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AFF

THAAD Helps GMD

Radar can relay information that GMD can use to be more effective and detect decoys (Pickrell – National Interest)

Ryan Pickrell (National Interest). Can America's Missile Defenses Really Beat ICBMs Fired from Russia, China or North Korea?. Published 6/2/17. <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/can-americas-missile-defenses-really-beat-icbms-fired-russia-20973>.

"This test was similar in nature to the type of threat we would expect to defend against," MDA Public Affairs Officer Chris Johnson told the Daily Caller News Foundation. **During Tuesday's ICBM intercept test, several sensors, including infrared satellites and radar systems, detected and tracked an incoming missile, according to Thomas Karako, the director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. A sea-based X-band radar provided high-resolution images of the missile target, allowing the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system to distinguish the missile from debris and decoys and move to eliminate the threat.** After exiting the atmosphere, the interceptor missile released a Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle that identified the warhead and adjusted course for a direct collision. "This is a good day for homeland missile defense and a bad day for Kim Jong-un," Karako said in response to the intercept test.

Russia Nuclear Blackmail Example

Russia threatened the US with nukes if we entered Crimea, allowing them to annex the territory (Kredo – Business Insider)

Adam Kredo (Business Insider). Russian leaders have 'discussed Moscow's willingness' to use nukes if the US or NATO enters Crimea. Published 5/30/17.

<http://www.businessinsider.com/russian-leaders-have-discussed-moscows-willingness-use-nukes-the-us-nato-enters-crimea-2017-5>.

Russian leaders are threatening to unleash a nuclear attack if the United States or its NATO allies enter the Ukrainian territory of Crimea, according to recent comments that appear to come in response to an increased military buildup by Western forces in the region.

Vyacheslav Alekseyevich Nikonov, a Russian lawmaker, discussed Moscow's willingness to use nuclear weapons in response to U.S. action in Ukraine, telling an international meeting of security officials on Sunday that Russian military officials have "discussed Moscow's willingness to use nuclear weapons in a conflict with military leaders in NATO," according to reports. "On the issue of NATO expansion on our borders, at some point I heard from the Russian military—and I think they are right—**If U.S. forces**, NATO forces, are, **were, in the Crimea, in eastern Ukraine**, Russia is undefendable militarily in case of conflict without using nuclear weapons in the early stage of the conflict," Nikonov was quoted as saying by Defense One during the conference. Nikonov later confirmed to the publication that Russian military officials are ready to deploy nuclear weapons if a conflict in the contested region of Crimea arises. "**Russian military leaders have discussed Moscow's willingness to use nuclear weapons** in a conflict with military leaders in NATO, as part of broader and increasingly contentious conversations about the alliance's expansion," Defense One reported.

Russia will continue to use the nuclear blackmail strategy in Ukraine (Buckley – Financial Times)

Neil Buckley (Financial Times). Russia: Putting the 'nuclear gun' back on the table. Published 9/15/16.

<https://www.ft.com/content/03dfef98-aa88-11e6-9cb3-bb8207902122?mhq5j=e5>.

Please use the sharing tools found via the email icon at the top of articles. Copying articles to share with others is a breach of FT.com T&Cs and Copyright Policy. Email licensing@ft.com to buy additional rights. Subscribers may share up to 10 or 20 articles per month using the gift article service. More information can be found at <https://www.ft.com/tour>. When a Russian-Nato conflict seemed barely thinkable in western capitals, the doctrine caused little concern. Today, it looms large for military planners. They fear it undermines the cold war-era concept called MAD, or mutually assured destruction. Andrei Piontkovsky, a Russian political scientist and outspoken Putin critic, has warned that **Russia's**

military doctrine could provide a basis for the president to engage in "nuclear blackmail" to force the west to accept Russian gains after a short conflict. That, he says, makes **Mr Trump's questioning of US**

obligations to Nato partners such as the Baltic republics especially risky. "The central issue in the US-Russia nuclear stand-off now is whether the Trump administration continues this disastrous line or abandons it under pressure from traditional Republicans in Congress," he says. More recently, Mr Putin has played the statesman on the nuclear issue. Asked about Russia's sabre-rattling during last month, the president distanced himself from his bellicose state TV.

Russia can get around GMD (Pickrell – National Interest)

Ryan Pickrell (National Interest). Can America's Missile Defenses Really Beat ICBMs Fired from Russia, China or North Korea?. Published 6/2/17.

<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/can-americas-missile-defenses-really-beat-icbms-fired-russia-20973>.

"The scenarios aren't realistic enough," Hanham explained. "If North Korea was actually going to attack the U.S., not just launch a single test ICBM, they would launch everything they had. It wouldn't resemble this test," Hanham said. "If we are talking about war with Russia or China, this is not at all a good test. **Russia and China would have many ICBMs with confusers and multiple**

independent re-entry vehicles launching from many different locations at very hard to determine times and targeting all over the country." Missile defense, hitting a bullet with a bullet, is a very challenging task that is difficult to master, especially without a real combat scenario to test effectiveness. "People think missile defenses are a magic wand. They aren't,"

Jeffrey Lewis, a renowned arms expert, told TheDCNF. The U.S. missile shield has a test success rate of 55 percent, with eight failures out of 18 interceptor tests. **The GMD system "has not demonstrated through flight testing that it can defend the U.S. homeland against the current missile defense threat,"** the Government Accountability Office reported in 2016. The Fiscal Year 2016 report on ballistic missile defenses from the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation declared that the GMD system "demonstrates a limited capability to defend the U.S. Homeland from small numbers of simple intermediate-range or intercontinental ballistic missile threats launched from North Korea or Iran." The report adds that the GMD system has low reliability.

Preemptive strikes

Thomas Karako (Senior Fellow at the Strategic Studies Quarterly). "Missile Defense and the Nuclear Posture Review." Fall 2017.

[http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-3/Karako.pdf?utm_source=Strategic+Studies+Quarterly&utm_campaign=bee7b014af-SSQ+Fall+2017+Campaign&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4b8d69edd5-bee7b014af-214545441&mc_cid=bee7b014af&mc_eid=\[UNIQID\]](http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-3/Karako.pdf?utm_source=Strategic+Studies+Quarterly&utm_campaign=bee7b014af-SSQ+Fall+2017+Campaign&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4b8d69edd5-bee7b014af-214545441&mc_cid=bee7b014af&mc_eid=[UNIQID])

Crisis stability. Missile defenses may improve crisis stability by providing the United States courses of action other than preemption or retaliation. In the days prior to North Korea's 2006 Taepodong-2 launch, some former senior officials recommended a preemptive US strike against the North Korean missile site.15 The existence of a limited US homeland missile defense capability, however, provided President Bush with an alternative to preemptively striking North Korea's launch facilities. Such a defensive posture creates options for decision-makers that can contribute to stability.

A more recent example of missile defense contributing to crisis stability occurred in October 2016, when two or more anti-ship cruise missiles reportedly were fired at the USS Mason as it sailed off the coast of Yemen. Instead of being hit, the ship employed defensive systems and was unharmed.¹⁶ Absent these active defenses, the United States could have been drawn further into the conflict. Instead, the United States was able to assess what had taken place and limit its response to a reprisal with a cruise missile strike.¹⁷ Raising the threshold for attack. Missile defenses also serve the purpose of raising the threshold for aggression for an adversary wishing to pursue coercive escalatory threats or actual strikes against the United States. Denying adversaries a "cheap shot" option against the American homeland or military forces may deter them from taking such actions. Missile defenses therefore can change the calculus of potential adversaries. They can create uncertainty about the effect of an escalatory threat or attack and thereby help thwart adversary escalation strategies. Buying time and creating options. Missile defense also buys time and creates otherwise unavailable options for decision-makers. Even limited and imperfect defenses create time and space for diplomacy or to attrite adversary missile forces with other means.¹⁸ In so doing, pressure to strike adversary launchers prior to launch is thereby relaxed.¹⁹ Difficulties of Scud hunting during the Gulf War demonstrated that relying on preemption alone, in addition to potentially creating instabilities, may be unreliable, especially if an adversary deploys mobile missiles.²⁰

North Korean Threat

Link: NK's strategy is inherently unsustainable (Beauchamp – Vox)

Zach Beauchamp (Vox). North Korea isn't crazy. It's insecure, poor, and extremely dangerous. Published 7/5/17.

<https://www.vox.com/world/2017/7/5/15922446/north-korea-nuclear-war-casualties>.

Nor is the North secure from military attack. While its army is extremely large personnel-wise, with about 1.2 million soldiers, it uses antiquated Cold War technology while its neighbors to the South are equipped with top-of-line modern gear. Moreover, the presence of 23,500 US troops in South Korea means any war between North and South Korea would draw in the world's only superpower, though with potentially enormous American casualties. **Facing the twin dangers of domestic instability and foreign attack, the North has devised a strategy for survival that depends (somewhat counterintuitively) on provoking the South and the United States. The North** will do something that it knows will infuriate its enemies, like testing an intercontinental ballistic missile or shelling a South Korean military base. This limit-pushing behavior is designed to show that **the North is willing to escalate aggressively in the event of any kind of action from Washington or Seoul that threatens the regime**, thus deterring them from making even the slightest move to undermine the Kim regime. It also sends a signal to the North Korean people that they're constantly under threat from foreign invasions, and that they need to support their government unconditionally to survive as a nation. **The problem is that this strategy is inherently unstable. There's always a risk that one of these manufactured crises spirals out of control, leading to a conflict that no one really wants. This is especially risky because the North Korean government is deeply insular: Washington doesn't have the kind of direct line of communication with the North that it had with the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, which was vital in preventing standoffs like the Cuban Missile Crisis from escalating.** Maybe the Trump

administration responds too aggressively to a provocation, prompting North Korean retaliation. Maybe North Korea thinks it's about to be invaded by the South, leading it to mount a preemptive strike. Maybe South Korea misreads the North's signals and thinks it is about to launch a war, causing the South to do something wild like try to assassinate Kim Jong Un. That isn't totally hypothetical: Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and a noted North Korean expert, thinks killing Kim is a real option that the South is considering if it thinks war is likely (mainly to head off a nuclear strike before it starts).

Warrant: NK is unpredictable and insecure (Beauchamp - Vox).

Zack Beauchamp (Vox). "North Korea isn't crazy. It's insecure, poor, and extremely dangerous." July 5, 2017.

<https://www.vox.com/world/2017/7/5/15922446/north-korea-nuclear-war-casualties>

While Americans were busy enjoying the July Fourth holiday, news broke that North Korea had crossed another military milestone: its first successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile. This missile, the kind that could theoretically be tipped with a nuclear warhead, could travel far enough to hit Alaska. That's pretty worrying in and of itself. But the North Korean crisis is even scarier than you think. That isn't because the country's supreme leader, 33-year-old Kim Jong Un, is totally irrational — a "crazy fat kid," as Sen. John McCain once termed him.

Instead, it's that **the impoverished North Korean regime is deeply insecure, so worried about its own survival that it is willing to go to dangerously provocative lengths to scare the United States and South Korea out of any potential attack. When you combine this insecurity with the opaque nature of the North Korean regime, you have a situation that could easily spiral into outright conflict in the event that one of North Korea's frequent military provocations (like the missile test) goes awry.** Given North Korea's massive conventional military and unknown number of nuclear weapons, conflict on the Korean Peninsula would cost hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of lives. That's not to say that war between the US and North Korea is likely, even after the new missile test. It isn't. Rather, it's that the risk of a catastrophic conflict is much higher than anyone should feel comfortable with, arguably more likely than anywhere else in the world. Here at home, many are preoccupied with the fight against ISIS and, before that, the Iranian nuclear program. North Korea gets far less public attention, but it is a literally existential threat to two of America's closest allies, Japan and South Korea. And it doesn't seem like there's any solution in sight.

Link: As NK increases their nuclear capacity, their threat exponentially increases (Park – Kookmin).

Hwee-Rhak Park (Kookmin University). South Korea's Defense Posture against the North Korean Nuclear Threat: Dangerous Reluctance.

Published 5/26/17. <http://www.icasinc.org/2015/2015I/2015Ihrp.pdf>.

Although extended deterrence of the U.S. missile defense systems would generally restrain North Korea from using nuclear weapons, nobody could exclude the possibility of North Korea using nuclear weapons. Ham and Lee state: "North Korea has recently announced its plan to use its nuclear weapons not only for the purpose of deterrence in peacetime, but also to achieve victory in possible future wars" (2013, 410). In fact, North Korea once ordered its strategic rocket and artillery forces to maintain "the first degree combat readiness," which was understood as nuclear attack readiness, on March 27, 2013. North Korea passed a law, which stipulated the authority and possible situations for the use of nuclear weapons on April 1, 2013. The law read that North Korea could use its nuclear weapons on a "belligerent nuclear power and a country that opposes North Korea by cooperating with the belligerent nuclear power ... by the order of its Supreme Commander" (Kwon Tae 2014, 192). **No one can be sure of the actual nuclear capabilities and intentions of North Korea due to the lack of reliable intelligence. However, for its own safety, South Korea should be prepared for the worst case scenario.** As Ham and Lee put it, **"As North Korea's nuclear arsenal becomes larger and more advanced, North Korea will become better able to dissuade nuclear retaliation or attacks from other states. This, in turn, will increase the possibility of North Korea's usage of its nuclear weapons and the number of nuclear weapons to be used"** (2013, 410). South Korea should not avoid the serious reality mentioned above.

Link: Nuclear attack inevitable (Hellman – Stanford).

Martin E. Hellman (Stanford University). On the Probability of Nuclear War. Published 2008.

<https://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/opinion/inevitability.html>.

As explained in the paper, **there is preliminary evidence that deterrence can be expected to work for about 100 years,** which is far too high a risk. Aside from concern for future generations, **that time horizon implies roughly a 1% chance of failure in any given year and a 10% chance of failure in any decade. With a 100 year time horizon, every 15 years is like pulling the trigger in a game of Russian roulette in which the whole world is at stake. Every 30 years is like pulling the trigger twice in that suicidal game. A sane person**

would never play Russian roulette even once. Neither would a sane world. Even if the proposed studies were to conclude that the time horizon for a failure of deterrence is closer to 1,000 years, that risk would still be intolerable. Given the million year time horizon that is demanded for a failure of a nuclear power plant, that risk level would be equivalent to building 1,000 nuclear power plants surrounding your home. Only if the time horizon for a failure of deterrence were greater than a million years might society's inaction be understandable.

Link: North Korea is a flashpoint (Hellman – Stanford).

Martin E. Hellman (Stanford University). On the Probability of Nuclear War. Published 2008.

<https://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/opinion/inevitability.html>.

should emphasize that this article did not call for unilateral disarmament. As noted in my work on war and peace, while ending war is necessary for humanity's long term survival, in the short term we need a strong military to deal with very real threats in a world that has not accepted that truth. I also should note that my references to wars in Iran and Iraq referred to the war between those two nations that lasted throughout most of the 1980's, with America supporting Iraq against what was seen as Iran's larger threat. Similarly, my reference to war in Afghanistan referred to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979-89), not the current American invasion of Afghanistan, post 9/11. While the imminent danger of an all-out nuclear war that would destroy civilization has greatly diminished in the post-Soviet era, there are processes at work that make nuclear war much more dangerous than might first appear. **Nuclear proliferation is creating more and more nuclear tinder that could set off a global fire**, with India, Pakistan, Israel, and **North Korea being the most obvious possible flash points**. Secondly, America now tends to treat Russia as a has-been superpower which need not be consulted before we take action that might bring us into confrontation. This is very dangerous behavior toward a nation with thousands of nuclear weapons. During the 1990's I was very concerned that American military action in the former Yugoslavia might bring about a situation similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis, where both Russia and the US found themselves dragged, reluctantly but inexorably, toward full scale nuclear confrontation. And as I update this in 2008, the danger is increasing rapidly as explained on part of my current project's website. So, while this op-ed at first may seem inapplicable in the post-Cold-War world, it has many elements of long-term truth that demand our attention. Given that a process of ending war will take decades, a long-term view is appropriate.

Link: 29% probability (Nuclear Risk Project).

(Nuclear Risk Project). How likely is a failure of nuclear deterrence?. Published 2008. <http://nuclearrisk.org/3likely.php>.

Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has quoted the odds of a nuclear terrorist attack within the next decade as being roughly 50-50 [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, puts those odds at less than 1%, but notes, "We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1 percent ... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can't live in a world where it's anything but 'extremely low-probability.'" [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts, **Senator Richard Lugar found an average estimate of 29% for the "probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,"** with 79 percent of the respondents believing "it more likely to be carried out by terrorists" than by a government [Lugar 2005, pages 14-15]. While even the most optimistic of these estimates is alarming, their wide range emphasizes the need for our proposed in-depth risk analysis studies to reduce the uncertainty. There is significant evidence supporting the need for greater attention to this issue. If you haven't already watched it, the "Attack on Pelindaba" video on our home page is a must see. It conveys the danger more graphically than anything else I've found. While it runs slightly over 12 minutes, even the first few minutes will do the job. The danger becomes even more obvious when combined with information from Matthew Bunn's MIT thesis, Guardians at the Gates of Hell:

Link: No nuclear deterrence in the squo (w) nuclear umbrella/US protection is ineffective (Park – Kookmin University)

Hwee-Rhak Park (Kookmin University). South Korea's Defense Posture against the North Korean Nuclear Threat: Dangerous Reluctance. Published 5/26/17. <http://www.icasinc.org/2015/2015I/2015Ihrp.pdf>.

South Korea also depends on the U.S. promise of an extended deterrence or a nuclear umbrella to deter a possible North Korean nuclear attack. South Korean former National Assembly member Jung Mong-jun has made accusations that **the concept of a nuclear umbrella is "broken"** (Lee 2013, A5). That has led many South Koreans to be skeptical of the reliability of the U.S. promise. **In fact, it would not be easy for the U.S. to retaliate against a North Korean nuclear attack on South Korea. The retaliation could provoke a North Korean nuclear attack on U.S. bases in South Korea, Japan, and U.S. territories, which are within the reach of North Korean ballistic missiles. It could also lead to an all-out nuclear war with China and/or Russia. Recognizing**

these difficulties, North Korea may decide to employ its nuclear weapons in the belief that the U.S. will not retaliate (Ham and Lee 2013, 411).

Impact: Damage of a nuke hitting Seoul (Elleman – 38 North).

Michael Elleman (38 North). THAAD: What It Can and Can't Do. Published 3/10/16.

https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/2016-03-10_THAAD-What-It-Can-and-Cant-Do.pdf.

North Korean First Attack

North Korea recently threatened a preemptive strike on Guam which shows a change in the posturing rhetoric, signifying a more aggressive North Korea.

Zachary Cohen And Euan Mckirdy, Cnn. "North Korea threatens strike on Guam." *CNN*. 8 Aug. 2017. Web. 9 Sept. 2017. <<http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/08/politics/north-korea-considering-guam-strike-trump/index.html>>

North Korea's military is "examining the operational plan" to strike areas around the US territory of Guam with medium-to-long-range strategic ballistic missiles, state-run news agency KCNA said early Wednesday local time. Specifically, the statement mentioned a potential strike on Andersen Air Force Base designed "to send a serious warning signal to the US." The base is one of two on the Pacific island, which are the closest bases on US soil to North Korea, and represent the westernmost tip of the country's military might. The North Korea comments were published after US President Donald Trump warned Pyongyang that if it continued to threaten the US, it would "face fire and fury like the world has never seen." Guam's governor, Eddie Baza Calvo, released a video address Wednesday, reassuring the island's residents that there was no change in the threat level resulting from North Korea. "I want to reassure the people of Guam that currently there is no threat to our island or the Marianas," he said. "I also want to remind national media that Guam is American soil and we have 200,000 Americans in Guam and the Marianas. We are not just a military installation," he added. Speaking from Guam, journalist Robert Santos said local reaction to the threats was mixed. "Some people are who are confident we are safe with the US bases here and others who are not so sure," he said. "Some people believe (Trump and Kim) are clashing personalities and they speak recklessly. But here are some people who believe... that we are completely safe regardless of what happens." However, he added that an attack on Guam "won't just be against the US military, it will be against the people." Guam's Homeland Security Advisor George Charfauros told CNN that despite Guam's strategic importance and the North Korean threats to strike it, he remains confident of the island's defenses. "They've slowly developed their capabilities but we stand in high confidence with the US (Defense Department's) ability to not only defend Guam and the surrounding areas but also the continental US... There are several layers of ballistic missile defense." One of these systems, he said, is THAAD, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, which is designed to shoot down short, medium and intermediate ballistic missiles. "Two years ago a permanent deployment of that missile system was placed on Guam," he said. He added that the US "routinely uses" Aegis-equipped warships around the island chain of the Marianas, of which Guam is the largest. The US Department of Defense reiterated its capability to counter North Korean aggression. "We always maintain a high state of readiness and have the capabilities to counter any threat, to include those from North Korea," spokesman Johnny Michael told CNN.

Ultimately,

Pyongyang did not develop its nuclear capability to be the aggressor in a war with the US, says CNN Military Analyst Rick Francona. However, **its most recent statements suggest that North Korea is taking a more aggressive stance -- suggesting that it might attack before the US has a chance to strike.** "The North Koreans did not develop their nuclear weapons to drop on the US," Francona told CNN. "They developed these weapons to prevent an attack from the US. Or at least that's the rhetoric coming from Pyongyang. **Now you're looking at a possible strike on American territory (like) Guam, and also the mainland of the US.**"

North Korea Nuclear Capability

NK tested an ICBM that can reach major US cities (Lendon - CNN)

Brad Lendon (CNN). "US slams North Korea missile test as Kim claims 'whole US mainland' in reach." July 30, 2017.

<http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/29/asia/north-korea-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-test/index.html>

North Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile Friday that appears to have the range to hit major US cities, experts say, and prompted a fresh round of condemnation from the United States, China, Japan and South Korea. A combination of US, South Korean and Japanese analyses of the launch from Mupyong-ni, near North Korea's border with China, shows the missile flew about 45 minutes, going 3,700 kilometers (2,300 miles) high and for a distance of 1,000 kilometers (621 miles). **If the missile were fired on a flatter, standard trajectory, it would have major US cities such as Los Angeles, Denver and Chicago well within its range, with the possible ability to reach as far as New York and Boston, according to David Wright, a missile expert at the Union of Concerned Scientists.** However, early analysis of Friday's test cannot determine how heavy a payload the missile was carrying in its warhead, Wright said. The heavier the payload, the shorter the range. South Korea's joint chiefs of staff said they estimate the missile tested Friday is more advanced than one launched earlier this month based on the range it traveled. Experts had said that test showed Pyongyang had the ability to hit Alaska. President Donald Trump condemned the missile launch and said the United States would act to ensure its security. "Threatening the world, these weapons and tests further isolate North Korea, weaken its economy and deprive its people," Trump said in a written statement. "The United States will take all necessary steps to ensure the security of the American homeland and protect our allies in the region."

NK has successfully miniaturized a nuclear warhead (Newman - Wired).

Lily Hay Newman (Wired Magazine). "NORTH KOREA JUST TOOK THE NUCLEAR STEP EXPERTS HAVE DREADED." 8/8/17.

<https://www.wired.com/story/north-korea-miniature-nuke/>

NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR and ballistic ambitions have existed for decades: The country conducted its first significant missile test launches in the 1980s, and conducted its first nuclear test in 2006. Now, thanks to a recent surge of development, the intertwined endeavors have both advanced to the point that experts have warned about for years. The worst-case North Korea hypotheticals, in other words, have suddenly become all too real. A report from the US government's Defense Intelligence Agency indicates that **North Korea finally has the technological capability to reliably build warheads that are small and light enough to be mounted on missiles.** This "miniaturization" capability has long eluded the country's weapons development program. But now that North Korea has achieved it, the list of hurdles keeping the country from directly threatening the continental US (or virtually any part of the world) with an intercontinental ballistic missile has dwindled significantly. The intelligence community consensus that North Korea can miniaturize nuclear warheads, first reported by *The Washington Post*, adds to an already strained and unpredictable geopolitical climate. Recurrent North Korean missile launch tests have underscored the country's determination to become a full-fledged nuclear power, while recent UN sanctions against the country have stoked tensions even more. The weapons advances were always a question of *when*, not *if*, but they are coming sooner than many expected. "There were some officials both inside and outside of government who already believed that North Korea had the capability to mate a warhead to a missile, but it certainly wasn't the consensus view," says James McKeon, a policy analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. "On North Korea's current trajectory, though, there was no doubt that they were going to get there eventually unless something changed, unless there was a form of diplomatic negotiation or something that stopped them from getting there." Compounding the

nuclear issue? North Korea pulled off its first successful intercontinental ballistic missile launch in early July, testing a Hwasong-14 missile that traveled 580 miles and reached an altitude of 1,741 miles during a 37-minute flight. Based on that test, analysts concluded that the Hwasong-14 might be able to travel more than 4,000 miles, putting Alaska in its range, along with countries like Japan. This radius even potentially puts Moscow at risk. Another successful ICBM test followed at the end of last month; North Korea issued commemorative stamps to celebrate. Taken separately, North Korea's possession of a miniaturized nuke and an ICBM would be plenty concerning, not just for the US but for the entire world. Combined, they present a significantly more serious threat. Playing to these fears, North Korean state-run media claimed on Tuesday that the country is considering a missile strike on Guam. At more than 2,000 miles away from North Korea, the island nation would be significantly more difficult to target than US allies like South Korea or Japan—a possible indication that the threat is an escalation of saber rattling rather than intent.

External Uncertainty Warrant

Uniqueness: Possibility the greatest now that it had ever been (Kelly - The National Interest).

Robert E. Kelly (The National Interest). "South Korea Needs to Realize That North Korea Isn't Going to Collapse." February 13, 2017. <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/south-korea-needs-realize-north-korea-isnt-going-collapse-19427?page=show>

With a new president in the White House, it is the season of reviews and reassessments, with no problem more thorny than North Korea. President Barack Obama apparently told President Donald Trump that North Korea is at the top of America's foreign challenges. As North Korea continues its missile and nuclear tests, this is almost certainly the case. The yield of the North's most recent nuclear test has exceeded that of weapons used by the United States during World War II. **The country's missile program has dabbled in submarine-launched ballistic missiles, road mobile launchers and intercontinental ballistic missiles. If these platforms genuinely work, then North Korea could become the first new country to be able to strike the continental United States since the depths of the Cold War decades ago. Coupled with President Trump's explosive, erratic personality, the possibility of a serious clash is greater than it has been in previous years.**

There is a strong sense that North Korea lives on borrowed time. As Victor Cha writes, it is the "impossible state." Its economy is weak. Its ostensible ideology is long since bankrupt. Its people are increasingly aware that their southern kinsmen live vastly healthier, wealthier and happier lives. The regime, for all its ferocity, is alienated from its own people whose uprising it fears. Its capital approximates a feudal city-state estranged from its own impoverished piedmont. It is extremely dependent on China for licit trade, illicit trade and financial services. Its conventional forces are technological dated. Hence the regular predictions, going back decades, that

Link: US says that NK is "quickly closing off the possibility of a diplomatic solution" (Newsweek).

NA (Newsweek). "WAR WITH NORTH KOREA: U.S. WILL USE 'CONSIDERABLE MILITARY FORCE'". 7/6/17. <http://www.newsweek.com/north-korea-we-will-use-force-if-we-have-says-united-states-632444>

The United States cautioned on Wednesday it was ready to use force if need be to stop North Korea's nuclear missile program but said it preferred global diplomatic action against Pyongyang for defying world powers by test launching a ballistic missile that could hit Alaska. **U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley told a meeting of the U.N. Security Council that North Korea's actions were "quickly closing off the possibility of a diplomatic solution" and the United States was prepared to defend itself and its allies. "One of our capabilities lies with our considerable military forces.** We will use them if we must, but we prefer not to have to go in that direction," Haley said. She urged China, North Korea's only major ally, to do more to rein in Pyongyang. Speaking with his Japanese counterpart on Wednesday, **U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis underscored the "ironclad commitment" of the United States to defending Japan and providing "extended deterrence using the full range of U.S. capabilities."** Pentagon spokeswoman Dana White said in a statement.

Link: The US is a lot more hawkish than SK and is considering a preemptive strike on NK. (Williams – Vox)

Jennifer Williams (VOX). South Korea just pulled a gutsy move on the US's THAAD missile defense system. Published 6/7/17. <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/6/7/15755278/south-korea-president-thaad-missile-system>.

The real story is that **Moon is far, far less hawkish on North Korea than Washington is.** Moon is a career human rights lawyer and the son of North Korean refugees. During his campaign, he pledged to review his predecessor's decision to allow the US to deploy the THAAD system and said he wants to improve relations with North Korea, including reopening a joint industrial park on the Northern side of the border that the previous president had said was funneling money to Kim Jong-un's regime in Pyongyang. **Moon is also concerned about economic retaliation from China, which staunchly opposes THAAD, seeing it as a threat to its military capabilities.** That stands in stark contrast to the Trump administration's far more aggressive stance toward the dictatorial regime in Pyongyang. **Fearful that North Korea is rapidly developing missiles capable of hitting mainland America, the administration has sent some of the US Navy's most powerful warships to South Korea, and top administration officials are openly talking about a potential preemptive military strike on North Korea's nuclear facilities.** They also sped up the deployment of the THAAD system — which is primarily designed to intercept missiles coming from North Korea. With the blessing of the previous administration in South Korea, the Trump administration quickly stepped up the timeline for THAAD's deployment, in large part because of the increased belligerence from the North. And as of May 2, the system is operational. But another reason for the rapid deployment was to make it that much harder for the next administration in South Korea to reverse the decision. **So far, it doesn't look like Moon's administration is actually trying to reverse the decision to allow THAAD to be deployed, but it is trying to slow it down dramatically.** "We are not saying the two launchers and other equipment that have already been deployed should be withdrawn. But those that have yet to be deployed will have to wait," the senior official said.

Warrant: US considering preemptive strikes against NK (Perlez - New York Times).

Jane Perlez (New York Times). All Eyes on China as U.S. Signals New Tack on North Korea." March 17, 2017.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/17/world/asia/all-eyes-on-china-as-us-signals-new-tack-on-north-korea.html>

BEIJING — **Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson signaled on Friday that the Trump administration was prepared to scrap nearly a decade of United States policy toward North Korea in favor of a more aggressive effort to eliminate the country's nuclear weapons program. Whether that means pre-emptive action, which he warned was "on the table,"** will depend a great deal on how China responds. North Korea relies on Chinese trade and aid to keep its economy afloat, and China has long been unwilling to withdraw that support. Up to 40 percent of the North's foreign currency — essential for buying goods abroad — comes from a network of about 600 Chinese companies, according to a recent study by Sayari Analytics, a Washington financial intelligence firm. **Mr. Tillerson went to China** on Saturday, a day after **saying** in Seoul, South Korea, **that the United States would not negotiate with North Korea on freezing its nuclear and missile programs.** His interactions with his hosts in Beijing, and whether he takes a hard line with China over its support for North Korea, will be closely watched — as will be China's response.

Warrant: Trump and US discussions of a preemptive strike against NK push NK closer to nuking SK (Beauchamp - Vox).

Zack Beauchamp (Vox). "North Korea isn't crazy. It's insecure, poor, and extremely dangerous." July 5, 2017.

<https://www.vox.com/world/2017/7/5/15922446/north-korea-nuclear-war-casualties>

To understand why North Korea is so unstable, we need to start with something counterintuitive: **North Korea is really weak.** Pyongyang is one of the world's poorest countries. Its GDP per capita is estimated at about \$1,000, about 1/28th of South Korea's. It faces chronic shortages of food and medical supplies, depending on Chinese aid to meet its citizens' basic needs. There's a real risk that the Kim regime collapses under the weight of its own mismanagement. **Nor is the North secure from military attack.** While its army is extremely large personnel-wise, with about 1.2 million soldiers, **it uses antiquated Cold War technology while its neighbors to the South are equipped with top-of-line modern gear.** Moreover, the presence of 23,500 US troops in South Korea means any war between North and South Korea would draw in the world's only superpower, though with potentially enormous American casualties. **Facing the twin dangers of domestic instability and foreign attack, the North has devised a strategy for survival that depends (somewhat counterintuitively) on provoking the South and the United States. The North will do something that it knows will infuriate its enemies, like testing an intercontinental ballistic missile or shelling a South Korean military base. This limit-pushing**

behavior is designed to show that the North is willing to escalate aggressively in the event of any kind of action from Washington or Seoul that threatens the regime, thus deterring them from making even the slightest move to undermine the Kim regime. It also sends a signal to the North Korean people that they're constantly under threat from foreign invasions, and that they need to support their government unconditionally to survive as a nation. The problem is that this strategy is inherently unstable. **There's always a risk that one of these manufactured crises spirals out of control, leading to a conflict that no one really wants.** This is especially risky because the North Korean government is deeply insular: Washington doesn't have the kind of direct line of communication with the North that it had with the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, which was vital in preventing standoffs like the Cuban Missile Crisis from escalating. **Maybe the Trump administration responds too aggressively to a provocation, prompting North Korean retaliation. Maybe North Korea thinks it's about to be invaded by the South, leading it to mount a preemptive strike. Maybe South Korea misreads the North's signals and thinks it is about to launch a war, causing the South to do something wild like try to assassinate Kim Jong Un.** That isn't totally hypothetical: Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and a noted North Korean expert, thinks killing Kim is a real option that the South is considering if it thinks war is likely (mainly to head off a nuclear strike before it starts). These scenarios illustrate that a basic truth: **A situation where one side is constantly provoking the other is extremely volatile. There are lots of ways for things to go wrong, all of which stem from the fundamental insecurity of the North Korean regime.** "In North Korea at least, everything is organized around the fear that they will be invaded, and that Kim Jong Un will end up like Muammar Qaddafi in Libya or Saddam Hussein in Iraq," Lewis told Vox in an April interview. "It's easy to see how things could get out of hand in a hurry."

Warrant: Since NK would lose a war if they act just a second late, they are incentivized to act when they feel threatened (Fisher - New York Times).

Max Fisher (New York Times). "North Korea and Its Weapons Programs Are Now a Fact of Life." July 7, 2017.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/world/asia/north-korea-weapons.html>

In the Cold War, this kept the United States and the Soviet Union locked in a comparable balance of power. On the Korean Peninsula, it does something otherwise impossible: It puts North Korea on equal footing with the United States. North Korea's strategy makes clear that even a limited strike, either to eliminate its weapons or its leadership, would prompt a full retaliation. **Because North Korea sees the weapons as its only hope for survival, losing them risks provoking the country's fears of a full invasion or an effort to topple the government. And because Pyongyang believes it can survive such a threat only by retaliating, its incentive is to do so before it is too late. The United States' overwhelming strength is, paradoxically, also a weakness. North Korean leaders must consider even a limited strike or accidental escalation as the start of a war they could lose within hours, virtually forcing them to immediately execute their full war plan.** This constrains American options. Even a single strike — for example, to destroy a missile or merely to punish the government — risks provoking a full war. This has held for decades. In 1969, when North Korea shot down a United States Navy plane, killing 31, the Nixon administration chose not to respond, fearing that North Korea would misperceive any attack as the start of a war. This logic has held as the stakes have grown.

Warrant: Squo foreign policy makes NK first strike more likely (Menon - The Nation).

Rajan Menon (The Nation). "Trump's Handling of North Korea Is Going to Lead Us Straight Into Nuclear Disaster." June 5, 2017.

<https://www.thenation.com/article/trumps-handling-north-korea-going-lead-us-straight-nuclear-disaster/>

Clearly, the North's leaders reject the proposition that American approval is required for them to build nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles. Like his father, Kim Jong-il, and his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, the founder of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (or DPRK, North Korea's official name), Kim Jong-un is an ardent nationalist who regularly responds to threats by upping the ante. Trump's national security adviser, General H.R. McMaster, characterized Kim as "unpredictable." In reality, the Korean leader, like his father and grandfather before him, has been remarkably consistent: He has steadfastly refused to stop testing either nuclear weapons or their possible delivery systems, let alone "denuclearize" the Korean peninsula, as McMaster demanded. **Indeed, from Pyongyang's perspective Trump may be the unpredictable one. On one day, amid press reports that the Pentagon was considering a preventive strike using means ranging from Tomahawk cruise missiles to cyber attacks, the president declared**

ominously that North Korea “is a problem, a problem that will be taken care of.” He followed up by warning Chinese President Xi Jinping, whom he was then hosting at his Mar-a-Lago estate, that if China wouldn’t rein in Kim, the United States would act alone. Not so long after, Trump suddenly praised Kim, calling him a “pretty smart cookie,” presumably impressed that the North Korean leader wasn’t even 30 years old when he succeeded his father. On yet another day, the president announced that he would be “honored” to meet Kim under the right circumstances and would do so “absolutely.” The roller-coaster ride otherwise known as the presidency of Donald Trump has many people perplexed. Trump’s boosters believe that the president’s unpredictability gives him leverage against adversaries. **But in the event of a military crisis on the Korean peninsula, Trump’s pendulum-like behavior could lead North Korea’s leaders to conclude that they had best prepare for the worst—and so strike first.** That prospect makes the Kim-Trump combination not just dangerous but quite possibly deadly.

Internal Struggles Warrant

North Korea is more likely to attack right more (Smith - NBC News).

Lester Holt and Alexander Smith, NBC News. April 3, 2017, “North Korean Defector Tells Lester Holt ‘World Should Be Ready.’” <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/north-korean-defector-tells-lester-holt-world-should-be-ready-n741901> — MW
President Donald Trump told the Financial Times newspaper on Monday that “something had to be done” about North Korea. This came after Defense Secretary James Mattis said the country “has got to be stopped” and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said military action was “on the table.” **“It does feel more dangerous — I’ll give you three reasons,” according to Adm. James Stavridis,** an NBC News analyst and dean of **the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in Massachusetts.** **“One is [Kim’s] own precarious situation in command of the nation. Number two is the instability in South Korea. We’ve just seen the South Korean president indicted, arrested, and incarcerated.”** “And, **number three, a new and more aggressive American foreign policy coming from Washington,**” he added.

.....NK

collapse imminent, which could lead to last resort attack (Reals - CBS).

Tucker Reals, CBS News. April 5, 2013, “Is it safe to back North Korea into a corner?” <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/is-it-safe-to-back-north-korea-into-a-corner/> — MW
“There’s a lot of strategists and analysts out there who are trying to project whether or not the North can actually come back from their rhetoric, whether or not they’re going to be forced into some kind of provocation because they have so-much threatened it,” he told national security correspondent Bob Orr. “This is, in some ways, a test-case for balancing the **need to demonstrate force**, without adding fuel to the flames and being too provocative,” added Zarate. Delury’s assessment was more urgent: **“The more you back North Korea into a corner, the more they’re going to lash out. They’re not going to capitulate. They’re never going to back down. It’s no surrender.”**

North Korean collapse is inevitable — economic stagnation, food shortage, harsher sanctions, and increasing social instability (Ting - South China Morning Post).

