# 1AC

**We affirm**

**Resolved:** The United Nations should grant India a permanent seat on the security council

**Our First Contention is Growing India**

**Hamal 18 explains[[1]](#endnote-1)** that around 50 million Indians currently live on less than $1.90 per day which is globally identified as extreme poverty. Luckily, **Sanford et al 15 finds[[2]](#endnote-2)** that members of the security council receive increased foreign aid from the United States in order to buy influence. **Hwang 19 explains[[3]](#endnote-3)** that If India becomes a new permanent member, they will likely receive enhanced foreign aid, foreign investment, and foreign loans through the process of vote buying. Thus, **Sanford et al 15 writes[[4]](#endnote-4)** that members of the United Nations Security Council receive 59% more foreign aid from the United States than non-members. This was seen during the 2011 temporary Indian membership on the council UNSC. U.S foreign aid took a sudden increase by [**23 million dollars**](https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/IND) despite having decreased for the 7 years prior. **Jha and Swaroop find[[5]](#endnote-5)** that 65-percent of foreign aid to India goes to building roads, schools, healthcare institutions, irrigation facilities, and power plants. These crucial programs are key to solving India’s poverty crisis as **Pearlstein concludes[[6]](#endnote-6)** that over the past decades, India’s rotting healthcare system has repeatedly disgraced its people, and children younger than five die every minute. There is one government doctor for every 10,000 people, one hospital bed for every 2,000 people, and one government-run hospital for every 90,343 people.

**The Impact is reducing poverty**

**McBride of CFR** **writes in** **2018[[7]](#endnote-7)** that typically when the United States doles out foreign aid, it does so through projects such as providing educational and healthcare-related infrastructure. Additionally, the government conducts evaluations to make sure money only goes into programs that show results. **Senbeta of the Journal of International Development** **finds**[[8]](#endnote-8) that every 1% increase in aid, decreases poverty by 1.8%. Finally, **Andre[[9]](#endnote-9) 15** **of the Markkula Center** **finds** that if foreign aid were to increase by .5%, poverty could be reduced by as much as 40% by the end of the decade. **Chamberlain 09 concludes[[10]](#endnote-10)** that poverty in India has led to the death of 2 million children under the age of five annually. In regard to Indian poverty, it is a “try or die” situation.

**Our Second Contention is Strengthening Peacekeeping Operations**

**Mukherjee[[11]](#endnote-11) 15** details that because of India’s major and consistent contributions to peace keeping operations, they are currently engaged in 12 of 15 active missions and are the “backbone” of UN peacekeeping. **Stuenkel[[12]](#endnote-12), Professor of International Relations**, writes that because India is an influential actor for an underrepresented region, granting it permanent membership would greatly increase UNSC legitimacy. Unfortunately, in the absence of Indian membership, former **UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan[[13]](#endnote-13)** **states** that the UNSC will be challenged by these countries who feel silenced. When this happens, the **Brookings Institute[[14]](#endnote-14)** **writes** that many countries will look to other institutions, decreasing cooperation and creating multilateral splintering. This is already happening as **Singh ‘18 of NDTV** explains that India views the security council as becoming increasingly illegitimate do to its lack of representation of developing countries and as such, is giving up its pursuit for Security Council membership. Furthermore, **Vira of CSIS** **writes[[15]](#endnote-15)** that India now views a seat on the UNSC as a near impossibility, causing Indian policymakers to shift towards regional organizations to gain international clout and advocate for the reduction of peacekeeping contributions. Overall, **Quarterman[[16]](#endnote-16)** finds that if we continue down our current path, emerging countries will reduce compliance with UNSC decisions, crippling peacekeeping operations.

**The Impact is Conflict De-Escalation**

**Hultman 18** writes that because UN peacekeeping efforts effectively dissolve regional conflicts and without robust operations, 4 more countries would be in major conflict today. **Hultman[[17]](#endnote-17)** furthers that with expanded UN operations, we could see a 70% reduction in conflict and 150,000 innocent lives saved.

**Affirm**

# Frontlines

## AT: Aid Funds Corruption

1. **Gharib 17 explains[[18]](#endnote-18)** that the scope of evidence indicates that most aid corruption is simply low-level and does not justify stripping away the tremendous benefits of improved healthcare and education.
2. Saying that generic foreign aid is corrupt is simply backwards logic. They must prove that U.S foreign aid given to India has been corrupted instead of just writing off a sixth of the world population. After hundreds of millions of dollars have been poured into India by the United States, they still remain a strong democracy.
3. **Turn their weighing. Tavares explains[[19]](#endnote-19)** that foreign aid decreases corruption in two ways. First, foreign aid establishes rules and conditions that limit the discretion of the recipient country’s officials, thus decreasing corruption. Second, foreign aid alleviates public revenue shortages and facilitates increased salaries for public employees which diminishes the supply of corruptible public officials.

## AT: Aid Hurts/Doesn’t Affect Growth

1. **Radelet 17 finds[[20]](#endnote-20)** that some commentators have fallen back on the old and tired claim that there is no evidence that aid works. The evidence was hotly contested a decade ago, but in recent years the vast majority of research has shown a positive impact of aid on growth. **He and his research team** looked back at three of the leading papers that concluded that aid had no impact on growth and found that with a sensible correction to the underlying models in those papers, a consistent positive relationship between aid and growth emerged.
2. **Burden:** They must provide a single indict to our conclusion or study’s methodology before you can prefer their evidence.

## IN: Almedia

1. They tell you that their huge study proves that poverty is not reduced by foreign aid. The issue is that Almedia, their evidence, only examines the nature of political regimes, of which India is not.
1. Homi **Kharas** & Kristofer **Hamel** & Martin **Hofer**, 12-13-**2018**, "Rethinking global poverty reduction in 2019," **Brookings**, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2018/12/13/rethinking-global-poverty-reduction-in-2019/>

To prepare for the year ahead, data scientists at World Data Lab responsible for uncovering these findings have updated the World Poverty Clock to take into account recently released data and forecasts from the World Bank and IMF, as well as refinements in poverty measurement in India. **The biggest headline from their work may be that when official numbers for India’s extreme poverty are published later this year, less than 50 million people will likely be living below $1.90 per day**, compared to 268 million in 2011, the last year for which official data on Indian poverty are available. Authors Homi Kharas Homi Kharas Interim Vice President and Director - Global Economy and Development Kristofer Hamel Chief Operating Officer - World Data Lab M Martin Hofer Research Analyst - World Data Lab Looking at poverty trends worldwide, World Data Lab now estimates that on New Year’s Day 2019, just under 600 million people across the world (excluding Syria) will live in extreme poverty. By 2030, this figure is expected to fall to some 436 million. The good news is that 2019 will start with the lowest prevalence of extreme poverty ever recorded in human history—less than 8 percent. In all likelihood, this level will set the “ceiling” for a new era of even lower single-digit global poverty rates for the foreseeable future. The bad news, though, is that poverty reduction rates are expected to keep slowing down considerably over the next decade. Consequently, only 20 million people are likely to escape extreme poverty in 2019. At this rate, it will take five years for the global number to fall below 500 million—making it nearly impossible to end poverty by 2030. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Wonjae **Hwang** & Amanda **Sanford** & Junhan **Lee**, xx-xx-**2015**, " Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly?" **International Interactions Academic Journal**, PDF available in A$AP Fuilta Folder

