Rule, <http://www.greeleytribune.com/news/opinion/fagin-electoral-college-a-check-on-tyranny-of-majority-rule/#> //CJC

The Founders could have written direct democracy into the Constitution, but they didn't. There's a good reason for that. They were well-versed in history and political philosophy and knew that **simple majority rule could easily lead to tyranny. Under majority rule, it's easy for the majority to oppress a minority, regardless of the party in power.** Yes, conservative majorities can tyrannize religious, racial, ethnic and sexual minorities. But liberal majorities can tyrannize, too. As hard as it may be for Clinton supporters to accept, there are thoughtful, reasonable people who do not share liberal positions on gun control, health care or how much of their wealth belongs to government. **All they ask is that their individual autonomy in those and other decisions be taken seriously,** regardless of whether they're outvoted in any given election. **Majority power is a two-edged sword.** That's why we have a Constitution and a Supreme Court: **To protect the rights of minorities against tyranny of the majority.** That's why **America is not a democracy. We're a constitutional republic. The Electoral College is part of that. Let's not forget about the specter of regional conflict that more direct democracies are vulnerable to.** Sure, California and Texas occasionally mutter about seceding, but it's just noise. By contrast, **ethnically concentrated regions of countries all across the globe have seen brutal violence and outright war because their political interests were ignored by far-away majorities who ruled over them.** **The electoral college helps mitigate that risk** by incentivizing presidential candidates to pay attention to all parts of the country.

Discrepancies in PV and EC are irrelevant — the results would have been different if people were trying to win PV but they weren't—and no effect on legitimacy

Michael Herz, law professor and Co-Director, Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy, Cardozo, Cardozo Law Review, May 2005, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION?: ROBERT DAHL'S HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION?: AN INTRODUCTION, WITH NOTES ON THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, p. 1195-6] //CJC

The World Series analogy should diminish concern over the winner of the popular vote not becoming President in a second way as well. Everyone understands and accepts that when a game is set up according to certain rules, the players act strategically in light of those rules. A manager who is trying to win the most games will adopt different strategies than a manager trying to score the most runs – a sacrifice bunt or a defensive replacement in the late innings of a close game makes sense if it is important to win games, but does not if all that matters is total runs. It is impossible to look at the results of a contest played under one set of rules and know what would have happened under a different set of rules, because the game would not have been played the same way. **Applied to the presidential elections, the point is that we do not know who would have won the most total votes if total votes were what the candidates were trying to maximize.** Invoking the World Series (of course), John McGinnis makes this point: **The popular vote result has no electoral meaning because the candidates were not in a contest for the popular vote. If they had been seeking the highest popular vote, they would have campaigned entirely differently.** George Bush would have campaigned more in Texas to run up his vote and Al Gore would have campaigned more in California. Both would have campaigned more in urban areas because it is easier to turn out the vote there. They would have run their television advertisements in different places and perhaps even run different advertisements altogether. **Given the less than four tenths of a percentage point difference between Bush and Gore, we cannot be certain who would have won the popular vote...** Accordingly, **it is not entirely coherent to label those instances in which the college winner loses the popular vote as “misfirings” of the electoral college.** Speaking before the 2000 election, and anticipating a possible Gore victory in the electoral college and loss of the popular vote, Walter Dellinger made precisely the same argument in **rejecting the claim that such an outcome would undermine the winner's legitimacy:** **“There's no real legitimacy argument. If the presidency was decided by the popular vote, the two candidates would have run different races. We simply don't know who would have won.”** This is inescapably true, at least for a relatively close election such as that of 2000 (or 1888 or 1876). This is not to say that the campaign incentives that the electoral college creates are the right ones. But **the system creates certain incentives, and given those incentives we cannot know what the outcome would have been under a different set of rules; therefore the inconsistency between electoral and popular vote outcomes should bother us less than it otherwise would.** The analogy to the World Series is useful because it helps make all this clear by invoking a setting where exactly the same dynamic operates and is understood and accepted.

