TODO: Chinadaily indict

A2 Infrastructure

1. Cross apply case infra bad
2. FW eu plan
3. TURN: Infrastructure only benefits the wealthy. Chaterjee of the European Economic Review in 2012 statistically determines that although income inequality decreases by 2.7% in the short run, in the long run income inequality actually increases by 5%. Lopez of the World Bank quantifies this in 2004, finding that a 1 percent increase in the Gini coefficient (income inequality) would increase poverty by 5.2 percent.
4. BRI barely fulfills it promises. ***The World Bank*** **2019**: weak organization and long build times make it so that "only 1 in every 1,000 projects finish on time and on budget" At this point there's only a 0.1% chance that BRI projects are actually successful

A2 Better than No Investment - FW

NU: Keegan Elmer of the South China Morning Post writes recently in 2019 that the European Union has launched their own connectivity and infrastructure plan, which is more sustainable than the Belt and Road.

Mishra of the New Straits Times in July writes that The EU connectivity strategy offers three key components of connectivity — sustainability, comprehensiveness, and rules-based connectivity — and they involve principles missing in China's BRI.

Where the EU's plan has potential is in its determination to satisfy those who look for a rule-based, fair and transparent mechanism that yields quality investments, avoids debt traps, and improves regional, and trans-regional connectivity.

The EU doesn't need a shady deal like the BRI when it has its own superior investment plan.

A2 Trade

Turn this argument: Trade with China is not beneficial for the EU. [Holslag in 2019] finds that unbalanced trade with China caused Europe to lose 1.4 trillion dollars in the past ten years. He furthers that large deficits are usually followed by destabilizing adjustments and economic instability,. Problematically, if a trade deficit is sucking out all of the economic growth from these countries, this means two things:

first, their whole argument about trade being beneficial for the EU is false.
And second, if the trade deficit sucks out all of the economic growth from the country, they won't be seeing any impacts of economic growth even if they exist.

Secondly, we would say that trade opens the gate for China to start dumping their cheap goods into Europe, destroying local industries and causing widespread job loss.

A2 Transport Times

Drop their link as Pose 11 finds that there is little evidence that transport infrastructure as the fundamental mechanism for regional economic growth has paid off in Europe

Cross-apply traffic shit

A2 Creating Jobs

DL: Kynge of Financial times 18 finds that of the contractors working on the BRI, 90 percent of workers were Chinese, meaning that jobs don't actually go to the domestic economy.

A2 Promoting Fair Trade

Opponents' claim: Affirming allows the EU to form a more balanced and fair trade with China
DL: PROMISES MADE BY CHINA ARE IRRELEVANT – THEY HAVE PROMISED TO CHANGE UNFAIR TRADE in the past and nothing has changed.

PRACTICES IN THE PAST WITH NO CHANGES.
Jonathan Holslag, (Prof, International Relations, Brussels Free University), THE SILK ROAD TRAP: HOW CHINA'S TRADE AMBITIONS CHALLENGE EUROPE, 2019, 154.
European leaders have to ask themselves what certainty they have that the situation will improve, with or without the cooperation of China, for instance because of the promises related to the Belt and Road. **Europe has tried for over twenty years and repeatedly China has promised to rebalance the partnership, but nothing has happened and the result of over two decades of engagement has been a direct loss on the current account of €1.4 trillion. This is an immense amount of capital that could otherwise have been used to boost internal demand for European producers or for investment in our own new industries. For this study, dozens of Chinese policy documents were reviewed and there is no indication that China will work to a more balanced partnership, whatever it promises publicly.**

23
Jonathan Holslag, (Prof, International Relations, Brussels Free University), THE SILK ROAD TRAP: HOW CHINA'S TRADE AMBITIONS CHALLENGE EUROPE, 2019, 146.
For many years, the European Union has hoped to build a balanced partnership with China and also expected the European institutions to engage China in regard to the trade deficit, market access and so forth. This book has found that this patient and constructive engagement has been unsuccessful. **On its seven most important policy objectives, the European Union has made no meaningful progress and has even lost in at least two cases.** To be sure, more and more official dialogues have been set up. Europe has provided financial support to help China to create a level playing field. Europe has also granted China almost unhampered access to its market while the access of European companies to the Chinese market remains limited. Europe has adhered to free trade, even while China has refused to reciprocate for over two decades.