Consistent with this theoretical speculation, **scholars report that** temporary **members of the UNSC receive favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, or more foreign aid from the United States** (Dreher et al. 2009a, 2009b; Kuziemko and Werker 2006). For example, Dreher et al. (2009a) show that a temporary member of the UNSC is more likely to participate in IMF programs and have fewer numbers of conditions in these programs than nonmembers. In another study, the **authors also report a positive relationship between temporary membership on the UNSC and the number of World Bank projects a country receives** (Dreher et al. 2009b). Kuziemko and Werker (2006) argue that the **UNSC members receive 59% more foreign aid from the United States than nonmembers do**. 1One example is UNSC Resolution 1973, adopted on March 17, 2011, with respect to the civil war situation in Libya. Although five members, including two permanent members (China and Russia) abstained, the other 10 members supported the resolution. This resolution authorized the international community to impose a no-fly zone over Libya and to use all necessary measures to protect civilians. Accordingly, military intervention led by France, Britain, and the United States followed. Although the multilateral forces faced some criticism for their military actions, they succeeded in their military operations while enjoying a relatively high level of legitimacy. If foreign aid or favorable treatment from international financial organizations where permanent members of the UNSC, especially the United States, maintain strong influence on decision making2 is designed to induce political support from recipients, then we should be able to observe cooperation between temporary and permanent members in their voting.3 Nevertheless, no study has empirically tested this vote-buying hypothesis. This is mainly because it is difficult to evaluate the impact of membership on the UNSC on states’ voting behavior by only looking at their voting decisions in the UNSC. Without examining temporary members’ policy preference changes before and after their membership on the Security Council, we face a selection bias. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Wonjae **Hwang** is an associate professor and PhD at the **University of Tennessee in Knoxville**, **EMAIL TO** **MFOSTER879@GMAIL.COM** **,** 04-24-**2019**

Hi, **If** **India becomes a new permanent member, definitely, India will enjoy much enhanced political and economic power. They are likely to receive foreign aid, foreign investment, or foreign loans more than before and in a much easier way**. Other countries will try to draw cooperation from India over many sensitive international issues that UNSC will deal with by offering economic incentives/benefits or building strong economic ties. However, it is not clear whether such positive effects that India may enjoy can be observed in other developing countries. Although India may try to represent other developing countries' national interests in UNSC, I do not see a clear causal mechanism through which India promotes foreign aid/investment into other developing countries. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Wonjae **Hwang** & Amanda **Sanford** & Junhan **Lee**, xx-xx-**2015**, " Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly?" **International Interactions Academic Journal**, PDF available in A$AP Fuilta Folder

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5. Shikha **Jha** & Vinaya **Swaroop**, 5-09-**1999**, “Foreign Aid to India: What Does It Finance?”, **Economic and Political Weekly (JSTOR)**, PDF in folder

**Most foreign aid - over 65 per cent of the total - goes to sectoral projects that finance activities including highways and bridges, schools and health clinics, irrigation facilities and power** **plants** [World Bank 1998]. For aid-financed projects, however, what we see is not always what happens. Let us see why. We observe projects as they come off the line - that is, a road or a power plant being built with donor assistance. To judge the success of these projects. among other things, the conventional benefit-cost analysis is used, and the economic rate of return is calculated. The true effect of the aid-financed project, however, depends on whether the recipient country is able to reallocate its other expenditure. For example, if a government would have undertaken a donor-financed project in the absence of that financing, then donor funds simply relax the government's budget constraint and finance, at the margin, something else. In such a case, donor funds, although earmarked for and expensed on a specific project, are fungible and the true rate of return on the project is not reflected by the conventionally calculated economic rate of return. Aid could also be partially fungible. In such a case, the recipient country spends at the margin, less than the full amount of aid in that sector. Thus, if funds are fungible - fully or partially, what we observe about the donor-financed project is not what actually happens. The concept of aid fungibility is relevant in a system of intergovernmental transfers also. In a federal structure of governance, foreign aid earmarked for a subsidiary government could end up re- placing funds that the federal government would have given in the absence of that aid. Aid fungibility, however, is only an issue if the donor and recipient have different preferences. If the objectives of the two parties are the same, project aid is exactly the same as if the amount were provided as general budget support [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Suparna **D'Cunha**, 9-12-**2017**, "Despite A Booming Economy, India's Public Health System Is Still Failing Its Poor," **Forbes**, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/suparnadutt/2017/09/12/despite-a-booming-economy-indias-public-health-system-is-still-failing-its-poor/#52acdc8478e0>

**Over the past decades, India’s rotting healthcare system has repeatedly disgraced its people**. A husband walked for miles carrying his wife’s body because ambulances refused help. Dogs fed on a body kept in a mortuary. Rats gnawed at a newborn in a hospital. And, it goes on. **Consider that in India, two children younger than five die every minute. There is one government doctor for every 10,189 people, one hospital bed for every 2,046 people, and one government-run hospital for every 90,343 people. Deaths in government hospitals -- which are in tatters -- are an everyday occurrence**. But what happened in August, even by India’s acceptance of child mortality, was shocking. Last month, more than 400 children died at a hospital in Gorakhpur in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh, India’s largest province. Home to about 200 million people, it sits at the bottom of the health rankings of India’s 36 provinces. Deaths were due to a variety of reasons, including oxygen shortages after a private supplier cut the supply over unpaid bills. In the same month, in another government-run hospital in Uttar Pradesh, 49 children died allegedly due to oxygen and medicine shortages. In the state of Jharkhand, more than 800 children have died in two state-run hospitals this year. YOU MAY ALSO LIKE A lack of accountability For a country which chronically lacks enough medical facilities, these are tell-tale signs of all that is wrong in the public health system. “[The] Gorakhpur tragedy is just another example of the general lack of attention being given in India to basic needs, especially those of poor or marginalized people,” says Jean Drèze, a development economist who has coauthored books with Amartya Sen on deep inequalities in Indian society and political economy. “In healthcare, the problem is worse because the privileged rely mainly on private medical facilities, so what happens in a public hospital is of little consequence to them. Furthermore, an enormous social distance separates the doctors who run public hospitals and their patients, especially in states like Uttar Pradesh. Illness itself also disempowers the patients. In all these ways, they are far removed from the levers of power and influence. So, the system gets away with an appalling lack of accountability,” he adds. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. (Carlos Barria, 10-1-2018, "How Does the U.S. Spend Its Foreign Aid?," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-us-spend-its-foreign-aid>

