

“Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

General info	4
Cards to be cut	5
PRO	6
Sanctions harm civilians instead of government	6
Sanctions led to civilian casualties	6
(not really) Sanctions preclude Maduro from resolving blackouts	8
Pompeo admits that the sanctions exacerbate the humanitarian crisis	8
Sanctions impede humanitarian aid	9
(contradicts case) Sanctions lead to overcompliance	9
(contradicts case) Humanitarian exemptions don't work in practice: parties cannot access funding for humanitarian goods	9
Sanctions impede economic recovery	10
Government cannot restructure debt with sanctions	10
Sanctions prevent venezuela from restructuring debt and other reform- could have already began recovery w/o sanctions	10
Effects of crisis are unique to sanctions	11
Crisis has worsened after United States imposed sanctions	11
US is attempting regime change	12
Neutral agencies refuse to join in the United State's efforts	12
Sanctions will not get rid of Maduro	12
Maduro uses the United State's war on Venezuela as justification to refuse talks with Gaudio	12
Don't read- Maduro wants to help his people	13
Empirical/ General: Sanctions fail	13
Populations blame the sanctions, not their government	13
Other countries trade	14
Extend: Maduro uses propaganda	14
Overuse of sanctions harm America's role as global leader: cryptocurrencies	15
Sanctioned countries develop workarounds to the dollar: undermine US global economic power	15
Russia develops cryptocurrencies with Venezuela	16
AT: Sanctions help CITGO	16
AT: Soldier Defections	17
Maduro's people will never defect- all criminals	17
AT: Hezbollah	18

“Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

Evidence challenges	18
DEFEND: CERP 40,000 deaths	18
AT: Soest	18
Indictment: successful 40/115, 34% Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (HSE)	19
AT: 80% chance of Maduro exit - Bosworth	21
CON	21
general sanction good	21
Increase probability of leader exit	21
Sanctions increase chance of leader losing power by 28%	23
Examples of success- Guatemala, Nicaragua, Thailand	23
Conditions were bad before sanctions	24
Dire conditions preceded sanctions	24
Economy contracted before harsher sanctions begun	24
Sanctions didn't cause oil failure	24
Venezuela's share of OPEC has declined since Chavez took over	25
PDVSA fails in either world (alternate cause/ non unique to sanctions)	25
Blackouts caused decline	26
Sanctions could not have caused crisis	26
Sanctions against Russia are worse	26
Blackouts caused by corruption, not sanctions	27
Maduro gives aid to political supporters	28
Administration politicizes aid- distributes it to political supporters	28
Identification cards track support and distribute aid	29
Maduro politicizes needed medical assistance	30
Quantifies: Maduro's supporters receive aid, dissenters do not	31
Sanctions exempt aid	31
United States gives aid FY 2019	31
Treasury allows humanitarian aid (via general license)	31
Treasury will work with individuals and businesses to see if they have a general license exemption. If not, Treasury will issue specific licenses for economic activity within Venezuela, prioritizing humanitarian purposes (overcompliance will not happen)	32
Maduro refuses humanitarian aid- sanctions not to blame	33
Maduro doesn't admit that there is a crisis	33
Maduro refuses aid	33
Aid piling up outside Venezuela	34
Humanitarian aid will never reach Venezuela under Maduro regime	34
UN: Maduro hasn't used all resources available or sought help to provide food	34
UN: Maduro exacerbates crisis by concealing health data	35

“Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

Maduro will misuse economy if sanctions are lifted	35
Maduro steals aid money	35
Maduro uses government revenue to prop up regime (not for his own people)	36
Maduro will not reform economy (shady card)	36
Sanctions lead to defections	37
Increasing protests inside of Venezuela	37
Sanctions encourage high level officials to resign- will occur soon	37
Sanctions lead to military defecting	37
Regime change will happen if Maduro can't pay generals	38
US SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVELY AIMED AT INDIVIDUAL CORRUPT MEMBERS OF THE VENEZUELEAN GOVERNMENT-Vidal and Mazzali '19	39
US will lift sanctions on specific individuals	39
Sanctions increase democracy	40
The sanctions are intended to improve democratic processes- not attain regime change	40
Sanctions limit Maduro's power, including ability to hurt his own people	40
Opposition wants sanctions	41
Sanctions lead to negotiations	41
Sanctions could lead to negotiations between Maduro regime and opposition	41
Sanctions pressured Maduro to reopen talks in Barbados	41
Negotiations have already occurred	42
Sanctions lead Maduro to resign	42
Solutions	43
Gaudio will fix PDVSA- new board will attract investment	43
New government will get IMF loans	43
Obtain loans from IMF to rebuild: 20b starting point, Gaudio adviser predicts 60-80b	43
Harvard economist predicts 60b needed to stop printing money	44
Required structural reforms means that only a new government can get the monetary aid	44
IMF loans need Maduro to request them	44
IMF and WB ready to help, meanwhile Maduro shuns them	45
Funds available in weeks	45
IMF loans good	46
Harvest and oil production	46
AT: Sanctions prevent debt restructuring	46
AT: ALBA initiative petrocaribe / Haiti	48
Petrocaribe fails in both worlds	49
Protests caused by corruption, not US sanctions	49
AT: CITGO will be CITGONE	49

“Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

AT: Illicit revenue streams - S. don't deprive elites	51
AT: Sanctions -> propaganda	51
AT: Russia/ Chinese Hegemony and influence	52
Russia is ready to accept a new leader of Venezuela	52
Russia will abandon Venezuela in the wake of collapse	52
AT: Scapegoating	53
AT: Dollarization	53
Venezuela is more than 50% dollarized	53
Evidence	53
DEFEND: GUATEMALA	53
AT: CEPR, Weisbrot, Sachs, 40,000 lives: The bulk of the collapse preceded sanctions	54
AT: Peksen and Drury	55
AT: Pape	57
All evidence before Jan 28, 2019 precedes major sanctions- non unique	58
Extension: Solvency	59

General info

The US recognizes Guaido (Jan 6)

- <https://www.wsj.com/articles/pence-tells-juan-guaido-he-is-the-only-legitimate-president-of-venezuela-11578343578>

US will grant amnesty to those who defect from the Maduro regime → more incentive to leave

- **The vague and open-ended provisions in the bill could effectively grant blanket impunity to officials** responsible for serious human rights abuses,” José Miguel Vivanco, the Americas director at Human Rights Watch, said in a statement. “Any amnesty that guarantees impunity by absolving government and military officials responsible for the most serious human rights violations is incompatible with Venezuela’s international obligations.”
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“Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

Cards to be cut

https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp235_grauvogel-soest.pdf

SOEST AUTHORITARIAN

https://www.jstor.org/stable/40664170?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

Econ sanctions on single-party and military regimes increase levels of cooptation and repression

(Con) Sanctions decrease political violence in target states

https://www.jstor.org/stable/27638645?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

(Con) Sanctions destabilizes leaders → regime change

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00142.x?casa_token=R4GbL_XO5F0AAAAA%3AxF5NGkPWu1FoRzq3ikPW7kAevW5p6KGKRIKhgptIH4vvJ8TiLNYdfdTf_KfrLpROQRQOZdpUM2t9Og

(pro) Overcompliance cards:

- K/P04.01) United Nations, STATES NEWS SERVICE, August 8, 2019, pNA, NexisUni. President Maduro has been in power since 2013 and was sworn in again for a second term on 10 January. "The sanctions are extremely broad and fail to contain sufficient measures to mitigate their impact on the most vulnerable sectors of the population", said Michelle Bachelet, High Commissioner for Human Rights. "I fear that they will have far-reaching implications on the rights to health and to food in particular, in a country where there are already serious shortages of essential goods".
- SK/P04.02) Human Rights Watch, STATES NEWS SERVICE, August 9, 2019, pNA, NexisUni. "Human Rights Watch is deeply concerned that recent US sanctions on Venezuela will further exacerbate the suffering of the Venezuelan people. While the purchase of food and medicine is in theory excluded from the sanctions, foreign providers fearing punishment under the sanctions may limit their transactions with Venezuelan authorities in ways that could seriously harm even more Venezuelans' economic and social rights."
- SK/P04.03) United Nations, STATES NEWS SERVICE, August 8, 2019, pNA, NexisUni. With the new sanctions further restricting economic activity, Ms. Bachelet [UN High Commissioner for Human Rights] expressed concern that "businesses and financial institutions are likely to err on the side of caution and completely halt transactions" with Venezuela, rather than risk punishment for violating the sanctions. "As I have stressed before, the roots of the economic crisis in Venezuela predate the imposition of any economic sanctions", the High Commission reiterated. "But the economic sanctions imposed in August 2017 and in January 2019 have exacerbated the effects of this dire crisis, and by extension the humanitarian situation, given that most of the foreign exchange earnings derive from oil exports, many of which are linked to the US market".
- SK/P04.04) United Nations, STATES NEWS SERVICE, August 8, 2019, pNA, NexisUni. She [Michelle Bachelet, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights] acknowledged that while technically, the latest sanctions do not apply to transactions on food, clothing or medicine intended to be used to relieve human suffering, "they are still likely to significantly exacerbate the crisis for millions of ordinary Venezuelans", citing "over-compliance by financial institutions" globally that have commercial relations with the US and Venezuela.

Sanctions lifted for individuals/ corporations

- SK/C11.03) U.S. Department of the Treasury, STATES NEWS SERVICE, July25, 2019, pNA, NexisUni. U.S. sanctions need not be permanent; sanctions are intendedto change behavior. The United States has made it clear that we will consider liftingsanctions for persons designated under E.O. 13692 or E.O. 13850, each as amended, whotake concrete and meaningful actions to restore democratic order, refuse to take part inhuman rights abuses, speak out against abuses committed by the Government ofVenezuela, and combat corruption in Venezuela.
- SK/C11.04) Peter E. Harrell [Foreign Policy], NEWSTEX BLOGS, October 5,2019, pNA, NexisUni. For sanctions to encourage targets to change their behavior, thosetargets must understand what behavior they have to change, and they need a clear path tothe removal of sanctions if they agree to concessions. This has helped achieve some near-term successes when it comes to individual people and companies targeted by U.S.sanctions. The administration's willingness to quickly lift sanctions off Figuera after hedefected from the Maduro regime, and off Italy's PB Tankers after it stopped transportingVenezuelan oil to Cuba, both reinforce the notion that individuals and companies will seeU.S. sanctions lifted if they agree to concessions, incentivizing other targets of sanctionsto make concessions to be removed from U.S. sanctions lists.
- SK/C11.05) Peter E. Harrell [Foreign Policy], NEWSTEX BLOGS, October 22,2019, pNA, NexisUni. When Trump sanctioned the then-Venezuelan spy chief ManuelRicardo Cristopher Figuera in February, the Treasury put out a press release stating, 'theUnited States has made clear that we will consider lifting sanctions for persons who takeconcrete and meaningful actions to restore democratic order, refuse to take part in humanrights abuses, speak out against abuses committed by the government, and combat corruption in Venezuela.' The administration then removed Figuera from sanctions lists in early May, a week after he defected from the government of Venezuelan strongman Nicols Maduro.

Corruption cards (con)

- <https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Venezuela-a-Mafia-State-InSight-Crime-2018.pdf>

“Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

- https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017

PRO

Sanctions harm civilians instead of government

Sanctions led to civilian casualties

Mark **Weisbrot** a and Jeffrey **Sachs**¹, 6-24-2019, Routledge, Punishing Civilians: U.S. Sanctions on Venezuela

<https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/05775132.2019.1638094>

The August 2017 sanctions prohibited the Venezuelan government from borrowing in U.S. financial markets. This prevented the government from restructuring its foreign debt, because any debt restructuring requires the issuance of new bonds in exchange for the existing debt. Thus, these sanctions prevented the economy from recovering from a deep recession that had already taken a large toll on the population, which along with the economy was more vulnerable to these sanctions and the ones that followed as a result of the economic crisis. Real gross domestic product (GDP) had already declined by about 24.7 percent from 2013 through 2016, and consumer price inflation for January to August 2017 was probably somewhere between 758 percent and 1,350 percent at an annual rate. It is important to emphasize that nearly all of the foreign exchange that is needed to import medicine, food, medical equipment, spare parts and equipment needed for electricity generation, water systems, or transportation is received by the Venezuelan economy through the government’s revenue from the export of oil. Thus, any sanctions that reduce export earnings, and therefore government revenue, thereby reduce the imports of these essential and, in many cases, life-saving goods.

The sanctions have also contributed substantially to the length and economic damage of power outages, including the severe electricity crises in March. For example, the sanctions have limited Venezuela’s access to diesel fuel, which is needed for its backup thermal generators. Further, Venezuela’s electrical sector relies upon equipment provided by international suppliers such as General Electric. The sanctions prevented the Venezuelan government from paying these companies, thereby increasing reliance on hydroelectric power generation. The sanctions implemented in 2019, including the recognition of a parallel government, accelerated this deprivation and also cut off Venezuela from most of the international payments system, thus ending much of the country’s access to these essential imports including medicine and food—even those that could normally be bought with available dollars. There is no doubt that all of these sanctions since August 2017 have had severe impacts on human life and health **According to the National Survey on Living Conditions (ENCOVI by its acronym in Spanish), an annual survey of living conditions administered by three Venezuelan universities, there was a 31 percent increase in general mortality from 2017 to 2018. This would imply an increase of more than 40,000 deaths.** More than 300,000 people were estimated to be at risk because of lack of access to medicines or treatment. This includes an estimated 80,000 people with HIV who have not had antiretroviral treatment since 2017, 16,000 people who need dialysis, 16,000 people with cancer, and 4 million with diabetes and hypertension (many of whom cannot obtain insulin or cardiovascular medicine). **These numbers by themselves virtually guarantee**

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“Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

that the current sanctions, which are much more severe than those implemented before this year, are a death sentence for tens of thousands of Venezuelans. This is especially true if the projected 67 percent drop in oil revenue materializes in 2019.

In 2018 the Venezuela Pharmaceutical Federation reported that shortages of essential medicines were 85 percent (UN 2019). The electricity crisis has also impacted hospitals and health care. It is not known how many people have died as a result of power failures in hospitals, but during the March blackouts there were press reports of fatalities due to loss of electricity (Gutierrez and Ramos 2019). As noted above, the sanctions contributed substantially to the duration and impact of the blackouts.

Again, we can never know what the counterfactual would have been. But what we can know is that the sanctions made such a stabilization program practically impossible. Most immediately, they prevented a debt restructuring that would be necessary to resolve Venezuela’s balance of payments crisis. The sanctions also prevented the government from pursuing an ERBS program because a peg to the dollar would require access to the dollar-based financial system, which the sanctions have cut off as much as possible. The whole idea of restoring confidence in the domestic currency while stabilizing the exchange rate would seem impossible when a foreign power is cutting off as much of the country’s dollar revenue as it can, freezing and confiscating international assets, and, as the Trump administration has done for nearly two years, pledging to do much more of these things — not to mention threatening to take military action. Thus one of the most important impacts of the sanctions, in terms of its effects on human life and health, is to lock Venezuela into a downward economic spiral. For this reason, it is important to note that when we look at, for example, the estimated more than 40,000 excess deaths that occurred just from 2017 to 2018, **the counterfactual possibility in the absence of sanctions is not just zero excess deaths, but actually a reduction in mortality and other improvements in health indicators.** That is because an economic recovery could have already begun in the absence of economic sanctions. And conversely, the death toll going forward this year, **if the sanctions remain in place, is almost certainly going to be vastly higher than anything we have seen previously, given the highly accelerated rate of decline of oil production and therefore the availability of essential imports, and also the accelerated decline of income per person.**

(not really) Sanctions preclude Maduro from resolving blackouts

Francisco **RodríGuez** and Jorge Alejandro RodríGuez, 3-26-2019, "Opinion," No Publication,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/26/opinion/venezuela-maduro-blackout.html?auth=login-google&login=google>

Zoom out and you’ll see the capital, Caracas, plunged into darkness. On Monday, another blackout struck Caracas and 16 other states. The government has blamed cyberattacks for the blackouts, but under Nicolás Maduro and his predecessor as president, Hugo Chávez, the electrical system was neglected for decades. To fully understand why it took Venezuela at least four days to restore power in March, you need an even wider lens: one that includes Washington. It is undeniable that Mr. Chávez and Mr. Maduro are to blame for having brought the country to this ruinous state. Nevertheless, **United States economic sanctions have left Mr. Maduro’s government unable to resolve the crisis on its own.** The cause of the first blackout is now well understood. A comprehensive report by the chairman of the engineering school at Central University in Caracas shows that the blackout resulted from a wildfire near three power transmission lines from the Guri Dam complex in southeastern Venezuela. The complex includes several hydroelectric dams and power stations that provide 80 percent of the nation’s electricity; its shutdown can thus by itself produce a nationwide blackout. Certainly, failing to cut back vegetation could have increased the probability of the fire, though wildfires can occur just about anywhere. But the real problem is not so much that a blackout occurred but that it took more than four days to get power back. To restart the system, dam generators and substations in distant points of the country needed to be activated. But only around one-fifth of the country’s thermal power capacity was operational at the moment of the shutdown, leaving little to no room for thermal generation backup to temporarily replace the energy generated by the dams. The absence of an alternate power source, lack of specialized workers, deteriorated equipment and faulty management thus all appear to have played their part in prolonging the blackouts. Yet **United States economic sanctions also played a part. For starters, one of the reasons some of the thermal power plants were down was the lack of fuel necessary to run them. Many of these plants run on diesel, which Venezuela was importing from the United States before the Trump administration banned its trade in January. It is not surprising that many diesel-fueled thermal plants were inactive one month later.**

Furthermore, Venezuela’s large electricity sector depends heavily on parts and services supplied by foreign companies. General Electric and Siemens [provide](#) most of the power generators used by Venezuela’s oil industry as well as much of the major equipment used in its hydroelectric plants. United States financial sanctions adopted in August 2017 left Venezuela unable to pay its foreign suppliers. As a result, Venezuela was unable to maintain or replace its power generators, and began relying more on hydroelectricity, contributing to the risks of overloading

“Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

the system. Venezuela’s oil production also went into a tailspin, with the rate of decline in output more than tripling after the 2017 sanctions, worsening the government’s cash crunch. Yet it is hard to conclude that sanctions were anything more than a secondary contributor to the causes of Venezuela’s electric grid failures today. Underinvestment, lack of maintenance, and the country’s economic crisis, which has been deepened by corruption and heavily subsidized electricity, are clearly the main drivers. In this sense, Mr. Chávez and Mr. Maduro undoubtedly shoulder the primary responsibility for the electrical collapse.

To have a meaningful discussion on the effect of sanctions, it is crucial to distinguish between the causes of a phenomenon and its remedies. While the blackouts are for the most part attributable to chavismo, it is impossible to address them without removing the constraints that impede the government from contracting and paying foreign corporations for the maintenance and repair of the electrical system. **It is not only Mr. Maduro, but also Juan Guaidó, the opposition leader and designated president, and President Trump, who control the levers needed to resolve the energy crisis.**

More recent [oil sanctions](#) legally bar American companies from doing any business with Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, while non-United States companies face the [threat](#) of punitive secondary sanctions for doing business with the Maduro regime. Venezuela’s bank accounts in the United States and Europe are for the most part either blocked or controlled by Guaidó appointees, impeding Mr. Maduro from using them to pay the firms he would need to hire to maintain and repair the electricity grid.

Pompeo admits that the sanctions exacerbate the humanitarian crisis

Check, 4-10-2019, "Pompeo: Sanctions Increase "Pain and Suffering" in Venezuela (Pt 2/2)," Real News Network, <https://therealnews.com/stories/pompeo-sanctions-increase-pain-and-suffering-in-venezuela-pt-2-2> MIKE POMPEO: Well, we wish things could go faster, but I’m very confident that the tide is moving in the direction of the Venezuelan people and will continue to do so. It doesn’t take much for you to see what’s really going on there. The circle is tightening. **the humanitarian crisis is increasing by the hour**. I talked with our senior person on the ground there in Venezuela last night, at 7:00 or 8:00 last night. You can see the increasing pain and suffering that the Venezuelan people are suffering from.

Sanctions impede humanitarian aid

(contradicts case) Sanctions lead to overcompliance

Wola, 8-1-2019, "Human Rights Organizations: New U.S. Sanctions Risk Aggravating Human Suffering in Venezuela With No Solution in Sight," WOLA, <https://www.wola.org/2019/08/human-rights-organizations-new-u-s-sanctions-risk-aggravating-human-suffering-in-venezuela-with-no-solution-in-sight/>

On August 5, the Trump administration announced new sanctions against the Nicolás Maduro government in Venezuela. This recent extension of Executive Order 13692 is intended to further limit the Maduro government’s access to global commerce. The sanctions are designed to limit the activities of third-party companies that engage with the Venezuelan government. As organizations devoted to advancing human rights and opposing authoritarianism in Venezuela, which has sparked a severe human rights and refugee crisis, the signing groups express our deep concern about the potential for these broad economic sanctions to aggravate Venezuela’s humanitarian emergency, and to inflict further suffering on the Venezuelan people. The country’s deep economic crisis predates U.S. sanctions, and has its roots in years of mismanagement and corruption. However, as underscored by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in her [July report](#), financial and oil sanctions are “exacerbating further the effects of the economic crisis, and thus the humanitarian situation.” Millions of Venezuelans today are suffering from widespread lack of access to essential goods including food and medicine.

Venezuela’s oil exports represent the main source of hard currency used to pay for imports, and limiting this revenue puts the importation of food and medicine at risk. The Executive Order signed on Monday claims that these latest sanctions will not impact transactions relating to imports of food, medicine, or clothing. In practice, however, **similar exemptions** included in previous rounds of U.S. sanctions **have failed to prevent the negative consequences of overcompliance**. It is clear that **this practice** has had the effect of **significantly [restricts]** restricting **legal work by independent humanitarian organizations in Venezuela. Financial institutions**, rather than risk running afoul of the U.S. Treasury Department, **have chosen to freeze legitimate accounts and deny legal transactions, even those associated with actors working to relieve the country’s humanitarian emergency or support a democratic transition.** What is more, the economic impact of these sanctions will be to reduce overall imports in a context in which millions of ordinary Venezuelan people are already highly vulnerable. The Trump administration’s announcement is premised on the idea that imposing broad economic sanctions will force regime change in the short term. Unfortunately, as shown in the cases of Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Syria, such sanctions often strengthen authoritarian leaders by providing a useful scapegoat to blame for their repression, and deepen the population’s susceptibility to policies that amount to forms of social control imposed by these governments. It should be lost on no one that the announcement comes as representatives of the Maduro government and the political opposition are in Barbados for a negotiation process mediated by the Norwegian government. International efforts to pressure actors to advance democratic and nonviolent change in Venezuela must be oriented towards this negotiation process, avoiding

“Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

inflicting even greater harm on a population that has already seen a severe degradation of its human rights by the government of Nicolás Maduro. We call on the U.S. government to find ways to address the Venezuela crisis that do not worsen human suffering on the ground. If there is no way to avoid the human cost of these measures and provide humanitarian assistance with the urgency and breadth that is required, then they should be lifted. The U.S. government needs to facilitate efforts to achieve a political solution to the conflict, rather than complicate them.

(contradicts case) Humanitarian exemptions don't work in practice: parties cannot access funding for humanitarian goods

Vivian **Salama**, 12-27-2019, "U.S. Expands Sanctions Against Venezuela Into an Embargo," WSJ,

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-expands-sanctions-against-venezuela-into-an-embargo-11565053782>

"Secondary sanctions would be significant, depriving the regime of desperately needed oil and gold revenue," said Benjamin Gedan, who was an Obama administration Latin America adviser. "But it's far from clear Venezuela's allies would comply with secondary sanctions," said Mr. Gedan, currently an adviser with the Wilson Center, a Washington think tank. "The White House is having a tough time enforcing Iran sanctions, after all. For Venezuela sanctions, even allies that share the U.S. position, such as the Europeans and Latin Americans, have not coordinated sanctions policy." Similar embargoes on Iran and Cuba haven't deterred the Chinese, Russians and others from doing business with those countries, experts said. Outside observers also warn that sweeping sanctions and secondary sanctions on Venezuela could exacerbate the economic crisis and lend Mr. Maduro ammunition to blame Washington for the nation's woes. The action the U.S. is set to take grants some 21 **exemptions to international and nongovernmental organizations** for services such as humanitarian goods, mail, food, medicine and the internet. However, experts said that this **rarely works in practice. "The administration hasn't been very good at dedicating financial lines that would allow the purchase of food and medicine in sanctioned countries,"** said Jeffrey Schott, an economic-sanctions expert at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a Washington think tank. **"In practice, we still block food and medicine because the parties in the targeted regime that want to import it can't get financing."**

Sanctions impede economic recovery

Government cannot restructure debt with sanctions

default, 7-26-2017, "Containing the Shock Waves from Venezuela," **Crisis Group**,

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/venezuela/65-containing-shock-waves-venezuela>

Venezuela is on the brink of a major default on its foreign debt, which would be the first in the region since the Argentine debt crisis of 2001. In early November 2017, President Maduro announced that he would seek to "restructure and refinance" the country's **debt** and invited bondholders to a meeting in Caracas. But he has put forward no plan and negotiations have not begun. **The chances of an orderly restructuring are close to nil, because U.S. sanctions in place since mid-2017 make it an offence under U.S. law to loan money to the Venezuelan government or to** **Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), the state oil company**, except under certain, highly limited circumstances.

