Rachel and I negate.

<u>Our sole contentionOur sole contention is Securing the South .</u>

NAFTA harms Mexico in four ways.

The **first** is through killing corn.
USDA 08 explains that NAFTA increased agricultural trade between the US, Mexico, and Canada.
Edwards 18 finds that the US spends billions annually on farm subsidies, especially on corn, which is why **Vaughn 04** determines that US-grown corn is 27% cheaper than Mexican corn. Problematically, **Weisbrot 17** finds that this allows American farmers to flood the international market with their cheaper corn.

The impact is displacing Mexican farmworkers.
Weisbrot finds that the influx of cheaply priced American crops, especially corn, displaced 19% of the Mexican agricultural workforce. **Gonzalez 17** adds that two million farmers were directly put out of work, which caused a ripple effect in related sectors, which is why **Weisbrot** ultimately quantifies that 4.9 million people were displaced.

The **second** way NAFTA harms Mexico is through export processing zones.
Angulo 17 explains that NAFTA has caused Mexico to become a center of cheap manufacturing, where manufactured goods like cars can be produced and exported, but are rarely sold within Mexico.

Critically, this means that the Mexican market was oversaturated with production without seeing a comparable increase in consumption, which **Blecker 97** reports led to a trade deficit and a steep decline in the value of the peso, harming the Mexican market, especially in manufacturing.

This harm was worst for workers, as **Anderson 09** finds that NAFTA drove Mexican manufacturing wages down 11%.

The **third** is by increasing inequality.

Weisbrot 17 finds that NAFTA pushed 20.5 million more Mexicans below the poverty line.

Critically, **Gonzalez 17** finds that this poverty is largely concentrated in rural areas, which is why they continue that NAFTA created a so-called “two-speed” economy, under which the urban north industrialized, while the rural south was pushed into cyclical poverty. **Anderson 09** quantifies that rural poverty increased 82% as a result of NAFTA.

But wait, there's more, because this poverty also exacerbated inequality within Mexico, which is why **Polaski 04** finds that, as a result of NAFTA, the top 10% of the Mexican economy saw their incomes increase, while the other 90% saw a significant drop in income.

The **fourth** is by destroying the environment.

NAFTA destroys the Mexican environment in two ways.

a. Pollution

Zarsky 04 finds that NAFTA has worsened the environment in Mexico, specifically increasing air pollution, water pollution, and toxins at a rate faster than GDP and population growth.

Skidmore 10 furthers that only 12% of the eight million tons of hazardous waste produced by export processing zones is properly treated and disposed, continuing that NAFTA has caused a 29% increase in water pollution and 97% increase in air pollution.

Vaughan 04 quantifies that NAFTA has led to a 2% annual increase in carbon monoxide and sulfur dioxide due to changes in the transportation sector and transit of NAFTA-traded goods, contributing directly to the spike in Mexican air pollution.

McAuliff 14 corroborates that greenhouse gas emissions increased by more than 1.3 billion metric tons over 15 years as a result of NAFTA.

Vaughan ultimately determines that air pollution in Mexico has increased 10% as a result of NAFTA.

b. Deforestation

Vaughan determines that NAFTA caused Mexico to increase its deforestation rate, continuing that deforestation disproportionately harms poorer citizens.

The impact of environmental damages is severe.
Audley 04 quantifies that the pollution caused by NAFTA results in $36 billion dollars per year of economic damages. **Civitello et al 15** adds that poor environmental quality leads to disease and cyclical poverty.

Skidmore concludes that NAFTA-created pollution in Mexico has increased rates of asthma, cancer, and respiratory illnesses, and has doubled the rates of birth defects in children born near factories or roads that transport goods sold under NAFTA.

Thus, we negate.