Only happens once every 100 years

David **Strömberg**, June 2008 [IIES, Stockholm University, "How the Electoral College Influences Campaigns and Policy: The Probability of Being Florida," Forthcoming American Economic Review, <http://perseus.iies.su.se/~dstro/ElectoralCollege.pdf>] MJS

Often discussed concerns are presidents without a majority of the popular vote and razor-thin victories. Since these are very rare events, it is hard to estimate their probabilities using empirical frequencies. However, given that the elections 1948-2004 are representative of future elections, these probabilities can be estimated by using the model to simulate elections and recording event frequencies. The estimated probability of a winning margin less than 1000 votes is about 40 times higher under the Electoral College system (0.8 percent compared to 0.02 percent under Direct Vote). **The estimated probability of electing a president without a majority of the popular vote is about four percent. This implies that we should expect this outcome about once in every hundred years.** Historically, it has happened around three (perhaps four) times in the last 200 years: 1824 (perhaps), 1876, 1888, and 2000. Arguably, however, the outcomes in 1824 and 1876 had to do with peculiarities in the aggregation of votes.

Rural votes good - ensures infrastructure gets built

Emily **Badger**, 11-20-2016 [, "As American as Apple Pie? The Rural Vote's Disproportionate Slice of Power," New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/upshot/as-american-as-apple-pie-the-rural-votes-disproportionate-slice-of-power.html>] MJS 3-16-2017

The Electoral College then allocates votes according to a state's congressional delegation: Wyoming (with one House representative and two senators) gets three votes; California (53 representatives and two senators) gets 55. Those two senators effectively give Wyoming three times more power in the Electoral College than its population would suggest. Apply the same math to California and it would have 159 Electoral College votes. And the entire state of Wyoming already has fewer residents than the average California congressional district. **In Washington, these imbalances directly influence who gets what, through small-state minimums** (no state can receive below a certain share of education funding) and through formulas that privilege rural states (early road spending was doled out in part by land area and not road use). **There are policy reasons that the country might want to disproportionately spend resources on places with few people. Repairing an interstate highway in rural Oklahoma keeps national commerce flowing. And when the private market won't build essential infrastructure, public investments like the New Deal's rural electrification help fight poverty.**

Power will centralize in urban areas

Gregg, Gary. "Electoral College keeps elections fair." Politico, 05 Dec. 2012. Web. 3 Mar. 2017. <<http://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/keep-electoral-college-for-fair-presidential-votes-084651>>.

“Barack Obama received 3.3 million more votes than Mitt Romney in the Nov. 6 election, but won 3.6 million more votes than Romney in just four cities — Chicago, Philadelphia, New York and Los Angeles. He won those margins without much of a campaign. Now, imagine an Obama candidacy free of the need to appeal to Ohio factory workers, Colorado cattlemen, Iowa hog farmers and Virginia police officers, and you start to get the picture. **If the United States does away with the Electoral College, future presidential elections will go to candidates and parties willing to cater to urban voters and skew the nation’s policies toward big-city interests. Small-town issues and rural values will no longer be their concern. Cities already are the homes of America’s major media, donor, academic and government centers.** A simple, direct democracy will centralize all power — government, business, money, media and vote — in urban areas to the detriment of the rest of the nation.

No difference in turnout when controlling for demographics

Scott Ashworth and Joshua D. Clinton, 2006 [Department of Politics, Princeton University, "Does Advertising Exposure Affect Turnout?," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, https://my.vanderbilt.edu/joshclinton/files/2011/10/AC_QJPS2007.pdf] MJS 3-27-2017

We identify an exogenous source of variation in exposure to campaign advertising in the 2000 presidential election, based on residence in battleground states. **If exposure to campaign advertising makes a potential voter significantly more likely to vote, then we should see significantly greater turnout in battleground states. We do not. This result is robust to several specifications and evident in a natural experiment consisting of New Jersey residents.** Conditional on existing campaign targeting strategies, campaigns do not affect the turnout decisions of the voters we study.

[...]

We analyze the results of a survey administered by Knowledge Networks. **The survey was administered to 4,000 randomly selected panelists** over the age of 18 from the Knowledge Networks panel on 27 October 2000. Respondents could complete the survey until 7 November 2000 and 68% of the respondents completed the survey.

[...]