Deng Yuwen and Huang Ting, South China Morning Post. May 18, 2016, “Collapse of the North Korean regime appears inevitable, and the world needs to prepare for it.” <http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1946189/collapse-north-korean-regime-appears-inevitable-and-world> — MW
The seventh ruling Worker’s Party congress in North Korea, the first in 36 years, turned out to be a coronation for Kim Jong-un, formalising the system centred on the young leader and promoting the party’s status vis-à-vis the army’s. The national byungjin strategy, which calls for securing a nuclear arsenal while seeking to develop the economy, was re-emphasised. **A five-year plan was put forward to show the government’s commitment to economic problems,** especially the supply of electricity, as Kim admitted that **lack of power has affected economic development and improvement of people’s living standards.** The general idea from the congress was thus that **Pyongyang would devote greater efforts to economic reform,** pay more attention to developing its economy and improve people’s lives. However, in reality, the **plan merely opens the door to reform just a crack instead of pushing hard. Without such opening up, reforms will not make significant**

progress. So there is still much uncertainty over North Korea's future. **With the significant drop in grain output and reduction of food aid as a result of increased international sanctions, North Korea is this year facing the most serious food problem in recent years.** According to the UN World Food Programme, **there is already a shortfall of 1.1 million tonnes of food, and a quarter of children are severely malnourished.** There have been signs that Pyongyang is preparing to test a fifth nuclear weapon and more missiles. If **Kim** goes his own way, regardless of opposition from the international community, he **will surely bring harsher sanctions upon his nation, which will affect his plan to build North Korea into economic power.** Thus, while it is still hard to judge North Korea in full, **there remains a high probability of regime collapse.** Unless **Pyongyang gives up its nuclear programme, the byungjin strategy is bound to fail. Even an economic recovery and improvement in people's livelihoods is unlikely to change this trend.** Harsh sanctions have left many from the upper classes at odds with the **leadership and led to a growing number of defectors.** In the most recent case, 13 employees of a North Korean-run restaurant in Ningbo (寧波) defected to the South – the largest single group in the past decade. Trouble usually arises within one's own boundaries. **Once those who have benefited from the regime in the past start to become dissatisfied with the government and seek an escape route, the collapse of the Kim dynasty,** built on the basis of lies and repression, **is just around the corner.** There may only be 10 to 15 years left for the Kim family to govern, and **a collapse could begin at any time.** So, how would such a scenario play out? There are several possibilities. First, **if the economy fails to pick up in the long term, more people will be pushed into extreme poverty, causing general dissatisfaction with the government, leading to more and more people from all classes seeking to flee the country.** Under such circumstances, **the collapse only needs a catalyst. With UN sanctions biting, it is impossible for Pyongyang to quickly solve the problems of food and electricity shortages. Sanctions will increasingly isolate North Korea,** preventing it from gaining the necessary funds, technology and assistance to spur growth. Thus, **in the long term, with no economic recovery, dissatisfaction will grow among the people. With widespread poverty and general social discontent, it would be increasingly hard for the government to deal with any emergency caused by policy mistakes, something which is common in a totalitarian regime.** Second, **in order to solve the problem of a lack of food to support a large army, Pyongyang would have to promote self-reliance** among its citizens, **relax control over the economy in a limited way and, to some extent, even allow some form of capitalism.** In its fragile state, **North Korea would also be increasingly vulnerable to natural disasters. Without external aid,** which has shored up the government in the past during such calamities, **Pyongyang would find it difficult,** if not impossible, to handle any natural or man-made disaster on its own. **The possibility of an internal coup also exists; the moody and unstable nature of the totalitarian regime leads to fear and insecurity that could bubble over into a bloody internal power struggle.** It is believed that **it was fear of a coup that prompted Kim to execute his uncle, Jang Song-taek, and other veterans. The congress seemed to further consolidate Kim's power, but its stability is very superficial and new dissenters could be created by the regime's actions at any moment.** Lastly, **outside intervention, including a targeted assassination and military strikes, is possible.** In terms of its capabilities, **there would be little North Korea could do if the US decided to press ahead with such an option.** In such circumstances, **it would be difficult for Kim and his family to survive challenges at home and abroad. In any of the above scenarios, great calamity would befall a Pyongyang that is already suffering much stress and danger. The collapse of North Korea is just a matter of time; it is important for the international community to realise this, explore the issue and be prepared for the inevitable chain reactions.**

North Korean collapse is likely and causes great power war — the status quo is unsustainable (Lankov - Kookmin University).

Lankov 16 — Andrei Lankov, professor of Korean Studies at Kookmin University, Seoul, a Russian scholar of Asia and a specialist in Korean studies, completed his undergraduate and graduate studies at Leningrad State University, attended Pyongyang's Kim Il-sung University, author of *The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia*, 2016 ("The grave nuclear risk of North Korean instability," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July 7th, Available Online at <http://thebulletin.org/north-koreas-nuclear-weapons-what-now>, Accessed 07-26-2016, AS)

The "Korean question" is a bit like a dormant volcano. Nothing especially dramatic has happened for decades, and the status quo has now persisted for so long that people have grown used to it. **But the sad, simple fact is that the status quo on the peninsula is inherently unstable.** Sooner or later, **North Korea's political and economic elite is likely to fall. This will present the very risky prospect of violent chaos**, in the style of Libya or Syria, **in a country that possesses nuclear weapons—and that lies along a strategic fault line where the interests of the United States, China, and Russia meet and often clash.** Roots of instability. In 1948, **when the pro-Soviet regime in Pyongyang and the pro-US regime in Seoul came into existence, neither side recognized its counterpart's right to exist.** Each government considered itself the sole legitimate authority for the peninsula. Each claimed unification as a long-term goal—though only on its own terms. But **while the Stalinist regime in the North inherited from Japan's colonial government the most advanced industrial economy in East Asia outside Japan itself, the right-wing dictatorship in the South took over an agricultural backwater. Over the course of a couple of decades, the tables were turned.** The North Korean economy, after a short period of growth, stagnated and began to fall apart. The South became a showpiece, an unmitigated economic success. Today, depending on how you calculate it, **the per capita income gap between the North and South is between 1:14 and 1:40. This may be the widest gap separating any pair of countries with a common land border.** The average South Korean enjoys roughly the same purchasing power as someone in France or Italy. The average North Korean can buy about as much as someone in Uganda or Sierra Leone. Thus **the South**, at least potentially, **exerts a powerful allure for North Koreans—who therefore are not supposed to know what goes on in the South lest they become restive and unmanageable. Pyongyang bans tunable radios; allows internet access only for very senior officials** (as well as foreigners); and **exerts strict control over the nation's few foreign residents.** International observers tend to view such restrictions as paranoid. But **these measures are vital to the regime's survival. So are Pyongyang's massive security bureaucracy and its large number of camps for political prisoners.** In the North, **anyone with dangerous ideas must be dealt with promptly and severely.** Making matters worse, **members of the North Korean elite** (semi-hereditary on all levels) **believe that regime collapse would amount to their personal downfall and perhaps even death. If Korea is unified** according to the German model—the only realistically conceivable example—**the North Korean elite expects to receive no share of power. Thus members of the elite are determined to survive and, if things get ugly, to fight. In recent years, North Korea's economic situation has improved a good deal**—not least because Kim Jong-un, contrary to common perception, is a reasonably good economic manager. **Famine is a thing of the past, and entrepreneurs are taking over the economy despite Pyongyang's fierce Stalinist rhetoric.** Though the private sector remains technically illegal, it is tolerated, and recently it has even been quietly encouraged. **People in North Korea today are much better fed and dressed than at any point since the late 1940s. But this economic success doesn't make much political difference in the North. When North Koreans assess their lifestyle, their benchmark is not the famine of the late 1990s—but rather China and South Korea**, which are still light-years ahead of the North. Moreover, **people in the North live under the mighty illusion that, in the event of unification, they would instantly attain the living standard enjoyed by people in Seoul.** In the long run, **the status quo is unsustainable. The regime's survival depends on maintaining unity among the elite**—not just second- and third-generation apparatchiks from established families but also newly rich business leaders. **It depends on continued success in controlling and terrifying the North Korean people. And it depends on maintaining the country's isolation**—an **increasingly difficult task amid a global revolution in information technology. Nations with a stake in peace on the Korean Peninsula had better devote**

hard thought now to the prospect of a Syrian-style crisis in the North—a crisis in which nuclear weapons could be very much in play.

NK collapse imminent, which could lead to last resort attack (Millar - Express).

Joey Millar (Express). "Desperate North Korea could spark WORLD WAR THREE to stave off collapse." May 26, 2016.

<http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/674104/north-korea-ww3-world-war-three-kim-jung-un-collapse>

Desperate North Korea could spark WORLD WAR THREE to stave off collapse **KIM JUNG-UN could start World War Three in a desperate final bid to avoid the collapse of his North Korean hermit state**, a high-ranking security expert has claimed. **The crackpot dictator is under pressure due to harsh sanctions, food shortages and rising dissatisfaction among the population** - something the former commander of US troops in Korea claims **could lead to a devastating war on the West**. General Walter Sharp said: "First off, I believe there will be strong provocations, strong attacks by North Korea that could quickly escalate into a much bigger conflict. **It's not business as usual on the Korean peninsula. [The economy] is clearly not meeting the needs of the people of North Korea.**" His claim as echoed by Wendy Sherman, former US undersecretary of state, who believes **Kim Jung-un's actions are going to become increasingly volatile as his support drops**. She said: **It is becoming increasingly clear that the status quo likely is not sustainable. Unexpected changes, including sudden regime collapse or a coup, cannot be ruled out.**" A North Korean attack on its South Korean rivals would spark a furious response from America, Japan and their Western allies, including Britain. The ultra-secretive state's allies of China and Russia may also join the fray, which could quickly escalate into an all-out world war. However, General Sharp believes Kim Jung-un may be forced from power before matters escalate so seriously. He said: "There will be instability in North Korea that I believe will lead to the collapse of North Korea much sooner than many of us think." If a war did break out between North and South Korea, one million people would be killed and the peninsula would be devastated, according to one academic. In his book, *The Impossible State*, former White House adviser Victor Cha said the North has the ability to pound its rival with half a million artillery shells an hour. In his description of an attack, Mr Cha said Kim Jung-un could use 600 chemical weapons to destroy airports, preventing the terrified population from escaping, before sending 700,000 North Korean troops and 2,000 tanks across the border through secret underground invasion tunnels.

Nuclear Proliferation

Link: US must show resolve to security in Southeast Asia or else allies will develop nuclear weapons (Santoro - Washington Quarterly).

David Santoro (The Washington Quarterly). "Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age." May, 20 2015.

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2015.1038182>

Recognizing the new assurance imperative and the consequences should assurance fail, the Obama administration has worked relentlessly to strengthen extended deterrence and assurance in Northeast Asia. The administration has taken steps to strengthen extended deterrence while increasing its political, economic, and military engagement, including establishing regular extended deterrence dialogues with Japan and Korea. These efforts have achieved considerable progress, but important assurance challenges remain. To keep extended deterrence credible in the eyes of allies, **the United States must address their anxiety** about low-level provocations and decoupling pressures **by sustaining key conventional and nuclear capabilities**, maintaining dialogue and consultations, **[and] effectively signaling U.S. interests and resolve**, and deepening political and economic integration. **Failing to do so would** jeopardize regional security, weaken the U.S. alliance system, and **risk driving allies to develop nuclear weapons capabilities of their own**.

Impact: Nuclear arms race would destabilize the region (Avery - Congressional Research Service).

Emma Avery (Congressional Research Service/Specialist in Asian Affairs) "Japan's Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US Interests" *Fas.org*. October 20, 2016. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf>

To many security experts, the most alarming possible consequence of **a Japanese decision to develop nuclear weapons would [result in] be the development of a regional arms race**.³³ The fear is based on the belief that **a**

nuclear-armed Japan could compel South Korea to develop its own program; encourage China to increase and/or improve its relatively small arsenal; and possibly inspire Taiwan to pursue nuclear weapons. This in turn might have spill-over effects on the already nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. **The prospect—or even reality—of several nuclear states rising in a region that is already rife with historical grievances and contemporary tension could be deeply destabilizing.** The counter-argument, made by some security experts, is that nuclear deterrence was stabilizing during the Cold War, and a similar nuclear balance could be achieved in Asia. However, most observers maintain that the risks outweigh potential stabilizing factors.

Nuclear Blackmail

Link: North Korea will use the threat of a nuclear attack to limit SK and US response to provocations and attacks (Hill - University of Denver).

Christopher R. Hill (University of Denver). "North Korea's Real Strategy." June 20, 2017.

<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/north-korea-nuclear-program-invasion-by-christopher-r-hill-2017-06>

DENVER – North Korea's quest for nuclear weapons is often depicted as a "rational" response to its strategic imperatives of national security and regime survival. After all, the country is surrounded by larger, supposedly hostile states, and it has no allies on which it can rely to come to its defense. It is only logical, on this view, that Kim Jong-un wants to avoid the mistake made by Iraq's Saddam Hussein and Libya's Muammar el-Qaddafi, both of whom would still be alive and in power had they acquired deliverable nuclear weapons. In fact, **North Korea's appetite for nuclear weapons is rooted more in aggression than pragmatism. North Korea seeks nothing less than to decouple the United States from its South Korean partner – a split that would enable the reunification of the Korean Peninsula on Kim's terms.** In other words, North Korea does not want only to defend itself; it wants **[and] to set the stage for an invasion of its own.** Of course, such a scenario is, in many ways, the stuff of fancy. But to be a North Korean today is not necessarily to accept the world as it is. And North Korean propaganda continues to reiterate the view that the Korean Peninsula consists of one people, sharing one language and one culture, indivisible – except by outsiders like the US. By this logic, the North needs to find a way to discourage those outsiders from intervening in the peninsula's affairs. As it stands, the US-South Korea relationship operates on the basis of something like the North Atlantic Treaty's collective-defense clause, Article 5: any North Korean aggression against South Korea will, it is assured, be met by the combined forces of South Korea and the US. Such a counterattack would be decisive, ensuring the total destruction of the North Korean regime. **If North Korea had long-range nuclear weapons, however, it might be able to change the strategic calculus, by threatening to launch a nuclear attack on the US mainland in response to US intervention on the Korean Peninsula.** The US might intervene anyway, launching its own devastating attack on North Korea. But it might also choose not to risk casualties on its own soil. If the US did shirk its collective-defense responsibilities, South Korea would still have plenty of recourse against its northern neighbor. After all, South Korea's conventional forces are far better trained, equipped, and motivated than their North Korean counterparts. But it is hard to say whether the North Koreans know that. Like many dictatorships before them, they may be the first to believe their own propaganda – in this case, that they can succeed against a South Korean foe that is not buttressed by American military might.

Link: NK will use nuclear weapons to attack SK without fearing a significant response. (ex) Pakistan-India and NK provocations in 2010 (Lewis - Johns Hopkins University).

Jeffrey Lewis (38 North/US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins). "Frienemies: The North's Nuclear Test Was Bad Enough, The South Shouldn't Make It Worse." February 26, 2013. <http://www.38north.org/2013/02/jlewis022613/>

Apart from simple historical problems with the Chinese case, it would seem that enjoying the security from a nuclear arsenal is simply one option available a newly armed tyrant. There is another option, one that is quite rational—which brings me to seat belts. When automakers initially introduced seat belts in the 1960s, many statisticians were surprised that the number of auto fatalities did not immediately decrease. University of Chicago economist Sam Peltzman argued that many drivers simply "spent" the additional safety afforded by the seat belt to drive more recklessly. He termed this effect "risk-substitution" although it is also known as the Peltzman effect. Although the academic literature on the specific case of seat belts appears more complicated than initially imagined—automobiles are vastly safer today but we don't drive like the Italians—the Peltzman effect has been observed in a number of different settings. I happen to think it is an elegant explanation for the behavior of some new nuclear states. Perhaps, like the belted-in driver racing to the grocery store, **Pyongyang will rationally substitute one risk for another. New nuclear weapons states may simply to choose to spend that security**

conferred by nuclear weapons on other foreign policy goals, like sticking it to a neighbor. There is an argument to be made that this is, more or less, how elements within the Pakistani leadership see their nuclear arsenal—as a shield that permits them to support the groups that launched terrorist attacks against India’s parliament in 2001 and in the city of Mumbai in 2008. Nuclear weapons in South Asia, as Vipin Narang has argued, have enabled Pakistan to adopt “the strategy of bleeding India by a ‘thousand cuts’”—a sly reference to a quotation attributed to Pakistan’s late dictator Zia al Haq. Saddam Hussein, one of Zia’s contemporaries, had a similar notion when discussing the impact an Iraqi nuclear weapon would have on Iraq’s foreign policy: “We are willing to refrain from using [a nuclear weapon], so that we can guarantee the long war that is destructive to our enemy, and take at our leisure each meter of land and drown the enemy with rivers of blood.” Clearly, these men are not safe drivers. Which brings us to North Korea **In 2009, North Korea conducted a more successful nuclear test than 2006, reprocessed more plutonium, and did god knows what with its uranium enrichment program. The following year was a rough one—North Korea engaged in a pair of high-profile provocations in 2010, sinking the Cheonan and shelling Yeonpyeong Island.** Discussion about North Korea’s aggression focused on leadership politics surrounding an ailing Kim Jong Il, which is almost certainly part of the story. But perhaps Kim had reason to feel more confident that the United States and South Korea would simply take our lumps. North Korea, of course, has a long history of provoking South Korea and the United States. Although the number of provocations appears to have declined starting in the 1990s, for much of the Cold War the North Koreans were extraordinarily aggressive. When North Korea shot down a US reconnaissance aircraft in 1969, the classified briefing paper for then-CIA Director Richard Helms included a chronology of recent incidents, which is a nice snapshot of what living with North Korea was like in the 1960s. North Korea’s behavior did not improve with time. A few months after the April 1969 shootdown, the North Koreans killed six US soldiers and one South Korean in the DMZ. We can all name the major incidents that stretched through the 1970s and 1980s: The 1979 axe murder incident. The 1983 Rangoon bombing that wiped out most of the South Korean cabinet. The 1987 bombing of KAL 858. You sometimes see references to the fact that South Korea’s President-elect, Madame Park, was first lady during the final years of her father’s presidency in the 1970s. That’s because her mother was killed in a North Korean assassination attempt on Park in 1974. As you might imagine, **South Korean governments have tended to find such provocations upsetting. It is difficult for any government, let alone a democratic one, to live with a nuclear-armed neighbor that feels emboldened to mount terrorist attacks. Since the problem is the bad guy’s nuclear weapons prevent escalation**, the obvious solution is to escalate the conflict such that the bad guy never gets a chance to launch. Although one might imagine hunting road-mobile missiles all over North Korea, the tempting solution is to target the central leadership—decapitation.

Impact: North Korea will stage attacks and invasions against SK (Rovere - Real Clear Defense).

Crispin Rovere (Real Clear Defense). “North Korea: The Case for War.” July 11, 2017.

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/07/11/north_korea_the_case_for_war_111767.html?utm_source=RC+Defense+Morning+Rec&utm_campaign=ec6206eb8f-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_07_10&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_694f73a8dc-ec6206eb8f-83928945

The United States chooses not to act militarily to destroy North Korea’s nuclear program. North Korea successfully conducts a long-range atmospheric nuclear test, conclusively proving its ability to deliver a nuclear weapon to the American homeland. The U.S. is deterred from further intervention, and over the next five to ten years North Korea continues to expand, diversify, and protect it’s growing nuclear arsenal. Consequences 1. Increased North Korean provocation Having achieved a survivable second-strike capability and a stabilized nuclear deterrence relationship with the U.S., **North Korea [will feel] utterly unconstrained with respect to its neighbors.** North Korea launches conventional ballistic missiles directly at Japan, killing scores of civilians. **Instead of responding with massive force, the U.S. seeks to restrain its ally from escalating, fearful that a collapsing regime will retaliate with nuclear warheads against the United States.** North Korea is co-opted into talks, but instead of rolling back it’s nuclear program in exchange for aid, the international community is blackmailed with threats of violence. The spiraling provocations destabilize the region and U.S. influence in Asia drastically recedes. 2. North Korea invades South Korea **Certain that the U.S. will not be able to intervene, North Korea breaks the armistice with a massive invasion of South Korea. North Korea is pushed back beyond the 38th parallel with American help, but not before millions of South Korean citizens lay dead. In Seoul, thousands perish daily as the city remains under constant bombardment. There is overwhelming pressure to push northward in response; however, the U.S. is paralyzed by the**

fear that a collapsing regime will launch its nuclear weapons against the U.S. In the end, ROK forces invade the north and seize control of the peninsula. At the last, North Korea launches two dozen nuclear missiles into the U.S., devastating several major U.S. cities and killing almost 20 million people. Despite being the victim of large-scale nuclear attack, U.S. options for responding remain elusive, as the North Korean regime is already being toppled.

Impact: Increased provocations and conventional war (Rovere - Real Clear Defense).

Crispin Rovere (Real Clear Defense). "North Korea: The Flaws of Deterrence." July 20, 2017.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/07/20/north_korea_the_flaws_of_deterrence_111851.html

Apparently, Santoro is imagining that conventional deterrence can be maintained even as North Korea achieves a state of mutual vulnerability with the United States - essentially defeating the "stability-instability paradox." This would be a breakthrough in international relations worthy of the Nobel Peace Prize, and nothing in Santoro's argument suggests it is possible here. Realistically, the only way is for America's allies to develop their own nuclear arsenals so they can retaliate against lower levels of aggression themselves, without relying on the U.S. to match North Korea's dominance of the escalation ladder. This is also one of many differences between North Korea today and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, where two European allies had their own nuclear deterrent. This all brings me back to the future scenarios I put forward in my original case for war. **If North Korea develops and expands an ICBM nuclear capability, there will be a series of unacceptable consequences, namely: increased North Korean provocation, nuclear proliferation, and/or a far more catastrophic future war.** Conversely, choosing war with North Korea now avoids these consequences and solves the fundamental problem. I am sobered by what war means and its many costs, but make no mistake, should North Korea continue its current path then war is the only viable choice.

Preserving US-SK Relation

Link: Not Deploying THAAD Represents a Lack of Resolve to the U.S. Alliance (Newsham - National Interest).

Grant Newsham (The National Interest). "The Real Reason China Is Desperate to Stop THAAD." March 15, 2017.

<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-real-reason-china-desperate-stop-thaad-19895>

Chinese opposition to South Korea's deployment of the THAAD missile defense system is less about missiles than about an ongoing effort to weaken—and ideally demolish—the United States' network of formal and informal alliances in Asia that has underpinned the regional order for the last seventy

years. The THAAD controversy that heated up in 2016 once deployment became likely displays a familiar Chinese modus operandi: First, pick a fight over an allegedly offensive act. Next, follow up with vitriol and veiled threats, and then inflict economic pressure—while making bland denials or declaring it the spontaneous reaction of the righteously offended Chinese people. This sequence played out to form in South Korea in recent months, highlighted by verbal assaults on South Korea and fierce pressure on Lotte Group's operations inside China. (Lotte provided the land for basing THAAD in ROK.) Other strong-arm tactics include restricting Chinese tourism to South Korea and blocking online trade in South Korean goods. **In addition to domestic disruption caused by Chinese hectoring and economic sanctions, in South Korea and other targeted countries, opposition voices are energized, claiming the U.S. relationship isn't worth the economic or security "costs" of offending the PRC.** And even if the alliance with the United States remains intact, it is at least shaken and may face self-imposed constraints in the future over worries about Chinese reactions. All in all, a "win-win" for the PRC.

Link: Suspending THAAD deployment strained US-SK relations (Rich - New York Times).

Motoko Rich (New York Times). "North Korea Fires More Missiles as Seoul Puts Off U.S. Defense System." June 7, 2017.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/world/asia/south-korea-thaad-missile-defense-us.html>

The missile defense system is contentious in South Korea and has drawn sharp criticism from China, which sees the system's radar as a threat. Beijing has taken retaliatory economic measures against Seoul, including curtailing the flow of Chinese tourists and punishing South Korean companies in China. During his campaign, Mr. Moon, who won the presidency last month, complained that the United States and the previous South Korean administration had rushed to deploy Thaad in order to present him with a fait accompli. His **decision to suspend the**

installation could strain relations with the White House, which has taken a hard line in confronting North Korea and its nuclear weapons program. It could also hurt American efforts to present a tough, unified position with Japan and South Korea **against the North**. Mr. Moon, who has said he wants to resolve the nuclear crisis through dialogue, has also suggested that South Korea must “learn to say no” to Washington. He has already signaled a softening stance toward North Korea by encouraging aid groups to visit the country, although the North has rejected those offers since Seoul supported new United Nations sanctions. Analysts said that as people protested the Thaad installation and South Korean businesses pressured the government to improve relations with China, Mr. Moon might have decided that suspending the progress of the system was politically expedient.

Link: Suspending THAAD angered Trump and can end up eroding US-SK assurances (Snyder - National Interest).

Scott A. Snyder (The National Interest). “Is the U.S.-South Korea Alliance in Trouble?” June 26, 2017.

<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-us-south-korea-alliance-trouble-21323>

While emphasizing a willingness to go along with the U.S.-led sanctions and pressure campaign, Moon has downplayed resumption of inter-Korean economic cooperation efforts such as the possible reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. He has conditioned such efforts on evidence of North Korea’s commitment to denuclearization. Moon expressed his outrage at North Korea’s responsibility for the death of American college student Otto Warmbier and called Kim Jong-un “an unreasonable leader and a very dangerous person” in a June 20 interview with the Washington Post. Moon’s pragmatic style thus far is a stark contrast to that of his populist political mentor Roh Moo-hyun. But **Moon’s decision on THAAD has reportedly angered President Trump, despite his administration’s assurances that the environmental review will not result in a reversal of South Korea’s decision to accept the missile defense system**. Likewise, **Trump’s longstanding personal perceptions of South Korean defense and trade free-riding could come to the surface at any time**, despite Moon’s pledges to strengthen South Korea’s defense and his country’s substantial financial contributions to the construction of a new base for U.S. forces south of Seoul. The two countries are set to negotiate South Korea’s future share of financial contributions in support of U.S. Forces in Korea later this year, and it is entirely reasonable to expect trade negotiators to review the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement as well. South Korea’s greatest fear is that **bad chemistry between Moon and Trump will erode the assurances on which South Korea’s security is based. These worries are likely to persist, despite deep institutional ties within the alliance**, a deeply shared common purpose in countering growing peninsular and regional instability, and strong public support for the security alliance in both countries.

Link: THAAD is an “alliance decision” and is essential to protect US troops stationed in SK (Griffiths - CNN).

James Griffiths (CNN). “South Korea suspends THAAD deployment.” June 8, 2017.

<http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/07/asia/south-korea-thaad-suspended/index.html>

Relations between Seoul and Beijing have soured significantly as a result of its deployment, affecting South Korean businesses and Koreans living in China. **A spokesman for the Pentagon said the United States will work with the South Korean government "throughout this process." "The US trusts (South Korea's) stance that the THAAD deployment was an alliance decision and it will not be reversed,"** Navy Cmdr. Gary Ross said. Gen. Mark Milley, US Army chief of staff, told the Senate Subcommittee on Defense that the system **is essential to protect thousands of US troops in South Korea**, as well as South Korean citizens.

Link: By blocking measures to protect troops SK erodes US confidence and support for US troop commitments (Snyder - Forbes).

Scott Snyder (Forbes). “South Korea’s Decision To Halt THAAD Carries Hidden Risks.” June 11, 2017.

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2017/06/11/south-koreas-decision-to-halt-thaad-carries-hidden-risks/#5442ed3429ad>

North Korea’s missile advances across the board are cause for concern--and cause for defensive countermeasures. The risks and vulnerabilities are out in the open: South Korea’s indigenous missile defense efforts are developing too slowly to counter North Korean progress, and that could put U.S. Forces in Korea at risk. Moon’s decision carries risks The Moon administration must find a way to enhance governmental transparency and accountability while upholding its credibility as a strong U.S. security partner. **If the perception becomes that**

the South Korean government is blocking measures necessary to protect American forces, that would rapidly erode American public support for U.S. troop commitments. It could potentially provide President Donald Trump with a pretext to pursue U.S. withdrawal of forces in Korea.

Moon's decision also carries another risk. For months, China put the economic pressure on South Korea for agreeing to the deployment in the first place. It could see the halt in implementation of the THAAD deployment as an acquiescence, and thereby invite even more pressure on Seoul on each occasion that China is dissatisfied with new South Korean defense measures toward North Korea. The way forward The THAAD debate has become overheated and politicized, generating risks of miscalculation and overreaction. A pause that defuses the political issues surrounding the THAAD deployment would be a good thing, but a pause as prelude to reversal could do great damage to the U.S.-ROK security alliance.

Solvency: Removing US troops solves for the threat (Bandow - The Hill).

Doug Bandow (The Hill). Worried about war with North Korea? Withdraw from South Korea — seriously. Published 5/2/17.

<http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/foreign-policy/331578-worried-about-war-with-north-korea-withdraw-from-south>.

And even so, U.S. casualties likely would be very high, as American forces rushed in to stop a North Korean invasion backed by biological, chemical, and perhaps nuclear weapons. Overall casualty estimates start in the tens of thousands and race skyward. To trigger the war which the U.S. has spent 64 years attempting to prevent would be extraordinarily foolish. Especially since **there is a very easy way to remove the North Korean target** from American cities. **Withdraw U.S. troops from the Republic of Korea.**

Washington policymakers [are] horrified by the thought that Pyongyang might be able to target America ignore the fact that the U.S. was vulnerable to Soviet attack for most of the Cold War. Eventually China added a rudimentary capability to do so as well. Yet leaders as foul as Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong did not strike America. They didn't want to die or destroy their societies. Attacking the U.S. would have resulted in horrific retaliation. Mutual Assured Destruction is an ugly doctrine, but it worked for decades to keep the peace. Nevertheless, there seems to be a common presumption that 33-year-old North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is irrational, even crazy. He is evil, but that doesn't make him suicidal: he, like his father and grandfather, prefers his virgins in this world.

Impact: U.S. military forces are key to South Korean security (Vu - The National Interest).

Khang Vu (The National Interest). "The Ultimate Nightmare: U.S. Withdrawal from South Korea." July 10, 2016.

<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-ultimate-nightmare-us-withdrawal-south-korea-16904>

Since the end of the Korean War, American troops in Korea have been used for two major purposes: first to deter North Korean attacks and second to constrain South Korean unilateralism. This security structure has successfully prevented a few crises from erupting into full-scale wars, namely the North Korean attacks on Cheong Wa Dae in 1968, the assassination of the South Korean first lady in 1974 and the presidential assassination attempt made by North Korean agents in 1983 in Rangoon. In all cases, Washington succeeded in preventing Seoul from launching a counterattack thanks to the U.S. influence on South Korea's military decision-making process. **A U.S. withdrawal would beyond all doubt create a vacuum of power on the Korean Peninsula, prompting North Korea to take on more provocative actions such as testing more missile and nuclear tests, attacking South Korean troops near the DMZ more often or shelling on the South's ships and islands near the Northern Limit Line. In return, South Korea may respond militarily to avoid losing face, and if initial deterrence fails, the two Koreas will be drawn into another Korean War, an adverse prospect for future U.S. administrations.**

The U.S. should not worry about being drawn into a conflict with North Korea because the presence of American troops has effectively thwarted North Korean attacks in the first place. In addition, keeping American troops on Korean soil is cheaper than sustaining the same number of troops in America, which helps shoulder some of the budget burden from American taxpayers. Maintaining the presence of American military in Korea is undeniably beneficial to both America and South Korea. Second, withdrawing U.S. troops will not result in any breakthroughs in negotiations with North Korea. Pyongyang's nuclear bid does not originate from its fear of Washington's threat; instead, it is the imbalance of power on the Korean Peninsula in Seoul's favor that pushes Pyongyang to resort to nuclear capability. Even if Washington were to withdraw all its troops from South Korea immediately, the South Korean military would still be able to defeat Northern aggression (though a Pyrrhic victory). Moreover, with the absence of American military, miscalculations between North and South Korea will increase, which poses more threats to Pyongyang after than before U.S. troops' withdrawal. Pyongyang clearly understands these facts; thus, it finds no incentive to give up its nuclear program and confronts Seoul in the realm of conventional warfare. Moreover, American withdrawal does not guarantee that North Korea will not carry on with its nuclear programs. The collapse of the Agreed Framework, the Six-Party Talks and the Leap-Day Agreement should serve as a reminder of North Korea's untrustworthiness; therefore, Washington must not make the same mistakes in future engagements with Pyongyang. In the meantime, the best way for the United States to curb North Korea's nuclear program should be to enforce UN sanctions and

persuade China to join forces, and this approach only works as long as the United States sustains its influence in the region. It is better to deal with the devil we know than the devil we do not know.

Impact: Defensive allies reduce chance of conflict by 28% (Leeds - Rice University).

Brett Ashley Leeds (Rice University). "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes." July, 2003. <http://atop.rice.edu/download/publications/LeedsAJPS03.pdf>

In the third column of Table 1, I list the absolute change in the predicted probability of dispute initiation associated with a change in each independent variable while all other independent variables are held constant at their means.¹⁹ In the case of the continuous variables, I report the difference in the predicted probability of dispute initiation with a value that is one standard deviation above the mean versus a value that is one standard deviation below the mean. In the case of the dichotomous variables, I report the difference in the predicted probability of dispute initiation with a value of one on this independent variable versus a value of zero. Thus, when a potential conflict initiator has an offensive ally, the probability of dispute initiation increases by 0.40%. This sounds like a low percentage, until one recognizes that the probability of dispute initiation in the sample as a whole is only 1.17%. For such a rare event, even the small percentage changes that we find in this analysis make a difference. This is easiest to see by examining the bar graph pictured in Figure 1. This figure shows the percentage change in the probability of dispute initiation that can be attributed to outside allies when all other variables are held at their mean values. The first bar shows that **when a target state has an ally committed to its defense, the probability of dispute initiation is 28% lower than the probability of dispute initiation in a dyad with the mean characteristics in the dataset but no outside allies.** The second bar represents the case in which the challenger has an offensive ally; in this instance, the probability of dispute initiation is 47% higher than it is in the case in which neither the challenger nor the target has any allies committed to intervene. Finally, the bar on the right shows that when challengers have obtained promises of neutrality from outside states, the probability of dispute initiation is 57% higher than it is when neither state has any allies. Notably, these substantive effects are similar to those associated with variables like power relations and similarity in alliance portfolios, which scholars of international politics have long considered crucial to predicting and preventing dispute initiation. Given the rare occurrence and severe implications of military conflict, the substantive effects of outside alliance commitments to potential conflict initiators and targets are important enough that they should influence scholarship and policy

South Korea is under the US security umbrella (Oh - Brookings)

Kongdan Oh (The Brookings Institute). "U.S.- ROK: The Forgotten Alliance." October 13, 2008.

<https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/u-s-rok-the-forgotten-alliance/>

But South Korea (the Republic of Korea or ROK) is of much greater importance to the United States. Its gross national income is 35 times larger than North Korea's, and its trade volume 240 times greater. South Korea has been a member of the OECD group of economically successful nations since 1996, and is today America's seventh largest trading partner. In 2008, South Korea also is celebrating its 60th anniversary, and in October, the 40th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) between the U.S. and ROK secretaries of defense, which receives little press coverage. The first SCM (under a different name), was held in March 1968 to coordinate defense strategy against North Korea, which two months earlier had captured the USS Pueblo and launched a commando raid against the ROK presidential mansion (the Blue House). **The U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, signed in October 1953, two months after the end of the Korean War, has guaranteed South Korea's national security. The security alliance** counts as one of the most important of America's alliances, not only **serve[s] to deter another North Korean attack on South Korea**, but also providing a continental base for U.S. forces to face China and Russia and to provide a front-line defense for Japan. **The alliance has also augmented South Korea's military forces and provided a nuclear umbrella**, thus enabling the South Koreans to pursue economic progress with relatively low military budgets. Like other security alliances, the U.S.-ROK alliance is easily overlooked during peacetime. It is sometimes viewed as more of a burden than a benefit, considering the shared cost of keeping troops stationed in Korea and the imposition, if you will, of having foreign troops stationed in one's country—an experience Americans are not familiar with. Sometimes the presence of American forces has triggered large protests, most notably in 2002 when a large American armored vehicle accidentally crushed two fourteen-year-old Korean girls walking along the side of a country road.

Impact Uniqueness (Econ): SK has been able to expand social spending while maintaining equivalent levels of military spending (Bobroske - American Action Forum).

Alexander Bobroske (American Action Forum). "Burden-Sharing With Allies: Examining The Budgetary Realities." November 1, 2016.

<https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/burden-sharing-allies-examining-budgetary-realities/>

Of all of these countries, South Korea spends the least on entitlement programs as a percentage of GDP. (The country spends about 20 percent of its GDP on education and about 20 percent on economic affairs—around two or three times as much as the other countries considered

here.) Still, **the rise in entitlement spending in the last 25 years is noteworthy, increasing about 10 percentage points. Over the same period, defense spending has declined about 1 percentage point despite increasing tension on the Korean Peninsula with North Korea's development of its missile and nuclear programs.** In recent years, however, President Park announced a plan to increase South Korean defense spending in response to rising threats.

Impact: Troops increase FDI and allow SK to have low military spending (Merkel – University of Brighton)

Udo Merkel (University of Brighton). The Politics of Sport Diplomacy and Reunification in Divided Korea. Published 2008.

We need to provide a lot of aid to the North. This is not just about pure survival of the people but also about thinking ahead and avoiding the kind of economic problems Germany faced after reunification. We want to be prepared when we finally reunite with the North. **The status quo with a strong American military presence in South Korea has a number of additional benefits: The US alliance creates a climate of stability favourable for foreign trade and investment and for preferential economic treatment by international financial institutions, exemplified in the 1997 International Monetary Fund bailout'** (Harrison, 2005: 12). The US military presence also provides a very large economic subsidy

to South Korea. **Without the US troops, the South Korean government would have to triple its military budget if it wanted to keep up the levels of defence after a withdrawal of the American armed forces.**

Equally worrisome for Seoul is China's potential reaction to such a collapse as this superpower could either intervene directly or orchestrate a coup and install a pro-China regime that would further complicate a peaceful Korean unification. China's lack of support, on the verge of opposing, unification is based on its reluctance to share a long border with a unified Korea, a vibrant democracy closely allied with the United States. So far, China has provided North Korea with whatever assistance it deems appropriate to support the regime and thus to achieve stability in the area. China also wants to avoid a sudden collapse of DPRK as it could cause a flood of North Korean refugees entering the country. Although over the past 50 years the reunification of the Korean peninsula has been one of the most frequently expressed foreign policy objectives of the North Korean government, its approach to unification is understandably very different, less differentiated and more self-centred. 'The Korean War (1950-53) was a catastrophic attempt on the part of North Korea to unify the peninsula by the use of force' (Hak, 1996: 5). Since the early 1990s the survival of North Korea has

Impact: A reduction of the US military presence in South Korea would force South Korea to spend more on defense at the expense of social and economic programs (Wallace - US Army War College).

Joseph K. Wallace (US Army War College). "TRANSFORMING DETERRENCE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA." May 3, 2004.

<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423758&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>

On a very practical level Korean political leaders understand that a U.S. withdrawal or troop reduction would require a significant increase in their own military budget. South Korea has avoided billions of dollars of

military spending because the U.S. has forward deployed high tech weapons and surveillance equipment such as Patriot Air Defense, Early Warning Aircraft, Apache Attack helicopters and over 225 combat aircraft to Korea. The ROK ranks 57 th among nations with 2.8% of its GNP devoted to military expenditures.²⁸ Compare that to Israel, another 9 country with an enemy at its border and who is ranked eighth in the world at 8.75% of GNP devoted to military expenditures. Recovery from the Asian economic slowdown in the late 1990s has been gradual in South Korea. In a very fragile economy that depends on export of consumer goods and import of virtually all forms of energy, increases in the military budget to purchase weapons systems from the U.S. and Europe would have a significant effect on Korean economic growth. South Korea's failure to significantly increase military spending has long been a source of criticism by U.S. officials who look upon a portion of the Korean economic miracle as having been a free ride on the American taxpayer. Realistically, **most acknowledge that a Korean administration that spends billions of dollars on foreign weapon systems at the expense of social and economic programs would not survive very long.** South Korea's failure to increase defense spending is not due to an aversion to spending on defense when it is provided at little cost by the U.S., but it is an acknowledgement that reductions in domestic program spending are politically unacceptable to the Korean people. In recent agreements the ROK has purchased both F15/F16 combat aircraft but long promised deals for Patriot PAC-3 missiles, EWACs and AH64 Attack helicopters have not come though to fruition. In a recent announcement, the U.S. promised over 11 billion dollars of military aid to help soften the blow to the South Korean economy due to a probable reduction in U.S. presence.²⁹ President Roh was elected to office in 2003 on a platform of political reform and selfreliance of South Korea's national defense. Many Koreans and Americans read his self-reliance defense policy as a call for withdrawal of U.S. military forces. In subsequent statements after his election President Roh stated, "The role of USFK will continue to be important in the years to come."³⁰ President Roh

realizes the economic impact of a U.S. troop withdrawal. **In a regional sense a South Korea without a U.S. presence cannot hope to successfully negotiate on an economic, political or military basis** with a powerful DPRK military threat and will increasingly be subject to the economic or political demands of a dominant China.

Impact: A 1% increase in defense spending decreases education spending by 1.04% and health spending by 0.16% (Bauwens - Lund University).

Mario-Alessander Bauwens (Lund University: School of Economics and Management). "Guns versus Butter: A Budgetary Trade-Off in the MENA Region?." June 2012. <http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordId=2971530&fileId=2971536>

Making use of the fixed effects least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model, our hypotheses of a negative trade-off are confirmed. Increasing shares of defense spending relative to the total central government expenditures (CGE) negatively impact spending on human capital, education, and health. While the negative trade-off between defense spending and health spending is confirmed, the trade-off is significantly more negative for education spending. At the aggregate level, a one percentage point increase in defense spending decreases human capital spending by 0.3 percentage points. **A one percentage point increase in defense spending decreases educational spending by 1.04 percentage points** but only **[and] decreases health spending by 0.16 percentage points.**

Applying interaction terms we find that income growth can play an important role in tempering the negative trade-off between defense and education spending. The level of democracy on the other hand would negatively impact the negative trade-off between defense spending and health spending, a counterintuitive result. We do not find convincing evidence that resource wealth can reverse the negative budgetary trade-off between defense and human capital, education, and health. The rest of the paper is divided as follows. Section II gives an overview of military expenditures and human capital accumulation in the MENA region. In section III the theory behind the guns versus butter hypothesis is explained. Section IV reviews the existing literature with regard to the consequences of military spending. In section V the model, explanatory variables, data and data sources, and the methodology are specified. The results are presented in Section VI. In section VII we discuss our results and the final section concludes.