Cards:

Skidmore 10 Skidmore, Thomas E, Peter H. Smith, and James N. Green. Modern Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Print. Companion website by Cameron Parsons. Skidmore graduated in political science and philosophy in 1954 from Denison University. He received a Fulbright Fellowship to study philosophy at Magdalen College, Oxford where he met his wife Felicity. He received a second B.A. in Philosophy, Politics and Economics in 1956 and a master's degree in 1959. He obtained his Ph.D. at Harvard University in 1960 with a thesis on the German Chancellor Leo von Caprivi.[2] His attention shifted to South America after the Cuban Revolution. His Harvard post-doctorate focused on Brazil. In 1967 he published Politics in Brazil: 1930-64, An Experiment in Democracy.[2] In 1966, Skidmore joined the faculty of the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He became a full professor in 1968. In 1986, Skidmore moved to Brown University.[2] https://library.brown.edu/create/modernlatinamerica/chapters/chapter-12-strategies-for-economic-developmen/nafta-free-trade-and-the-environment-in-mexico/ // RH

Since the implementation of NAFTA, environmental degradation in Mexico has worsened as trade has increased. The number of factories in the maquiladora doubled (see graph at left), and by 1994 the zone was responsible for 58% of Mexican exports, as opposed to only 12% eleven years earlier. (ATTAC 2000) **As a result, from 1985 to 1999, municipal solid waste production in Mexico grew by 108%, water pollution by 29%, and urban air pollution by 97%. (Gallagher 2004) Only 12% of the eight million tons of hazardous waste produced in the maquiladoras is properly treated and disposed, and 70% of it remains within Mexico's borders. (Sierra Club 2004) Toxic emissions and particulate matter produced as a byproduct of the manufacturing and transportation industries—note that 70% of all NAFTA goods are transported by trucks whose emission standards do not meet U.S. regulations—have been connected to increased threats of cancer, asthma and respiratory diseases, as well as a number of serious birth defects near the border.** (Ibid) Indeed, one study conducted in four Texas border counties found that between 1993 and 1996 **(three years following NAFTA) the number of babies born with anencephaly (a birth defect that causes partial development of brain and skull) jumped to more than twice the U.S national average** (Bolterstein 1999). The timing of the increase can in no way be coincidental. While all these problems have been mounting, the Kuznets Curve belief of free traders has not come to fruition because although Mexico's manufacturing has increased and its GDP/capita has risen, investment in pollution abating technology and waste storage and treatment facilities has remained scarce. (World Bank 2010)

Broad evidence for the dilution effect hypothesis. David J. **Civitello**, Jeremy Cohen, Hiba Fatima, Neal T. Halstead, Josue Liriano, Taegan A. McMahon, C. Nicole Ortega, Erin Louise Sauer, Tanya Sehgal, Suzanne Young, Jason R. Rohr Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Jun 20**15**, 201506279; DOI:10.1073/pnas.1506279112.Edited by Simon A. Levin, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, and approved May 15, 2015 (received for review March 30, 2015) Halstead Education M.S. Biology, University of South Florida, 2007 B.S. Biology, University of Wisconsin - Stevens Point, 2001 http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2015/06/10/1506279112 // RH

We can use the estimated coefficients from SI Appendix, Table S7 to evaluate policy scenarios, such as **the expansion of strict PAs between 1990 and 2010 by 63%,** for example. Our estimates suggest that this expansion **reduced ARI, diarrhea, and malaria by 1.5%, 2%, and 6%, respectively**, in an average municipality. It is difficult to benchmark these findings against (i) other conservation actions because the empirical evidence does not exist and (ii) public health interventions because they have different designs and contexts (e.g., targeting specific groups, not general populations). Nonetheless, our modeling of multiple drivers would also allow conservation planners to consider scenarios such as combining strict PAs with the complementary strategy of reducing roads, which together would have a much larger impact on malaria, for example.

Broad evidence for the dilution effect hypothesis. David J. **Civitello**, Jeremy Cohen, Hiba Fatima, Neal T. Halstead, Josue Liriano, Taegan A. McMahon, C. Nicole Ortega, Erin Louise Sauer, Tanya Sehgal, Suzanne Young, Jason R. Rohr Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Jun 20**15**, 201506279; DOI:10.1073/pnas.1506279112.Edited by Simon A. Levin, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, and approved May 15, 2015 (received for review March 30, 2015) Halstead Education M.S. Biology, University of South Florida, 2007 B.S. Biology, University of Wisconsin - Stevens Point, 2001 http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2015/06/10/1506279112 // RH

Recent approximations attribute as much as 24% of the global burden of disease (GBD) to poor environmental quality, including land-use patterns (9, 10). Ecosystem degradation and infectious diseases are central elements of a vicious cycle of rural poverty traps in the developing topics (11⇓–13). Although these problems are not new, they continue to be of global concern and significance, especially in the context of climate change. Thus, there is renewed attention to the environmental drivers of health (2, 6, 14, 15), which requires stepping back from a purely biomedical and molecular view of health to examine community and environmental drivers using a landscape epidemiology or ecoepidemiology perspective (16, 17). The desire to make the case for conservation has led to broad claims regarding the benefits of nature conservation for human health; these claims must be tested and substantiated with rigorous empirical analysis (3, 8, 18⇓–20).