Sanctions prevent venezuela from restructuring debt and other reform- could have already began recovery w/o sanctions

Mark **Weisbrot** and Jeffrey **Sachs**², 6-24-2019, Routledge, Punishing Civilians: U.S. Sanctions on Venezuela

<https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/05775132.2019.1638094>

In a situation of hyperinflation, people increasingly lose confidence in the domestic currency and do not want to hold it. Therefore, at some point the hyperinflation becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. However, the dynamic that is created can make it possible to get rid of hyperinflation easier and more quickly than taming much lower, but still high, inflation. This happens when, as a result of the hyperinflation, people cease to look at prices in the domestic currency, and instead look to the exchange rate for pricing. At that point, stabilizing the exchange rate can quickly stabilize domestic prices. For example, in the Bolivian hyperinflation of 1985, hyperinflation was brought under control within 10 days.⁵⁸ This Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization (ERBS)

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“Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

was done by creating a new exchange rate system with full convertibility and a managed float of the currency. Following that, in order to change expectations and maintain price stability, **the government also had to undertake serious fiscal and monetary reforms.** Could Venezuela have adopted such a program in the absence of US economic sanctions? It is certainly possible. Venezuela would not necessarily have needed outside help to have enough reserves to create a new exchange rate system.⁵⁹ Nor was there any need for further austerity to stabilize the balance of payments; by 2016 imports had already fallen by more than 80 percent from their 2012 level.⁶⁰ To the extent that the government did need to borrow — or provide collateral for a debt restructuring — Venezuela should have been able to securitize some of their 300 billion barrels of oil in the ground. With unimpeded access to the international financial system, there would be some price — even if it were only a small fraction of current prices — at which the potential return would balance the risk of non-payment and would attract investors. These contracts are less difficult to arrange than in the past, as the ability of investors to collect judgements for such assets has increased substantially in recent years.⁶¹ And for a government that wants to avoid an economic collapse, selling off some fraction of its oil in the ground at a very low price would be worthwhile, especially since these reserves are more than it could hope to export in a century. Thus, **in the absence of sanctions, a government with these vast oil reserves (in addition to other minerals) would be expected to have the ability to avoid this kind of an economic crisis.**⁶² Again, we can never know what the counterfactual would have been. But what we can know is that the **sanctions made such a stabilization program practically impossible.** Most immediately, **they prevented a debt restructuring that would be necessary to resolve Venezuela’s balance of payments crisis. The sanctions also prevented the government from pursuing an ERBS program because a peg to the dollar would require access to the dollar-based financial system, which the sanctions have cut off as much as possible. The whole idea of restoring confidence in the domestic currency while stabilizing the exchange rate would seem impossible when a foreign power is cutting off as much of the country’s dollar revenue as it can, freezing and confiscating international assets, and, as the Trump administration has done for nearly two years, pledging to do much more of these things — not to mention threatening to take military action. Thus one of the most important impacts of the sanctions, in terms of its effects on human life and health, is to lock Venezuela into a downward economic spiral.** For this reason, it is important to note that when we look at, for example, the estimated more than 40,000 excess deaths that occurred just from 2017 to 2018, **the counterfactual possibility in the absence of sanctions is not just zero excess deaths, but actually a reduction in mortality and other improvements in health indicators. That is because an economic recovery could have already begun in the absence of economic sanctions.**

Effects of crisis are unique to sanctions

Crisis has worsened after United States imposed sanctions

https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20180523_acaps_thematic_report_humanitarian_crisis_in_venezuela.pdf, Jude

Sweeney, 2018, ACAPS

96% of hospitals surveyed in the National Hospital Survey in March 2018 reported not being able to provide (or only partly being able to provide) nutrition services, up from 85% in 2017. 66% of hospitals reported shortages of milk formula, up from 64% in 2017 (Encuesta Nacional de Hospitales 03/2018). Reportedly, stocks of infant formula in pharmacies are also low (NYT 17/12/2017). There is no official data available for malnutrition rates in Venezuela. A Caritas study conducted April-August 2017 in the most vulnerable parts of the states of Miranda, Vargas, and Zulia, found the SAM rate among children under five was 4%, above the Emergency threshold of 2%, and the GAM rate was 14.5%, with rates having increased in comparison with previous surveys (Caritas 27/09/2017). In January 2018, Caritas reported an overall GAM rate of 16.2%, above the Emergency threshold of 15%, in the surveyed areas in the aforementioned states as well as Carabobo and Bolívar states and the Capital District (El Nacional 27/01/2018). Malnutrition-related deaths have been reported in Bolívar state (El Nacional 18/11/2017). Health The health system is disrupted by shortages of medical supplies and medicines. It is unclear whether some parts of the country are more affected than others. Health care access and availability: The health system in Venezuela continues to deteriorate. Hospitals and health service provision is impacted by shortages of supplies, lack of services, and doctors leaving the country. The National Hospital Survey conducts annual surveys about the state of the health system. In March 2018, it surveyed 134 hospitals in 22 of 23 states. In many hospitals, basic services are not fully available. 94% of x-ray services were inoperable or only partly functional, up from 89% in 2017 and up from 19% in 2014. **79% of hospitals reported water shortages, up from 63% in 2017**, and up from 29% in 2014. 53% of operating rooms are reportedly not functional, up from 51% in 2017 and up from 38% in 2014. (Encuesta Nacional de Hospitales 03/2018) Shortages of medicines and health supplies have been widely reported. **88% of hospitals surveyed in 2018 reported medicine shortages, up from 78% in 2017** and up from 55% in 2014 (Encuesta Nacional de Hospitales 03/2018). Since January 2018, there has reportedly been a shortage of reagents needed to test blood donations, which has led to shortages of blood reserves, impacting the provision of transfusions and medical surgeries (Washington Post 08/03/2018). Patients have reportedly been asked to bring their own basic supplies like syringes or scalpels (Washington Post 08/03/2018, Miami Herald 29/03/2018). Media reports a shortage of HIV tests and medication for HIV treatment (DW 14/02/2018). In February 2018, the Venezuelan organisation Codevida reported that 16,000 dialysis patients were going without treatment because of the lack of supplies (RunRunEs 01/02/2018, UN 09/02/2018). Medicine shortages have reportedly led to the growth of a black market for medicines and contraband of medicines (Reuters 08/12/2017, The Guardian 05/04/2018). There are health risks associated with medicine being sold illegally, as it may have been stored incorrectly, or expired (Reuters 08/12/2017, NPR 01/02/2018). Inflated prices of medicine on the black market imply that access is limited and many people cannot afford to buy medicine (The Guardian 05/04/2018). Shortages of condoms and birth control pills have been reported, which in addition to shortages of basic supplies for babies has contributed to increasing

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numbers of women seeking sterilisation to avoid unwanted pregnancies, and to avoid having to care for a child in a context of supply shortages (NYT 17/12/2017). The health sector is further impacted by low salaries, the absence of medical staff, and violence. Salaries for medical staff, particularly in public hospitals, are often very low. According to media reports, 22,000 doctors have left the country, which further impacts ACAPS Thematic Report: Humanitarian Crisis in Venezuela 5 the availability of healthcare (Miami Herald 29/03/2018). There is anecdotal evidence of health staff being attacked or receiving death threats if a patient dies (Miami Herald 29/03/2018, The Guardian 05/04/2018). The percentage of people with health insurance has dropped since 2014. According to the ENCOVI study, over 68% of the surveyed population did not have health insurance in 2017. In 2014, just over 50% of the surveyed population was not insured (ENCOVI 02/2018)

US is attempting regime change

Neutral agencies refuse to join in the United State’s efforts

Ciara **Nugent**, Feb 22, 2019, "What to Know About the Showdown at the Venezuelan Border This Weekend," Time, <https://time.com/5535496/venezuela-border-aid/>

The U.S., along with most other Western democracies, quickly recognized Guaidó as interim president after his inauguration ceremony on Jan. 23 and the Trump Administration has vowed to help him take power. They also answered his call for humanitarian assistance, with National Security Adviser John Bolton pledging \$20 million of aid. Canada, Germany and others have also contributed.

Colombia, which has dealt with an influx of over a million desperate Venezuelan refugees, is helping to coordinate efforts to get the aid in. Meanwhile, British billionaire Richard Branson has helped to organize a massive pop concert at the Tienditas bridge near Cúcuta on Friday and Saturday, featuring some of Latin America’s most famous acts, to raise money for more supplies.

Maduro has organized his own rival concert on the other side of the border. **U.N. agencies, along with the Red Cross and Catholic charity**

Cáritas, have refused to help bring aid in, saying that it is too political a move for neutral aid groups to join in. “The

action of the Red Cross is based on two principles: humanity and neutrality. Neutrality is the most important one in situations like this,” Francesco Rocca, president of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies told CNN.

Program, 2-25-2019, "Why US-backed aid to Venezuela harkens back to a dark history of covert operations," Public Radio International,

<https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-02-25/why-us-backed-aid-venezuela-harkens-back-dark-history-covert-operations>

The clashes between Maduro and Guaidó supporters over American aid raises the inevitable question: Will US aid lead to US intervention? Trump has already sent strong messages to Maduro and his backers, warning that military options remain on the table if a peaceful transition of power does not take place, though some regional experts are skeptical. Venezuelans have been dealing with crisis conditions for two decades, but this is the first time the US has made [overt threats](#) of military involvement.

While humanitarian aid would help desperate Venezuelan people in the short run, many have flagged it as a political ploy. **Both the United Nations and the International Committee for the Red Cross declined to collaborate with the US, arguing that humanitarian missions should not be linked to political power plays.** And with the US’s history of aiding regime change in Latin America — and some of the same key players involved again — the criticism is valid

Sanctions will not get rid of Maduro

Maduro uses the United State’s war on Venezuela as justification to refuse talks with Gaudio

Reuters, 8-7-2019, "Venezuela government to skip Barbados talks to protest U.S. sanctions," National Post,

<https://nationalpost.com/pmnenvironment-pmn/venezuela-government-to-skip-barbados-talks-to-protest-u-s-sanctions-2>

CARACAS — **Venezuela’s government will skip a round of** Norway-brokered **talks** on Thursday and Friday **to protest a new set of**

U.S. sanctions meant to force President Nicolas Maduro from power, the Venezuelan information ministry said on Wednesday. U.S. President Donald Trump on Monday imposed a freeze on Venezuelan government assets in the United States and blocked U.S. citizens from conducting business with Maduro’s government, increasing

“Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

pressure on him to quit. **Maduro’s government** said its delegation **was withdrawing from the round of talks in Barbados aimed at resolving Venezuela’s political crisis with allies of opposition leader Juan Guaido.** The two sides began meeting there in July to seek a resolution to the political stalemate. “Venezuelans have noted how the leader of the opposition delegation, Juan Guaido, has celebrated and promoted these actions that are harmful to national sovereignty,” the information ministry said in a statement.

Don't read- Maduro wants to help his people

Reuters Editorial, 9-11-2019, "Humanitarian aid reduces shortages in Venezuela emergency rooms: NGO," U.S., <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-aid/humanitarian-aid-reduces-shortages-in-venezuela-emergency-rooms-ngo-idUSKCN1VW1K9>

Maduro allows aid into the country Opposition leader Juan Guaido in February attempted to bring U.S.-backed aid into Venezuela via Colombia against the wishes of President Nicolas Maduro’s government, which blocked the entrance of supplies in a violent standoff along the border. **Maduro later gave permission to the International Federation of the Red Cross and the United Nations to provide hospitals with emergency supplies** that included power plants, medicine and surgical gloves. “Despite the improvement, in our opinion, there is not much stability,” said Julio Castro, of Doctors for Health, which gathers data from employees in 40 Venezuelan public hospitals. Emergency rooms for the last six months have lacked around 50% of the supplies they need, he said. A lack of medicine, water and power outages, and the migration of personnel due to low wages, have crippled Venezuela’s health sector. **U.N. agencies this year provided 358 tonnes of medicine and supplies.** Castro said, **enough to provide treatment for as many as 3.5 million people. The** International

Federation of the **Red Cross** as of August had **delivered 100 tonnes of supplies**, it said in a news release. Castro said aid groups have not provided a breakdown of how much aid reached each hospital or if any was distributed to Venezuela’s 300 smaller public health clinics. A U.N. official said in response to questions that the United Nations works with a number of Venezuelan hospitals and provides aid through organizations that include the Pan American Health Organization and the United Nations Children’s Fund. The International Federation of the Red Cross and Venezuela’s information ministry did not reply to requests for comment. Guaido, who has been recognized by more than 50 countries as Venezuela’s legitimate president, says the February aid effort boosted pressure on Maduro to allow aid into the country. Humanitarian relief groups had said that effort risked politicizing aid. Venezuela’s government until this year had refused such aid on the grounds that the country was not in humanitarian crisis. Castro said that despite announcements by Russia and China about providing humanitarian aid, no follow-up information on aid from the two has been provided, making it impossible to evaluate its impact.

Empirical/ General: Sanctions fail

Populations blame the sanctions, not their government

Gabe Levine-**Drizin**, 3-22-2019, "Sanctions Are Economic Warfare," In these Times, <http://inthesetimes.com/article/21913/venezuela-iran-iraq-sanctions-donald-trump-civilians-south-africa-palestine>

Generating discontent One irony of U.S. sanctions is that they fail to achieve even the (often imperialist) goals of the U.S. government. In Iraq, the U.S. government’s repeated affirmations that sanctions would not be lifted unless Saddam Hussein stepped down made clear that the goal was to trigger the disaffected masses to overthrow Hussein. This did not happen. Rather, many Iraqis saw their crisis as exacerbated by U.S. aggression: As an Iraqi Army officer told the New York Times, “Most people thought, ‘Saddam is feeding us while the Americans are trying to starve us to death.’” Saddam Hussein played on this perception with a media campaign that broadcast and exaggerated the effects of the sanctions. At one point, Hussein instructed doctors to wait to bury individual children until there had been enough deaths to stage a mass funeral and generate outrage. The effectiveness of this campaign and the brutality of the sanctions led to long-lasting anti-American sentiment. Osama bin Laden’s 9/11 attacks were in part motivated by the sanctions. In the wake of President George H.W. Bush’s 2018 passing, bitter Iraqis, asked by journalists about his legacy, denounced “Mr. Embargo.” **The case of Iraq makes clear that the impoverished, hungry and sick victims of sanctions are not ideal candidates to overthrow their governments. Nor are they easily misled into blaming those governments for the effects of external sanctions. In the last month, Iranians and Cubans have taken to the streets in massive numbers to protest U.S. sanctions.** In Venezuela, Juan Carlos Rosales knows whom to blame as well: “Ever since the executive decree, the situation here has been lethal.”

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Other countries trade

Marco Aponte-**Moreno**, "5 reasons why Trump's Venezuela embargo won't end the Maduro regime", 8-7-2019, Conversation,

<http://theconversation.com/5-reasons-why-trumps-venezuela-embargo-wont-end-the-maduro-regime-121538>

4. China and Russia still support Venezuela. Maduro has few international allies. When the Trump administration led efforts earlier this year to recognize opposition leader Juan Guaidó as the legitimate president of Venezuela, 60 countries joined it. But **China and Russia continue to be Venezuela's most powerful international boosters and have bailed out Maduro by giving his government massive loans** in the past. Both have vetoed every U.S. effort to pass resolutions against Maduro's government within the United Nations. China has exploited Venezuela's vast natural resources for profit. Russia has made the South American nation a strategic geopolitical partner in the Western Hemisphere, a key ally in its efforts to undermine American influence. **Neither of the two countries are likely to comply with an economic embargo to Venezuela. Analysts expect them to continue buying oil, gold and other valuable commodities from Maduro's regime, providing much-needed cash to his government.**

Extend: Maduro uses propaganda

1. The [Medium 19](#) finds that propaganda in Venezuela is especially effective because 44% of Venezuelans are active social media users. Maduro uses multiple propaganda tools, including twitter bots.
2. The New York Times 19 finds that 68% of Venezuelans believe that sanctions worsen their quality of life.

Francisco Rodríguez, 7-10-2019, "Trump Doesn't Have Time for Starving Venezuelans," New York Times
<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/opinion/venezuela-sanctions.html>

Industry experts have confirmed that the sanctions have had a crippling effect on the country's oil sector. Jon Bilbao, the respected former oil industry executive asked by Juan Guaidó, recognized by many as Venezuela's interim leader, to run the state-owned fertilizer company Monómeros, said last month that if the sanctions were lifted, the company could turn a profit this year. It lost \$23 million last year. Tell the opposition's intellectual elites that sanctions are exacerbating the country's crisis and you are likely to be met with silence or be told that this is false, that the country's economic crisis began long before. This is the logical equivalent of saying that a terminally ill patient cannot be killed. There is a stark contrast between their claims and the views of regular Venezuelans. **A recent survey** by the local pollster Datincorp **found that 68 percent of Venezuelans believe sanctions have negatively affected their quality of life.** How to stop hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans from starving to death this year should be front and center of the international community's debate on how to help Venezuela.

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Overuse of sanctions harm America’s role as global leader: cryptocurrencies

Sanctioned countries develop workarounds to the dollar: undermine US global economic power

New York Times, Nov 15, 2019, “Trump’s Embrace of Sanctions Irks Allies and Prompts Efforts to Evade Measures,”

Alan Rappeport and Katie Rogers

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/us/politics/trump-iran-sanctions.html?auth=login-google&login=google&login=google&auth=login-google>

WASHINGTON — President Trump’s increasing reliance on economic sanctions to solve foreign policy problems is fueling concern that the United States is abusing its financial power and prompting some governments to seek ways to evade American measures. In recent months, the United States has increased pressure on Iran and Venezuela, dangled the removal of North Korean sanctions and, in only a few days, imposed, then reversed sanctions against Turkey. Now, American allies and adversaries alike are stepping up efforts to protect themselves in ways that could, over time, **erode American power by undermining a key national security tool and diminishing the world’s reliance on the dollar as the global reserve currency.** In October, Turkey and Russia agreed to a new system for international transactions that would use their local currencies instead of the dollar, which President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia said in October is being employed by the Trump administration as a “political weapon.” Russia has been holding similar talks with Iran and China about an alternative system that, according to Russian state media, could allow the countries to engage in transactions while evading the arm of United States sanctions. **And the European Union moved ahead this year with developing an alternative system that would allow countries to bypass the existing infrastructure for international financial transactions.** Mr. Trump’s scattershot approach to sanctions was on display this week with the visit of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey to the White House. In October, Mr. Trump threatened to “destroy” Turkey’s economy after its military incursion into Syria. He then withdrew the sanctions after brokering a cease-fire. Now, officials are considering new measures because of Turkey’s purchase of a missile defense system from Russia. “They are throwing sanctions at everybody for everything,” said Richard Nephew, a scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy and the author of “The Art of Sanctions.” “The administration seems to think that sanctions are a surrogate for foreign policy.” **Mr. Trump’s use of sanctions has far exceeded those of his predecessors’, both in scale and the scope of his targets. In 2018, the Trump administration added about 1,500 individuals and entities to its sanctions list, a total that is 50 percent more than in any prior year,** according to a tally from the law firm Gibson Dunn. Through late October of this year, another 606 sanctions designations had been added. The United States has steadily broadened its use of sanctions since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, using its place at the center of the global financial system to stifle the economies of adversaries and disrupt the flow of illicit funds to terrorist organizations. Mr. Trump has expanded the punitive measures, targeting them at NATO allies like Turkey and expanding the use of secondary sanctions against countries and companies that continue to do business with adversaries like Iran. **Experts warn that the administration’s haphazard use of tools that freeze assets and cut people and countries off from the world’s banking system could undermine the entire program by spawning new workarounds.** “Sanctions alone will never solve your problem unless they are used in tandem with other tools,” said Matthew Levitt, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “We tend now to be seeing sanctions as the nonkinetic, nonmilitary tool for everything.” Mr. Levitt, who served as deputy assistant secretary for intelligence and analysis at the Treasury Department during the George W. Bush administration, added, “I do worry about a time when overreliance on sanctions, absent the use of complementary diplomatic and other tools, could undermine the U.S. position in the world economy.” There have been early signs of such a shift. Over the past year, the European Union has rolled out the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges, or INSTEX, as an alternative to the Swift financial messaging service, which facilitates the majority of international financial transactions. It would allow European countries to complete transactions with Iran through what is essentially a bartering system. While Europe has said that it would use this only for sales of humanitarian goods, which are acceptable, the United States has expressed concern that the payments vehicle could be used to evade sanctions. **Venezuela and North Korea have also increased their interest in cryptocurrencies, which could be used to circumvent the traditional banking system,** according to Peter Harrell, a sanctions expert at the Center for a New American Security. And Russia has shifted billions of dollars’ worth of sovereign reserves, which are held in American banks, into gold as a way to reduce the potential effect of additional sanctions. “The question is are we now reaching the point where both **adversaries and allies will invest in the kinds of tools that will let them fundamentally get out from under our leverage,**” Mr. Harrell said. “We are seeing signs that they are pursuing these investments.” The future of such investments could hinge on Mr. Trump’s re-election. John E. Smith, who was the director of the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control until last year, said that other countries would most likely move to further distance themselves from America’s teeth if Mr. Trump wins a second term. The United States has warned that it will not stand for any form of sanctions evasion without a fight, saying it will impose secondary actions against governments if they do business with Iran. Mr. Mnuchin acknowledged that over “a long period of time” there was a risk that the rest of the world could shift away from the dollar as the reserve currency and that the United States must be responsible with how it wielded sanctions. But he suggested that, for now, other countries have little choice but to comply. “The reason why they are so effective is because the dollar is the reserve currency of the world,” Mr. Mnuchin said. “Other countries may not like adhering to our sanctions, but because the dollar is the reserve currency and their banking systems are attached to dollars and dollars are a major component of trade, that’s why people have to cease activities.”

“Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

Russia develops cryptocurrencies with Venezuela

Simon Shuster, 3-20-2018, "Exclusive: Russia Secretly Helped Venezuela Launch a Cryptocurrency to Evade U.S. Sanctions," Time, <https://time.com/5206835/exclusive-russia-petro-venezuela-cryptocurrency/>

Ever since 2014, when the U.S. and its allies used sanctions to punish Russia for invading parts of Ukraine, the **Russian elites have been desperate to get those sanctions lifted and, in the long term, to weaken the West's ability to impose them in the future.** One of the core aims of these efforts, as Putin outlined in a policy paper on global trade that was published in September, is to “overcome the excessive dominance” of Western currencies, and especially the dollar. Putin’s advisers have been more open about their ultimate aim: “The reign of the dollar must end,” Andrei Kostin, the head of state-controlled VTB, Russia’s second-largest bank, said in a speech last month in Moscow, calling on Russia to promote other currencies for use in international trade. “This whip that the Americans use in the form of the dollar would then, to a great extent, not have such a serious impact on the global financial system.” While not as ambitious as the Russian attempt in 2016 to influence the U.S. presidential election, the Kremlin’s move into cryptocurrencies reveals another layer of ingenuity in its struggle against what Putin’s advisers have called the U.S. “hegemony” in global affairs. **The use of cryptocurrencies could, at least in theory, hurt the U.S. ability to control the flow of money in and out of sanctioned countries, thus chipping away at one of most powerful means of U.S. influence around the world.** There are currently more than 1,500 cryptocurrencies in existence, with a combined value of more than \$320 billion, according to CoinMarketCap.com, which tracks this market. By far the biggest of them is Bitcoin, which accounts for over 40% of their total value. But new cryptocurrencies can be created and sold without involving the banks and regulators that normally police currency markets. That is partly what makes them attractive to people under U.S. sanctions. By flying under the radar of big financial institutions, cryptocurrencies can help these people move their money around securely, discretely and with less fear of having it seized by U.S. authorities. In the long term, **if more people start using this type of digital cash, and more businesses accept it as a form of payment, trade in cryptocurrencies could ultimately grow large enough to rival major currencies like the dollar.** That is what many investors in this field are banking on. “It’s an explosive technology,” German Gref, one of the Russian state bankers closest to Putin, recently said of the innovations that make cryptocurrency possible. “It will turn a lot of spheres upside down.” One of their more ambitious ideas has been to create a digital version of the ruble that would mimic key elements of Bitcoin. The Russian Central Bank has, however, resisted this idea, because it would risk destabilizing Russia’s actual currency, says the executive at the Russian state bank. “For Russia, it’s too dangerous,” he says. “If we say that the only reason we do it is to avoid U.S. sanctions, then the United States is definitely going to be displeased about it.” So instead of putting the ruble at risk, **Russia encouraged its ally in Latin America to run the experiment on itself,** the banker says. “Venezuela has nothing to lose. For them it’s the only chance.” Indeed, the value of the Venezuelan currency, the bolivar, has been decimated by official mismanagement and the impact of U.S. sanctions, which were imposed last year to punish Maduro for his deepening authoritarianism. The crisis has also made Maduro’s regime deeply dependent on Russia for loans and investments. “So Russia made its stronghold here in Venezuela,” says Armando Armas, an opposition member of the nation’s parliament, the National Assembly, which has tried in vain to block the creation of the petro. “Now they are using Venezuela as a guinea pig for their experiment,” Armas tells TIME by phone from Caracas. The job of arranging the details for this experiment has gone to the two Russian businessmen, Druzhkov and Bogorodsky, who met with Maduro on Feb. 20 to discuss the preparations. Toward the end of the hourlong launch ceremony of the petro that day, Bogorodsky stood to give a short speech in Russian, congratulating the “beloved leader” of Venezuela for the “very risky but timely move” he had made. The Russian connection to this experiment became all the more clear the following day, Feb. 21, when Maduro sent his minister of finance, Simon Zerpa, to inform the Russian government about the results. Zerpa met that day in Moscow with Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov and other officials, and he posted photos of the meetings on Twitter. “We deliver to Min. Siluanov updated information about our cryptocurrency,” the Venezuelan minister wrote.

AT: Sanctions help CITGO

AT: Soldier Defections

1. The United States must offer members of Maduro’s regime a protection, amnesty, or relief from sanctions as an incentive to leave him. However, Diehl 19 finds that this is impossible because Maduro’s inner circle are all drug traffickers or mafia members. The United States has to prosecute these criminals, so he finds that they will never defect.
2. Empirically untrue, hasn’t occurred yet. Only low ranking soldiers are defecting → doesn’t really have an impact on the government

“Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

- a. <https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/venezuela-crisis/venezuela-soldiers-who-choose-defection-hope-more-join-their-ranks-n976336>
 - b. 320
3. Even if you don't buy my first two responses, cross apply to our C1, the second link → which tells you that Maduro has restructured the military to dilute the power of individuals, so defections will not have a large effect. Defections, even if they occur, will not link into their impact.

Maduro's people will never defect- all criminals

Jackson **Diehl**, Washington Post, 5-12-2019, "The real reason Venezuela's Maduro survives: Dirty money,"

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-real-reason-venezuelas-maduro-survives-dirty-money/2019/05/12/ba96413e-7263-11e9-8be0-ca575670e91c_story.html

Though both the Trump administration and Maduro's far-left foreign defenders prefer to describe the Venezuelan crisis in political terms, the reality is that the regime is less a government — much less a socialist one — than a criminal gang. That has two consequences that are complicating its removal. First, the money it is reaping from criminal activity is serving as a prop that allows it to survive U.S. sanctions.