THAAD Improves SK-Japan Relations

Uniqueness: SK-Japan tensions prevent trilateral summits (Kennedy - Diplomat).

Pamela Kennedy (The Diplomat). "South Korea-Japan-US: A Window for Trilateral Cooperation." April 27, 2017.

<http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/south-korea-japan-us-a-window-for-trilateral-cooperation/>

Tensions between Japan and South Korea are an ongoing concern, with controversies relating to historical issues periodically souring diplomatic relations. Japan recently sent its ambassador back to South Korea after a three-month absence following the placement of another "comfort woman" statue. **The Japan-ROK relationship sometimes prevents top-level trilateral summits with the United States:** Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and former Presidents Park Geun-hye and Barack Obama only managed to meet twice on the sidelines of the 2014 and 2016 Nuclear Security Summits, at the urging of Obama, to discuss regional security. Abe and Park met twice as well in 2015 and 2016. However, lower-level trilateral meetings on security issues, particularly North Korea, are held with regularity, most recently the 9th Defense Trilateral Talks this April in Japan. The three militaries have also conducted joint exercises, including a new anti-submarine warfare drill this year. Such functional steps are necessary to prepare trilateral responses to regional threats. Yet now, more than ever before, the top-level summits matter. The new ROK president to be elected on May 9 will likely make changes to former President Park's hardline policy. The U.S. policy towards North Korea is also in flux. President Donald Trump seemed to give China pause when he declared, days before the April 6 summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping, that the U.S. would consider unilateral action if China did not agree to cooperate vis-à-vis North Korea. China agreed to increase cooperation on April 7, and by April 17, White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer told the press that the Trump-Xi summit was "paying off" and China was already "playing a much more active role." When asked about China's actions, Spicer cited the suspension of coal imports from North Korea, China took this action back in February. Trump accepted China's promise as good enough, asking rhetorically, "Do I want to start heavy, heavy trade or currency manipulation statements against someone who's out there trying to stop what could be a very bad situation?" The administration has also swung between an impulse to show force and a willingness to try negotiation: the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson was (mistakenly) said to be going to the Korean Peninsula as a warning to North Korea on April 9, but Press Secretary Spicer said on April 17 that the administration would not draw any "red lines" with North Korea. On the same day, Vice President Mike Pence announced, while visiting the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea, that "all options are on the table," though the U.S. sought stability "through negotiation." What direction the U.S. policy towards North Korea will take under Trump is guesswork. But the administration intends to prioritize North Korea as an issue that requires international cooperation. Some argue that China's assistance is important, especially because any economic sanctions will fail without China's cooperation as North Korea's largest trading partner. China is also obligated by treaty to assist militarily should North Korea be attacked.

Effective action needs Chinese cooperation to minimize the potential for devastating side conflicts. But Japan and South Korea must not let the Trump administration's focus on gaining China's cooperation allow the North Korea policy to be shaped by primarily the U.S. and China, particularly if the Trump administration fails to hold China to its promises. Lower-level trilateral meetings might become less efficient in planning policy implementation if the messages coming from the top begin to diverge or confuse. Trump is interested in working with U.S. allies, as indicated by an April 13 tweet and his calls to Japan and South Korea on Syria and North Korea. Top-level meetings with Abe and the next ROK president can reinforce Trump's interest by showing him the benefits of close cooperation. Abe and the next ROK president must delve into the regional intricacies of the North Korea threat with Trump (which he has heard from the Chinese perspective), so that he can incorporate the interests of the two allies. Abe and the ROK president can also discuss past policy approaches, ranging from hard to soft, and their combined influence might temper Trump's North Korea policy and prevent it from unexpectedly changing course. If top-level trilateral meetings occur regularly, the benefits can expand beyond immediate security concerns. The three countries share interests in other areas of international relations, such as trade, economic development, peacekeeping, and international norms. Relations between Japan and South Korea might accumulate goodwill if the leaders can demonstrate the positive impact of cooperation. **Indeed, the future of trilateral meetings might depend on Japan-ROK collaboration.** There is no guarantee that Trump will press Abe and the next ROK president to meet; instead, they might need to persuade Trump to join them. South Korea and Japan would do well to leverage trilateral cooperation soon, not only for North Korea but for broader impact and the opportunity to shape U.S. policies that value allies.

Uniqueness: SK-Japan relations are a liability for both nations security (Lendon - CNN).

Brad Lendon (CNN). "US, South Korea, Japan start drills off North Korea." March 14, 2017.

<http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/14/asia/us-south-korea-japan-aegis-missile-defense-ship-exercises/index.html>

(CNN) The US, Japan and South Korea sent a pointed message to North Korea on Tuesday, dispatching high-tech missile defense ships to the same area where Pyongyang fired four missiles just eight days ago. Aegis warships from the US, South Korea and Japan began exercises Tuesday to improve their capability to shoot down enemy ballistic missiles, the US Navy said in a statement. The US Navy called the two-day drills "a trilateral missile warning informational link exercise." "The exercise will employ tactical data link systems to trade communications, intelligence and other data among the ships in the exercise," a statement from the US Navy's 7th Fleet in Japan said. China's Foreign Ministry reacted sternly Tuesday afternoon, calling on all sides to end "a vicious cycle that could spiral out of control." "North Korea has violated UN Security Council resolutions banning its ballistic missile launches; on the other hand, South Korea, the US -- and now Japan -- insist on conducting super-large-scale military drills," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said. In response, Pyongyang accused the US of preparing a "preemptive strike", according to North Korea's Korean Central News Agency, KCNA, "if they infringe on our sovereignty and dignity even a bit, our army will launch merciless ultra-precision strikes from ground, air, sea and underwater," read the statement. Analysts said the Japan-South Korea cooperation in Tuesday's exercise was important. **In the past, South Korea has been accused of not "play(ing) nice with Japan on a variety of military and intelligence issues,"** according to Corey Wallace, a Japan security expert at Freie University in Berlin. He said that was considered **[which is] a liability when it comes to countering the North Korean threat.** A US Navy 7th Fleet spokesman said the current exercises are the third in a series designed to improve ballistic missile defenses among the US, Japan and South Korea. "The partnership between both nations and the US is critical in deterring future North Korean acts of aggression," Lt. Paul Newell said in an email to CNN. Carl Schuster, a professor at Hawaii Pacific University and former director of operations at the US Pacific Command's Joint Intelligence Center, said both Pyongyang and Beijing would have reason to be wary of better military integration between South Korea and Japan. "The last thing North Korea -- or China for that matter -- wanted was Japanese and South Korean defense cooperation. Now North Korea's behavior has driven that to reality," he said China is already upset with the arrival last week of the first pieces of a US-built missile defense system in South Korea. It opposes THAAD -- Terminal High Altitude Area Defense -- saying the missile batteries threaten its own security. Analysts say China fears THAAD's radar could enable the US to see further into Chinese territory and monitor Chinese military movements. The three ships involved in the exercises, the guided-missile destroyers USS Curtis Wilbur, ROKS Sejong the Great, and JS Kirishima, are equipped with the Aegis missile defense system. The system enables early detection of missile threats and provides the ability to track those missiles for interception later in their flights, according to Lockheed Martin, the prime contractor behind the system. Ballistic missiles use a high, arching trajectory to reach their targets. Using powerful AN/SPY-1 radars, Aegis ships closest to the launch site can detect the missiles during their ascent phase. Those ships can fire interceptors to strike the ballistic missile early in its flight, or send tracking data to ships farther along the ballistic missile's flight path, so it can be destroyed when it's near its highest point. Schuster said integrating more ships into the system makes it more capable. "It adds a new dimension to ballistic missile defense, better depth," he said. Aegis can also work with other missile defense systems -- such as THAAD or the Patriot missile defense. The ballistic missile protection systems are not foolproof, however. Though Aegis is touted as being able to track more than 100 targets at one time, and has passed repeated tests, according to the US Navy, it has never taken out a ballistic missile in combat. THAAD has also never been used in combat. And the system could be overwhelmed if North Korea were to launch a series of missiles simultaneously, according to a report from the North Korea monitoring group 38 North. It's also not effective against submarine-launched ballistic missiles launched from south, east or west of lower South Korea, 38 North said. Patriot missile defenses have been tested in combat, taking out short-range ballistic missiles during the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, according to the Arms Control Association.

Link: Japan is vulnerable to a missile attack, even with their own missile defense systems (Fifield - Washington Post)

Anna Fifield (Japan warns citizens they might have only 10 minutes to prepare for a North Korean missile). The Washington Post. Published 4/25/17.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/04/25/nervous-over-north-korea-japan-issues-guidelines-for-missile-attack/?utm_term=.a529f14fcece.

TOKYO — North Korea might be talking about building missiles that can reach the United States, but Kim Jong Un's regime already has lots of missiles that can reach Japan. **So the Japanese government is preparing its citizens in case a missile comes their way — possibly with less than 10 minutes' warning.** The prime minister's office issued new "actions to protect yourself" guidelines this week, including for the first time instructions on how to respond if a North Korean ballistic missile is heading toward Japan. Three of the four missiles that North Korea launched March 6 fell within Japan's exclusive economic zone in the Sea of Japan, the body of water that separates Japan and the Korean Peninsula. North Korea later said that it was practicing to hit U.S. military bases in Japan. North Korea showed almost two decades ago that it has all of Japan in its reach. In 1998, North Korea fired a Taepodong-1 missile — ostensibly for launching a satellite — over Japan and into its economic zone on the Pacific Ocean side. The Japanese government's advice isn't exactly helpful, amounting to basically: You won't get the warning in time, but if you do, then go to a strong building. As North Korea has issued threats and paraded missiles this month, Japan's official civil defense website has had 5.7 million visitors in the first 23 days of April — compared with usual monthly traffic of less than 400,000 hits. Under the "frequently asked questions" section, the government poses the question of how many minutes it would take for a missile to reach Japan. "When a missile is launched from North Korea, it will not take long to reach Japan," the answer reads. "For example, the ballistic missile launched from [North Korea] on February 7 last year took 10 minutes to fly over Okinawa."

Link: South Korean anti-missile defense systems can be used to fill in Japan's security gap (Lendon - CNN).

Brad Lendon (CNN). "How would missile defense systems work against North Korea?" Tue March 7, 2017.

<http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/07/asia/north-korea-japan-us-ballistic-missile-defense/index.html>

The first piece of the controversial THAAD missile defense system arrived in South Korea Monday night, hours after North Korea test-fired four ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan, also known as the East Sea. The Patriot and Aegis systems are already deployed in the Pacific region. THAAD, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, can shoot down short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in the latter stages of their flight as they plunge toward their targets. **But its presence in South Korea might be just as important for its sophisticated radar** -- the AN/TPY-2 X-Band radar -- **which could provide the first warning of any missile launched from North Korea.** Why does that matter? The missiles that North Korea fired Monday were thought to be of longer range, designed for targets beyond South Korea. That would put THAAD interceptors out of range. But **by being closer to North Korea, THAAD's radar could provide critical early tracking data to missile interception systems farther afield, such as those protecting Japan** or US bases in Guam, according to data from the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency. Those other protection systems, including the Aegis and Patriot missile defense systems, are linked to THAAD by the US military's Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications system, known as C2BMC, according to contractor Lockheed Martin. The THAAD battery's radar in South Korea would have detected the launch of the North Korean missiles launched on Monday. Determining the missiles were not targeting South Korea, the THAAD battery would send radar tracking data to US Navy warships equipped with the Aegis missile defense system sailing between South Korea and Japan. The Aegis ships would combine data from THAAD's radar with information from their own AN/SPY-1 radar to track and fire interceptors at the enemy missiles midflight, US military documents show. If Aegis interceptors were unable to make the intercept, data from both the Aegis radar and the THAAD radar could be transmitted via the C2BMC system to Patriot missile batteries, which are stationed closer to the enemy's intended targets and would attempt to take out missiles as they are plunging toward those targets, according to the Missile Defense Agency. Could a North Korean missile still hit its target? The ballistic missile protection systems are not foolproof. Though Aegis is touted as being able to track more than 100 targets at one time, and has passed repeated tests, according to the US Navy, it has never taken out a ballistic missile in combat. THAAD has also never been used in combat. And the system could be overwhelmed if North Korea were to launch a series of missiles simultaneously, according to a report from the North Korea monitoring group 38 North. It's also not effective against submarine-launched ballistic missiles launched from south, east or west of lower South Korea, 38 North said. Patriot missile defenses have been tested in combat, taking out short-range ballistic missiles during the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, according to the Arms Control Association. Which target is in the most danger? The South Korean capital of Seoul, but not necessarily from ballistic missiles. Seoul sits only about 35 miles from the border with North Korea. That means it could be struck by shorter range rockets and artillery, of which North Korea has thousands of units. Civilian casualties in Seoul and its northern suburbs from a North Korean artillery barrage could number in the thousands or more, experts have said. The only protection to such an attack would be an early warning to get in shelters.

Link: Strengthening Trilateral Cooperation between South Korea, the US, and Japan (Rich - New York Times).

Motoko Rich (New York Times). "North Korea Fires More Missiles as Seoul Puts Off U.S. Defense System." June 7, 2017.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/world/asia/south-korea-thaad-missile-defense-us.html>

American military officials noted that the system became operational in April and therefore could provide basic, limited defense in the event of a North Korean attack, even if the additional launchers were not deployed. Opponents of Mr. Moon said the suspension was probably a first step toward rejecting the defense system altogether. Oh Shin-hwan, a spokesman for the conservative-leaning Bareun Party, said in a statement that because the environmental review would take more than a year to complete, "the government does not intend to deploy the remaining four launchers." **"North Korean provocations are occurring almost every day,"** the statement said. "And South Korea is saying that it will defend the country with half of the Thaad system." Analysts said it was too early to predict the outcome of the assessment. The early deployment "was rushed, so if the rush has been slowed down a bit, it's not the end of the world," said Gordon Flake, the chief executive of the Perth-U.S. Asia Center at the University of Western Australia. But, he added, Mr. Moon "has to be aware of a fundamentally changed strategic environment in the last several years in Northeast Asia." **As North Korea rapidly develops the capability to strike Japan and American bases in the region, Mr. Flake said, "decisions that South Korea makes have regional and global implications."**

Link: Suspending THAAD hurts trilateral efforts (Rich - New York Times).

Motoko Rich (New York Times). "North Korea Fires More Missiles as Seoul Puts Off U.S. Defense System." June 7, 2017.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/world/asia/south-korea-thaad-missile-defense-us.html>

The missile defense system is contentious in South Korea and has drawn sharp criticism from China, which sees the system's radar as a threat. Beijing has taken retaliatory economic measures against Seoul, including curtailing the flow of Chinese tourists and punishing South Korean companies in China. During his campaign, Mr. Moon, who won the presidency last month, complained that the United States and the previous South Korean administration had rushed to deploy Thaad in order to present him with a fait accompli. His **[South Korea's] decision to suspend the installation could strain relations with the White House, which has taken a hard line in confronting North Korea and its nuclear weapons program. It could also hurt American efforts to present a tough, unified position with Japan and South Korea against the North.** Mr. Moon, who has said he wants to resolve the nuclear crisis through dialogue, has also suggested that South Korea must "learn to say no" to Washington. He has already signaled a softening stance toward North Korea by encouraging aid groups to visit the country, although the North has rejected those offers since Seoul supported new United Nations sanctions. Analysts said that as people protested the Thaad installation and South Korean businesses pressured the government to improve relations with China, Mr. Moon might have decided that suspending the progress of the system was politically expedient.

Impact: Consolidating Japan-South Korea relations is key to regional democratization and stability through a multilateral regional order, specifically in China and Myanmar (Auslin - Yale).

Michael Auslin (Yale/Director Project on Japan-U.S. Relations/Sciencedirect). "Japan and South Korea: The New East Asian Core." Summer 2005.

<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438705000451>

A roadmap for Tokyo and Seoul's security cooperation exists in their current participation in regional multilateral forums. Both Seoul and Tokyo are members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Community and the asean Regional Forum. The latter in particular provides the only ministerial-level opportunity for discussing Asian security issues.¹⁵ Yet the wide political, economic, and social disparities among its member nations prevent it from forming any type of durable communal identity. As for Chinese attempts to recast multilateral organizations, these gain traction only because of concerns over China's future strength and not due to any natural formation of international bonds. Moreover, at the International Institute of Strategic Studies' 2003 Asian security conference held in Singapore, then-jda chief Ishiba agreed with then-U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz that East Asia did not need a nato-type self-defense organization for now. nato, of course, was a self-defense organization, and creating one in East Asia would mean identifying an enemy and dividing the region into two blocs. Such a move would serve simply to exacerbate tensions and suspicions, China would undoubtedly feel targeted, and it is inconceivable in any case that East Asian nations today trust one another enough to create such an organization. If the ultimate goal of the area's governments is to create some type of all-inclusive multilateral organization, East Asia, then, must leapfrog the European experience to begin forging a region-wide mechanism. But no such community of interests currently exists to allow for that type of evolution. Precisely the kind of shared interests that mark the Japan-South Korea relationship, however, **can lead those two to forming the core of a new security architecture in East Asia** in ways that asean and Chinese initiatives are unable to imitate. Despite limitations on broader initiatives, Japan and Korea can take the first substantive steps towards recasting the regional security environment. They can adopt the asean Regional Forum's planned three-stage evolution of confidence-building

measures, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution to East Asian problems, working in cooperation with both the United States and ASEAN, and perhaps even with states such as China. Although the tcoG and other initiatives noted above have already built confidence in the Japan-South Korea relationship, a viable conflict resolution mechanism will take years to build. That, however, is no reason not to capitalize on the improvements already in place. Similarly, a true Japan-Korea fta would not only be an enormous stimulus toward regional free trade, it would further bind the two nations together on security issues. Negotiating the agreement will be difficult, and inequalities in production will make a long lead-time necessary for it to be workable, but there is already the political will to start exploring the concept. With that will come a clearer recognition of the common interests linking the two states. Indeed, the specter of such an agreement has already spurred calls from Beijing for a China-Japan-Korea fta, which would have to include strict provisions for transparency, juridical mechanisms, and confidence-building measures. The emergence of such a relationship, and the potential participation of China, will likely spill over to larger issues of human rights and security. The Broader Face of Security The Japan-South Korea relationship could influence East Asian politics in yet another way. The two represent powerful examples of the liberal democratic system. Their undeniable social and economic advances should be leveraged into a regional role encouraging the spread of the rule of law, market liberalization, and social progressiveness—in short, a joint program to strengthen civil society in Asia. The expansion of democracy in Thailand, Mongolia, Taiwan, and other states offers a historic opportunity for Japan and South Korea to shape the future. In particular, the two can identify liberalizing and at-risk nations, targeting aid and expanded relations. They can increase the number of academic, intellectual, and artistic exchanges and grassroots programs with those countries; negotiate more favorable loan packages; and serve as a repository of technical and legal expertise. Cultural exchange organizations such as the Japan and Korea Foundations can provide initial funding, and established venues such as the Japan Center for International Exchange (jcie) and the International House of Tokyo offer the infrastructure and expertise for running meaningful exchange programs. Not least important, this perhaps is the most attractive way to interact with China, seeking to integrate it more fully into a new set of regional norms defined by the success of Japan and Korea. In the same way, the Japan-South Korea relationship can serve as the nucleus of a liberal bloc in East Asia designed to project a common political front against failing or rogue states. The case of North Korea is obvious, and perhaps unique, but regional pressure on Myanmar could also be more effective with a push led by Japan and South Korea. The Japan-South Korea relationship can also help manage the transition to a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula. The necessary human and financial capital can come largely from those two countries, and a clear Japanese commitment to helping produce a liberal, democratic, stable, one-Korea will go a long way toward dispelling the lingering resentments of colonialism and war. Taiwan, of course, is the biggest wildcard in all of this. By rights, it should be part of the Japan-South Korea relationship, as another liberal, democratic, free-market state. The unique problem of Sino-Taiwanese relations, the longstanding U.S. position against Taiwanese independence, and the effective diplomatic isolation of Taiwan due to Chinese pressure make it an extremely sensitive issue. Yet the trends discussed in this article affect Taiwan just as much as they affect Japan and South Korea. If the Japan-South Korea relationship strengthens and evolves to play a role like the one envisioned here, then the course of events in East Asia may make it unavoidable that Taiwan will be seen as a natural partner of the new East Asian core. In that case, Beijing will have to decide the direction it wants to go, and it will be up to the coalition of liberal states in East Asia to make it clear that there is only one path that will benefit all players in the region. Tokyo and Seoul's ultimate goal in strengthening their bonds is maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The combined economic, military, and cultural power of the two nations is enough to start the process of forming a durable security architecture centered on these two democratic, free-market states. A conscious bilateral policy to work for stability and to spread political and economic norms in the region would naturally attract other states sharing those values, particularly Taiwan and the Philippines.

Impact: SK-Japan relations key to stability and peace (Nishino - Center for Strategic and International Studies).

Junya Nishino (Center for Strategic and International Studies/CSIS). "Japan's Security Relationship with the Republic of Korea: Opportunities and Challenges." 2014.

At the same time, the leaders of Japan and South Korea need to speak to their respective publics more enthusiastically and openly about the importance of Japan-ROK relations and cooperation. It goes without saying that the understanding and support of the people of both countries are essential for the further development of Japan-ROK relations, especially in the field of security cooperation. The political leaders in both countries must distance themselves from short-sighted, emotionally loaded arguments and instead highlight the importance of a long-term vision for Japan-ROK relations. The National Security Strategy adopted by the Japanese cabinet in December 2013 made this clear when it stated that South Korea **[Japan] "is a neighboring country of the utmost geopolitical importance for the security of [South Korea] Japan. Close cooperation with [Japan] the ROK is of great significance for peace and stability in the region,** including in addressing North Korean nuclear and missile issues."³⁷ Japan holds the same importance for

South Korea. Therefore, it is incumbent upon Tokyo and Seoul to explain more candidly and persuasively each other's great importance for their own security.³⁸

Reducing the Reliance on 'Kill Chain'

Uniqueness: North Korean missile tests and Trump aggression has lead South Korea to accelerate and move forward aggressively with the 'Kill Chain' development (Nesbit - US News and World Reports).

Jeff Nesbit (U.S. News & World Report). "South Korea, With 'Kill Chain,' Wants to Up Its Guard Against North Korea." U.S. News & World Report. U.S. News & World Report. 30 June 2017.

<https://www.usnews.com/news/at-the-edge/articles/2017-06-30/south-korea-with-kill-chain-wants-to-up-its-guard-against-north-korea>

But it is the first and most dangerous part of the new military strategy – the "Kill Chain" – that has diplomatic observers worried. Such a preemptive strike would almost certainly lead to war – and not just any war, but regional nuclear war. **South Korea had originally planned to develop the scientific and technical expertise necessary to successfully implement a "Kill Chain" effort by the mid 2020s. But when North Korea claimed it had tested a miniaturized nuclear warhead in 2016, South Korea accelerated its timetable and began to see if it could lease satellite time from Israel or other countries.** It wants to monitor activity inside its northern neighbor, according to Korea Times. But **after Trump won and he started tweeting his threats to North Korea, South Korea announced it was moving forward aggressively with a three-pronged military strategy to respond to a North Korean nuclear strike.** The government considered a huge increase to its military budget built around the three pillars approach.

Solvency: Not deploying THAAD increases SK reliance on 'Kill Chain' (Klingner - ICAS Fellow).

Bruce Klingner (ICAS Fellow, is the Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center. Bruce joined Heritage in 2007 after 20 years in the intelligence community working at the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency.). "South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense." June 12, 2015. <http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense>

Yet China is developing its own missile defense system. Beijing publicly announced that it conducted ground-based midcourse BMD tests in 2010, 2013, and 2014.[37] Moreover, Beijing is attempting to sell its FD-2000/HQ-9 BMD to Turkey. The FD-2000 interceptor has a range of 125 km and altitude of 27 km.[38] China Should Not Be Concerned with a Defensive System. Beijing should be less concerned with THAAD than with Seoul's "Kill Chain" strategy. While THAAD is a defensive system, the latter is a pre-emptive attack strategy. **By not deploying THAAD, Seoul would be more reliant on [kill chain,] a tripwire, escalatory policy that requires perfect intelligence to identify and track a North Korean mobile missile in the field, discern the type of warhead, and assess the North Korean leadership's intentions (training, political gesture, or imminent attack) with sufficient time to attack before the missile launch.** The Kill Chain strategy assumes that the South Korean president would authorize a preemptive attack on North Korea and thus be potentially responsible for triggering an all-out war on the Korean Peninsula with a nuclear-armed enemy.

Impact: A preemptive strike against north Korea would lead war on the Korean peninsula (Gaydos of Fox News).

Ryan Gaydos (FOX News). "North Korea Threat: Experts Paint Dark Picture of What Fallout of Pre-emptive Strike May Look like." April 26, 2017. <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/04/26/north-korea-threat-experts-paint-dark-picture-what-fallout-pre-emptive-strike-may-look-like.html>

Former CIA analyst Bruce Klingner told Newsweek that **Kim Jong Un**, the North Korean leader, **would** likely **hit back with an artillery barrage in the event of a pre-emptive strike** by the U.S. or an ally. "Without moving a single soldier in its million-man army," Klingner said. **"The North could launch a devastating attack on Seoul." From there, a second Korean War could escalate.** Victor Cha, a former National Security Council staffer, theorized in his 2012 book "The Impossible State," that North Korea could start an invasion by debilitating South Koreans with chemical weapons and cutting off options to flee the country. **An**

arsenal of 600 chemically armed Scud missiles would be fired on all South Korean airports, train stations and marine ports, making it impossible for civilians to escape,” Cha wrote. North Korea may be able to equip medium-range missiles with chemical weapons and launch them at Japan and U.S. bases, stemming the immediate flow of reinforcements. U.S. war experts believe Pyongyang would look to overrun Seoul before the allies could prop up South Korea's armies. Cha said a possible **war on the Korean Peninsula in 2017 “would be the most unforgiving battle conditions that can be imagined.”** Cha theorized the U.S. would dispatch about 20,000 troops per combat division, 10 Air Force wings of about 20 fighters per unit and up to five aircraft carriers. Cha added that “U.S. and South Korean “soldiers would be fighting with little defense against DPRK artillery, aerial bombardments, and in an urban warfare environment polluted by 5,000 metric tons of DPRK chemical agents.” Even with North Korea's first wave of attacks, war planners still believe the U.S. and South Korea would come out on top, but **the casualties could be catastrophic.** Gary Luck, the commander of the U.S.-Republic of Korea forces in 1994 under President Bill Clinton, estimated that **a new Korean War could result in one million deaths and \$1 trillion of economic damage.**

Missile Defense Protects SK

Framework

World With vs World Without: If you negate the resolution you are advocating for a world without the deployment of antimissile defense systems.

Anti-Missile Defense Systems Solvency (General)

1. Link: Multiple layers of anti-missile defense systems in SK (Elleman - Johns Hopkins).

Michael Elleman (38 North/US - Korea Institute at SAIS). THAAD: What It Can and Can't Do. Published 3/10/16.

https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/2016-03-10_THAAD-What-It-Can-and-Cant-Do.pdf. 1

To defend against the North Korean missile force, South Korea currently has a mix of Patriot systems with the older PAC-2 batteries to be upgraded or replaced by the more modern PAC-3 by the end of the year. These are supplemented by US deployments of the same weapon. **The PAC-3 system is intended to provide protection for key installations such as airfields, ports, critical infrastructure, military command centers or leadership locations.** Comprised of Extended Range Interceptors (ERINT), an MPQ-53 phased-array radar, launch canisters, a mast group for communications, and a fire-control unit, **PAC-3 intercepts short- and medium-range missiles by colliding with the threatening missile or warhead at low-altitudes** (less than 25 km, or endoatmospheric) **and at short distances** (35-40 km or less) **from its location.** Because PAC-3 destroys targets at low altitudes, it is said to be a 'lower-tier' defense system. **The THAAD system intercepts incoming short, medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles above the atmosphere—exoatmospheric intercept—providing an upper-tier layer of defense when operating in conjunction with the lower-tier Patriots.** THAAD consists of five primary components: interceptor missiles, launch canisters, AN/TPY-2 phased array radar, a fire-control unit, and support equipment—including a power-generation and cooling units. These can detect and track targets at a range of about 1000 km—assuming the target has a radar-cross section of about 1 m².

2. Missile defense can deter NK from using nukes (Park – Kookmin University)

Hwee-Rhak Park (Kookmin University). South Korea's Defense Posture against the North Korean Nuclear Threat: Dangerous Reluctance.

Published 5/26/17. <http://www.icasinc.org/2015/2015I/2015Ihrp.pdf>.

The U.S. currently has 30 Ground-based Interceptors in California and Alaska for its mid-course phase defense. It is planning to increase the number to 44 by 44 South Korea's Defense Posture Against the North Korean Nuclear Threat 2017. It has 30 AEGIS destroyers, which have SM-3 interceptor missiles. It also has developed the Theater High Altitude Areas Defense (THAAD) and Patriot Advanced Capabilities (PAC)-3 as part

of its terminal phase defense. Although there is no reliable information about the BMD of Russia and China, they are believed to be developing similar missile defense systems. **If one has effective BMD capabilities, meaning one can destroy all incoming missiles in the air before they land, then one can make an enemy's nuclear weapons useless.** Christopher R. Hill, who participated in the nuclear negotiations with North Korea as a representative of the U.S., mentioned that **"missile defense could ultimately become the game-changer toward North Korea"** (Hill 2013, 18). However, it is very difficult to build-up sufficient BMD capabilities to intercept all attacking nuclear missiles. BMD capabilities could be an important and safe part of a nuclear defense, but could not take the entire responsibility of the defense alone.

THAAD Solvency

1. Delink: THAAD is different from Patriot Batteries and Aegis Missiles, which are already deployed (Freedberg – Breaking Defense)

Sydney J. Freedberg (Breaking Defense). THAAD Missile Defenses Deploy To South Korea: How Will North Korea, China React?. Published 3/6/17. <http://breakingdefense.com/2017/03/us-deploys-thaad-missile-defenses-to-south-korea-how-will-north-china-react/>.

American THAAD missile vehicles landed at Osan, South Korea today after almost eight months of waiting. Now the question is how the North and China react. Increasingly threatened by North Korean missiles — most recently test-launched just yesterday — the South agreed last July to host the US Army's Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system. **THAAD would provide an additional layer of protection on top of both the Army's shorter-ranged, lower-altitude Patriot batteries already deployed on the peninsula and the Standard Missiles on Navy Aegis ships offshore.** (Pacific Command chief Adm. Harry Harris has argued forcefully for connecting the Army and Navy missile defense networks in his theater). But THAAD radar's greater range means batteries in South Korea can potentially detect, not just North Korean missiles, but planes in Chinese airspace. Experts we spoke to in 2015, after Beijing first raised this objection, said it was not a serious threat to China but rather a pretext for throwing wrenches in the US-Korean alliance — but in fact, Chinese pressure had been so heavy-handed it had made Seoul more receptive to THAAD rather than less.

2. Delink: THAAD has a 100% success rate (Macias - Business Insider)

Amanda Macias (Business Insider). "This is the advanced anti-missile defense system being deployed to Korea — and it has Beijing spooked." March 7, 2017. <http://www.businessinsider.com/thaad-defense-south-korea-2016>

US ARMY MCGREGOR RANGE, New Mexico — **The most advanced missile system on the planet can hunt and blast incoming missiles right out of the sky with a 100% success rate** — and we got to spend a day with it. **Meet America's THAAD system. THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) is a unique missile-defense system with unmatched precision, capable of countering threats around the world with its mobility and strategic battery-unit placement. "It is the most technically advanced missile-defense system in the world,"** US Army Col. Alan Wiernicki, commander of the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, told Business Insider in an interview. "Combatant commanders and our allies know this, which puts our THAAD Batteries in very high global demand," Wiernicki added. That claim has been spot on. This week, after North Korea launched four ballistic missiles into the sea amid angry bluster over joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises, the White House said it was moving forward with the plan to station THAAD on the Korean peninsula.

3. Delink: THAAD is effective at deterring ballistic missile warheads and WMDs (Kazianis - Real Clear Defense).

Harry Kazianis (Real Clear Defense/Real Clear Politics) "Why China Fears THAAD." 3-21-2015. http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/03/21/why_china_fears_thaad_107784.html

China is quite upset at the prospect of South Korea acquiring America's latest missile defense platform, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD for short. However, Xi Jinping might want to redirect his anger at the real problem and why President Park Geun-hye might be considering THAAD in the first place: North Korea. But before we get to the heart of the matter, it seems appropriate to understand what THAAD is, what it can do, and why its important. Back in November, I spoke to Dan Sauter of Business Development for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense at Lockheed Martin to get a better understanding of the system and its capabilities. Sauter explained that THAAD is "a key element of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and is designed to defend U.S. troops, allied forces, population centers and critical infrastructure against short-thru-medium-range ballistic missiles." He went on to explain that THAAD "has a unique capability to destroy threats

in both the endo- and exo-atmosphere using proven hit-to-kill (kinetic energy) lethality. **THAAD is effective against all types of ballistic-missile warheads, especially including Weapons of Mass Destruction (chemical, nuclear or biological) payloads. THAAD was specifically designed to counter mass raids with its high firepower** (up to 72 Interceptors per battery), capable organic radar and powerful battle manager/fire control capability.” THAAD also has one nice feature that is sure to get Beijing’s panties in a bunch--interoperability. Sauter told The National Interest that THAAD is “interoperable with other BMD elements, working in concert with Patriot/PAC-3, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, forward based sensors, and C2BMC (Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications System) to maximize integrated air and missile defense capabilities. THAAD is mobile and rapidly deployable, which provides warfighters with greater flexibility to adapt to changing threat situations around the globe.”

4. Delink: THAAD sensors could have detected NK’s most recent strike (London - CNN)

Brad Lendon (CNN). “How would missile defense systems work against North Korea?” 3-7-2017.

<http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/07/asia/north-korea-japan-us-ballistic-missile-defense/index.html>

(CNN)If North Korea fires a missile at a US target or ally, there are a number of defense systems that could shoot it down. The first piece of the controversial THAAD missile defense system arrived in South Korea Monday night, hours after North Korea test-fired four ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan, also known as the East Sea. The Patriot and Aegis systems are already deployed in the Pacific region. THAAD, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, can shoot down short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in the latter stages of their flight as they plunge toward their targets. **But its presence in South Korea might be just as important for its sophisticated radar -- the AN/TPY-2 X-Band radar -- which could provide the first warning of any missile launched from North Korea.** Why does that matter? The missiles that North Korea fired Monday were thought to be of longer range, designed for targets beyond South Korea. That would put THAAD interceptors out of range. But by being closer to North Korea, THAAD’s radar could provide critical early tracking data to missile interception systems farther afield, such as those protecting Japan or US bases in Guam, according to data from the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency. Those other protection systems, including the Aegis and Patriot missile defense systems, are linked to THAAD by the US military’s Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications system, known as C2BMC, according to contractor Lockheed Martin. Could it have detected the most recent missiles? **The THAAD battery’s radar in South Korea would have detected the launch of the North Korean missiles launched on Monday. Determining the missiles were not targeting South Korea, the THAAD battery would send radar tracking data to US Navy warships equipped with the Aegis missile defense system sailing between South Korea and Japan.** The Aegis ships would combine data from THAAD’s radar with information from their own AN/SPY-1 radar to track and fire interceptors at the enemy missiles midflight, US military documents show.

5. Delink: THAAD better than what SK currently has (Klingner - Institute For Security and Development Policy).

Bruce Klingner (Institute For Security and Development Policy). “South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense.” April 21, 2015.

<http://isdpc.eu/content/uploads/images/stories/isdpc-main-pdf/2015-klngner-why-south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense.pdf>

Yet, despite this growing threat, South Korea insists on exposing its citizens to a greater threat than necessary. Seoul resists procuring more effective interceptors, resulting in smaller protected zones, gaps of coverage so fewer citizens are protected, and minimal time to intercept a missile, all of which contribute to a greater potential for catastrophic failure. **The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) would be more effective than existing South Korean systems to defend military forces, population centers, and critical targets at a higher altitude over a larger area with more reaction time than existing systems in South Korea.** Even the U.S. deployment of THAAD BMD to better protect American troops on the Korean Peninsula has been controversial due to Chinese pressure on Seoul. The Park Geun-hye Administration pursues a policy of “strategic ambiguity” in order to postpone public discussion on THAAD deployment. South Korean presidential spokesman Min Kyungwook described Seoul’s position as three ‘no’s’ – “no [U.S. deployment] request, no consultation, and no decision.” But a February 2015 JoongAng Ilbo poll showed that 56 percent of respondents favored deployment of THAAD.

R/T It can’t hit Scud missile (Padden - VOA News).

Brian Padden (VOA News). “For Some South Koreans, THAAD Deterrence Not Worth Risk.” 7-13-2016.

<https://www.voanews.com/a/south-korea-announces-location-for-thaad/3416225.html>

THAAD uses road-mobile launchers and missiles equipped with precise infrared seeking technology to intercept incoming enemy missiles after reentry from high altitude, during their final, or terminal,

phase of flight. This missile defense system in South Korea would be effective against a number of missiles in North Korea's arsenal, including short-range scuds and medium range Nodong and Musudan missiles.

Critics point out that in Seoul and other areas near the inter-Korean border, THAAD's effectiveness is limited against some short-range North Korean missiles and artillery that do not travel into the upper atmosphere. But proponents say THAAD is part of a larger deterrence program needed to counter North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile capabilities. "People like to take a look at one particular weapon system, you know, very short range rockets or artillery and say, well, THAAD doesn't protect against that, so we don't really need this. But you have to look across the whole spectrum of threats," said Daniel Pinkston, a North Korea security analyst and lecturer in international relations at Troy University in Seoul. The South Korean military is also planning to increase its short-range Patriot missile defense system to protect vulnerable areas closer to the border.

KAMD Solvency

Link: KAMD protects SK from land and sea strikes (Ji-Hye - Korea Times).

Jun Ji-Hye (Korea Times). "3 military systems to counter N. Korea: Kill Chain, KAMD, KMPR." 11-1-16.

http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/11/205_217259.html

The military is expected to introduce two anti-ballistic missile early warning radar systems, in addition to the two existing systems, because they are the core of the KAMD that traces the trajectory of North Korean missiles and shoots them down.

The ministry's budget plan for 2017 included the introduction of one radar system, but amid mounting threats from the North's submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), the ministry is moving to modify the plan to secure an additional radar system. In August, Pyongyang test-fired an SLBM that flew about 500 kilometers and splashed down in waters under Japan's Air Defense Identification Zone in the East Sea, showing a significant improvement from past tests. South Korea believes the North will be able to deploy operational SLBMs within one to three years. "**Once a total of four radar systems are deployed, the military will be able to monitor the land in the North as well as South Korean territorial waters, which will enable us to immediately respond to Pyongyang's launch of ballistic missiles**" said another military official on condition of anonymity. The military is also working to secure a budget to introduce more maritime patrol aircraft, possibly the Boeing P-8 Poseidon, as well as making concentrated efforts to develop domestically L-SAM long-range ground-to-air missiles to enhance interception capability.

Patriot Solvency

Link: THAAD Good (Elleman – 38 North)

Michael Elleman (38 North). THAAD: What It Can and Can't Do. Published 3/10/16.

https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/2016-03-10_THAAD-What-It-Can-and-Cant-Do.pdf

North Korea's recent nuclear test and satellite launch have provoked a strong response from the United States, the Republic of Korea and the international community. One result has been a greater willingness on the part of South Korea to undertake negotiations with the United States on deploying the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system on the peninsula to protect it from North Korean ballistic missile attacks.

Adding **THAAD** to missile-defense deployments that already include **[and] Patriot systems** would likely **substantially enhance South Korea's capacity to minimize the damage caused by a large North Korean missile attack.**

However, it is important to note that a layered defense will not be able to completely block such an attack. As a result, missiles armed with nuclear weapons could cause significant casualties as well as damage in the South.

R/T Can't protect areas close to the border (Padden - VOA News).

Brian Padden (VOA News). "For Some South Koreans, THAAD Deterrence Not Worth Risk." 7-13-2016.