 **The current foreign aid system** was created by the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, which **attempted to streamline the government’s efforts to provide assistance around the world [through]**. The statute defines aid as “**the unilateral transfers of U.S. resources by the U.S. Government to or for the benefit of foreign entities**.” **These resources include not just goods and funding, but also technical assistance, educational programming, health care, and other services.** Recipients include foreign governments, including foreign militaries and security forces, as well as local businesses and charitable groups, international organizations such as the United Nations, and other nongovernmental organizations. How much does the United States spend on it? Given the many agencies, funding methods, and categories of aid associated with U.S. foreign assistance efforts, estimates can differ. According to the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service (CRS), which uses the broadest definition of aid [PDF], including military and security assistance, total spending was roughly $49 billion in 2016, the last full fiscal year analyzed. This accounts for about 1.2 percent of the federal budget. 1.2 percent Share of foreign aid in the U.S. federal budget Source: Congressional Research Service. Share Since taking office, President Trump has sought deep cuts in foreign aid spending, aiming to slash nearly a third of the budget. In his 2018 speech before the UN General Assembly, he said, “Moving forward, we are only going to give foreign aid to those who respect us and, frankly, are our friends.” Congress, the branch of government that sets federal funding, has so far disagreed with the president, largely maintaining existing levels of funding in 2017 and 2018 budget deals. Aid funding levels are at their highest since the period immediately following World War II, when the United States invested heavily in rebuilding European economies. Aid levels were cut in the 1990s, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union; in 1997 they were less than $20 billion, or 0.8 percent of the overall budget. Aid rose again in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, surpassing 1.4 percent of the budget by 2007, which analysts say was driven largely by assistance to Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as President George W. Bush’s global health programs. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Aberra **Senbeta**, 12-xx-**2009**, " Three Essays on Foreign Aid, Poverty and Growth," **Western Michigan University**, <https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1725&amp;context=dissertations>

For all measures of poverty, in both specifications, the variable of interest—foreign aid— enters negatively and significantly. **This indicates that aid** **plays a positive role in reducing poverty**. The finding that **aid has poverty‐reducing effects even after controlling for average income is noteworthy** and has important policy implications. It means that despite the controversy surrounding the aid–growth relation, **the direct effect of aid indeed helps reduce poverty** even though its effects on growth remain uncertain. When we use the headcount index, **a one‐percentage‐point increase in aid to a recipient country reduces the proportion of people living below the poverty line by 1.8 percent. This result is consistent with the findings of Mosley and Suleiman (2007) who find that aid reduces headcount poverty by a similar magnitude in a cross‐country analysis of 49 countries**. Interestingly, if this direct effect of aid on poverty is taken into account, poverty‐efficient allocation of aid calculated by Collier and Dollar (2002) would have an even stronger poverty‐reducing effect. 9The negative and significant estimates of the aid parameter in columns (3) through (6) suggest that aid helps even the poorest of the poor who survive on a dollar a day or less. The estimate in column (3) indicates that **a one‐percentage‐point increase in aid reduces the average income shortfall of the poor by 3 per cent**. Although the poverty mitigation effect of aid is significant in our study, we believe that our estimates understate the potential impact. This is because we are assessing the direct effect of aid but are using all types of aid flows, whether aimed at poverty reduction or not. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. ####

**Andre** and **Velasquez** 15 [Claire Andre and Manuel Velasquez, Nov 13, 2015, World Hunger: A Moral Response, Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, <https://www.scu.edu/ethics/focus-areas/more/resources/world-hunger-a-moral-response/>

Between now and tomorrow morning, 40,000 children will starve to death. The day after tomorrow, 40,000 more children will die, and so on throughout 1992. In a "world of plenty," the number of human beings dying or suffering from hunger, malnutrition, and hunger-related diseases is staggering. According to the World Bank, over 1 billion people—at least one quarter of the world's population—live in poverty. Over half of these people live in South Asia; most of the remainder in sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia. The contrast between these peoples and the populations of rich nations is a stark one. In the poor nations of South Asia, the mortality rate among children under the age of 5 is more than 170 deaths per thousand, while in Sweden it is fewer than 10. In sub-Saharan Africa, life expectancy is 50 years, while in Japan it is 80. These contrasts raise the question of whether people living in rich nations have a moral obligation to aid those in poor nations. Currently, less than 1/2 of 1% of the total world gross national product is devoted to aiding poverty-stricken nations. In 1988, the amount of aid from the U S. amounted to only 0.21% of its GNP. In 1990, the World Bank urged the international community to increase aid to poor countries to 0.7% of their GNP. If this goal is reached, poverty could be reduced by as much as 40% by the end of this decade. What is the extent of our duty to poor nations? [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Gethin **Chamberlain**, 10-3-**2009**, "Two million slum children die every year as India booms," **Guardian**, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/oct/04/india-slums-children-death-rate>