Perhaps more importantly, **the toxic taint on almost every top official makes it much harder to pursue the usual formulas for a peaceful transition, including the creation of a transitional government and amnesty for those who step**

down. The collapse of Venezuela's regular economy has created dire shortages of food, water, medicine and power, and caused more than 10 percent of its 30 million people to flee the country. Yet the illicit revenue pouring in for Maduro's clique appears to be increasing. A recent CNN report said drug flights from Venezuela had risen from about two per week in 2017 to nearly daily in 2018; it cited one U.S. official as saying there had been up to five flights per night this year. In 2018, an estimated 265 tons of Colombian cocaine, with a street value of \$39

billion, was trafficked through Venezuela, the report said. **As a practical matter, however, it's hard to imagine most of the Maduro mafia simply walking away.** At least two of its capos have been indicted by U.S. federal grand juries. Another, former general Hugo Carvajal, defected to

Spain last month — and was promptly jailed on a U.S. extradition request. He faces federal cocaine smuggling charges. **Some opposition leaders and foreign governments are hoping to broker a transitional administration that includes regime figures. But,** as veteran opposition activist María Corina Machado told The Post, **“you cannot have drug trafficking kingpins . . . you cannot have individuals who are part of the mafia in gold trafficking, oil trafficking and gas trafficking, or food mafias.”** That, alas, may exclude just about everyone with the power to bring about a peaceful change in Caracas.

AT: Hezbollah

Hezbollah revenue decrease by 70% after S. were in place

1. Extra-resolution: 70% decrease due to S. implemented in iran, not venezuela
2. Alt cause/non-unique: US killed Soleimani, the leader/direct funder of Hezbollah
 - a. Can reach solvency in pro as well
3. S. cannot completely kick hezbollah out of the Venezuela unless Maduro is ousted (funds H. with gov. \$)

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Evidence challenges

DEFEND: CERP 40,000 deaths

Andrew **Buncombe**, 4-1-2019, "US sanctions on Venezuela 'responsible for tens of thousands of deaths'," Independent,

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/venezuela-sanctions-us-excess-death-toll-economy-oil-trump-maduro-juan-guaido-jeffrey-sachs-a8888516.html>

As many as 40,000 people may have died in Venezuela as a result of US sanctions that made it harder for ordinary citizens to access food, medicine and medical equipment, a new report has claimed. The report, published by the Centre for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) a progressive, Washington DC-based think tank, says those deaths took place following the imposition of sanctions in the summer of 2017. It said the situation had probably worsened since the imposition earlier this year, of tougher sanctions targeting Venezuela's vital oil industry, as part of the Trump administration's effort to oust president Nicolas Maduro. "The sanctions are depriving Venezuelans of lifesaving medicines, medical equipment, food, and other essential imports," says the report, co-authored by Jeffrey Sachs, an award-winning economist based at Columbia University, and Mark Weisbrot. "This is

illegal under US and international law, and treaties that the US has signed. Congress should move to stop it." **The report's authors based their claims on estimates of excess mortalities contained within Venezuela's National Survey on Living Conditions**, known as Encovi. The annual survey of living conditions is administered by three Venezuelan universities. It found there was a 31 per cent increase in general mortality from 2017 to 2018 – representing more than 40,000 deaths. Mr Weisbrot, a cofounder of the CEPR, told The Independent **the authors could not prove those excess deaths were the result of sanctions, but said the increase ran parallel to the imposition of the measures and an attendant fall in oil production, which has for decades been a mainstay of the Venezuelan economy.** You cannot prove a counterfactual," said Mr Weisbrot. "But **[the excess deaths do] not have another obvious explanation."**

AT: Soest

Problematic because this study relies on the fact that sanctions lead to economic decline, which will somehow mobilize the people in demand for political reform and overthrow the government.

- Maduro's approval rating has been low, economy has been bad → no impact yet

Christian Von Soest, 9-11-2013, "Are democratic sanctions really counterproductive?," Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2014.888418?casa_token=CYYa59_FizQAAAAA%3AF8q5x0100Ta-jGaZbd0MhRUYWsXO2-ocZly9TmiYAPCBrQaDTUv3xky_25SShz6BaVATBYDGZ2w

Moreover, regimes with small winning coalitions are also more likely to experience mass mobilization in connection with poor economic performance. When economic downturns are caused by sanctions associated with democratic goals, we can expect sanctions to send particularly strong signals to opposition groups and positively affect their chances of mobilizing the masses in demand for political reform. Regime change does not necessarily lead to democratization, but as shown by Teorell, economic decline is one of the most prominent determinants of short-term democratization.

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Indictment: successful 40/115, 34% Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (HSE)

apparent success of sanctions is nearly always due to the successful use of force

- They even include German surrender in WW1 as one of the forty examples of success.
- Pape finds that 18/40 sanction success stories are similar cases- where use of force was really the cause of the success.
- Only 5% effective
- Eighteen were actually settled by direct or indirect use of force; in 8 cases there is no evidence that the target made the demanded concessions; 6 do not qualify as instances of economic sanctions; and 3 are indeterminate. Of HSE's 115 cases, only 5 are appropriately considered successes, and 2 of the successes are trivial and the other 3 successes did not require sanctions for it to occur. None of these cases caused regime change.

Pape, R. A. (1997). Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. *International Security*, 22(2), 90. doi:10.2307/2539368
HUFBAUER, SCHOTT, AND ELLIOT'S ERRORS

An examination of the 40 cases in which HSE claim economic sanctions were successful reveals only 5 clear successes. The remainder are accounted for by 4 classes of errors: 18 were determined by force, not economic sanctions; 8 are failures, in which the target state never conceded to the coercer's demands; 6 are trade disputes, not instances of economic sanctions; and 3 are indeterminate. FORCE The largest category of error is represented by the 18 cases that were determined by the use of force by the sanctioner or, in some cases, another party. In each of these cases, force was both sufficient and necessary to cause the outcome, while economic sanctions played little role. In six of these cases (Allies-Germany 1939, India-Hyderabad, Nigeria-Biafra, U.K./U.S.-Uganda, U.S.-Nicaragua, and U.K.-Argentina), the target state made no concessions prior to military defeat. Indian troops conquered Hyderabad in four days in September 1948. Fourteen months of Indian occupation later, the nazim of Hyderabad admitted that his domain had become part of India. Sanctions had little to do with the outcome. Similarly, Biafra did not collapse until its last strongholds were overrun by 200,000 Nigerian troops after two and a half years of intense warfare. Nigeria's economic blockade of Biafra contributed to this result by reducing Biafra's ability to import weapons or to pay for them, but this is an instance of economic warfare, not economic sanctions. The blockade also led to the starvation of 2 million Biafrans, but this had little effect on the outcome. Seven target states (U.K.-Germany 1914, the League of Nations-Yugoslavia, the League of Nations-Greece, U.S.-U.K./France, U.S.-Dominican Republic, U.K./U.N.- Rhodesia, and U.S./Netherlands-Suriname) were successfully coerced by the threat of superior military force. This category contains some of the most egregious errors in the HSE database. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot count the League of Nations' coercion of Greece in 1925 as an instance of economic sanctions when in fact the League Council had rejected economic sanctions in favor of a naval demonstration. In addition, their explanation of British and French concessions during the 1956 Suez crisis fails to mention that the Soviet Union had threatened both countries with nuclear attack.³¹ The Rhodesia case is a critical one for the sanctions literature, because for many years after sanctions were imposed in 1965 it was cited as evidence that sanctions do not work. The end of white rule in 1979 removed a major barrier to claims for the effectiveness of economic sanctions. However, guerrilla war, not sanctions, accounts for the outcome. For ten years after sanctions were imposed, they had little effect on the Rhodesian economy, and the minority government was easily able to contain the guerrilla threat. However, when from the mid-1970s onward, the guerrillas were able to base their operations in Mozambique and benefit from expanded Soviet and Chinese military aid, the Rhodesian government's economic and military position rapidly declined, forcing it to seek terms. In five cases (U.K./U.S.-Iran 1951, U.S.-Laos, U.S.-Brazil 1962, U.S.-South Vietnam, and U.S.-Chile 1970), the target government was overthrown in a foreign-sponsored military coup. Economic sanctions played little role in these cases, not even as a signal of U.S. support for a coup, which the United States explicitly communicated to the plotters in every case. President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, for example, was assassinated, not destabilized by economic sanctions. The coup was plotted with the knowledge of senior U.S. officials, who told the South Vietnamese generals leading the coup that the United States would not oppose them and would recognize and support a new regime; in addition, they repeatedly asked the plotters for more of the plan's details, so that they could evaluate its feasibility

CORRECT CALLS Of the 40 cases claimed by HSE, there are only five instances (U.K.-USSR 1933, U.S./Canada-South Korea, the Arab League-Canada

1979, U.S.-El Salvador 1987, and India-Nepal 1989) **in which economic sanctions were clearly successful.** Three of these were over

trivial issues. Canada agreed not to move its embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem; the Soviet Union agreed to release six British nationals accused of spying; and El Salvador

agreed not to release three prisoners convicted of murdering U.S. citizens. **In the latter two cases, it is not even clear that economic sanctions were**

necessary to achieve the desired outcome, because there is no evidence that either target government wished

to do other than what the coercer requested. The most substantial success that can be claimed for economic sanctions is India's coercion of Nepal in 1989-90.

Thirteen months after India partially closed its border with Nepal in retaliation for Nepal's purchase of anti-aircraft guns from China, King Birenda surrendered power to a pro-democratic government that agreed to consult India on defense matters. This was primarily an internal democratization crisis in which the international dispute was secondary. Although Indian sanctions did cause some dissatisfaction with the regime in 1989, we do not know what role they played in the opposition leader's decision in February 1990 to call the general strikes that led to the regime's collapse. Finally, in 1976 the United States and Canada pressured South Korea to abandon its plans to purchase a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant from France. The determinants of this outcome are quite unclear; but lacking firm documentation of the alternative explanations, I have credited it as a sanction success. In summary, HSE's 40 claims of economic sanction success comprise 32 errors, 5 correct calls, and 3 indeterminate cases.³³ Two problems account for the errors in HSE's findings. First, although their aim is to study the use of economic sanctions for political goals, their data set inappropriately includes instances of two other types of uses of economic instruments in international politics: commercial negotiations and economic warfare.

The problem is not that HSE define the economic sanctions universe to include either of these categories, given that full inclusion of either would have expanded their data set so greatly as to overwhelm and obscure the phenomenon they are trying to study. Rather, they simply did not employ the concept of economic sanctions rigorously enough to prevent inappropriate inclusion of several instances of each of the other categories.³⁴ Even if we include the six trade cases, this would do little to improve HSE's record, because two of them (France-Tunisia 1964 and

U.S.-Chile 1965) are coercive failures. Thus, even if we move the boundary of the sanctions universe, it is impossible to find more than 9 successes out of the 40 claimed by HSE. Second,

HSE routinely fail to control for the role of force. This is the most serious possible methodological error in a study of economic sanctions, because the principal policy usefulness claimed for economic sanctions is as an alternative to force. In addition, economic sanctions or the threat of sanctions and force or the threat of force are very often employed simultaneously, making it especially

important to distinguish which type of pressure was responsible for a particular concession. Nearly half of HSE's claimed successes of economic sanctions are actually instances of successful

“Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

use of force, which they routinely underrate or even underreport. In summary, the appropriate conclusion to be drawn from the cases assessed by HSE is that the universe of economic sanctions episodes from 1914 to 1990 confirms that the old conventional wisdom was right: **there is little valid social science support for claims that economic sanctions can achieve major foreign policy goals. Accordingly, optimists who argue that multilateral cooperation may make economic sanctions even a moderately effective alternative to military force have little empirical basis for such a claim.**

Why Economic Sanctions Will Not Become More Important Even if sanctions become somewhat more effective after the Cold War, they still have far to go before they can be a reliable alternative to military force. First, **sanctions have been successful less than 5 percent of the time**, not 34 percent of the time as HSE claim.

The study is so flawed that it even includes the end of WW1 as a success story for sanctions, ignoring the fact that sanctions only played a small role, and that

7. **1914: U.K. VERSUS GERMANY** Issue: World War I. Britain blockaded Germany throughout the war. Outcome: Germany signed an armistice on November 11, 1918. **Assessment: This is an instance of military coercion just short of conquest.** The British blockade, as a form of economic warfare, may have had a modest impact on German military capability, but if considered as an economic sanction, it had little coercive impact. Even though food shortages led to more than 500,000 German deaths during the winter of 1917-18, economic hardship did not cause Germany to sue for peace.⁵⁴ Rather, **Germany was defeated militarily by the greater industrial and manpower resources of the Allies**, including tanks, aircraft, **and the appearance in 1918 of more than 1 million fresh U.S. troops on the western front at the same time that German manpower pools had been run dry after four years of war.**⁵⁵ On September 28, after the fall of the Hindenburg Line, Germany's last major defense line in the West, German Chief of Staff Marshal Erich von Ludendorff advised the government that Germany must immediately seek an armistice.

AT: 80% chance of Maduro exit - Bosworth

1. Study methodology sus
 - a. Never talks about his methodology at all
 - b. Made predictions abt Maduro exiting in 2018 and 2019 → prediction fell through
 - c. There is literally no way to quantify the probability of a leadership exit Imao what
 - d. The only ppl to take bosworth seriously is high school deaters running con on this topic
 - e. He's on Reddit Imao
2. Warranting sus - maduro collapse only when oil collapses
 - a. Oil isn't collapsing (um this is kind of risky to read)
3. Bosworth provides a list of factors that could change his forecast/increase chances of maduro staying in power such as -> econ going up or -> guaido losing support, these factors are happening so 80% is hella outdated and doesn't account for these changes in venezuela
4. Turn regime change bc Bosworth says in his own card he doesn't predict **how** regime change happens, he says it could be a coup or whatever, sanctions mean there's no chance of peaceful negotiation, there's gonna be a violent regime change under sanctions that's bad causes state instability really shitty
5. Turn regime change bc Bosworth also says in his own card whoever comes into power after maduro has a really really ruined country to manage, this means nothing gets better under regime change and if the transition is violent we say state instability like ruins/delays ending the hum crisis in venezuela

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CON

general sanction good

Increase probability of leader exit

Fvon Soest, Christian, and Michael Wahman. 2014. “[The Underestimated Effect of Democratic Sanctions.](#)”

E-International Relations. Copy at <http://www.tinyurl.com/y67q4ly8>

- Sanctions with the intention of increasing democracy are overwhelmingly successful
- Democratic sanctions have a strong probability of increasing democracy, including by leadership exit

Full Text Democratic sanctions have a bad reputation. For most people with even a slight interest in international politics, it is not particularly hard to find examples to support a generally sceptic view of sanctions as a tool for external democracy promotion. The authoritarian regime in Zimbabwe has been targeted by both EU and US sanctions since 2002, but the Mugabe regime has remained stable and maintained remarkably high levels of repression, showing no real signs of political liberalization. Similarly, the EU’s sanctions against its Eastern authoritarian neighbour, Belarus, have still not had any noticeable effects. Despite costly sanctions in place since 2004, President Lukashenko remains one of the last European dictators. And there is more bad news. Academic research has shown that sanctions are not only ineffective, but even counterproductive. It has been argued that authoritarian countries do not become more, but less democratic when targeted by sanctions (Peksen & Drury 2010; Wood 2008). In a recently published article in the journal Democratization, we reinvestigate the effect of democratic sanctions, i.e. those which explicitly aim at improving the level of democracy, using new data and statistical analysis, to see if democratic sanctions really are as bad as their reputation. Perhaps surprisingly, our findings are rather optimistic. Our study shows that sanctions are not always effective, sometimes they may even be counterproductive, and all types of sanctions are not equally likely to lead to positive outcomes, but on average, democratic sanctions are, in fact, associated with higher levels of democracy in the targeted state. We also show that democratic

sanctions have other more profound effects on the targeted state. **In authoritarian states targeted by democratic sanctions,**

authoritarian leaders are more likely to lose power and countries are more likely to change their basic

political institutions. Such institutional changes do not necessarily lead to a fully-fledged liberal democracy, but often open up to increased civilian political control or multiparty elections. Sanctions and Their Effect on Democratization Instigating democratization has been by far the most common goal of sanctions initiated by the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations against authoritarian regimes in the post-Cold War period. Given previous research on the democratic effects of sanctions, the frequent use of sanctions as a tool for democratization is rather surprising (Drury 1998; Haass 1998; Pape 1997). Number of international sanctions according to sanction goals. Source: Representation based on own data set. In a seminal and widely cited study, Peksen and Drury (2010) argued that sanctions have an adverse effect on the level of democracy in targeted countries. According to the logic presented by Peksen and Drury, the negative democratic effect of sanctions is a consequence of increased levels of repression used by political elites in targeted countries as they attempt to cope with increased domestic pressure (also Wood 2008). Indeed, severe and widespread repression has often followed international sanction as a means to fight off increased opposition. However, previous research in the comparative democratization literature have shown that economic stress is one of the most robust determinants of democratization and/or regime change in authoritarian regimes (e.g. Geddes 1999; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2010; Teorell 2010). Authoritarian regimes tend to survive with a mixed strategy of repression and co-optation (Rotberg 2007; Wintrobe 1998). Without the financial ability to co-opt counter elites, authoritarian regimes often resort to a strategy of increased repression. However, repression is generally a less efficient tool for long-term regime survival than co-optation (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2010; Gandhi & Przeworski 2007). Although often temporarily effective, repression is an imprecise instrument that often leads to an increase in both opposition support and levels of dissent (Lichbach 1987). As a consequence, economic downturn often results in regime

accommodation or, even more dramatically, regime collapse. **Sanctions can,** if effectively designed and strategically imposed, **be used**

to increase such economic pressure on authoritarian elites. Moreover, by targeting central elite figures or

strategically important industries, sanctions can also effectively undermine the inner elite’s support for

top-leaders or current institutions. Although the current literature on comparative democratization makes it plausible that sanctions could have a positive effect on the level of democracy in the targeted country, this is not to say that all sanctions necessarily have the same effect. As several authors have acknowledged (Kirschner 1997; Allen 2005; Hufbauer et al. 2007), senders have used a multitude of sanction designs to achieve their desired goals. It is also not at all evident that sanctions aimed at goals other than democratization would have the unexpected and in some cases even undesired effect of causing regime change. For instance, we cannot expect sanctions aimed at ending nuclear weapon proliferation to have the same democratic effect as a sanction purposefully designed to instigate democratic reforms, such as introduction of multiparty elections or reinstatement of an elected civilian leadership. In earlier research on sanctions and democratization, sanctions have not been clearly separated in relation to their explicit goal. Thereby, the question of democratic sanction effectiveness has been left largely unanswered. In our study on sanctions and democratization, we are therefore especially interested in the democratic effect of those sanctions that explicitly aim to increase the level of democracy in the targeted country. A New Data Set on Sanctions We introduce a new data set of EU, UN, and US sanctions against authoritarian regimes in the period 1990-2010 and combine these data with standard indices of democracy to reinvestigate the effects of democratic sanctions. The new dataset is a vital asset to explore our research question and, in contrast to previous datasets on international sanctions, it clearly separates democratic sanctions from sanctions set out to achieve other objectives (Table 1). Our data set is composed of the entire universe of sanction regimes imposed by the UN, the US, and the EU (the main sanction senders) in the period 1990-2010, including those sanction regimes that were already in place in 1990 and those episodes that are still ongoing (Portela & von Soest 2012). Given that the investigation explores the impact of sanctions on authoritarian regimes, the data set only includes countries that the Hadenius, Teorell, and Wahman data set (2013) has coded as being “nondemocratic regimes” at the start of the sanction episode. Democratic Sanctions May Actually Help to Democratize The article presents a number of statistical models to investigate the general democratic effects of sanctions. Table 2 shows a simplified presentation of the results by providing the average yearly change in democracy scores in countries targeted by different types of sanctions. The democracy index ranges between 0-10, where higher scores represent higher levels of democracy. Looking at all the different categories of sanctions presented in Table 1, our statistical analyses indicate that none of the imposed sanctions have been counterproductive to the democratic development of authoritarian regimes. **Sanctions in general do not promote democratization, but democratic sanctions**

“Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

are significantly associated with higher levels of democracy in the targeted country. Our results are remarkable given that

Peksen and Drury (2010) have

shown that all sanctions have a robust negative impact on democracy. These findings show the importance of separating sanctions according to their explicit goal. **When we look specifically at democratic sanctions, we observe much clearer positive outcomes than for all international sanctions combined.**

A potential problem with the results could be that democratic sanctions are generally more comprehensive than sanctions imposed to obtain other goals. Yet the variable remains significant when we control for these different measures. To study the more profound effects of democratic sanctions, we also tested whether democratic sanctions are associated with a higher rate of regime change and ruler exit. This provides an insight into how implemented democratic sanctions actually work in targeted authoritarian regimes and how they contribute to improved democracy levels. There is no general relationship between sanctions and a higher probability of rulers losing power. However, looking at only

democratic sanctions, we see a significant positive relationship. It reaffirms Marinov's (2005) finding that sanctions **generally increase the probability of leadership exit.**

Such leadership exits can be an effect of leaders losing elections, being violently disposed from power or forced to resign. A brief glimpse at some sanction cases reveals that different mechanisms may account for increased democracy levels in targeted authoritarian regimes, with the two major ones being (1) elite splits (and, in turn, regime changes and leadership exit) and (2) democratic concessions without regime and/or leader change. In Guatemala (1993), for instance, the military ousted President Serrano – who had unconstitutionally dissolved parliament and the judiciary – after the US and its allies imposed sanctions. An interim president took over, and the country's democratic institutions were restored. In Nicaragua (1996) and Thailand (1993), sanctions similarly contributed to regime change. However, democratic sanctions rarely manage to instantly create liberal democracies. More commonly, we see a regime trajectory where closed authoritarian regimes are replaced by some form of electoral authoritarianism. Although such transitions do not amount to a fully-fledged transition to democracy, they increase competition and increases prospects for future democratisation (Teorell 2010). In Peru, sanctions contributed to democratization without ruler change. When President Fujimori suspended the legislature and introduced rule by decree in 1992, the US withheld military assistance and economic aid and blocked Peru's efforts to obtain loans from international financial institutions. In response, Fujimori agreed to hold elections and to reinstate formally democratic institutions. Although his presidential dominance persisted until 2000, Peru's political system was liberalized, to some extent, for the remainder of his time in office (Collins 2009, pp.80-81). In this particular case we could, hence, observe both institutional change and democratization, without change in leadership. Conclusions Since the end of the Cold War, democratization has motivated an overwhelming majority of sanctions directed towards authoritarian regimes. Previous literature gives little support for continuing the practice of sanctioning authoritarian regimes, especially if the aim is to induce democratization. It is suggested that sanctions are not only generally ineffective, but also counterproductive in increasing the level of democracy in the targeted countries. In our recently published study, we provide evidence to the contrary. We argue that empirical research on the effectiveness of sanction must take the explicit goal of sanctions into account. By concentrating only on sanctions aimed at increasing the level of democracy in the targeted authoritarian state, we found that these sanctions are indeed associated with increasing levels of democracy. Moreover, authoritarian regimes targeted by democratic sanctions are more likely to experience institutional and leadership change. These findings should not be taken as evidence to justify all types of sanctions in all contexts where democracy is on the decline. There are several examples of highly unsuccessful democratic sanctions in the past and we can be sure to see many more such examples in the future. However, the findings work to rebut earlier academic research on the ineffectiveness of democratic sanctions and offer a more nuanced picture of sanctions as a tool for promoting democracy abroad.

Sanctions increase chance of leader losing power by 28%

Marinov, N. (2005). Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders? American Journal of Political Science, 49(3), 564. doi:10.2307/3647732

One way debate can move forward is by verifying whether a basic ingredient for the successful use of economic pressure is, in fact, in place. Sanctions are more likely to extract concessions or induce compliance if targeted leaders have an incentive to avoid them (Hirschman 1945; Wagner 1988). Do leaders have such incentives? A natural way of answering this question is to look at whether economic sanctions hurt the survival of government leaders in office. Using panel data on 136 countries, observed over an average of 37

years, I find that the presence of sanctions against a government leader in a given year makes her or him significantly more likely to lose power in the following year.⁷ Specifically, **sanctions increase the baseline risk of**

losing power by 28%. The result holds after adjusting for other determinants of leadership survival such as domestic political institutions, the level of economic growth, time in office, and any residual country-specific heterogeneity. What did the literature miss? Unlike existing work on economic sanctions, I compare cases in which coercion took place to cases in which it was absent. Studies of economic statecraft and coercive diplomacy look only within cases of coercion.⁸ This is appropriate only if the question to be answered is why are some cases of coercion more successful than others. If the question is "Does coercion work?," we need to compare cases in which pressure was applied, to those in which it was not. There are three main implications of the argument made. First, to understand and evaluate the record of success of economic pressure, it is essential to use the right comparison. Given that existing studies have looked only within cases of coercion, it appears that we have not really learned whether pressure works. This also means that we cannot be confident that coercion is ineffective in producing policy change. Second, if pressure is effective in destabilizing the leaders it targets, leaders would have an incentive to compromise once under pressure. This provides one reason to believe that sanctions may be more effective in securing policy change than previously thought. Third, the evidence that sanctions destabilize indicates that they may work in an 'invisible' way. Because pressure threatens destabilization, leaders would have an incentive to avoid it. Some or many potential targets may pursue policies congruent with the sender's preferences, without ever crossing the threshold that would cause foreign pressure to be applied. To borrow some terms from game theory, the threat of punishment "off the equilibrium path" may be inducing compliance "on the equilibrium path."

Examples of success- Guatemala, Nicaragua, Thailand

Fvon Soest, Christian, and Michael Wahman. 2014. **“The Underestimated Effect of Democratic Sanctions.”**

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- Sanctions increase the probability of leadership exit by 28%
- Three examples: Thailand, Nicaragua, Guatemala
- While these sanctions did not make the countries into full fledged democracies, they increased the level of democracy from the previous regime
- Teorell 10 says that democratic sanctions increase prospects for future democracy

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- We do not have to prove that sanctions will create democracy in Guatemala, instead, we are showing that the next regime will be democratic enough to accept IMF loans and restore Venezuela’s economy to pre-crisis output.