<https://www.voanews.com/a/south-korea-announces-location-for-thaad/3416225.html>

THAAD uses road-mobile launchers and missiles equipped with precise infrared seeking technology to intercept incoming enemy missiles after reentry from high altitude, during their final, or terminal, phase of flight. This missile defense system in South Korea would be effective against a number of missiles in North Korea's arsenal, including short-range scuds and medium range Nodong and Musudan missiles. Critics point out that in Seoul and other areas near the inter-Korean border, THAAD's effectiveness is limited against some short-range North Korean missiles and artillery that do not travel into the upper atmosphere. But proponents say THAAD is part of a larger deterrence program needed to counter North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile capabilities. "People like to take a look at one particular weapon system, you know, very short

range rockets or artillery and say, well, THAAD doesn't protect against that, so we don't really need this. But you have to look across the whole spectrum of threats," said Daniel Pinkston, a North Korea security analyst and lecturer in international relations at Troy University in Seoul.

The South Korean military is also planning to increase its short-range Patriot missile defense system to protect vulnerable areas closer to the border.

Link: SK upgraded its patriot defense system (Shim - UPI).

Elizabeth Shim (UPI). "Report: U.S. military upgrading Patriot missile system in Korea." February 13, 2017.

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2017/02/23/Report-US-military-upgrading-Patriot-missile-system-in-Korea/5161487867045/

The United States military in South Korea has begun to upgrade the Patriot missile system currently deployed on the peninsula. According to U.S. Forces Korea on Thursday, **Patriot Advanced Capability-2, a solid-fuel, ground-launched interceptor designed to destroy tactical ballistic and cruise missiles will receive the latest PAC-3 modifications.** South Korean newspaper Seoul Shinmun reported. The Patriot Advanced Capability 3 upgrade includes engineering services. U.S. manpower for the enhancement work arrived at Osan military base last week, according to the report. The U.S. military has said North Korea's missile provocations are driving the Korean peninsula into a "crisis," adding the Patriot upgrade would clearly grow defense capabilities on the Korean peninsula. U.S. Army Secretary Eric Fanning said during a visit to Korea in 2016 all Patriot upgrades would take place by 2018, according to Seoul Shinmun. The latest measures suggest the military may be accelerating its plans for deployment. On Feb. 12, North Korea tested an upgraded version of a submarine-launched ballistic missile it fired last August. The Pukguksong-2 was described as a "new solid-propulsion missile" by South Korea's military. It is believed to have a solid-fuel engine that would make it more stable and cut down the time required for fueling prior to launch. In early February The National Interest reported the United States and its global allies were looking into radar and targeting upgrades for the Patriot missile, so the system could deter against a wider range of drones, rotary wing aircraft and cruise missiles.

Counter Battery Solvency

Link: Counter Battery tactics are the only way that SK can respond to artillery strikes, etc. (Rich - New York Times).

Motoko Rich (New York Times). "In North Korea, 'Surgical Strike' Could Spin Into 'Worst Kind of Fighting.'" July 5, 2017.

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/world/asia/north-korea-south-us-nuclear-war.html>

United States and South Korean forces could be put on alert and bracing for retaliation before any attempt to knock out North Korea's nuclear program. But **there is little they can do to defend Seoul against a barrage of artillery. The South can intercept some ballistic missiles,** with the recently installed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, as well as Patriot and Hawk systems. **But it does not have anything like Israel's Iron Dome that can destroy incoming artillery shells and rockets, which fly at lower altitudes. Instead, South Korean and American troops would employ traditional "counterbattery" tactics — using radar and other techniques to determine the location of the North's guns when they are moved out of their bunkers and fired, and then using rockets and airstrikes to knock them out.** David Maxwell, associate director for the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University and a veteran of five tours in South Korea with the United States Army, said **the Pentagon was constantly upgrading its counterbattery capabilities.** But he added, "There is no silver bullet solution that can defeat North Korean fire before they inflict significant damage on Seoul and South Korea." Based on counterbattery efforts in the Iraq war, **the Nautilus Institute study estimates that North Korea might lose about 1 percent of its artillery every hour to American and South Korean counterbattery fire, or more than a fifth of its arsenal after a day of fighting.** What makes the situation so dangerous is how easy it would be for either side to take action that leads the other to conclude an all-out war is imminent and escalate the battle. The United States and South Korea could hit targets besides artillery, including supply lines and communication facilities, for example. The North could send tanks and troops across the border and drop special forces into the South's ports. Especially perilous would be any hint that the United States and South Korea were preparing a "decapitation" strike against the North Korean leadership, which could lead a desperate Mr. Kim to turn to nuclear or biochemical weapons.

Solvency: Counter Battery tactics can destroy NK artillery at a rate of 1% per hour (Cavazos - Nautilus Institute).

Roger Cavazos (Nautilus Institute). "Mind the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality." June 26, 2012.

<http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/mind-the-gap-between-rhetoric-and-reality/>

Dud rate – the only numbers available—to the DPRK as well as the rest of the world—indicate a dud rate of twenty-five percent. It's like immediately taking every fourth artillery tube away. Counter-battery fires – **shortly after the KPA artillery begins firing, and the political decision has been made, South Korean artillery, Air Forces, and others will begin destroying artillery at a historical rate of 1% per hour.** South Korea has had approximately 50 years to figure out where North Korean artillery tubes are emplaced using every sense available to man and machine. Logistics – in order to move south from the DMZ trace and place the rest of Seoul at risk, KPA must expose approximately 2,500 thin-skinned vehicles each day along three well-defined transportation corridors. Otherwise, KPA grinds to an almost immediate halt without a way to transport fuel, ammunition and spare parts needed to continue moving south. Alternatively, KPA can scavenge from ROK fuel stores and depots if they have not been previously destroyed.

Anti-Missile Systems Impact

Impact: Anti-Missile systems can save hundred of thousands of lives (Baewoo - Security Strategy Studies Department).

Lee Baewoo (Director of the Security Strategy Studies Department). "Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)." April 14, 2017.

Meanwhile, the safety of the local residents living in the area of deployment has also been confirmed through various methods. The THAAD radar safety assessment has been carried out at the same level with TPY-2 radar and was concluded to be safe. That is, it was confirmed that the radar had no negative repercussions for the milieu, air, soil, animals, and vegetation. To detect a long distance, the THAAD battery will be deployed at a high altitude, and radar will be operated more than 5 degrees above ground. It will keep a 100 meters clearance distance, and will be deployed at the inner part, at least 500m inside the base. Obviously, even though there are costs to bear, **deploying THAAD (and PAC-3) will save around 340,000 civilians for intercepting one North Korean nuclear missile and 700,000 civilians for intercepting two nuclear missiles.** As such, there are 4 sufficient reasons to deploy THAAD in South Korea. Need for an additional THAAD deployment: Since THAAD's radar could sweep 120 degrees frontward, at least two batteries are needed to defend South Korea. However, this is under the condition that the THAAD radar is not positioned toward the West Sea, therefore China. Three THAAD batteries are purportedly required to defend the whole of South Korea. There is a need for Seoul to make a swift decision whether to deploy additional THAAD batteries or not. This is because it takes 30 months to make THAAD radar and 3-4 years to produce one THAAD battery.

R/T NEG

R/T Diplomacy

Link Turn – R/T Troop Pullout

1. No IL: Troop withdrawal won't help diplomacy (Vu - National Interest).

Khang Vu (The National Interest). "The Ultimate Nightmare: U.S. Withdrawal from South Korea." July 10, 2016.

<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-ultimate-nightmare-us-withdrawal-south-korea-16904>

A U.S. withdrawal would beyond all doubt create a vacuum of power on the Korean Peninsula, prompting North Korea to take on more provocative actions such as testing more missile and nuclear tests, attacking South Korean troops near the DMZ more often or shelling on the South's ships and islands near the Northern Limit Line. In return, South Korea may respond militarily to avoid losing face, and if initial deterrence fails, the two Koreas will be drawn into another Korean War, an adverse prospect for future U.S. administrations. The U.S. should not worry about being drawn into a conflict with North Korea because the presence of American troops has effectively thwarted North Korean attacks in the first place. In addition, keeping American troops on Korean soil is cheaper than sustaining the same number of troops in America, which helps shoulder some of the budget burden from American taxpayers. Maintaining the presence of American military in Korea is undeniably beneficial to both America and South Korea. Second, **withdrawing U.S. troops will not result in any breakthroughs in negotiations with North Korea. Pyongyang's nuclear bid does not originate from its fear of Washington's threat; instead, it is the imbalance of power on the Korean Peninsula in Seoul's favor that pushes Pyongyang to resort to nuclear capability. Even if Washington were to withdraw all its troops from South Korea immediately, the South Korean military would still be able to defeat Northern aggression (though a Pyrrhic victory).** Moreover, with the absence of American military, miscalculations between North and South Korea will increase, which poses more threats to Pyongyang after than before U.S. troops' withdrawal. Pyongyang clearly understands these facts; thus, **it finds no incentive to give up its nuclear program and confronts Seoul in the realm of conventional warfare. Moreover, American withdrawal does not guarantee that North Korea will not carry on with its nuclear programs.** The collapse of the Agreed Framework, the Six-Party Talks and the Leap-Day Agreement should serve as a reminder of North Korea's untrustworthiness; therefore, Washington must not make the same mistakes in future engagements with Pyongyang. In the meantime, the best way for the United States to curb North Korea's nuclear program should be to enforce UN sanctions and persuade China to join forces, and this approach only works as long as the United States sustains its influence in the region. It is better to deal with the devil we know than the devil we do not know.

2. DA: troop pullout invites, not decreases North Korean Aggression:

Vu 16 Khang Vu (The National Interest). "The Ultimate Nightmare: U.S. Withdrawal from South Korea." July 10, 2016.

<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-ultimate-nightmare-us-withdrawal-south-korea-16904>

Since the end of the Korean War, American troops in Korea have been used for two major purposes: first to deter North Korean attacks and second to constrain South Korean unilateralism. This security structure has successfully prevented a few crises from erupting into full-scale wars, namely the North Korean attacks on Cheong Wa Dae in 1968, the assassination of the South Korean first lady in 1974 and the presidential assassination attempt made by North Korean agents in 1983 in Rangoon. In all cases, Washington succeeded in preventing Seoul from launching a counterattack thanks to the U.S. influence on South Korea's military decision-making process. **A U.S. withdrawal would beyond all doubt create a vacuum of power on the Korean Peninsula, prompting North Korea to take on more provocative actions such as testing more missile and nuclear tests, attacking South Korean troops near the DMZ more often or shelling on the South's ships and islands near the Northern Limit Line. In return, South**

Korea may respond militarily to avoid losing face, and if initial deterrence fails, the two Koreas will be drawn into another Korean War, an adverse prospect for future U.S. administrations. The U.S. should not worry about being drawn

into a conflict with North Korea because **the presence of American troops has effectively thwarted North Korean attacks in the first place**. In addition, keeping American troops on Korean soil is cheaper than sustaining the same number of troops in America, which helps shoulder some of the budget burden from American taxpayers. Maintaining the presence of American military in Korea is undeniably beneficial to both America and South Korea. Second, withdrawing U.S. troops will not result in any breakthroughs in negotiations with North Korea. Pyongyang's nuclear bid does not originate from its fear of Washington's threat; instead, it is the imbalance of power on the Korean Peninsula in Seoul's favor that pushes Pyongyang to resort to nuclear capability. Even if Washington were to withdraw all its troops from South Korea immediately, the South Korean military would still be able to defeat Northern aggression (though a Pyrrhic victory). Moreover, with the absence of American military, miscalculations between North and South Korea will increase, which poses more threats to Pyongyang after than before U.S. troops' withdrawal. Pyongyang clearly understands these facts; thus, it finds no incentive to give up its nuclear program and confronts Seoul in the realm of conventional warfare. Moreover, American withdrawal does not guarantee that North Korea will not carry on with its nuclear programs. The collapse of the Agreed Framework, the Six-Party Talks and the Leap-Day Agreement should serve as a reminder of North Korea's untrustworthiness; therefore, Washington must not make the same mistakes in future engagements with Pyongyang. In the meantime, the best way for the United States to curb North Korea's nuclear program should be to enforce UN sanctions and persuade China to join forces, and this approach only works as long as the United States sustains its influence in the region. It is better to deal with the devil we know than the devil we do not know.

This is more likely and important than any potential diplomatic solution:

1. It essentially means that diplomacy becomes impossible because North Korea would no longer have any reason to negotiate if its principal enemy, the US, was pulling out of the region. Even if the North still was willing to negotiate, SK and the US certainly wouldn't be any longer
2. Even if negotiations were possible, talks have always taken a long time. So while diplomats sit around at the negotiating table making small talk, North Korea will be directly endangering the South's interests.

Link Defense – R/T Troop Pullout

1. Link: No probability of withdrawal from SK; no plan to do it (Kaiman – LA Times)

Jonathan Kaiman (The LA Times). Here's what's driving North Korea's nuclear program — and it might be more than self-defense. Published 5/1/17. <http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-north-korea-missile-worship-2017-story.html>.

North Korea has been demanding the removal of U.S. troops from South Korea since the Korean War, which ended with an armistice in 1953. In December 1955, Kim Il Sung, the country's founder-president and Kim Jong Un's grandfather, said in a speech that "peaceful unification" was the ideal option, and could come about when "we grow stronger" and the "forces of peace, democracy and socialism become more powerful." If that fails, "the problem of reunification might also be solved by war," he said. Pyongyang is probably confident that it can drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington, Myers said. South Korea will elect a new president on May 9, and both front-runners advocate a relatively lenient North Korea policy. **North Korea is unlikely to get its wish, at least any time soon. The U.S. has shown no sign of withdrawing its military commitment to South Korea, and South Korea is, economically, light years ahead of its northern neighbor.** But "we need to distinguish the feasibility of the strategy from the likelihood that North Korea is pursuing it," Myers said. "The world isn't going to become an Islamic caliphate, but that doesn't stop the Islamists from pursuing that as a goal. And the North Koreans are pursuing something more feasible than what Islamic State is." In North Korea, militant propaganda is ubiquitous and shrill. Often, images of missiles are paired with slogans denouncing "U.S. imperialists" and calling for reunification. "Start a war against us, we strike the American bastards first!" says one poster, showing missiles destroying the Capitol building in Washington

2. Delink: Both public and government support for US-SK alliance will prevent the withdrawal of US military forces (Snyder - The National Interest).

Scott A. Snyder (The National Interest). "Is the U.S.-South Korea Alliance in Trouble?" June 26, 2017.

<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-us-south-korea-alliance-trouble-21323>

Moon served as Roh's chief-of-staff and his campaign borrowed directly from the Roh administration's playbook. Moon's decision to temporarily halt implementation of the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) U.S. missile defense system due to

procedural concerns about transparency and domestic environmental standards have reminded Americans of the prickly challenges that beset alliance relations between Washington and Seoul a decade ago. But Moon Jae-in faces a dramatically different domestic and international situation as president compared to the one he experienced as chief-of-staff in the Roh Moo-hyun administration. **Domestically, Moon leads a government that holds a minority of seats in South Korea's National Assembly and South Korean public support for the U.S.-ROK alliance (as well as the deployment of the THAAD missile defense system) is high.** Moon's electoral mandate revolves primarily around the need to root out domestic corruption and address economic inequality; to do so, he must pursue a pragmatic and responsible foreign policy, the centerpiece of which will be the security alliance with the United States. Second, North Korea under Kim Jong-un is different from the North Korea that his father Kim Jong-il led a decade ago. Despite Moon's stated desire during the campaign to cultivate dialogue and renew economic relations with Pyongyang, North Korean missile tests—conducted only four days after Moon's election—served as a wake-up call. North Korea long ago abandoned denuclearization negotiations and has rebuffed early Moon administration efforts to reopen non governmental exchanges. North Korea under Kim Jong-un has appointed military leaders focused on subversion to handle relations with South Korea and has shown little interest in dialogue.

3. Delink: Meeting with Trump reassured Moon of his less hardline approach to NK

Jon Sharman (Independent News). "South Korean president 'more confident' over North Korea after meeting Trump." 7-3-2017. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/south-korea-confident-north-peace-talk-moon-jae-in-meet-donald-trump-washington-a7819066.html>

Meeting Donald Trump has eased the concerns of South Korea's president over their potentially conflicting approaches to peace on the peninsula, it has been reported. **Moon Jae-in plans to pursue his policy towards North Korea "with more confidence" following his meeting with Mr Trump** in Washington, according to a government official quoted by Yonhap. "With regard to our government's resolve to resume South-North talks, it's true that there was some burden from worries that it may undermine [international] sanctions on North Korea," he told the agency. But after **the US President backed Mr Moon's plans for renewed dialogue** those fears appear to have faded, Yonhap reported. **Noting that sanctions are a tool of diplomacy, the two leaders emphasised that the door to dialogue with the DPRK remains open** under the right circumstances," read a joint statement following their summit. Successive rounds of sanctions on Pyongyang have followed its repeated weapons tests. Under Barack Obama, the policy of imposing sanctions and isolating the North diplomatically was known as "strategic patience".

Link Defense – R/T Total Military Withdrawal

DA: Without US presence North Korea would get its way (Revere - Brookings).

Evans J.R. Revere (The Brookings Institute). "2017: Year of Decision on the Korean Peninsula." February 8, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/fp_20170208_evans_revere_krins.pdf

Another priority for Pyongyang is a peace treaty to replace the 1953 Korean War Armistice Agreement. North Korea wants to conclude such a treaty exclusively with the United States. Excluding the Republic of Korea from the negotiations would undermine the South's legitimacy and reinforce the North's charge that the South is a U.S. puppet. The new U.S. administration should expect Pyongyang to make such a treaty a major focus of its diplomacy in the coming months. **North Korea argues that formally ending the Korean War will require the United States to end its "hostile policy," which Pyongyang says is manifested by the U.S. military alliance with South Korea. In Pyongyang's view, to end "hostility" the United States would have to terminate that alliance, withdraw its forces from the peninsula, and end its nuclear deterrence commitment to South Korea. Convincing the United States to do this would then open the way for Pyongyang to achieve its ultimate goal: the reunification of the Korean Peninsula on its terms.**⁷ One important item is missing from North Korea's ambitious: denuclearization. This is no accident. In North Korea's view, denuclearization is no longer a topic for discussion with the United States, especially since North Korea now regards itself as a de facto nuclear-weapon state. ⁸ Nuclear weapons, in fact, have become the key tool by which the North Korean regime plans to achieve its goals vis-à-vis the United States and South Korea. So it is no surprise that North Korea's rhetoric today contains no mention of its past denuclearization commitments.

Link – R/T China

1. Nonunique: Last week China came out in support of UN sanctions and furthering a dialogue with north korea even though missile defense has been deployed (The Associated Press).

NA (The Associated Press/ABC News). "China supports UN action on North Korea while urging talks." September 7, 2017.

<http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/china-supports-action-north-korea-urges-dialogue-49673123>

China supports further United Nations action in response to North Korea's latest nuclear test but also wants to see renewed efforts to begin dialogue involving all sides. Foreign Minister Wang Yi said Thursday. **China hopes North Korea will "see the situation clearly and come to the right judgment and choice."** Wang said. **He said the U.N. should take "necessary measures," but added that sanctions and pressure should spur dialogue and negotiation between the sides toward the goal of a peaceful solution on the Korean Peninsula. "We believe that sanctions and pressure are only half of the key to resolving the nuclear issue. The other half is dialogue and negotiation.** Only when the two are put together can it unlock the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula," Wang said. China is a veto-wielding permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, as well as North Korea's main trading partner and source of food and fuel aid.

2. Just because China wants stability, that doesn't mean it wants to negotiate.

Feldman 17 Noah Feldman, 7-6-2017, "Here's Why China Tolerates a Nuclear North Korea," Bloomberg,

<https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-07-06/here-s-why-china-tolerates-a-nuclear-north-korea> //DF

China, in contrast, wants to be a responsible global actor and **wants to avoid** the **regional instability** that would come from a war. **Trump's mistake is to think that translates into a motivation to do its bidding on North Korea. China knows that the endgame from a Western perspective is regime change** in Pyongyang. **That would probably lead to reunification** of the two Koreas. **With thousands of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, that would be dangerous from China's perspective. Xi is in the process of expanding China's regional and global strategic position. The last thing he wants is to give the U.S. a chance to make a counter-move.** For that reason, he needs North Korea to remain stable. So don't expect Trump's threats to work any better than his blandishments.

3. Negotiations are really unlikely to be successful now because Chinese-NK relations are at an all time low.

Perlez 17 Jane Perlez, 2-24-2017, "China and North Korea Reveal Sudden, and Deep, Cracks in Their Friendship," New York Times,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/world/asia/china-north-korea-relations-kim-jong-un.html> //DF

The exposure of the deepening rift comes as the Trump administration has been pressuring Beijing to use its leverage to curtail the North's rapidly expanding nuclear weapons program. In the last week, the American secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, has spoken with China's senior foreign policy official, Yang Jiechi, and the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, about North Korea. **President Trump has said China can do significantly more to persuade the North to scale back its nuclear program, even as Beijing has told Washington that it holds limited influence. The latest flare-up is likely to further weaken that leverage,** while illustrating the resistance of Kim Jong-un to China's arguments in favor of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. "In terms of diplomacy, I see no solution," said Yan Xuetong, the director of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University. Mr. Yan, writing in the Chinese news media this week, said that **China had no choice but to accept the North as a nuclear-armed state.** That was because **China had only two options: either a nuclear North Korea that was friendly toward China or a nuclear North Korea that was unfriendly,** he wrote.

4. China really doesn't have much control over NK and has a very limited response

Perlez 17 Jane Perlez, 7-5-2017, "China's Strongman Has a Weak Point: North Korea," New York Times,

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/world/asia/xi-jinping-kim-jong-un-north-korea-china-icbm.html?ribbon-ad-idx=4&rrref=world/asia&module=Banner&version=context*ion=Header&action=click&contentCollection=Asia%20Pacific&pgtype=article //DF

But no matter the North's behavior, it would be very difficult for Mr. Xi to declare a red line with Pyongyang, either officially or unofficially, said Cheng Xiaohe, associate professor of international relations at Renmin University. "The ICBM is not a Chinese red line — even the U.S. does not draw that line clearly and unequivocally," Mr. Cheng said. If China did draw such a red line, he said, "China or the U.S. must automatically take retaliatory actions," such as Beijing cutting off oil supplies to North Korea. But China cannot afford to squeeze the North so hard — by cutting off fuel, for example, or basic trade — that the country destabilizes, sending refugees pouring over the border. Mr. Xi is at least publicly expressing disapproval of North Korea's latest actions. He was in Russia visiting President Vladimir V. Putin when the North announced it had successfully tested an ICBM. The two leaders issued a joint statement calling for negotiations that would aim to freeze the North's arsenal in exchange for limitations on the American military posture in South Korea. Instead of penalizing North Korea, China has been calling for such negotiations for many months, but the Trump administration has declined. Beyond cracking down on trade between the two nations, Mr. Xi holds very few cards against North Korea, and he has little choice but to rely on a kind of strategic hesitation, said a Chinese analyst of foreign affairs who sometimes advises the government.

5. North Korea can just pivot to the black market, like they just did by selling weapons to Egypt.

(Warrick - Wash Post) Joby Warrick, 17, 10,01,17 A North Korean ship was seized off Egypt with a huge cache of weapons destined for a surprising buyer, Washington Post
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/a-north-korean-ship-was-seized-off-egypt-with-a-huge-cache-of-weapons-destined-for-a-surprising-buyer/2017/10/01/d9a4e06e-a46d-11e7-b14f-f41773cd5a14_story.html, 10-9-2017, (NK)

Last August, a secret message was passed from Washington to Cairo warning about a mysterious vessel steaming toward the Suez Canal. The bulk freighter named Jie Shun was flying Cambodian colors but had sailed from North Korea, the warning said, with a North Korean crew and an unknown cargo shrouded by heavy tarps. Armed with this tip, **customs agents** were waiting when the ship entered Egyptian waters.

They **swarmed the vessel and discovered, concealed under bins of iron ore, a cache of more than 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades.** It was, as a United Nations report later concluded, the "largest seizure of ammunition in the history of sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." But who were the rockets for? The Jie Shun's final secret would take months to resolve and would yield perhaps the biggest surprise of all: The buyers were the Egyptians themselves. A U.N. investigation uncovered a complex arrangement in which Egyptian business executives ordered millions of dollars worth of North Korean rockets for the country's military while also taking pains to keep the transaction hidden, according to U.S. officials and Western diplomats familiar with the findings. The incident, many details of which were never publicly revealed, prompted the latest in a series of intense, if private, U.S. complaints over Egyptian efforts to obtain banned military hardware from Pyongyang, the officials said. It also shed light on a little-understood global arms trade that has become an increasingly vital financial lifeline for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in the wake of unprecedented economic sanctions.

IL – R/T Unconditional Talks

This is not in South Korea's best interests for two reasons:

1. NK will probably continue their missile development during talks

Bader 17 Jeffrey A. Bader, 8-8-2017, "Why deterring and containing North Korea is our least bad option," Brookings,
<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/08/08/why-deterring-and-containing-north-korea-is-our-least-bad-option/> //DF
Negotiations without preconditions. This is invariably a popular proposal in dealing with belligerents. In this case, however, it **would be a non-starter. The North Koreans have evinced no interest in a negotiation that does not validate their status as a nuclear weapons power. If they were to show up for such talks,** as some think they might, **the North Koreans could be expected to continue development of their nuclear and missile programs while negotiations continued. The North Koreans would see such talks** as tantamount to U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations, **which treated the parties as equal and limited numbers of nuclear weapons and missiles on both sides.** This is not a road the United States should go down.

2. It would harm the US-SK alliance (Jackson - Council on Foreign Relations).

Jackson 2/8/2016 (Dr. Van Jackson, Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, February 8, 2016. "A New Baseline for North Korea Policy: What the Next US President Needs to Know."

<http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/a-new-baseline-for-north-korea-policy-what-the-next-us-president-needs-to-know/>

North Korea Wants Peace...But Not the Kind We Seek Some things don't change. At some point during the next president's tenure, **North Korea will dangle the possibility of negotiating a peace treaty.** This wouldn't be the first time. I think **North Korea does sincerely want peace, but not the way we imagine it. It wants a peace that formalizes its nuclear weapons program, elevates its status as the "legitimate Korea"** above South Korea by excluding it from the treaty, **and removes U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula.** As seductive and intuitive as a peace treaty sounds, in the Korea context **it's a way to get backdoor legitimization of its nuclear status and a deliberate wedge issue for the U.S.-ROK alliance. Even if these terms of peace were acceptable to the United States,** which seems unlikely, **it would only be a U.S.-North Korea peace; relations between North and South Korea would likely be as hostile as ever.** None of this means we shouldn't open peace treaty discussions at some point, but it's imperative to be clear-eyed about what that means for U.S. alliances and the nuclear nonproliferation norm. Every Korea watcher is familiar with former Secretary of Defense William Perry's famous observation in 1999: "We must deal with North Korea as it is, not as we wish it to be." Current U.S. policy deals with the North Korea of the past; one whose nuclear weapons were negotiable, whom we could invade and occupy if necessary, and whom could be brought to heel by sanctions or other forms of pressure. That's not the North Korea of today.

Undermining the US-South Korean alliance is more important than any potential diplomatic success because that alliance has been effective at preventing a second Korean War while negotiations with the North have never stymied their aggression or halted their nuclear program.

IL – R/T No Clear Goal

1. If there is no goal then the talks are pointless

Geraghty 17 Jim Geraghty, 8-10-2017, "North Korea's Recent History of Random, Sudden, Violent Provocations," National Review, <http://www.nationalreview.com/morning-jolt/450355/north-korea-aggression-toward-south-korea> //DF

It's probably going to be option A. Yesterday, Jonah recalled a debate about North Korea from the mid-1990s, and pointed out how the natural dynamics of American politics create incentives to continue "diplomatic outreach" even when it is clear no agreement is possible: "There will always be loud and large constituencies insisting there is more time to talk. There will always be strong forces encouraging leaders to kick-the-can to some future administration. **If you don't decide before you enter negotiations what you want from negotiations, all you are doing is negotiating for more negotiations while your opponent is negotiating for more time in pursuit of a concrete goal. In the meantime, their position becomes stronger and ours weaker, which means future negotiations are less likely to yield more desirable outcomes.**" You're already hearing recommendations that the same diplomatic outreach attempted with Cuba and Iran be applied to North Korea, and that the United States should "formally end the Korean War with a peace treaty and normalize relations – even if the North remains a nuclear power." I don't know about you, but these promises and predictions sound familiar: With normalization of relations, the United States will be in a better position to deal with North Korea on any issue of mutual concern. Human rights organizations will have the opportunity to address concerns in North Korea directly, rather than observing from the outside. Moreover, U.S. companies and brands could also conceivably move into North Korea. Direct economic interactions between the United States and North Korea might bring about changes that the United States has long pressed for but could not achieve. But as laid out yesterday, **back in the mid-1990s, the United States already gave the North Koreans \$6 billion in new reactors and other aid in exchange for promises, promises that the regime had no intention of keeping.** In fact, here comes Obama's former national security advisor, Susan Rice, today: "History shows that we can, if we must, tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea – the same way we tolerated the far greater threat of thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons during the Cold War. It will require being pragmatic." The proposal for **diplomatic outreach assumes that the North Korean regime is rational and is willing to end its long history of violent provocations, shady**

arms deals, and other hostile behavior. Does this look like a regime that can change its character that fundamentally?

IL – R/T Sunshine Policy

1. The ‘Sunshine Policy’ failed in the past (Min - Stanford).

Jesse Min (Stanford University). “The Sunshine Policy of South Korea.” March 13, 2017. <http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2017/ph241/min2/>

Many people criticized the policy saying that the South was being played by the North's stick-and-carrot strategy. **There were more than 10 major armed provocations of North Korea including the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong in 2002, in which 1 South boat was sunk, 6 men were killed, and 19 were wounded.** [6] **North Korea executed its first nuclear experiment in 2006 as well.** There was a severe criticism on these incidents that South Korea's financial support that mimicked the West Germany's financial support to East Germany was not used for humanitarian purpose for North Korean citizens, but for developing nuclear weapons and military forces. Some conservative-leaning people criticize that a decade of **the Sunshine Policy weakened the US-South Korea alliance.** After September 11, 2001, President Bush proclaimed that he would punish any kind of terrorist group and clarified his "deep-rooted distrust of Kim Jong Il and the North Korean regime." However, **by being friendly with North Korea and helping the North with massive amount of financial support, the ROK-U.S. relations were aggravated or at least, did not advance further,** which blocked potentials of South Korean economy during early 2000's. Last but not least, some critics believe that the Democrats used the Sunshine Policy as a political gain in domestic politics in the South, but it is controversial.

IL – R/T Six Party Talks

1. Six Party Talks failed from 2003-2009 (Diamond - The Atlantic).

Larry Diamond (The Atlantic). “There Is a Peaceful Way Out of the North Korea Crisis.” April 26, 2017.

<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/north-korea-trump-china/524349/>

It is difficult to exaggerate the stakes here. A preemptive strike on North Korea's military facilities would have nothing like the limited scope of containment or punishment conveyed by the recent American cruise missile strike on Syria. To accomplish anything meaningful, an American strike on North Korea would have to be on a scale many, many times larger. Even then, it would likely fail to eliminate all of Kim's short-range missiles (many of which are mobile) or his nuclear weapons (which are surely hidden). And so it could bring on the worst of all scenarios, a furious military response from North Korea with its nuclear arsenal still intact, putting millions of lives in South Korea and potentially Japan as well at imminent risk. It is no wonder, then, that the Trump administration has rather quickly discovered the virtues of a diplomatic track. **Yet the six-party talks, launched in 2003 among Japan, South Korea, Russia, China, the U.S., and North Korea to find a diplomatic formula to halt North Korea's nuclear program, have been suspended since 2009.** While efforts to resume those talks have been surrounded by mutual threats and false starts, North Korea has raced ahead to build an ever more menacing nuclear weapons program, which is now bringing the region to a crisis potentially more serious than anything since the end of the Korean War.

IL – R/T Aid

TURN: NK uses aid to prop up its military and overall it's regimes. NK had its first successful nuclear test under the ‘Sunshine Policy’. (Bandow - National Interest).

Doug Bandow (The National Interest). “Here's a Tip: Don't Give North Korea More Aid.” August 9, 2015.

<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/heres-tip-dont-give-north-korea-more-aid-13531>

Tempting though it might be to try again, a bad idea it certainly would be. The situation is, as Yogi Berra once said, déjà vu all over again. No matter what promises North Korea makes and agreements North Korea signs, nothing is likely to change. **Pyongyang will treat official aid as support for the regime; any resources transferred inevitably will be used to buttress the**

regime. As J. Peter Pham of James Madison University has noted, **“there is no possibility of aid being neutral, much less apolitical. By propping up the pillars of the same government that caused the humanitarian crises in the first place, any aid becomes, however unintentionally, a political choice to reinforce, at least partially, the existing system of oppression.”** Thus, U.S. support would increase popular hardship over the long-term. That is most obviously the case when assistance is directly diverted. **Some was transferred to political apparatchiks and the military; other was repackaged and sold on the domestic black market and in China.** Even when monitoring has limited if not eliminated such abuses, aid inevitably assisted the regime. **Transfers necessarily free up resources for the regime to spend elsewhere. The more support, the less pressure for reform.** The possibility of getting such aid also **creates an additional incentive for the regime to attempt to manipulate the international community.** Of course, no one should have any illusion that refusing humanitarian assistance is likely to force the regime’s collapse. The Kims always have done whatever they believed to be necessary to maintain power, including allowing mass starvation. But rather than stick Americans with the bill for reinforcing the North Korean regime, Washington should let the North put the burden for regime survival on China.

NK’s pursuit of nuclear weapons enables them to engage in agreements that provide them aid, but never abide to the terms of the agreements (Kim - Business Insider).

Hyung-Jin Kim (Business Insider/Associated Press). “Nuclear blackmail and Chinese handouts: How North Korea gets what it wants and needs.” August 1, 2017. <http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-north-koreas-evolving-ways-to-get-what-it-wants-and-needs-2017-8>

A relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons has been a major source of the country's ability to pull in aid and concessions. Since the North Korean nuclear crisis first started in 1993, Pyongyang has agreed to several now-dormant disarmament-for-aid deals. One accord was signed with the United States following bilateral talks in Geneva in 1994, while others were struck with several regional powers including Washington during on-and-off multilateral forums that lasted from 2003-2008. Under those deals, North Korea halted atomic activities or disabled key elements of its weapons programs in return for security guarantees, heavy fuel shipments, power-producing nuclear reactors or other aid. **Despite it all, nothing has led to North Korea substantially dismantling its nuclear program.** Washington accused Pyongyang of cheating and covertly continuing its atomic work, while the North often blamed the United States and others for failing to provide aid on time. South Korean sunshine Seoul, though the North's bitter enemy, has also helped its neighbor out regularly. **During the Sunshine Era of inter-Korean detente from 1998-2008,** liberals in Seoul espoused a greater reconciliation. This was welcome in North Korea, which had depended on outside handouts to feed many of its 24 million people and revive an economy devastated by a famine that killed hundreds of thousands in the mid-1990s. **South Korea shipped hundreds of thousands of tons of rice and fertilizer to North Korea annually and engaged in cooperation projects that became some of the few legitimate sources of foreign currency for the North. The value of the cash and goods provided to North Korea during that time was \$6.8 billion,** according to Seoul's Unification Ministry. Liberals credit their engagement with lowering border animosities and allowing two landmark inter-Korean summit talks and emotional reunions of families separated by war. Critics question whether **South Korean aid** and investment reached those who needed it most or instead **helped finance the North's weapons programs.** Seoul's large humanitarian assistance programs and cooperation projects were suspended after conservatives came to power in 2008.

Extra

Turn On Diplomacy: North Korea has a poor track record on receiving aid:

Economist 17 8-5-2017, "How to avoid nuclear war with North Korea," Economist,

<https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21725768-there-are-no-good-options-curb-kim-jong-un-blundering-war-would-be-worst-how> //DF

Can Mr Kim be cajoled or bribed into giving up his nuclear ambitions? It is worth trying, but has little chance of success. **In 1994 President Bill Clinton secured a deal whereby Kim Jong Il** (the current despot’s father) **agreed to stop producing the raw material for nuclear bombs in return for a huge injection of aid. Kim took the money** and technical help, **but immediately started cheating. Another deal in 2005 failed, for the same reason.** The younger **Kim,** like his

father, sees nuclear weapons as the only way to guarantee the survival of his regime. It is hard to imagine circumstances in which he would voluntarily give up what he calls his “treasured sword of justice”.

IIL Defense – R/T Freeze

1. The US doesn't support a freeze, and understands its past history of failure

Sanger 17 David E. Sanger and Gardiner Harris, 6-21-2017, "U.S. Pressed to Pursue Deal to Freeze North Korea Missile Tests," New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/21/world/asia/north-korea-missile-tests.html?mcubz=3> //DF

But White House officials say they are not interested in any proposal that would require the United States to lift military or economic pressure on the North, even in return for a moratorium on tests. Instead, Mr. Tillerson and Mr. Mattis publicly pressed the Chinese to exert more diplomatic and economic pressure on Pyongyang, though President Trump indicated on Twitter on Tuesday that he had just about given up on obtaining help from the Chinese. “China understands that the United States regards North Korea as our top security threat,” Mr. Tillerson told reporters at a news conference after meetings with his Chinese counterpart, Yang Jiechi, and Gen. Fang Fenghui, in the first security dialogue with Beijing conducted by the Trump administration. “We reiterated to China that they have a diplomatic responsibility to exert much greater economic and diplomatic pressure on the regime if they want to prevent further escalation in the region.” But like his predecessors, Mr. Trump is gradually learning that for all its talk about cooperation, China is deeply reluctant to take any measures that could seriously destabilize the North Korean government, for fear the country might collapse or be absorbed by the South. So China’s strategy has been to buy time — and preserve the status quo — with talks that may be linked to some kind of testing freeze. They may now have a new advocate of that approach, President Moon Jae-in of South Korea, who was elected on a platform pledging resumed engagement with the North. On Tuesday, he embraced a similar idea, telling Norah O’Donnell of CBS News in an interview that a freeze could be a way station to a second phase of talks that would “achieve the complete dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear program.” In an interview broadcast on Wednesday, the North Korean ambassador to India, Kye Chun-yong, said his country was willing to consider a moratorium on nuclear and ballistic missile tests if the United States and South Korea stopped their annual joint military exercises. “Under certain circumstances, we are willing to talk in terms of freezing nuclear testing or missile testing,” Mr. Kye said, speaking in English. “For instance, if the American side completely stops big, large-scale military exercises temporarily or permanently, then we will also temporarily stop. Let’s talk about how to solve the Korean issue peacefully.” But to American officials, a freeze is a trap that previous administrations have stepped into. The Clinton administration tried a freeze in 1994 that the North Koreans first cheated on and then openly discarded early in the administration of President George W. Bush. At the end of Mr. Bush’s term, a second such freeze and partial dismantlement of a nuclear reactor was negotiated, only to be abandoned by the North Koreans as soon as President Barack Obama entered office.

2. SK and the US don't want this

Choe 17 Choe Sang-Hun, 9-6-2017, "Putin Rejects Cutting Off Oil to North Korea," New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/world/asia/north-korea-putin-oil-embargo.html?mcubz=3> //DF

Mr. Moon himself has been a proponent of dialogue with North Korea. But as North Korea has escalated tensions recently with a series of missile tests, he has pushed for tougher new sanctions, hoping that they would force the North to return to the negotiating table. In his meeting with Mr. Moon, Mr. Putin called on the United States and South Korea to consider the “freeze-for-freeze” proposal from China and Russia in which Washington and Seoul would suspend their joint annual military exercises in exchange for a North Korean moratorium on missile and nuclear tests. Washington and Seoul have rejected the idea out of hand, calling it tantamount to giving up legitimate defense exercises as a reward for halting the North’s weapons program, which is already banned by the United Nations.