Some random tariffs shit GENERAL

Erica York of the Tax Foundation finds that Historical evidence shows that tariffs raise prices and reduce available quantities of goods and services for U.S. businesses and consumers, which results in lower income, reduced employment, and lower economic output

Dina Shuang of the Standard Chartered Bank quantifies that a 10% tariff on Chinese goods would directly lead to a 0.4% decrease on China's economic growth.

What this means, is that U.S. tariffs immediately undercut any marginal benefits to economy in the BRI.

A2 Leverage/Reform - 3 responses

DELINK: Holstag '19 explains that for the last 2 decades the EU has made no progress in negotiations on its seven most important policy objectives and in two cases, even lost.

DELINK: Beja 19 that Europe has never shown unity against China and recent events could further weaken a common response. The EU's response to the BRI has been mixed and contradictory, with many countries splitting in their courses of action.

DELINK:**China has begun to adapt to criticisms but if the international community gives the perception they're fine with the reforms, i.e. by literally joining BRI, China loses the motivation to actually finalize any of the reforms (Loon 19)**

TURN: They tell you that if the EU is in the BRI, then China will make reforms. But what Daly 19 explains is that major EU countries will not join the BRI unless certain reforms happen. What this means is that reform is a prerequisite to EU joining.

History is on our side, as Bloomberg 19 corroborates that past negotiations with the EU regarding joining the BRI have faced major hurdles over regulations and standards. He concludes that the only way China can get the developed countries to join is if they enact reforms.

What this means, is that affirming now joins the EU to the BRI without forcing China to make reform, skipping the negotiation process and removing any leverage. We're one step ahead of the affirmative.

DELINK:

A2 Tech Transfer Concessions

1. The concessions that my opponents bring up are rather small and between the EU and China. However, the concessions needed to defeat our contention would be on the scale of fundamentally changing China's foreign policy abroad.

A2 BRI Inevitable

Schrader 18 finds that funding has dropped by 89% since 2015, and lending by commercial banks—who are dealing with their own financial issues domestically—has ceased almost entirely. Policy banks have also scaled back, despite their status as arms of PRC government policy.

DELINK: Scissors 19 (June) tells you that the BRI is shrinking due to a lack of funding, and that eventually, China will only focus on rich countries, like Southeast Asia and the Arab world. Therefore, the BRI won't come to Europe.

Li 19 (July) explains this funding gap by stating that China was depending on its trade surplus with the US to fund the BRI, but Trump's trade war has shrunk that surplus significantly, thereby shrinking the funding.

A2: Aid War

Trump weaponizing aid prevents it helping anyone

Nahal **Toosi 19**, 6-30-2019, "How Trump's 'weaponized' use of foreign aid is backfiring," POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/30/trump-foriegn-aid-1390417 \\ OPF

The situation reflects broader fears that **Trump's unusually politicized approach to handing out U.S. aid worldwide is backfiring, tarnishing America's brand and possibly risking the lives of people from Latin America to the Palestinian territories**. "The Trump administration seems to have weaponized humanitarian assistance," said Larry Sampler, a former career employee at the U.S. Agency for International Development. "**We used to be able to say we're not choosing sides, that all we're doing is alleviating human suffering. We've lost that now**." Venezuela has been a particularly blatant example, aid officials say. "**This whole idea that in Venezuela aid was going to be part of a political change process — it's rare to see it that overt**," said Joel Charny of the Norwegian Refugee Council, which has not yet received U.S. funding for work inside Venezuela. "It's just not a good way to do aid. **If you're really concerned about the welfare of the people of Venezuela you find the ways that are available to get the maximum amount of assistance to those people**." America's foreign aid decisions have never been entirely apolitical — every presidential administration, Republican or Democrat, to some extent disburses aid in ways it hopes will benefit the U.S. image. That's part of the reason such assistance is branded with phrases like "from the United States." But aid officials and analysts say **Trump and his aides have intervened to exceptional degrees to direct the funds and goods in ways designed to benefit one side in a conflict — and to bolster Trump's standing with his Republican political base.** It's an approach that may violate core international principles that such assistance be politically neutral, especially if intended for humanitarian reasons. "In a conflict environment or a politically contested environment, if you align aid with one or the other side, it has a much harder time getting through," said Jeremy Konyndyk, a senior policy fellow at the Center for Global Development who worked at USAID under the Obama administration.

