**GENEALOGY OF DEPENDANCY/PARTICIPATORY PARITY**

## Framework

#### Participatory parity breaks from the violent identity ethic and concerns itself with stasis of agents.

**Fraser 1**

Nancy Fraser 3, 2001, “Recognition without ethics?”, Nancy Fraser is an American critical theorist, feminist, and the Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and Social Science and professor of philosophy at The New School in New York City, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/cc50/e6131c4cf5b0e8492bcf4ba127006e3fb22c.pdf>

The key to my strategy is to break with **the** standard **‘identity’ model of recognition**. On this model, what **requires** recognition is **group-speciﬁc cultural identity**. Misrecognition consists in the depreciation of such identity by the dominant culture and the consequent damage to group members’ sense of self**. Redressing this harm** means demanding ‘recognition’. This in turn **requires that group members join together to refashion their collective identity by producing a self-afﬁrming culture of their own**. Thus, on the identity model of recognition, the politics of recognition means ‘identity politics’.1 **This** identity **model is deeply problematic**. Construing misrecognition as damaged identity, it emphasizes psychic structure over social institutions and social interaction. Thus, **it risks substituting intrusive forms of consciousness engineering for social change. The model** compounds these risks by positing group identity as the object of recognition. Enjoining the elaboration and display of an authentic, self-afﬁrming and self-generated collective identity, it **puts moral pressure on individual members to conform to group culture. The result is** often **to impose a single,** drastically **simpliﬁed group identity,** which **denies the complexity of people’s lives**, the multiplicity of their identiﬁcations and the cross-pulls of their various afﬁliations. In addition, the model reiﬁes culture. Ignoring transcultural ﬂows, **it treats cultures as** sharply bounded, **neatly separated** and non-interacting, as if it were obvious where one stops and another starts. As a result, **it** tends to **promote separatism** and group enclaving in lieu of transgroup interaction. Denying internal heterogeneity, moreover, **the identity model obscures** the **struggles** within social groups **for** the **authority,** and indeed for the power, to represent them. Consequently**, it masks the power of dominant fractions and reinforces intragroup domination.** In general, then, the identity model lends itself all too easily to repressive forms of communitarianism.2 For these reasons, I shall propose **an alternative** analysis of recognition. My **proposal is to treat recognition as a question of social status.** From this perspective – I shall call it **the status model**– what **requires recognition [of]** is not group-speciﬁc identity but rather **the status of group members as full partners in social interaction**. Misrecognition, accordingly, does not mean the depreciation and deformation of group identity. Rather, it means social subordination in the sense of being prevented from participating as a peer in social life. To redress the injustice requires a politics of recognition, to be sure, but this no longer means identity politics. In the status model, rather, it means a politics aimed at overcoming subordination by establishing the misrecognized party as a full member of society, capable of participating on a par with other members.3 Let me elaborate. To view recognition as a matter of status is to examine institutionalized patterns of cultural value for their effects on the relative standing of social actors. If and when such patterns constitute actors as peers, capable of participating on a par with one another in social life, then we can speak of reciprocal recognition and status equality. When, in contrast, institutionalized patterns of cultural value constitute some actors as inferior, excluded, wholly other or simply invisible, hence as less than full partners in social interaction, then we should speak of misrecognition and status subordination. On the status model, then, misrecognition arises when institutions structure interaction according to cultural norms that impede parity of participation. Examples include marriage laws that exclude same-sex partnerships as illegitimate and perverse, social-welfare policies that stigmatize single mothers as sexually irresponsible scroungers, and policing practices such as ‘racial proﬁling’ that associate racialized persons with criminality. In each of these cases, interaction is regulated by an institutionalized pattern of cultural value that constitutes some categories of social actors as normative and others as deﬁcient or inferior: straight is normal, gay is perverse; ‘male-headed households’ are proper, ‘female-headed households’ are not; ‘whites’ are law-abiding, ‘blacks’ are dangerous. In each case, **the result is to deny** some **members** **of society** the status of full partners in **interaction**, **capable** **of participating on a par with the rest**. In each case, accordingly, a claim for recognition is in order. But note precisely what this means: aimed not at valorizing group identity, but rather at overcoming subordination, claims for recognition in the status model seek to establish the subordinated party as a full partner in social life, able to interact with others as a peer. They aim, that is, **to de-institutionalize patterns of cultural value that impede parity of participation and to replace them with patterns that foster it. This status model** avoids many difﬁculties of the identity model. First, by rejecting the view of recognition as valorization of group identity, it **avoids essentializing such identities**. Second, by focusing on the effects of institutionalized norms on capacities for interaction, it resists the temptation to substitute the re-engineering of consciousness for social change. Third, by enjoining status equality in the sense of parity of participation, **it valorizes cross-group interaction, as opposed to separatism** and group enclaving. Fourth, the status model avoids reifying culture – without denying culture’s political importance. Aware that institutionalized patterns of cultural value can be vehicles of subordination, it seeks to de-institutionalize patterns that impede parity of participation and to replace them with patterns that foster it. Finally, the status model possesses another major advantage. Unlike the identity model, it construes recognition in a way that does not assign that category to ethics. Conceiving recognition as a matter of status equality, deﬁned in turn as **participatory parity**, it **provides** a **deontological account of recognition**. Thus, it frees recognition claims’ normative force from direct dependence on a speciﬁc substantive horizon of value. Unlike the identity model, then, the status model is compatible with the priority of the right over the good. Refusing the traditional alignment of recognition with ethics, it aligns it with morality instead. Thus, the status model permits one to combine recognition with redistribution – without succumbing to philosophical schizophrenia. Or so I shall argue next.