**India's growing status as an economic superpower is masking a failure to stem a shocking rate of infant deaths among its poorest people. Nearly two million children under five die every year in India – one every 15 seconds – the highest number anywhere in the world. More than half die in the month after birth and 400,000 in their first 24 hours**. A devastating report by Save the Children, due out on Monday, reveals that the poor are disproportionately affected and the charity accuses the country of failing to provide adequate healthcare for the impoverished majority of its one billion people. While the World Bank predicts that India's economy will be the fastest-growing by next year and the country is an influential force within the G20, World Health Organisation figures show it ranks 171st out of 175 countries for public health spending. Malnutrition, neonatal diseases, diarrhoea and pneumonia are the major causes of death. Poor rural states are particularly affected by a dearth of health resources. But even in the capital, Delhi, where an estimated 20% of people live in slums, the infant mortality rate is reported to have doubled in a year, though city authorities dispute this. In the Bhagwanpura slum on the north-west fringes of the capital, numerous mothers have lost one or more infants in their first years of life through want of basic medical attention. Akila Anees's son, Mohammed Armann, who was almost three, died in her arms three weeks ago. A torrential downpour had flooded the slum, rainwater mixing with the raw sewage which fills the ink-black drains bisecting the narrow lanes. It rose to a depth of 2ft. Within days, Armann had fallen ill and died soon afterwards. Save the Children says millions of mothers and their babies are simply not getting the skilled medical care they need, and the poor, in particular, have been left behind. "For many poor parents and their children, seeking medical help is a luxury and health services are often too far away," said Shireen Miller, its head of policy and advocacy in India. "The difference between rich and poor is huge. In a city like Delhi it is more stark because we have got state-of-the-art hospitals and women giving birth under flyovers. The health service has failed to deliver. They are supposed to reach the poorest, but they have not." India's state healthcare system is supposed to be open to all, offering access to government-run hospitals. The reality is that, while government hospitals often offer high standards of care, they can be overcrowded, and if they are short of the required medicines patients are asked to pay for them themselves. In the meantime, private health care has surged and now accounts for the majority of India's medical provision, giving access to world-class facilities for those who can pay or who can afford private insurance premiums. According to the UK India Business Council, about 50 million middle-class Indians can afford private healthcare – a growing number but still a tiny fraction of the overall population – while the country still lags behind other developed countries, with only 0.7 hospital beds per 1,000 people compared with a global average of 4. Many slum-dwellers are too far from hospitals to make use of their facilities, because they cannot afford to use private auto-rickshaws to reach them and there is no public transport. Instead they turn to quack doctors – a slightly cheaper option, but because they are unregulated and notoriously unreliable, one fraught with dangers. According to the report, the national mortality rate for under-fives in the poorest fifth of the population is 92 in 1,000 compared with 33 for the highest fifth. The national average is 72. A couple of hundred yards from Anees's shack in Bhagwanpura, Gudiya, 22, sat holding her surviving daughter, Priya, two, amid scenes of abject squalor. Almost every square inch of the slum is covered in a layer of rubbish and human and animal waste. She has lost three children in four years. Her most recent child, a boy, died two days after she gave birth at home, she said. "He cried, but it was feeble and he gradually turned cold. We wrapped him in blankets and took him to the hospital but I could feel he was getting weaker, and then I could see he was not breathing and there was no heartbeat and then the doctor said he was dead." Three years ago her three-month-old son, Ahmit, died from pneumonia. A year earlier her five-month-old daughter, Kumkum, died after developing a fever. Delhi's health minister, Kiran Walia, has blamed migration into the city for its problems, but many poorer families simply feel that they are shut out by the system. Selma Shakil's son, Muzzamil, died in July after she was turned away from a government hospital. He was a year old. She sat on the hard wooden bed in the tiny room in Bhagwanpura that is home to her two surviving children and her crippled husband and dabbed at her eyes with her headscarf. "It was shattering for us. We were so happy when he was born, he was so happy and playful. I would give everything to get him back, but we can't," said Shakil, 27. Muzzamil had been ill for months. Shakil had taken him to a government hospital three times; the first time they gave him medicine and sent her home, the second time he was admitted for a few days and then discharged, and the third time they turned her away. "They said they would not take him; they said, 'You can't keep coming here, the child will be fine'." The day he died the doctors told her he was sleepy because of the medicines he was taking. She went home, but then he started groaning. "His breath was shallow, and that was when I realised it was too late. I took him in my arms. He opened his eyes once and said 'Ammi' [mummy] and that was it. He died in my arms." They buried him the same evening. The Save the Children report says nearly nine million children die worldwide every year before the age of five. India has the highest number of deaths, with China fifth. Afghanistan has the dubious distinction of featuring in the top 10 of total child deaths and of child deaths per head of population, a list topped by Sierra Leone. The charity accuses the world's leaders of a scandalous failure to meet the Millennium Development Goals, agreed in 2000, to cut child mortality by two- thirds between 1990 and 2015 and calls for a sharp increase in health spending. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Anit **Mukherjee**, 10-20-**2015**, "At the crossroads: India and the future of UN peacekeeping in Africa," **Brookings**, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/at-the-crossroads-india-and-the-future-of-un-peacekeeping-in-africa/>

Historically, India has participated in near­ly all UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. Most famously, India helped set the trend in “peace enforcement missions” by deploying a sizeable contingent-around 5,000 troops as­sisted by light bombers, to the United Nations Operations in Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1963. This militarized mission ensured the unity of Congo and resulted in the maximum number of casualties suffered by India in any UN operation. The end of the Cold War led to a pronounced increase in UN peacekeep­ing operations in Africa. India contributed to these efforts and was an active participant in almost all missions , sending military observers to Namibia (1989- 1991) , Angola (1989-1991), Liberia (1993-1997 and since 2007), Congo (since 1999), Ethiopia-Eritrea (since 2000), Ivory Coast (since 2004) and, more substan­tially, sending military contingents to Mo­zambique (1992-1994) , Somalia (1993-94), Rwanda (1993-1996), Angola (1995- 1999), Sierra Leone (1999-2000), Congo (from 2005 onwards) and Sudan and South Sudan (from 2005 onwards). These military contingents have at times undertaken ‘robust’ operations bordering on peace enforcement type missions, inflicting and suffering casualties in the process. To support these operations India has also deployed attack and support helicopters, which are always in short supply and are crit­ical to overcome the vast distances in Africa. Tellingly, there was considerable international outcry when India announced that it was with­drawing some of its helicopters for supporting internal security missions at home. While the military’s deployment is well-known the role of police, including women police officers, and civil affairs specialists assisting in tasks like conduct of elections or other capacity build­ing exercises is no less important**. According to some experts therefore India’s combined ef­forts constitute the “backbone” of UN peace­keeping and it is presently engaged in 12 of the 15 active peacekeeping missions.** [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. **Stuenkel ’10 Stuenkel, Oliver (Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo). “Leading the disenfranchised or joining the establishment? India, Brazil, and the UN Security Council.” *International Law*, March 2010,** <https://ri.fgv.br/sites/default/files/publicacoes/10d7bc9faa.pdf>**. [Premier]**