Vaughan 04 NAFTA's Promise And Reality: LESSONS FROM MEXICO FOR THE HEMISPHERE. Scott Vaughan. 2004 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Scott Vaughan is a visiting scholar with the Carnegie Endowment, focusing on the WTO and NAFTA. He previously held positions with the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations Environment Program, and the Royal Bank Financial Group (Canada). https://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf // RH

The increase in U.S. corn imports also risks weakening in situ conservation involving some or all of the forty races of maize that are grown in Mexico, with some varieties dating their origin back 6,000 years. While there has been an absolute contraction in maize production in Mexico since the enactment of NAFTA, led by a free fall in commercially harvested crops, production of rain-fed maize has remained stable. To date, there is little evidence that NAFTA has undermined in situ conservation of maize. **However, the price difference of approximately 27 percent between U.S. corn and Mexican varieties suggests that over time the price wedge may result in U.S. imports crowding out rain-fed varieties**. This substitution will eventually present small-scale farmers with three choices: exit farming altogether; diversify the composition of crop output; or concentrate on fledgling but potentially high-growth market niches that award a price premium for traditional, organic, and sustainable produce such as traditional maize. Each presents formidable obstacles to small-scale farmers. As noted in chapter 1, there are few economic and employment alternatives for millions of farmers in Mexico. At the same time, the quality of soil in marginal lands makes crop switching very unlikely. Finally, even if market niches for sustainable produce expand dramatically, this will not alleviate all pressures on in situ conservation. Therefore, **the long-term erosion of the knowledge base on which traditional maize growing is based is one of the greatest conservation threats directly posed by NAFTA.**

Vaughan 04 NAFTA's Promise And Reality: LESSONS FROM MEXICO FOR THE HEMISPHERE. Scott Vaughan. 2004 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Scott Vaughan is a visiting scholar with the Carnegie Endowment, focusing on the WTO and NAFTA. He previously held positions with the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations Environment Program, and the Royal Bank Financial Group (Canada). https://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf // RH

Notwithstanding the NAFTA Chapter 11 cases, the greatest environmental pressure associated with NAFTA is transmitted through the scale effects of economic growth, to which trade liberalization contributes. In the manufacturing sector, environmental regulations—as strong as they were on paper with the passage of NAFTA—did not keep pace with rates of economic growth. Mexico's manufacturing sector has grown by 4 percent per annum since enactment of NAFTA, but real spending on pollution monitoring and on-site inspections has fallen by 45 percent over the same period. **Overall, air pollution has increased 10 percent per year in the manufacturing sector of Mexico since NAFTA took effect.**

Vaughan 04 NAFTA's Promise And Reality: LESSONS FROM MEXICO FOR THE HEMISPHERE. Scott Vaughan. 2004 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Scott Vaughan is a visiting scholar with the Carnegie Endowment, focusing on the WTO and NAFTA. He previously held positions with the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations Environment Program, and the Royal Bank Financial Group (Canada). https://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf // RH

In the manufacturing sector, which due to its pollution intensity has been subject to closet scrutiny, **NAFTA has contributed directly to an increase of between 1 and 2 percent in annual gross emissions of carbon monoxide and sulfur dioxide, due to changes in the petroleum, base metals, and transportation equipment sectors. NAFTA has also contributed directly to air pollution spikes in the Canadian-U.S. and U.S.-Mexican border regions, as 80 percent of total NAFTA trade is transported via truck-transport passing through increasingly congested border points.**

NAFTA Chapter 6 energy provisions have contributed to an increase in carbon dioxide emissions arising from increased U.S.-Canadian trade in electricity, as well as increased Mexican exports of electricity to the United States