#### Justice as participatory parity accommodates multi-dimensional claims of justice and can evaluate these ontologically distinct claims on the basis of a shared evaluative standard.

**Fraser 7**

Nancy Fraser (Nancy Fraser is Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and Social Science at the Graduate Faculty of New School University.  “Feminist Politics in the Age of Recognition: A Two-Dimensional Approach to Gender Justice” Studies in Social Justice, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 2007 — KW)

“**To develop** such **an approach requires** a conception of **justice as broad and capacious** as the preceding view of gender. **Such a conception must** also **accommodate** at least **two sets of concerns**. On the one hand, it must encompass the traditional concerns of theories of **distributive justice**, especially **poverty**, exploitation, **inequality, and class** differentials. **At the same time**, it must also encompass concerns recently highlighted in philosophies of **recognition,** especially disrespect, cultural **imperialism, and status hierarchy. Reject**ing sectarian **formulations that cast distribution and recognition as** mutually **incompatible** understandings of justice, such a conception must accommodate both. As we shall see, this means theorizing maldistribution and misrecognition by reference to a common normative standard, without reducing either one to the other. The result, once again, will be a two-dimensional conception of justice. Only such a conception can comprehend the full magnitude of sexist injustice. **The conception of justice** I propose **centres on the principle of parity of participation**. According to this principle, **justice requires social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact** with one another **as peers.** For participatory parity to be possible, at least **two conditions must be satisfied. First**, the **distribution of material resources must be such** as **to ensure participants’** independence and “**voice**.” **This “objective” condition precludes** forms and levels of **economic** dependence and **inequality that impede parity of participation**. Precluded, therefore, are social arrangements that institutionalize deprivation, exploitation, and gross disparities in wealth, income, and leisure time, **thereby denying some people the means** and opportunities **to interact with others as peers**. In contrast, **the second** condition for participatory parity is “intersubjective.” It **requires that institutionalized patterns of cultural value** express equal respect for all participants and **ensure** **equal** opportunity for achieving **social esteem.** This condition precludes institutionalized value patterns that systematically depreciate some categories of people and the qualities associated with them. **Precluded**, therefore, **are** institutionalized **value patterns that deny** some people **the status of full partners in interaction**—whether by burdening them with excessive ascribed “difference” or by failing to acknowledge their distinctiveness. **Both conditions are necessary for participatory parity**. Neither, alone, is sufficient. The first brings into focus concerns traditionally associated with the theory of distributive justice, especially concerns pertaining to the economic structure of society and to economically defined class differentials. The second brings into focus concerns recently highlighted in the philosophy of recognition, especially concerns pertaining to the status order of society and to culturally defined hierarchies of status. Yet **neither** condition **is merely an** **epiphenomenal effect of the other. Rather, each has** some relative **independence**. Thus, **neither can be achieved** wholly indirectly **via reforms addressed** exclusively **to the other**. The result is a two-dimensional conception of justice that encompasses both redistribution and recognition, without reducing either one to the other.4”