**India’s** major argument is that its **inclusion would increase the UNSC’s legitimacy by making it more representative of UN membership**.81 In 2004, for example, India argued that **it deserved the seat because it was the world’s second largest country in terms of population, with a large economy and the third largest contributor of troops to UN peace-keeping missions**.82 In addition, it has always been India’s proclaimed goal to increase the representation of the “global South” and limit the influence of the established powers. The government argues that **an “adequate presence” of developing countries is needed in the Security Council. Nations of the world must feel that their stakes in global peace and prosperity are factored into the UN’s decision making**. Any expansion of permanent members’ category must be based on an agreed criteria, rather than be a pre-determined selection. There must be an inclusive approach based on transparent consultations. India supports expansion of both permanent and non-permanent members’ category. The latter is the only avenue for the vast majority of Member States to serve on the Security Council. Reform and expansion must be an integral part of a common package.”83 With regards to these principled motivations, India’s rhetoric has been and remains remarkably similar to that of Brazil, another G77 member. But permanent membership would also help India defend its ever more global interests. According to Kulwant Rai Gupta, there is a sense in India that with regards to security matters, the role of the UNSC is increasing while that of the UN General Assembly is diminishing. Development issues are more and more handled by the IMF and the World Bank, while the UN turns into an institution dealing mostly with security issues. This interpretation is thus yet another reason why India should seek to gain admission as a permanent member to an ever more important organ.84 Finally, India is said to eye a permanent seat to assure that the United Nations does not get involved in the conflict in Kashmir, which would, Indians fear, lead to a partition or independence of Kashmir.85 Specifically, India seeks to expand the UNSC by four permanent and six non-permanent members. The G4’s proposal envisions the six new permanent seats to be occupied by two African nations, two for Asia (India and Japan), one for Latin America (Brazil) and the Caribbean and one for Western Europe and others (Germany); and four new non-permanent members (one from Africa, one from Asia, one from Eastern Europe, and one from Latin America and the Caribbean). [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. **Dabhade ’17 Dabhade, Manish S. (Assistant Professor of Diplomacy and Disarmament in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University). “India’s Pursuit of United Nations Security Council Reforms.” *Rising Powers Quarterly,* Volume 2, Issue 3,15 December 2017,** <https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-pursuit-united-nations-security-council-reforms/>**. [Premier]**

Foremost in Indian calculus, however, lies the Indian aspiration of the institutionalized big power status the permanent seat in the Security Council would confer on India right away. Being a “pen holder” as the permanent member of the Security Council, India would similarly assume the mantle of international peace and security decision-making. India sees itself carrying the necessary abilities, actual and potential, which entitles it to a permanent seat at the Council. Further, **the seat on the high table, at the UN’s premier, powerful body would provide it the much needed leverage to expand its global geo-political and geo-economic clout. It would serve as an equalizer to China, its rival and an emerging hegemon in Asia, and an ever increasing strategic and security concern in its immediate neighborhood and beyond.** **India has always seen itself as a** **democratic alternative to the authoritarian China.** India’s millennia old civilizational existence also demands it to be at the top of the international hierarchy of states. As India’s international profile and capabilities rise due to its ever expanding global and regional footprint in diverse areas such as politics, development, economics, culture and science and technology, India wishes to shift its international position from a rule taker (a constrained role) to a rule maker (a system shaping role). The Indian attempts at joining various regimes like the MTCR and the ongoing, high-pitched campaign to join the NSG amply indicate that India is no more satisfied with being either the target or a mere follower of various international norms and rules, and now wants to shape and align them to suit Indian ideas and interests. In conclusion, and most significantly, Indian hopes significantly rest on an acknowledgement by the UN itself of the need to expand the UNSC. In an interview to The Guardian (2015), **former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that the Security Council must either reform or risk becoming increasingly irrelevant: “If we don’t change the council, we risk a situation where the primacy of the council may be challenged by some of the new emerging countries.”** [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. **Brookings ’15 Brookings Institute. “The UN Security Council in an Era of Great Power Rivalry and India’s options.” *Brookings*, 13 February 2015,** <https://www.brookings.edu/events/the-un-security-council-in-an-era-of-great-power-rivalry-and-indias-options/>**. [Premier]**

**UN Security Council reforms have been called for by many nations, who argue that the framework set up after the Second World War is not relevant today.** Reforms have broadly been discussed under the three main headings: working methods; the veto; and the enlargement of the Council. The workings methods of the Council have been very opaque and autocratic, however, this has drastically changed through the reform exercise and continues to be worked on. On the issue of the veto, however, while there have been discussions on its removal the problem remains that the permanent members can veto any changes to the UN charter, resulting in the continuation of the veto. The issue of the enlargement of the membership of the Council was first organised in 1993 by Singapore and gained popularity amongst other nations. Council reforms gained momentum when a high level panel for reform of the United Nations system, including the Security Council, was set up by the UN Secretary General. The panel laid out forceful reasons for the reform of the Security Council in its report released in December 2004. The panel recommended the addition of both permanent members and non-permanent members. The panel proposed two models for reform: Model A called for six new permanent members who would be distributed according to regional groupings – Asia Pacific, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. The model also recommended three additional non-permanent members. Model A clearly mentioned that neither of the members would have veto powers. However, most schemes which have been suggested for the inclusion of more permanent members on the council have failed to have an impact. Another reason being that smaller countries still need to be convinced that they have an interest in seeing a change in the Council especially with more non-permanent seats. However, it remains a challenge. Model B, which has become salient again today, recommended altering the UN Charter to allow for a set of semi-permanent members who would enjoy a term of more than 2 years and would be eligible for immediate re-election once their term was up. This category would be different from the non-permanent members, therefore, creating another level of membership. However, once again, neither of these members would have veto powers. Since these recommendations in 2004 nothing more has happened with regards to membership for countries like India. However, with the United States’ public support recently there is some hope. It is an important step forward, though not enough to open the way for India to put forth its candidacy for permanent membership status. **The longer it takes to reform the Security Council, the greater the danger of it becoming irrelevant. With the changes in the international power structure, the significant security business of the world will start to be transacted elsewhere**, as it will require the leading powers such as India, that are not in the Security Council. Hence, the longer the reforms take, aspirants will leave and be forced to form their own organization. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Varun **Vira**, xx-xx-**2012**, "India and UN Peacekeeping: Declining Interest with Grave Implications," **Smart Wars Journals**, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/india-and-un-peacekeeping-declining-interest-with-grave-implications?fbclid=IwAR0NeTHIb7v7WiW\_nMvy52PiqJBiFeKPdWQsjq7rWUa-unXW757MTuhkLGo