A2 5G - 3 responses

NU: 5G is completely non-unique for two reasons.

First, Either way China is a tech giant that will continue to fund 5G.
Second, we would contend that 5G will make its way to the world soon eventually regardless of the resolution.

TURN: increased 5G in this case would be disastrous, because Drury 19 finds that the biggest supplier of 5G technology is funded by Beijing security agencies, that is problematic because Authoritarian regimes use technology to suppress people.

In authoritarian countries, tech systems can directly aid domestic control and surveillance, helping internal security forces process massive amounts of information, this means that this technology will be used to help authoritarian regimes, which is problematic because authoritarianism stunts economic growth, as Acemoglu 14 finds that a country that switches from nondemocracy to democracy achieves about 20% higher GDP per capita. The Economist 13 quantifies that every 1% increase in GDP per head reduces poverty by around 1.7%

A2 Health Silk Road

1. China doesn't actually benefit these countries, as McLaughlin 13 finds that there is ample proof of counterfeit medicine from China, including 1.2 million doses of fake aspirin bound for Africa

If They say dev world

1. Prove eu has a connection with dev world
2. Read responses to funding

If they say Connectivity

1. NUQ with EU connectivity plan

If They say Telemedicine

1. Read 5G blocks (NUQ)

A2 Green Energy Investment

Lastly, the MoU was controversial in an international context — so much so that the U.S. National Security Council issued an unusual tweet warning: **"Endorsing BRI lends legitimacy to China's predatory approach to investment** and will bring no benefits to the Italian people." The concern was well-founded: shortly following Italy's decision, Switzerland signed an MoU to cooperate with China in third countries participating in the BRI and New Zealand signaled a potential softening of its opposition to the initiative.

1. **DL. Developing Green Tech is incredibly cost prohibitive. Willuhn 19 calculates that renewable energy use like solar energy on the BRI would cost 11.2 Trillion dollars. The analysis to make here comes on two fronts:**
First its cost prohibitive to the investors. China's already massive BRI project over multiple years is only 1 trillion dollars, they need to add 10 trillion dollars, which EU cannot do. Second its cost prohibitive to investees. Remember that these developing countries take loans in order to pay for infrastructure, they would obviously prefer the much cheaper loan that is more feasible to pay off.

2. **Weigh. Comparatively even if they achieve some offense in changing green tech, realize that its still completely out scaled by the carbon construction projects in the rest of the world.** In the status quo, energy-sector investment is overwhelmingly geared towards harmful fossil fuels. Lihuan Zhou of the World Resources Institute quantifies that 91% of energy-sector loans to BRI countries go to the fossil fuel industry.

At this point, the overwhelming majority of constructions would still be bad.

A2 Chinese Loan Superiority

Weizhen Tan: Turn?: Chinese loans are too opaque; Affects investors who are considering bonds from those countries; hinders IMF and World Bank on debt analysis; China copped Sri Lanka

A2 FDI good- 2 responses

TURN: The Yale Environment Review finds that FDI has negative effects on developing countries in terms of both environment and economic sustainability.

First: FDI leads to an increase in natural resource depletion, enhancing the depletion of energy, forest, and mineral resources in developing countries.

Secondly: FDI fosters dependency on income generated from resource depletion, such as forestry or mining.

What this means is that not only does FDI increase environmental unsustainability, it also forces the developing country into a cycle of dependency, which will eventually dry up and destroy their economy.

TURN: The second turn is that Herzer of the Kiel Institute finds that A 1% increase in FDI increases income inequality by 12%. This is because inward FDI increases the relative demand for skilled labor in developed host countries. Higher relative wages, in turn, then lead to increasing income inequality.