## Advantage 1: Defying Dependency

### Impact

#### Connections between certain forms of labor, wages and social status have produced notions of dependency that designate some bodies as deviant or incompetent, which is incompatible with a social status that enables people to socially interact as peers.

**Fraser & Gordon 97**

(Nancy Fraser. Chapter 5 is co-authored with Linda Gordon. “Chapter 5: A Genealogy of ‘Dependency': Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State.” Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the ‘Postsocialist’ Condition. Routledge Publishing. 1997. — KW)

**“'Dependency'**, once a general-purpose term for all social relations of subordination, is now differentiated into several analytically distinct registers. In the economic register, its **meaning has shifted from gaining one's livelihood by working for someone else to relying for support on charity or welfare; wage labor now confers independence**. In the sociolegal register, **the meaning of dependency** as subsumption is unchanged, but its scope of reference and connotations have altered: once a socially approved majority condition, it first became a group-based status deemed proper for some classes of persons but not others and then **shifted** again **to designate** (except in the case of children) an anomalous, **highly stigmatized status of deviant and incompetent individuals**. Likewise. **in the political** register, **dependency's mean[s]**]ing as **subjection to an external governing** **power** has remained relatively constant, but its evaluative connotations worsened as individual political rights and national sovereignty became normative. Meanwhile, with the emergence of a newer moral/psychological register, properties once ascribed to social relations came to be posited instead as inherent character traits of individuals or groups, and the connotations here, too, have worsened. This last register now claims an increasingly large proportion of the discourse, as if the social relations of dependency were being absorbed into personality. Symptomatically, erstwhile relational understandings have been hypostatized in a veritable portrait gallery of dependent personalities: first, housewives, paupers, natives, and slaves; then poor black teenage solo mothers. These shifts in the semantics of dependency reflect some major sociohistorical developments. One is the progressive differentiation of the official economy-that which is counted in the gross domestic product-as a seemingly autonomous system that dominates social life. **Before** the rise of **capitalism, all forms of work were woven into a net of dependencies**, which constituted **a single, continuous fabric of social hierarchies**. The whole set of relations was constrained by moral understandings, as in the preindustrial idea of a moral economy. In the patriarchal families and communities that characterized the preindustrial period, [womyn] were subordinated and their labor often controlled by others, but their labor was visible, understood, and valued. **With the emergence of** religious and secular **individualism**, on the one hand, **and** of **industrial capitalism**, on the other, **a sharp**, new **dichotomy was constructed in which** economic **dependence and** **economic independence were unalterably opposed to each other. A** crucial **corollary of this** dependence/independence **dichotomy**, and of the hegemony of wage labor in general, **was the occlusion and devaluation of [women]'s unwaged domestic** and parenting **labor.** The genealogy of dependency also expresses the modern emphasis on individual personality. This is the deepest meaning of the spectacular rise of the moral/psychological register, which constructs yet another version of the independence/dependence dichotomy. In the moral/psychological version, social relations are hypostatized as properties of individuals or groups. **Fear of dependency**, both explicit and implicit, **posits an ideal,** **independent personality in contrast to** which **those considered dependent are deviant**. This contrast bears traces of a sexual division of labor that assigns men primary responsibility as providers or breadwinners and [womyn] primary responsibility as caretakers and nurturers and then treats the derivative personality patterns as fundamental. It is as if male breadwinners absorbed into their personalities the independence associated with their ideologically interpreted economic role, whereas the persons of female nurturers became saturated with the dependency of those for whom they care. In this way, **the opposition between the independent** personality **and** the **dependent personality maps onto a** whole **series of hierarchical oppositions** and dichotomies that are central in modern capitalist culture: **masculine/feminine, public/private, work/care,** success/love, individual/community, economy/family, and competitive/ self-sacrificing. A genealogy cannot tell us how to respond politically to today's discourse about welfare dependency. It does suggest, however, the limits of any response that presupposes rather than challenges the definition of the problem that is implicit in that expression. **An adequate response would need** to question our received valuations and definitions of dependence and independence in order **to allow new, emancipatory social visions to emerge**. Some contemporary welfare-rights activists adopt this strategy, continuing the NWRO tradition. Pat Gowens, for example, elaborates a feminist reinterpretation of dependency: [‘]The vast majority of mothers of all classes and all educational levels "depends" on another income. It may come from child support ... or from a husband who earns $20,000 while she averages $7,000. But "dependence" more accurately defines dads who count on [womyn]’s unwaged labor to raise children and care for the home. Surely, “dependence" doesn't define the single mom who does it all: child-rearing, homemaking, and bringing in the money (one way or another). **When caregiving is valued and paid, when** dependence is not a dirty word, and **interdependence is the norm**-only then **will we make a dent in poverty**.[‘]