Audley 04

NAFTA's Promise And Reality: LESSONS FROM MEXICO FOR THE HEMISPHERE. John J. Audley. 2004 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. John J. Audley directed the Trade, Equity, and Development Project. Before joining the Carnegie Endowment, Audley was the trade policy coordinator at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). There, he was responsible for developing and presenting EPA's positions on U.S. trade policy. He won a silver medal from the agency for his work on two documents: "Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements," an executive order, and "The White House Policy Paper on Trade and Environment." Before he served at the EPA, Audley was international affairs director of the National Wildlife Federation, where he worked for two years. He has taught on environment, public policy, and other subjects at Georgetown University, Purdue University, and the University of Maryland. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf // RH

The fear of a "race to the bottom" in environmental regulation has proved unfounded. At this point some elements of Mexico's economy are dirtier and some are cleaner. The Mexican government estimates that **annual pollution damages over the past decade exceeded $36 billion per year. This damage to the environment is greater than the economic gains from the growth of trade and of the economy as a whole**. More specifically, **enactment of NAFTA accelerated changes in commercial farming practices that have put Mexico's diverse ecosystem at great risk of contamination from concentrations of nitrogen and other chemicals commonly used in modern farming. Mexico's evolution toward a modern, exportoriented agricultural sector has also failed to deliver the anticipated environmental benefits of reduced deforestation and tillage**. Rural farmers have replaced lost income caused by the collapse in commodity prices by farming more marginal land, a practice that has resulted in an average deforestation rate of more than 630,000 hectares per year since 1996 in the biologically rich regions of southern Mexico.

Vaughan 04

NAFTA's Promise And Reality: LESSONS FROM MEXICO FOR THE HEMISPHERE. Scott Vaughan. 2004 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Scott Vaughan is a visiting scholar with the Carnegie Endowment, focusing on the WTO and NAFTA. He previously held positions with the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations Environment Program, and the Royal Bank Financial Group (Canada). https://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf // RH

The average deforestation rate in the biologically rich southern regions of Mexico has exceeded 630,000 hectares per year since 1993. The **leading cause of deforestation in Mexico remains poverty, with slash-and-burn clearing and tree felling by poor households in need of fuel remaining the leading causes of forest clearing**. In addition, small-scale, **rain-fed maize production has increased by 18 percent in marginalized areas, as poor farmers respond to falling prices.** The environmental costs of deforestation and changes in land use in Mexico are staggering. **That country is one of the planet's leading centers of "megadiversity," home to 10 percent of all known species, of which 30 to 50 percent are endemic.** Mexico has the world's second-highest number of reptile species, and ranks fourth for amphibians and fifth for mammalian diversity in the world. However, the geography of this biological diversity coincides exactly with Mexico's geography of extreme poverty. Trade theory scarcely hides the unhappy fact that there are winners and losers from trade liberalization. However, people—**especially indigenous peoples in the poorest regions of southern Mexico— maintain an enduring allegiance to their ancestral homes, community ties, and traditional knowledge, which date back 6,000 years. Given that these ties reach deeper than economically rational decision making, millions of poor farmers who are clearly losers on the ledgers of free trade remain committed to their lands, despite structural changes in the farm sector that increasingly lock them out of commercially viable markets.**

McAuliff 14

Michael McAuliff covers Congress and politics for HuffPost, where he started working in 2011 after eight years at the New York Daily News.

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/11/nafta-environment_n_4938556.html // RH

The report estimates that a significant jump in pollution can be linked to NAFTA, with greenhouse gas emissions in the region increasing from 7 billion metric tons in 1990 to about 8.3 billion in 2005.