3. H.R. McMaster has said that a freeze is no longer an option (Wintour - The Guardian).

Patrick Wintour (The Guardian). “Why a return to diplomacy over North Korea has few takers.” September 4, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/04/return-diplomacy-six-party-talks-north-korea-few-takers>

Further implementation of the agreement stalled when North Korea prevaricated on agreeing to a second phase verification protocol, including on how much plutonium it had produced. Stalemate was reached when Pyongyang walked out of six-party talks altogether in April 2009 in protest at sanctions imposed when it test-fired a modified Taepodong-2 three-stage rocket, ostensibly as part of its civilian space programme. A year later, North Korea revealed a vast new uranium enrichment facility to visiting US scientists. In February 2012, under its new leader Kim Jong-un, North Korea again offered to suspend nuclear tests and allow international inspectors in exchange for food aid from the US. But a long-range missile launch in late 2012 and another bigger test in early 2013 that defied UN resolutions led to a further round of sanctions. Critics of the six-party format say it was unwieldy and that Pyongyang ruthlessly exploited divisions in the opposing camps, becoming almost an end in itself. Worse still, in the view of Christopher Hill, the chief negotiator for the US, North Korea simply did not tell the truth. China continues to insist this is the only forum with the expertise and experience to examine the steps needed to defuse the crisis, and as a start it proposes a freeze for a freeze. **Donald Trump’s national security adviser, HR McMaster, however, has said Beijing’s plan to offer a freeze on US-South Korean military exercises in return for a freeze on Pyongyang’s nuclear programme is no longer viable. “They are at a threshold capability now. Freeze for freeze doesn’t work anymore,” he said. “The goal is denuclearisation of the peninsula.” The only alternative is to accept that North Korea will have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, but limit their strategic utility.**

IL Turn – R/T Freeze

1. A freeze is unlikely to really work for several reasons:

Haldevang 17 Max De Haldevang, 8-11-2017, "This is the diplomatic way out of the North Korea crisis," Quartz, <https://qz.com/1051864/the-us-north-korean-nuclear-crisis-can-be-averted-with-this-diplomatic-strategy/> //DF

Wit says getting to the “freeze for freeze” point is “startlingly easy” and mainly being held back by trenchant views in Washington. For example, he says, the US can “easily” stop joint military exercises with South Korea, but argues there are many in Washington, DC policy circles who insist Pyongyang should reciprocate by stopping its own maneuvers. Wit argues there’s no point in pushing for that, since “we don’t care” about North Korean exercises, and doing so would ruin the most important quid pro quo: an end to US military exercises for an end to Korean missile tests. Michael Mazarr, a nuclear weapons and East Asia expert at the RAND Corporation, is less bullish, arguing it’s going to be “devilishly hard...at this point it’s almost a coin flip” as to whether a freeze would work. He worries **[A] the Koreans may now feel so empowered by the strength of their nuclear arsenal as to realize that, if they keep developing it, the US may have to make more concessions**, particularly as the threat of non-nuclear military action seems to recede. At the same time, **[B] a host of details will have to be nailed down if the two sides do start discussing a freeze**. North Korea, for example, may want to stop all US-South Korea military exercises, while the US will only want to halt large ones. The US is also worried about the North Korean space program, which many consider a way of working on missile development without officially testing missiles.

Mazarr thinks **[C] the Koreans may also want to just draw out these negotiations as a stalling tactic. “They’re not going to agree to freeze until they’re at a level of nuclear development where they’re comfortable pausing**, and I don’t think anyone knows precisely where that’s at,” he says. **“They’re clearly racing to get to threshold.”** As evidence, he points to the fact that **the North has either turned down or ignored two offers of talks by South Korea in recent months**. Collina, on the other hand, simply doesn’t think **[D] Trump’s administration [does not] “has the wherewithal currently to pull [the negotiations] off.”** “I have no sense that there’s any coordination or that there’s a plan at all other than Donald Trump doing whatever he wants,” he says. The other experts hoped—without any inside knowledge—that plans have been made behind the scenes while Trump blusters, with Mazarr saying he’s impressed by Tillerson’s “pragmatism and carefulness.”

2. DA: a freeze is a win only for North Korea

Bader 17 Jeffrey A. Bader, 8-8-2017, "Why deterring and containing North Korea is our least bad option," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/08/08/why-deterring-and-containing-north-korea-is-our-least-bad-option/> //DF

A freeze-for-freeze option. China and Russia have proposed a freeze on U.S.-South Korea major joint exercises in return for a North Korean freeze on nuclear and ballistic missile testing. **This proposal would accept the equivalency of prudent U.S.-South Korea self-defense exercises with nuclear weapons testing by the only country in the world engaged in such, whose intent is to intimidate and develop the capability to cause mass destruction among its neighbors.** As former Six Party negotiator Christopher Hill has pointed out, **accepting such a precondition for negotiations would encourage loss of confidence in the U.S.-South Korea alliance, which is one of Pyongyang's principal diplomatic objectives.**

Undermining the US-South Korean alliance is more important than any potential diplomatic success because that alliance has been effective at preventing a second Korean War while negotiations with the North have never stymied their aggression or halted their nuclear program.

3. Sets a bad precedent (Diplomat).

Prashanth Parameswaran, The Diplomat. "Why Trump Should Beware the North Korea Double Freeze Deal." The Diplomat. 6 Jul. 2017. Web. 2 Sept. 2017. <<http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/why-trump-should-beware-the-north-korea-double-freeze-deal/>> NS

Second, even if the double freeze is pursued, the Trump administration should be clear about what it is gaining and what it is being given up. For instance, some versions of the double freeze proposal have suggested trading a pause in North Korean nuclear and missile testing in exchange for a temporary halting of U.S.-South Korea exercises. **In accepting this, however, Washington would essentially be rewarding Pyongyang for ceasing behavior that is already in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions – a dangerous precedent. It also risks sending confusing signals about how it is equating engagements meant to defend an ally against attack with offensive, provocative moves by an adversary.** This is not to say that some other versions of the freeze could eventually be struck. For example, U.S.-ROK exercises could be scaled back briefly rather than halted or frozen altogether, as Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies suggested in a commentary earlier this week. The focus could also be redirected at less controversial areas, to variations of confidence-building measures or even limited dialogues aimed at preventing future accidents or discussing what kinds of security assurances the North Koreans really require. But the point here is that caution should be exercised as much with respect to the specifics of a double freeze proposal as it is with the idea of such a proposal itself.

Impact – R/T Decreasing Tensions

1. Talks always fail to decrease tensions fail because Kim's survival relies on him constantly provoking the south and the US. (Beauchamp – Vox)

Zach Beauchamp (Vox). North Korea isn't crazy. It's insecure, poor, and extremely dangerous. Published 7/5/17.

<https://www.vox.com/world/2017/7/5/15922446/north-korea-nuclear-war-casualties>.

Nor is the North secure from military attack. While its army is extremely large personnel-wise, with about 1.2 million soldiers, it uses antiquated Cold War technology while its neighbors to the South are equipped with top-of-line modern gear. Moreover, the presence of 23,500 US troops in South Korea means any war between North and South Korea would draw in the world's only superpower, though with potentially enormous American casualties. **Facing the twin dangers of domestic instability and foreign attack, the North has devised a strategy for survival that depends (somewhat counterintuitively) on provoking the South and the United States. The North** will do something that it knows will infuriate its enemies, like testing an intercontinental ballistic missile or shelling a South Korean military base. This limit-pushing behavior is designed to show that **the North is willing to escalate aggressively in the event of any kind of action from Washington or Seoul that threatens the regime,** thus deterring them from making even the slightest move to undermine the Kim regime. It also sends a signal to the North Korean people that they're constantly under threat from foreign invasions, and that they need to support their government unconditionally to survive as a nation. **The problem is that this strategy is inherently unstable. There's always a risk that one of these manufactured crises spirals out of control, leading to a conflict that no one really wants. This is especially risky because the North Korean government is deeply insular: Washington doesn't have the kind of direct line of**

communication with the North that it had with the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, which was vital in preventing standoffs like the Cuban Missile Crisis from escalating.

Maybe the Trump administration responds too aggressively to a provocation, prompting North Korean retaliation. Maybe North Korea thinks it's about to be invaded by the South, leading it to mount a preemptive strike. Maybe South Korea misreads the North's signals and thinks it is about to launch a war, causing the South to do something wild like try to assassinate Kim Jong Un. That isn't totally hypothetical: Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and a noted North Korean expert, thinks killing Kim is a real option that the South is considering if it thinks war is likely (mainly to head off a nuclear strike before it starts).

This explains why North Korea hasn't responded to South Korea's attempts to talk.

Kim 17 Kim Myong-Song, 8-2-2017, "N.Korea Silent on Seoul's Talks Proposals," Chosun Ilbo,

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/08/02/2017080201430.html //DF

North Korea never responded to Seoul's proposals for military talks on July 21 and Red Cross talks on Aug. 1, making it increasingly clear that it wants to freeze South Korea out of any negotiations on its nuclear and missile programs. A Unification Ministry spokesman told reporters on Tuesday the North "hasn't made any response to the offers yet." "Seoul will continue to make multifaceted efforts to solve humanitarian issues" like the reunion of families separated by the Korean War "and to ease military tensions along the border area," the spokesman added. "We're not going to be overly optimistic or pessimistic about any response or lack thereof." But some ministry officials are embarrassed that they are being so completely ignored. "We didn't think that the North would meekly accept to our offers, but we hoped that they would make a counterproposal or at least some kind of gesture," one said. Since the Moon administration came into office, Pyongyang has turned down 76 approaches from South Korean civic groups to visit the North. The regime also rejected a proposal from Hyundai Group, its long-term business partner in the South, to visit Mt. Kumgang and hold a memorial service for its late chairman Chung Mong-hun. Hyundai executives went to the resort for the memorial service almost every year. The regime also dismissed President Moon Jae-in's offer to field a unified team in the upcoming Pyeongchang Winter Olympics as "ridiculous."

2. Even if diplomacy is somewhat successful, there is no long-term impact. Negotiations have never historically worked

Daniels 17 Jeff Daniels, 7-30-2017, "As Trump fumes, experts warn that an answer to the North Korea crisis won't come through China," CNBC,

<https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/30/answer-to-north-korea-standoff-wont-come-through-china-experts-say.html> //DF

Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, opposes any negotiations at this time. He said South Korea has tried more than 200 agreements, not all nuclear, and those too failed to moderate the secretive regime's behavior. Over a stretch of two decades, Klingner said there's been various multi-party talks with the North Koreans, which have largely gone nowhere. "We need to avoid a premature return to negotiations," said Klingner, a former chief of the CIA's Korea branch.

R/T Past Talks Worked

1. Past talks were only successful because North Korea did not have a capable missile and nuclear. Thus, when North Korea successfully tested their first nuclear weapons in 2006 prospects for a diplomatic resolution have dimmed (Saeed - Institute for National Strategic Studies)

Ferial Ara Saeed (Institute for National Strategic Studies). "Redefining Success: Applying Lessons in Nuclear Diplomacy from North Korea to Iran." September 2010. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/133876/SP_LessonsNuclearDiplomacyNorthKorea.pdf

Notwithstanding their drawbacks, the Six Party Talks are important. Involving North Korea's immediate neighbors in addressing the nuclear standoff underpins a strategic modus vivendi between a nuclear weapons-capable North Korea and its neighbors (China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia). Dire predictions by some that Japan and South Korea would pull out of the NPT and develop their own nuclear capability have not

been borne out.⁴² While the U.S. security umbrella over Japan and South Korea is the key reason, the talks help Tokyo and Seoul show they are “managing” the North Korean threat, calming public anxieties sufficiently to prevent a destabilizing arms race. The talks also allow the United States to focus on the standoff rather than regional anxieties, and provide a place to “park” North Korea during stalemates. Despite the advantages of the Six Party Talks, **prospects for denuclearization have receded since North Korea’s nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. The regime is more confident because of its advanced nuclear capability and now seeks recognition as a Nuclear Weapons State.**⁴³ North Korean stakeholders in the state’s nuclear weapons capability (presumably the Korean People’s Army, among other groups) would have to be persuaded that relinquishing the nuclear arsenal would not come at the expense of their power and position within the leadership hierarchy—and that this would even advance their interests. **It is hard to imagine a deal enticing enough to North Korea’s domestic nuclear stakeholders, and yet politically acceptable to the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. Moreover, so long as the international community continues to treat nuclear weapons as symbols of power and prestige, it will be difficult to convince states that have acquired such weapons to give them up.**

Impact – R/T Denuclearization

There is no impact. Negotiations have never historically worked

Daniels 17 Jeff Daniels, 7-30-2017, "As Trump fumes, experts warn that an answer to the North Korea crisis won't come through China," CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/30/answer-to-north-korea-standoff-wont-come-through-china-experts-say.html> //DF

Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, opposes any negotiations at this time. He said **South Korea has tried more than 200 agreements**, not all nuclear, **and those too failed to moderate the** secretive **regime's behavior. Over a stretch of two decades**, Klingner said **there's been various multi-party talks with the North Koreans, which have largely gone nowhere.** "We need to avoid a premature return to negotiations," said Klingner, a former chief of the CIA's Korea branch.

This is for two reasons

1. North Korea sees nukes as too important to give up (Klug - TIME)

AP 17 Associated Press, 7-5-2017, "Kim vows North Korea's nukes are not on negotiation table," ABC News, <http://abcnews.go.com/amp/International/wireStory/kim-vows-north-koreas-nukes-negotiation-table-48444781>

SEOUL, SOUTH KOREA—**North Korean leader Kim Jong-un vowed Wednesday his nation will** "demonstrate its mettle to the US" and **never put its weapons programs up for negotiations, a day after successfully testing its first intercontinental ballistic missile.** The hard line suggests that North Korea will conduct more weapons tests until it perfects nuclear-armed missiles capable of striking anywhere in the United States. Analysts say **Mr. Kim's government believes nuclear weapons are key to its own survival** and could be used to wrest concessions from the US. Tuesday's ICBM launch, confirmed by US and South Korean officials, was a milestone in North Korea's efforts to develop long-range nuclear-armed missiles. But the North isn't there yet, and many analysts say it needs more tests to perfect such an arsenal. Worry spread in Washington and at the United Nations, where the US, Japan, and South Korea requested an emergency UN Security Council session on Wednesday. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said the US response would include "stronger measures to hold the DPRK accountable," using the acronym for the nation's formal name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In a show of force, US and South Korean troops fired "deep strike" precision missiles off South Korea's east coast on Wednesday. South Korea's military later released previously shot video showing the test-firing of sophisticated South Korean missiles and a computer-generated image depicting a North Korean flag in flames with the backdrop of a major building in Pyongyang, North Korea's capital. North Korean state media on Wednesday described leader Kim as "feasting his eyes" on the ICBM, which was said to be capable of carrying a large nuclear warhead, before its launch. "With a broad smile on his face," Kim urged his scientists to "frequently send big and small 'gift packages' to the Yankees," it said, an apparent reference to continuing the stream of nuclear and missile tests Kim has ordered since taking power in late 2011. North Korea was also pleased that its test came as Americans celebrated Independence Day. State media said Kim told "scientists and technicians that the US would be displeased to witness the DPRK's strategic option" on its Independence Day. **Kim also said North Korea "would neither put its nukes and ballistic rockets on the table of negotiations in any case**

nor flinch even an inch from the road of bolstering the nuclear force chosen by itself unless the US hostile policy and nuclear threat to the DPRK are definitely terminated," the Korean Central News Agency

reported. The missile launch was a direct rebuke to President Trump's earlier declaration on Twitter that such a test "won't happen!" and to South Korea's new president, Moon Jae-in, who was pushing to improve strained ties with the North. South Korea's Defense Ministry said it was unable to verify whether North Korea has mastered re-entry technology for an ICBM. It said North Korea may now conduct a nuclear test with "boosted explosive power" to show off a warhead to be mounted on a missile. The UN Security Council could impose additional sanctions on North Korea, but it's not clear they would stop it from pursuing its nuclear and missile programs since the country is already under multiple rounds of UN sanctions for its previous weapon tests. **"An attempt to curb Kim Jong Un's nuclear and missile ambitions has clearly failed. I think North Korea won't stop its nuclear drive until it feels that it has reached the level that it wants to reach,"** said Lim Eul Chul, a North Korea expert at South Korea's Kyungnam University. "I don't know when North Korea can reach that level. But I would say it's imminent." **There is a consensus among many analysts that Kim's government won't give up its nuclear program because it believes it guarantee its survival from outside threats.** But once it possesses functioning ICBMs, it would also have a stronger bargaining position and might propose talks with the US on reducing those threats, possibly in exchange for freezing but not dismantling some of its nuclear or missile activities, the analysts say.

Nukes are Jesus

Field 17 Anna Fifield, 9-5-2017, "For Kim Jong Un, nuclear weapons are a security blanket. And he wants to keep it," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/for-kim-jong-un-nuclear-weapons-are-a-security-blanket-and-he-wants-to-keep-it/2017/09/05/d7b7ecb8-9236-11e7-b9bc-b2f7903bab0d_story.html?utm_term=.dde3d3d231ba //DF

Not only has Kim's regime made quantum leaps at an astonishingly fast pace, but it has done it amid sanctions that were supposed to stop it from getting the parts or the money it needed. Now North Korea can say it is not reliant on anyone for its security and can credibly threaten to retaliate if it comes under attack — unlike Japan and South Korea, which depend on the United States for their defense. "It's a personal triumph for him with the North Korean elite, with the North Korean people. And there will be a lot of world leaders who will be very impressed," Ward said. "Having a working nuclear deterrent turns the leadership from looking like a bunch of incompetent economic managers to being some of the most successful leaders on the continent." But some analysts wonder whether Kim's urgency to become a fully fledged nuclear state belies some uncertainty about the 33-year-old's position at the head of the regime. "The fast pace of the nuclear and missile development may suggest that Kim Jong Un is confident, but it could also signal that he's worried about the future," said Kim Dong-yub, assistant professor at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies and a former South Korean navy commander who participated in military talks with North Korea. "North Korea might think there is a low chance of an American attack for now, but there is no guarantee for the future," Kim said. So the question is no longer how to stop North Korea from getting nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. It is how to persuade it to give up something it has spent so much time and money obtaining. "There are three ways to resolve the North Korean problem," said Lee Soo-hyuck, a former denuclearization negotiator who is now a South Korean lawmaker. "North Korea giving up their nuclear weapons voluntarily, resolving through quid pro quo negotiations, and taking military action," he said. "We all know the first and the last are not realistic options, so negotiation is the only way. We must not forget that." **Can North Korea be persuaded to give up its nuclear weapons? Not absent revolutionary change,** Troy University's Pinkston said. **It's more likely that the pope is going to abandon Jesus Christ."**

2. NK sees nukes as essential to their national identity, and will never give them up

Bolton 17 Derek Bolton [PhD Student International Relations, University of Bath], 2-9-2017, "North Korea's deep sense of national identity is the main obstacle to nuclear negotiations," The Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/north-koreas-deep-sense-of-national-identity-is-the-main-obstacle-to-nuclear-negotiations-72686> //DF

The trouble is, policymakers and analysts have traditionally struggled to account for DPRK foreign policy. It has always been something of a mystery. But a new approach to explaining its past foreign policy might provide useful insights into how best to contend with the country. One such approach is to build a framework around the concept of "ontological security". Ontological security, as explained by psychiatrist R D Laing and sociologist Anthony Giddens, refers to the "security of being". Put simply, **in order to feel secure we must possess a stable feeling of self-identity. Our ability to do this is intimately tied to the group to which we belong, providing us with the stability** upon which we can build a sense of self. **If the foundations of that group are challenged or called into question, then so too is the related sense of self. In North Korea, this largely**

stemmed from post-colonial nationalism, a response to Japanese occupation and negative interactions with Russia and China during World War II. **We have subsequently seen North Korea consistently seeking to uphold a national narrative of extreme independence, unification and non-subservience to great powers.** As my ongoing research has found, **this has often been done at the expense of its own physical security and economic interests, jeopardising key alliances and undermining access to military and economic support**, all while seeking to maintain an aggressive posture against its adversaries. For example, the DPRK repeatedly rejected Chinese military assistance before and during the Korean War. Once China did get involved, the effectiveness of its forces was hindered by North Korean concerns over sovereignty. After the war, subsequent feuds with both China and Russia came at a time North Korea relied on both for its sustenance, again highlighting the priority of national narrative over other interests and considerations. Against this backdrop of behaviour being linked to ontological security, **the notion that the international community, or China, can somehow cajole North Korea into making concessions over its nuclear program seems counter intuitive.** This is not to say there is no leverage. China is well positioned to crack down on DPRK procurement of the materials and resources required for future progress within its nuclear and ballistic missile weapons program. Should China choose, it also has the capability to put significant pressure on the North Korean economy. But there is little interest from Beijing in seeing the DPRK collapse only for US and South Korean forces to take its place. **At best, should China manage to twist North Korea's arm to such an extent their survival depends on change, Pyongyang will undertake the necessary face lift.** Whether that change would be lasting or substantial is questionable. **North Korea's security interests are now intimately tied to its nuclear weapons program.** Perhaps **more importantly** though, **so too are its notions of independence, non-subservience and self-reliance.** A failure to account for the DPRK's history when seeking to understand its current interests will lead to misplaced diagnoses and policies. Instead, **policymakers need to look to the past in order to understand how we might approach and deal with North Korea in the future.** Understanding the North Korean highly protective attitude to its own identity will help us predict DPRK reactions and perhaps shed light on new avenues for engagement. Failure to do so will lead to misunderstanding, and potentially dangerous consequences.

R/T Agreed Framework

Bush stopped the agreement after they learned NK was cheating

Davenport 17 Kelsey Davenport [Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association], 8-2017, "The U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework at a Glance," Arms Control Association //DF

Following North Korea's 1998 Taepodong missile test, the Clinton administration, with the assistance of former Secretary of Defense William Perry, conducted a North Korea policy review, which recommended building additional agreements on top of the Agreed Framework. However, just before the Clinton administration could reach an additional agreement with North Korea, President **Bush** was elected **began his own North Korea policy review**, which stretched into 2002. **Although the Bush administration review initially also called for further negotiations, before it could release the review, U.S. intelligence sources revealed that North Korea's centrifuge program was pursuing technology for a uranium enrichment program,** which would produce material for nuclear weapons. **Rather than confront the North Koreans** and demand they halt their efforts to create a uranium enrichment capability, **the intelligence findings gave those in the Bush administration** who opposed the Agreed Framework **a reason to abandon it.** John Bolton, then- undersecretary of state for arms control and international security under President Bush, later wrote that "this was the hammer I had been looking for to shatter the Agreed Framework."

R/T THAAD Ineffective

R/T GMDs Bad

Outdated: the Pentagon upgraded it's effectiveness

MDP 17 6-7-2017, "Pentagon Upgrades Assessment of US ICBM Defense," Missile Defense Project, <https://missilethreat.csis.org/pentagon-upgrades-assessment-us-icbm-defense/> //DF

After a successful Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system intercept on May 30, the Pentagon has reportedly upgraded its assessment of the United States' ability to defend the United States against ICBMs, according to a June 6 memo. Prior DOD assessments had characterized GMD as providing a "limited" defense capability, but the Pentagon now assesses that it has a "demonstrated capability to defend the U.S. homeland from a small number of intermediate-range or intercontinental missile threats with simple countermeasures," according to the memo obtained by Reuters. The update changes language that the Department of Operational Test and Evaluation has used to describe GMD since 2012.

Uniqueness – R/T Already BMDs

THAAD is different from Patriot Batteries and Aegis Missiles, which are already deployed (Freedberg – Breaking Defense)

Sydney J. Freedberg (Breaking Defense). THAAD Missile Defenses Deploy To South Korea: How Will North Korea, China React?. Published 3/6/17. <http://breakingdefense.com/2017/03/us-deploys-thaad-missile-defenses-to-south-korea-how-will-north-china-react/>.

American THAAD missile vehicles landed at Osan, South Korea today after almost eight months of waiting. Now the question is how the North and China react. Increasingly threatened by North Korean missiles — most recently test-launched just yesterday — the South agreed last July to host the US Army's Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system. **THAAD would provide an additional layer of protection on top of both the Army's shorter-ranged, lower-altitude Patriot batteries already deployed on the peninsula and the Standard Missiles on Navy Aegis ships offshore.** (Pacific Command chief Adm. Harry Harris has argued forcefully for connecting the Army and Navy missile defense networks in his theater). But THAAD radar's greater range means batteries in South Korea can potentially detect, not just North Korean missiles, but planes in Chinese airspace. Experts we spoke to in 2015, after Beijing first raised this objection, said it was not a serious threat to China but rather a pretext for throwing wrenches in the US-Korean alliance — but in fact, Chinese pressure had been so heavy-handed it had made Seoul more receptive to THAAD rather than less.

THAAD is better than what SK currently has (Klingner - Institute For Security and Development Policy).

Bruce Klingner (Institute For Security and Development Policy). "South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense." April 21, 2015.

<http://isdpc.eu/content/uploads/images/stories/isdpc-main-pdf/2015-klingner-why-south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense.pdf>

Yet, despite this growing threat, South Korea insists on exposing its citizens to a greater threat than necessary. Seoul resists procuring more effective interceptors, resulting in smaller protected zones, gaps of coverage so fewer citizens are protected, and minimal time to intercept a missile, all of which contribute to a greater potential for catastrophic failure. **The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense**

(THAAD) would be more effective than existing South Korean systems to defend military forces,

population centers, and critical targets at a higher altitude over a larger area with more reaction time

than existing systems in South Korea. Even the U.S. deployment of THAAD BMD to better protect American troops on the Korean Peninsula has been controversial due to Chinese pressure on Seoul. The Park Geun-hye Administration pursues a policy of "strategic ambiguity" in order to postpone public discussion on THAAD deployment. South Korean presidential spokesman Min Kyungwook described Seoul's position as three 'no's' — "no [U.S. deployment] request, no consultation, and no decision." But a February 2015 JoongAng Ilbo poll showed that 56 percent of respondents favored deployment of THAAD.

R/T Bad Performance in Tests

This just isn't true. THAAD has a 100% success rate (Macias - Business Insider)

Amanda Macias (Business Insider). "This is the advanced anti-missile defense system being deployed to Korea — and it has Beijing spooked." March 7, 2017. <http://www.businessinsider.com/thaad-defense-south-korea-2016>

US ARMY MCGREGOR RANGE, New Mexico — **The most advanced missile system on the planet can hunt and blast incoming missiles right out of the sky with a 100% success rate** — and we got to spend a day with it. **Meet America's THAAD system. THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) is a unique missile-defense system with unmatched precision, capable of countering threats around the world with its mobility and strategic battery-unit placement. "It is the most technically advanced missile-defense system in the world,"** US Army Col. Alan Wiernicki, commander of the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, told Business Insider in an interview. "Combatant commanders and our allies know this, which puts our THAAD Batteries in very high global demand," Wiernicki added. That claim has been spot on. This week, after North Korea launched four ballistic missiles into the sea amid angry bluster over joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises, the White House said it was moving forward with the plan to station THAAD on the Korean peninsula.

R/T Doesn't Protect Seoul

It only takes three batteries at most to cover South Korea, and they're planning to have six in total (Newman - Wired and Lee - CNN).

Lily Hay Newman (Wired). "ALL ABOUT THE US MISSILE DEFENSE THAT'LL PROTECT SOUTH KOREA—AND TICK OFF CHINA." 4-23-17. <https://www.wired.com/2017/04/missile-defense-will-protect-south-korea-make-china-nervous/>

"THAADs are tailored to those medium-range threats that North Korea has in spades—North Korea regularly demonstrates that kind of capability," says Thomas Karako, the director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "THAADs are exactly the kind of thing that you would want for a regional area." **The only downside? South Korea doesn't have enough of them. In fact, even when fully functional, the current South Korea THAAD "can't even cover Seoul,** let alone catch Chinese missiles going to the US," says Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation. Because the THAAD has a relatively small interceptor range of around 125 miles, **it would take two or three of them to cover all of South Korea.** Still, the country having some protection against a potential North Korean strike beats having none. Just not if you're China.

R/T Develop Around THAAD

1. Delink: My opponents concede that current anti-missile defense systems defend from the current NK threat. So, anti-missile defense systems gives SK like 5 years of security to develop and deploy better anti-missile defense systems.

R/T Swarms

1. THAAD designed to stop a missile barrage (Kazianis - National Interest).

Harry J. Kazianis (National Interest). "THAAD 101: The Ultimate Guide to the Missile Defense System China and North Korea Hate." March 6, 2017. <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/thaad-101-the-ultimate-guide-the-missile-defense-system-19684>

Kazianis: For our readers who might not be familiar with THAAD or Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, could we begin by you giving TNI readers a basic description of the system and how it works? What makes it unique? Why is it in America's interest to have such a system? Sauter: THAAD is a key element of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and is designed to defend U.S. troops, allied forces,

population centers and critical infrastructure against short-thru-medium-range ballistic missiles. THAAD has a unique capability to destroy threats in both the endo- and exo-atmosphere using proven hit-to-kill (kinetic energy) lethality. **THAAD is effective against all types of ballistic-missile warheads, especially including Weapons of Mass Destruction (chemical, nuclear or biological) payloads. THAAD was specifically designed to counter mass raids with its high firepower (up to 72 Interceptors per battery), capable organic radar and powerful battle manager/fire control capability.** THAAD is interoperable with other BMDS elements, working in concert with Patriot/PAC-3, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, forward based sensors, and C2BMC (Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications System) to maximize integrated air and missile defense capabilities. **THAAD is mobile and rapidly deployable, which provides warfighters with greater flexibility to adapt to changing threat situations around the globe.** Kazianis: How is the system different than say PAC-3 or AEGIS systems? How is it different than other defensive systems, such as the S-300/S-400 or the Israeli Arrow?

NK can only launch up to 50 missiles

Elleman 16 Michael Elleman, 3-10-2016, "THAAD: What It Can and Can't Do," 38 North //DF

If one further assumes that two interceptors are launched at each layer of defense, the SSPk requirement to meet the overall defense criterion that all warheads in an attack are destroyed with a probability of 0.75, or a more stringent probability of 0.90, can be calculated. For illustrative purposes, **assume the attacks consist of either 20 or 50 missiles at a time, which is a small fraction (less than 10 percent) of the overall stockpile held by North Korea, but is reasonably consistent with the estimated number of trained and equipped firing brigades capable of launching Hwasong and Nodong missiles under wartime conditions.**² The benefits of layering the defenses are captured in Table 1, where the calculated results for one- and two-tiered defenses are presented.

Warrant:

Elleman 16 Michael Elleman, 3-10-2016, "THAAD: What It Can and Can't Do," 38 North //DF

The total number mobile launchers (transporter-erector-launchers or TELs) is not the limiting factor here. Rather, **road-mobile missile operations are supported by a large logistics trail**, including trucks for carrying the oxidizer and fuel, pumping trucks to transfer the propellants to the missile, surveying units to establish an accurate determination of location and missile alignment prior to launch, weather units to measure wind speed at various altitudes, repair and maintenance teams, trailers to carry spare missiles, cranes to transfer missiles to the TEL, command and control trucks and teams, security and protection teams. **The overall logistics requirement involves tens of vehicles and hundreds of trained personnel.**

Missile defense can stop around 50 missiles

"Why China is wrong to be furious about THAAD." The Economist. 23 Mar. 2017. Web. 17 Jul. 2017.

<https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21719485-deployment-american-anti-missile-system-south-korea-does-not-threaten-chinas-nuclear>

America says it has repeatedly offered Chinese officials technical briefings on the radar's capabilities and limitations. They have shown little interest, possibly because they do not really disagree about the threat THAAD represents. Chinese military analysts have boasted of China's ability to "blind" THAAD (meaning to incapacitate it through electronic interference)—a further indication that the outrage is politically motivated. It is also wrong to suggest that THAAD does nothing to protect South Korea from the North. In a paper for 38 North, a website, Mr Elleman and Michael Zagurek calculate that **faced with 50-missile salvos, a layered defence consisting of South**

Korea's Patriot system and two THAAD batteries (another may be deployed when it is available) **would probably destroy 90% of incoming land-based missiles.** **The threat that one of the 10% getting through might be carrying a nuclear warhead would not be eliminated. But South Korea is a lot safer with THAAD than without it.** It is more likely, however, that China, always resentful of the presence of American troops so near its borders, sees an opportunity to use THAAD to weaken America's alliance with South Korea. It may hope that its bullying might yet pressure South Korea's next president into reversing the deployment. If that is the intention, however, it has probably overplayed its hand, raising Korean hackles with its blatantly coercive methods.

R/T Submarines

1. Most NK subs can't carry missiles

Starr 17 Barbara Starr and Ryan Browne, Cnn, 7-20-2017, "US intelligence shows North Korean preparations for a possible missile test," CNN,

<http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/19/politics/north-korea-possible-missile-test/index.html> //DF

Officials also say that North Korea is continuing to test components to launch a missile from a submarine but the US intelligence assessment is that program remains in early stages. At the same time, a North Korean submarine was spotted in international waters engaging in "unusual activity," two defense officials said. **North Korea's submarine fleet is believed to encompass around 70 subs, though the majority are quite old and likely cannot fire missiles.** When taken together, these developments are concerning because North Korea says it is trying to develop a missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to the United States.

2. SK would need two batteries to stop submarine missiles; they're planning to install six

ISDP 16 11-2016, "THAAD in the Korean Peninsula," Institute for Security and Development Policy,

<http://isdpeu.org/content/uploads/2016/11/THAAD-Background-ISDP-2.pdf> //DF

Only a single THAAD battery is planned to be installed in South Korea. It is still unclear whether this will be enough to defend against North Korean submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). As the THAAD radar only has a 120-degree field of view, it is possible for a North Korean submarine to travel outside of the range before firing. Based on analysis of North Korea's test in August 2016, it is estimated that the SLBM would be able to travel over 1,000 kilometers on a minimum trajectory, making it possible for SLBMs to be launched further from the radar range.¹⁹ **At least two THAAD batteries would be needed to cover all of North Korea's sea and intercept possible SLBM attacks.**

R/T Chemical/Bio Weapons

This just isn't true. THAAD intercepts chemical and bio weapons (Kazianis - Real Clear Defense).

Harry Kazianis (Real Clear Defense/Real Clear Politics) "Why China Fears THAAD." 3-21-2015.

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/03/21/why_china_fears_thaad_107784.html

China is quite upset at the prospect of South Korea acquiring America's latest missile defense platform, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD for short. However, Xi Jinping might want to redirect his anger at the real problem and why President Park Geun-hye might be considering THAAD in the first place: North Korea. But before we get to the heart of the matter, it seems appropriate to understand what THAAD is, what it can do, and why it's important. Back in November, I spoke to Dan Sauter of Business Development for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense at Lockheed Martin to get a better understanding of the system and its capabilities. Sauter explained that THAAD is "a key element of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and is designed to defend U.S. troops, allied forces, population centers and critical infrastructure against short-thru-medium-range ballistic missiles." He went on to explain that THAAD "has a unique capability to destroy threats in both the endo- and exo-atmosphere using proven hit-to-kill (kinetic energy) lethality. **THAAD is effective against all types of ballistic-missile warheads, especially including Weapons of Mass Destruction (chemical, nuclear or biological) payloads. THAAD was specifically designed to counter mass raids with its high firepower** (up

to 72 Interceptors per battery), capable organic radar and powerful battle manager/fire control capability." THAAD also has one nice feature that is sure to get Beijing's panties in a bunch—interoperability. Sauter told The National Interest that THAAD is "interoperable with other BMDS elements, working in concert with Patriot/PAC-3, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, forward based sensors, and C2BMC (Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications System) to maximize integrated air and missile defense capabilities. THAAD is mobile and rapidly deployable, which provides warfighters with greater flexibility to adapt to changing threat situations around the globe."

R/T Escalation

Uniqueness – R/T Survival

Non-unique: Kim fears his survival is at risk now

1. Survival

Allen 17 TS Allen, 9-19-2017, "The War North Korea Wants," Real Clear Defense,

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/09/19/the_war_north_korea_wants_112329.html

//DF

No one is surprised anymore when North Korea threatens the United States and its allies. After nearly seventy years of incessant threats and provocations, their angry rhetoric is par for the course. Many think those threats are meaningless. According to the conventional wisdom, North Korea knows that America would certainly defeat it in a war and end that war by removing Kim Jong-un and his cronies from power. Since the North's ultimate aim is "regime survival," war with America is not in North Korea's interest. "North Korea," the standard line goes, "is not suicidal." They may threaten, but they will never strike. Thus, North Korea's recent provocations—including a sixth nuclear test, the launch of a ballistic missile over Japan, and repeated promises to fire missiles at the US territory of Guam—are alarming, but not designed as a prelude to war. This common, comforting belief—in essence, that America and South Korea have successfully deterred North Korea with their overwhelming military force—misses the point. **For Kim Jong-un, "regime survival" is inextricably linked to "Final Victory," the North Korean term for reunification with South Korea on the North's terms—the former a necessary condition for ultimate fulfillment of the latter. As long as North Korea only controls half the Korean Peninsula, its regime's survival is tenuous. The two half-nation states are doomed to threaten each other.** As the insightful Koreanist B.R. Meyers put it, "North Korea has consistently proclaimed its determination to unify [Korea] and behaved accordingly," because doing so is "the only long-term solution to the regime's chronic security problems."

2. His elites view him as weak, making Kim feel very paranoid

Cheng 17 Evelyn Cheng, 4-27-2017, "North Korean elites increasingly think Kim Jong Un is a weak leader, new study says," CNBC,

<https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/26/north-korean-elites-increasingly-think-kim-jong-un-is-a-weak-leader-new-study-says.html> //DF

More and more North Korean elites think dictator Kim Jong Un is a weak leader, according to new research published Thursday from Rand Corp. citing senior officials who have defected. "**Kim Jong Un appears increasingly to the elites as ineffective and not a particularly good leader**, which is likely how he's viewed now," said Bruce Bennett, senior defense analyst at research organization Rand. "Other than North Korea's weapons and [the] ballistic missiles of this regime, **Kim Jong Un doesn't really have a lot to make him feel empowered**," Bennett said, noting that recent events such as the murder of the dictator's older half brother show how **the leader is "clearly paranoid."** Moreover, if Kim were to die suddenly, North Korea's elites would probably not choose a successor from Kim's family, ending their dominance since the state's founding more than half a century ago, Bennett said, based on his interviews with defectors. "North Korea's elites have heavily gone into being entrepreneurs," Bennett said. "They would look to set up an economy like the Chinese which is what the Chinese have been asking them to do."

IL – R/T More Advanced Missiles

North Korea is one of the lowest spending nuclear powers.

Pearson 16 James Pearson and Ju-Min Park, 1-11-2016, "North Korea overcomes poverty, sanctions with cut-price nukes," Reuters,
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-money-idUSKCN0UP1G820160111> //DF

North Korea was at the bottom of a 2011 list on nuclear arms spending by Global Zero, a group campaigning to rid the world of nuclear weapons. **The full cost of Pyongyang's program** that year **was** estimated by the group at **\$700 million, making it the lowest spender among nuclear states, beneath Pakistan's** estimated \$2.2 billion, although the analysis was made before the North's two most recent nuclear tests. By comparison, the United States spent \$61.3 billion on nuclear weapons in 2011, according to the report. Construction of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, North Korea's main nuclear facility, cost \$600-700 million, based on a 2012 estimate, a South Korean defense ministry official told Reuters. The small reactor at Yongbyon, which began construction in 1979, is based on Soviet-era technology and generates just 5 megawatts of power. "Actually, what they spend isn't that much," Kim Min-gyu, a former North Korean diplomat who worked at the North Korean embassy in Moscow until defecting in 2009, told Reuters.

As a result, North Korea's nuclear arsenal is cheap and rudimentary. Pearson continues:

Pearson 16 James Pearson and Ju-Min Park, 1-11-2016, "North Korea overcomes poverty, sanctions with cut-price nukes," Reuters,
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-money-idUSKCN0UP1G820160111> //DF

North Korea has developed a nuclear weapons program despite poverty and international sanctions, **using home-grown technology** and virtually free labor to cut costs, experts said. South Korean government analysis has put North Korea's nuclear spending at \$1.1 billion to \$3.2 billion overall, although experts say it is impossible to make an accurate calculation given the secrecy surrounding the program, and estimates vary widely. However, **the weapons that North Korea has tested** thus far **are** comparatively **small and based mostly on less sophisticated** fission, or atomic bomb, **technology**. **The** isolated **North's claim that its fourth** and most recent **test**, conducted last week, **was of a more advanced and powerful hydrogen bomb has been widely doubted**, although experts said it is possible Pyongyang took the intermediate step of boosting an atomic bomb with hydrogen isotopes. North Korea was at the bottom of a 2011 list on nuclear arms spending by Global Zero, a group campaigning to rid the world of nuclear weapons. The full cost of Pyongyang's program that year was estimated by the group at \$700 million, making it the lowest spender among nuclear states, beneath Pakistan's estimated \$2.2 billion, although the analysis was made before the North's two most recent nuclear tests. By comparison, the United States spent \$61.3 billion on nuclear weapons in 2011, according to the report. Construction of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, North Korea's main nuclear facility, cost \$600-700 million, based on a 2012 estimate, a South Korean defense ministry official told Reuters. The small reactor at Yongbyon, which began construction in 1979, is based on Soviet-era technology and generates just 5 megawatts of power. "Actually, what they spend isn't that much," Kim Min-gyu, a former North Korean diplomat who worked at the North Korean embassy in Moscow until defecting in 2009, told Reuters. **Their workforce works for free and, except for a few key imported parts, they make everything** else".