### Solvency

**Providing a UBI promotes participatory parity:**

#### **First, a UBI continuously provides income to people independent of whether and how they labor. This consistent provision of money is an ongoing redistribution to people who are structurally excluded by the labor market from accessing basic goods. Thus, the impact is that a UBI promotes participatory parity by redistributing money to the very people who suffer maldistribution.**

#### Second, the UBI promotes the material conditions necessary for participation without stigmatizing the poor who are in need of that support. This is key to redressing the misrecognition caused by existing welfare programs

**Leppänen 12**

(Joonas Leppänen MA. “Basic Income as Participatory Parity”, University of Helsinki, Dep. Politics and Economics. Conference Paper 14.9-16.9.2012 Munich, Pathways to a Basic Income – BIEN2012, 2012. <http://www.basicincome.org/bien/pdf/munich2012/Leppanen.pdf>

With regards to **an unconditional basic income** it is possible to **utilize** the concept of **recognition** to highlight different problems with our current welfare systems. **A means-tested system** social security system **can easily stigmatize the recipients of the benefits. If income supports marks** the **disadvantaged as poor** then it is possible to view and criticize our institutions related to social services in the framework of recognition. Marking the disadvantaged as poor would in Fraserian terms is to **[it] add[s] the insult of disrespect to the insult of deprivation** (Fraser, 2003, p. 77). An unconditional basic income **[UBI] could reduce inequality without stigmatizing** the poor **and** thus **allow them to be recognized as peers in society**. An income transfer can be framed as a claim based on redistribution. However a justice-based claim of redistribution would be adjudicated with a traditional need based income support. Thus I claim that on this part claims for **a [UBI]** unconditional basic income should be done in terms of recognition. Also with regards to in this sense justice is done on the basis of equality of respect to ensure that no one is degraded by our institutions. An [UBI] unconditional basic income could also prevent exploitation of the worst of as the dependence of work, ones spouse etc. would lessen. To introduduce new means tested policies would not help this problem as they would only shift the dependency from for example one’s spouse to the whim of the case worker. Fraser has also argued that a basic income model could change the gendered division of labor that give [womyn] the responsibility for a major part of the unpaid domestic work and marks some professions as feminine and thus of lesser value. A universal basic income would universalize the role of the caregiver and thus promote gender equality. (Fraser, 1997b) (Fraser, 1998) A basic income scheme could also change the view on the recipients of welfare benefits and also persons at large in society. An unconditional basic income scheme **presupposes an active view of a person in contrast of a passive agent** that has to be **guided by incentives and penalties**. In this sense **an unconditional basic income could function as adjudicating claims for recognition on a** more **universal level as our** basic **presuppositions of the political agent would be of one that wants to** promote one’s own well-being and **participate.**