Blecker 97

NAFTA AND THE PESO COLLAPSE Not Just a Coincidence by Robert A. Blecker . March 1, 1997 1660 L Street, NW l Suite 1200 l Washington, D.C. 20036 l 202/775-8810. Robert A. Blecker is an American economist who is currently a Professor in the Department of Economics at American University in Washington, DC.[1] He is also Affiliate Faculty of the American University School of International Service and Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, and a Research Associate at the Economic Policy Institute and Political Economy Research Institute.[2][3][4] His research has made contributions to the fields of post-Keynesian and neo-Kaleckian macroeconomics, open economy macroeconomics, international trade theory and policy, global imbalances and the U.S. trade deficit, the North American Free Trade Agreement, the economy of Mexico, export-led growth, and the theory of balance-of-payments constrained growth (also known as Thirlwall's Law).[5] https://secure.epi.org/files/page/-/old/briefingpapers/1997_bp_nafta.pdf // RH

The overvalued peso in the early 1990s caused three related problems for Mexico. First, **it made Mexican exports less competitive in the U.S. market compared with U.S. domestic products or imports from other newly industrializing countries. Second, the high peso combined with liberalized trade led to an unprecedented surge in Mexican imports of consumer goods in 1993-94. Weak exports and surging imports together resulted in an enormous trade deficit that reached $29 billion - 8% of Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP) - by 1994.**

Blecker 97

NAFTA AND THE PESO COLLAPSE Not Just a Coincidence by Robert A. Blecker . March 1, 1997 1660 L Street, NW l Suite 1200 l Washington, D.C. 20036 l 202/775-8810. Robert A. Blecker is an American economist who is currently a Professor in the Department of Economics at American University in Washington, DC.[1] He is also Affiliate Faculty of the American University School of International Service and Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, and a Research Associate at the Economic Policy Institute and Political Economy Research Institute.[2][3][4] His research has made contributions to the fields of post-Keynesian and neo-Kaleckian macroeconomics, open economy macroeconomics, international trade theory and policy, global imbalances and the U.S. trade deficit, the North American Free Trade Agreement, the economy of Mexico, export-led growth, and the theory of balance-of-payments constrained growth (also known as Thirlwall's Law).[5] https://secure.epi.org/files/page/-/old/briefingpapers/1997_bp_nafta.pdf // RH

The overvalued peso in the early 1990s caused three related problems for Mexico. First, **it made Mexican exports less competitive in the U.S. market compared with U.S. domestic products or imports from other newly industrializing countries.** Second, the **high peso combined with liberalized trade led to an unprecedented surge in Mexican imports of consumer goods in 1993-94. Weak exports and surging imports together resulted in an enormous trade deficit that reached $29 billion - 8% of Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP) - by 1994. Third, the rising peso made Mexican labor costs rise in dollar terms in 1991-94 (see Table l).' thus making Mexico a less attractive investment location for multinational corporations seeking sites for low wage, labor-intensive assembly operations. The devaluation of the peso - which lowered Mexico's labor costs by about 40% in dollar terms from 1994 to 1995 - was thus necessary for the success of Mexico's economic strategy for attracting direct foreign investment.**

The importance of **devaluing the peso can be seen by comparing the impact of devaluation to the small tariff reductions in NAFTA.** The U.S. International Trade Commission (1991, 2-2) **calculated that the average tariffs in effect at the start of the NAFTA negotiations were about 3.4% for U.S. imports and 10% for Mexican imports.** **In contrast, the peso appreciated by over 75% in real terms from 1987 to 1994 and then fell by about 50% from 1994 to 1995.** Thus, none of the tariff reductions in NAFTA could have made much of a difference if the peso stayed as high as it was in 1993-94. **In order for NAFTA to promote Mexican exports as intended, a significant devaluation of the peso was unavoidable.**

Polaski 04

NAFTA's Promise And Reality: LESSONS FROM MEXICO FOR THE HEMISPHERE. Sandra Polaski. 2004 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Sandra Polaski is a senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment's Trade, Equity, and Development Project. Her work focuses on international labor policy in the context of trade, development, and multilateral relations. She served from – as the Special Representative for International Labor Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf // RH

Income inequality has been on the rise in Mexico since NAFTA took effect, reversing a brief declining trend in the early 1990s. Compared to the period before NAFTA, **the top 10 percent of households have increased their share of national income, while the other 90 percent have lost income share or seen no change.** Regional inequality within Mexico has also increased, reversing a long-term trend toward convergence in regional incomes.