We control for individual-level heterogeneity based on: political interest, gender, strength of partisanship, an indicator for Black respondents, an indicator for Hispanic respondents, and age. We also use indicators for union members and respondents who attend church “once or twice a month” or more to control for possible mobilization efforts undertaken by unions and churches in the 2000 election.⁵ We also use an indicator variable for voters who live in one of the 20 states identified by CNN as a battleground state for the 2000 presidential election: Washington, Oregon, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Wisconsin, Illinois, Tennessee, Michigan, Ohio, West Virginia, Florida, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Maine.⁶ Approximately 39% of our sample resides in a battleground state. Finally, we control for the political context by indicating whether senatorial and gubernatorial elections were held in the state.

[...]

Our main empirical finding is readily apparent in Table 1: residents of battleground states are no more likely to vote than residents of other states. Even if we attribute all of the possible differences in campaign activity and news coverage between battleground and non-battleground states to advertising – a move that surely overstates the true impact of advertising – the effect is essentially 0.7. And this is in spite of a considerable difference in self-reported exposure to advertising (21.2%). This represents prima-facie evidence against the claim that advertising increases turnout. (The next section addresses concerns that covariate differences explain this pattern, but the substantive conclusion of Table 1 persists.)

Getting rid of the electoral college means the death of federalism — causes elimination of the Senate, states, and the constitution

Guelzo 2016 [Allen Guelzo is Professor of the Civil War Era and Director of the Civil War Era Studies at Gettysburg College, “In defense of the electoral college”, *Washington Post*, https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/11/15/in-defense-of-the-electoral-college/?utm_term=.676edcaea31c#comments] //CJC

All of which is strange because **the electoral college is at the core of our system of**

federalism. The Founders who sat in the 1787 Constitutional Convention lavished an extraordinary amount of argument on the electoral college, and it was by no means one-sided. The great Pennsylvania jurist James Wilson believed that “if we are to establish a national Government,” the president should be chosen by a direct, national vote of the people. But wise old Roger Sherman of Connecticut replied that the president ought to be elected by Congress, since he feared that direct election of presidents by the people would lead to the creation of a monarchy. “An independence of the Executive [from] the supreme Legislature, was in his opinion the very essence of tyranny if there was any such thing.” Sherman was not trying to undermine the popular will, but to keep it from being distorted by a president who mistook popular election as a mandate for dictatorship. Quarrels like this flared all through the convention, until, at almost the last minute, James Madison “took out a Pen and Paper, and sketched out a mode of Electing the President” by a “college” of “Electors ... chosen by those of the people in each State, who shall have the Qualifications requisite.” The Founders also designed the operation of the electoral college with unusual care. The portion of Article 2, Section 1, describing the electoral college is longer and descends to more detail than any other single issue the Constitution addresses. More than the federal judiciary — more than the war powers — more than taxation and representation. It prescribes in precise detail how “Each State shall appoint ... a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress”; how these electors “shall vote by Ballot” for a president and vice president; how they “shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate” the results of their balloting; how a tie vote must be resolved; what schedule the balloting should follow; and on and on. Above all, the electoral college had nothing to do with slavery. Some historians have branded the electoral college this way because each state’s electoral votes are based on that “whole Number of Senators and Representatives” from each State, and in 1787 the number of those representatives was calculated on the basis of the infamous 3/5ths clause. But the electoral college merely reflected the numbers, not any bias about slavery (and in any case, the 3/5ths clause was not quite as proslavery a compromise as it seems, since Southern slaveholders wanted their slaves counted as 5/5ths for determining representation in Congress, and had to settle for a whittled-down fraction). As much as the abolitionists before the Civil War liked to talk about the “proslavery Constitution,” this was more of a rhetorical posture than a serious historical argument. And the simple fact remains, from the record of the Constitutional Convention’s proceedings (James Madison’s famous Notes), that the discussions of the electoral college and the method of electing a president never occur in the context of any of the convention’s two climactic debates over slavery. If anything, it was the electoral college that made it possible to end slavery, since Abraham Lincoln earned only 39 percent of the popular vote in the election of 1860, but won a crushing victory in the electoral college. This, in large measure, was why Southern slaveholders stampeded to secession in 1860-61. They could do the numbers as well as anyone, and realized that the electoral college would only produce more anti-slavery Northern presidents. Yet, even on those terms, it is hard for Americans to escape the uncomfortable sense that, by inserting an extra layer of “electors”