#### Third, a UBI redresses the maldistribution and misrecognition inflicted on care-givers, who have traditionally been women. Thus, UBI is key to redistribution and recognition as it concerns gender-based injustices.

**Leppänen**,

Joonas Leppänen MA. “Basic Income as Participatory Parity”, University of Helsinki, Dep. Politics and Economics. Conference Paper 14.9-16.9.2012 Munich, Pathways to a Basic Income – BIEN2012, 2012. <http://www.basicincome.org/bien/pdf/munich2012/Leppanen.pdf>

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**…**

When framed in this way **the question about basic income** becomes one of justice and through Fraser’s framework also about democracy. In Fraser’s words it becomes a question of who the author and the subject of the requirements of justice. When framed this way it **enables** us also to open up the **discussion of giving the silenced and** the **marginalized** the **possibility of participating on par in society**. I other words, it gives the marginalized the voice they deserve. Thus an unconditional basic income should be seen as a program/policy that fosters participatory parity and on this ground also justice. Thus we should focus on utilizing the conceptional framework of justice and democracy to ground our claims for justice.

#### Fourth, UBI enables people to detach the capacity to survive from paid labor. This facilitates greater levels of social interaction.

**Wright 06**

Erik Wright, xx-xx-2006, "Two redistributive proposals—universal basic income and stakeholder grants”, University of Wisconsin, https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/two-proposals.pdf

What would society gain from the institution of an unconditional basic income? A generous, [UBI] unconditional basic income which would allow employees a meaningful exit from a particular employment situation, or indeed from paid employment itself, directly transforms the dynamics of the employer-employee relationship in a private market economy. First, **in** a **capitalism** **with** **basic income** **people are free to** **engage** **in non-market-oriented**, **socially productive activity**. There is a wide range of **activities** **which** many **people want to do** **but** which **are** **badly** **organized** **by** either **capitalist** **markets** or public institutions. **Prominent** **among these is care-giving** labor—of children, of the elderly, and in many situations, of the ill. **Engagement in the arts,** in **politics**, **and** in **various** **kinds of community service** would also be **facilitated by UBI.** Frequently **people** **with serious interests** **in** **these** kinds of **activities** **would** be willing to **do** **them** **at** relatively **modest earnings** **if** **they were provided** **through markets**—witness the very low standards of living accepted (if reluctantly) by actors, musicians, political activists, and community organizers. **The proble**m for many people **is** not so much the low earnings, but **the inability to find employment** in these kinds of activities. **UBI makes it possible** for people to choose to do this kind of activity **without having to enter into an employment relation**. In this way it contributes to a shift in the balance of power within class relations. Second, for those people who still enter into ordinary private market employment relations, UBI would contribute to a greater symmetry of power between labor and capital even if workers did not engage in collective organization. This would be particularly salient for workers in low-skilled, lowwage jobs. Often workers in such jobs suffer both from low wages and from miserable working conditions. The realistic exit options of low-wage workers under a UBI system would increase their bargaining power with employers. Of course, this might mean that many such low-skill jobs would disappear, but since many low-skilled people will still want discretionary income above the no-frills UBI level, there will still be potential workers willing to take such jobs. The difference is that the balance of power within which the attributes of such jobs are determined would be shifted toward workers. Third, an unconditional basic income could also contribute in various ways to increasing the collective strength of workers, not just their individual leverage within employment. Where workers individually have easier exit options, employers may have greater incentives to agree to new forms of collective cooperation with organizations of workers. Such collective cooperation is an element in what is sometimes called “high road” capitalism, a model of capitalism in which labor and capital engage in much closer collaboration over the design and regulation of work, production, and innovation than is characteristic of conventional capitalist organization in which employers have more or less unilateral control over basic production decisions. If it is economically sustainable UBI seems likely to underwrite a set of social and institutional changes which more profoundly reshape the power relations of capitalism than will a program of stakeholder grants. The argument for basic income, in these terms, is more like a public goods argument than a simple individual social justice argument, since changes in power relations affect the overall dynamics and conditions everyone experiences in a society, not simply those immediately party to the power relation. Let me explain. 7 The ideal of “equality of opportunity,” as it is conceived in much liberal egalitarian discussion of justice, involves trying to distinguish between those conditions of life for which people can reasonably be held responsible and those for which they cannot. Social **justice** **requires** **trying to minimize** those **inequalities** **outside of individual control**, and redistribution is one way of accomplishing this. Both **UBI** and stakeholder grants **can be defended** **as** **significant** steps **in the direction** **of remedying unjust failures** **of such equality of opportunity**. On these grounds, in fact, some people might prefer a generous stakeholder grant system to UBI, insofar as it might be thought as better embodying the responsibility ideal of equal opportunity. In some ways UBI looks like a paternalistic program in which, to avoid the risk of individuals squandering redistributed resources, the state doles out a stipend to people rather than giving them a single, large lumpsum payment. In a UBI program people can still squander their basic income, but they can only do so one month at a time. If avoiding paternalism is a high priority within a conception of equality of opportunity, and if equality of opportunity is the central justification for redistribution, then stakeholder grants might be preferred over UBI.