Sharay **Angulo**, 10-9-20**17,** "Shaky NAFTA deal threatens Navistar's Mexico-made exports to world," U.S.,

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-nafta-navistar/shaky-nafta-deal-threatens-navistars-mexico-made-exports-to-world-idUSKBN1CE0BX // RH

Still, that might be slight enough for U.S. consumers to absorb, or for the company to shave off its margins. And Navistar's strategy of using Mexico's low costs and multiple free trade deals to export to markets from Saudi Arabia to Australia could soften the blow of any tougher export rules for the United States, Mexican Chief Executive Carlos Pardo said. "More than ever I believe **Mexico is a logistic springboard, where on top of a qualified work force and reasonable production costs, logistically it has created the connections to supply any part of the world**," Pardo said in Navistar's Mexico City headquarters. While **98 percent of trucks exported from Mexico go to the United States or Canada, U.S. truckmaker Kenworth, China's Giant and Korean automaker Kia all have a similar strategy of building in Mexico to export to countries other than the United States.**

Elizabeth **Becker**, 8-27-20**03**, "U.S. Corn Subsidies Said to Damage Mexico," New York Times,

https://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/27/business/us-corn-subsidies-said-to-damage-mexico.html // RH

The more than $10 billion that American taxpayers give corn farmers every year in agricultural subsidies has helped destroy the livelihoods of millions of small Mexican farmers, according to a report to be released on Wednesday. Prepared in advance of critical trade talks next month, the report by Oxfam International argues that **the subsidies given American corn farmers allow them to sell their grain at prices far below what it costs to produce. That has led to cheap American corn flooding the Mexican market and pushing the poorest Mexican farmers out of business**, the report said. ''**There is a direct link between government agricultural policies in the U.S. and rural misery in Mexico**,'' according to the report entitled, ''Dumping Without Borders: How U.S. agricultural policies are destroying the livelihoods of Mexican corn farmers.'

Weisbrot 17 "Did NAFTA Help Mexico? An Update After 23 Years" By Mark Weisbrot, Lara Merling, Vitor Mello, Stephan Lefebvre, and Joseph Sammut* Updated March 2017

(Mark Weisbrot is Co-Director at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) in Washington, DC. Lara Merling is a Research Assistant, Vitor Mello is an International Program Intern, Stephan Lefebvre is a former Research Assistant, and Joseph Sammut is a former International Program Intern at CEPR.)

http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/nafta-mexico-update-2017-03.pdf?v=2

As was well known at the time of NAFTA's passage, the main purpose of NAFTA was to lock in a set of economic policies, some of which were already well under way in the decade prior. These included the liberalization of manufacturing, of foreign investment, and of ownership, and other changes.1 The idea was that the continuation and expansion of these policies would allow Mexico to achieve efficiencies and economic progress that was not possible under the developmentalist, protectionist economic model that had prevailed in the decades before 1980. While some of the policy changes were undoubtedly necessary and/or positive, **the end result has been decades of economic failure by almost any economic or social indicator. This is true whether we compare Mexico to its developmentalist past, or even if the comparison is to the rest of Latin America since NAFTA**. After 23 years, these results should provoke more public discussion as to what went wrong.

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http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/nafta-mexico-update-2017-03.pdf?v=2

As would be expected during such a period of very little economic growth, the poverty rate was not reduced in Mexico; in fact it increased. Figure 4 shows Mexico's national poverty rate.7 In 2014, it was 55.1 percent, compared to the 52.4 percent rate in 1994. As a result, **there were about 20.5 million more Mexicans living below the poverty line as of 2014 than in 1994**. Measures of more extreme poverty — "unable to afford health care, education and food," and "unable to afford food" (as categorized by Mexico's Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social) improved very little since 1994, falling by just 0.6 and 0.9 percentage points, respectively

Anderson 9 SARAH ANDERSON, JOHN CAVANAGH | NOVEMBER 9, 2009, 8:53 PM "Happily Ever NAFTA?" http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/09/happily-ever-nafta/