between the people and the president, the electoral college is something less than democratic. **But even if we are a democratic nation, that**

is not all we are. The Constitution also makes us a federal union, and the electoral college is pre-eminently both the symbol and a practical implementation of that federalism. The states of

the union existed before the Constitution, and in a practical sense, existed long before the revolution. Nothing guaranteed that, in 1776, the states would all act together, and nothing that guaranteed that after the Revolution they might not go their separate and quarrelsome ways, much like the German states of the 18th century or the South

American republics in the 19th century. The genius of the Constitutional Convention was its ability to entice the American states into a “more perfect union.” But **it was still a union of states, and we probably wouldn’t have had a constitution or a country at all unless the route we took was federalism. The electoral college was an integral part of that federal plan. It made a place for the states as well as the people in electing the president by giving them a say at different points in a federal process and preventing big-city populations from dominating the election of a president. Abolishing the electoral college now might satisfy an irritated yearning for direct democracy, but it would also mean dismantling federalism. After that, there would be no sense in having a Senate (which, after all, represents the interests of the states), and further along, no sense even in having states, except as administrative departments of the central government. Those who wish to abolish the electoral college ought to go the distance, and do away with the**

entire federal system and perhaps even retire the Constitution, since the federalism it was designed to embody would have disappeared.

Federalism encourages political accountability, more involvement in democracy (turns turnout)

Neil Siefel, Associate Professor of Law and Political Science at Duke University School of Law, 2008 ("INTERNATIONAL DELEGATIONS AND THE VALUES OF FEDERALISM", Law and Contemporary Problems, Winter) //CJC

Second, democratic self-government is supposed to be facilitated when there exists a robust space for participatory politics at levels closer to the people who are governed. 21 **Federalism**, observed Justice O'Connor for the Court in Gregory, "**increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes.**" 22 On this point, she referenced Alexis de Tocqueville, who "understood well that **participation in local government is a cornerstone of American democracy.**" 23 Third, **political responsiveness and accountability are believed to be encouraged when states compete** for mobile citizens who can vote with both their hands and their feet. 24 Justice O'Connor wrote for the Gregory Court that **federalism "makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry."** 25 Responsiveness and accountability are distinguishable but related. One way to ensure responsiveness is not through exit but through voice 26 —that is, voting politicians out of office or pressuring them. This is often what is meant by accountability.

Money is buying vetoes - studies can't pick up on it

U Chicago Stigler Center, 5-2-2016 [, "Historical Comparison Shows the Extent of Growth in Political Contributions from Big Donors," Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, <https://research.chicagobooth.edu/stigler/indexes/campaign-financing-capture-index/campaign-financing-capture-historical-comparisons>] MJS 4-12-2017

Many politicians who receive money from super PACs claim that large donations do not affect their decision making, and despite the immense growth in political spending in recent years, **many academic researchers encounter difficulties when they search for empirical evidence** that campaign contributions influence legislation. Some succeed (see Powell 2012), but overall, most scholars tend to see campaign contributions as having little influence over policy. According to Coates, **this is partly due to** what he calls a "**research design problem.**" He adds: "Another thing is that **we have many, many vetoes in the political process. Some of the most effective money flows to people who are in a position to block something from happening, which is going to be harder to find evidence of, because by definition you're preserving the status quo.** You have to have some benchmark to measure what would have happened had the veto not been exercised. There are some studies that do find evidence of policy impact. These tend to be in places where the money is flowing to a committee chairman, or to specific influential members."

US federalism is essential to democracy worldwide

David Broder, *Washington Post*, June 24, 2001, "Lessons On Freedom." //CJC

Even more persistent were the questions about the role the United States would play, under this new administration, in supporting democratic movements around the world.

It is sobering to be reminded how often, during the long decades of the Cold War, this country backed (and in some cases, created) undemocratic regimes, simply because we thought military rulers and other autocrats were more reliable allies against communism. The week of the Salzburg Seminar coincided with President Bush's first tour of Europe. He was a target of jokes and ridicule for many of the fellows as the week began. But the coverage of his meetings and, especially, his major address in Poland on his vision of Europe's future and America's role in it, earned him grudging respect, even though it remains uncertain how high a priority human rights and promotion of democracy will have in the Bush foreign policy.