# Frontlines

## FL: Framework

### AT: UTIL General

#### Large-scale threats of future suffering collapses consequentialist ethics and creates a form of temporal blackmail- the only ethical response is to refuse the internal ingenuity

**Olson 15**

Elizabeth Olson, 8-5-2015, "Geography and ethics I: Waiting and urgency," SAGE Journals, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0309132515595758?journalCode=phgb>

Though toileting might be thought of as a special case of bodily urgency, geographic research suggests that **the body is** increasingly set at odds with larger scale ethical concerns, especially **large-scale future events of** forecasted **suffering**. Emergency planning is a particularly good example in which the large-scale threats of future suffering can distort moral reasoning. Žižek (2006) lightly develops this point in the context of the war on terror, where in the presence of fictitious and real ticking clocks and warning systems, **the urgent** **body** **must be bypassed** **because** **there are bigger scales to worry about**:¶ What does this all-pervasive sense of urgency mean ethically? **The pressure of events** **is so overbearing**, the stakes are so high, **that they** **necessitate** a **suspension of** ordinary **ethical concern**s. After all, displaying moral qualms when the lives of millions are at stake plays into the hands of the enemy. (Žižek, 2006)¶ **In** the **presence of large-scale** **future** **emergency**, **the urgency to secure** the state, the citizenry, the economy, or the climate **creates new scales and** new **temporal orders of response** (see Anderson, 2010; Baldwin, 2012; Dalby, 2013; Morrissey, 2012), many of **which treat the urgent body as impulsive** **and** **thus requiring management**. McDonald’s (2013) analysis of three interconnected discourses of ‘climate security’ illustrates how bodily urgency in climate change is also recast as a menacing impulse that might require exclusion from moral reckoning. The **logics of** climate **security**, especially those related to national **security**, ‘can **encourage** **perverse political responses** **that** not only **fail to respond effectively** to climate change but may present victims of it as a threat’ (McDonald, 2013: 49). **Bodies** that are **currently suffering** cannot be urgent, because they **are excluded** **from** the **potential collectivity** **that could be suffering everywhere in some future time**. Similar bypassing of existing bodily urgency is echoed in writing about violent securitization, such as drone warfare (Shaw and Akhter, 2012), and also in intimate scales like the street and the school, especially in relation to race (Mitchell, 2009; Young et al., 2014).¶ **As large-scale urgent concerns are institutionalized**, **the** urgent **body** **is** increasingly **obscured through** technical **planning and coordination** (Anderson and Adey, 2012). The predominant characteristic of this institutionalization of large-scale emergency is a ‘built-in bias for action’ (Wuthnow, 2010: 212) that circumvents contingencies. The urgent body is at best an assumed eventuality, one that will likely require another state of waiting, such as triage (e.g. Greatbach et al., 2005). Amin (2013) cautions that in much of the West, governmental need to provide evidence of laissez-faire governing on the one hand, and assurance of strength in facing a threatening future on the other, produces ‘just-in-case preparedness’ (Amin, 2013: 151) of neoliberal risk management policies. In the US, ‘personal **ingenuity’ is built into emergency response at the expense of the poor and vulnerable** for whom ‘[t]he difference between abjection and bearable survival’ (Amin, 2013: 153) will not be determined by emergency planning, but in the material infrastructure of the city.