There is no general relationship between sanctions and a higher probability of rulers losing power. However, **looking at only democratic sanctions, we see** a significant positive relationship [between sanctions and ruler exit]. It reaffirms Marinov’s (2005) finding **that sanctions generally increase the probability of leadership exit**. Such leadership exits can be an effect of leaders losing elections, being violently disposed from power or forced to resign. A brief glimpse at some sanction cases reveals that different mechanisms may account for increased democracy levels in targeted authoritarian regimes, with the two major ones being (1) elite splits (and, in turn, regime changes and leadership exit) and (2) democratic concessions without regime and/or leader change. In **Guatemala (1993), for instance, the military ousted President Serrano – who had unconstitutionally dissolved parliament and the judiciary – after the US and its allies imposed sanctions**. An interim president took over, and the country’s democratic institutions were restored. **In Nicaragua (1996) and Thailand (1993), sanctions similarly contributed to regime change**. However, democratic sanctions rarely manage to instantly create liberal democracies. More commonly, we see a regime trajectory where closed authoritarian regimes are replaced by some form of electoral authoritarianism. **Although such transitions do not amount to a fully-fledged transition to democracy, they increase competition and increases prospects for future democratisation (Teorell 2010)**. In Peru, sanctions contributed to democratization without ruler change. When President Fujimori suspended the legislature and introduced rule by decree in 1992, the US withheld military assistance and economic aid and blocked Peru’s efforts to obtain loans from international financial institutions. In response, Fujimori agreed to hold elections and to reinstate formally democratic institutions. Although his presidential dominance persisted until 2000, Peru’s political system was liberalized, to some extent, for the remainder of his time in office (Collins 2009, pp.80-81). In this particular case we could, hence, observe both institutional change and democratization, without change in leadership. Conclusions Since the end of the Cold War, democratization has motivated an overwhelming majority of sanctions directed towards authoritarian regimes. Previous literature gives little support for continuing the practice of sanctioning authoritarian regimes, especially if the aim is to induce democratization. It is suggested that sanctions are not only generally ineffective, but also counterproductive in increasing the level of democracy in the targeted countries. In our recently published study, we provide evidence to the contrary. We argue that empirical research on the effectiveness of sanction must take the explicit goal of sanctions into account. By concentrating only on sanctions aimed at increasing the level of democracy in the targeted authoritarian state, we found that these sanctions are indeed associated with increasing levels of democracy. Moreover, authoritarian regimes targeted by democratic sanctions are more likely to experience institutional and leadership change. These findings should not be taken as evidence to justify all types of sanctions in all contexts where democracy is on the decline. There are several examples of highly unsuccessful democratic sanctions in the past and we can be sure to see many more such examples in the future. However, the findings work to rebut earlier academic research on the ineffectiveness of democratic sanctions and offer a more nuanced picture of sanctions as a tool for promoting democracy abroad.

Conditions were bad before sanctions

Dire conditions preceded sanctions

Moises **Rendon**, The, 9-3-2019, "Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela?," Center for Strategic and International Studies, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-sanctions-working-venezuela>

Sanctions did not cause the economic or humanitarian crisis in Venezuela as dire conditions in Venezuela preceded the implementation of sanctions. By 2016, a year before any financial or sectoral sanctions hit the country, Venezuela’s economy was already enduring severe hyperinflation, which surpassed a rate of 800 percent. **Between 2013 and 2016, food imports fell 71 percent and medicine and medical equipment imports dropped 68 percent. Over the same period, infant mortality increased by 44 percent. By the time sanctions were introduced, Venezuelans earning the minimum wage could only afford 56 percent of the calories necessary for a family of five.** Over two million Venezuelans had already fled the country at this point. The extent of the humanitarian damage suffered before sectoral sanctions indicates that the blame cannot be placed on the sanctions themselves. As an example, Venezuela’s Central Bank confirmed in 2014 that plummeting f had triggered a severe economic contraction with simultaneous hyperinflation. Under the guise of austerity, Maduro announced cuts to major social services upon which millions of citizens relied.

"Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

Economy contracted before harsher sanctions begun

Kenneth **Rapoza**, May 3, 2019, "No, U.S. Sanctions Are Not Killing Venezuela. Maduro Is," Forbes,

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/05/03/no-u-s-sanctions-are-not-killing-venezuela-maduro-is/#36a6d3994343>

Since the founding of PSUV by revolutionary Hugo Chavez, the party reluctantly paid Wall Street bondholders, while preaching its brand of anti-capitalist, Cuban-style Marxism. They ruined the country long ago. They were more interested in the past, and their role in erasing it, than they were interested in investing in Venezuela's future. After years of lackluster investment in infrastructure, their entire power grid is buckling. **Real GDP declined 15% in 2018, back when the only sanction was on PdVSA bonds,** hardly an economic mover. Demarais of The Economist Intelligence Unit says she expects further contractions this year and next. A forecast recovery in 2021 to 2023 rests on the assumption that Maduro (and PSUV) are gone. Then the International Monetary Fund, Chavez's old enemy, will come in to fund this mess. PSUV's worst nightmare would have come true...all thanks to them

Sanctions didn't cause oil failure

1. The Venezuelan oil market was already in crisis before sanctions.
 - a. We tell you this in C1SA. Extend Ulmer 19 who finds that oil revenue has decreased every year since 2012
 - b. Next, Hausmann 19 shows that Venezuela's share of OPEC has declined at the same rate since 2000 due to mismanagement
2. Recent decline is due to blackouts.
 - a. Muci finds that any recent decrease in production is attributable to the blackouts, which were caused by corruption.
3. PDVSA will fail in both worlds due to poor leadership.
 - a. [Cunningham 18](#) writes that Maduro appointed a military general to be oil minister and lead PDVSA, who has increased corruption and alienated the workforce. Even if we lift sanctions, he will continue to mismanage the oil industry.

Oil decline is attributable to Maduro, not sanctions.

Venezuela's share of OPEC has declined since Chavez took over

Ricardo Hausmann and Frank Muci, 5-2-2019, "Don't Blame Washington for Venezuela's Oil Woes: A Rebuttal," America's Quarterly,

<https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/dont-blame-washington-venezuelas-oil-woes-rebuttal>

(contrast to Sachs) If instead we compare Venezuela to the rest of OPEC, a set of countries with typically large reserves more similar to Venezuela, a clear picture emerges. While Venezuela's production fluctuated around 10% of OPEC before Chavez took over in 1999, it started a sustained decline thereafter (Figure 3), almost two decades before the sanctions, courtesy of policies that included the afore mentioned firing of 20,000 employees, the repeated expropriation of oil production and service companies, the diversion of its borrowing to non-oil activities and gross mismanagement and corruption.

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PDVSA fails in either world (alternate cause/ non unique to sanctions)

Nick **Cunningham**, 4-20-2018, "Corruption at Venezuela's state-run oil company is pushing the country deeper into a crisis," Business Insider,

<https://www.businessinsider.com/corruption-at-venezuelan-oil-company-is-worsening-the-economic-crisis-2018-4>

- Deteriorating for years
- Maduro handed over control to the military to assure their loyalty
- Corruption and mismanagement has accelerated its decline

The decline of Venezuela's oil production for the foreseeable future has been assumed, and to a large extent, already priced into the market. However, an acceleration in the rate of decline is possible, and a few recent developments raise the odds that such a disaster will become a reality. Reuters reported that state-owned PDVSA is completely falling apart, with workers walking off the job at a frightening pace. **The conditions for oil workers has deteriorated for years, with shortages of food, unsafe**

working conditions, and hyperinflation utterly hollowing out the value of paychecks. Since last year, however, **things have grown worse.** Venezuela President Nicolas **Maduro** sacked the head of PDVSA and **handed over control to the military** in order to keep

the armed forces on his side. But Major General Manuel Quevedo has only **accelerated the decline of PDVSA**, which once held a reputation as one of

the better managed state-owned oil companies in the world. Reuters reports that about **25,000 workers have quit** PDVSA between January 2017 and January 2018, a staggering sum. PDVSA employs roughly 146,000 people. Thousands of workers are walking off of job sites, fed up with going to work hungry, putting their lives at risk at rickety refineries, all for a paycheck that fails to cover even the most basic expenses. The worker exodus has grown so bad that the company has in some cases refused to process resignations. Those higher up are no less unhappy. Reuters says that General Quevedo “quickly alienated the firm’s embattled upper echelon and its rank-and-file.” The loss of both top level engineers

and managers as well as workers on the ground ensure the oil production losses will continue. Reuters reports that some rigs in the Orinoco Belt, where PDVSA produces heavy oil, are only operating “intermittently for lack of crews.” Moreover, the situation at the company’s refineries are arguably worse. Fires are breaking out because they are falling apart and they no longer even have the staff to run them properly. Even ports are reducing operations because of a lack of workers. But the problems don’t stop there. PDVSA only accounts for about half of the nation’s oil production on its own. The rest comes from joint ventures with international oil companies. Production at the joint ventures has eroded at a much slower pace than operations run solely by PDVSA. Yet, the Venezuelan government is in danger of sparking steeper losses from joint venture operations. On Tuesday, Chevron said that two of its workers were arrested in Venezuela. Chevron has not fled the country even as its peers have packed up and departed, but the detainment of the oil company’s workers could very well lead the oil major into rethinking its operations. “Chevron has been one of the more steadfast participants in Venezuela, having stuck around through some of the most challenging times over the past two years,” Mara Roberts Duque, a BMI Research analyst, told Bloomberg. “These arrests will likely encourage them to turn away from Venezuela in a more definitive manner.” Reuters says that Venezuelan intelligence “burst into the Petropiar joint venture’s office” and arrested two workers. The arrests appear to be the first to directly hit an international company operating in the country. “Oil industry companies would do well to be cautious and stop assuming that good relations with PDVSA can last forever due to a common interest in pumping oil,” Raul Gallegos, associate director with the consultancy Control Risks, and author of Crude Nation, a book about how oil ruined the Venezuelan economy, said

in an interview with Reuters. **“The level of corruption in PDVSA, especially under a military administration, can and will trump production logic.”** It isn’t necessarily that the few remaining international oil companies in Venezuela will immediately withdraw their personnel. But at some point the costs of operating become too high. Companies like Chevron and others have long been frustrated with lack of payment. Reuters reports that they are now also increasingly aggravated by

PDVSA’s chief Miguel **Quevedo**, who **refused to enact reforms to stop the decimation of the country’s oil and refining facilities.** Ultimately, President Maduro’s grip on the nation will become increasingly shaky. Utterly dependent on oil exports for revenues, the resources available to Maduro are vanishing.

Blackouts caused decline

Ricardo Hausmann and Frank Muci, 5-2-2019, "Don't Blame Washington for Venezuela's Oil Woes: A Rebuttal," America's Quarterly,

<https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/dont-blame-washington-venezuelas-oil-woes-rebuttal>

In January 2019, the U.S. government sanctioned PDVSA, restricting the ability of U.S. persons from having any commercial or financial relationship with the company. The sanctions were

followed by a precipitous decline in oil production. Again, can we straightforwardly attribute the decline to the sanctions? No. Most sanctions were to take effect on April 15 and yet **oil**

production declined precipitously before that date. After all, Venezuela was able to skirt the sanctions by redirecting oil sales from the U.S. to India, China,

and Russia. Instead, **the national electric blackouts that recently paralyzed Venezuela are the main driver of the added**

decline. As seen in Figure 5, the collapse of oil production in March was fundamentally related to the two blackouts that occurred between March 7-11 and March 25-31. These recent blackouts were triggered by wildfires near key transmission lines — nobody had done the required maintenance to trim the overgrown vegetation. But the electric sector’s collapse dates back to its nationalization in 2007 and the 2009 “electrical emergency” where the regime allocated over \$50 billion to investments in the sector. A well-documented corruption orgy consumed most of the funds and generation capacity did not increase by a single gigawatt.

“Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

Sanctions could not have caused crisis

Sanctions against Russia are worse

Kenneth **Rapoza**, May 3, 2019, "No, U.S. Sanctions Are Not Killing Venezuela. Maduro Is," Forbes,

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/05/03/no-u-s-sanctions-are-not-killing-venezuela-maduro-is/#36a6d3994343>

In 2018, the U.S. sanctioned trading in PdVSA bonds in the secondary market. All of those bonds but one were already in default long before those sanctions were announced. Then in 2019, the U.S. asked PdVSA crude oil importers like Chevron to wind down its purchases, demanding PdVSA keep its cash receipts from U.S. sales in its U.S. bank account and not repatriate it to Venezuela. And last week, total bans on PdVSA crude oil shipments to the U.S. began. Venezuela's economy was in dire straits way before this. **Worth pondering, if the U.S. sanctions, of which the most serious were only enacted this year, were driving Venezuela to the poor house, why are even worse economic sanctions against Russia not hurting that country just as bad?** "Without hard currency exports to the U.S., the Venezuelan regime is under extreme duress," says Agathe Demarais, global forecasting director for The Economist Intelligence Unit. She says it is hard to quantify the impact of sanctions on an economy unless there is a total embargo.

Blackouts caused by corruption, not sanctions

PRESS RELEASES, 6-27-2019, "Treasury Sanctions Officials of the Illegitimate Maduro Regime Involved in Rampant Corruption," U.S. Department Of The Treasury, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm718>

Washington — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two Maduro regime officials who continue to engage in significant corruption and fraud to the detriment of the people of Venezuela.

Persistent countrywide blackouts are the latest and worst in a long history of electricity outages, stemming from years of massive corruption, neglect, and mismanagement of Venezuela's electricity infrastructure by the illegitimate Maduro regime. The lack of electricity limits the Venezuelan people's access to basic goods, services, and potable water supplies, and exacerbates the already precarious health care system, in which the majority of hospitals already lack reliable water and power and are experiencing shortages of medicine and medical supplies.

"The people of Venezuela entrusted their public officials to provide fundamental civic services, like water and electricity. The illegitimate Maduro regime exploits the public trust by plundering Venezuelan assets, enriching themselves, and watching idly as basic public systems needlessly and catastrophically fail," said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. "Treasury will continue to target officials who exacerbate corruption at the expense of the Venezuelan people and knowingly fail to provide basic public services."

Today's **action targets** the former minister of Electric Power and **President of the National Electric Corporation** (CORPOELEC), Luis Alfredo Motta Dominguez (**Motta**), and the Deputy Minister of Finance, Investments, and Strategic Alliances for the Ministry of Electric Power, Eustiquio Jose Lugo Gomez (**Lugo**), pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13692. Rather than use their official positions to serve the Venezuelan people, Motta and Lugo illegally enriched themselves and contributed to the electricity crisis.

Pursuant to an investigation undertaken by the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida, the Justice Department's Criminal Division and the Drug Enforcement Administration in Miami, as a part of a criminal complaint in March 2019, senior CORPOELEC officials were identified as having previously received bribes, since at least 2016, from two Venezuelan businessmen in exchange for awarding contracts for expensive equipment to maintain Venezuelan electrical infrastructure. Some of the equipment received as a part of these contracts was incompatible with the Venezuelan electrical system, rendering them useless and contributing to the ongoing deterioration of the electrical system. Despite those incompatibilities, officials from CORPOELEC listed these contracts as delivered and processed in full. As corruption ran rampant through CORPOELEC, senior officials continued to exacerbate the ongoing mismanagement intertwined in the Venezuelan electrical infrastructure and ignored their responsibility to the Venezuelan people.

The following two individuals are being designated today pursuant to Executive Order 13692, as amended, as current or former officials of the Government of Venezuela:

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Luis Alfredo Motta Dominguez is the former Minister of Electric Power as well as President of the National Electric Corporation (CORPOELEC), both positions he had held since 2015. Maduro removed Motta from these positions in March 2019. Additionally, Motta is a Major General of the Bolivarian National Guard and previously served as the head of Strategic Integral Development Region (REDI) Central.

Eustiquio Jose Lugo Gomez is the Deputy Minister of Finance, Investment, and Strategic Alliances for the Ministry of Electric Power. Additionally, Lugo is a Brigadier General and was formerly appointed to the Operations Directorate of the Anti-Drug Command of the General Command of the Bolivarian National Guard. As a result of today's action, all property and interests in property of these individuals, and of any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by such individuals, that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. OFAC's regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.

Also today, the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida and the Justice Department's Criminal Division indicted Motta and Lugo for their alleged roles in laundering the proceeds of violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and Venezuelan anti-bribery law in connection with their alleged receipt of bribes to award CORPOELEC business to U.S.-based companies. Additional information about today's action.

U.S. sanctions need not be permanent; sanctions are intended to bring about a positive change of behavior. For example, on May 7, 2019, OFAC removed sanctions imposed on former high-ranking Venezuelan intelligence official Manuel Ricardo Cristopher Figuera after his public break with Maduro. The United States continues to make clear that the removal of sanctions is available for persons designated under E.O. 13692 or E.O. 13850, both as amended, who take concrete and meaningful actions to restore democratic order, refuse to take part in human rights abuses, speak out against abuses committed by the illegitimate Maduro regime, or combat corruption in Venezuela.

Maduro gives aid to political supporters

Administration politicizes aid- distributes it to political supporters

Isayen **Herrera**, 12-17-2017, "As Venezuela Collapses, Children Are Dying of Hunger," NYT,

<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/17/world/americas/venezuela->

President Nicolás Maduro has acknowledged that people are hungry in Venezuela, but he has refused to accept international aid, often saying that Venezuela's economic problems are caused by foreign adversaries like the United States, which he says is waging an economic war against his country. The suffering of Venezuelan families is expected to worsen next year. Beyond the I.M.F.'s warning that inflation could surpass 2,300 percent, observers worry that the leftist government will continue to refuse international aid for political reasons.

"If they accept the help, they accept that there is a humanitarian crisis here, and officially recognize that their population is vulnerable, and just how much their policies failed them," said Susana Raffalli, a specialist on food emergencies who consults for Caritas in Venezuela. The Venezuelan government has used food to keep the Socialists in power, critics say. **Before recent elections, people living in government housing projects said they were visited by representatives of their local a community councils — the government-aligned groups that organize the delivery of boxes of cheap food — and threatened with being cut off if they did not vote for the government.**

Ryan **Dube**, Kejal Vyas and Anatoly Kurmanaev, 12-23-2019, "Venezuela's Maduro, Clinging to Power, Uses Hunger as an Election Weapon," WSJ,

<https://www.wsj.com/articles/venezuelas-maduro-clinging-to-power-uses-hunger-as-an-electoral-weapon-1521734622A>

32-year-old teacher, she's fed up with President Nicolás Maduro's government. Her salary has fallen to the equivalent of \$2 a month with Venezuela's currency collapse. She struggles to feed her 10-year-old son and is unable to treat the small tumor on her breast because the health-care system is in shambles. Still, Ms. Meza voted for the ruling Socialist Party in recent mayoral elections, fearing that otherwise she would have lost her state job and benefits—especially the monthly bags of rice, corn flour and other subsidized food she says keeps her family alive. She also plans to vote for Mr. Maduro in the May 20 presidential election "If I didn't vote, there would be trouble, I was told," she said in this arid town near the Colombian border. "They are playing with people's hunger." But **the Maduro administration, which has just a 22% approval rating, has** developed a broad strategy to prevail

through dirty tricks, fear tactics and, crucially, **using the lure of food to get the country's poorest voters to support his**

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administration, pollsters and elections experts in Venezuela say. Last year, the ruling party won three elections for local, state and national bodies. Food is an enormously powerful weapon in a country where babies die of malnutrition, store shelves are often bare and three-quarters of the population has lost an average of 19 pounds. The grants to millions of poverty-stricken voters might very well ensure his leftist movement runs this country for many years to come. “It’s criminal,” said Maritza Landaeta, head of the Bengoa Foundation, a group that studies nutrition and poverty in Venezuela and has been a strong critic of the government. **“The same people that asphyxiated the food industry and generated the shortages are now using food as a political tool.”** About 3.5 million of Venezuela’s 6 million homes receive boxes of food through the military-run Local Committee for Supply and Production, according to pollster Delphos. That program—known by its Spanish initials, **CLAP—is the main food source for 15% of Venezuelans**, according to Caracas’s Catholic University. “With an economy that is destroyed, every day Venezuelans become more dependent on the state,” said Mr. Capriles. **“If you’re not loyal you don’t eat.”** In November, a month ahead of the mayoral elections, Mr. Maduro offered pork joints to voters. Weeks later, with people struggling to pay for goods amid hyperinflation, he promised voters cash bonuses. And then on election day, with turnout slumping, he enticed voters with what he said would be a special gift. It was unclear what the gift was, although many voters did get boxes of food. To receive benefits, the government is increasingly requiring citizens to hold new identification cards, which authorities say have been issued to about half of Venezuela’s 30 million people. The so-called Fatherland Card, using technology from Chinese telecom giant ZTE Corp., allows the government to keep track of who has voted. That permits officials to put pressure on food recipients if they are reluctant to cast a ballot, according to election experts, government critics and ruling party activists. By law, the vote is supposed to be secret. But at voting centers in the capital, Caracas, and the westernmost state of Zulia during the December municipal elections, it was easy to see how the ruling party worked the levers of government to ensure that likely supporters made it to the polls. In a giant red tent, Socialist activists scanned voters’ Fatherland Cards. Using a computerized database, they could determine who hasn’t voted and what benefits those people receive. Government supporters called “patrollers” were then dispatched on motorbikes to the homes of food recipients to remind them of the benefits and convince them to turn out, according to a local ruling-party official. Voters who used their Fatherland Cards were given food at a quarter of the polling stations surveyed in December by Torino. At some other sites, voters were instead told where they could pick up the food. After voting, Katerina Noriega, a street vendor in Santa Rita, was directed by Socialist activists to a warehouse to receive a couple of pounds of rice and beans, worth about 10 days of work. “They bought our votes,” said Ms. Noriega, who acknowledged supporting the government candidate to get the free food. “I did it because of our difficult situation.” In Valles del Tuy, a crime-ridden region an hour drive south of Caracas, food helped the ruling party get 85% of the votes in some districts in December

Human Rights Council, 5 July 2019, "Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of Human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela," UN, https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/report/report-of-the-united-nations-high-commissioner-for-human-rights-on-the-situation-of-human-rights-in-the-bolivarian-republic-of-venezuela/A_HRC_Venezuela-report.pdf

21. For two decades, the Government promoted social policies through the “Misiones Bolivarianas,” which were economic and social programmes aimed at fighting poverty and social exclusion and decreasing the gender equality gap. Today, Venezuelans are increasingly relying on social programmes to access to minimum levels of income and food. 22. On 13 May 2016, the Government declared a “state of exception and economic emergency”¹⁵ and created the Local Committees for Supply and Food Distribution (CLAP) as part of the local structure of “community councils”. 16 These structures, along with military and security forces, were mandated to distribute food assistance, known as CLAP boxes, which according to the Government, reaches 6 million households. **OHCHR received accounts of people, who despite not having adequate access to food, were not included in the distribution lists of the CLAP boxes because they were not Government supporters.** 23. In addition, at the end of 2016, the President announced the creation of the “carnet de la patria” (“carnet”), a card through which all social programmes would now be delivered, including a new system of direct financial transfers to families. The list of beneficiaries of these programmes is managed by the local structures of the governing parties, as opposed to Government institutions. Interviewees reported that members of these local structures monitor beneficiaries’ political activity. 24. Women, who carry the burden of household tasks and child rearing, are the majority of beneficiaries of social programmes related to health, food, and housing. They also constitute 72 percent of the membership of local community councils.¹⁷ However, discrimination based on political grounds and social control through “carnets” has had a direct impact on their ability to exercise their rights. In 2018 and 2019, women led many local and peaceful protests demanding access to basic goods and services, they also participated in anti-government protests. OHCHR collected accounts of women, including local leaders, who have been targeted due to their activism, threatened by community leaders and pro-government civilian armed groups (armed “colectivos”), and excluded from social programmes. Women reported not exercising their rights, including not speaking out against the Government, for fear of reprisals.

Identification cards track support and distribute aid

Ryan **Dube**, Kejal Vyas and Anatoly Kurmanaev, 12-23-2019, "Venezuela’s Maduro, Clinging to Power, Uses Hunger as an Election Weapon," WSJ, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/venezuelas-maduro-clinging-to-power-uses-hunger-as-an-electoral-weapon-1521734622A>

32-year-old teacher, she’s fed up with President Nicolás Maduro’s government. Her salary has fallen to the equivalent of \$2 a month with Venezuela’s currency collapse. She struggles to feed her 10-year-old son and is unable to treat the small tumor on her breast because the health-care system is in shambles. Still, Ms. Meza voted for the ruling Socialist Party in recent mayoral elections, fearing that otherwise she would have lost her state job and benefits—especially the monthly bags of rice, corn flour and other subsidized food she says keeps her family alive. She also plans to vote for Mr. Maduro in the May 20 presidential election “If I didn’t vote, there would be trouble, I was told,” she said in this arid town near the Colombian border. “They are playing with people’s hunger.” But the Maduro administration, which has just a 22% approval rating, has developed a broad strategy to prevail through dirty tricks, fear tactics and, crucially, using the lure of food to get the country’s poorest voters to support his administration, pollsters and elections experts in Venezuela say. Last year, the ruling party won three elections for local, state and national bodies. Food is an enormously powerful weapon in a country where babies die of malnutrition, store shelves are often bare and three-quarters of the population has lost an average of 19 pounds. The grants to millions of poverty-stricken voters might very well ensure his leftist movement runs this country for many years to come. “It’s criminal,” said Maritza Landaeta, head of the Bengoa Foundation, a group that studies nutrition and poverty in Venezuela and has been a strong critic of the government. “The same people that asphyxiated the food industry and generated the shortages are now using food as a political tool.” About 3.5 million of Venezuela’s 6 million homes receive boxes of food through the military-run Local Committee

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people. The so-called Fatherland Card, using technology from Chinese telecom giant ZTE Corp., **allows the government to keep track of who has voted.**

That permits officials to put pressure on food recipients if they are reluctant to cast a ballot, according to election experts, government critics and ruling party activists. By law, the vote is supposed to be secret. But at voting centers in the capital, Caracas, and the westernmost state of Zulia during the December municipal elections, it was easy to see how the ruling party worked the levers of government to ensure that likely supporters made it to the polls. In a giant red tent, Socialist activists scanned voters’ Fatherland Cards. **Using a computerized database, they could determine who hasn’t voted and what benefits those**

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Human Rights Council, 5 July 2019, "Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of Human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela," UN,

https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/report/report-of-the-united-nations-high-commissioner-for-human-rights-on-the-situation-of-human-rights-in-the-bolivarian-republic-of-venezuela/A_HRC_Venezuela-report.pdf

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Interviewees reported that **members of these local structures monitor beneficiaries’ political activity.** 24. Women, who carry the burden of household tasks and child rearing, are the majority of beneficiaries of social programmes related to health, food, and housing. They also constitute 72 percent of the membership of local community councils.¹⁷ However, discrimination based on political grounds and social control through “carnets” has had a direct impact on their ability to exercise their rights. In 2018 and 2019, women led many local and peaceful protests demanding access to basic goods and services, they also participated in anti-government protests. OHCHR collected accounts of women, including local leaders, who have been targeted due to their activism, threatened by community leaders and pro-government civilian armed groups (armed “colectivos”), and excluded from social programmes. Women reported not exercising their rights, including not speaking out against the Government, for fear of reprisals.