deals and traditions are, however, not easily abandoned, and peacekeeping is deeply engrained in India’s perception of itself on the international stage. Moreover, as India’s Security Council bid inches closer, there still remains an attachment to the sentiment best expressed by retired Indian Lt. Gen Satish Nambiar, a UNPROFOR force commander in former Yugoslavia who stated that, “India has no immediate interests in Sierra Leone. But that is not the point. We have to look beyond our immediate interests. As a great country we have certain commitments; if we aspire to be permanent members of the UN Security Council it cannot come on a platter – we must develop a stake in strengthening the Security Council set-up and such missions help do just that.”[8] The entrance of China as a peacekeeping power has also complicated Indian calculations. From once deeply opposed to international intervention on principle, China since the 2000s has rapidly expanded its UNPKO participation. By 2011, China was the largest troop contributor among the P-5 countries, expanding from 120 military and police personnel in 2003 to 2,146 by 2008. Since the UNTAET mission in East Timor in 2000, China has allowed lightly armed peacekeepers, and since 2008 has pushed for the deployment of combat contingents. On one level India welcomes Chinese participation as helping plug key resource gaps, but on another resents the disproportionate attention Chinese contributions receive. Additionally, with China and India both competing heavily for influence and resources in Africa, where UNPKOs are concentrated, it cannot help but become part of a broader competition. UNPKOs, however, now come with lowered expectations. **Expecting a permanent seat as a transactional reward was overly optimistic and Indian planners now recognize the host of other obstacles affect India’s bid – opposition from China, the Kashmir dispute, the Indian nuclear program etc. – and a growing body now favors alternative alignments outside the UN**. The ‘African soft power’ argument too is not entirely convincing. Africa is important to the Indian strategic interest – the East African coastline is within India’s ‘near abroad,’ Africa accounts for about a fifth of Indian oil imports, and trade ties are rapidly expanding, but regional challenges in Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Indian Ocean, and southeast Asia – all more core to the Indian strategic interest – are growing ever more pressing. In net terms, UNPKOs are but one component of Indian defense diplomacy with Africa, which in turn is a small component of India’s total economic and political outreach. That too must be seen in comparative terms; in FY2009-2010, India’s Rs400bn of aid to Afghanistan was almost twenty times the size of its aid to the entire African continent – giving some indication of priorities.[9] India’s growing wealth may account more for its soft power than any gratitude for service in African UNPKOs. UNPKOs are one of India’s most visible contributions on the continent, and are appreciated in many quarters – especially in contrast to China’s mercantilist approach – but they should not be overly conflated in importance; in some countries such as the DR Congo, participation may have worsened Indian prospects. Economic ties between Kinshasa and New Delhi have improved since 2003 when the first Indians were deployed with MONUC, but in comparative terms, China is a much larger economic partner with a much smaller troop contingent. Moreover, much of India’s success may be a function of India’s willingness to extend lines of credit and infrastructure loans. By contrast, the peacekeeper element may only be inflaming relations, as the UN and by extension Indian forces grow more willing to confront the Kabila government. In late 2008, the Congolese government requested the removal of Indian peacekeepers from the country, and paid locals to throw stones at the contingent, sparking a political crisis in which India threatened to withdraw all its troops, potentially collapsing the mission. The crisis was averted only when Kabila wrote a personal letter to the Indian PM expressing gratitude for Indian contributions. The strategic benefit of UNPKOs is also increasingly in question. Critics note that India is often left with the consequences when more fickle UNPKO partners withdraw, as during the UNOSOM and UNITAF missions in Somalia in the early 1990s. Indian progress in stabilizing southern Somalia was compromised after the 1993 Black Hawk Down incident and the US withdrawal that essentially collapsed the mission. The resultant anarchy in Somalia has compromised Indian security, spawning the piracy that is destabilizing the East African littoral and Indian Ocean security, through which most of India’s seaborne trade and energy imports pass. There is an element of futility in many UNPKOs, especially when vastly inadequate UN resourcing makes missions scarcely viable, and some worry UN failures taint India by association. One of the most embarrassing moments in UNPKO history – the debacle with UNAMSIL – occurred under the watch of an Indian Force Commander. Similarly in 2010 in eastern DR Congo, an Indian unit at COB Kibua failed to see, and therefore prevent, the mass rape of over 300 women, men and children in the nearby town of Luvungi – a very public tragedy that deeply undermined MONUSCO claims of progress in its civilian protection mandate. Such failures are particularly galling for troop contributors such as India when the mismatch between UN mandates and resources makes such tragedies virtually inevitable. MONUSCO’s presence today in DR Congo is roughly equivalent to asking the California National Guard (with far less equipment and training) to secure 70 million people across an area the size of Western Europe, over two-thirds of which is covered by rainforest. In 1999, the UN estimated a need for 100,000 troops to provide solely the civilian protection mission, [10] yet in 2011, MONUSCO’s total end-strength amounted to just over 18,250 troops but its mission had expanded to no less than 45 separate tasks (p. 10). At these levels, the MONUSCO mission equates to a force-to-population ratio of one peacekeeper to secure 3929 people and one peacekeeper to cover 128.5 square kilometers of territory – a near impossible task. (Calculations by author based on troop figures here and country data here. PROMOTING INDIAN-LED REFORM An Indian departure from UNPKOs would be devastating. The UN for all its blemishes works on second-order security issues where the rest of the world is unwilling to help, and even small reductions in India’s support – its reduction of helicopters for example – can degrade the viability of existing missions. All-out departure would devastate UNPKO capacity, particularly as it could trigger a cascading reaction. The size and nature of Pakistan’s deployments closely mirror India’s, which given Pakistan’s India-centric calculus may be no coincidence. As one example, Pakistani troops with UNOSOM in Somalia are speculated to have persevered in part because withdrawal would have drawn unflattering comparisons with India, whose troops were performing well in the south.[11] As such, Indian reductions could reduce Pakistani contributions, robbing the UN of two of its largest three contributors. Yet, it would be wrong to see India and Pakistan as wholly linked; Pakistan draws its own unique benefits from participating and has its own long tradition of honorable service across many missions. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. **Quarterman ’10 Quarterman, Mark (Director of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies). “Security Council Reform and the G-20.” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 9 November 2010,** <https://www.csis.org/analysis/security-council-reform-and-g-20>**. [Premier]**

Seen in the context of the upcoming G-20 summit, President Obama’s pledge might have been a shot across the bows of those who support the status quo in the international institutions created in the aftermath of the World War II. The Security Council, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund have governance and decisionmaking structures that reflect the global power configuration of the past and do not take into account the changed environment created by emerging powers such as India. The G-20, by contrast, is inclusive and provides a voice for “centers of influence.” If the older organizations were merely quaint relics of a bygone era, this would not be an important problem. But, each has an essential role to play in global governance that is weakened by its lack of representativeness. Each organization provides too great a voice to Europe, which is diminishing in clout, in particular in relation to rising Asian powers. **Leaving significant voices out of international organizations lessens their legitimacy, which can reduce compliance with their decisions.** The five permanent members of the Security Council are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. There are no African or Latin American countries among them. The membership structure of the council—which was last reformed in 1965 to expand the nonpermanent membership from 6 to 10—is heedless of the changed regional power environment of the early twenty-first century. States that have a legitimate claim to a larger role in the Security Council by dint of their regional significance, economic clout, and/or military size and prowess include India, Brazil, Germany, Japan, and South Africa. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Håvard **Hegre** & Lisa **Hultman** & Håvard **Nygård**, 6-28-**2018**, “U.N. peacekeeping really can be effective. Here’s how we tabulated this”, **Washington Post**, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/28/u-n-peacekeeping-really-can-be-effective-heres-how-we-tabulated-this/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.78d78c95393a>