¶ In short, the urgencies of the body provide justifications for social exclusion of the most marginalized based on impulse and perceived threat, while large-scale future emergencies effectively absorb the deliberative power of urgency into the institutions of preparedness and risk avoidance. Žižek references Arendt’s (2006) analysis of the banality of evil to explain the current state of ethical reasoning under the war on terror, noting that people who perform morally reprehensible actions under the conditions of urgency assume a ‘tragic-ethic grandeur’ (Žižek, 2006) by sacrificing their own morality for the good of the state. But his analysis fails to note that bodies are today so rarely legitimate sites for claiming urgency. In the context of the assumed priority of the large-scale future emergency, the urgent body becomes literally nonsense, a non sequitur within societies, states and worlds that will always be more urgent

#### Debates about our ethical orientations precede consequentialism – anything else means we can justify infinitely unethical policies

Burke et al. 14 - Associate Prof and Reader in International and Political Studies at UNSW Australia
Anthony, Katrina Lee-Koo, and Matt McDonald, *Ethics and Global Security*, Routledge, p. 5-6

We believe that "ethics" and "morality" are not things that can be brought to insecurity or war from outside, to a space that would otherwise be unethical or amoral. Rather, we believe that even before we face a specific moral decision, ethics constitutes the choices available to us—that particular ethical commitments, options, limits and imperatives are implicit in the system itself, and in particular theoretical and policy world views. Every vision, every practice, and every system of security has an ethics even if we cannot agree that all are equally ethical. As Richard Shapcott argues, any work of political ethics must draw attention to the possible consequences or implications of different starting points...it is only once we have assessed or understood these [ consequences] that we can reflect adequately upon our ethics and whether we think the costs of our positions are worth it, or not, or whether they are justifiable or need modification. (Shapcott 2010: vii-viiii) In sum, even as we accept that to be able to term a perspective or behaviour " amoral", "immoral", or "unethical" is a powerful and sometimes legitimate use of language, it is analytically more helpful to be able to lay out the assumptions and commitments of a range of ethical frameworks that bear on the problems and realities of global security, so that their effects can be considered and judged. Even as we assume a responsibility to advance a distinctive global security ethics that is better--that will lead to a more just and stable world—we do so in a global political context where moral pluralism is a fact. Debate among competing ethical perspectives is necessary and important.

### AT: Material Violence

**Reducing stigma through a UBI is specifically necessary as any welfare program that marks specific bodies as “dependent” on social services and others that are “independent” exacerbate the root of material maldistribution. That’s Fraser 7. The negative generative nature of dependency thus outweighs all negative offense in the long-term while also providing a more holistic explanation for material suffering**

## FL: Link

## FL: Solvency General

### AT: Dependency Exists Elsewhere

**Participatory Parity suggests that welfare normatively stigmatizes reliance and identifies its subjects as inherently problematic.**