2) China's strategy is to invest mainly through loans and not equity. In the energy and transport sectors, the vast majority of Chinese investment in the BRI countries has not implied direct investment. Usually, state-owned construction companies develop the initiative through loans provided by state-owned banks such as the China Development Bank. Multilateral financial institutions provide just 1 percent of the total investment in these initiatives. Procedures are blurred and there is a high risk that projects do not generate sufficient revenue to repay the debt. At present, $66 billion in Chinese loans within the BRI are non-performing loans.

DELINK:
https://blogs.worldbank.org/trade/three-opportunities-and-three-risks-belt-and-road-initiative someone write this block later lmao

A2 SEZs

1. SEZs—enclaves in which exporters and other investors receive tax, tariff and regulatory incentives—create distortions within economies. Other costs include required infrastructure investment and forgone tax revenues. The hope is that these are outweighed by the boost to jobs and trade. In reality, many SEZs fail. There is a long tail of failed zones that either never got going, were poorly run, or where investors gladly took tax breaks without producing substantial employment or export earnings.

A2 Chinese Overcapacity

1. **[NU]** There is solvency in the status quo for the overcapacity of chinese corporations. Tang '16 confirms this as China already is setting and completing targets for reducing

capacity. This includes cutting 45 million tonnes of steel and 280 million tonnes of coal capacity.

2. **[DL]** My opponents aren't going to be able to solve for global overcapacity simply by solving for China. This is because Xinzhen '16 finds that there are so many countries involved in the production of commodities that just solving one country won't help.
3. **MITIGATE:** Miles of Reuters '18: "But for most of those, Chinese overcapacity had little impact on global trade, the study said. China's exports of those products accounted for only a small proportion of its total exports and less than 2 percent of G20 countries' manufacturing imports, it found."
4. **TURN:** The solution is not dumping in emerging markets. Because emerging markets cannot hope to compete with cheaper Chinese goods, domestic industries are harmed and never able to develop for themselves.

A2 South China Sea

1. DL. Realize that China would never stop expanding in the South China Sea based on historical precedence. Hayton 18 states, China's behavior in the South China Sea has not fundamentally changed. It's still using military force to extort it's neighbors, and they still pose a threat to its neighbors. That goes to show that regardless of EU cooperation, regardless of intervention, and regardless of reform -- China has it's own motives at heart, and will continue to do the best thing for China.

2. TURN: The BRI will actually reduce China's incentives to follow international norms because of increasing economic resilience and independence. Ljungwall '18 finds that the BRI makes China less vulnerable to economic sanctions by creating regional self-sufficiency. As a result, he concludes that China will exhibit a greater degree of aggression, exacerbating conflict in the south china sea.

thus highlighting how government investment generates a sharp intertemporal trade-off for the distribution of income.25

A2 Trickle-Down

Herrera 17 - "the US poverty rate has been essentially the same for forty years, despite a significant increase in GDP per capita." This means that only economic growth, by itself, does not eliminate poverty. Hence, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) [12] indicates that the trickle-down effect or pro-poor growth ceased to be a valid idea

Cards

Holstag '19

Holslag, J. (2019). *The silk road trap: How Chinas trade ambitions challenge Europe*. Retrieved July 16, 2019, from https://www.wiley.com/en-us/The Silk Road Trap: How China's Trade Ambitions Challenge Europe-p-9781509534692

For many years, the European Union has hoped to build a balanced partnership with China and also expected the European institutions to engage China in regard to the trade deficit, market access and so forth. This book has found that this patient and constructive engagement has been unsuccessful. On its seven most important policy objectives, **the European Union has made no meaningful progress and has even lost in at least two cases.** To be sure, more and more official dialogues have been set up. Europe has provided financial support to help China to create a level playing field. Europe has also granted China almost unhampered access to its market while the access of European companies to the Chinese market remains limited. **Europe has adhered to free trade, even while China has refused to reciprocateffor over two decades. The Chinese leadership has repeatedly vowed to build a win–win partnership**. It has even presented itself as a new champion of free trade. **But the reality remains different. First of all, there is no win–win partnership with China. For the vast majority of European countries, the impact of China on their economic growth has remained negative**. It might be the case that individual European companies make a profit in China, but taking the general interest as a point of departure, which is what governments are meant to do, and evaluating the impact of China on the overall economy, it is just not appropriate to insist that China has been 'good' for growth in Europe. Most countries have a persistent deficit on the current account, which includes the trade balance. Altogether, **the European Union has directly lost €1.4 trillion to China** since 2006, as a result of that protracted deficit. European countries have also lost out to China in third markets.