Maduro politicizes needed medical assistance

Nicholas **Casey**, 3-17-2019, “‘It Is Unspeakable’: How Maduro Used Cuban Doctors to Coerce Venezuela Voters,” NYT, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/17/world/americas/venezuela-cuban-doctors.html>

In interviews, 16 members of Cuba’s medical missions to Venezuela — a signature element of relations between the two countries — described **a system of deliberate political manipulation in which their services were wielded to secure votes for the governing Socialist Party, often through coercion.** Many tactics were used, they said, from simple reminders to vote for the government to denying treatment for opposition supporters with life-threatening ailments. The Cuban doctors said they were ordered to go door-to-door in impoverished neighborhoods, offering medicine and warning residents that they would be cut off from medical services if they did not vote for Mr. Maduro or his candidates. But the use of Cuban doctors to exert political control is not widely known, the doctors say, and the practice casts a harsh light on a sweeping exchange that supposedly benefits all Venezuelans, regardless of their politics. “The Cuban government wants to make sure the Venezuelan regime survives and is willing to do anything in their power to support Maduro,” said José Miguel Vivanco, director of the Americas program at Human Rights Watch. “It is unspeakable.” “With Chavez it had been hard, but with Maduro, starting in 2013, it was worse,” another Cuban doctor said. “It became a form of blackmail: ‘You’re not going to have medicine. You’re not going to have free health care. You’re not going to have prenatal care if you’re a pregnant woman.’” “Doling out the little medicine that remained, the doctors now focused their vote-getting efforts on patients with chronic illnesses, who needed repeated attention, Dr. Arias said. “The theme was chronic illnesses, the ones where you would die if patients didn’t get medicine, and that’s how they controlled people,” Dr. Arias recalled.

“Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

Quantifies: Maduro’s supports receive aid, dissenters do not

Moises **Rendon**, The, 9-3-2019, "Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela?,"Center for Strategic and International Studies, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-sanctions-working-venezuela>

Maduro has shut out foreign aid from abroad, including the United States, Canada, and the European Union, describing their contributions as a violation of sovereignty. Under his command, Venezuela’s borders with former allies Brazil and Colombia have been shuttered, bringing the delivery of crucial humanitarian aid to a near halt. **Additionally, Maduro has abused Venezuela’s subsidized food program CLAP to punish political dissenters; 83 percent of Maduro’s supporters receive benefits, as opposed to 14 percent of independents.** New methods are in order to address this challenge.

Sanctions exempt aid

United States gives aid FY 2019

ReliefWeb, 9-30-2019, "Venezuela Regional Crisis,"

<https://reliefweb.int/report/venezuela-bolivarian-republic/venezuela-regional-crisis-complex-emergency-fact-sheet-4-0>

HIGHLIGHTS USG announces nearly \$119 million in additional humanitarian funding for the Venezuela regional crisis response, including support to affected populations in Venezuela USG provides \$56 million to support humanitarian activities in Venezuela New Ecuadorian visa requirement results in increase in Venezuelans in Ipiales, as well as informal entries from Colombia to Ecuador KEY DEVELOPMENTS On September 23, U.S. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo announced nearly \$119 million in additional U.S. Government (USG) humanitarian funding to support efforts to respond to the Venezuela regional crisis, including inside of Venezuela. The funding—comprising more than \$78.8 million from State/PRM, nearly \$21.3 million from USAID/FFP, and more than \$18.6 million from USAID/OFDA—will enable non-governmental organization (NGO), public international organization (PIO), and UN partners to continue providing critical multi-sector support to vulnerable populations. **In FY 2019, the USG provided more than \$368 million in humanitarian assistance to support communities affected by the Venezuela regional crisis**, bringing the total amount of USG humanitarian funding since FY 2017 to nearly \$473 million. **The assistance includes more than \$56 million to support immediate relief activities inside of Venezuela.** The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has warned that if economic, political, and social conditions in Venezuela do not improve, populations will continue to depart the country. Drawing on interviews with Venezuelans residing across the region, the report notes ongoing food scarcity and unaffordability and the dire health situation as key humanitarian issues in the country. The implementation of the Government of Ecuador’s (GoE) new requirement that all Venezuelans must apply for humanitarian visas prior to entering Ecuador has contributed to an increase of Venezuelans residing on the Colombian side of the Rumichaca International Bridge in Nariño Department’s Ipiales city, as well as an uptick in informal crossings into Ecuador. In response, relief agencies have increased humanitarian programming in Ipiales, particularly the distribution of food and relief commodities.

Treasury allows humanitarian aid (via general license)

Press Releases, 8-6-2019, "Treasury Underscores U.S. Commitment to Humanitarian Support for Venezuelan

People," **U.S. Department Of The Treasury**, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm752>

Washington—Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued guidance highlighting the United States’ commitment to the unfettered flow of humanitarian aid to the Venezuelan people. OFAC maintains several authorizations that permit humanitarian-related transactions, enabling continued support to the people of Venezuela and ensuring that legitimate humanitarian activity is not the target of U.S. sanctions. “Treasury is committed to ensuring the unfettered flow of humanitarian aid to the people of Venezuela, who continue to suffer as a result of the mismanagement and corruption of the illegitimate former Maduro regime. It is imperative that the international community continues to fully utilize humanitarian exemptions to ensure that food and supplies continue to flow to Venezuelans suffering from Maduro’s man-made economic crisis,” said Sigal Mandelker, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. “The United States stands with the Venezuelan people and interim President Juan Guaidó in support of efforts to ensure that food, international aid, and resources reach vulnerable Venezuelans. Treasury regulations have and will continue to allow for unimpeded humanitarian support to the Venezuelan people, and we encourage U.S. persons to employ these authorizations to engage with those in need.” OFAC’s regulations and general licenses allow U.S. persons to continue to provide humanitarian support to the Venezuelan people, including transactions through the U.S. financial system for certain authorized activity related to food, agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices; non-commercial, personal remittances; international organizations;

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telecommunications and mail; the Internet; medical services; and nongovernmental organizations. Humanitarian support is generally excepted from sanctions, so long as such activity meets the requirements outlined in each authorization. Sanctions do not prohibit U.S. persons from engaging in transactions involving the country or people of Venezuela, provided blocked persons or proscribed conduct are not involved. Across all sanctions programs, we remain committed to working with the private sector to clarify U.S. sanctions regulations and promote a risk-based approach to sanctions compliance, including in cases involving the provision of humanitarian aid. For transactions not otherwise authorized by OFAC general licenses, OFAC maintains a long-standing, favorable specific licensing policy supporting the provision of humanitarian assistance through which U.S. persons can request OFAC approval for such transactions. OFAC considers specific licenses on a case-by-case basis and prioritizes license applications, compliance questions, and other requests related to humanitarian support for the Venezuelan people.

Treasury will work with individuals and businesses to see if they have a general license exemption. If not, Treasury will issue specific licenses for economic activity within Venezuela, prioritizing humanitarian purposes (overcompliance will not happen)

Press Releases, 8-6-2019, "Treasury Underscores U.S. Commitment to Humanitarian Support for Venezuelan People," **U.S. Department Of The Treasury**, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm752>

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Maduro refuses humanitarian aid- sanctions not to blame

Maduro doesn't admit that there is a crisis

Isayen **Herrera**, 12-17-2017, "As Venezuela Collapses, Children Are Dying of Hunger," NYT, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/17/world/americas/venezuela->

The Venezuelan **government** has tried to cover up the extent of the crisis by **enforcing a near-total blackout of health statistics**, and by creating a culture in which doctors are often afraid to register cases and deaths that may be associated with the government's failures. But the statistics that have come out are staggering. In the Ministry of Health's 2015 annual report, the mortality rate for children under 4 weeks old had increased a hundredfold, from 0.02 percent in 2012 to just over 2 percent. Maternal mortality had increased nearly fivefold in the same period. For almost two years, the government did not publish a single epidemiological bulletin tracking statistics like infant mortality. Then in April of this year, a link suddenly appeared on the Health Ministry's official website, leading to the unpublished bulletins. They showed that 11,446 children under the age of 1 had died in 2016 — a 30

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percent increase in one year — as the economic crisis accelerated. The new findings made national and international headlines before the government declared that the website had been hacked, and the reports were swiftly removed. The health minister was fired and the military was put in charge of monitoring the bulletins. No reports have been released since. Doctors are censored in hospitals, too, often warned not to include malnutrition in children’s medical records. “In some public hospitals, the clinical diagnosis of malnutrition has been prohibited,” Dr. Huniades Urbina said

default, 7-26-2017, "Containing the Shock Waves from Venezuela," Crisis Group,

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/venezuela/65-containing-shock-waves-venezuela> Nor is

it clear how humanitarian assistance can be delivered, given the government’s refusal to acknowledge that there is a crisis, and its insistence that offers of aid are a cover for foreign military intervention. In January 2018, for example, **Maduro declared** that the foreign media had published 3,800 negative items about Venezuela and that **stories relating to a supposed humanitarian crisis were invented to “justify an imperialist intervention”**. “Presidente Maduro denuncia campaña internacional contra Venezuela para justificar intervención”, Agencia Venezolana de Noticias, 8 January 2018. The government has repeatedly rejected offers of food and medical aid.

Maduro refuses aid

default, 7-26-2017, "Containing the Shock Waves from Venezuela," **Crisis Group,**

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/venezuela/65-containing-shock-waves-venezuela> Nor is

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Isa **Soares**, Natalie Gallón and Laura Smith-Spark, Cnn, 2-8-2019, "Venezuela blocks border bridge in aid standoff," CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/07/americas/venezuela-aid-blocked-bridge-intl/index.html>

Two US trucks carrying food and medical supplies arrived at Venezuela’s border this afternoon, according to a US official in the Colombian border town of Cucuta. But it is not clear when or whether the aid will reach people inside the country. The government of embattled Venezuelan President Nicolas **Maduro has blocked aid deliveries**, amid rising tensions over opposition plans to bring humanitarian aid into the country. Venezuela’s opposition leader and self-declared president, Juan Guaido, last week named Cucuta as one of three collection points for the delivery of international aid. His move ramped up tensions with Maduro’s government even as many in Venezuela remain in desperate need of such supplies. Maduro has rejected the international aid, **saying: “We are not beggars.”** On Friday he tweeted: “The humanitarian aid is a show to humiliate us and is intended to justify military aggression; a macabre plan which does not hide the robbery of more than \$10 billion from our nation by the United States. If they want to help, they must stop the blockade, the persecution, and the aggression against Venezuela.”

Aid piling up outside Venezuela

Ciara **Nugent**, Feb 22, 2019, "What to Know About the Showdown at the Venezuelan Border This Weekend,"

Time, <https://time.com/5535496/venezuela-border-aid/>

Juan Guaidó, the Venezuelan parliament leader who many countries now recognize as the country’s interim president, has worked with the U.S. government to bring **millions of dollars worth of aid to the country, where a humanitarian crisis has driven millions to the edge of starvation and forced more than 3 million people – one tenth of the population – to flee. Trucks and warehouses filled with food, medicine and other supplies** now **sit at several locations just outside [Venezuela]** the country – in the Colombian border city of Cúcuta, at points along the southern border with Brazil and on the nearby island of Curaçao.

But **Maduro**, who has refused to abandon the presidency and retains the support of Venezuela’s powerful military, **is refusing to let the aid in.** He says it is an attempt “to humiliate the Venezuelan people” **and has labelled the food “carcinogenic.”** On Wednesday he banned all travel to Curaçao and on Thursday closed the border with Brazil. There, **soldiers opened fire on civilians who tried** to reopen it **to get the aid in, killing two indigenous people.**

Humanitarian aid will never reach Venezuela under Maduro regime

Karen **DeYoung**, Washington Post, 3-8-2019, "Venezuela’s health system in ‘utter collapse’ as infectious diseases spread, report says,"

“Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/venezuelas-health-system-in-utter-collapse-as-infectious-diseases-spread-report-says/2019/04/03/fd39a152-563e-11e9-8ef3-fbd41a2ce4d5_story.html

It calls on U.N. Secretary General António Guterres to spearhead efforts to declare a complex humanitarian emergency, an official designation that would trigger a major, comprehensive effort under U.N. auspices and unlock the mobilization of international resources.

Humanitarian aid to Venezuela has been slow, compared with the need, because of the intransigence of President Nicolás Maduro — who has blamed deprivations on U.S. sanctions and refused to allow anything beyond a trickle of assistance to enter the country — and the reluctance of some donors to allow assistance to be distributed by the Maduro government. A U.N. declaration, the reports' authors say, would put Guterres in a position to press Maduro to allow U.N. agencies to lead and implement a large-scale humanitarian response aid.

UN: Maduro hasn't used all resources available or sought help to provide food

Human Rights Council, 5 July 2019, "Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of Human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela," UN, https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/report/report-of-the-united-nations-high-commissioner-for-human-rights-on-the-situation-of-human-rights-in-the-bolivarian-republic-of-venezuela/A_HRC_Venezuela-report.pdf

13. Information verified by OHCHR confirms violations of the right to food, including the State's obligation to ensure the population is free from hunger. The main food assistance programme known as CLAP boxes does not meet basic nutritional needs. **The Government has not demonstrated that it has used all resources at its disposal to ensure the progressive realization of the right to food, nor that it has unsuccessfully sought international assistance to address gaps.** In the last few months, the Government has requested and accepted aid, although insufficient to meet the needs of the population. 14. Interviewees consistently reported a lack of access to food due to scarcity as well as unaffordability. Availability of sufficient quality food is deficient, with interviewees reporting eating once, or at most twice, per day, and consuming few proteins or vitamins. Lack of access to food has a particularly adverse impact on women who are the main caregivers and/or heads of households, and who dedicate an average of 10 hours per day queuing for food. Local sources reported some women being compelled to exchange sex for food. 15. In addition to hyperinflation and economic contraction, economic and social policies adopted over the past decade have undermined food production and distribution systems, increasing the number of people that rely on food assistance programmes. The United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization reported 3.7 million people in Venezuela were malnourished, and the NGO Caritas confirmed particularly high levels of malnutrition among children and pregnant women.7

UN: Maduro exacerbates crisis by concealing health data

Human Rights Council, 5 July 2019, "Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of Human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela," UN, https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/report/report-of-the-united-nations-high-commissioner-for-human-rights-on-the-situation-of-human-rights-in-the-bolivarian-republic-of-venezuela/A_HRC_Venezuela-report.pdf

16. The situation regarding the right to health in Venezuela is dire. Interviewees consistently described a healthcare infrastructure that has been declining for years, hallmarked by an exodus of doctors and nurses, unsanitary conditions, and severe shortages in basic medical equipment, supplies and medicines. Families of patients have to provide all necessities, including water, gloves, and syringes. Reports point to shortages of 60 to 100 percent of essential drugs in four of Venezuela's major cities, including Caracas.8 17. Moreover, previously controlled and eliminated diseases, including vaccinepreventable diseases such as measles and diphtheria, have re-emerged. In the last year, with the support of the Pan American Health Organization, the authorities implemented a series of vaccination strategies, aimed at interrupting the circulation of measles.9 The authorities informed that during June 2019, there had been no new case of measles. 18. There is a lack of access to all types of contraceptives, with several cities facing a 100 percent shortage.10 This increases risk of contracting HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, and of unwanted and adolescent pregnancies. The rate of adolescent pregnancies has increased by 65 percent since 2015.11 This impacts girls' right to education, with pregnancy being the primary reason girls drop out of school. Due to restrictive legislation on abortion, some women and girls must resort to unsafe abortions. This has contributed to an increase in preventable maternal mortality, with an estimated 20 percent of maternal deaths reportedly linked to unsafe abortions.12 Lack of skilled birth attendants, medical supplies and hospital conditions has driven many women to give birth abroad. 19. The National Hospital Survey (2019) found that between November 2018 and February 2019, 1,557 people died due to lack of supplies in hospitals.13 Blackouts have caused irreparable harm, as evidenced by reports that indicate that 40 patients died as a result of the March 2019 power outages.14 During the High Commissioner's visit, health professionals and parents of sick children mentioned the impact of economic sanctions on the health sector, particularly the possibility of receiving urgent medical treatment, including transplants, outside the country. 20. Violations of the right to health resulted from the Government's failure to fulfil its core obligations, which are non-derogable, even for economic reasons. Violations of core obligations were linked to the widespread lack of availability of, and access to, essential medicines and treatment, the deterioration

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of conditions in hospitals, clinics, and maternity clinics, insufficient provision of underlying determinants of health, including water and adequate nutrition, deterioration of immunization and preventative health programmes, and restrictions on access to sexual and reproductive health. Moreover, **the failure of the Government to publish comprehensive data on public health, essential for the development and implementation of an adequate response to the health crisis is a violation of the right to health.**

Maduro will misuse economy if sanctions are lifted

Maduro steals aid money

Vasco **Cotovio**, Isa Soares and William Bonnett, Cnn, 8-23-2019, "A trail of 'bloody gold' leads to Venezuela's government," CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/08/20/americas/venezuela-gold-mining-intl/index.html>
Forced to provide some relief for a population starving under a crumbling economy, crippled further by US sanctions, which have made trade increasingly difficult, Maduro saw in gold the commodity that oil could no longer be: Increasingly prized, historically stable in value and considerably easier to ship around the world. Gold would allow the regime to suppress some of the country's needs while allegedly enriching Maduro and winning the military's favor. In 2018, Venezuela sold almost 24 tonnes of "unrefined" gold valued at more than \$900 million dollars to Turkey, data from the Turkish Statistical Institute shows. It was exchanged for supplies later included in government subsidized food boxes for poor Venezuelans. However, the US government has said **the Venezuelan government is skimming its own profits from such food imports and distribution.** The Turkish government did not respond to CNN's request for comment.

Maduro uses government revenue to prop up regime (not for his own people)

Moises **Rendon**, The, 9-3-2019, "Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela?," Center for Strategic and International Studies, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-sanctions-working-venezuela>

Sanctions are undoubtedly cutting off financing to the Maduro regime, limiting the government's ability to import food and medicine amid economic freefall. However, **reversing sanctions against Maduro and giving the regime access to revenues will not fix the humanitarian crisis** for three main reasons: Although government revenues have been used in the past to bankroll social programs, **Maduro's regime has neglected to provide food and medicine to the Venezuelan people. Instead, they have directly profited from these revenues, funding illicit projects and buying the loyalty of military officials.** Sanctions are designed to choke off these earnings, weakening Maduro's grasp on power and therefore accelerating the restoration of democracy.

Marcela **Escobari**, 2-28-2019, "Made by Maduro: The Humanitarian Crisis in Venezuela and US Policy Responses," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/made-by-maduro-the-humanitarian-crisis-in-venezuela-and-us-policy-responses/>

To conclude, this is a moment where the question for all of us should be, how does the U.S. and international community maximize the chances of success of this full-on pressure strategy, so we can help Venezuela move from the palliative to the needed structural reforms required to restore prosperity to all Venezuelans. The current government under Nicolas **Maduro has consistently been willing to use the dwindling resources of the nation to enrich a corrupt political elite and buy loyalty to keep itself in power at the expense of the suffering and hunger of its people.** The strategy of maximum economic and political pressure on the regime, including the recent U.S. sanctions on PDVSA, will make it hard for the Maduro government to continue to fund itself and press the military to defect, in what everyone hopes is a bloodless transition. As this strategy plays out, the U.S. government should project an unwavering commitment to helping the people of Venezuela, and to democratic

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principles of governance in unison with the growing global coalition of nations. The strategy should also involve a humanitarian response—that is distinct from the political and diplomatic strategy— that complies with international law and the Geneva convention protocols, and that it is both neutral, apolitical and targeting those most in need. Our unwavering support to the Venezuelan people in this critical moment, reinforces who we are as a country and what works when we use development and diplomacy to support stability and prosperity around the globe.

Maduro will not reform economy (shady card)

Default, 7-26-2017, "Containing the Shock Waves from Venezuela," **Crisis Group**,

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/venezuela/65-containing-shock-waves-venezuela>

Debt crises are destabilising events for financial markets, particularly when a relatively large economy is involved. In the case of Venezuela, the financial ripple effect abroad may be limited

because the rest of the region is in much better shape and the likelihood of default has been priced into the market for years. **With the country's enormous potential for attracting investment in oil and other basic industries, its domestic recovery could be fairly rapid.**

But that— and indeed even an initial restructuring deal for Venezuela's debt — **would require the government taking steps to reform the economy.** Under Maduro, and with sanctions in place, such a reform is virtually unthinkable. **The president insists the economic problem is one of external aggression aimed at regime change**, while sources of fresh finance are sharply reduced by lack of access to the U.S. financial system.

Sanctions lead to defections

Increasing protests inside of Venezuela

https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20180523_acaps_thematic_report_humanitarian_crisis_in_venezuela.pdf, Jude

Sweeney, 2018, ACAPS

Since the end of December 2017, across the country there have been increased protests over the lack of food, medicine, and basic services, as well as lack of political rights. In the first three months of 2018, the Venezuelan Observatory of Social Conflict (OVCS) registered 2,414 protests, compared to 1,254 in the same period of 2017. March was the month with the highest number of protests (1,106). From January to March 2018, 784 protests were related to basic services, 708 were related to worker rights, 549 were related to food, and 287 were related to health. The number of protests relating to health and worker rights has been increasing. 184 lootings or looting attempts have also been registered, most of them in January (OVCS 10/04/2018). Some protests have culminated in violence and resulted in casualties (Reuters 08/03/2018). OVCS reported that 10 people were killed during protests in 2018 so far (OVCS 10/04/2018).