2. De-Link: US missile defense systems will always outpace the North's missiles

Pellerin 17 Cheryl Pellerin, 6-8-2017, "Officials: U.S. Missile Defense System Outpaces Threat," U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,

<https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1208062/officials-us-missile-defense-system-outpaces-threat/> //DF

The defense system that protects the United States from ballistic missile attacks now outpaces the threat from adversaries out to 2020, and the Defense Department is advancing the capability to stay ahead of the threat into the future, defense officials said on Capitol Hill yesterday. Thomas H. Harvey III, acting assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities, and Missile Defense Agency Director Navy Vice Adm. James D. Syring testified before the House Armed Services Committee's subcommittee on strategic forces, discussing fiscal year 2018 missile defense posture and priorities. **The department continues efforts to sustain and modernize homeland missile defense capabilities so the nation stays ahead of the threat while providing an effective, integrated and interoperable regional missile defense capability**, Harvey said. "The U.S. homeland is currently protected by the ground-based midcourse defense system -- the GMD system. Improving the capacity, reliability and effectiveness of the GMD system is one of our highest priorities," he added. Funding for 2018 Harvey told the panel that the fiscal 2018 proposed budget -- which Syring said in his written testimony requests \$7.9 billion for the Missile Defense Agency -- would fund a redesigned exo-atmospheric kill vehicle and long-range discrimination radar. It would also help to lay the groundwork for a new radar in Hawaii, continue funding for advanced discrimination center technology and space-based kill assessment programs, and remain on track to complete deployment of remaining interceptors in Alaska by the end of this year to bring the total to 44, the assistant secretary said. "We're also moving forward with efforts to bolster our defenses against advanced cruise missiles," he added. Allies and Partners From a regional standpoint, Harvey said, the 2018 budget request continues the deployment of missile defenses tailored to threats in Europe, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region. "In Europe, we would continue to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach, EPAA, and work in close collaboration with our NATO allies to develop an advanced network of sensors and interceptors," he said. The EPAA addresses the threat from Iranian short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to U.S. troops and interests in Europe. The budget request supports the Aegis Ashore system scheduled for deployment in Poland in the 2018 time frame, Harvey said, noting that NATO allies have committed to spend more than \$1 billion on NATO ballistic missile defense command and control, and many U.S. allies are improving national BMD capabilities. "In the Asia-Pacific, our force posture includes Aegis BMD-capable ships along with Patriot batteries deployed in Japan and South Korea, and the recent deployment of [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] to South Korea. We've also converted the THAAD battery deployment to Guam to permanent status in response to North Korean threats," he added. The United States maintains a robust ballistic missile defense presence in the Middle East, including land- and sea-based assets deployed in defense of forward-located forces and those of allies and partners, Harvey said. Looking ahead, the assistant secretary said, means ensuring that the U.S. investment strategy and priorities "balance the needs of addressing the most dangerous threats we confront today while positioning ourselves to respond to emerging threats over the next decade." Outpacing the Threat In his testimony before the panel, Syring showed and narrated a video of the May 30 ground-based interceptor test over the Pacific Ocean, submitting his written statement for the record in lieu of an opening statement. The day

after the May 30 interceptor test, Syring said during a phone briefing with reporters that the interceptor tested outpaced the threat to the United States through 2020. "The intelligence community gives us a body of evidence about where they think the threat is today and where it will evolve by 2020. We design tests specifically to incorporate the attributes of that threat today and what the intelligence community predicts it will be in say three years," he added. In his written testimony, Syring said the MDA 2018 budget request will continue the development of reliable, increasingly capable, and state-of-the-art defenses against ballistic missiles for the nation, deployed forces, allies and international partners. "Everything that this committee has supported over the last four years," he told the subcommittee, "has been targeted toward a near-term -- which is now part of the program of record and a fielded set of capabilities -- a mid-term and a far-term capability." Mid-term is defined by 2020, he added, "and everything that we are working on and fielding is to stay ahead of the threat by 2020."

IL – R/T Tests

Non-unique: the pace of tests have been increasing since Kim took office

Berlinger 17 Joshua Berlinger, Cnn, 9-17-2017, "North Korea's missile tests: What you need to know," CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/29/asia/north-korea-missile-tests/index.html> //DF

Less than six years into his reign, **Kim Jong Un has tested more missiles than his father and grandfather combined.** During the first months following the inauguration of US President Donald Trump, Pyongyang conducted a similar number of launches as it did during the same period in 2016. However, North Korea did not conduct any tests during the two months from Trump's election to his inauguration. The political turmoil in South Korea, which led to the eventual impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye, may also have factored into North Korea's decision making, experts say. Pyongyang has tested an average of one missile per week in the three weeks following the election of President Moon Jae-in, Park's successor. **They need to conduct tests to perfect the technology,** analysts say. Some have speculated that the United States has tried to meddle with the program using cyber methods, which could halt progress. The tests also are thought to be timed for maximum political impact -- a May launch coincided with the One Belt One Road summit in Beijing, an important project for Chinese President Xi Jinping, and a February launch happened as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was visiting US President Donald Trump. And the ICBM test came on July 4, Independence Day in the US. All of this applies equally to the North's nuclear test program, which has typically followed a similar pattern.

The natural progression of North Korea's needs leads to more testing and provocations – it has nothing to do with BMDs or external threats (Lockie – Business Insider)

Alex Lockie (Business Insider). Experts say North Korea doesn't want peace talks — it wants nuclear missiles and to bully the US. Published 9/27/17. <http://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-doesnt-want-peace-bully-the-us-2017-9>.

"I think they **[North Korea] will first want to demonstrate their capacity to have an ICBM** ... that could reach the United States" before negotiating, Suzanne DiMaggio, a director and senior fellow at the New America think tank who directs unofficial talks between the US and the North Koreans, told Axios. **To demonstrate this capacity, North Korea needs to test more. Pyongyang has learned all it can from laboratory tests, simulations, and lofting missiles halfway to space instead of around the globe. North Korea needs to keep firing missiles, probably over Japan, to demonstrate a credible ICBM in real world conditions. This need exists independently of Trump's threats.** "North Korea will complete its remaining tests before softening" its negotiating position, Tong Zhao, a leading North Korea expert with the Carnegie's Nuclear Policy Program in Beijing, told Business Insider. In short, experts say there's little that would bring North Korea to the table right now. Only after North Korea has satisfied itself with its nuclear and missile technologies will it talk with the US on anything close to acceptable terms.

Impact – R/T Accidental War

These are historically rare because countries actually have to plan them. In Korea, no party really wants to go to war so it's even less likely

Farley 13 Robert Farley [Assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce], 4-5-2013, "North Korea and the Fallacy of Accidental Wars," Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/north-korea-and-the-fallacy-of-accidental-wars/?allpages=yes> //DF Accidental wars rarely happen. Historians have demonstrated that most wars initially deemed "accidental," (perhaps most notably the First World War), have in actuality resulted from deliberative state policy, even if the circumstances of the war were unplanned. While war seems discordant, it actually requires a great deal of cooperation and coordination. Fundamentally, two parties have to agree to conduct a war; otherwise, you have either a punitive raid or an armed surrender negotiation. Consequently, the baseline for evaluating the chances for accidental war on the Korean Peninsula should be judged as quite low. South Korea, in all likelihood, views the prospect of decisive victory against North Korea as worse than the status quo. The United States has no interest in fighting a war against the DPRK at the moment. For example, the sinking of the Cheonan was obviously an act of war, but neither the United States nor South Korea were interested in fighting a war on the terms offered. While we know less about the strategic calculus of North Korea, there is little reason to think that North Korea was interested in war, either; it probed South Korean capabilities and resolve, but did not press the issue in ways that could have forced Seoul's hand.

R/T Arms Race

Non-Unique

Non-unique: Absent THAAD Asian militarization will continue (Low - CNBC)

Michelle Low (CNBC). "US upped military spending, Asian militarization accelerated in 2016: Report." June 23, 2017.

<http://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/21/us-upped-military-spending-asian-militarization-accelerated-in-2016-report.html>

While the U.S. is the world's biggest military spender, making up a solid third of the world's expenditure on that front, **the Asia Pacific is by far the fastest growing region. Countries there collectively spent \$450 billion on defense in 2016 — a 4.6 percent increase from the previous year. Five of the world's top 15 military spenders come from the Asia-Pacific, and regional defense spending has increased by 64 percent in the past decade, a stark reflection of the growing geopolitical tension in the Korean peninsula, East and South China Sea and between India and Pakistan.** China is the Asia Pacific's largest spender, accounting for 48 percent — or close to half — of the region's military expenditure. The rising superpower spent \$215 billion on defense alone, which was almost four times that of its nearest rival, India. Those two nations collectively made up 60 percent of regional spend.

North Korea's survival strategy is literally to be aggressive against SK and the US

Christopher R. Hill (University of Denver). "North Korea's Real Strategy." June 20, 2017.

<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/north-korea-nuclear-program-invasion-by-christopher-r-hill-2017-06>

DENVER — North Korea's quest for nuclear weapons is often depicted as a "rational" response to its strategic imperatives of national security and regime survival. After all, the country is surrounded by larger, supposedly hostile states, and it has no allies on which it can rely to come to its defense. It is only logical, on this view, that Kim Jong-un wants to avoid the mistake made by Iraq's Saddam Hussein and Libya's Muammar el-Qaddafi, both of whom would still be alive and in power had they acquired deliverable nuclear weapons. In fact, **North Korea's appetite for nuclear weapons is rooted more in aggression than pragmatism. North Korea seeks nothing less than to decouple the United States from its South Korean partner — a split that would enable the reunification of the Korean Peninsula on Kim's terms.** In other words, North Korea does not want only to defend itself; it wants **[and] to set the stage for an invasion of its own.** Of course, such a scenario is, in many ways, the stuff of fancy. But to be a North Korean today is not necessarily to accept the world as it is. And North Korean propaganda continues to reiterate the view that the Korean Peninsula consists of one people, sharing one language and one culture, indivisible — except by outsiders like the US. By

this logic, the North needs to find a way to discourage those outsiders from intervening in the peninsula's affairs. As it stands, the US-South Korea relationship operates on the basis of something like the North Atlantic Treaty's collective-defense clause, Article 5: any North Korean aggression against South Korea will, it is assured, be met by the combined forces of South Korea and the US. Such a counterattack would be decisive, ensuring the total destruction of the North Korean regime. **If North Korea had long-range nuclear weapons, however, it might be able to change the strategic calculus, by threatening to launch a nuclear attack on the US mainland in response to US intervention on the Korean Peninsula.** The US might intervene anyway, launching its own devastating attack on North Korea. But it might also choose not to risk casualties on its own soil. If the US did shirk its collective-defense responsibilities, South Korea would still have plenty of recourse against its northern neighbor. After all, South Korea's conventional forces are far better trained, equipped, and motivated than their North Korean counterparts. But it is hard to say whether the North Koreans know that. Like many dictatorships before them, they may be the first to believe their own propaganda – in this case, that they can succeed against a South Korean foe that is not buttressed by American military might.

This aggression is what spurred BMD deployment, not the other way around

Lee, Hee Ok. "THAAD: A Critical Litmus Test for South Korea-China Relations." US- Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS. 3/2/17. Web. Accessed 8/12/17. <http://www.38north.org/2017/03/hlee030217/>. **"When the decision was originally made, the ROK government** anticipated a negative Chinese reaction to THAAD deployment, but **went ahead with it for** several reasons. First, **its anxiety about security and lack of missile defenses had increased significantly in response to the acceleration of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile development.** Second, the ROK government needed to manage the risk of Washington abandoning the US-ROK alliance. In doing this, it considered THAAD to be one means of filling security gaps and securing conditions for the stable presence of US forces. Third, Seoul understood the system's effective radar detection range to be limited to the Korean peninsula and is oriented solely to detect North Korean ballistic missiles. Fourth, Seoul needed to demonstrate that it would not permit China to exercise a veto over its right to deploy a system to defend its national security. Fifth, the ROK government dismissed the fear that a THAAD battery in its territory would become integrated into the US ballistic missile defense system as groundless.[1] In addition to these factors, opponents of President Park Geun-hye's conservative administration won a majority of National Assembly seats in the subsequent general election, raising the prospect that deploying THAAD would have become less politically feasible with further delay."

Link – R/T North Korea Tests

1. The tests have been increasing since Kim came into office

Berlinger 17 Joshua Berlinger, Cnn, 9-17-2017, "North Korea's missile tests: What you need to know," CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/29/asia/north-korea-missile-tests/index.html> //DF

Is the pace of missile testing speeding up? Less than six years into his reign, Kim Jong Un has tested more missiles than his father and grandfather combined. During the first months following the inauguration of US President Donald Trump, Pyongyang conducted a similar number of launches as it did during the same period in 2016. However, North Korea did not conduct any tests during the two months from Trump's election to his inauguration. The political turmoil in South Korea, which led to the eventual impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye, may also have factored into North Korea's decision making, experts say. Pyongyang has tested an average of one missile per week in the three weeks following the election of President Moon Jae-in, Park's successor.

Kim wants this more than his ancestors

Powell 17 Bill Powell, 4-25-2017, "This is what war with North Korea would look like," Newsweek, <http://www.newsweek.com/2017/05/05/what-war-north-korea-looks-588861.html> //DF

Reunification of the two Koreas under Pyongyang's rule, as ludicrous as that possibility seems to the outside world, **has always been the foremost goal of both Kim Jong Un and his father.** For a while, in the wake of the famine in the late 1990s that killed tens of thousands of North Koreans and the deep, relentless poverty that followed, military strategists began to discount that

possibility, believing it to be rhetoric unmoored from reality. All you had to do was look at the satellite images of Seoul and Pyongyang at night, one brightly lit and the other dark, to see which half of Korea was strong, and which was weak. And although the economic disparity hasn't changed much, the North's weaponry has, its war plan has, and its dictator's bellicose rhetoric has. The young man known in China as "Fatty Kim the Third" (Kim Jong Un is the grandson of Kim Il Sung, who was the supreme leader of Democratic People's Republic of Korea from its founding in 1948 until 1994) appears to be serious about being a nuclear power. In speeches, he mentions the reunification far more often than his father did, North Korea watchers say. If the U.S. launches a pre-emptive strike, Kim appears likely to hit back, starting with an artillery barrage—thousands of rounds per hour. "Without moving a single soldier in its million-man army," says former CIA analyst Bruce Klingner, now at the Heritage Foundation, "the North could launch a devastating attack on Seoul."

SK is deploying BMDs because of NK, not the other way around

ISDP 16 11-2016, "THAAD in the Korean Peninsula," Institute for Security and Development Policy, <http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2016/11/THAAD-Backgrounder-ISDP-2.pdf> //DF

The U.S. has been proposing the deployment of THAAD in the Korean Peninsula since 2014, but it was only in early February 2016 that official discussions started. This was largely a result of North Korea's fourth nuclear test that was conducted in January 2016. After a series of consultations, the decision to deploy THAAD was made public by the Park Geun-hye administration on July 7th, 2016. The decision was seemingly made overnight and did not go through a ratification process which is required for treaties that would "significantly transform the security environment of South Korea." According to a joint statement between the U.S. and South Korea, the purpose of THAAD is to act as a "defensive measure to ensure the security of ROK and its people, and to protect Alliance military forces from North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile threats." South Korea would be protected against potential nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks from its northern neighbor and, in addition, Pyongyang would also be limited in its ability to engage in coercive diplomacy.

2. They only resumed THAAD deployment after NK launched an ICBM

Reuters 17 Reuters Editorial, 7-29-2017, "South Korea to deploy more THAAD units after North Korea ICBM launch," Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-norhtkorea-missiles-thaad-idUSKBN1AE02L> //DF

South Korea said on Saturday it will proceed with the deployment of four additional units of the U.S. THAAD anti-missile defense system after North Korea's latest launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile. The deployment of the additional Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) units had been delayed after the initial two units, after South Korean President Moon Jae-in ordered an environmental assessment. China has been notified of the move to speed up the deployment, the South's presidential Blue House said. China has angrily objected to the THAAD deployment, saying it does little to deter the North's missile threat while destabilizing regional security balance. It believes the THAAD's radar can penetrate deep into its territory.

R/T – Link Chinese Modernization

Non-unique: China is already modernizing and has been for some time

Zhai 17 Keith Zhai, 7-30-2017, "Xi Calls for Strong Army, Tells China Troops 'World Isn't Safe'," Bloomberg

<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-30/xi-calls-for-strong-army-tells-china-troops-world-isn-t-safe> //DF

President Xi Jinping said China needs to speed up the modernization of its military to fend off threats in increasingly dangerous times. "The world isn't safe at this moment" Xi, wearing a camouflage military uniform, said on Sunday after riding in an open jeep at an army parade in Inner Mongolia. "A strong army is needed now more than ever." The speech came just hours after U.S. President Donald Trump lambasted China for failing to do more to stop North Korea's

nuclear program, saying “we will no longer allow this to continue.” North Korea, which relies on ally China for food and fuel, test-fired a second intercontinental ballistic missile late on Friday night. Over the past two years, Xi has overseen the most sweeping changes to China’s military since the 1950s in an effort to create a fighting force that can win modern wars. The modernization drive, which has focused on expanding China’s air and naval reach, is challenging more than 70 years of U.S. military dominance in the Western Pacific.

Link – R/T China and Russia

Russia and China are increasing their military spending while the US decreased spending (Johnson - The Daily Signal).

Justin Johnson (The Daily Signal). “Russia and China Increase Defense Spending While US Continues Cutting.” April 11, 2016.

<http://dailysignal.com/2016/04/11/russia-and-china-increase-defense-spending-while-us-continues-cutting/>

While the changes from 2014 to 2015 are notable, they are even more striking when we look at these countries over time. **From 2011 to 2015, the U.S. defense budget went down by 21 percent while China increased its military budget by 38 percent and Russia increased its military budget by 40 percent.** Putting these changes in regional context is even more striking. In the past 10 years, Russian forces have moved across their border to invade neighboring countries, most recently annexing Crimea from Ukraine and actively assisting a separatist force in destabilizing the eastern half of Ukraine. China continues to assert its claims by force in the South China Sea, creating islands in long disputed international waters, then militarizing them, and intimidating other countries from freely using the seas and airspace around them. Iran is more active than ever, testing ballistic missiles, helping to fuel the turmoil being felt throughout the Middle East, and even seizing U.S. sailors.

Link – R/T Japan

Delink: My opponents need to prove that there is enough support to 1 - change their pacifist constitution and 2 - to militarize offensively. However, a poll finds that only the slim minority support changes in the Constitution and that there is only support for enhanced self defensive not offensive capabilities (Tamkin - Foreign Policy).

Emily Tamkin (Foreign Policy). “Is Japan Moving to Revise its Pacifist Constitution.” May 1, 2017.

<http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/01/is-japan-moving-to-revise-its-pacifist-constitution/>

Japan’s explicitly pacifist constitution turns 70 on Wednesday. Ahead of the big birthday, a mail-in survey was conducted as to whether the Japanese population wants the constitution revised — and it seems about half the country does. The Japanese population slightly favors a revision to Article 9, the section of the constitution that renounces war. Some 49 percent of respondents believe Article 9 must be changed, while **47 percent say it shouldn’t be touched. But most do not want it changed now, with 51 percent saying they are against constitutional amendments under Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,** who then called for his country to make a historic revision to the document on Monday. But all respondents are already living in a country that has a very different relationship to its military than it did in the very recent past. Even without changing the constitution, Abe has deliberately sought to loosen the fetters that bound the Japanese military since World War II — and to play a bigger part in global security. Abe already passed laws that allow Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defense without violating Article 9, and lifted its ban on exporting weapons. Japan unveiled an initiative to further security with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, increasingly concerned as they are about China. On Monday, Japan sent its largest warship to accompany a U.S. supply vessel in Japanese waters. Abe has already “achieved the goals that he wanted in terms of letting Japan be a more ‘normal’ nation” where military and defense are concerned, said Michael Auslin of the American Enterprise Institute. But Abe still has work to do to garner enough support to formally codify the changes to Japan’s security laws through a constitutional change, said Jim Schoff of the Carnegie Endowment. That requires figuring out just what a revised Article 9 would say, and how unfettered Japan’s armed forces would be. That is “the next big step in the staircase,” he said. Still, the fact that it is even up for discussion — with a good degree of public support — is in part a reflection of the changing world around Japan. Tokyo is staring at an erratic North Korea, an unpredictable South Korea, and an increasingly aggressive China, whether in the South China Sea or closer to home in the East China Sea. Capping it all off, Japanese leaders have in recent years sought to reassess their relationship with the United States, fearing too much

reliance on Washington could leave them in the lurch. That said, the Japanese people are still pacifistic, **Auslin says. Beefing up the ability to defend themselves doesn't translate into much appetite for interventions around the world, or even in Asia. A leader who forgets that and tries to turn Japan's new freedom of maneuver into an interventionist approach might get a reminder — in the form of removal from office.**

Link – R/T US-SK Alliance

Turn: Any increase in military related to the US is less likely to trigger an arms race since the US is a superpower (Salam - Slate).

Salam 16 Reihan Salam [columnist. Slate], 11-18-2016, "The United States Doesn't Spend Enough on Its Military," Slate Magazine, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2015/11/military_spending_the_case_for_spending_more_not_less.html
Why does the U.S. extend security guarantees to so many different countries, including rich ones? One way to think about it is that U.S. allies are by definition countries that the U.S. will never have to fight against. Instead of building up their militaries in ways that might threaten the U.S. or their neighbors, former rivals like Germany and Japan have militaries that are almost exclusively devoted to territorial defense. Whereas both Germany and Japan once had imperial designs, neither country could conquer a faraway land if they tried. What they can do is meaningfully contribute to U.S.-led efforts to defend not only their own homelands but also other democracies in their respective regions. **The U.S.-led global alliance has created a vast zone in which interstate conflict is largely unknown, and commerce can flow freely. American leadership allows and encourages our allies to cooperate, and it makes it effectively impossible for them to wage war on each other.** This is a far cry from the years before 1945, when the world's richest and most powerful countries were at each other's throats. Could it be that the remilitarization of Germany and Japan outside of the American security umbrella would be welcomed by their neighbors? Might the Middle East be safer if Saudi Arabia had to fend for itself, and it devoted its oil wealth to, say, building its own nuclear arsenal? I'm skeptical, and frankly I think it would be unwise for us to roll the dice to find out. For decades, mainstream Democrats and Republicans have agreed that bearing the costs of U.S. global leadership is preferable to the uncertainty that would arise if the U.S. were to pull back, and so the U.S.-led global alliance has persisted. From Bill Clinton to Barack Obama, every president since the end of the Cold War has actually favored expanding this alliance. The problem we face now is that both Democrats and Republicans don't seem to appreciate that the costs of U.S. global leadership are rising, whether they like it or not.

Delink: The US-led global alliance prevents worse arms races and escalation from happening (Salam - Slate).

Salam 16 Reihan Salam [columnist. Slate], 11-18-2016, "The United States Doesn't Spend Enough on Its Military," Slate Magazine, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2015/11/military_spending_the_case_for_spending_more_not_less.html//DF
The other thing we expect of our military is that it be able to protect not just the U.S. homeland, but also our allies around the world. **The United States is pledged to defend every other NATO member state** if they're ever under attack. To be sure, every other NATO member state has also pledged to defend the U.S. But let's just say that in practice, the U.S. is not banking on the Estonians to ride to the rescue in case of an invasion while the Estonians are certainly banking on the U.S. having their back if the Russians come knocking. **And NATO is just the tip of the iceberg.** Michael Beckley, a political scientist at Tufts, has observed that since World War II, **the United States has signed defense pacts with more than 60 countries. This U.S.-led global alliance contains 25 percent of the world's population and generates 75 percent of global GDP.** America's allies have primary responsibility for their own defense, to be sure. Yet they really do count on the U.S. to step up when the going gets tough. Why does the U.S. extend security guarantees to so many different countries, including rich ones? One way to think about it is that **U.S. allies are by definition countries that the U.S. will never have to fight against. Instead of building up their militaries in ways that might threaten the U.S. or their neighbors, former rivals like Germany and Japan have militaries that are almost exclusively devoted to territorial defense.** Whereas both Germany and Japan once had imperial designs, neither country could conquer a faraway land if they tried. What they can do is meaningfully contribute to U.S.-led efforts to defend not only their own homelands but also other democracies in their respective regions. **The U.S.-led global alliance has created a vast zone in which interstate conflict is largely unknown, and commerce can flow freely.**

American leadership allows and encourages our allies to cooperate, and it **makes it effectively impossible for them to wage war on each other. This is a far cry from the years before 1945, when the world's richest and most powerful countries were at each other's throats.** Could it be that the remilitarization of Germany and Japan outside of the American security umbrella would be welcomed by their neighbors? Might the Middle East be safer if Saudi Arabia had to fend for itself, and it devoted its oil wealth to, say, building its own nuclear arsenal? I'm skeptical, and frankly I think it would be unwise for us to roll the dice to find out.

Impact – R/T War

1. TURN: Arms Races force diplomatic solutions -> only 25% of conflicts occur after arms buildups, while 77% happen after non-buildups. The reason for this is that when both sides build up arms, it raises the cost of going to war, which in fact makes them more likely to take diplomacy as an option.

Paul Diehl -- Journal of Peace Research -- "Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look*" -- 1983.

The relationship between arms races and war is a critical consideration in both peace research and strategic planning. This study reconsiders the work of Michael Wallace which has postulated that arms races significantly increase the probability of a serious dispute escalating to war. A critique of Wallace's coding procedures and arms race index precedes an attempt to replicate his findings. In the replication, serious disputes, taken from the Correlates of War Project, among major powers during the years 1816-1970 serve as the population to be tested. Adjustments in coding and index construction from the Wallace work are made. It was discovered that **only 25% of those disputes preceded by a mutual military buildup escalated to war, while almost 77% of the wars** in this population **were preceded by periods lacking armaments competition.** Controls for inter-century differences and unilateral military buildups failed to alter this apparent lack of a relationship between arms races and dispute escalation. Differences with Wallace's study are analyzed and the implications for peace research discussed.

2. Impact Defense: An arms race does not determine whether or not a war will follow, there are other external factors that influence whether or not an arms race leads to war.

Geller 98 Daniel S. Geller [University of Mississippi] and J. David Singer [University of Michigan], 1998, "Nations at War: A Scientific Study of International Conflict," Cambridge University Press //DF

As Siverson and Diehl (1989:214) note, "**If there is any consensus among arms race studies, is that some arms races lead to war and some do not.**" Given the lack of consistent and cumulative findings in this area, it would appear that an

additional factor (or **factors**) **must be included in the model** which will account for the incongruent results and permit the integration **of arms races dynamics in** an explanation of **war**. Morrow (1989) attempts to solve this problem by developing a formal (expected-utility) model of an arms race and testing it empirically. He argues that an arms race creates transitory advantages that many be exploited; however, the risk orientation of decision makers on both sides will determine whether or not the temporary vulnerabilities will be challenged or resisted, with risk-acceptant actors more likely to initiate arms race wars. The data-based test involves 35 dispute cases and 17 core cases in which major power disputes were preceded by arms races. However, Morrow notes that the tested proportions are supported robustly but not strongly by the data.

R/T Rider 11

1. He uses data from 1816, which is pre-nuclear weapons and MAD. Even he admits that this skews the relationship

Rider 11 Rider Toby J. Rider [Department of Political Science, Texas Tech University], 2011, "Just part of the game? Arms races, rivalry, and war," Journal of Peace Research, https://politicalscience.byu.edu/mfindley/assets/RFD_JPR_FinalDraft.pdf //DF

Diehl & Crescenzi (1998) raise the fundamental question of whether the arms race-war connection is substantively meaningful or spurious. Answers to this question largely begin with theory, but this literature has been plagued by overly inductive approaches devoid of theoretical

specification (Siverson & Diehl, 1989). Diehl & Crescenzi (1998) offer three possible answers to the question. First is a direct and causal connection between arms races and war. Those who argue that arms races 'cause' war cite a host of connections between the two. These include the claims that arms races increase the influence of the military in decisionmaking (NoelBaker, 1958), lower trust (Sample, 1996), exacerbate the urge for pre-emption (Lambelet, 1975; Morrow, 1989; Weede, 1980), and encourage the use of shortcuts that result in misperception (Jervis, 1976). Yet such explanations are largely post-hoc claims that are not directly subject to testing. Somewhat implicitly, Sample (2000) argues that prevailing international norms affect the arms race-war relationship, a point echoed by Senese & Vasquez (2008). This is consistent with the finding that **the arms race-war relationship was stronger prior to World War II and the development of nuclear weapons.** Yet this is better at explaining why **the arms race-war relationship changed with the advent of nuclear weapons** than in accounting for why it occurred in prior periods.

2. The chance of war goes from almost nothing to, well, almost nothing

Rider 11 Rider Toby J. Rider [Department of Political Science, Texas Tech University], 2011, "Just part of the game? Arms races, rivalry, and war," Journal of Peace Research, https://politicalscience.byu.edu/mfindlev/assets/RFD_JPR_FinalDraft.pdf //DF

The probability of war for an adolescent rivalry moves from 0.0131 to 0.0324 when there has been an arms race in the last 10 years. **The probability of war for a mature rivalry moves from 0.0144 to 0.0621 when there has been an arms race** in the last 10 years.

Indict: Gibler 05

They need to win an 8% increase

Gibler 05 Douglas M. Gibler [Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky], 2005, "Taking Arms Against a Sea of Troubles: Conventional Arms Races During Periods of Rivalry," Journal of Peace Research, <http://saramitchell.org/Gibleretal.pdf> //DF

We use two indicators to identify whether an arms race has occurred during a strategic rivalry. First, **both rivals must have increased their military spending** or personnel by **8%** or more **in every year of a three-year period**; we use the two military components – personnel and expenditures – of the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) from the Correlates of War project (Singer, Bremer & Stuckey, 1972) to identify these states. The 8% figure is chosen to prevent the capture of gradual increases in expenditures due to inflation and mirrors the most widely used measure in the field (Diehl, 1983). The three-year temporal criterion is long enough to avoid temporary expenditure anomalies, possibly aimed at equipment upgrades, and short enough to exclude multiple cases of arming. We do not assume that 8% has any particular significance, but we believe that, along with the rivalry criterion, this level allows for a sample size that is reasonably large for inference but still small enough to establish interdependence.¹⁰

R/T CN Aggression

Link – R/T Radar

It really isn't about radar

Kelly 17 Robert E Kelly [associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University], 6-13-2017, "The Real Reason China Wants South Korea to Ditch THAAD," National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-reason-china-wants-south-korea-ditch-thaad-21139> //DF

THAAD captures this problem well, because China's objections are almost certainly not technical. **THAAD does not impinge on China's strategic deterrent against the United States.** Its anti-missile rockets do not have the range for that. **THAAD also does not give America any new intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to observe China. The United States already has excellent satellite coverage of China and would rapidly detect a Chinese missile launch. THAAD's X-band radar, about which so much fuss has been made, does not point into China.** Unlike an

I-band radar (the sort one sees at airports or in the movies), the X-band does not rotate 360 degrees, generating imagery of China. Rather it projects northward, as its intended target is North Korea. Chinese (and Russian) objections that it might then penetrate into northeastern China (or the Russian far east) are also specious. The curvature of the earth means that the X-band signal begins to peel away from the earth after several hundred miles, so coverage north of North Korea is limited too. As its name implies, THAAD is a defensive system. It is designed to shoot down incoming missiles as they approach a target. Unless China, or Russia, intend to strike South Korea or Japanese cities, there is no threat to them. Repeating all this, however, is almost besides the point now. The Chinese (and the Russians) know this. Beijing had ample years before the Park deployment decision last summer to raise technical concerns. It forewent all such opportunities. This strongly suggests a political motive, which Moon's transparently phony excuses to drag out deployment only further verify.

IL – R/T North Korea

Won't make China align with NK (Fitzpatrick - Georgetown).

Mark Fitzpatrick (Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs). "THAAD and the Military Balance in Asia." 2016.

https://asianstudies.georgetown.edu/sites/asianstudies/files/documents/gjaa_3.1_fitzpatrick_0.pdf

Despite all of the criticism that China raised in advance of the THAAD deployment decision, Beijing will get over this just as they got over it when Japan deployed ballistic missile defenses. They tried clumsily, in a bullying way, to influence Seoul's decision, and they failed. There's nothing to be gained for China to continue to insist that THAAD not be deployed once a decision has been made. If they think the decision is not final, however, then China probably will continue to press its case, so this pressure won't evaporate right away. Seoul has to maintain its firmness of purpose and demonstrate that it's not going to waver. There will be some period of time before THAAD is actually introduced so it is this period of time where relations between South Korea and China might be rocky. **The idea that THAAD deployment would cause China and North Korea to strengthen their very bad relationship is a misreading of the realities of Northeast Asia. Pyongyang has given China so many reasons to be concerned that the Chinese population as a whole has generally turned against North Korea.** And although THAAD angers China and sparked a nationalistic campaign, it doesn't rise at all to the level of the North Korean provocations. **THAAD is a defensive system. North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are offensive systems and they do much more to undermine China's security than does THAAD.** So, one might see a small increase in the level of positive communications between Beijing and Pyongyang, but I don't think it fundamentally alters their relationship.

IL – R/T Russia and China

The relations between China and Russia won't last. They have distinctly different ideals. Daniel Wagner from the Huffington Post finds

Daniel Wagner. "Why the China/Russia Rapprochement Won't Last." *HuffPost*. 10 Nov. 2014. Web. 20 Jul. 2017.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/china-russia-rapprochement_b_6133480.html

Being a big believer in the lessons taught by history, I'm inclined to think that **the current 'love fest' between China and Russia will probably have a limited shelf life.** Natural resource acquisition and the gyrating geopolitical chess board are the primary reasons why both countries are enjoying a bilateral rapprochement. Russia is driven by a desire to find alternative buyers for its oil and natural gas, and both countries are trying to gain a competitive foothold to gain increasing influence in the emerging world order, at the expense of the U.S. But can such an alignment stand the test of time? History suggests not.... **Politically, China and Russia want some similar things, but with a vastly different approach to getting what they want.** China throws its weight around when it wants to, but generally not through aggressive military action. Rather, **China [prefers diplomacy]** tends to take things right up to the line (vis-à-vis border disputes or treaty negotiations, for example) in order to get its point across. **Russia** has demonstrated an ongoing propensity to breach geographical borders and **use[s] military force to achieve its objectives.** While China tends to sit back and let warring parties slug it out, Russia tends to want to jump into the fray. There is room for conflict between them on this basis.

Internal Link – R/T Hurts China-US Cooperation

1. Delink (China-US general): US and China not cooperating has nothing to do with THAAD or anti-missile defense systems in general (Pennington - Business Insider).

Matthew Pennington (Business Insider/Associated Press). "Relations between the US and China are getting tense." June 20, 2015.
<http://www.businessinsider.com/relations-between-the-us-and-china-are-getting-tense-2015-6>

WASHINGTON (AP) — Tensions between the U.S. and China are growing over its island-building in the South China Sea and over suspicions that Beijing was behind a massive hack into a federal government server that resulted in the theft of personnel and security clearance records of 14 million employees and contractors.

But both powers have incentives to calm the waters ahead of the Chinese leader's visit to Washington in the fall. The two countries' top diplomats and finance officials meet here next week for the annual U.S.-China strategic and economic dialogue. The Obama administration says the two governments won't be papering over their differences, but they are expected to accentuate the positive, stressing areas of cooperation, like climate change. Civilian and military officials will meet Monday to discuss thorny security issues. Secretary of State John Kerry and Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew kick off two days of talks Tuesday with Vice Premier Wang Yang and State Councilor Yang Jiechi on a sprawling agenda, including plans for a bilateral investment treaty. China, in particular, is presenting the dialogue as a prelude to Xi Jinping's visit to the White House slated for September, his first since becoming China's president in 2013. Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang called it an opportunity to "push for new progress in the building of a new model of major power relationship," the state-run Xinhua news agency reported Friday. But it's a model with cracks in it.

Relations between the world's two largest economies, with their divergent political systems and priorities, rarely run smoothly. But recent months have been particularly rocky China's reclamation of more than 2,000 acres of land on disputed islands and atolls in the South China Sea since last year has raised international alarm over its territorial ambitions.

Washington took the unusual step last month of publicizing a U.S. military surveillance flight that showed the massive scale of China's island-building.

China says the islands are its sovereignty territory, but Washington argues that the continuation of building work and militarization of the islands could enflame complex territorial disputes with China's neighbors, with whom the U.S. is seeking to forge closer ties while preserving freedom of navigation in sea lanes crucial for world trade. "Nobody is interested in conflict here and there's no reason why it needs to devolve into conflict. Again, that's why next week's meeting is so important," State Department spokesman John Kirby told reporters Thursday. Cybersecurity is another source of acrimony that's up for discussion, given fresh urgency by the massive security breach that led to the theft of personal information of as many as 14 million current and former U.S. federal employees. The Obama administration believes that China's government, not criminal hackers, was responsible for the breach that included detailed background information on military and intelligence personnel. China has denied involvement in the break-in and says it is also a victim of cyberattacks. The U.S. business community, meanwhile, is concerned that regulatory barriers in China are growing, not easing, despite Xi's promise to advance economic reforms. Progress has been slow on the bilateral investment treaty the U.S. and China agreed to pursue two years ago, and China has reportedly submitted a long list of sectors it wants excluded. Daniel Russel, top U.S. diplomat for East Asia, said that the U.S. and China wouldn't ignore their differences, including on human rights issues. Since taking power two years ago, Xi has consolidated China's authoritarian system, squelching dissent and civil society. "We don't always see eye to eye but the fact is global challenges require that we cooperate," Russel told reporters Thursday, citing recent cooperation on fighting the Ebola virus in Africa, the transition in Afghanistan and diplomacy by world powers to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. As the push for a global climate change deal intensifies ahead of a December summit of world leaders in Paris, President Barack Obama needs China's support. Obama and Xi committed to curbing emissions when they met in Beijing in November, which environmentalists hailed as a sign that reluctant nations like China were finally getting on board. Climate change will be a "hot topic" at next week's dialogue in Washington, China's Xinhua agency said in Friday's report. The South China Sea and cybersecurity didn't get a mention.

2. Delink (China-US cooperation over NK): Months after the partial deployment of THAAD "U.S., China reaffirm cooperation for 'irreversible' North Korean denuclearization" (Kristian - The Week).

Bonnie Kristian (The Week). "U.S., China reaffirm cooperation for 'irreversible' North Korean denuclearization." June 24, 2017.
<http://theweek.com/speedreads/708165/china-reaffirm-cooperation-irreversible-north-korean-denuclearization>

The United States and China have reaffirmed their mutual commitment to "strive for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," Chinese state media agency

Xinhua reported Saturday. The statement comes after Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Defense Secretary James Mattis hosted Chinese diplomats in Washington in an attempt to reach consensus on how to deal with increasing provocation from Pyongyang. Tillerson indicated earlier this week he is asking China, which is North Korea's primary trading partner, to increase its political and economic pressure on the Kim Jong Un regime.

Impact – R/T China Attack

No impact: China and the US are too dependent “tether effect”

Chen 15 Dingding Chen, 6-9-2015, "Economic interdependence underpins peace between China and the US," South China Morning Post

<http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1819183/economic-interdependence-underpins-peace-between-china-and> //DF

If these trends are allowed to develop naturally, then very soon we will witness a military conflict between the two. How can we avoid it? Despite the grave challenges, there is still hope for the two to peacefully co-exist in the South China Sea, and in Asia more broadly. For one thing, the high level of economic interdependence is a major reason why things have remained under control. Both China and the US would suffer hugely from a serious military conflict. Alongside nuclear weapons, economic interdependence also acts as a deterrent, given the potential for "mutually assured destruction" in a breakdown of ties. More importantly, there are many other areas where cooperation is necessary. Think climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, terrorism and cybersecurity, to name just a few. Today's Sino-US relations are not just bilateral relations; it is a global relationship. Still, to avoid conflict or war, both need to make great efforts to restrain themselves, particularly in military affairs. The US should seriously reconsider what hegemony or dominance means in Asia; China should recognise its own domestic problems and limits.