In Mexico, for example, 50 **percent productivity growth didn't prevent an 11 percent slide in real manufacturing wages between 1994 and 2001**, according to a Global Policy Network study by Mexican labor economist Carlos Salas. The U.S. government reports that even in nominal dollar-value terms, **Mexican manufacturing wages were no higher in 2000 than in NAFTA's first year and considerably lower than in 1981, prior to Mexico's sweeping free market reforms**. Making ends meet in Mexico's rural areas is even tougher. **NAFTA opened the floodgates to cheap U.S. corn imports, leading to an 18-fold increase between 1993 and 2000. The devastating impact on Mexican small farmers is reflected in the rising rural poverty rate, which climbed from 79 percent in 1994 to 82 percent in 1998**, according to the World Bank. Why have increased trade and investment failed to reduce poverty or raise wages? Part of the answer is that in a globalized marketplace, highly mobile employers have even more power to suppress workers who fight for their fair share of the benefits. And these firms often find allies among governments desperate for foreign investment. Just ask the mostly female workers at Duro Bag Manufacturing in Río Bravo, Mexico, a U.S.-owned plant that makes decorative bags for Hallmark. When these workers demonstrated peacefully in June 2000 for their right to form an independent union, local police swept in and beat them, reportedly sending one pregnant woman to the hospital. Later the Fox administration reneged on promises to allow a secret ballot in the union election, forcing terrified Duro workers to vote in front of management, with armed thugs allegedly hovering nearby.

Gonzalez 17

Josue Gonzalez, 10-4-2017, "NAFTA's Economic Impact," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/naftas-economic-impact // RH

Mexican unemployment also rose, which some economists have blamed on NAFTA for exposing Mexican farmers, especially corn producers, to competition from heavily subsidized U.S. agriculture. A study led by CEPR economist Mark Weisbrot estimates that **NAFTA put almost two million small-scale Mexican farmers** [PDF] **out of work, in turn driving illegal migration to the United States.** (Migration to the United States, both legal and illegal, more than doubled after 1994, peaking in 2007. However, the flow reversed after 2008 as more Mexican-born immigrants began leaving the country than arriving. Experts attribute this to stricter border enforcement, changing demographics in Mexico, and the combination of fewer available jobs in the United States along with more in Mexico.) **Many analysts explain these divergent outcomes by pointing to the "two-speed" nature of Mexico's economy, in which NAFTA drove the growth of foreign investment, high-tech manufacturing, and rising wages in the industrial north, while the largely agrarian south remains detached from this new economy.** As University of Pennsylvania economist Mauro Guillen argues, **Mexico's rising inequality stems from NAFTA-oriented workers in the north gaining much higher wages from trade-related activity.**

Zarsky, Lyuba, and Kevin P. Gallagher. "NAFTA, foreign direct investment, and sustainable industrial development in Mexico." *Americas Program Policy Brief* 28 (20**04**).

http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/AmerProgFDIJan04.pdf

Many environmental trends are worsening in Mexico. Between 1985 and 1999, **the estimated economic costs of environmental degradation—including rural soil erosion, municipal solid waste and urban air pollution—amounted to 10% of annual GDP.** Mexico's environmental problems cannot be laid solely at the feet of industry. **However, predicted improvements from FDI-led growth have been elusive. Recent studies conclude that, since the 1980s, overall levels of industrial pollution, particularly air pollution, water pollution, and toxics, have increased faster than population growth and faster than the GDP of the economy as a whole.** Moreover, the failure to create manufacturing jobs has not alleviated the pressure on rural areas or increased municipal revenues that could be channeled to environmental infrastructure.

USDA, 20**08**, Foreign Agriculture Service, NAFTA Agriculture Fact Sheet, https://www.fas.usda.gov/sites/development/files/nafta1.14.2008_0.pdf // RH

The final provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were fully implemented on January 1, 2008. Launched on January 1, 1994, **NAFTA** is one of the most successful trade agreements in history and has **contributed to significant increases in agricultural trade and investment between the United States, Canada and Mexico** and has benefited farmers, ranchers and consumers throughout North America.

Chris **Edwards**, 4-16-20**18**, "Agricultural Subsidies," Downsizing the Federal Government, https://www.downsizinggovernment.org/agriculture/subsidies // RH

The federal government spends more than $20 billion a year on subsidies for farm businesses. About 39 percent of the nation's 2.1 million farms receive subsidies, with the lion's share of the handouts going to the largest producers of corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, and rice.