Sanctions encourage high level officials to resign- will occur soon

Kenneth **Rapoza**, May 3, 2019, "No, U.S. Sanctions Are Not Killing Venezuela. Maduro Is," Forbes,

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/05/03/no-u-s-sanctions-are-not-killing-venezuela-maduro-is/#36a6d3994343>

National Assembly President Juan Guaido has been orchestrating protests all year. Guaido declared himself interim president in January until new elections could be held. He has gone so far as using those powers to appoint new diplomats at its embassies. Tens of thousands more people come to Guaido rallies than come to Maduro's counter-rallies. Yet, despite Guaido's ability to woo some defectors from the National Guard, he has yet to make any big splash moves. Top officials and military commanders remain supportive of Maduro. No A-listers have said they have

had enough of this chaos. However, Guaido's strategy is more like death by a thousand cuts. Time is on his side and not on Maduro's. **As the economy deteriorates, more National Guardsmen are expected to defect. This opens a new element in the crisis: an opening among the military and PSUV officials to negotiate Maduro's resignation.**

Sanctions lead to military defecting

Marcela **Escobari**, 2-28-2019, "Made by Maduro: The Humanitarian Crisis in Venezuela and US Policy Responses," Brookings,

<https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/made-by-maduro-the-humanitarian-crisis-in-venezuela-and-us-policy-responses/>

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Regime change will happen if Maduro can't pay generals

Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Jan 25, 2019, "Venezuela's Embattled President Will Survive As Long As His Generals Are Still Getting Paid.," Slate Magazine,

<https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/01/venezuela-maduro-survives-guaido.html>

And yet, despite intense opposition, the question remains, how vulnerable is Maduro's regime to being overthrown? To provide guidance in answering this crucial question, we rely on the theoretical research we and others have done into the factors that increase the risks to political survival in autocratic governments and in rigged election regimes. Why do governments actually fall? **Popular uprisings often get credit for bringing down dictators, but mass protests can only cause the overthrow of a regime if members of the incumbent's inner circle choose to back the insurgents at their expense.** Unarmed civilians cannot overcome guns provided that those holding the guns are willing to fire on protesters. In Tiananmen Square, the generals stayed loyal and the Chinese Communist regime survived. Myanmar's Saffron Revolution in 2007 saw tens of thousands protesting throughout the fall, but protest collapsed once the army cracked down. When would the army defect? We can learn the answer by reflecting on past experience. The shah of Iran's military chose to sit on its hands in 1979 rather than fight off the Khomeini revolution. Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak's military decided to sit on the sidelines during the 2011 Arab Spring while the people revolted. Indeed, Egypt's military leaders chose to join the newly emergent replacement government and then toppled it shortly thereafter securing their own monopoly on power. Many other examples illustrate a similar phenomenon. **The members of the incumbent's inner circle are loyal as long as they can count on their leader to ensure that they have a steady, continuous, substantial flow of access to wealth and power. But if the incumbent's reliability on that front comes into doubt, then the inner circle is better off either backing a mass uprising, hoping to co-opt it later, or launching a coup d'état to install themselves in power.** This brings us to an important difference between Maduro and the shah or Mubarak. The shah was widely believed to be dying of cancer when he was overthrown (and, indeed, he did die of cancer about 18 months later). Mubarak, in his 80s at the time, suffered from the ultimate terminal illness, old age. That, coupled with President Barack Obama's decision to reduce U.S. aid to Egypt in order to pay for the war in Afghanistan meant that Mubarak's generals could no longer count on him to deliver the great wealth that bought their loyalty. As it turned out, Mubarak, despite frequent bouts of illness, is still alive, eight years after he was overthrown. Nevertheless, from the perspective of his inner circle, given his age and condition, he was not thought to be a reliable source of future income. Maduro, in contrast, appears perfectly healthy and likely to be a source of enrichment for his generals for years to come. Hence, **they have little incentive to back away from him and great incentives to assure that he remains in power as the source of their wealth and influence.** One might reasonably suppose that severe economic shocks could lessen the loyalty of a leader's inner circle since a severe economic downturn makes the incumbent less able, it would seem, to continue to line the pockets of his cronies. But that is too quick a leap in logic. Successful leaders, by which we mean those who survive in power, minimize what we like to call the winning coalition—the number of cronies upon whom they depend. **In a democracy, an economic downturn is a political disaster because a leader cannot compensate the many supporters who experience loss.** Over the past decades Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chávez, successfully purged thousands of civil servants and members of the military, undermined democratic institutions and stacked the judiciary. The effective result is that **Maduro depends on a far smaller proportion of the Venezuelan population than do democratic leaders. Economic contraction gives him less with which to pay the winning coalition, but contraction in the winning coalition means that far, far fewer supporters need to be paid off.** And indeed, the policies that reward these cronies are often the same policies that have collapsed the economy. Maduro has certainly done lots to damage the economy, but he is not responsible for the great drop in global oil prices, a constraint that would limit his successor every bit as much as it limits him. So, as long as Maduro's regime continues to generate substantial, albeit reduced, oil revenue, he can continue to assure his cronies that they are better off with him than they would be by gambling on a new leader who might toss them out and replace them with his own team of loyalists. That is not true for the people on the street, but their support is not essential to keep Maduro in power. **As long as Maduro can credibly promise to continue to pay his generals and other essential supporters better than they can expect to get from someone else, they have no reason to betray him. As long as they remain loyal, the odds of his downfall are small. The generals, after all, control the guns and can, in their own self-interest, choose to use the guns to make rebellion against the regime too costly for it to be sustained.** That is exactly what the Basij, Iran's paramilitary security force, did in Iran on Ayatollah Khamenei's behalf when mass protests broke out following Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's questionable re-election in 2009. That is what Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's regime has done in Egypt following its overthrow of the freely elected government of Mohamed Morsi. Bashing heads is very effective at diminishing the incentives of new rebels to continue to take to the streets, putting their lives at risk. **Guaidó, despite the international recognition, has little real power without the backing of the men with guns. And despite his calls for the military to abandon Maduro and promises of amnesty if they do so, they are sticking with their president.** Could anything induce them to abandon him now? The answer resides in money, base though that may be. Russian President Vladimir Putin has lined the pockets of the Venezuelan government to the tune of up to \$5 billion. That will pay a lot of generals a lot of money for a long time. The U.S. government, by recognizing Guaidó, has opened the door to channeling aid and other funds to him and his "government." Thus far, however, the sum of money being talked about is only around \$20 million, a paltry amount as compared

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with what Putin has already given and is likely to do in the future. The path to a successful coup d'état or popular transition to democracy in Venezuela requires more money for military leaders if they abandon Maduro and back Guaidó than they can expect if they remain loyal to the current regime. That is a tall order for the Organization of American States and the governments in the Americas, but short of a war that just about no one wants, that is the only viable near-term path to bringing down Venezuela's dictatorship and giving the rebirth of democracy any chance.

US SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVELY AIMED AT INDIVIDUAL CORRUPT MEMBERS OF THE VENEZUELEAN GOVERNMENT-Vidal and Mazzali '19

Laura Vidal and Jessica Mazzali, 1-31-2019, "US sanctions squeezed Venezuela's Chavismo elites. This time, it's oil," Public Radio International, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-01-31/us-sanctions-squeezed-venezuelas-chavismo-elites-time-its-oil>

David Smolansky, former mayor of El Hatillo metropolitan district in Caracas and member of opposition party Voluntad Popular, sees the sanctions as an effective way to pressure Maduro's government.

“Many of these high officials have fortunes in foreign banks and properties in foreign countries,” Smolansky says. “The sanctions have debilitated their possibility to move around internationally as well as their financial possibilities abroad. These sanctions have not hurt Venezuelans, they are individual sanctions coming from multilateral efforts of not only the United States, but also Canada, the European Union, and other Latin American countries.”

While “Chavismo” (socialist) elites were hit with a variety of sanctions over the last three years, they've done little to make an impact on ordinary Venezuelans, whose lives have spiraled into a humanitarian crisis as hyperinflation has driven nearly 3 million to flee.

“The sanctions have nothing to do with hyperinflation (projected to reach a 10 million percent this year), with the fall in oil production, or the food and medicine shortage that has generated a humanitarian and a migrant crisis. The only person responsible for that is Nicolás Maduro,” Smolansky adds.

US will lift sanctions on specific individuals

PRESS RELEASES, 6-27-2019, "Treasury Sanctions Officials of the Illegitimate Maduro Regime Involved in Rampant Corruption," U.S. Department Of The Treasury, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm718>

Washington – Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two Maduro regime officials who continue to engage in significant corruption and fraud to the detriment of the people of Venezuela. Persistent countrywide blackouts are the latest and worst in a long history of electricity outages, stemming from years of massive corruption, neglect, and mismanagement of Venezuela's electricity infrastructure by the illegitimate Maduro regime. The lack of electricity limits the Venezuelan people's access to basic goods, services, and potable water supplies, and exacerbates the already precarious health care system, in which the majority of hospitals already lack reliable water and power and are experiencing shortages of medicine and medical supplies. “The people of Venezuela entrusted their public officials to provide fundamental civic services, like water and electricity. The illegitimate Maduro regime exploits the public trust by plundering Venezuelan assets, enriching themselves, and watching idly as basic public systems needlessly and catastrophically fail,” said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. “Treasury will continue to target officials who exacerbate corruption at the expense of the Venezuelan people and knowingly fail to provide basic public services.” Today's **action targets** the former minister of Electric Power and **President of the National Electric Corporation** (CORPOELEC), Luis Alfredo Motta Domínguez (**Motta**), and the Deputy Minister of Finance, Investments, and Strategic Alliances for the Ministry of Electric Power, Eustiquio Jose Lugo Gomez (**Lugo**), pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13692. Rather than use their official positions to serve the Venezuelan people, Motta and Lugo illegally enriched themselves and contributed to the electricity crisis. Pursuant to an investigation undertaken by the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida, the Justice Department's Criminal Division and the Drug Enforcement Administration in Miami, as a part of a criminal complaint in March 2019, senior CORPOELEC officials were identified as having previously received bribes, since at least 2016, from two Venezuelan businessmen in exchange for awarding contracts for expensive equipment to maintain Venezuelan electrical infrastructure. Some of the equipment received as a part of these contracts was incompatible with the Venezuelan electrical system, rendering them useless and contributing to the ongoing deterioration of the electrical system. Despite those incompatibilities, officials from CORPOELEC listed these contracts as delivered and processed in full. As corruption ran rampant through CORPOELEC, senior officials continued to exacerbate the ongoing mismanagement intertwined in the Venezuelan electrical infrastructure and ignored their responsibility to the Venezuelan people. The following two individuals are being designated today pursuant to Executive Order 13692, as amended, as current or former officials of the Government of Venezuela: Luis Alfredo Motta Domínguez is the former Minister of Electric Power as well as President of the National Electric Corporation (CORPOELEC), both positions he had held since 2015. Maduro removed Motta from these positions in March 2019. Additionally, Motta is a Major General of the Bolivarian National Guard and previously served as the head of Strategic Integral Development Region (REDI) Central. Eustiquio Jose Lugo Gomez is the Deputy Minister of Finance, Investment, and Strategic Alliances for the Ministry of Electric Power. Additionally, Lugo is a Brigadier General and was formerly appointed to the Operations Directorate of the Anti-Drug Command of the General Command of the Bolivarian National Guard. As a result of today's action, all property and interests in property of these individuals, and of any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by such individuals, that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. OFAC's regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons. Also today, the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida and the Justice Department's Criminal Division indicted Motta and Lugo for their alleged roles in laundering the proceeds of violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and Venezuelan anti-bribery law in connection with their alleged receipt of bribes to award CORPOELEC business to U.S.-based companies. Additional information about today's action. **U.S. sanctions need not be permanent**; sanctions are intended to bring about a positive change of

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behavior. For example, on May 7, 2019, OFAC removed sanctions imposed on former high-ranking Venezuelan intelligence official Manuel Ricardo Cristopher Figuera after his public break with Maduro. The United States continues to make clear that the removal of sanctions is available for persons designated under E.O. 13692 or E.O. 13850, both as amended, who take concrete and meaningful actions to restore democratic order, refuse to take part in human rights abuses, speak out against abuses committed by the illegitimate Maduro regime, or combat corruption in Venezuela.

Sanctions increase democracy

The sanctions are intended to improve democratic processes- not attain regime change

Voa News, 9-7-2017, "US: Venezuela Sanctions Aim at Behavior, Not Regime Change," Voice of America, <https://www.voanews.com/americas/us-venezuela-sanctions-aim-behavior-not-regime-change> WASHINGTON -

New sanctions on Venezuela aren't aimed at regime change but rather to push President Nicolas Maduro's

government to restore democratic standards after he started a process to rewrite his nation's constitution, a top U.S. official said Thursday. The comments by Rick Waddell, the White House's deputy national security adviser, suggest a softening in America's position. President Donald Trump last month suggested the U.S. could consider military action against Venezuela and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson raised the idea of pressuring Maduro to leave power. Waddell said sanctions imposed by the Trump

administration in August are "behaviorally focused." The set of penalties banned American financial institutions from providing new money to Venezuela's government or its state oil company, PDVSA. They also barred trading in two bonds the government recently issued to circumvent its increasing isolation from Western financial markets. Also, Venezuelan oil giant's U.S. subsidiary, Citgo, can no longer send dividends back to Venezuela, which the government says will further crush its beleaguered economy. "We would like the Venezuelan regime to return to democratic process," Waddell said. "We would like them to respect human rights. We would like them to respect property. That does not necessarily necessitate regime change."

Sanctions limit Maduro's power, including ability to hurt his own people

Moises Rendon, The, 9-3-2019, "Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela?," Center for Strategic and International Studies, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-sanctions-working-venezuela>

There is significant evidence of the impact of sanctions on Maduro's power. Not only have **targeted economic sanctions limited his ability to finance his regime's antidemocratic activities and human rights abuses** by reducing oil and illegal mining earnings, but they have also [strained his inner circle](#). **His control over state institutions and assets is slipping along with public confidence in his regime**. The United States has instituted a strategy of risk; the current administration's interminable threat to impose further sanctions leaves Maduro and his accomplices unsure as to how far it will go, forcing them to fear the worst. Most recently, sanctions have increased leverage for democratic forces within Venezuela. Maduro recently agreed to send a delegation to Barbados to reopen talks with the opposition after dialogues stalled earlier this year. The increased pressure of sanctions was a key factor in his decision to negotiate with political adversaries, as he and his inner circle are more limited than ever in their capacity to travel and engage with financial assets.

Opposition wants sanctions

Tom Dichristopher, Wilfred Frost, MAY 30 2017, "Venezuela's political opposition finds a new weapon against its leftist dictator," CNBC,

<https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/30/venezuelan-opposition-threatens-not-to-repay-bonds.htm>

Venezuela's opposition party is refining a new weapon against the government of embattled President Nicolas Maduro: threatening that the country's lenders may not get their money back after Maduro is removed from power. **The leader of Venezuela's National Assembly, Julio Borges, criticized Goldman Sachs after the company bought the distressed debt of PDVSA**, the country's state-owned oil company. Borges suggested that a future government might not honor the bonds. **The letter accuses Goldman of "making a quick buck off the suffering Venezuelan people" by helping to prop**

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up the Maduro regime. Venezuela's government has mismanaged the country's economy, leading to severe food shortages and staggering inflation, but despite those hardships it has continued to make debt payments. The repayment threats are the only leverage the opposition has right now, beyond supporting the huge street protests that have rocked the country, said Risa Grais-Targow, director of risk consultancy Eurasia Group's Latin America practice. **The opposition is trying to hasten**

Maduro's end by starving the government of financing and making his rule

untenable. The Development Bank of Latin America reportedly [held off disbursing \\$440 million in loans](#) earlier this year due to maneuvering by Venezuela's opposition-held National Assembly. Politicians refused to approve debt financing and then warned that future governments would not be obligated to pay back the money if Maduro secured the funds without assembly approval.

Sanctions lead to negotiations

Sanctions could lead to negotiations between Maduro regime and opposition

default, 7-26-2017, "Containing the Shock Waves from Venezuela," Crisis Group, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/venezuela/65-containing-shock-waves-venezuela>

The second priority is to **revive talks between government and opposition**. Ideally, the government would postpone forthcoming presidential elections, but even if the polls go ahead, the priority afterward should be a swift return to meaningful negotiations. **The U.S., Canada and the EU have [has] sanctioned the government, and several regional leaders are considering following suit. In themselves, such sanctions rarely prove effective. But in Venezuela's case, the threat of further sanctions, especially those imposed by Latin American governments, might improve prospects for negotiations,** provided that threat was accompanied by reinvigorated diplomacy and tied to specific, realistic concessions demanded of the Maduro government.

Sanctions pressured Maduro to reopen talks in Barbados

Moises Rendon, The, 9-3-2019, "Are Sanctions Working in Venezuela?," Center for Strategic and International Studies, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/are-sanctions-working-venezuela>

There is significant evidence of the impact of sanctions on Maduro's power. Not only have targeted economic sanctions limited his ability to finance his regime's antidemocratic activities and human rights abuses by reducing oil and illegal mining earnings, but they have also [strained his inner circle](#). His control over state institutions and assets is slipping along with public confidence in his regime. The United States has instituted a strategy of risk; the current administration's interminable threat to impose further sanctions leaves Maduro and his accomplices unsure as to how far it will go, forcing them to fear the worst. **Most recently, sanctions have increased leverage for democratic forces within Venezuela. Maduro recently agreed to send a delegation to Barbados to reopen talks with the opposition after dialogues stalled earlier this year. The increased pressure of sanctions was a key factor in his decision to negotiate with political adversaries, as he and his inner circle are more limited than ever in their capacity to travel and engage with financial assets.**

Negotiations have already occurred

David Luhnow and José De Córdoba, 12-24-2019, "Venezuela's Opposition Held Talks With Government on Ousting Maduro," WSJ, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/venezuelas-opposition-held-talks-with-government-on-ousting-maduro-11556767656>

Venezuela's opposition held secret talks with members of President Nicolás Maduro's inner circle in recent months in an ill-fated bid to get Mr. Maduro to leave power and install a united interim government, according to U.S. officials and Venezuelan opposition figures. The talks involved the highest levels of Mr. Maduro's regime, including Defense Minister Gen. Vladimir Padrino, Supreme Court Chief Justice Maikel Moreno and the

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presidential guard commander and head of military intelligence, Gen. Iván Rafael Hernández. The goal was to remove Mr. Maduro and restore democracy in the country, according to U.S. special envoy Elliott Abrams and people close to Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó. The talks would mark the first known contact between the government and the opposition since Mr. Guaidó declared himself interim president in late January, sparking the most serious challenge yet to Mr. Maduro's rule. Fifty-four countries, including the U.S., recognize the opposition leader as Venezuela's legitimate president. “We know that a part, a large part, a majority of the high command were talking with the Supreme Court and Juan Guaidó about a change, a change in government, with the departure of Maduro, and with guarantees for the military,” Mr. Abrams told Venezuelan online TV network VPItv on Wednesday. The opposition believed it was close enough to a deal that a document that laid out the legal framework for the transition had been produced, said Mr. Abrams. “I am told the document is long—15 points, I think—and it talks of guarantees for the military, for a dignified exit for Maduro, and Guaidó as interim president.” In the end, the exact reason the talks broke down couldn't be determined. On Tuesday, Mr. Guaidó, joined by only a handful of National Guard troops, called for a rebellion, leading to two consecutive days of widespread protests. But only one senior regime official—the head of Venezuela's secret service—has switched sides. Mr. Maduro, speaking on television late Wednesday, denied that members of his government were negotiating with the opposition, calling it “fake news.” Opposition leader Juan Guaidó, joined by a small group of troops, called for an uprising against Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. The U.S. and its allies see Mr. Guaidó as the country's legitimate leader. “They're trying to create their own intrigue,” he said, referring to U.S. officials, accusing Washington of trying to create divisions within the Socialist movement that has ruled Venezuela for 20 years. Carlos Vecchio, Mr. Guaidó's envoy to the U.S., backed claims by U.S. officials that there were secret talks and that senior members of the government were willing to negotiate Mr. Maduro's exit. “That tells you the military are willing [to participate in] a peaceful transition, that we are very close to an end,” he said. Elliott Abrams, the U.S. special envoy for Venezuela. Another Venezuelan opposition figure close to Mr. Guaidó and familiar with the discussions said that the talks had been going on for a while. The contacts were made through a fugitive Venezuelan businessman who was close to Gen. Hernandez, said another person familiar with the negotiations. The failed effort to unseat Mr. Maduro suggests that many senior figures in the Maduro regime could be open to change and believe the benefits of a transition outweigh continuing on the country's current path of a deepening economic and political crisis. That shows Mr. Maduro's hold on power is weak, a point stressed by U.S. officials this week even as Mr. Guaidó's rebellion failed. “If you're Nicolás Maduro, can you look at your defense minister anymore and trust him?” national security adviser John Bolton told reporters on Wednesday. “I don't think so. I think Maduro is now surrounded by scorpions in a bottle, and it's only a matter of time.”

Sanctions lead Maduro to resign

BBC News, 5-1-2019, "Guaidó calls for more Venezuela protests,"

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-48114826>

Juan Guaidó has appealed for his supporters to take to the streets of Venezuela again on Wednesday, after a day of violent clashes on Tuesday. President Nicolás Maduro, whom the opposition leader is trying to unseat, remains defiant despite the protests. In a television address he described Mr Guaidó's supporters as a “small group” whose plan had failed. Meanwhile, **the US administration alleges Mr Maduro had been ready to travel to Cuba to escape the unrest.** “They had an airplane on the tarmac. He was ready to leave this morning [Tuesday], as we understand it. Russians indicated he should stay,” US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told CNN, without offering evidence. Senior US officials also claimed three prominent figures in Mr Maduro's government had agreed the president had to go, but later backtracked. US National Security Advisor John Bolton said those figures allegedly included Defence Secretary Vladimir Padrino - who has since reaffirmed his support and appeared alongside Mr Maduro in his televised address. Sitting alongside military commanders, Mr Maduro vowed he would be victorious in the face of what he called a coup attempt backed by US imperialism. He also said events of Tuesday would “not go unpunished”. “[Prosecutors] will launch criminal prosecutions for the serious crimes that have been committed against the constitution, the rule of law and the right to peace,” he said in his speech. Meanwhile, Mr Guaidó has renewed his calls for Venezuelans to take to the streets to complete what he has said is the “final phase” of his effort to oust Mr Maduro

Solutions

Gauido will fix PDVSA- new board will attract investment

How did we get here? The initial fall in output was caused by insufficient investment in and poor management of the oil industry, resulting in shortages of equipment and supplies, corruption that siphoned off resources, and a brain drain of skilled workers especially after a two-month strike that ended in 2003. Output took a precipitous downturn in August 2017 in part because U.S. sanctions restricted Venezuela's ability to borrow from American investors or access U.S. financial markets. In January, new penalties [effectively blocked](#) Venezuela from exporting crude to the U.S., its biggest customer. Those sanctions [also barred](#) U.S. companies from selling Venezuela the petroleum distillate it needs to dilute its heavy crude, further hindering its ability to export. What can be done? The U.S. presumably would lift its sanctions if Maduro, Chavez's chosen successor, were to be ousted and Guaido, the head of the National Assembly, to assume real power. **Guaido has announced his picks for new boards for the state oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela SA, and its U.S. refining arm, Citgo. They include industry veterans whose credibility could help attract the investment needed to expand exploration and production. An investor-friendly Venezuela could expect to tap financing from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, Wall Street, foreign oil companies and Venezuelans moving money back into the**

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country. To achieve economic stability in the longer term, Venezuela would need to reduce its vulnerability to boom-and-bust commodity cycles by using oil revenue to invest in other industries.

New government will get IMF loans

Obtain loans from IMF to rebuild: 20b starting point, Gaudio adviser predicts 60-80b

Martin Langfield, 2-4-2019, "Breakingviews," U.S.,

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-breakingviews/breakingviews-breakdown-how-to-fix-venezuela-idUSKCN1PT1QQ>

Venezuela will need the help of friends abroad to restore basic functions if Maduro departs. That will best be provided by loans and investment, though, not the kind of throwback U.S. military intervention that President Donald Trump hinted at on Sunday. Breakingviews provides an overview of how the country could rebuild itself. HOW MUCH WOULD IT COST? Some \$15 billion to \$20 billion a year seems a reasonable starting point. That's the estimate Venezuelan economist Francisco Rodríguez came up with (reut.rs/2MMnZRa) while campaigning last year with unsuccessful presidential candidate Henri Falcón. **That would need to be provided by loans from the International Monetary Fund** and other multilateral lenders, as well as by private investment. More recently, **former Planning Minister Ricardo Hausmann, now at Harvard University, has put the funding need at \$60 billion or more over several years, perhaps as much as \$80 billion** (reut.rs/2HS7apr). THAT SOUNDS LIKE A LOT. Yes and no. Venezuela has a lot of oil: 300 billion barrels of proven reserves, the world's biggest (reut.rs/2WINXU). BUT ISN'T ITS OIL INDUSTRY A MESS? Yes. Production is likely to fall below 1 million barrels per day this year from 2.4 million in 2013. That's the result of a lack of investment, the departure of trained staff and the appointment of military officers more noted for their loyalty to Maduro than industry expertise. Nevertheless, if 2013 production levels can be restored, \$80 billion would represent less than two years of output, assuming \$50 a barrel, for state oil firm Petróleos de Venezuela.

Harvard economist predicts 60b needed to stop printing money

Eric Martin, Patricia Laya, 3-9-2019, "What Broke Venezuela's Economy and What Could Fix It," Bloomberg,

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-09/what-broke-venezuela-s-economy-and-what-could-fix-it-quicktake>

Among the top priorities is reducing the budget deficit. No plan will get inflation under control unless this is accomplished. Because the government stopped providing statistics several years ago, no one knows the true size of the deficit. Estimates range, but the CIA put it at [46 percent](#) of gross domestic product in 2017. Venezuelan economist Ricardo Hausmann of Harvard University, an informal adviser to Guaido, **has proposed that the IMF loan Venezuela more than \$60 billion over three years. A loan of that magnitude would allow the central bank to stop printing bolivars.** To restore incentives for saving and investment, one approach would be to replace the bolivar with the U.S. dollar or another stable, widely convertible currency. So-called dollarization is currently employed in Ecuador. Another option is for Venezuela to peg its currency to the dollar, as Brazil did in the mid-1990s, in order to both stabilize the currency and stem hyperinflation.

Required structural reforms means that only a new government can get the monetary aid

Kenneth Rapoza, Feb 8, 2019,, "In Venezuela, Life After Socialism Will Require IMF Life Support," Forbes,

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/02/08/in-venezuela-life-after-socialists-united-to-require-imf-life-support/#34788b8740b1>

“Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

But the thing is financial aid. That will come from the **International Monetary Fund and World Bank**, which will **require massive structural reforms, including a return of foreign investment and foreign companies into the Venezuelan oil market.** Hugo Chavez nationalized many foreign assets when he was president and has shut out foreign investment. The very recent exception has been Russia and China, a desperation move by Maduro who relied on both countries to keep Venezuela's most prized possession intact. It is unclear just how much aid Venezuela needs or will be able to get. To put things into perspective for a moment, Argentina has a \$56 billion aid package from the IMF and while their economy was leveled due to the closed-door, quasi-socialist policies of Cristina Kirchner, Argentina's social unrest is nothing like what is taking place in Venezuela today. [Last year Colombia reportedly contacted international lending agencies about crafting a \\$60 billion aid package.](#) **Given the massive investment needs of the Venezuelan economy, access to international financing will be essential** to lift the country of its version of the Great Depression. It will take several years before Venezuela rebounds, with significant political risk of backsliding on reforms throughout the process. This is especially true if the electorate views the new government as being too pro-business at their expense.