**Existing studies tend to evaluate PKO effectiveness by looking at individual pathways separately. This approach is likely to severely underestimate the overall effectiveness of PKOs, we found. Instead, we developed a methodology that allows us to rigorously evaluate the effectiveness of PKOs along all of these pathways simultaneously**. Based on a model trained on the period 1960-2013, we run a set of simulations to assess the impact of alternative U.N. peacekeeping policies for the period 2001-2013. **We believe this approach allows our study to be one of the first to offer a comprehensive assessment of PKO effectiveness.** We find that peacekeeping is even more effective than previous studies suggest. **In the short run, peacekeeping missions limit the amount of violence. But we also find clear evidence that the de-escalated conflicts are easier to end conclusively a few years down the road.** Sierra Leone fits these patterns. The country experienced prolonged conflict until the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers, UNAMSIL, in 1999. The level of violence dropped precipitously after the deployment of the PKO and three years after the PKOs deployed the conflict ended. [Is U.N. peacekeeping under fire? Here’s what you need to know.] **In a given year, our results imply that for each conflict that the U.N. manages to transform from a major conflict to a minor one, another conflict ends. In a hypothetical historical scenario where the U.N. completely shuts down its peacekeeping practice from 2001 onward, we estimate that three to four more countries would had been in major conflict in 2013 relative to what the world saw, given the actual level of peacekeeping activity**. While U.N. peacekeeping policies have been effective in the period we study, the United Nations could have done much more. **The more the United Nations is willing to spend on peacekeeping, and the more missions with a strong mandate, the greater the conflict-reducing effect. If the U.N. had deployed PKOs with robust mandates and budgets to most armed conflicts, our scenarios predict between four and five of the largest active wars in 2013 could have been contained.** What does this mean, in hypothetical terms? **This represents a 70 percent reduction from the six major 2013 conflicts in Afghanistan, D. R. Congo, Iraq, Nigeria, Syria and Pakistan to hypothetically only two or three. How much would it cost?** This ambitious but effective scenario wouldn’t be exorbitantly expensive — according to our simulations, it would require maintaining an annual $17 billion U.N. peacekeeping, approximately twice the current level. [Trump wants to cut U.N. funding — but peacekeeping saves money, as well as lives] This is substantial, but given the cost of armed conflicts that can easily reach in the tens of billions of dollars each, it is clearly a cost-effective intervention. When politicians criticize U.N. peacekeeping for being expensive, they rarely consider the costs of war avoided through effective peacekeeping. **A typical major conflict causes about 2,500 direct battle-related deaths per year. Over the 2001 to 2013 period, ambitious PKO deployment could, according to our estimates, have saved about 150,000 direct deaths**. Massive indirect deaths due to conflict violence would also have been averted. Of course, the countries that contribute to U.N. peacekeeping with troops or funds are not necessarily those who reap the direct benefits. The costs of war, however, are not born solely by the countries in conflict, as there is potential for contagion of the conflict itself. Both the negative impact of conflict as well as the potential contagion of the conflict reach well beyond the initial region. Here’s an example — “Africa’s Missing Billions,” an Oxfam report, estimated that between 1990 and 2005 Africa as a whole lost over $280 billion to conflict. These costs are relevant for the U.N. Security Council to consider when deciding on future peacekeeping operations. Preventing conflict and sustaining peace What’s next for the U.N.? The new peacebuilding agenda, spearheaded by the Secretary General Antònio Guterres, puts the focus squarely on managing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict. **U.N. peacekeepers can play an essential, and cost effective, part in achieving these goals — but only if they are adequately funded.** [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Malaka **Gharib**, 8-4-**2017**, "Is Corruption Really A Big Problem In Foreign Aid?," **NPR**, <https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/08/04/539285319/is-corruption-really-a-big-problem-in-foreign-aid>

So even though you don't think we should be obsessed with corruption, you do admit that corruption is out there. What kinds of corruption are there in the aid world? [One] way is that you charge too much for what you'll deliver. There have been cases where government officials have improperly used funding. **There's a lot of low-level corruption. For example, training programs where people get a per diem of let's say $15 from an aid agency and they don't turn up. If this happens across thousands of trainings, [the agency will ask]**: where's the money? But you maintain that corruption is not widespread. **The evidence of the scope of corruption suggests it's not a very big problem. It isn't somehow a more fundamental problem than a number of other issues that poor countries face: poor health, limited access to finance, weak infrastructure**. For you, the real problem is that donors pay too much attention to corruption. In the last 20 years, we have seen an increasing focus on [aid donors] counting every dollar spent at the expense of measuring results. Focusing on corruption without regard to questions like "did the aid program work" or "are lives being improved" is an unhealthy obsession. We're forgetting that the outcomes are what we really care about. What is the worst example of that? USAID, after the invasion of **Afghanistan, worked with the country's Ministry of Health and set up a system that provided very basic levels of health care to the majority of Afghanistan's population for a low cost. It worked.** After the Taliban [fell from power] **life expectancy jumped so rapidly [from 42 years to 62 years between 2004 and 2010].** There were huge improvements — especially for young people and children. You can trace that to increased vaccinations, neonatal care funded by USAID. A special investigative team [from USAID] looked at the Ministry of Health's accounts and they were not perfect. **The Ministry couldn't show where [$63 million of the U.S.'s $236 million investment] went. As a result, USAID's special inspector general in Afghanistan recommended that the agency "provide no further funding to the program until program cost estimates are validated as legitimate." They ignored massive evidence of impact. It's a terrible story.** [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Jose **Tavares**, 8-28-2002, " Does foreign aid corrupt?," **Dochas (Irish Research Institute)**, https://dochas.ie/sites/default/files/DoesForeignAidCorruptFinal.pdf