Another great lesson for an American reporter is that the struggle to maintain the legitimacy of representative

government in the eyes of the public is a worldwide battle. Election turnouts are dropping in almost all the established democracies, so much so that seminar participants seriously discussed the advisability of compulsory voting, before most of them rejected it as smacking too much of authoritarian regimes. Political parties -- which most of us have regarded as essential agents of democracy -- are in decline everywhere. They are viewed by more and more of the national publics as being tied to special interests or locked in increasingly irrelevant or petty rivalries -- anything but effective instruments for tackling current challenges. One large but unresolved question throughout the week: Can you organize and sustain representative government without strong parties? The single most impressive visitor to the seminar was Vaira Vike-Freiberga, the president of Latvia, a woman of Thatcherite determination when it comes to pressing for her country's admission to NATO, but a democrat who has gone through exile four times in her quest for freedom. She is a member of no party, chosen unanimously by a parliament of eight parties, and bolstered by her popular support. But how many such leaders are there? Meantime, even as democracy is tested everywhere from Venezuela to Romania to the Philippines, a new and perhaps tougher accountability examination awaits in the supranational organizations. The European Union has operated so far with a strong council, where each nation has a veto, and a weak parliament, with majority rule. But with its membership seemingly certain to expand, the age-old dilemma of democracy -- majority rule vs. minority and individual rights -- is bound to come to the fore. The principle of federalism will be vital to its success. And, once again, the United States has important lessons to teach. But only if we can keep democracy strong and vital in our own country.

Swing States are Representative of US

Richie Bernardo, 2-18-2016 [, "Electorate Representation Index: Which States Most Closely Resemble the U.S.?", *WalletHub*, <https://wallethub.com/edu/electorate-representation-index/18190/>] JSM, accessed: 3-17-2017

*NOTE: Illinois, Florida, Michigan, Arizona, Pennsylvania, Ohio, North Carolina, and Colorado are swing states

To determine which states most closely resemble the sociodemographic anatomy of the U.S. and its stances on certain national issues, WalletHub's analysts examined five key dimensions as they relate to the remaining primary-election states: 1) Sociodemographics, 2) Economy, 3) Education, 4) Religion, and 5) Public Opinion. First, we compiled 31 relevant metrics, which are listed below with their corresponding weights. For each metric, we calculated the absolute difference between the value for each state and the U.S. average value. In order to calculate the Overall Electorate Representation Index, we weighted the differences between the state and the U.S. based on each metric's weight and calculated a score between 0 and 100, wherein 100 corresponds with a perfect match with the U.S. reference values. Finally, we ranked the states based on the values of the Overall Electorate Representation Index.

Overall Rank	Electorate Representation Index	State	*Sociodemog Rank
1	94.35%	Illinois	1
2	94.32%	Florida	21
3	93.17%	Michigan	15
4	92.67%	Arizona	18
5	91.85%	Pennsylvania	25
6	91.71%	Ohio	29
7	90.92%	Indiana	13
8	90.81%	Delaware	6
9	90.59%	Missouri	24
10	90.58%	Virginia	3
11	90.52%	North Carolina	4
12	90.07%	Nebraska	27
13	89.83%	Colorado	10
14	89.63%	Texas	39
15	89.52%	Kansas	11
16	89.40%	Wisconsin	34
17	89.39%	Iowa	37
18	89.12%	New Mexico	43
19	88.83%	Minnesota	31
20	88.66%	Nevada	26
21	88.63%	Washington	7
22	88.26%	Oregon	23
23	88.17%	Georgia	30
24	88.00%	Maryland	20
25	87.99%	Rhode Island	14
26	87.70%	New Jersey	9
27	87.55%	New York	8
28	87.18%	Connecticut	2
29	87.09%	California	46
30	86.90%	Oklahoma	5
31	86.78%	Idaho	35
32	86.74%	South Carolina	19
33	86.11%	South Dakota	40
34	85.82%	Montana	45
35	85.71%	North Dakota	47
36	85.31%	Hawaii	50
37	85.06%	Alaska	33
38	84.41%	Kentucky	32
39	83.90%	Louisiana	28
40	83.72%	Wyoming	36
41	82.81%	Maine	49
42	82.74%	Tennessee	17
43	82.40%	Arkansas	12
44	82.11%	New Hampshire	42
45	80.37%	Utah	44
46	79.67%	Massachusetts	16
47	79.60%	Alabama	22
48	79.50%	West Virginia	41
49	78.32%	Mississippi	38
50	77.94%	Vermont	48