IMF loans need Maduro to request them

John Paul, 10-16-2017, "IMF crunches the numbers for possible Venezuela rescue," Financial Times, <https://www.ft.com/content/3908e5c0-b19b-11e7-a398-73d59db9e399>

The International Monetary Fund has begun preparations for a possible rescue of Venezuela that could require \$30bn or more in international help annually and come alongside one of the world's most complex bond restructurings and a big test of Fund rules. The IMF has had no official relationship with Venezuela since [Chavez] Caracas cut off relations in 2007 and has not conducted an on-the-ground review in 13 years. Officials insist no rescue is imminent and publicly say they are simply conducting normal surveillance, stressing that they have had no meaningful contact with the government other than occasional low-level responses to requests for data. But in recent months IMF staff have quietly crunched numbers for a potential bailout that, were it to happen, could be bigger financially and more politically complex than its much-criticised involvement in Greece. "The market needs to be properly prepared for this," said a senior IMF official. "This is going to be Argentina meets Greece in terms of complexity," added Douglas Rediker, a former US representative at the IMF. Venezuela held elections for 23 state governorships on Sunday in which polls suggested the opposition would trounce the government amid a severe economic recession that has shrunk the economy by a third, and inflation that the IMF estimates at more than 1,000 per cent. Shortages of foreign currency have slashed imports by 80 per cent in five years, leaving the country teetering on the brink of default and suffering extreme shortages of food and medicine. On Monday, the government-dominated electoral council announced the ruling Socialist party had won 17 out of 23 governorships. The opposition cried fraud, and said it would refuse to recognise the results, raising the prospect of further international sanctions against the government. "Like others we're very concerned about the dramatic economic and humanitarian conditions in Venezuela," an IMF spokesman said. "As part of our surveillance mandate, we've been gathering information and following the situation closely, including monitoring how the crisis is affecting neighbouring countries." The Trump administration, which has already selectively imposed sanctions on Venezuelan officials, for a time pushed the IMF to consider sanctions on the country for failing to live up to data-sharing commitments. But it has since decided such measures would be toothless and only complicate any future bailout. Venezuela is all but shut out of international capital markets, and a controversial debt placement earlier this year with Goldman Sachs had an estimated yield of 48 per cent. By contrast, the IMF typically lends at 2 per cent. However, **the biggest barrier to an IMF rescue of Venezuela is the government of President Nicolás Maduro**, which has clung to power even as pressure grows for him to resign. Opposition street protests this year left more than 125 people dead. **IMF programmes depend on a request from a government for help and co-operation from national authorities. But “there has been no dialogue,** so the timeline [of any programme] would be more uncertain," said a senior IMF official. "Plus, much depends on the nature of any [political] transition. If it is messy, and there is no consensus, the international community will not want to pour good money after bad." Another factor likely to delay any lending programme is the lack of reliable statistics. The last time Venezuela had a so-called Article 4 consultation was 2004 and officials liken the lack of information to what they saw with Soviet bloc countries before the fall of the Berlin Wall. The scale of Venezuela's needs will probably also be an issue. Normally, IMF programmes across three to four years are limited to a maximum 435 per cent of a country's quota, which in Venezuela's case would be \$23bn. Other multilateral lenders might contribute another \$2bn each, and bilateral donors — from Europe and the US — might reach \$5bn. That adds up to a total possible multiyear package of around \$32bn. But Venezuela would probably need that annually. To return imports to 2015 levels of \$35bn, and so boost consumption and some rebuilding of the country's decayed capital stock, would require balance of payments support of \$22bn annually. On top of that, the fiscal deficit, currently about 7 per cent of GDP, would need to be financed. In total, Venezuela might need \$30bn a year in help from the international community. That is far more than might be available — unless Venezuela can convince the IMF and shareholders such as the US to grant it "exceptional access". That was the case with Greece, which got IMF credit lines worth 17 times its quota. With similar treatment, Venezuela, which sits on the world's largest energy reserves, could borrow more than \$88bn. But the politics are fraught. Republicans in the US Congress demanded a tightening of the IMF's exceptional access rules as a condition for approving IMF quota reforms in 2015 and a "systemic exemption" rushed through for Greece in 2010 is still viewed with scorn. Douglas Rediker, a former US representative at the IMF. A further complication lies with the inevitable debt restructuring that would accompany any rescue. Venezuela's total debt load is some \$140bn, including \$70bn of traded bonds, bilateral Chinese and Russian loans, promissory notes issued to unpaid suppliers, and compensation claims from nationalised companies. That is equivalent to 116 per cent of GDP with debt service payments of about 75 per cent of the value of Venezuelan exports, which according to Torino Capital is the highest level in the world. "The Republic and its national oil company PDVSA are facing what may be the most complex and challenging sovereign debt restructuring yet," experts Mark Walker and Richard Cooper warned in a recent paper. Still, at least one part of normal IMF interventions may have been taken care of. IMF programmes have been associated with austerity. But Venezuela has already suffered a massive drop in consumption. "In many ways, the most painful part of the adjustment has already happened," said Miguel Angel Santos, an economist at Harvard's Centre for Economic Development who has studied Venezuelan transition scenarios.

IMF and WB ready to help, meanwhile Maduro shuns them

Luis Alonso Lugo, 4-11-2019, "IMF, WB ready to respond to Venezuelan humanitarian crisis," No Publication, https://news.yahoo.com/imf-wb-ready-respond-venezuelan-humanitarian-crisis-172537914.html?mc_cid=281f100406

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WASHINGTON (AP) — **The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank said Thursday they are ready to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela if their participation is requested.** The country is suffering hyperinflation and the economy is rapidly shrinking, causing enormous hardships. Output by the government oil company and other nationalized firms has plummeted in recent years, and new U.S. sanctions are also hurting. But President Nicolás **Maduro has followed the lead of his predecessor, Hugo Chávez, and shunned the two international lending agencies**, accusing them of imposing damaging austerity policies on nations they aid. Neither the World Bank nor the IMF has taken a position in the political struggle between Maduro and Juan Guaidó, the U.S.-backed head of Venezuela's opposition-controlled congress who has declared himself interim president. "The bank will be involved as the situation evolves and the bank is preparing for that, but the situation is still very troublesome on the ground in Venezuela," World Bank Group President David Malpass said at a news conference. IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde said at a separate press conference that the IMF has done "as much preparatory work as we could, drawing on information that is out there, in order to be prepared to act as quickly as we can."

Funds available in weeks

Gregory Makoff, 7-26-2017, "Venezuela's economic crisis can be stopped. Here's how," World Economic Forum, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/07/venezuela-economic-chaos-how-to-end/>

By re-engaging, Venezuela should be able to unlock significant financial assistance from the international community to meet humanitarian needs and to support a re-orientation of the economy. **Just by starting the process, several billion dollars of assistance might be unlocked in weeks – with minimal conditions** – to help Venezuela meet urgent needs.

However, much more significant assistance could come once Venezuela reaches agreement on a detailed medium-term economic plan with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which would entail months of painful negotiations. But, with such an agreement, Venezuela might obtain tens of billions of dollars of support through a combination of new loans and an officially supported debt-restructuring operation.

Assistance from the IMF with debt restructuring should be of particular interest to Venezuela. With over US \$30 billion of foreign debt payments due in the next five years, Venezuela has much to gain by pushing out or reducing these cash flows through a voluntary arrangement with creditors.

IMF loans good

Harvest and oil production

Benjamin Russell, April 2018, xx-xx-xxxx, "A 180-Day Plan for Venezuela," No Publication, <https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/180-day-plan-venezuela>

A gradual easing of price controls on fuel and other goods begins. To maintain public support for reform, any reduction in subsidies comes with a clear commitment to maintain or revive functioning social programs. The new government continues planning for long-term changes to the oil sector, including the creation of an independent regulator and the introduction of a transparent auction system. Restaffing and maintenance to existing PDVSA installations would already be underway. Food aid and increased foreign exchange allow the new government to restore 1990s-era food assistance programs aimed at children and pregnant mothers. **Aid and investment directed to short life cycle crops can yield a harvest within three to six months;** restoring reliable meat and poultry production will take at least a year. Fully rebuilding agricultural production will take a decade or more and cost some \$10 billion to \$15 billion. **Oil production at PDVSA once topped 3.5 million barrels per day; today it's less than 2 million. Unlike other oil producers in decline, Venezuela knows where much of its oil is and what it will take to get to it. Technical assistance, foreign investment and a commitment to wider reform could see production stabilize in as little as six months.**

AT: Sanctions prevent debt restructuring

1. Delink: Venezuela does not have to repay lots of its debt. **Venezuelan law requires that Congress approve contracts of national importance, however Maduro bypassed these laws and issued debt himself. [Gulati 19](#) finds that according to debt laws, a creditor cannot enforce a debt contract made through an agent not authorized to conduct such a transaction. In other words, creditors cannot demand to be repaid for debt Maduro issued. Venezuela will not have to repay**

Group:

“Resolve The United States should end its economic sanctions against Venezuela.

2. Delink: According to Americas Society, Maduro does not want to restructure debt, pro can't access solvency³
3. Delink: Maduro can never restructure.
 - a. most countries in the world recognize Juan Guaido as president, not Maduro. Bondholders in these countries can only restructure debt with Guaido then. Therefore, they gain no offense because Maduro is in power right now.
 - b. [Gulati 18](#) for debt restructuring to happen, Maduro must persuade creditors that a sensible fiscal plan for the future has been put in place and that the government will stick to it. Maduro is not able to do this.
4. We link into their arguments better:
 - a. Once Maduro is gone, the new leader will be legally able to engage in negotiations with creditors, and then he will convince creditors to agree to his restructuring plan.

<https://www.as-coa.org/articles/latam-focus-why-restructuring-venezuelan-debt-wont-happen-under-maduro>

Economist Siobhan Morden says that there is no prospect, either legally or logistically, to go ahead with restructuring under the Maduro administration.

Mitu Gulati, Ugo Panizza and Mark Weidemaier, 10-9-2019, "Should Creditors Pay the Price for Dubious Bonds?," Project Syndicate,

<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/venezuela-pdvsa-debt-default-creditor-risk-by-mitu-gulati-et-al-2019-10>

DURHAM/GENEVA/CHAPEL HILL – In late October, Venezuela is likely to default on a \$913 million payment on a key bond. Because the country has already defaulted on most of its debt, one might be tempted to regard another missed payment as no big deal. But this bond, issued by the national oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), and referred to as **PDVSA 2020, is backed by juicy collateral: a controlling stake in Venezuela's economic crown jewel, United States-based refiner CITGO.** Ordinarily, unpaid bondholders could tell the bond trustee to seize the collateral. But, given its **dubious provenance, the PDVSA 2020 is no ordinary bond.** It was issued in 2016, when PDVSA was close to default. To buy time, the company swapped short-maturity bonds for this longer-maturity one. In exchange, creditors received collateral in the form of a 50.1% interest in CITGO's parent company. **The transaction was unusual in at least one respect. The Venezuelan Constitution requires the country's National Assembly to approve contracts of national interest. But the opposition-controlled legislature did not approve this bond issue, which it undoubtedly viewed as an attempt by President Nicolás Maduro's government to buy time for itself. Maduro still holds power, but the US and other governments deem his rule illegitimate. Instead, the government-in-exile of Juan Guaidó – the leader of the National Assembly – represents Venezuela in US courts and elsewhere.** Concerned about the potential loss of CITGO, Guaidó and his team [approved](#) a smaller payment on the PDVSA 2020 bond in April this year. But **we doubt that Venezuela can afford the upcoming payment. More important, there also are doubts about whether the Venezuelan people should be responsible for honoring a debt contract that their elected representatives did not approve.** Most legal systems recognize that not all contracts have the same degree of sanctity. For example, **according to basic agency law in the US, a creditor cannot enforce a debt contract made through an agent of the corporation whom the creditor knew was not authorized to conduct such a transaction. Given that the issuance of the PDVSA 2020 bond was not authorized by the National Assembly, Venezuela might have legal defenses if creditors try to seize CITGO.** Other governments have disputed creditors' claims in similar contexts. Notably, Puerto Rico has disputed debt issued in 2012 and 2014 that [arguably violated](#) a constitutional debt limit. Sovereign states such as Ukraine and Mozambique have recently made similar arguments, and there are a number of [older cases](#) involving municipal debt. These disputes raise questions of both technical and theoretical importance. As a technical matter, a court would have to decide whether Venezuelan law determines the Maduro government's authority to issue the PDVSA 2020 bond, or whether that question will instead be governed by New York law (which the bond designates as governing most issues). Even if Venezuelan law determines whether the Maduro government was in fact authorized to incur this debt, New York law may govern other important issues, such as whether investors were entitled to rely on the government's representations about the bond's legality. More broadly, disputes like this require courts to decide whether creditors should bear the risk that unauthorized debts can be repudiated. At first glance, it may seem odd to impose such a risk on creditors. Venezuelan officials, after all, are in a good position to understand and comply with their own country's legal requirements. If they say that the

³ <https://www.as-coa.org/articles/latam-focus-why-restructuring-venezuelan-debt-wont-happen-under-maduro>

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bond issue is legitimate, why should foreign creditors doubt them? But as [Ricardo Hausmann](#) recently [pointed out](#), this view ignores the agency problems inherent in government debt: public officials are supposed to represent the populace, but are sometimes motivated by self-interest. The problem is especially acute with despotic governments. Although the international community still recognized Maduro's government at the time of the PDVSA bond issue, it had already seriously questioned that government's legitimacy. Venezuela's creditors in 2016 knew this, just as they knew that the National Assembly had not approved the bond. Moreover, creditors are often sophisticated. Investment banks that underwrite complex collateralized bonds like the PDVSA 2020 are surely capable of making informed judgments about whether a loan complies with legal requirements. In that case, they should bear the consequence of a failure of due diligence. These creditors, not the Venezuelan people, were in a position to block the transaction, yet now ordinary Venezuelans risk losing a crucial national asset. And in the final analysis, imposing some risk on careless creditors may be the best way to ensure that politicians honor the limits on their borrowing authority. Some may argue that this approach could harm retail investors who bought bonds on the secondary market in good faith. This is unlikely to be the case for the PDVSA 2020 bond, because even retail investors with limited information should have been aware of the unsavory nature of the issuing regime. In any case, this objection could be addressed by establishing a [public registry](#) of all outstanding sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds that were issued with legal or ethical infirmities. How Venezuela's latest debt drama plays out will start to become clearer in the coming weeks. Instead of being just another story of default, the PDVSA 2020 bond may yet become a cautionary tale for creditors around the world.

AT: ALBA initiative petrocaribe / Haiti

Background info

Through the Venezuelan aid program known as Petrocaribe, Haiti once received roughly 60,000 barrels of oil a day under favorable terms that beat anything on the open market. More than half the costs of the oil, which came at a heavily discounted price, were repayable over 25 years at a 1% interest rate, allowing the government to supposedly use the windfall for economic development. In exchange, Haiti reliably backed Venezuela against the United States in regional forums such as the Organization of American States.

<https://time.com/5609054/haiti-protests-petrocaribe/>

<https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/14745>

1. Non unique- petrocaribe falters in both worlds
 - a. Look to our CISA: sanctions did not cause the oil crisis, PDVSA fails in both worlds
2. Delink: program would have ended soon anyways because Haiti cannot pay even the subsidized price
 - a. [Atlantic Council](#): some indications suggest that oil transfers went to zero in 2015
 - b. [AP News 19](#): Haitian government paid Venezuela 27 cents per barrel of oil, but they were \$71 million behind in payments. The program would not have lasted much longer anyways.

Neither the pro or the con has access to this impact. This is good because petrocaribe is a horrible program:

3. Mitigate benefits: the Haitian government has been embezzling money from PetroCaribe in order to fund its own corruption. → US sanctions don't uniquely hurt this initiative
 - a. PetroCaribe's supposed benefits to Haitian society is also dubious: The amount of money in government coffers was misreported, exchange rates were adjusted and more than half of the contracts given to companies to service the projects did not go through the usual government bid process → the social programs PetroCaribe was expected to prop up just never happened
4. Turn: petrocaribe increases corruption
 - a. [Time 19](#): Because the money was not from a conventional international aid package, analysts say there was little oversight of how governments spent the proceeds and few conditions on what they could do with it—leaving ample opportunity for corruption.
 - b. The [Economist 17](#) his funding was heavily relied upon by successive Haitian administrations, as it came without any oversight or preconditions, unlike the majority of international aid. From 2008-2016, more than half of contracts were awarded outside of normal channels.
5. Turn: Venezuela uses petrocaribe to pressure other countries- Maduro threatens that they'll 'go dry'

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- a. [Atlantic Council](#): The reliance of Petrocaribe recipient states on the program also eroded their political freedom of action. Venezuela frequently used Petrocaribe to exert influence in the Organization of American States (OAS). Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro noted in 2014 that countries Venezuela perceived as intervening in its affairs would “go dry.” Many interpreted this phrase as a warning to Petrocaribe states to refrain from supporting OAS resolutions critical of the regime. 7
6. Turn: instead of allowing Venezuela to gain hegemony, look to the United States:
 - a. The Caribbean Energy Security Initiative provides loans to promote energy development in the Caribbean, including Haiti. These loans are better because they rely on a private enterprise approach to energy development, instead of state subsidies. They also provide funding to non-oil projects, such as solar and wind power.
 - i. <https://www.state.gov/caribbean-energy-security-initiative-loan-guarantee-agreement/>
 - ii. <https://ht.usembassy.gov/under-secretary-for-political-affairs-hales-meeting-with-caribbean-foreign-ministers-at-unga-74/>

Evaluating this argument:

- I just showed that Petrocaribe fails in both worlds, so their argument is unfeasible, then
- I showed that the impacts of petrocaribe are negative, so they have no offense on the topic

Petrocaribe fails in both worlds

Protests caused by corruption, not US sanctions

ALSO US RUNS THAT THERE IS SOCIAL TURMOIL and there are street protests BUT the people are protesting against government corruption /embezzlement of money, not against like „, whatever US is trying to run

AT: CITGO will be CITGONE

Guido now has control of CITGO. Sanctions prevent anyone from dealing with Guido or CITGO. Once sanctions are lifted, investors will give Guido \$913 million to pay off CITGO. Once Guido has CITGO, this will offer Venezuela a path to recovery, and it will help Guido be legitimized as a leader.

1. Guido will win a court case which prevents creditors from taking CITGO.
 - a. Maduro must get the National Assembly’s approve on contracts of national importance, however Maduro bypassed these laws when he issued CITGO as collateral to creditors. [Gulati 19](#) writes that laws prevent these creditors from seizing CITGO as collateral. Therefore, creditors cannot legally take CITGO. Right now Guido has a United States court case about this. He will win, CITGO will not be taken, their argument will never happen.
2. Trump will not allow creditors to take CITGO.
 - a. Even if Guido loses the court case, CITGO will not be taken because Trump will step in. Guido is supported by Trump and he asked Trump to take executive action to protect CITGO.
 - b. Let’s walk through this logically: the US sanctioned the Maduro regime because they support Guido. Our opponents’ argument is that these sanctions have the opposite of the intended

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effect, and are hurting Guaido. If you accept this, then you’ll also have to accept that the Trump will not allow sanctions to hurt Guaido. He will take executive action to prevent CITGO ownership to transfer. Bush issued a similar executive order after the invasion of Iraq, showing that this very feasible. ([WSJ](#))

Weigh: improbable, your vote does nothing

3. Their argument is non-unique because sanctions don’t affect CITGO.
 - a. Even if you don’t buy my previous two responses, and you think that CITGO is doomed, they still have no impact. They try to tell you that lifting sanctions will save CITGO, but [Reuters](#) finds that Sanctions specifically exempt CITGO. Lifting sanctions has no impact on CITGO, and you will not save it by voting pro.
 - i. (CITgoing to fail in either world)

(no specific impact)

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-usa-citgo/new-venezuela-sanctions-protect-citgo-encourage-debt-talks-opposition-idUSKCN1UW1YK>

4. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-eyes-transferring-control-of-citgo-to-the-new-venezuelan-government-it-has-recognized/2019/01/25/3f257a0c-20eb-11e9-8b59-0a28f2191131_story.html

Jordan Blum, 7-30-2019, "Citgo's fate could depend on Trump," HoustonChronicle,

<https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/Citgo-s-fate-could-depend-on-Trump-14268522.php>

Citgo, a U.S. company with a more than 100-year history, was acquired by PDVSA about three decades ago and owns oil refineries in Corpus Christi, Lake Charles, La., and Illinois. It employs about 4,000 people in the United States, including about 800 in Houston. The Canadian mining firm, Crystallex International and other companies owed money by the Venezuelan government and the national oil company PDVSA are eyeing Citgo as the best way to recoup their losses. Citgo is a profitable business that produces significant revenues, although U.S. sanctions prevent Citgo’s earnings from being repatriated to Venezuela.

“This is a bad court decision for Guaido and Venezuela in general,” said Francisco Monaldi, a fellow in Latin American energy policy at Rice University, “I think it’s now in the hands of the Trump administration. This is an extremely unusual and maybe unprecedented situation.”

Guaido has asked Trump to prevent creditors from seizing Citgo and other Venezuelan assets. The Guaido-appointed PDVSA board vowed to contest the court ruling that allows Crystallex to seize Citgo’s assets

“We will take all necessary actions to defend the assets of Venezuela abroad,” the Guaido board said. PDVSA paid Crystallex nearly \$500 million last year but couldn’t satisfy the rest of the debt. Crystallex then opted to move forward legally to seize the shares of Citgo. Venezuela and PDVSA can appeal the decision of the three-judge panel to entire Third Circuit Court of Appeals and then the U.S. Supreme Court. Another alternative is for **Citgo to declare bankruptcy to potentially protect it from being seized**, said Russ Dallen, a legal and financial analyst with Caracas Capital Markets, a research analysis firm focused on Venezuelan capital markets.

5.

AT: Illicit revenue streams - S. don’t deprive elites

1. Can’t quantify how much revenue the elites are receiving
2. New targeted sanctions in 2019 on relevant elites → more prominent change
3. C2 first warrant - inner circle neg. already happening, doesn't matter if they still have illicit rev. streams

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AT: Sanctions -> propaganda

1. Maduro's propaganda campaign will never be successful. [Foreign Policy](#) writes that Maduro's is not nearly as charismatic as his predecessor Chavez, and that life for the average Venezuelan is horrible. The idea that Venezuelan's attention could be deflected by government propaganda is wholly disconnected from Venezuelan reality.

José R. Cárdenas, 3-30-2015, "Have U.S. Sanctions Against Venezuela Actually Helped Maduro?," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/30/have-u-s-sanctions-against-venezuela-actually-helped-maduro/>

That Maduro would enjoy some sort of political renaissance in the wake of U.S. sanctions was never likely — for a number of reasons. First, Maduro is not Hugo Chávez, who retained an almost mystical bond with Venezuela's historically marginalized (although Chávez never had to test his leadership skills against Venezuelan oil trading internationally at \$44 per barrel).

Maduro has neither the charisma nor the wiles of his predecessor and mentor. Moreover, his attempts to imitate Chávez come off poorly and his repeated attempts to blame others for Venezuela's difficulties flat. Secondly, the Venezuelan economy is a horror show that is impacting the poor and working poor that serve as the base for chavismo the most. In short, due to centralization, corruption, and mismanagement, Chávez's vaunted "21st century socialism" is a shambles. According to the website [Quartz](#), "By many measures, Venezuela's economy is the most sickly in the world. From the value of its currency (sinking), to its inflation (scorching) and GDP (shrinking), Venezuela ranks at or near the bottom of just about every important financial indicator out there, performing worse even than Argentina, Greece, or Ukraine. On top of that, Venezuela under chavismo remains one of the world's [most dangerous](#) countries, with skyrocketing crime and a homicide rate last year at 82 per 100,000, a total exceeded only by Honduras.

What all this means is that life for the average Venezuela is turning ever more nasty and brutish. When not dodging violent street crime, citizens' daily life is being consumed by plaintive searches for basic foodstuffs, household items, and medicines. The idea that their attention could be "deflected" by [endless](#) government remonstrances about invasions, coups, and assassinations that never take place is just wholly disconnected from Venezuelan reality.

AT: Russia/ Chinese Hegemony and influence

Russia is ready to accept a new leader of Venezuela

Washington Post, 1-25-2019, "Analysis,"

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/01/24/russia-spent-billions-build-influence-venezuela-now-it-faces-bet-gone-bad/>

On Friday, a senior Russian Foreign Ministry official said Moscow was ready to serve as a mediator between Maduro and his opposition -- even as Russia continued to insist that Maduro was Venezuela's legitimate president. The government redoubled its efforts to push back against the mounting speculation that Russia would lose its billions invested in Venezuela. A [column](#) published by the RIA Novosti state news agency said Russian companies had already profited from the country's loans to Venezuela by way of arms deals. Russia's ambassador to Venezuela, Vladimir Zayemsky, also [told](#) the Kommersant newspaper that Moscow's financial agreements with Caracas were not dependent on Maduro's continued rule. "I don't see any reason to fear for the future of Russia's

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investments in Venezuela, first of all because all of the current projects were properly agreed to by all sides and received approval from the legislative bodies of both countries,” Zayemsky said.

Russia will abandon Venezuela in the wake of collapse

Yana **Shevkirova**, 11-4-2019, "Op-Ed: Venezuela is proving to be too costly for Russia," Latin America Reports, <https://latinamericareports.com/op-ed-venezuela-is-proving-to-be-too-costly-for-russia/3629/>

However, Russia's geostrategic investment in Venezuela is far from paying dividends, in fact, the country's economic collapse will likely encourage the Kremlin to reconsider its closely forged alliance with Chavismo.

Russia is, for the moment, saving face by expressing its support for Maduro and staging military visits. At the end of September, Putin met the Venezuelan leader but **made no further economic commitments** to the Bolivarian Government, as it **granted no additional financing**. Russia also backed the controversial appointment of Venezuela to the UN Human Rights Council, another symbolic gesture.

In sum, for Putin, Venezuela has become a burden too heavy to carry, yet too important to leave, even if Russia has more pressing matters to attend to. Leaving Venezuela in the hands of the opposition and (likely) U.S. influence, would send the wrong signal to people back home. It would make Russia more vulnerable before its regional allies — Bolivia, Cuba, and Nicaragua — who would certainly be next in-line to be abandoned by the Kremlin. What's next for Russia? Maduro's economic mismanagement, political ineptitude, and most importantly, the decline in Venezuelan oil production make his cling to power more fragile. Russia is now too tired to save it and not ready to engage in a military conflict only to save Maduro, making a negotiated outcome an increasingly likely option. The current situation will likely develop in three different ways: 1) If the attempts succeed and a strong transitional government steps in while Venezuela is to hold free and fair elections, Russia will likely recognize it, but seek to ensure that its assets are protected and loans paid in full by a future government. 2) If Venezuela's political stalemate continues, however, while the opposition struggles to gain momentum, the States will impose further sanctions while Russia is providing the cheapest support feasible to sustain Maduro in power. 3) Forcing Maduro to step down may also be dangerous if there is no plan for the future. If a vacuum is created and instability increases due to a weak interim government, this may endanger infrastructure and other assets that Russia has invested in. Putin may then send the military to protect company assets such as Rosneft's, but direct intervention into Venezuela from his side will remain highly unlikely. Whatever the outcome, Russia will have to find a way to balance the increasingly complex political and economic situation in Venezuela. The bottom line is that although Venezuela is only moderately strategic in the large scheme of things, Russia needs to find a way to minimize its exposure to Maduro's imminent downfall while saving face internationally.

AT: Scapegoating

1. Non-unique → exists in both worlds
2. Quantify the effects of propaganda
3. Propaganda
 - a. We cut off funds for propaganda C2 2L
 - b. We cut off M.