Gonzalez 17

Josue Gonzalez, 10-4-2017, "NAFTA's Economic Impact," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/naftas-economic-impact // RH

But Mexico's NAFTA experience has suffered from a disconnect between the promises of some of its supporters—that the pact would deliver rapid growth, raise wages, and reduce emigration—and the deal's more mixed outcomes. **Between 1993 and 2013, Mexico's economy grew at an average rate of just 1.3 percent a year during a period when Latin America was undergoing a major expansion. Poverty remains at the same levels as in 1994. And the expected "wage convergence" between U.S. and Mexican wages didn't happen, with Mexico's per capita income rising at an annual average of just 1.2 percent in that period—far slower than Latin American countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Peru**. **Mexican unemployment also rose, which some economists have blamed on NAFTA for exposing Mexican farmers, especially corn producers, to competition from heavily subsidized U.S. agriculture.** A study led by CEPR economist Mark Weisbrot estimates that **NAFTA put almost two million small-scale Mexican farmers** [PDF] **out of work, in turn driving illegal migration to the United States.** (Migration to the United States, both legal and illegal, more than doubled after 1994, peaking in 2007. However, the flow reversed after 2008 as more Mexican-born immigrants began leaving the country than arriving. Experts attribute this to stricter border enforcement, changing demographics in Mexico, and the combination of fewer available jobs in the United States along with more in Mexico.) **Many analysts explain these divergent outcomes by pointing to the "two-speed" nature of Mexico's economy, in which NAFTA drove the growth of foreign investment, high-tech manufacturing, and rising wages in the industrial north, while the largely agrarian south remains detached from this new economy.** As University of Pennsylvania economist Mauro Guillen argues, **Mexico's rising inequality stems from NAFTA-oriented workers in the north gaining much higher wages from trade-related activity.**

Weisbrot 17 "Did NAFTA Help Mexico? An Update After 23 Years" By Mark Weisbrot, Lara Merling, Vitor Mello, Stephan Lefebvre, and Joseph Sammut* Updated March 2017

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http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/nafta-mexico-update-2017-03.pdf?v=2
NAFTA removed tariffs (but not subsidies) on agricultural goods, with a transition period in which there was a steadily increasing import quota for certain commodities. The transition period was longest for corn, the most important crop for Mexican producers, only ending in 2008. Not surprisingly, **US production**, which is not only subsidized but had higher average productivity levels than that of Mexico, **displaced millions of Mexican farmers**. Table 2 shows agricultural employment in Mexico in 1991 and 2007, according to census data.
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As can be seen, **there was a 19 percent drop in agricultural employment, or about 2 million jobs**. The loss was in family labor employed in the family farm sector. Seasonal (less than six months employment) gained about 3 million jobs, but it was not nearly enough to compensate for the **4.9 million jobs lost in the family farm sector. Proponents of NAFTA of course knew that family farms in Mexico would not be able to compete with subsidized US production** but argued that displaced workers would shift to higher productivity agriculture (mainly vegetables and fruits for export), as well as industrial jobs. Although vegetable and fruit production did expand considerably (from 17.3 million tons in 1994 to 28.2 million in 2012), and presumably accounted for many of the 3 million seasonal jobs created, it was clearly not enough in terms of employment.

(**2018**). **Citizen**.org. Retrieved 8 May 2018, from https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/nafta_factsheet_deficit_jobs_wages_feb_2018_final.pdf // RM

At the heart of NAFTA are special protections that make it cheaper and safer for corporations to outsource U.S. jobs to low-wage Mexico. These investor protections provide special benefits to firms that relocate and eliminate many of the usual risks that make corporations think twice about moving production to another country. With Mexican manufacturing workers paid a fraction of what U.S. workers are paid, some U.S. companies had begun to relocate production to Mexico before NAFTA. Many of these jobs were in industries, such as apparel, that did not require major investments to open a factory. But **NAFTA's investor protections made it safe for U.S. firms to relocate high-end manufacturing jobs. And because Mexico did not have independent unions, the U.S. corporations could rely on wages staying low. U.S. auto, electronics, appliance, heavy equipment and other manufacturers built high-tech, multi-million dollar plants in Mexico. Mexican workers making less per day than their U.S. counterparts had made per hour toiled to make products that were then sent back to the United States for sale. Mexican workers were not paid enough to buy the cars, televisions and other goods they produced.** And many of the U.S. workers who used to make these goods – many in union factories – could only find new jobs that paid much less. Companies' profits exploded, while U.S. workers lost jobs and faced declining wages, fueling increasing income inequality.