CUBAN EMBARGO ARG IS STUPID AND EMPIRICALLY DISPROVEN

Sopo 2017 [Giancarlo Sopo is a Democratic strategist and serves as the (pro-bono) chair of CubaOne Foundation, "Updated Analysis of the 2016 Cuban-American Vote," *Wordpress*, December 20, 2016, <https://giancarlosopoblog.com/2016/12/20/final-analysis-of-the-2016-cuban-american-vote/>] //WGC

"It's Unclear if U.S.-Cuba Policy Influenced Cuban-American Voters

It is unclear what, if any, role U.S.-Cuba policy plays in determining how Cuban-Americans vote. The data shows that voters' stances on the issue are not the best indicator of how they will vote.

- **According to an August 2016 study by Florida International University (FIU) with a sample of 743 Cuban-American voters, 72% of embargo supporters are Republicans, the vast majority of which would have voted for Trump regardless of Clinton's position on the issue.**

- Four out of 10 (41.6%) **Cuban-Americans electors** who said they support the new U.S. policy identified themselves as Trump supporters. **In addition, 55% of Cuban-American voters support the new Cuba policy. The study also found that 58% favor ending the U.S. embargo** (including 75% of Independent voters), and 61% support diplomatic relations with Cuba. Support for the new Cuba policy goes beyond the Cuban-American community. An October Bloomberg poll showed 67% of likely Florida voters favor engagement with Cuba.

However, **embargo advocates point to a pair of *New York Times*/Sienna College polls from September and October as proof that Trump enjoyed a + 20-point surge among Cubans after changing his position on Cuba policy to a more hardline stance. The problem with this conclusion is that given that the poll only interviewed approximately four dozen Cuban voters, the results are statistically unreliable.** In fact, the *Times* itself warned its readers the “survey did not sample a large number of Cuban voters, so the findings should be interpreted with caution.”

Meanwhile, **surveys with significant Cuban-American samples by pollsters from different political parties found that Donald Trump’s margins among Cuban-American voters did not change after his Cuba policy reversal.**

With Clinton making significant gains in Cuban-American neighborhoods; polls showing that majorities of Cuban voters support engagement policies; and no sign that Trump’s Cuba 180° helped him, **there is simply no evidence to backup the claim that Obama’s Cuba policy hurt Democrats or that a hardline stance benefited Republicans.**

The Cuban-American Vote Was Important, But Not Decisive in Florida

Some argue that Cuban-American voters cost Hillary Clinton the state of Florida. Two conditions are required for this to be true: (1) Clinton’s performance among Cubans would have to be unusually low *and* (2) Clinton would have won the state had she mirrored past performances among Cuban-Americans. The election results clearly show that Clinton surpassed Obama’s totals, and as *FiveThirtyEight* pointed out, “Cuban-Americans would have needed to vote for Hillary Clinton by an impossibly wide margin to swing the election her way, and Trump would have won the state if they hadn’t voted at all.”

Indeed, Cuban-American voters accounted for six percent (564,938) of the 9,415,638 Florida voters^[10] who cast a ballot for President. Even if Clinton had improved her performance among them by 10 points, it’s a gain of 57,000 votes—**well short of her statewide deficit of 114,000.** It’s clear that while Cuban-Americans remain an important political constituency, they were not the deciding factor in Present-elect Trump’s Florida win.

White Non-Hispanic Voters Propelled Trump to Victory in Florida

Trump’s performance among white non-Hispanics was the most important factor in his victory in Florida.