AT: 6% increase in approval rating

1. 17% → 23% (very marginal, doesn't matter)
2. Why does the approval rating matter
 - a. Low approval ratings for maduro doesn't do anything
 - i. Is venezuela a democracy → do the ppl have a say in the government
 - b. Voice of the ppl dont matter → elite unique ability oust M. → we better link into ousting M.

AT: Dollarization

1. Non-unique - Venezuela is still dollarizing with sanctions

Venezuela is more than 50% dollarized

Zerpa, Bloomberg, "Venezuela is Now More Than 50% Dollarized, Study Finds - Bloomberg", **2019**,

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-05/venezuela-is-now-more-than-50-dollarized-study-finds>

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An estimated 54% of all sales in Venezuela last month were in dollars, according to a survey by Econoalitica, a Caracas-based research firm. **In Maracaibo, the country’s second-largest city, about 86% of all transactions took place in dollars**, according to the study. The city has been one of the worst hit by blackouts, which has rendered credit card readers useless for days on end.

Evidence

DEFEND: GUATEMALA

Christian von Soest and Michael Wahman, January 2013, “Sanctions and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era,” GIGA Research Programme: Violence and Security, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/71739835.pdf> Second, the United States, the European Union and – to some extent – the United Nations have increasingly used sanctions to strengthen democracy and human rights globally. More than 50 percent of all the sanctions directed towards autocratic regimes recorded in the new global data set on post-Cold War sanctions (see below) explicitly aim to bring about democratization in the authoritarian countries targeted. According to Collins (2009a: 77), for the US the “most frequent factor for the initiation of economic sanctions was to foster democracy in states abroad.” In cases such as Guatemala (1993), the US was able to swiftly forge an international coalition that imposed sanctions in reaction to President Serrano’s decision to dissolve Congress and the judiciary (Christensen Bjune and Petersen 2010; Crawford 2001: 194). In Guatemala (1993), for instance, the military ousted President Serrano, who had unconstitutionally dissolved parliament and the judiciary, after the US and its allies imposed sanctions on Guatemala. An interim president took over, and the country’s democratic institutions were restored. In Nicaragua (1996) and Thailand (1993), sanctions also contributed to regime change.

Christensen Bjune, Maren, and Stina Petersen (2010), Guarding Privileges and Saving the Day: Guatemalan Elites and the Settlement of the Serranazo, in: Mariana Llanos and Leiv Marsteintredet (eds), Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America: Causes and Outcomes of Executive Instability in Developing Democracies, New York, NY/Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 165–180.

INCEP. 1993. La crisis político-constitucional de Guatemala. Del golpe de Estado de Jorge Serrano a la Presidencia Constitucional de Ramiro de León Carpio. In Panorama Centroamericano. Ciudad de Guatemala: Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Políticos

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AT: CEPR, Weisbrot, Sachs, 40,000 lives: The bulk of the collapse preceded sanctions

- Two errors
 1. Relies on a faulty comparison between Colombia and Venezuela
 2. Supposes that any abnormal deaths after 2017 were caused by sanctions, ignoring the fact that the crisis was already on an upward trend before sanctions. The study fails to establish any causal link
- For these reasons, it has been repeatedly denounced in academic circles, and should not be weighed in this round.
- Instead, extend C1
 - Venezuela was in crisis before sanctions
 - Maduro refuses aid
 - Maduro misuses government revenue to fund himself

Dany Bahar, 5-22-2019, "Chavismo is the worst of all sanctions: The evidence behind the humanitarian catastrophe in Venezuela," Brookings,

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2019/05/22/chavismo-is-the-worst-of-all-sanctions-the-evidence-behind-the-humanitarian-catastrophe-in-venezuela/>

The dimensions of this ongoing tragedy morally mandate us to find solutions, instead of analyzing whether we can blame someone other than those who have been in power for over 20 years. Yet, it has become popular among some circles to play the “blame game,” sometimes even ignoring the woes of Chavismo—the government of former President Hugo Chávez—which is—without a doubt—the main, if not the only, elephant in the room. An example of this is the recent CEPR report assessing the impact of the 2017 U.S. sanctions on Venezuela. The report claims that these sanctions, which eliminated the possibility that Venezuela will issue new sovereign debt, have caused the death of over 40,000 Venezuelans. The sanctions, they claim,

sharply reduced the ability of PDVSA—Venezuela’s state-owned oil company—to produce oil, which is the country’s main and almost only source of income. **The main analytical source behind the paper’s claim is a comparison of oil production between Venezuela and Colombia before and after the 2017 sanctions. According to their analysis, because Colombia’s oil production behaved quite similar to Venezuela’s between 2013 and 2017, any change thereafter, namely the drop in Venezuela’s oil production, can be attributed to the sanctions enacted in August 2017.** In a new report, my co-authors Sebastian Bustos, Jose Ramón Morales, and Miguel Santos and I

revisit this evidence. We look in detail at their data and methods and conclude that it is impossible to conclude anything about the impact of those sanctions on the performance of Venezuela’s oil industry, and more importantly, on many of the socio-economic indicators that determine the humanitarian catastrophe the country is going through. But here is our most important point. The worsening trends in all of the socio-economic determinants of the humanitarian catastrophe so clearly start before 2017 that it is impossible to estimate what is or isn’t

explained by sanctions. Moreover, when looking at almost any socio-economic indicator that determines, at least part of, the humanitarian catastrophe, **the bulk of the**

damage happened before sanctions were enacted (see figures 2-5 below). **For instance, by 2016—the year before sanctions were imposed—food imports in the country had fallen by 71 percent from their 2013 peak. Imports of medicines and medical equipment fell by 68 percent between 2013 and 2016. In terms of calorie intake, we find that by August 2017 Venezuelans earning the minimum wage could only afford** a maximum of 6,132 of the cheapest available calories per

day—equivalent to 56 percent of the minimum dietary needs of a family of five. This is **92 percent fewer calories than the minimum wage could**

purchase in January 2010. Infant mortality, a good proxy for the quality of public health services, grew by 44 percent between 2013 and 2016 and has continued to do so since. Thus, it is clear from our analysis that the further deterioration observed since 2017—whether caused by the sanctions, management incompetence, or

whatever it was—**by no means constitutes the bulk of the collapse** that has caused widespread suffering, death, and displacement to millions of Venezuelans. **The weight of evidence seems to indicate that much of the suffering and devastation in Venezuela has been, in line with most accounts, inflicted by those in power for more than 20 years already. Ignoring this and blaming the damage on agents other than Maduro and the Chavista governments after decades of failed policies is, to put it mildly, highly misleading.**

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AT: Peksen and Drury

Peksen asks the overly general question, do “sanctions work.” Must instead look specifically at sanctions intended to increase democracy. Wahman finds that these are overwhelmingly successful in the past 20 years.

Auth. regimes coapt and repress to keep power. Sanctions decrease their ability to coapt, so regimes have to turn to repression, and this is not a successful long term strategy so these regimes fail.

Fvon Soest, Christian, and Michael Wahman. 2014. [“The Underestimated Effect of Democratic Sanctions.”](http://www.tinyurl.com/y67q4ly8)

E-International Relations. Copy at <http://www.tinyurl.com/y67q4ly8>

Full Text Democratic sanctions have a bad reputation. For most people with even a slight interest in international politics, it is not particularly hard to find examples to support a generally sceptic view of sanctions as a tool for external democracy promotion. The authoritarian regime in Zimbabwe has been targeted by both EU and US sanctions since 2002, but the Mugabe regime has remained stable and maintained remarkably high levels of repression, showing no real signs of political liberalization. Similarly, the EU's sanctions against its Eastern authoritarian neighbour, Belarus, have still not had any noticeable effects. Despite costly sanctions in place since 2004, President Lukashenko remains one of the last European dictators. And there is more bad news. Academic research has shown that sanctions are not only ineffective, but even counterproductive. It has been argued that authoritarian countries do not become more, but less democratic when targeted by sanctions (Peksen & Drury 2010; Wood 2008). In a recently published article in the journal Democratization, we reinvestigate the effect of democratic sanctions, i.e. those which explicitly aim at improving the level of democracy, using new data and statistical analysis, to see if democratic sanctions really are as bad as their reputation. Perhaps surprisingly, our findings are rather optimistic. Our study shows that sanctions are not always effective, sometimes they may even be counterproductive, and all types of sanctions are not equally likely to lead to positive outcomes, but on average, democratic sanctions are, in fact, associated with higher levels of democracy in the targeted state. We also show that democratic sanctions have other more profound effects on the targeted state. In authoritarian states targeted by democratic sanctions, authoritarian leaders are more likely to lose power and countries are more likely to change their basic political institutions. Such institutional changes do not necessarily lead to a fully-fledged liberal democracy, but often open up to increased civilian political control or multiparty elections. Sanctions and Their Effect on Democratization Instigating democratization has been by far the most common goal of sanctions initiated by the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations against authoritarian regimes in the post-Cold War period. Given previous research on the democratic effects of sanctions, the frequent use of sanctions as a tool for democratization is rather surprising (Drury 1998; Haass 1998; Pape 1997). Number of international sanctions according to sanction goals. Source: Representation based on own data set. In a seminal and widely cited study, Peksen and Drury (2010) argued that sanctions have an adverse effect on the level of democracy in targeted countries. **According**

to the logic presented by Peksen and Drury, the negative democratic effect of sanctions is a consequence of increased levels of repression used by political elites in targeted countries as they attempt to cope with

increased domestic pressure (also Wood 2008). Indeed, severe and widespread repression has often followed international sanction as a means to fight off increased opposition. However, previous research in the comparative democratization literature have shown that economic stress is one of the most robust determinants of democratization and/or

regime change in authoritarian regimes (e.g. Geddes 1999; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2010; Teorell 2010). **Authoritarian regimes tend to survive with a mixed strategy of repression and co-optation** (Rotberg 2007; Wintrobe 1998). **Without the financial ability to co-opt counter elites, authoritarian regimes often resort to a strategy of increased repression. However, repression is generally a less efficient tool for long-term regime survival than co-optation** (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2010; Gandhi & Przeworski 2007).

Although often temporarily effective, repression is an imprecise instrument that often leads to an increase in both opposition support and levels of dissent (Lichbach 1987). **As a consequence, economic downturn often results in regime accommodation or, even more dramatically, regime collapse**.

Sanctions can, if effectively designed and strategically imposed, be used to increase such economic pressure on authoritarian elites. Moreover, by targeting central elite figures or strategically important industries, sanctions can also effectively undermine the inner elite's support for top-leaders or current institutions. Although the current literature on comparative democratization makes it plausible that sanctions could have a positive effect on the level of democracy in the targeted country, this is not to say that all sanctions necessarily have the same effect. As several authors have acknowledged (Kirschner 1997; Allen 2005; Hufbauer et al. 2007), senders have used a multitude of sanction designs to achieve their desired goals. It is also not at all evident that sanctions aimed at goals other than democratization would have the unexpected and in some cases even undesired effect of causing regime change. For instance, we cannot expect sanctions aimed at ending nuclear weapon proliferation to have the same democratic effect as a sanction purposefully designed to instigate democratic reforms, such as introduction of multiparty elections or reinstatement of an elected civilian leadership. In earlier research on sanctions and democratization, sanctions have not been clearly separated in relation to their explicit goal. Thereby, the question of democratic sanction effectiveness has been left largely unanswered. In our study on sanctions and democratization, we are therefore especially interested in the democratic effect of those sanctions that explicitly aim to increase the level of democracy in the targeted country. A New Data Set on Sanctions We introduce a new data set of EU, UN, and US sanctions against authoritarian regimes in the period 1990-2010 and combine these data with standard indices of democracy to reinvestigate the effects of democratic sanctions. The new dataset is a vital asset to explore our research question and, in contrast to previous datasets on international sanctions, it clearly separates democratic sanctions from sanctions set out to achieve other objectives (Table 1). Our data set is composed of the entire universe of sanction regimes imposed by the UN, the US, and the EU (the main sanction senders) in the period 1990-2010, including those sanction regimes that were already in place in 1990 and those episodes that are still ongoing (Portela & von Soest 2012). Given that the investigation explores the impact of sanctions on authoritarian regimes, the data set only includes countries that the Hadenius, Teorell, and Wahman data set (2013) has coded as being “nondemocratic regimes” at the start of the sanction episode. Democratic Sanctions May Actually Help to Democratize The article presents a number of statistical models to investigate the general democratic effects of sanctions. Table 2 shows a simplified presentation of the results by providing the average yearly change in democracy scores in countries targeted by different types of sanctions. The democracy index ranges between 0-10, where higher scores represent higher levels of democracy. Looking at all the different categories of sanctions presented in Table 1, our statistical analyses indicate that none of the imposed sanctions have been counterproductive to the democratic development of authoritarian regimes. Sanctions in general do not promote democratization, but democratic sanctions are significantly associated with higher levels of democracy in the targeted country. Our results are remarkable given that Peksen and Drury (2010) have shown that all sanctions have a robust negative impact on democracy. These findings show the importance of separating sanctions according to their explicit goal. When we look specifically at democratic sanctions, we observe much clearer positive outcomes than for all international sanctions combined. A potential problem with the results could be that democratic sanctions are generally more comprehensive than sanctions imposed to obtain other goals. Yet the variable remains significant when we control for these different measures. To study the more profound effects of democratic sanctions, we also tested whether democratic sanctions are associated with a higher rate of regime change and ruler exit. This provides an insight into how implemented democratic sanctions actually work in targeted authoritarian regimes and how they contribute to improved democracy levels. There is no general relationship between sanctions and a higher probability of rulers losing power. However, looking at only democratic sanctions, we see a significant positive relationship. It reaffirms Marinov's (2005) finding that sanctions generally increase the probability of leadership exit. Such leadership exits can be an effect of leaders losing elections, being violently disposed from power or forced to resign. A brief glimpse at some sanction cases reveals that different mechanisms may account for increased democracy levels in targeted authoritarian regimes, with the two major ones being (1) elite splits (and, in turn, regime changes and leadership exit) and (2) democratic concessions without regime and/or leader change. In Guatemala (1993), for instance, the military ousted President Serrano – who had unconstitutionally dissolved parliament and the judiciary – after the US and

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its allies imposed sanctions. An interim president took over, and the country's democratic institutions were restored. In Nicaragua (1996) and Thailand (1993), sanctions similarly contributed to regime change. However, democratic sanctions rarely manage to instantly create liberal democracies. More commonly, we see a regime trajectory where closed authoritarian regimes are replaced by some form of electoral authoritarianism. Although such transitions do not amount to a fully-fledged transition to democracy, they increase competition and increases prospects for future democratisation (Teorell 2010). In Peru, sanctions contributed to democratization without ruler change. When President Fujimori suspended the legislature and introduced rule by decree in 1992, the US withheld military assistance and economic aid and blocked Peru's efforts to obtain loans from international financial institutions. In response, Fujimori agreed to hold elections and to reinstate formally democratic institutions. Although his presidential dominance persisted until 2000, Peru's political system was liberalized, to some extent, for the remainder of his time in office (Collins 2009, pp.80-81). In this particular case we could, hence, observe both institutional change and democratization, without change in leadership. Conclusions Since the end of the Cold War, democratization has motivated an overwhelming majority of sanctions directed towards authoritarian regimes. Previous literature gives little support for continuing the practice of sanctioning authoritarian regimes, especially if the aim is to induce democratization. It is suggested that sanctions are not only generally ineffective, but also counterproductive in increasing the level of democracy in the targeted countries. In our recently published study, we provide evidence to the contrary. We argue that empirical research on the effectiveness of sanction must take the explicit goal of sanctions into account. By concentrating only on sanctions aimed at increasing the level of democracy in the targeted authoritarian state, we found that these sanctions are indeed associated with increasing levels of democracy. Moreover, authoritarian regimes targeted by democratic sanctions are more likely to experience institutional and leadership change. These findings should not be taken as evidence to justify all types of sanctions in all contexts where democracy is on the decline. There are several examples of highly unsuccessful democratic sanctions in the past and we can be sure to see many more such examples in the future. However, the findings work to rebut earlier academic research on the ineffectiveness of democratic sanctions and offer a more nuanced picture of sanctions as a tool for promoting democracy abroad

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Fvon Soest, Christian, and Michael Wahman. 2014. “[The Underestimated Effect of Democratic Sanctions.](#)”

E-International Relations. Copy at <http://www.tinyurl.com/y67q4ly8>

Full Text Democratic sanctions have a bad reputation. For most people with even a slight interest in international politics, it is not particularly hard to find examples to support a generally sceptic view of sanctions as a tool for external democracy promotion. The authoritarian regime in Zimbabwe has been targeted by both EU and US sanctions since 2002, but the Mugabe regime has remained stable and maintained remarkably high levels of repression, showing no real signs of political liberalization. Similarly, the EU's sanctions against its Eastern authoritarian neighbour, Belarus, have still not had any noticeable effects. Despite costly sanctions in place since 2004, President Lukashenko remains one of the last European dictators. And there is more bad news. Academic research has shown that sanctions are not only ineffective, but even counterproductive. It has been argued that authoritarian countries do not become more, but less democratic when targeted by sanctions (Peksen & Drury 2010; Wood 2008). In a recently published article in the journal Democratization, we reinvestigate the effect of democratic sanctions, i.e. those which explicitly aim at improving the level of democracy, using new data and statistical analysis, to see if democratic sanctions really are as bad as their reputation. Perhaps surprisingly, our findings are rather optimistic. Our study shows that sanctions are not always effective, sometimes they may even be counterproductive, and all types of sanctions are not equally likely to lead to positive outcomes, but on average, democratic sanctions are, in fact, associated with higher levels of democracy in the targeted state. We also show that democratic sanctions have other more profound effects on the targeted state. In authoritarian states targeted by democratic sanctions, authoritarian leaders are more likely to lose power and countries are more likely to change their basic political institutions. Such institutional changes do not necessarily lead to a fully-fledged liberal democracy, but often open up to increased civilian political control or multiparty elections. Sanctions and Their Effect on Democratization Instigating democratization has been by far the most common goal of sanctions initiated by the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations against authoritarian regimes in the post-Cold War period. Given previous research on the democratic effects of sanctions, the frequent use of sanctions as a tool for democratization is rather surprising (Drury 1998; Haass 1998; Pape 1997). Number of international sanctions according to sanction goals. Source: Representation based on own data set. In a seminal and widely cited study, Peksen and Drury (2010) argued that sanctions have an adverse effect on the level of democracy in targeted countries. According to the logic presented by Peksen and Drury, the negative democratic effect of sanctions is a consequence of increased levels of repression used by political elites in targeted countries as they attempt to cope with increased domestic pressure (also Wood 2008). Indeed, severe and widespread repression has often followed international sanction as a means to fight off increased opposition. However, previous research in the comparative democratization literature have shown that economic stress is one of the most robust determinants of democratization and/or regime change in authoritarian regimes (e.g. Geddes 1999; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2010; Teorell 2010). Authoritarian regimes tend to survive with a mixed strategy of repression and co-optation (Rotberg 2007; Wintrobe 1998). 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Although the current literature on comparative democratization makes it plausible that sanctions could have a positive effect on the level of democracy in the targeted country, this is not to say that all sanctions necessarily have the same effect. As several authors have acknowledged (Kirshner 1997; Allen 2005; Hufbauer et al. 2007), senders have used a multitude of sanction designs to achieve their desired goals. It is also not at all evident that sanctions aimed at goals other than democratization would have the unexpected and in some cases even undesired effect of causing regime change. 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Yet the variable remains significant when we control for these different measures. To study the more profound effects of democratic sanctions, we also tested whether democratic sanctions are associated with a higher rate of regime change and ruler exit. This provides an insight into how implemented democratic sanctions actually work in targeted authoritarian regimes and how they contribute to improved democracy levels. There is no general relationship between sanctions and a higher probability of rulers losing power. However, **looking at only democratic sanctions, we see** a significant positive relationship [between sanctions and ruler exit]. It reaffirms Marinov's (2005) finding **that sanctions generally increase the probability of leadership exit.** Such leadership exits can be an effect of leaders losing elections, being violently disposed from power or forced to resign. 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These findings should not be taken as evidence to justify all types of sanctions in all contexts where democracy is on the decline. There are several examples of highly unsuccessful democratic sanctions in the past and we can be sure to see many more such examples in the future. However, the findings work to rebut earlier academic research on the ineffectiveness of democratic sanctions and offer a more nuanced picture of sanctions as a tool for promoting democracy abroad.

All evidence before Jan 28, 2019 precedes major sanctions- non unique

Tom Phillips, 1-28-2019, "Trump steps up Maduro pressure with sanctions on Venezuelan oil company," Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/28/trump-venezuela-sanctions-oil-pdvsa-maduro-guaido>

The Trump administration has tightened the screws on Venezuela's embattled president, Nicolás Maduro, announcing sanctions against the country's state-owned oil company PDVSA in what the US national security adviser admitted was partly an attempt to counter strategic threats from Cuba and Iran. At a briefing in the White House, the US treasury secretary, Steve Mnuchin, told reporters the sanctions would help punish "those responsible for Venezuela's tragic decline" and boost Juan Guaidó, the opposition leader who last week declared himself Venezuela's rightful interim president and was recognized by the United States. "It is a complete tragedy to have a humanitarian crisis in a country that has very rich resources," Mnuchin said. **The sanctions – which represent the US's toughest economic move against Maduro to date –** come five days after Guaidó's dramatic declaration sparked Venezuela's latest political crisis. The national security adviser, John Bolton, said \$7bn of PDVSA assets would be immediately blocked as a result of the sanctions while the company would also lose an estimated \$11bn in export proceeds over the coming year. Bolton said the sanctions were an attempt to alleviate "the poverty and the starvation and the humanitarian crisis" currently gripping the South American nation and stop "Maduro and his cronies" looting the assets of the Venezuelan people. "Now is the time to stand for democracy and prosperity in Venezuela," he said, calling on "all responsible nations" to back Guaidó. However, Bolton also conceded US strategic interests were in play, including concerns about the presence and activities of US foes in the region. "We think stability and democracy in Venezuela are in the direct national interests of the United States right now," Bolton told reporters. "The authoritarian regime of Chávez and Maduro has allowed the penetration by adversaries of the United States, not least of which is Cuba." He added: "Some call the country 'Cubazuela', reflecting the grip that Cuba's military and security forces have on the Maduro regime. We think that is a strategic significant threat to the United States and there are others as well, including Iran's interest in Venezuela's uranium deposits." Maduro hit back in a live broadcast to the nation from the Miraflores presidential palace in Caracas. "This group of extremists that have stormed the White House have no limits," he said, attacking the "belittlement, disdain and aggression" with which he claimed "Donald Trump's unfit government" treated Venezuela. Amir Richani, a Latin America analyst at ClipperData, which tracks energy shipments, said the sanctions were intended "to continue the asphyxiation of Maduro's government" and would come as a major blow. The US national security adviser, John Bolton, bearing his notepad. Photograph: Jim Young/Reuters The US is the biggest importer of Venezuelan crude, followed by India and China, last year importing an average of around 500,000 barrels a day. Richani said the sanctions indicated the White House had decided to go "all-out" against Maduro: "This is a really dangerous situation for Caracas." The notepad Bolton was holding as he took to the stage hinted at just how potentially dangerous it could be. A handwritten note on its yellow pages appeared to read: "5,000 troops to Colombia". I hold Donald Trump responsible for any violence that might come to pass in Venezuela Nicolás Maduro Asked if there was any possibility of US troops getting involved in the Venezuelan crisis, Bolton replied: "Look, the president has made it very clear on this matter that all option are on the table." Any violence against Guaidó, the Venezuelan opposition or US diplomatic staff "would be met by a significant response". In his televised broadcast Maduro accused Bolton and Trump of seeking to destroy his leftist

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“Bolivarian” administration through a coup that risked plunging Venezuela into conflict. “I hold Donald Trump responsible for any violence that might come to pass in Venezuela. It will be you, señor presidente Donald Trump, responsible for this policy of regime change in Venezuela, and the blood that might flow in Venezuela will be on your hands ... You will have your hands covered in blood, if you lead Venezuela into partial or generalised violence.” Earlier on Monday, Pope Francis said he feared bloodshed. Speaking on the papal plane as he returned from a five-day visit to Panama, the pope told reporters: “In this moment, I support all the Venezuelan people because they are a people who are suffering. “I suffer for what is happening in Venezuela. What is it that scares me? Bloodshed.” The Republican senator Marco Rubio celebrated the fresh sanctions, tweeting: “All property & interests of PdVSA are now blocked and US persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them.” Rubio, thought to have been a major influence in Trump’s decision to recognize Guaidó, added: “Venezuela’s oil belongs to the Venezuelan people and the money for oil will now go to them through the legitimate government of Guaido.” In a second tweet, Rubio posted a photograph of Maduro and wrote: “All bad things must also come to an end.” In the latest sign of coordination between Guaidó and the White House, Guaidó also announced on Monday plans to name a new board for PDVSA and its US refining subsidiary, Citgo. The move would help kickstart the recovery of an industry “that today is living through a dark moment,” Guaidó tweeted.

Kenneth Rapoza, May 3, 2019, "No, U.S. Sanctions Are Not Killing Venezuela. Maduro Is," Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/05/03/no-u-s-sanctions-are-not-killing-venezuela-maduro-is/#36a6d3994343>

Since the founding of PSUV by revolutionary Hugo Chavez, the party reluctantly paid Wall Street bondholders, while preaching its brand of anti-capitalist, Cuban-style Marxism. They ruined the country long ago. They were more interested in the past, and their role in erasing it, than they were interested in investing in Venezuela’s future. After years of lackluster investment in infrastructure, their entire power grid is buckling. Real GDP declined 15% in 2018, back when the only sanction was on PdVSA bonds, hardly an economic mover. Demarais of The Economist Intelligence Unit says she expects further contractions this year and next. A forecast recovery in 2021 to 2023 rests on the assumption that Maduro (and PSUV) are gone. Then the International Monetary Fund, Chavez’s old enemy, will come in to fund this mess. PSUV’s worst nightmare would have come true...all

Extension: Solvency

1. Ousting Maduro
2. Crippled infrastructure
 - a. Even if you buy that pro will be able to oust maduro → they still cannot solve for the already crippled economy in venezuela
3. The only way to provide solvency and rebuild the economy /infrastructure is through an IMF bailout→ need outside actors to solve
 - a. Only CON can provide solvency to both