The reasoning is that, when a OECD country increases its total aid outflows (irrespective of where they are directed), developing countries that are culturally and geographically closer to that donor country experience an exogenous increase in aid inflows as a share of their GDP. In the first stage we regress aid inflows for each developing country on the four exogenous instruments above. The predicted value of the dependent variable in that regression is then used in the second stage regression to explain corruption. We infer the causal effect of foreign aid on developing country’s corruption from the coefficient of aid in the second stage regression. In Table 1 we estimate the impact of aid on corruption, using both actual aid data (inflows of 17 foreign aid as a share of GDP) and instrumented aid. We use the logarithm of GDP as a control and successively add time, region, legal origin and religion controls. As can be verified, both aid and instrumented aid are negatively related to the level of corruption, significantly so except in the case 18 where only time dummies are used. The main difference is that the coefficient on instrumented aid is, without exception, higher in absolute value than the coefficient on actual aid. An increase in aid inflows of 1% of GDP leads to a decrease in corruption of | 0.2 points out of a possible range of 10. Alesina and Weder (2002) suggest that more corrupt countries may actually receive larger aid inflows. If they are right, our results are exactly the pattern one would expect: the coefficient on actual aid flows is biased down by reverse causation. In other words, even if aid leads to less corruption, the fact that less corrupt countries tend to receive less aid biases the size of the coefficient. Instrumenting for 19 aid inflows uncovers the real relationship: aid decreases corruption. In Table 2 we present results for the ICRG corruption index, after excluding the outliers in aid flows. We present the specification with seven different controls and then add legal, religious and regional dummies. As can be verified, successive inclusion of additional controls and the exclusion of the outliers do not change the results in any substantial way. The coefficients on other variables tend to appear with the expected sign, with income per capita decreasing corruption and being an oil exporter increasing corruption. 4. Conclusion In this paper we ask whether foreign aid corrupts by using data on a cross-section of developing countries and instrumenting for total aid inflows. **We find that foreign aid decreases corruption. Our results are statistically and economically significant and robust to the use of different controls.** Why might aid decrease corruption? One can advance several possibilities**. First, foreign aid may be associated with rules and conditions that limit the discretion of the recipient country’s officials, thus decreasing corruption—a conditionality effect. Second, if foreign aid alleviates public revenue shortages and facilitates increased salaries for public employees it may diminish the supply of 20 corruption by public officials—a liquidity effect**. One important caveat is in order. Since most actual aid flows are driven by motives other than the economic and political performance of recipient countries, as pointed out in Alesina and Dollar (2002), one cannot infer from our results that when more aid is observed lower corruption will follow. Instead we should interpret our results as pointing to the potentially beneficial impact of aid inflows on corruption once current biases in aid allocation are weeded out. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Steve **Radelet**, 5-8-**2017**, "Once more into the breach: Does foreign aid work?," **Brookings**, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2017/05/08/once-more-into-the-breach-does-foreign-aid-work/>

The Trump administration’s proposals to drastically cut foreign aid have once again sparked debates about aid effectiveness. **Right on cue, some commentators have fallen back on the old and tired claim that there is no evidence that aid works.** Perhaps the most forceful (and egregious) of these statements came from Stephen Moore of the Heritage Foundation, who declared on National Public Radio, “There’s zero evidence that any of these foreign aid programs have had any effect on development, whether it’s in the Middle East or Africa or South America. And there’s just zero evidence that any of that development aid has had any effect on raising the living standards…” Author Steve Radelet Nonresident Senior Fellow - Global Economy and Development Moore’s claim is utterly false. There is lots of evidence from independent research showing the positive impacts of aid on development and raising living standards. **As this evidence has grown in recent years, a strong bipartisan consensus has emerged that aid is an effective and important tool of U.S. foreign policy and national security.** In turn, **the major debates about aid have shifted from the outdated “does aid work” to much more helpful questions about how aid mechanisms could be strengthened further and how they should evolve in a rapidly changing world.** Those latter questions are still the right ones. But since the old questions have come back, it is important to once again look at the evidence on aid effectiveness. To begin with, let’s point out the obvious: not all aid-financed projects work, some completely fail, and not all of the evidence points to positive outcomes. This is to be expected, just as some diplomatic efforts fail, not all military interventions work, and not all private sector investments succeed. So don’t be fooled by people who point to examples of individual aid projects that have not worked as evidence of systemic failure any more than someone who would point to Enron, Lehman Brothers, or any of the 20,000 U.S. companies that file for bankruptcy every year to argue that private investment doesn’t work. Yes, there is failure, especially in the most challenging countries. But there is a great deal of success as well. For starters, there is widespread agreement that aid programs focused on health have saved millions of lives. The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which among other things provides antiretroviral treatment for 11.5 million people, has been a key reason why global deaths from the disease have fallen by almost half since 2005. There is rigorous research to back this up: an exhaustive four-year study by the Institute of Medicine concluded that “PEPFAR has saved and improved the lives of millions; supported HIV prevention, care, and treatment; strengthened systems; and engaged with partner countries to facilitate HIV policy and planning.” At the same time, malaria mortality has declined by nearly 50 percent since 2000—saving almost 7 million lives—in part through the efforts of U.S. Agency for International Development’s President’s Malaria Initiative. Tuberculosis infections have fallen by 25 percent, the world is on the brink of eradicating polio, and 4 million fewer children die from diarrheal diseases each year than three decades ago. Leadership and hard work in developing countries deserve much of the credit, but there is no doubt that aid was a major force in saving these lives. **The biggest debates have centered on aid and economic growth. The evidence was hotly contested a decade ago, but in recent years the preponderance of research has shown a positive impact of aid on growth. My colleagues** Michael Clemens, Rikhil Bhavnani, Sami Bazzi, **and I looked back at three of the leading papers that concluded that aid had no impact on growth and found that with a few modest (and sensible) adjustments to the underlying models in those papers, a consistent positive relationship between aid and growth emerged.** **Our findings are consistent with recent research by Henrik Hansen, Finn Tarp, Sam Jones, Robert Lensik, Howard White, Sebastian Galiani, Sandrina Moreira, Channing Arndt, Markus Brückner, and many others, all published in respected academic journals**, which you can find here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here (there are others). The skeptics rarely mention this research and sometimes pretend that it doesn’t exist. Of course, there are research papers that conclude that there is little connection between aid and growth, such as those by Peter Boone, Raghuram Rajan and Arvind Subramanian, and Axel Dreher and Sarah Langlotz. If you want to understand the debate, you should read them. But **most of the recent research concludes that aid supports growth, as shown in the excellent summary** by Ardnt, Jones, and Tarp. They find that the research shows that a “sustained inflow of foreign aid equivalent to 10 percent of GDP is roughly expected to raise growth rates per capita by one percentage point on average.” For developing countries with per capita growth rates of 3-4 percent per year, an extra percentage point of growth is an important addition. Other reviews of the recent literature have reached similar conclusions. **Even The Economist magazine, long skeptical of aid, changed its tune a couple of years ago, concluding that most evidence shows that aid boosts growth.** Randomized control trials for development? Three problems There is more. **In 2015, USAID’s Feed the Future program helped more than 9 million famers increase their incomes by more than $800 million and improved the nutrition of more than 18 million children.** Aid has also supported progress in education, especially girls’ education. For example, in Afghanistan, less than 1 million children attended schools in 2002, and almost none were girls. But since then, the Afghan government, **USAID, and other donors have built more than 16,000 schools, recruited and trained more than 154,000 teachers, and increased net enrollment rates to nearly 60 percent.** Today there are 9 million children in school, including more than 3.5 million girls. And beyond the money itself, my colleague John McArthur, senior fellow at Brookings, has shown a clear acceleration of development progress during the period of the U.N.’s Millennium Development Goals, which was a coordinated effort by donors and host governments to achieve specific development targets. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)