- In 2016, white non-Hispanic voters were 62% of the electorate; yet they made-up 81% of Trump’s statewide coalition. Republicans made gains in predominantly white non-Hispanic suburban and exurban counties in Central Florida. For example: Trump surpassed Mitt Romney’s margins in Pasco and Lake counties by 14,164 and 13,447 votes, respectively.
- Sixty-four percent of Florida’s white, non-Hispanic voters supported Donald Trump, while 32% backed Hillary Clinton. In 2012, President Obama and Mitt Romney received 61% and 37%, respectively, of Florida’s white non-Hispanic voters. Trump’s 32-point advantage was an eight-point improvement for the GOP from 2012.
- Had Clinton mirrored Obama’s 2012 performance among Florida’s white non-Hispanic voters and kept Trump at Romney’s support levels, she would have narrowed her 2016 gap among this demographic by approximately 467,015 votes—and maintained Florida in the Democratic column.

The Bottom Line

- **In 2016, Cuban-American voters supported Hillary Clinton at historically high levels.** Moreover, Democrats saw double-digit gains in Cuban neighborhoods, a sign that these voters are still in play.
- **Cuba policy is no longer the third rail of Florida politics for pro-engagement candidates. Based on the data (electoral and survey), neither Obama’s Cuba policy or Clinton’s support for ending the embargo affected the results. Moreover, Cuban-American voters did not determine the outcome in Florida.**
- It’s unclear if a candidate’s position on U.S.-Cuba policy—regardless of whether they support or oppose the embargo—determines how Cuban-Americans vote.
- **Taking a pro-embargo stance on Cuba is no longer the secret to convincing persuadable Cuban voters or winning in Florida where two thirds of all electors support ending the embargo. Six polls showed that Trump’s support among Cuban-American voters did not change after he reversed his U.S.-Cuba policy position to a more hardline stance. This is largely due to the fact that three out of**

four embargo supporters are Republicans, and were likely going to vote for Trump regardless of his position on Cuba.”

Two Party System Disregards Black Voters and Black Issues

Arielle Newton, 8-17-2016 [, "Column: It's time for black people to break the two-party system," *PBS NewsHour*, <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/its-time-for-black-people-to-break-the-two-party-system/>] JSM, accessed: 3-7-2017

To be a white spectator in this election season means to cast an uncomplicated vote dependent on personal value systems. **To be a black body witnessing this unprecedented election means to be in a constant state of conflict; to be caught in the middle of two great evils.**

I will not be voting for either mainstream candidate. **Hillary Clinton does not care deeply for black lives; she is a foreign policy hawk that has dismantled black and brown communities for profit and special interest. Trump is a thin--skinned coward.**

Many politically and civically engaged black folk are voting for Clinton come November. **Historically, the Democratic Party of which Clinton is the newly elected standard--bearer, has relied heavily on dedicated and reliable groups of black voters. Following the meteoric election of President Barack Obama, the Democratic Party is sure to reap the political benefits of the robust black voting bloc for years, --if not centuries-- to come.**

Compounded with the election of the first black president is the overarching strategic inclusion of black voices throughout Democratic contemporary political operations. **In recent times, the Democratic Party, with its well--stocked infrastructural establishment, has secured its allegiance of black voters through the careful installation of black political operatives and its comprehensive grassroots ground game. But the Democratic Party pays lip service to the black community, and does not represent any transformative pathway to wholehearted racial justice or black liberation.**

The Democratic Party is a master of reformist performance. They claim to care about the plight of black bodies and offer half measures that serve to placate black voters. Yet they are beholden to multi--national corporations and are incapable of introducing and implementing radical policies that will fundamentally reshape the anti--black construction of this nation. The Democratic establishment will never call for the abolition of law enforcement or economic reparations for black bodies; instead they'll call for police--worn body cameras and (maybe) "independent" oversight.

Less than 13% of campaign funds are from super PACs

Anu Narayanswamy, Dec 2016 [, "How much money is behind each campaign?," *Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/2016-election/campaign-finance/>] MJS 4-8-2017

Of the \$1.7 billion donated to support **Democratic** candidates, **13 percent was raised by super PACs** and other independent groups.

[...]

Of the \$621.4 million donated to support **Republican** candidates, **10 percent was raised by super PACs** and other independent groups.