R/T CN Sanctions

Link – R/T Harsher Sanctions

De-link: China has no incentive to impose harsh sanctions

Ward 17 Alex Ward, 8-1-2017, "The frightening new developments in Trump's standoff with North Korea, explained," Vox,

<https://www.vox.com/world/2017/8/1/16068716/north-korea-icbm-missile-test-bomber-south-korea-japan> //DF

“The US never had a chance to get Beijing to substitute America's national interest for its own,” Rapp-Hooper said. So Trump lashed out using his favorite weapon, Twitter. This was from July 29. The core issue is Washington's primary fear that North Korea develops means of reliably firing nuclear missiles capable of reaching the US. China's primary concern is very different. It's terrified that the Kim regime could collapse, sending millions of North Korean refugees flocking into China. That's something Beijing expressly does not want. Beijing prioritizes stability on the Korean Peninsula. Any change, China fears, may lead to problems for the Chinese government down the road. Plus, if America won a war with North Korea, it might be able to negotiate the reunification of the peninsula on its, and South Korea's, terms. That wouldn't only be politically bad for China, but also US and South Korean forces would

be stationed on China's border — something Beijing doesn't want. There's yet another benefit for China to let things continue as they are.

"The Chinese have an incentive to let this fester because it's a big distraction for Washington," said Narang.

"North Korea is a huge thorn in our side." In essence, keeping American eyes on North Korea allows China to continue to do what it wants in the region, like build military facilities on artificial islands it constructed in the South China Sea.

De-link: My opponents portray China's reluctance to cut off oil as a matter of will. But this is really no choice at all

Fisher 17 Max Fisher, 9-6-2017, "Bad News, World: China Can't Solve the North Korea Problem," New York Times,

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/world/asia/china-north-korea-nuclear-problem.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FNorth%20Korea&action=click&contentCollection=world%2Fstream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=7&pgtype=collection //DF

China's reticence toward North Korea is often portrayed as a matter of will. Because Beijing is technically capable of inflicting harsher pain, it would do so if it cared enough. But when Americans look at their own options,

they understand that they are useful only if they can be used. **The United States could flatten Pyongyang overnight. But this would spark a conflict risking millions of Korean, Japanese and American lives. Washington declines such an option because it is unusable, not for any lack of will. China faces similar constraints, with drastic**

options risking unacceptable costs. In recent years, Beijing has tried to cut off trade or impose limited sanctions. These efforts have changed little or have backfired, with North Korea instead increasing its provocations, often timed to embarrass Beijing. In these tit-for-tats, Pyongyang is demonstrating that, though the weaker state, it has greater leverage because it is willing to accept more risk. North Korea has also labored to limit Beijing's diplomatic influence. It has purged officials thought to be sympathetic to China, including Mr. Kim's own uncle in 2013. This year, it killed Mr. Kim's brother, living in exile under Chinese protection. Though Mr. Kim is at times openly hostile to Beijing, he is its only option.

Link – R/T Oil Sanctions

1. China is likely to support tougher oil sanctions already because they look bad perceptually right now with North Korea

Lo, Kinling. "Oil supplies to North Korea could be cut as China's frustration with ally's failure to communicate grows." *South China Morning Post*. 5 Sept. 2017. Web. 6 Sept. 2017.

<<http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2109803/china-will-back-tougher-north-korea-sanctions-after>>

The New York Times, citing a senior official in the US government, said Washington was pressing China and other members of the UN Security Council to cut oil and other fuel supplies to North Korea. South Korean President Moon Jae-in has also said it was time to discuss cutting off oil supplies to North Korea, the Yonhap News Agency reported. Jia Qingguo, an international relations expert at Peking University, said Beijing should consider oil sanctions after the latest test. "This act **[North Korea] has hurt China's national interests and damaged regional stability,**" he said. Wang Sheng, a professor who studies Korean affairs at Jilin University, said **China would support tougher sanctions by the UN, including oil "because this is seemingly the only way to show pressure at this moment"**.

CHOOSE ONE

De-link: China would never fully cut off oil supplies to North Korea, or do so long enough to have any impact (Munroe – Reuters).

Tony Munroe (Reuters). "For North Korea, cutting off oil supplies would be devastating." April 13, 2017.

<http://in.reuters.com/article/northkorea-nuclear-china-oil-idINKBN17F179>

China, which supplies most of North Korea's crude, no longer reports its oil shipments to the country, but according to South Korean data supplies it with roughly 500,000 tonnes of crude oil annually. It also exports over 200,000 tonnes of oil products, according to U.N. data.

Analysts said the impact of a full oil embargo on Pyongyang would be so damaging that China, which opposes any measures that could fuel instability in North Korea, would be unlikely to take that step or agree to such a measure in the United Nations Security Council, where it has a veto as a permanent member. "If China cuts off oil supply, North Korea would not survive on its own for three months and everything in North Korea would be paralysed," said Cho Bong-hyun, who heads research on North Korea's economy at IBK Bank in Seoul. "This could increase the possibility of North Korea's collapse and have an adverse impact on China as well. China would rather consider reducing crude oil supply," he said. North Korea has virtually no domestic oil production, and has traditionally imported the little demand it has for fuel at its refineries from China and, to a lesser extent, Russia. North Korea has two refineries: the Ponghwa Chemical Factory sits on the river border with Dandong in China, while the Sungri refinery is located on the Tumen River bordering Russia. Much of North Korea's energy is supplied by abundant domestic coal, but oil is used by the military as well as in transport and agriculture. **Cutting off all oil for an extended period of time**, perhaps indefinitely, is probably the toughest economic punishment that China could impose on North Korea. It **is highly** unlikely that China would take such a step," said Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. **"It is possible that it might reduce the flow, stop oil deliveries for a week or two, but not cut it off entirely."** **In 2003, China's oil pipeline to North Korea shut down for three days after a missile launch, adding to pressure on Pyongyang to draw back from nuclear brinkmanship.** Chinese officials said then it was a mechanical breakdown, but some experts said it was deliberate.

Impact – R/T Oil Sanctions Work

1. No impact: an oil embargo wouldn't shift NK's policy because they could just use coal resources

Noel 17 Pierre Noel, 9-6-2017, "IISS," No Publication,

[//DF">http://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2017-6dda/september-87a1/the-problem-with-a-north-korean-oil-embargo-883b](http://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2017-6dda/september-87a1/the-problem-with-a-north-korean-oil-embargo-883b) //DF

Even if China agreed to implement such an oil embargo, however, it would be very unlikely to cause sufficient pain to change North Korea's attitude, let alone trigger the collapse of the country. The implicit reasoning behind the oil embargo proposal is: North Korea consumes oil; it produces none and imports it all from China; and it would therefore collapse – or yield to international demands regarding its nuclear and missile programme, for fear of collapsing – if China stopped supplying oil. In the parlance of the security literature, North Korea is dependent on oil from China and this dependence gives China leverage – which, unfortunately, China is not willing to use. The trouble is that **North Korea does not**, strictly speaking, **need oil from China. It gets its liquid hydrocarbons from China out of convenience, not necessity. If China ceased supply, it would manufacture them out of solid hydrocarbons, of which it has plenty.** According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), North Korea imported 15,000 barrels per day of crude oil from China in 2016, plus 6,000 bpd of refined products. (By way of comparison, that is about 1% of UK oil consumption.) The EIA mentions that some trade may go unreported and therefore, the actual figures may be higher. The real question, in order to assess North Korea's oil vulnerability and China's leverage, is not how much North Korea consumes but how much of that consumption it could replace. The basic fact to understand is that hydrocarbons, which come naturally in different forms – mainly oil, natural gas and coal, but also wood, grass, sugar and so on – can be chemically reconfigured from one form to the other. There are several processes available, but the basic engineering is a hundred years old. In the commercial world, reconfiguring hydrocarbons is a way to arbitrage structural (expected) price differences between different hydrocarbon forms. In Qatar, Shell has built a very large plant that turns natural gas into high-quality petroleum products. In the US and China, among other countries, there are several plants turning coal into various liquid fuels, natural gas and other petrochemical feedstocks. The other use of the technology is for purposes of self-sufficiency. If one is cut off from the oil market but has access to coal, one can manufacture oil products. Both Nazi Germany and Japan covered a significant share of their liquid-fuel consumption during the Second World War through coal liquefaction; in the case of Japan, the coal mines and liquefaction plants were located in Indonesia and northern Korea. This is also how South Africa coped with the 1980s oil embargo. Sasol, a South African company, is still a world leader in the technology. A rough calculation from the input/output ratios of US and Chinese coal-liquefaction plants suggests that North Korea would need to liquefy about six million tonnes of coal to cover all of its 2015 reported oil imports. North Korea produces more than enough coal to do this; its total anthracite-coal exports, mostly to China, were reported to be 25 million tons in 2015, making North Korea the largest anthracite exporter in the world. (Since the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 2321, in 2016, international coal trade with North Korea has been limited to 7.5 million tonnes per year.) Even if North Korea's true oil consumption is higher than reported, it has ample margin to work with. It is not clear whether North Korea already has the necessary facilities to begin liquefying coal immediately, and thus to replace its oil imports overnight. There is evidence, however, that North Korea has

mastered the basic technology and deployed it at industrial scale. Beginning in 2006, North Korea carried out major building and upgrading work at the Namhung Youth Chemical Complex. Part of this work consisted of building, and then expanding, a major coal-gasification plant (to generate petrochemical feedstock from anthracite coal). This is significant: coal liquefaction amounts to coal gasification plus an added step. It is the very same technology. And given North Korea's precarious liquid-fuel procurement situation, and the standoff over its nuclear programme, it would be very surprising if the country had not worked on a backup plan along these lines. Given that it has mastered the technology, the country is surely scrambling to expand whatever liquefaction capacity it already has. The partial coal export ban pushes it in this direction anyway, as it creates a glut of coal and deprives North Korea of the cash needed to pay for oil imports. Moreover, North Korea, like any other country, could surely reduce its oil consumption if it needed to. It could certainly produce more coal if required – which is unlikely, given that sanctions will have created surplus production capacity. It also could turn some crops into diesel or ethanol. North Korea imports Chinese oil for the same reason that Germany imports Russian gas: because it is convenient (that is, economical) to do so. Would it be good news for North Korea if the oil stopped flowing? No. Is it likely to cripple the economy and force the government to change course on their foremost strategic priority? No. There are ample hydrocarbons in North Korea to substitute for those it imports from China, though maybe not 100% overnight. Overcoming Chinese opposition to an oil embargo, in other words, is unlikely to solve the larger problem.

2. No Impact: They would just turn to Russia, who said they would not cut off oil supplies

Choe Sang-hun. "Putin Rejects Cutting Off Oil to North Korea." *Nytimes.com*. 6 Sept. 2017. Web. 8 Sept. 2017. <<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/world/asia/north-korea-putin-oil-embargo.html>>

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia said his country opposed cutting off oil supplies to North Korea as part of new sanctions being considered in the wake of the country's latest nuclear test, according to official accounts of his meeting Wednesday with President Moon Jae-in of South Korea. The United States and its allies are pushing for a global embargo on oil exports to North Korea as the United Nations Security Council debates a new round of sanctions against the North. Russia has veto power over any such Security Council sanctions. north Korea has been getting most of its oil from China. But it has been trying to increase imports from Russia as an alternative source of energy for its military, as well as for its decrepit industries, amid signs that Beijing is growing impatient with the North's nuclear adventurism, South Korean analysts said. During a meeting on the sidelines of an economic summit conference in the eastern Russian city of Vladivostok on Wednesday, Mr. Moon asked Mr. Putin to support the proposed oil embargo. But Mr. Putin said that sanctions and pressure would not persuade North Korea to give up nuclear weapons, said Yoon Young-chan, a spokesman for Mr. Moon.

3. Even under the strictest of sanctions, they would not stop

Griffiths 17 James Griffiths and Serenitie Wang, Cnn, 8-8-2017, "China willing to 'pay a price' for stronger North Korea sanctions," CNN,

<http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/08/asia/china-north-korea-sanctions/index.html> //DF

While China may be on board with the new sanctions, many experts are skeptical as to the effect economic pressure will have on Pyongyang, pointing to the failure of sanctions to prevent the build up of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs in the first place. North Korea has "an impressive track record over its whole history, going back to the 1940s when it was founded, of being able to ... weather virtually any kind of economic pressure," John Delury, a professor at Yonsei University in South Korea, told CNN Money. "This is not the kind of regime that is easy to bring to its knees." While Pyongyang may suffer economically, analysts say the country's nuclear program will likely be the last thing cut, a conclusion supported by North Korea's public statements on the matter. "We will, under no circumstances, put the nukes and ballistic rockets on the negotiating table," North Korea Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho said this week, adding that Pyongyang's "possession of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles is a legitimate option for self-defence in the face of a clear and real nuclear threat posed by the US."

Impact Defense – R/T Rocket Fuel

Nope

Broad 17 William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, 9-17-2017, "The Rare, Potent Fuel Powering North Korea's Weapons," New York Times,

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/17/world/asia/north-korea-rocket-fuel-missiles.html?_r=0 //DF

But it may well be too late. **Intelligence officials believe that the North's program has advanced to the point where it is no longer as reliant on outside suppliers, and that it may itself be making the** potent **fuel**, known as UDMH. Despite a long record of intelligence warnings that the North was acquiring both forceful missile engines and the fuel to power them, there is no evidence that Washington has ever moved with urgency to cut off Pyongyang's access to the rare propellant. Classified memos from both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations laid out, with what turned out to be prescient clarity, how the North's pursuit of the highly potent fuel would enable it to develop missiles that could strike almost anywhere in the continental United States. In response to inquiries from The New York Times, Timothy Barrett, a spokesman for the director of national intelligence, said that "**based on North Korea's demonstrated science and technological capabilities — coupled with the priority Pyongyang places on missile programs — North Korea probably is capable of producing UDMH domestically.**" UDMH is short for unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine.

Impact Defense – R/T Harsher Sanctions Work

Harsher sanctions won't work for three reasons

1. Despite China controlling most of NK's trade, NK would always find ways around even total sanctions

Bader 17 Jeffrey A. Bader, 8-8-2017, "Why deterring and containing North Korea is our least bad option," Brookings,

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/08/08/why-deterring-and-containing-north-korea-is-our-least-bad-option/> //DF

Sanctioning Chinese companies that trade with North Korea. Such an approach has some of the same shortcomings as relying on China to solve the North Korea problem. **China may be responsible for 90 percent of North Korea's foreign trade, but the total amount is trivial. A complete halt in Chinese economic interaction with North Korea—which is not in the cards—would no doubt be painful for the North, but Pyongyang would find ways around it, through smuggling, an opening to South Korea (which South Korea's new president could reciprocate), yet greater self-reliance, and endless belt-tightening.** If Washington goes too far in sanctioning Chinese companies, China would retaliate by diminishing or eliminating its cooperation with the United States on North Korea, which would be devastating for any successful outcome.

2. North Korea will turn to Russia as a sanctions loophole. Funabashi from the Washington Post reports

Yoichi Funabashi, Yoichi Funabashi. "Opinion | Why Trump's North Korea strategy can't succeed." *Washington Post*. 11 Jun. 2017. Web. 13 Jul. 2017.

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/06/11/why-trumps-north-korea-strategy-cant-succeed/>

Third, heavy-handed economic sanctioning by China of South Korea in response to Seoul's agreement to deploy the U.S.-supplied Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, anti-missile system has heightened South Korea's insecurity. Moreover, U.S.-Russian, Chinese-Japanese and Japanese-South Korean relations have been troubled. Poor Russia-U.S. relations prevent regional cooperation. **Even if China complies**

with Trump's demand for action against Pyongyang, Russia provides an alluring alternative for North Korea's economy as a sanctions loophole.

Chinese-Japanese relations resemble a scaled-down version of the rivalry between the established power of the United States and the rising power of China, and territorial disputes over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands continue to bubble over. Chronic bilateral issues between Japan and South Korea, which have hindered trilateral cooperation with the United States, may resurface. Newly elected South Korean President Moon Jae-in has said that his country "cannot emotionally accept" the 2015 comfort women accord with Japan. Relations among all these states are caught in a vortex, one in which coordinated policies toward North Korea are rendered unfeasible. The most recent round of "six-party talks" between North Korea, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States was held in 2008. Since then, nuclear weapons have come to be viewed by Kim Jong Un as a necessity for his regime's survival.

3. Sanctions will become less effective because NK is liberalizing its economy

Wallace 17 Christopher Wallace, 7-31-2017, "North Korea's night lights show improving economy despite sanctions," Fox News,

<http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/07/31/north-koreas-night-lights-show-improving-economy-despite-sanctions.html> //DF

Complicating efforts to exert economic pressure on North Korean leader Kim Jong Un are recent economic reforms his regime has implemented. Some North Korean farmers are now allowed to keep a percentage of what they produce rather than give it all over to inefficient state-run enterprises for redistribution. Experts believe the policy change could mitigate the effects of North Korea's frequent drought-induced food crises, which have forced Pyongyang to turn to the international community for help in the past. The number of government-approved markets in North Korea has doubled to 440 since 2010. According to a study by the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul, these markets employ about 1 million people as salesmen or managers, out of a population of 25 million. The former head of South Korea's intelligence service told lawmakers earlier this year that about 40 percent of North Korea's population now works in some form of private enterprise. At the same time, wages have apparently risen, along with living standards. More cars are said to be clogging Pyongyang streets, and diplomats report a denser skyline from just a few years ago. The elites are reportedly shopping on Amazon.com and enjoying a new ski resort and luxury hotel near the capital. "North Korea has gone from a very tightly controlled state socialist economy to basically a marketizing economy," Sokeel Park of Liberty in North Korea told the Financial Times last month.

Impact Defense – R/T Denuclearization

No impact: even if China imposes maximum sanctions on North Korea, they still won't work to de-nuclearize

1. Because nukes are too important to Kim's survival

Fisher 17 Max Fisher, 9-6-2017, "Bad News, World: China Can't Solve the North Korea Problem," New York Times,

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/world/asia/china-north-korea-nuclear-problem.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FNorth%20Korea&action=click&contentCollection=world&ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=7&pgtype=collection //DF

If China complied with every American request to cut trade, it could devastate North Korea's economy,

which especially relies on Chinese fossil fuels. **But repeated studies have found that sanctions,** while effective at forcing small policy changes, **cannot persuade a government to sign its own death warrant. North Korea sees its weapons as essential to its survival,** and tests as necessary to fine-tune them. Jeffrey Lewis, who directs an East Asia program at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, called notions that China could impose costs exceeding the benefit North Korea draws from its weapons "sad and desperate." Imagine, Mr. Lewis said, that you are Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, and China

turned against you, joining your enemies in pressuring you to disarm. “The last thing you would do in that situation is give up your independent nuclear capability,” he said. “The one thing you hold that they have no control over. You would never give that up in that situation.” When sanctions aim at forcing internal political change, they often backfire, hardening their targets in place. In the 1960s, the United States imposed a total embargo on its neighbor and onetime ally, Cuba. Fidel Castro, the Cuban leader, ruled for half a century, even surviving the loss of Soviet support. When Americans rage at Beijing for failing to toughen sanctions, Mr. Lewis said, “The Chinese response is, ‘Because they’re not going to work.’ And the data is on their side.” North Korea may be especially resistant to such pressure. The Chinese, Mr. Delury said, “can keep reducing their already minuscule trade and investment ties to North Korea, but it will not deflect Kim Jong-un because one thing the North Korean system is especially good at is absorbing pain.” Even a total trade ban would impose less suffering than what North Korea has already proved it can endure. In the 1990s, when Russian subsidies disappeared, a famine killed up to 10 percent of North Korea’s population. But North Korea neither collapsed nor sought to end the crisis by opening up to the outside world. Overriding its calculus, then, would require imposing costs greater than destruction or famine but short of war, which would risk a nuclear exchange. That may be a Venn diagram with no overlap.

2. Because nukes are key to North Korea’s national identity

Bolton 17 Derek Bolton [PhD Student International Relations, University of Bath], 2-9-2017, “North Korea’s deep sense of national identity is the main obstacle to nuclear negotiations,” The Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/north-koreas-deep-sense-of-national-identity-is-the-main-obstacle-to-nuclear-negotiations-72686> //DF

The trouble is, policymakers and analysts have traditionally struggled to account for DPRK foreign policy. It has always been something of a mystery. But a new approach to explaining its past foreign policy might provide useful insights into how best to contend with the country. One such approach is to build a framework around the concept of “ontological security”. Ontological security, as explained by psychiatrist R D Laing and sociologist Anthony Giddens, refers to the “security of being”. Put simply, in order to feel secure we must possess a stable feeling of self-identity. Our ability to do this is intimately tied to the group to which we belong, providing us with the stability upon which we can build a sense of self. If the foundations of that group are challenged or called into question, then so too is the related sense of self. In North Korea, this largely stemmed from post-colonial nationalism, a response to Japanese occupation and negative interactions with Russia and China during World War II. We have subsequently seen North Korea consistently seeking to uphold a national narrative of extreme independence, unification and non-subservience to great powers. As my ongoing research has found, this has often been done at the expense of its own physical security and economic interests, jeopardising key alliances and undermining access to military and economic support, all while seeking to maintain an aggressive posture against its adversaries. For example, the DPRK repeatedly rejected Chinese military assistance before and during the Korean War. Once China did get involved, the effectiveness of its forces was hindered by North Korean concerns over sovereignty. After the war, subsequent feuds with both China and Russia came at a time North Korea relied on both for its sustenance, again highlighting the priority of national narrative over other interests and considerations. Against this backdrop of behaviour being linked to ontological security, the notion that the international community, or China, can somehow cajole North Korea into making concessions over its nuclear program seems counter intuitive. This is not to say there is no leverage. China is well positioned to crack down on DPRK procurement of the materials and resources required for future progress within its nuclear and ballistic missile weapons program. Should China choose, it also has the capability to put significant pressure on the North Korean economy. But there is little interest from Beijing in seeing the DPRK collapse only for US and South Korean forces to take its place. At best, should China manage to twist North Korea’s arm to such an extent their survival depends on change, Pyongyang will undertake the necessary face lift. Whether that change would be lasting or substantial is questionable. North Korea’s security interests are now intimately tied to its nuclear weapons program. Perhaps more importantly though, so too are its notions of independence, non-subservience and self-reliance. A failure to account for the DPRK’s history when seeking to understand its current interests will lead to misplaced

diagnoses and policies. Instead, policy makers need to look to the past in order to understand how we might approach and deal with North Korea in the future. Understanding the North Korean highly protective attitude to its own identity will help us predict DPRK reactions and perhaps shed light on new avenues for engagement. Failure to do so will lead to misunderstanding, and potentially dangerous consequences.

Impact Defense – R/T Diplomacy

Sanctions won't stop NK's nukes because they view them as too essential to give up

Malinowsky 17 Tom Malinowski, 7-24-2017, "How to Take Down Kim Jong Un," POLITICO Magazine, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/07/24/how-to-take-down-kim-jong-un-215411> //DF

North Korea tests this proposition like nothing else. Since its latest provocative missile test, thoughtful observers have pointed out that neither sanctions nor diplomacy are likely to dissuade Kim Jong Un from deploying nuclear weapons that can reach the United States, that we cannot depend on China to stop him for us, but that the alternative of a military strike on North Korea could cause a war that would lay waste to our ally South Korea. When it comes to North Korea, the phrase "there are no good options" has become a mantra. Though we've been slow to admit it, the reasons have been plain for some time. Kim Jong Un, like all totalitarian leaders, wants above all to ensure his survival. He is convinced that a nuclear strike capability is necessary to deter the United States and South Korea from threatening his regime, and to extract concessions that might prolong its life. There is nothing crazy about this conviction. And because the matter is existential for Kim, more economic pressure will not change his mind. His regime survived a famine and can risk economic hardship. What he apparently will not risk is following the example of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qadhafi, who gave up nuclear programs and found themselves defenseless against foreign interventions that claimed their lives.

Impact Turn – R/T Sanctions Good

Turn: harsh sanctions make NK more of a threat

a) They cut off the North. Isolation is exactly what Kim wants

Malinowsky 17 Tom Malinowski, 7-24-2017, "How to Take Down Kim Jong Un," POLITICO Magazine, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/07/24/how-to-take-down-kim-jong-un-215411> //DF

Even if we can't stop North Korea's weapons programs, it makes sense to cause delays and disruptions, including through targeted sanctions against Chinese companies that work with the North Korean military. But we should not encourage an end to general trade between China and North Korea because the movement of goods enables the movement of people and ideas. The Kim regime was never more secure than when its country was closed to the world; a return to total isolation would prolong its life, while make its ultimate demise harder to manage.

b) They cause healthcare collapses, food shortages, and lower quality of living for innocent North Koreans. That increases the kind of anti-outsider sentiment that Kim thrives on

Tania **Branigan**, 4-1-2014, "North Korean health system crumbling as shortages and sanctions bite," Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/23/north-korean-health-system-crumbling-sanctions> — JS

But, said Choi's co-author Sanghyuk Shin, "the widespread food shortages, lack of access to clean water, and poor living conditions have placed a great strain on the health system to provide quality preventive and curative services". Shin, a post-doctoral scholar at the University of California Los Angeles, said there were clear signs that sanctions—supposed to target the country's weapons programme and luxuries for its elite—had hit the broader economy. The ban on trade in "dual-use" items, which have both military and civilian applications, can also have unintended consequences; he pointed to a major health project, backed by a US institution, which struggled to import the laboratory equipment it needed. A recent article in the Lancet by public health experts at the University of Oslo pressed the case for increased academic engagement with the North to help reduce "grave,

morally unacceptable, health inequities". **"The effect of sanctions is likely to be even stronger in a country like North Korea, where the state is the primary health provider for the population. Sanctions directly affect the state's ability to maintain a strong health infrastructure,"** Shin said.

That's why, after the most recent round of sanctions, NK says things like this:

BBC, 9-12-2017, "N Korea threatens US with 'greatest pain'," BBC News,

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41242992> //DF

North Korea has threatened the United States with the "greatest pain" it has ever suffered following new sanctions imposed by the United Nations.

Pyongyang's envoy to the UN accused Washington of opting for "political, economic and military confrontation". US President Donald Trump said the move was nothing compared to what would have to happen to deal with North Korea. The UN sanctions are an attempt to starve the country of fuel and income for its weapons programmes. The measures restrict oil imports and ban textile exports, and were approved after North Korea's sixth and largest nuclear test earlier this month. Han Tae Song, North Korea's ambassador to the UN, said he "categorically rejected" what he called an "illegal resolution". "The forthcoming measures by DPRK [the Democratic Republic of Korea] will make the US suffer the greatest pain it has ever experienced in its history," he told a UN conference in Geneva. "Instead of making [the] right choice with rational analysis... the Washington regime finally opted for political, economic and military confrontation, obsessed with the wild dream of reversing the DPRK's development of nuclear force - which has already reached the completion phase."

Impact DA

Harsher sanctions harm ordinary North Koreans, not the elites who could change policy

Bandow 16 Doug Bandow [Senior Fellow, the Cato Institute and, former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan], 6-7-2016, "Sanctioning North Korea Only Hurts Ordinary People," National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/sanctioning-north-korea-only-hurts-ordinary-people-16488> //DF

That appears to be the case in North Korea. So far the elite have prospered, despite penalties directed against luxury imports. Lu Chao, a Senior Researcher at China's Academy of Liaoning Social Science, argued that "there are so many channels for importing these goods. The ban is just propaganda and has no significance." The streets of Pyongyang suggest he's right. **Privileged North Koreans have money and goods which were lacking only a few years ago.** The Washington Post recently reported on "Pyonghattan," home to North Korea's privileged elite: "They like fast fashion from Zara and H&M. They work out to be seen as much as to exercise. They drink cappuccinos to show how cosmopolitan they are. Some have had their eyelids done to make them look more Western." In contrast, argued Andrei Lankov of Kookmin University, **"the average North Korean will also bear the brunt of the sanctions."** For instance, **restrictions on the minerals trade will directly hit engineers, miners, truck drivers, and those serving mining communities. Hunger continues to stalk much of the land and health care is lamentable. The latest round of sanctions has increased hardship.** Choi Ha-young, chairman of the Love North Korean Children Charity, complained: "Currently, **due to the UN sanctions, people in the lowest class are really impacted.**" Unfortunately, Washington seems to have only one response to the North: increase sanctions. However, this policy is a dead-end. The U.S. and its allies must find a new strategy toward Pyongyang.

R/T CN Econ Retaliation

Uniqueness

Internal Link – R/T SK Econ Pressure

THAAD is a short-term issue, there are underlying reasons why South Korean exports are falling.

Retail Asia 17 Retail Asia, 7-17-2017, "Chinese market no longer land of opportunity for Korean products," Retail News Asia,

<https://www.retailnews.asia/chinese-market-no-longer-land-opportunity-korean-products/> //DF

Industry officials say that data indicates **THAAD may not be the only cause of falling South Korean exports to China as firms there are quickly catching up in technology and no longer relying on foreign products.** South Korea's auto exporters have also been nudged out by Chinese companies, data showed. Hyundai Motor and its sister firm Kia Motors reported their market share in China had been cut in half compared with five years ago. The carmakers said their numbers fell from 8.6 percent to 3.8 percent. They were routed by Chinese local labels, which claimed 46.1 percent of the market, followed by European (21.4 percent) and Japanese (17.6 percent) automakers.

The trade decreases are indicative of a shift in Chinese-South Korean relations that preceded THAAD

Rich 17 Motoko Rich, 3-8-2017, "As Leaders Argue, South Korea Finds China Is No Longer an Easy Sell," New York Times,

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/asia/china-south-korea-economy.html?_r=0 //DF

But **even before China began lashing out at South Korea, the economic relationship** between the industrial giants **had started to shift. China is increasingly a competitor as much as a customer for South Korea.** Chinese companies have improved product quality and can compete on price, both at home and abroad, in everything from complex components to cosmetics to smartphones. That presents major challenges for a country where a bribery scandal has engulfed both the country's president and the de facto chief of its biggest conglomerate, Samsung, and raised questions about whether an economy driven by exports and close ties between officials and big business have reached their limit. To thrive long term, experts say, South Korea needs to consider overhauls that will help empower entrepreneurs and spread wealth domestically. "A key question is whether Korea is going to be able to make a shift away from a trade- and export-led growth model that brought them dramatic economic success," said Mark W. Lippert, who recently left Seoul as the American ambassador to South Korea.

Link Turn

Halting the implementation of THAAD sends a message to China that economic coercion works, incentivizing China to do it more in the future (Snyder - Forbes).

Snyder, Scott. "South Korea's Decision To Halt THAAD Carries Hidden Risks." *Forbes*. 11 Jun. 2017. Web. 16 Aug. 2017. <<https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2017/06/11/south-koreas-decision-to-halt-thaad-carries-hidden-risks/>>

The Moon administration must find a way to enhance governmental transparency and accountability while upholding its credibility as a strong U.S. security partner. If the perception becomes that the South Korean government is blocking measures necessary to protect American forces, that would rapidly erode American public support for U.S. troop commitments. It could potentially provide President Donald Trump with a pretext to pursue U.S. withdrawal of forces in Korea. Moon's decision also carries another risk. For months, **China put the economic pressure on South Korea for agreeing to the deployment in the first place. It could see the halt in implementation of the THAAD deployment as an acquiescence, and thereby invite even more pressure on Seoul on each occasion that China is dissatisfied with new South Korean defense measures toward North Korea.**

Impact Defense – R/T Extreme Sanctions

1. Interdependency (Weijia – Global Times)

Hu Weijia (Global Times). South Korea would hurt own economy by trying to lessen market ties with China. Published 3/28/17.

<http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1040025.shtml>.

It is understandable that South Korea doesn't want to rely on the Chinese market for economic growth, but with the economical interdependency between Beijing and Seoul that will be difficult to achieve. Over the next year or two, boycotts by China in reaction to the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system could cause an economic loss of around 10 trillion won (\$9 billion) in commodity exports for South Korea, media reports said recently, quoting research from the Overseas Economic Research Institute under the Export-Import Bank of Korea. As South Korean businesses have felt the impact of China's anger over the THAAD deployment, there have been an increasing number of voices in South Korea calling for the country to reduce its dependence on the Chinese market. However, this won't be easy to realize. A close economic relationship has been established between the two neighboring countries and South Korea exports a large amount of intermediate industrial products to China, which serves as the last stop in the Asian manufacturing supply chain. Asia-Pacific's outstretched supply chains are a complex network and can not be completely changed overnight, thus it is impossible to cut off trade links between China and South Korea. South Korea should learn a lesson from Japan. Although Japan wanted to reduce its dependence on the Chinese market following damaged Sino-Japan economic ties in 2012 due to the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, China has remained an important destination for Japanese exports and investment. Additionally, enterprises from other countries are fiercely competing to win attention from local buyers in the world's second-largest economy and would enjoy if South Korean companies decreased their dependence on China's fast-growing consumer market. The game between China and South Korea over the THAAD deployment is more of a reflection of the US' strategy against China. It would be unwise for South Korea to give up the Chinese market to support the US' strategy at a time when American companies are striving to increase their presence in the Chinese market. The South Korean economy can't grow well without close involvement with China as the economies in Asia are closely connected to each other. If viewed from another angle, **it is also impossible for China to impose extreme economic sanctions against South Korea, which is an important trade partner for China with its many primary and intermediate exports. As such, economical interdependency between Beijing and Seoul cannot be altered in the short term by geopolitical decisions, such as the THAAD deployment.**

Delink: (Snyder, Aug. 2017) China can't continue these sanctions for much longer, nor can they make it more severe. China can only go so far before it is hurting itself.

Scott A. Snyder "China's Limited Retaliation Options Against the THAAD Deployment in South Korea." *Council on Foreign Relations*. 8/08/2016 Web. 13 Jul. 2017. <<https://www.cfr.org/blog-post/chinas-limited-retaliation-options-against-thaad-deployment-south-korea>>

The Chinese Ambassador to South Korea gave a rather dramatic warning to the leader of South Korea's opposition Democratic Party on February 25 that a decision to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system would put China-South Korean relations at risk. Thus, it should not be surprising that threats of Chinese retaliation toward South Korea would surface following the July 8 U.S.-ROK announcement that the governments had decided to deploy THAAD in South Korea in response to North Korea's growing missile threats. Despite emotional assertions that South Korea has compromised Chinese interests by pursuing self-defense against North Korea's growing missile capabilities, **China does not have the capability to punish South Korea without damaging its own**

economic and strategic interests on the Korean peninsula. The Global Times stated in a July 15 editorial that "Beijing must review and readjust its Korean Peninsula strategies in accordance with the latest threat from the peninsula, including its ROK policies." At a bilateral meeting between South Korean and Chinese foreign ministers on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting on July 25, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi went out of his way to assert that the South Korean decision "has undermined the foundations of trust

between the two countries.” **Threats of Chinese retaliation including reductions of tourist flows and visa approvals between China and South Korea and cancellations of Korean pop concerts** and television dramas in China have inflamed a South Korean domestic political debate over THAAD deployment in an attempt to take advantage of domestic opposition and threaten the Korean public with retaliatory countermeasures designed to punish South Korea for what Beijing views as a strategic misjudgment. But **China’s capacity to pursue economic countermeasures without sacrificing its own economic and political interests remains limited.**

Yang, Jun. “China Bullies South Korea at Its Own Risk.” Reuters. 12 Jan. 2017. Web. 06 July 2017.
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-china-breakingviews-idUSKBN14W14D>

China can only do so much to make life harder for South Korea. Beijing appears to be taking economic revenge against Seoul over a missile defence deal with the United States. Sectors riding the “Korean wave” in China, such as cosmetics, tourism and entertainment, are hurting. But **\$100 billion-plus manufacturing ties between the two nations are much harder to break. Excessive harshness would backfire on China.** Tensions have been escalating between Beijing and Seoul since a July decision to install the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, system in South Korea. China, uncomfortable with the missile shield’s powerful radar, is protesting. An unlucky cluster of South Korean companies seems to be bearing the brunt of Beijing’s wrath. China’s quarantine authority has rejected imports of a large number of South Korean cosmetics products, local media reported. The People’s Republic may also be trying to cut back on tourist flows to the Land of Morning Calm. Regulators have reportedly blocked television shows and brands from South Korea, along with K-pop stars. Blocking access to Chinese consumers is a big blow to these firms, which have capitalized on the popularity of South Korean entertainment and personal care products in the People’s Republic. Major cosmetics maker Amorepacific, for one, has lost a third of its market capitalization since the THAAD decision. **But the bulk of South Korean exports to China is probably safe from retaliation. South Korea is the biggest exporter of parts and unfinished goods to China.** Such items accounted for more than 77 percent of the \$137 billion South Korean product exports to China in 2015, dwarfing 0.8 percent for cosmetics, according to the Seoul-based Institute for International Trade. **High-quality, technologically advanced components made in South Korea are crucial for many Chinese brands competitiveness.** The squabble still highlights a need for rebalancing. South Korean companies depend on China for a quarter of their exports, but sales could slow as growth in the world’s second-largest economy weakens. Southeast Asia could pick up the slack. Chinese firms, for their part, want to climb the value chain and reduce reliance on imported components. But for now, a breakup would be as painful to China as it would be to South Korea.

2. South Korea makes up for sanctions loss in other markets (Hyung-Ho - Korean Herald).

Kim Hyung-Ho (Korea Herald). “Korea goes all-out to diversify export markets.” March 15, 2017.
<http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170315000624>

With its trade relationships with China and the US increasingly strained, South Korea is stepping up efforts to diversify markets for its export goods. According to data from the Korea International Trade Association, China and the US accounted for 25.1 percent and 13.4 percent of the country’s outbound shipments last year, respectively. This heavy reliance on the world’s two largest economies for exports has made Korea’s position more vulnerable to China’s retaliatory steps against Seoul’s hosting of a US anti-missile system and protectionist policies pursued by US President Donald Trump’s administration. Hyun Jung-taik, head of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, a state-funded think tank, said emotional responses to pressures from the country’s biggest trade partners would be of no help. He noted it was important to avoid being put into a similar trouble again in the future through the diversification of overseas markets for Korean companies. Experts say Korea should actively look for ways to reduce economic dependence particularly on China to make it less tempted to hit Korean businesses with a view to affecting Seoul’s diplomatic and security decisions. **A growing number of Korean companies are turning to the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations and India as two major markets where demand for their goods will continue to increase in the coming years.**

Powell 17 Bill Powell, 4-25-2017, "This is what war with North Korea would look like," Newsweek,
<http://www.newsweek.com/2017/05/05/what-war-north-korea-looks-588861.html> //DF

But this would not be a one-week walkover, like the first Gulf War against Saddam Hussein, when his forces were arrayed like clay pigeons in the Iraqi and Kuwaiti deserts, where they were easily destroyed by U.S. air power. Conventional thinking in the Pentagon is that it would be a four- to six-month conflict with high-intensity combat and many dead. **In 1994**, when President Bill Clinton contemplated the use of force to

knock out the North's nuclear weapons program, the then commander of U.S.-Republic of Korea forces, Gary Luck, [estimated] told his commander in chief that **a war on the peninsula would likely result in 1 million dead, and nearly \$1 trillion of economic damage.** The carnage would conceivably be worse now, given that the U.S. believes Pyongyang has 10 to 16 nuclear weapons. If the North could figure out a way to deliver one, why wouldn't Kim go all in?

Impact Defense – R/T Travel Ban

1. While China is actively stopping group travel agencies, it isn't stopping individual tourism. Instead of going in groups, they're ridin' solo.

"South Korea losing luster as tourist destination?." *koreatimes*. 14 Feb. 2017. Web. 16 Aug. 2017.

http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/culture/2017/08/141_223049.html

The number of Chinese visitors to Jeju is expected to reach 42,800 during the holiday, down 16.6 percent from the same period a year ago, according to the Jeju Special Self-governing Provincial Tourism Association. Despite the downturn, **some agencies reported that a growing number of independent Chinese tourists will eventually have positive effects on the tourism sector. "The number of Chinese group tourists has significantly decreased but independent tourists increased,"** said another tourist agency official.

2. The travel ban at worst decreases the GDP by half a percent

Ren 17 Shuli Ren, 3-5-2017, "China's Sanctions Over THAAD Can Sink Korea's Economy," No Publication, <http://www.barrons.com/articles/chinas-sanctions-over-thaad-can-sink-koreas-economy-1488773168>
//DF

China has expressed its displeasure at South Korea over its intent to install a U.S.-backed missile defense system by telling Chinese travel agencies not to organize group tours to Korea and suspending conglomerate Lotte Group's supermarket operations in China. China's travel ban can shave at least 20% off Korea's GDP growth this year, says Credit Suisse. The bank currently forecasts Korea to grow at 2.5%. The reasoning is very simple. **Chinese tourists**, who come as part of tour groups, **contribute \$7.3 billion in tourism revenue** to Korea's economy, or **0.5% of its total GDP**. Individual tourists from China, contribute another \$11.3 billion, or 0.8% of its total GDP. So **if China just cancels travel groups alone this year, 0.5% of Korea's GDP is gone**, or 20% of overall GDP growth estimated by Credit Suisse. And things could get worse. China has asked for a boycott of Lotte Group's products, but China's displeasure has so far only been directed at cosmetics, duty-free shops and Korean casinos. Will China launch sanctions against Korean smartphones and car makers too?