Megaw '16

Megaw, N. (2016, July 12). EU trade deficit with China hits €180bn. Retrieved 22 July 2019, from Financial Times website: https://www.ft.com/content/5cfd2363-2758-3d65-967b-abecbdf2504c

A surge in imports led the **EU's trade in goods deficit with China** to **a record €180bn** last year, according to Eurostat data. The union's surplus in services also hit a new record, but remained a fraction of total trade.

Chatterjee ‘12

Chatterjee, S., & Turnovsky, S. J. (2012). Infrastructure and inequality. European Economic Review, 56(8), 1730–1745. doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.08.003

Since the stock of private capital, its initial distribution, and the stock of public capital are initially given, wealth inequality does not change on impact. It does so only gradually, increasing by about 2.7% in the long run. **In the short run, income inequality declines by 2.6%** relative to its preshock level. **However, over time this decline is reversed, with long-run income inequality increasing by about 5%**.

Lee ‘19

Lee, May 2019, The end of Chimerica The passing of global economic consensus and the rise of US–China strategic technological competition (2019), Professor John Lee is a senior fellow at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. He is also a senior fellow at the, Hudson Institute in Washington DC. He served as senior adviser to Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop from 2016 to 2018., https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019-04/SI%20136%20The%20end%20of%20Chimerica.pdf?zquA2PovEXIFcI6_E30FH9PuLVx7PMHM

These issues go to the heart of China's political economy and will remain unresolved by any US–China trade deal. Beijing won't leave the commercial fate of its companies to the gods of competition, competence and chance. More than any other major economy, it's prepared to use state power, laws, regulations and resources to: • ensure that state-owned enterprises and 'national champions' dominate in targeted sectors, domestically and internationally • lock in guaranteed external markets for those entities, especially through its Belt and Road Initiative and the initiative's Digital Silk Road arm • support the use of forced or illegal IP transfers to allow state-owned enterprises and national champions to compete and eventually dominate • rely on opaque and even corrupt political deals to create economic footholds for Chinese entities (such as occurred in Malaysia24 and the Maldives25). These approaches inherently undermine what globalisation and interdependence are designed to facilitate and enhance: the maximisation of efficiency and creation of new opportunities for participants based on market forces. China's approach in the global economy reflects its own political-economic set-up, which is designed to ensure that the CCP retains the levers of economic power and relevance. While all governments intervene in the domestic and global economy to some degree, the nature, scale and extent of intervention by the CCP and Chinese state mean that authoritarian China plays a vastly different game from other major economies in the global system. For example, a recent survey of the largest 98 companies in China revealed that less than one-quarter were privately owned.26 In all state-owned firms, the CCP has a significant if not decisive say in major corporate decisions and senior managerial appointments.27 Even when it comes to private firms, China's Company Law stipulates the establishment of party committees in all commercial entities 'to carry out the activities of the party in accordance with the charter of the Communist Party of China'.28 Similarly, the 2017 National Intelligence Law demands that 'Any organization and citizen shall … support, provide assistance, and cooperate in national intelligence work, and guard the secrecy of any national intelligence work that they are aware of …'29 The poor separation of political and economic agencies allows the party-state to blatantly manipulate markets and distort competition to achieve the CCP's goals.30

EU Won't Fund - Reuters '19

BRUSSELS (Reuters) - The European Union and Japan signed an infrastructure deal on Friday to coordinate transport, energy and digital projects linking Europe and Asia, seeking an alternative to Chinese largesse that has raised suspicion in Brussels and Tokyo. The accord, signed by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, formalizes Japan's involvement in a new EU-Asia "connectivity" plan that is set to be backed by a 60 billion euro ($65.48 billion) EU guarantee fund, development banks and private investors.