R/T Corruption

Link – R/T Public Perception

1. Delink: 67% of South Koreans believe that U.S. and South Korean relations will get better in the future and 55% support the installation of THAAD (Yonhap News Agency).

NA (Yonhap News Agency). "3 out of 5 S. Koreans optimistic about relations with U.S.: survey." 2017/06/25.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN20170626004800315>

SEOUL, June 26 (Yonhap) -- More than three out of five South Koreans expect that the relations between South Korea and the United States will improve under the President Moon Jae-in government, a survey showed Monday. **The survey disclosed by the Asan Institute showed that 67 percent of those polled said that South Korea-U.S. relations will get better going forward**, with 20.7 percent saying the opposite. The survey was conducted via phone on 1,000 adults aged 19 or older during June 1-3. It was unveiled days before President Moon is to meet his U.S. counterpart Donald Trump in Washington later this week. "This is a very significant change compared to the previous survey done in November last year in which as much as 64 percent of those polled expressed concerns about the bilateral relations," the research said in a report. The report attributed the higher level of optimism to the hopes that many

South Koreans are pinning on the new president who took office in May. Of those polled, 30.6 percent said that the main focus during the upcoming summit between the allies should be placed on "building trust," followed by 24.9 percent and 20.1 percent saying that economic cooperation and coordination against North Korea should be the top priority, respectively. About 19 percent cited the controversial issue of the deployment of the U.S. missile defense system known as THAAD in South Korea should be the most important agenda item during the summit.

Meanwhile, with regard to the THAAD issue in particular, 55 percent expressed support for its installation, but 63.7 percent said that it requires parliamentary endorsement.

2. Delink: 1 - There is a consistent majority support from the public for the deployment of THAAD. 2 - Moon has delayed the deployment of THAAD to conduct an environmental impact study and show that THAAD's deployment will be transparent (Friedhoff - Real Clear World).

Karl Friedhoff (Real Clear World/Real Clear Politics). "Will Trump Upend U.S.-South Korea Alliance?" June 28, 2017.

http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2017/06/28/trump_south_korea_summit_112414.html

Hand-wringing over the deployment of THAAD is also commonplace. But this ignores Moon's domestic political realities and overreacts to a series of unforced errors by the United States in THAAD's rollout. These missteps have overshadowed the fact that, **according to polling by Gallup Korea, a slim majority of the South Korean public consistently favors the deployment of THAAD.** To understand the mistakes Washington has made, consider THAAD's delivery to South Korea. The South Korean public saw images in the green glow of night-vision as the systems were rolled off of airplanes literally under the cover of dark. The terrible optics of this deployment coincided with a highly unpopular South Korean president being impeached for corruption. This strengthened the narrative that this deployment was being conducted in secret, with the explicit goal of avoiding public scrutiny. **In this light, Moon's decision to delay the full deployment is astute. As a year-long environmental impact study takes place, two launchers will remain operable while four others wait to come on line. Full deployment will likely take place, but Moon has effectively bought time for broader public support to overwrite the anger of a vocal minority**, thus smoothing over a potential trouble spot in the U.S.-South Korea alliance.

3. Moon clearly supports THAAD; he even sent his defense minister to Washington to confirm this

Kim 17 Jack Kim, 5-10-2017, "Moon Seeks to Assure U.S. South Korea Won't Abandon THAAD," Time Magazine,

<http://time.com/4800725/south-korea-thaad-moon-jae-in/> //DF

South Korean President **Moon Jae In's top security aide left for Washington** on Thursday **as the new leader tries to reassure Seoul's main ally he won't scrap a deal to host a missile defense system** that has angered China. Moon ordered an investigation this week into why his office had not been informed about the deployment of four more launchers for the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which are being deployed amid a growing threat of missile launches by North Korea. The new liberal leader had pledged during the recent election campaign that he would review the decision to deploy THAAD, and said it was "very shocking" his office had not been told of the latest deployment while he is preparing for a summit with U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington this month. The decision to deploy the system in South Korea was made by Moon 's conservative predecessor Park Geun-hye, who was impeached and thrown from office in a corruption scandal that engulfed South Korea's business and political elite. **My order for a probe on THAAD is purely a domestic measure and** I want to be clear that it **is not about trying to change the existing decision or sending a message to the United States**," Moon told visiting U.S. Senator Dick Durbin late on Wednesday. **The remarks were Moon 's first clear indication that he does not intend to stop the deployment**, which has drawn angry protests from China, South Korea's biggest trading partner. Chung Eui-yong, Moon 's national security adviser, also denied that the controversy over the THAAD deployment would have a negative impact on the summit between Moon and Trump. "We've sufficiently explained that **this has nothing to do with our alliance**," Chung told reporters before his departure.

R/T Kill Chain

1. Kill Chain isn't an anti missile system. Merriam Webster defines an anti-missile as "a missile intercepting another missile in flight"

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/antimissile%20missile>

R/T Iran Oil

1. (Turn) The US will step up. Lee 17 of Platts explains that South Korea has been expanding its imports of US oil and gas to diversify and protect themselves, so I'd contend that South Korea would just get even more from the US. That's better than the negative world where South Korea gets it from Iran for two reasons:

- A. It's probably better to get oil from your ally than from a country that sponsors terrorism.
- B. It's probably better to get your oil from a country that has never been invaded than a country in one of the most conflict-prone regions of the world, because that increases the likelihood of a crash.

South Korea has been increasing imports of US oil and gas

Charles Lee, 1-13-2017, "S Korea to look for more US oil, gas imports under Trump administration," Platts, <https://www.platts.com/latest-news/oil/seoul/s-korea-to-look-for-more-us-oil-gas-imports-under-27750022>

"**[South Korea is]** We are **looking for what we [it] can take to expand energy cooperation with the US, such as shale gas imports**, with the Trump administration's looming protectionist policies," Woo Tae-hee, vice minister in charge of energy, told S&P Global Platts on the sidelines of a trade forum in Seoul. **South Korean companies have been increasing oil and gas imports from the US to diversify its supply sources from the Middle East**, Woo said. GS Caltex imported 2 million barrels of US Eagle Ford crude over November-December, the country's first purchase of American crude other than condensate and Alaskan crude since **Washington lifted a 40-year restriction on crude oil exports in late 2015**. State-owned Korea Gas Corp. planned to import 2.8 million mt/year from the Sabine Pass terminal in Louisiana from July this year under a 20-year contract that will help diversify supply sources, Woo said. This will be the first US LNG to be shipped to South Korea.

R/T Preemptive Strike

R/T US

1. De-Link China has threatened to back North Korea during a war if the U.S. strikes first, the US doesn't want to go to war with China so they won't initiate a preemptive (Denyer – Washington Post).

Simon Denyer and Amanda Erickson (Washington Post). "Beijing warns Pyongyang: You're on your own if you go after the United States." 8/11/17.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-warns-north-korea-youre-on-your-own-if-you-go-after-the-us/2017/08/11/a01a4396-7e68-11e7-9026-4a0a64977c92_story.html?utm_term=.e0e318011bb8

BEIJING — **China won't come to North Korea's aid if it launches missiles threatening U.S. soil and there is retaliation, a state-owned newspaper warned Friday — but it would intervene if Washington strikes**

first. The Global Times newspaper is not an official mouthpiece of the Communist Party, but in this case its editorial probably does reflect government policy, experts said. The stern Chinese warning came as government leaders and politicians around the world urged calm after a series of threats and counter threats by the U.S. and North Korean governments. The brinkmanship has spread jitters and weighed on global financial markets, which were down Friday for a fourth consecutive day. German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Friday called the escalating rhetoric “the wrong answer.” She pledged her country’s support for “any nonmilitary solutions,” telling reporters in Berlin, “I don’t see a military solution to this conflict.” Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, said there had been an “overwhelming amount” of “belligerent rhetoric” from Washington and Pyongyang. “The side that is stronger and cleverer” will take the first step to defuse tensions, he said.

2. De-link: the US would need permission from its Asian allies, who would *never* give it to him

Yuki Tatsumi, The Diplomat. "What It Would Really Take for a US Preemptive Strike on North Korea." *The Diplomat*. 10 Aug. 2017. Web. 9 Sept. 2017. <<http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/what-it-would-really-take-for-a-us-preemptive-strike-on-north-korea/>>

On August 8, the Washington Post reported the assessment of U.S. intelligence sources that North Korea has considerably elevated the threat posed by the regime in Pyongyang. For the first time since North Korea’s nuclear problem first surfaced as a security challenge for the United States more than 20 years ago, Pyongyang now poses a direct threat not only to U.S. allies in Northeast Asia, but also to the U.S. homeland. Responding to the latest development, U.S. President Donald Trump said any attempt to threaten the United States on the part of North Korea will be “met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.” While such saber-rattling rhetoric may make an excellent sound-bite, meeting

North Korea with “fire and fury” is much easier said than done in reality. **Any U.S. president who contemplates military actions against North Korea needs to be ready for the conflict to turn into the Second Korean War.**

Taking on such a military adventure would require the consent of the two U.S. allies in Northeast Asia

— South Korea, which has seen the war on the peninsula before, **and Japan**, where most U.S. reinforcements will have to come through

for a sustained U.S. military operation on the Korean Peninsula. **In addition, Beijing** — the guarantor of the North Korean regime’s

survival, whether Pyongyang likes it or not — **and Washington need to agree on the end-state of such a military**

action. Simply put, it takes more than a tweet and a statement to the press for the United States to execute a military option vis-à-vis the

Korean Peninsula. What is more problematic for the United States is that **neither of its allies in the region is in a condition**

to agree or acquiesce to a U.S. military option easily. In Seoul, newly-elected President Moon Jae-in has been conflicted

about how his new administration should respond to North Korea and remain close to its ally and security guarantor (the United States) without

upsetting its relationship with its biggest trading partner (China). In Tokyo, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe faces a dwindling approval rate at home

that, even with the recent cabinet reshuffle, cannot be expected to significantly improve without a notable improvement in the state of the

Japanese economy. His decision on how Japan would support the U.S. military in case of armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula would surely

be placed under extra scrutiny. Furthermore, given the aggravated diplomatic tensions between Tokyo and Seoul over the last several years,

Washington has not been able to have an opportunity to discuss what a military operation on the Korean Peninsula to curb North Korea’s

nuclear program would look like, what the role of Japan and South Korea respectively would be in a case of an armed conflict on the Korean

Peninsula, and how the three countries should coordinate their actions during the contingency.

3. De-link: every US President has threatened strikes and then backed down because the costs are too high

Fifield 17 Anna Fifield, 4-21-2017, "Twenty-five million reasons the U.S. hasn’t struck North Korea,"

Washington Post

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/twenty-five-million-reasons-the-us-cant-strike-north-korea/2017/04/21/47df9fea-2513-11e7-928e-3624539060e8_story.html?utm_term=.55fbace433cc

//DF

This prospect of extensive damage and casualties has restrained successive U.S. administrations,

however provocative North Korea has been. “Every U.S. administration, as they have looked at this problem, has

said that all options are available. But that’s not really true,” said Baker, who is at the Pacific Forum of the Center for

Strategic and International Studies. **“We really don’t have a military option.”** Vice President Pence, speaking in Seoul this week,

said that all options are on the table for dealing with North Korea, echoing statements that Secretary of State Rex Tillerson made in Seoul last

month. There was a similar discussion in 1994, when North Korea threatened to go nuclear, sparking talk of surgical strikes. "People in Washington were saying, 'We have the capability to do this,' but those of us who were sitting in Seoul said, 'You can't do that.'" Baker said.

4. De-link: there is no public support for a pre-emptive strike; since any strike would most likely lead to a prolonged conflict, that would require some level of public support, but there is none

Clement 17 Scott Clement, 9-24-2017, "Poll: Far more trust generals than Trump on N. Korea, while two-thirds oppose preemptive strike," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-far-more-trust-generals-than-trump-on-n-korea-while-two-thirds-oppose-preemptive-strike/2017/09/23/5cc4377c-9fbb-11e7-8ea1-ed975285475e_story.html?utm_term=.7270c5b745cd //DF

Two-thirds of Americans oppose launching a preemptive military strike against North Korea, with a majority trusting the U.S. military to handle the escalating nuclear crisis responsibly but not President Trump, a new Washington Post-ABC News poll finds. Roughly three-quarters of the public supports tougher economic sanctions on North Korea in an attempt to persuade it to give up its nuclear weapons, while just about one-third think the United States should offer the isolated country foreign aid or other incentives. The Post-ABC poll finds 37 percent of adults trust Trump either "a great deal" or "a good amount" to responsibly handle the situation with North Korea, while 42 percent trust the commander in chief "not at all." By comparison, 72 percent trust U.S. military leaders, including 43 percent saying they trust them "a great deal." A scant 8 percent of Americans surveyed think North Korean leader Kim Jong Un can act responsibly.

Turn (Read by itself)

(Karako - Strategic Studies Quarterly in 2017) Missile Defense Systems remove the need for preemptive strikes by giving the United States alternative avenues to resolving the conflict.

Thomas Karako (Senior Fellow at the Strategic Studies Quarterly). "Missile Defense and the Nuclear Posture Review." Fall 2017. [http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-3/Karako.pdf?utm_source=Strategic+Studies+Quarterly&utm_campaign=bee7b014af-SSQ+Fall+2017+Campaign&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4b8d69edd5-bee7b014af-214545441&mc_cid=bee7b014af&mc_eid=\[UNIQID\]](http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-3/Karako.pdf?utm_source=Strategic+Studies+Quarterly&utm_campaign=bee7b014af-SSQ+Fall+2017+Campaign&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4b8d69edd5-bee7b014af-214545441&mc_cid=bee7b014af&mc_eid=[UNIQID])

Crisis stability. Missile defenses may improve crisis stability by providing the United States courses of action other than preemption or retaliation. In the days prior to North Korea's 2006 Taepodong-2 launch, some former senior officials recommended a preemptive US strike against the North Korean missile site.¹⁵ The existence of a limited US homeland missile defense capability, however, provided President Bush with an alternative to preemptively striking North Korea's launch facilities. Such a defensive posture creates options for decision-makers that can contribute to stability. A more recent example of missile defense contributing to crisis stability occurred in October 2016, when two or more anti-ship cruise missiles reportedly were fired at the USS Mason as it sailed off the coast of Yemen. Instead of being hit, the ship employed defensive systems and was unharmed.¹⁶ Absent these active defenses, the United States could have been drawn further into the conflict. Instead, the United States was able to assess what had taken place and limit its response to a reprisal with a cruise missile strike.¹⁷ Raising the threshold for attack. Missile defenses also serve the purpose of raising the threshold for aggression for an adversary wishing to pursue coercive escalatory threats or actual strikes against the United States. Denying adversaries a "cheap shot" option against the American homeland or military forces may deter them from taking such actions. Missile defenses therefore can change the calculus of potential adversaries. They can create uncertainty about the effect of an escalatory threat or attack and thereby help thwart adversary escalation strategies. Buying time and creating options. Missile defense also buys time and creates otherwise unavailable options for decision-makers. Even limited and imperfect defenses create time and space for diplomacy or to attrite adversary missile forces with other means.¹⁸ In so doing, pressure to strike adversary launchers prior to launch is thereby relaxed.¹⁹ Difficulties of Scud hunting during the Gulf War demonstrated that relying on preemption alone, in addition to potentially creating instabilities, may be unreliable, especially if an adversary deploys mobile missiles.²⁰

R/T South Korea

De-Link: SK would never launch a preemptive strike because China has sworn to come to North Korea's aid (Le Miere – Newsweek)

Jason Le Miere (Newsweek). CHINA WOULD JOIN FORCES WITH NORTH KOREA IF U.S. LAUNCHES PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE. Published 8/11/17.

<http://www.newsweek.com/china-north-korea-preemptive-strike-649802>.

China will remain neutral if North Korea fires missiles at United States territory first, but should the U.S. launch a pre-emptive strike, as it has suggested it might, North Korea's chief ally would come to the North's aide. While not direct government policy, that verdict of how the country should react amid the unfolding nuclear threats from the U.S. and North Korea is contained in an editorial in the influential Communist Party-run Global Times newspaper Friday. **"China should also make clear that if North Korea launches missiles that threaten U.S. soil first and the U.S. retaliates, China will stay neutral,"** read the editorial. **"If the U.S. and South Korea carry out strikes and try to overthrow the North Korean regime and change the political pattern of the Korean Peninsula, China will prevent them from doing so."** Keep Up With This Story And More By Subscribing Now It went on: "China opposes both nuclear proliferation and war in the Korean Peninsula. It will not encourage any side to stir up military conflict, and will firmly resist any side which wants to change the status quo of the areas where China's interests are concerned." The piece stated that the government was "not able to persuade Washington or Pyongyang to back down at this time."

De-Link: Moon is totally opposed to war and only desires a diplomatic solution

Harris 17 Gardiner Harris, 8-7-2017, "A Rare Round of Diplomacy From North Korea's Top Diplomat," New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/07/world/asia/north-korea-asean-tillerson.html> //DF

In what appeared to be a blunt warning to the Trump administration, President Moon Jae-in of South Korea on Monday strongly opposed any military actions against the North that could set off war. "Above all, President Moon emphasized that South Korea can never accept a war erupting again on the Korean Peninsula," Mr. Moon's office said in a statement describing a 56-minute phone call with President Trump. "He stressed that the North Korean nuclear issue must be resolved in a peaceful, diplomatic manner through close coordination between South Korea and the United States." United States officials said Mr. Moon had requested the call. The White House, in its own statement about the conversation, said the two leaders had "affirmed that North Korea poses a grave and growing direct threat." Mr. Trump himself described the call on Twitter, praising the weekend vote by the United Nations Security Council in favor of sanctions.

R/T Environmental Harms

1. Delink: THAAD poses no threat of environmental harm in South Korea, in reality is very safe and only emits 0.007% watts of the legal limit of electromagnetic wave emission (Klingner - National Interest)

Bruce Klingner (The National Interest). "Why South Korea Needs THAAD." July 22, 2016.

<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-south-korea-needs-thaad-17095>

Beijing claims that missile defense deployment would be against China's security interests, overlooking, of course, that North Korean development of nuclear weapons and missiles—and the repeated threats to use them—go against South Korean and U.S. security interests. A careful analysis of THAAD interceptor and radar capabilities and Chinese missile deployment sites reveal Chinese technical objections are disingenuous. Beijing's true objective is preventing improvement in allied defensive capabilities and multilateral cooperation. **South Korea**

critics claim fears of radiation risks from the missile shield's radar, saying it would kill bees and irradiate melons. The U.S. invited South Korean media to the missile shield's deployment site on Guam for independent tests. Measured levels of the electromagnetic waves emanating from the radar revealed the system operates at an intensity far safer than required by Korean law, i.e. the radar emitted only 0.007 percent of the 10 watts per square meter allowed under Korean standards. Rep. Madeleine Bordallo, D-Guam, told South Korean reporters that there have been no signs of environmental impact nor any noise complaints from the defense system's deployment on the island.

Critics fail to understand that North Korea will continue to develop nuclear-tipped missiles regardless of whether the advanced defense system is deployed or not. If THAAD were to intercept even one North Korean nuclear missile, it would save hundreds of thousands of South Korean and U.S. lives.

2. Delink: THAAD radar has had no environmental effects (Daewoo - Security Strategy Studies Department).

Lee Baewoo (Director of the Security Strategy Studies Department). "Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)." April 14, 2017.

Furthermore, given that the U.S.—which plays a decisive role in deterring North Korea's provocations as the one side of ROK-U.S. alliance—intends to deploy THAAD in order to protect its army as well as South Korea, there is no reason for South Korea (the other actor in the alliance) to oppose such moves. **Meanwhile, the safety of the local residents living in the area of deployment has also been confirmed through various methods. The THAAD radar safety assessment has been carried out at the same level with TPY-2 radar and was concluded to be safe. That is, it was confirmed that the radar had no negative repercussions for the milieu, air, soil, animals, and vegetation.** To detect a long distance, the THAAD battery will be deployed at a high altitude, and radar will be operated more than 5 degrees above ground. It will keep a 100 meters clearance distance, and will be deployed at the inner part, at least 500m inside the base. Obviously, even though there are costs to bear, deploying THAAD (and PAC-3) will save around 340,000 civilians for intercepting one North Korean nuclear missile and 700,000 civilians for intercepting two nuclear missiles. As such, there are

3. Even if there is environmental harms, there will be regulations to prevent harms. (Park - Defense Ministry)

Byong-su, Park, and Kim Jeong-Su. "Defense Ministry Claims That THAAD Won't Be Harmful to People or Environment." *Hankyoreh*. N.p., 15 July 2016. Web. 02 July 2017. <http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/752539.html>

On July 14, the Ministry of National Defense released data to the press on measurements of electromagnetic radiation from the Green Pine radar installation in the Chungcheong region and the Patriot missile defense system in the greater Seoul area. **The data is intended to provide reassurance that if regulations are followed, radiation from THAAD is not dangerous.** The Green Pine radar is an early-warning system with output stronger than that of THAAD, while the output of radar used with Patriot missiles is weaker than THAAD's. **The results of the measurements showed that the average level of radiation emitted** by Green Pine at a distance of 100 meters (which is within the zone of restricted access) was 0.0630 watts per square meter, which **is well within the maximum level regarded as safe for the human body.** The output of the Patriot radar averaged at 0.0313 watts per square meter. Lee Beom-seok, chief of research at the Agency for Defense Development (ADD), who was present when the measurements were taken, says, "Both measurements, taken within the restricted-access zones, were very low, at only three to five percent of the level permitted for human exposure. The residential areas [of Seongju] are far from the installation and at a much lower altitude, so the strength of the electromagnetic radiation is expected to be markedly less." This means that there will be almost no harmful effects from THAAD radiation.

R/T Health Harms

1. Delink: Past tests have shown that THAAD radar has no negative health effects (Bora - International Business Times).

perhaps over a hamburger. He seemed confident that his deal-making skills could extend to nuclear disarmament, but at times talked about getting other powers — chiefly China and Iran — to deal with North Korea for him, because they would have more leverage.

Frontlines

R/T Blackmail

R/T GMD Ineffective

1. The GMD is effective right now

Thompson 17 Loren Thompson, 9-11-2017, "America's Homeland Missile Defense System Is Much More Effective Than Critics Claim," Forbes,
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2017/09/11/americas-homeland-missile-defense-system-is-much-more-effective-than-critics-claim/> //DF

However, the central premise of their argument -- that missile defense doesn't work -- is disproven by the facts. Despite the often-voiced claim that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system isn't reliable, in fact five out of six of the tests in which the currently deployed interceptors were flown against targets mimicking the behavior on ballistic missiles were successful. That's a success rate of 83%, and doesn't take into account improvements the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency is making to the interceptor's engines, its kill vehicle, the various sensors that guide it to incoming warheads, and various other items in the system. But let's assume none of these enhancements make the system any better (although they will), and it is stuck at about 80% effectiveness. That implies that if North Korea shot a warhead at each of the five biggest cities on the U.S. West Coast, only one would get through. And if it shot three warheads at, say, Los Angeles, none of them might get through. Sounds like a system worth having to me, especially considering that it receives less than 1 percent of the Pentagon's budget each year. However, that estimate actually understates the system's effectiveness, because like I said earlier, it is designed to intercept using a "shoot-look-shoot" tactic in which an initial failure is followed by a second attempt to hit the incoming warhead. If you take two shots and they each have an 80% chance of being effective, that means that only one out of every 25 warheads would get past the defenses to reach its target. That's an impressive level of performance, since North Korea doesn't even have 25 warheads capable of reaching the U.S., and probably won't for a long time
In its first test against an intercontinental-range target last May, GMD successfully distinguished the attacking warhead from other objects in the "threat cloud" and scored a direct hit (the radars and kill vehicle are made by Raytheon and the overall program is managed by Boeing, both of which contribute to my think tank).

2. The GMD is improving faster than North Korea's missile program

Pellerin 17 Cheryl Pellerin, 6-8-2017, "Officials: U.S. Missile Defense System Outpaces Threat," U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
<https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1208062/officials-us-missile-defense-system-outpaces-threat/> //DF

The defense system that protects the United States from ballistic missile attacks now outpaces the threat from adversaries out to 2020, and the Defense Department is advancing the capability to stay ahead of the threat into the future, defense officials said on Capitol Hill yesterday. Thomas H. Harvey III, acting assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans and capabilities, and Missile Defense Agency Director Navy Vice Adm. James D. Syring testified before the House Armed Services Committee's subcommittee on strategic forces, discussing fiscal year 2018 missile defense posture and priorities. The department continues efforts to sustain and modernize homeland missile defense capabilities so the

nation stays ahead of the threat while providing an effective, integrated and interoperable regional missile defense capability, Harvey said. "The U.S. homeland is currently protected by the ground-based midcourse defense system -- the GMD system. Improving the capacity, reliability and effectiveness of the GMD system is one of our highest priorities," he added. Funding for 2018 Harvey told the panel that the fiscal 2018 proposed budget -- which Syring said in his written testimony requests \$7.9 billion for the Missile Defense Agency -- would fund a redesigned exo-atmospheric kill vehicle and long-range discrimination radar. It would also help to lay the groundwork for a new radar in Hawaii, continue funding for advanced discrimination center technology and space-based kill assessment programs, and remain on track to complete deployment of remaining interceptors in Alaska by the end of this year to bring the total to 44, the assistant secretary said. "We're also moving forward with efforts to bolster our defenses against advanced cruise missiles," he added. Allies and Partners From a regional standpoint, Harvey said, the 2018 budget request continues the deployment of missile defenses tailored to threats in Europe, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region. "In Europe, we would continue to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach, EPAA, and work in close collaboration with our NATO allies to develop an advanced network of sensors and interceptors," he said. The EPAA addresses the threat from Iranian short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to U.S. troops and interests in Europe. The budget request supports the Aegis Ashore system scheduled for deployment in Poland in the 2018 time frame, Harvey said, noting that NATO allies have committed to spend more than \$1 billion on NATO ballistic missile defense command and control, and many U.S. allies are improving national BMD capabilities. "In the Asia-Pacific, our force posture includes Aegis BMD-capable ships along with Patriot batteries deployed in Japan and South Korea, and the recent deployment of [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] to South Korea. We've also converted the THAAD battery deployment to Guam to permanent status in response to North Korean threats," he added. The United States maintains a robust ballistic missile defense presence in the Middle East, including land- and sea-based assets deployed in defense of forward-located forces and those of allies and partners, Harvey said. Looking ahead, the assistant secretary said, means ensuring that the U.S. investment strategy and priorities "balance the needs of addressing the most dangerous threats we confront today while positioning ourselves to respond to emerging threats over the next decade." Outpacing the Threat In his testimony before the panel, Syring showed and narrated a video of the May 30 ground-based interceptor test over the Pacific Ocean, submitting his written statement for the record in lieu of an opening statement. The day after the May 30 interceptor test, Syring said during a phone briefing with reporters that the interceptor tested outpaced the threat to the United States through 2020. "The intelligence community gives us a body of evidence about where they think the threat is today and where it will evolve by 2020. We design tests specifically to incorporate the attributes of that threat today and what the intelligence community predicts it will be in say three years" he added. In his written testimony, Syring said the MDA 2018 budget request will continue the development of reliable, increasingly capable, and state-of-the-art defenses against ballistic missiles for the nation, deployed forces, allies and international partners. "Everything that this committee has supported over the last four years," he told the subcommittee, "has been targeted toward a near-term -- which is now part of the program of record and a fielded set of capabilities -- a mid-term and a far-term capability." Mid-term is defined by 2020, he added, "and everything that we are working on and fielding is to stay ahead of the threat by 2020."

R/T MDP Forces US Response

1. The whole point of the blackmail strategy is that the US would shirk its defense responsibility to avoid getting hit

Christopher R. Hill (University of Denver). "North Korea's Real Strategy." June 20, 2017.

<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/north-korea-nuclear-program-invasion-by-christopher-r-hill-2017-06>

As it stands, the US-South Korea relationship operates on the basis of something like the North Atlantic Treaty's collective-defense clause, Article 5: any North Korean aggression against South Korea will, it is assured, be met by the combined forces of South Korea and the US. Such a counterattack would be decisive, ensuring the total destruction of the North Korean regime. If North Korea had long-range nuclear weapons, however, it might be able to change the strategic calculus, by threatening to launch a nuclear attack on the US mainland in response to US intervention on the Korean Peninsula. The US might intervene anyway, launching its own devastating attack on North Korea. But it might also choose not to risk casualties on its own soil. If the US did shirk its collective-defense responsibilities, South Korea would still have plenty of recourse against its northern neighbor. After all, South Korea's conventional forces are far better trained, equipped, and motivated than their North Korean counterparts. But it is hard to say whether the North Koreans know that. Like many dictatorships before them, they may be the first to believe their own propaganda -- in this case, that they can succeed against a South Korean foe that is not buttressed by American military might.

2. Trump makes the especially likely, since he doesn't care at all about the alliance

Hooper 17 Mira Rapp-Hooper [Senior Fellow at the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School and an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security] 9-7-2017, "Decoupling is Back in Asia: A 1960s Playbook Won't Solve These Problems," War on the Rocks,

<https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/decoupling-is-back-in-asia-a-1960s-playbook-wont-solve-these-problems/> //DF

This summer, the Trump administration's approach to North Korea has been the stuff of Pyongyang's wildest decoupling dreams. The president has made apocalyptic statements suggesting the first use of force against North Korea without consulting with allies, and has repeatedly contradicted his own cabinet officials when they try to qualify his remarks. **In statements censuring North Korea** for its provocative behavior, Donald **Trump routinely fails to mention U.S. allies, leading them to worry they have been abandoned** on the front lines. This is not misplaced anxiety: A U.S. senator has insisted that **Trump sees regional security as entirely distinct from the safety of the American homeland.** Further, in an utterly perplexing move, **Trump threatened to end the South Korean-U.S. free trade deal in the midst of North Korea's technological triumphs**, holding at risk the economic ballast of the alliance at a harrowing moment. Trump previously threatened to force South Korea to pay for THAAD, and coupled his most recent trade warning with a tweet accusing South Korea of appeasement towards the North. What's more, **the administration has yet to appoint the ambassadors or senior Department of State or Department of Defense officials** who are responsible for working closely with allies on sensitive security matters. In response, Moon has actively distanced himself from Trump, making it clear that he will not be dragged into a reckless war that Washington starts, and public opinion of the United States is plummeting in South Korea. **The president has not only failed to mount an active reassurance campaign; he has himself carved the rift into which Pyongyang will drive its wedge.** This was likely a leading objective in North Korea's late August missile launch over Japan, and it will use future threats and tests to try to reveal the United States as a flimsy security patron. North Korea has long hoped to convince the South that the United States will not defend it, as this may allow it to coerce and intimidate Seoul in new and harrowing ways. With his alliance malpractice, Trump is playing directly into Pyongyang's hands.

R/T MAD Prevents Blackmail

3. **If you buy that the US will respond either way, you are banking on Donald Trump valuing South Korean lives in Seoul, over Millions of US lives inside of the American homeland.**

R/T US Will Never Respond

1. **It's scalar: the more missile defense the US has, the more willing we become to protect South Korea**

Karako 17 Thomas Karako [senior fellow with the International Security Program and the director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies], 2017, "Missile Defense and the Nuclear Posture Review," Strategic Studies Quarterly,

http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-3/Karako.pdf //DF

A second objective that missile defense complements in the US nuclear posture is the assurance of allies. The viability of US security commitments presupposes that the United States will remain willing and able to come to the defense of its allies and avoid becoming decoupled from them. In this respect, both defenses of the American homeland and regional defenses can support assurance. **In the absence of defenses, the United States might have to face the** proverbial **choice between trading New York for Berlin**, or Los Angeles for Taipei. Military action against regional threats from Libya and Iraq, for instance, might have carried a significantly greater degree of risk had they possessed intercontinental-range missiles. **Even some limited protection of the United States against long-range missile blackmail might therefore still be an American resolve.** Such a risk to the basic international order and US projection of power informs the long-standing US opposition to Iranian and North Korean ICBMs. **By reducing the costs of conflict with an ICBM-capable adversary, strong homeland missile defenses can improve the credibility of US security guarantees to allies.**²⁵

2. From North Korea's perspective, their threat has to be credible. If there's a chance that it isn't, they can't attack

Roberts 17 Brad Roberts [consulting professor, Stanford University; William Perry Fellow in International Security, the Center for International Security and Cooperation], 6-2014, "On the Strategic Value of Missile Defense," Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Ifri) //DF

If and as a regional adversary begins to contemplate possible nuclear attacks on the American homeland, perhaps only in revenge, **missile defense**: 1. **Significantly reduces** if not eliminates **the vulnerability of the U.S. homeland to one or a few shots, thus taking the adversary's "cheap shot" off the table and driving him to larger salvos that will seem less like blackmail than all-out nuclear war and thus should be deterrable** by other means. 2. Reduces the vulnerability of the U.S. homeland to repeat attacks, thus reinforcing its intention to remain in the fight. A catalogue of the strategic values of BMD must also include an assessment of its contributions in peacetime to the foundations of effective deterrence in crisis and war. In this context, it: 1. Provides opportunities for close defense cooperation among the United States and its allies and security partners. 2. Signals the resolve of the United States and its allies/partners to stand up to coercion and aggression (regional missile defense can be demonstrated in live testing with our partners to demonstrate that resolve). 26 3. Erodes the perceived potential effectiveness for both military and political purposes of nascent ballistic missile capabilities. 4. Imposes additional costs and uncertainty on those considering the acquisition of nuclear weapons to challenge U.S. regional guarantees. 5. Encourages engagement with Russia and China to slow or halt missile proliferation in both its quantitative and qualitative aspects. 6. Provides non-nuclear allies a means to contribute to the strengthening of extended deterrence, thereby reducing incentives to acquire nuclear deterrents of their own.

R/T Blackmail Troops

Threatening servicemen who signed up to fight is not at all the same thing as millions of civilians

Narang 17 Vipin Narang [Associate Professor of Political Science, MIT], 7-6-2017, "North Korea's ICBM: A New Missile and a New Era," War on the Rocks,

<https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/north-koreas-icbm-a-new-missile-and-a-new-era/> //DF

The big deal is that now the United States cannot threaten a conventional invasion of North Korea without risking direct nuclear attack on its homeland.

Not only does this curtail American defense and deterrence options, it has significant implications for its allies in East Asia. **North Korea's ability to hold the U.S. homeland at risk cuts a knife through the credibility of American extended deterrence commitments to Japan and South Korea.** With North Korea developing the ability to strike the United States, Seoul and Tokyo may soon wonder whether the United States would truly give up New York or Los Angeles for them — in other words, would the United States still respond in kind to a nuclear attack on an East Asian city if it meant provoking retaliation on U.S. soil? Indeed, the core strategic implication of North Korea's ICBM development is an old Cold War goodie known as "decoupling." That is, Bonn, Paris, and London feared that with Soviet ICBMs pointed at the U.S. homeland, American security guarantees in continental Europe were not credible. **It is one thing to expose American military forces forward deployed in theater; it is quite another to expose American population centers to nuclear retaliation.** It is part of what motivated de Gaulle's France to pursue an independent nuclear deterrent. As hard as it may be to deter Kim, reassuring our allies may now be even harder.

R/T The US Will Always Respond

1. In 2010 North Korea conducted two attacks that killed a total of 50 South Koreans, but, the US did not intervene. This shows that the US will only respond to a nuclear attack, not a conventional attack (BBC) PDF

2. The US has learned to live with nuclear states that incite conflict that they don't like (Kelly - National Interest).

Robert E. Kelly (National Interest). "The Surprisingly Simple Reason North Korea Has Nuclear Weapons." June 26, 2017.

<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/north-korean-nukes-are-almost-certainly-defense-21671>

Since the launch of a North Korean medium- to long-range intercontinental missile this month, there has been much anxiety about Pyongyang's ability to strike U.S. cities. It seems likely that North Korea can at least strike Alaska's largest city, Anchorage. Some analysts have suggested Pyongyang already has the capability to strike the east coast of the United States. Skepticism may be warranted. North Korea may have trouble with missile reentry, guidance, warhead miniaturization and other technical issues. But nonetheless, it appears quite likely that if Pyongyang does not yet have the ability to strike the lower forty-eight American states, it will soon. Last month, I suggested the United States is on countdown of sorts. North Korea is rushing toward a nuclear ICBM, and Americans will soon be forced to adapt to it, or fight. It seems that decision fork is coming sooner than many expected. **Striking North Korea would be incredibly risky, and the United States has learned to live with other states' nuclear missileization. Russia, China and Pakistan are powers whom Washington would almost certainly prefer were not nuclear.** Yet the United States has adjusted.

Each of those three, including Pakistan, has treated its weapons reasonably carefully. There has not been the much-feared accidental launch or hand-off to terrorist groups. All appear to think of their nuclear weapons as defensive and for deterrence purposes. Indeed, the offensive potential of nuclear weapons is curiously constrained. They would so devastate an enemy that conquest of said enemy would be pointless—who wants to take-over an irradiated wasteland? Plus, nuclear use would likely bring nuclear retaliation on the attacker, in which case any benefit of a war would be lost to the huge costs of nuclear destruction in the homeland.

3. If you buy that the US will respond either way, you are banking on Donald Trump valuing South Korean lives in Seoul, over Millions of US lives inside of the American homeland.

R/T The US Still Has Nuclear Deterrence

1. US nuclear deterrence relies on missile defense -> Karako (in case)

2. As NK increases their nuclear capacity, their threat exponentially increases and nuclear deterrence is lost (Park – Kookmin).

Hwee-Rhak Park (Kookmin University). South Korea's Defense Posture against the North Korean Nuclear Threat: Dangerous Reluctance.

Published 5/26/17. <http://www.icasinc.org/2015/2015I/2015Ihrp.pdf>.

Although extended deterrence of the U.S. missile defense systems would generally restrain North Korea from using nuclear weapons, nobody could exclude the possibility of North Korea using nuclear weapons. Ham and Lee state: "North Korea has recently announced its plan to use its nuclear weapons not only for the purpose of deterrence in peacetime, but also to achieve victory in possible future wars" (2013, 410). In fact, North Korea once ordered its strategic rocket and artillery forces to maintain "the first degree combat readiness," which was understood as nuclear attack readiness, on March 27, 2013. North Korea passed a law, which stipulated the authority and possible situations for the use of nuclear weapons on April 1, 2013. The law read that North Korea could use its nuclear weapons on a "belligerent nuclear power and a country that opposes North Korea by cooperating with the belligerent nuclear power ... by the order of its Supreme Commander" (Kwon Tae 2014, 192). **No one can be sure of the actual nuclear capabilities and intentions of North Korea due to the lack of reliable intelligence. However, for its own safety, South Korea should be prepared for the worst case scenario.** As Ham and Lee put it, **"As North Korea's nuclear arsenal becomes larger and more advanced, North Korea will become better able to dissuade nuclear retaliation or attacks from other states. This, in turn, will increase the possibility of North Korea's usage of its nuclear weapons and the number of nuclear weapons to be used"** (2013, 410). South Korea should not avoid the serious reality mentioned above.

While NK doesn't have all the tech, they're getting close. Getting the nuke would for a major shift in US calculus (Sang-Hun - NY Times).

Sang-Hun 17 Choe Sang-Hun and Rick Gladstone, 7-5-2017, "U.S. Vows Tougher Action on North Korea After Missile Test," New York Times,

<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/world/asia/north-korea-war-us-icbm.html> //DF

North Korea carried the missile to its test site on a 16-wheel truck, believed to have been imported from China and reconfigured for military purposes. But **the missile was launched from a platform, indicating that the country had not developed the ability to launch it directly from the vehicle**, South Korean officials said. **A missile fired from a vehicle is harder to counter because it requires less time to prepare to launch**, they said. The North also said its missile was capable of carrying a "large-sized heavy nuclear warhead." Some analysts say that North Korea is probably still years away from developing a nuclear warhead small and light enough to fit into a long-range rocket that could reach the continental United States. **If North Korea successfully develops an ICBM, it would drastically change strategic calculations by the United States** and its allies, analysts said. **Such a missile would give decision makers in Washington reason to pause before deciding to strike** the country.

3. Currently, US rhetoric is not that nuclear deterrence will solve, rather US rhetoric shows an increased likelihood of military action against NK. Insofar as this is true nuclear deterrence does not apply.